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How did Hong Kong become part of the British Empire?

In 1997, Hong Kong stopped being a British colony after more than 150 years of British rule. Authority over Hong Kong was transferred to China. Many see this moment as the end of the last significant colony in the British Empire.

Hong Kong became a British colony through two wars: the First and Second Opium Wars. The First Opium War broke out in 1839. It is called the 'Opium War' because of one of its major causes: the British were smuggling opium from their Indian colonies into Chinese ports against the wishes of the Chinese government. This was to help pay for the large amounts of Chinese tea that they were importing - by the early 1800s, tea was a popular drink with the British public. Britain also wanted more control over their trade with China, as they could only trade with certain officials called Hong merchants.

The Opium Wars resulted in two treaties, each expanding the size of Britain's Hong Kong territory. These treaties were followed by a 99-year lease in 1898 that allowed Britain to control even more land - a lease that ran out in 1997.

Use this lesson to find out the causes behind the First Opium War and how Hong Kong became part of the British Empire. How important were economic factors in the growth of the British Empire? How can we explain the unique position of Hong Kong in the world today?

Tasks
2. The importance of tea 4. Extract from Nanking treaty
Background

In the 18th and early 19th centuries, Britain was experiencing a problem with its trade with China: it bought more than it sold. Chinese goods such as silk, porcelain, and especially tea were very popular. However, Chinese merchants did not want to buy British goods in return. As a result, Britain had to pay silver for the goods that it was importing, eventually risking a silver shortage.

Britain's solution to this trade imbalance was opium. Opium is an addictive and dangerous drug made out of plants. Britain started growing opium in its Indian colonies and exporting it to China, where it spread through the population. China now started experiencing its own problems: it was losing silver, and there was a rapidly growing rate of opium addiction amongst its people. In response, opium was completely banned in China in 1796. However, British merchants kept illegally smuggling opium into the country.

At the same time, the British were unhappy with the restrictions on who they could trade with in China. All foreign trade in China had to go through the Hong merchants. This was a group of officials who made sure that foreign traders followed rules and regulations. British merchants could only trade with the Hong merchants at the southern port of Canton (now Guangzhou), which was close to Hong Kong.

By the early 19th century, the drug problem in China was worsening. It was spreading across the country and the British were smuggling in over 1,000 tonnes of opium per year. Suggestions to ease the prohibitions were rejected and by 1838, opium smugglers risked the death penalty.

In 1839, Chinese official Lin Zexu was tasked with stopping the opium smuggling. He famously seized large amounts of opium from foreign ships and threw it into the sea. He then introduced a system where traders would only be allowed to enter China if they signed a bond stating that they had no illegal goods. The British Superintendent of Trade in China, Charles Elliot, ordered British merchants not to sign.

Other events around this time further heightened tensions - including the murder of Lin Weixi, a villager from Tsim Sha Tsui, by British merchant sailors. Elliot ordered the arrest of the sailors and refused a request from Lin Zexu to turn them over to Chinese authorities. In retaliation, Lin put up a blockade against Macau, where the British had been staying, causing them to be expelled and move to Hong Kong. Lin also prevented food from being sold to the British.

The First Opium War eventually broke out on 4 September 1839 when Elliot issued an ultimatum stating that, if the British would not be allowed to trade for food with locals in Kowloon, British ships would open fire.

Britain won the war in 1842, leading to the Treaty of Nanking. This treaty gave Hong Kong Island to Britain, allowed for free British trade with any merchants in China, and forced China to pay damages for the destroyed opium.

However, Britain was not completely satisfied with the treaty and demanded that it be renegotiated. Among other things, they wanted the opium trade to be legalised and the whole of China to be open to foreign trade. This led to the Second Opium War breaking out in 1856. China was defeated once again, ending in the Treaty of Tientsin, which gave Britain the area north of Hong Kong Island called Kowloon.

The final expansion of British Hong Kong came in 1898. This was the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, a lease signed between Britain and China. This lease granted Britain the territory above Kowloon that is today known as the New Territories - but only for 99 years. Britain likely did not think they would ever need to return it.

However, 99 years later, China did indeed demand this land back. By this point, most of Hong Kong's population lived in the New Territories, and it was not possible to separate it. On 1 July 1997, Britain officially transferred authority over Hong Kong to China, ending over 150 years of British rule. This is known in the English-speaking world as the 'handover'.

Today, Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China. One of the conditions of the 1997 transfer was to maintain the existing colonial systems of government and economy for 50 years. This is known as 'one country, two systems'.

Teachers' notes

This lesson looks at why the Opium Wars happened and how Hong Kong became a British colony. It shows the importance of ports and trade routes for the British Empire around this time, and how economic factors were linked to its growth.

Please note that this lesson includes two sources that deal directly with the opium drug trade.

To begin with, students examine three maps of British Hong Kong. The first map shows what Hong Kong looked like after the First Opium War, when it was just Hong Kong Island. The second map shows what Hong Kong looked like after the Second Opium War, when Kowloon was added. Finally, the third map shows what Hong Kong looked like after the 1898 lease, which added the New Territories - this map is identical to what Hong Kong looks like today.

Sources 2a and 2b show students the importance of tea in Britain during the 1800s. Source 2a is an advertisement for tea in the late 1800s, showing how tea was associated with an exotic and stereotypical vision of 'East Asia' around this time. It also shows that tea was marketed towards everyday people, reflecting that it was now part of daily British life and culture. Source 2b shows a table that records the amounts and values of different Chinese goods imported into Britain by the East India Company from 1811-1828. By following the numbers, students can clearly see how valuable tea was and the large amounts that were being imported.

Sources 3a and 3b are translated from Chinese and show China's perspective on Britain's opium smuggling. Source 3a describes the negative effects of opium, and that British colonies were the source of the drug. It also outlines the economic impacts of opium smuggling, draining silver from the Chinese economy and flipping the trade imbalance previously experienced by the British. Source 3b shows how Britain's refusal to obey trade restrictions and the opium ban was leading to heightened tensions. The First Opium War broke out just two years later.

The final source shows extracts from the Treaty of Nanking, after Britain won the First Opium War. It shows two of the most important things that Britain gained - not just the territory of Hong Kong, but a lifting of trade restrictions for British merchants.

Further questions/activities:

Look closer at the treaty that resulted from the First Opium War. Treaty of Nanking (Catalogue ref: FO 93/23/1b)

What does it tell you about what Britain wanted through its treaties with China?

This treaty is often referred to as one of the first of the 'unequal treaties' in China. Why do you think that is?

Explore Hong Kong under British colonial rule. What was life like for Hongkongers under British rule? How did Hong Kong become known as a global financial centre in the latter half of the 20th century? Potential topics to cover can include:

Segregation in colonial Hong Kong

The 1894 Hong Kong plague

Protests in the 1960s against the colonial government

The unique history of the Kowloon Walled City. Why was it not colonised in the same way as the rest of Hong Kong? How did its story end?

Sources

1a. Hong Kong, surveyed by Captain Sir Edward Beleher, 1841. Catalogue ref: FO 925/2293

1b. Hong Kong Sun-on District, 1868. Catalogue ref: CO 700/HONGKONGANDCHINA3A (1)

1c. Map of Hong Kong and of the Territory leased to Great Britain under the Convention between Great Britain and China signed at Peking on the 9th of June 1898. Catalogue ref: MPG 1/796

2a. Phillips and Co's Teas, Coffees and Cocoas, 1886. Catalogue ref: COPY 1/74/28

2b. Printed Accounts, etc. of the East India Company's China trade, 1830. Catalogue ref: PRO 30/9/4/38

3a. Chinese translations on opium, 1836. Catalogue ref: FO 228/4

3b. Letter from Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in Fukien, 1 September 1837. Catalogue ref: FO 682/2462/41

4. Treaty of peace and friendship, commerce, indemnity (Treaty of Nanking), 1842. Catalogue ref: FO 93/23/1b

External links

Overview of the First Opium War from the National Army Museum.

Resource for teachers on the First Opium War from Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University.

Resource for teachers from the BBC about the causes behind the First Opium War as part of the BBC series The Story of China.

Blog from The National Archives on photos of Hong Kong in our collection.

Connections to curriculum
Key Stage 5

Edexcel:
Britain: losing and gaining an empire, 1763-1914
The changing nature and extent of trade

OCR:

From Colonialism to Independence: The British Empire 1857-1965

China and its Rulers 1839-1989

Key topics:
China and the wider world

Depth studies:
The First Opium War and its impact

AQA:

The British Empire, c1857-1967

The Transformation of China, 1936-1997

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Hong Kong and the Opium Wars - The National Archives

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In 1997, Hong Kong stopped being a British colony after more than 150 years of British rule. Authority over Hong Kong was transferred to China. Many see this moment as the end of the last significant colony in the British Empire. Hong Kong became a British colony through two wars: the First and Second Opium [...]

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Air pollution caused by industrial plants (a factory at Yangtze River)

Environmental issues in China had risen in tandem with the country's rapid industrialisation, as well as lax environmental oversight especially during the early 2000s. China was ranked 120th out of the 180 countries on the 2020 Environmental Performance Index.

The Chinese government has acknowledged the problems and made various responses, resulting in some improvements, but western media has criticized the actions as inadequate. In recent years, there has been increased citizens' activism against government decisions that are perceived as environmentally damaging, and a retired government official claimed that the year of 2012 saw over 50,000 environmental protests in China.

Since the 2010s, the government has given greater attention to environmental protection through policy actions such as the signing of the Paris climate accord, the 13th Five-Year Plan and the 2015 Environmental Protection Law reform From 2006 to 2017, sulphur dioxide levels in China were reduced by 70 percent, and air pollution has decreased from 2013 to 2018 In 2017, investments in renewable energy amounted to US$279.8 billion worldwide, with China accounting for US$126.6 billion or 45% of the global investments. China has since become the world's largest investor, producer and consumer of renewable energy worldwide, manufacturing state-of-the-art solar panels, wind turbines and hydroelectric energy facilities as well as becoming the world's largest producer of electric cars and buses.

From an international perspective, China is a party to most of the major treaties meant to address environmental issues. This includes the Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Climate Change treaty, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Endangered Species treaty, the Hazardous Wastes treaty, the Law of the Sea, the International Tropical Timber Agreements of 1983 and 1994, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, and agreements on Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, and Wetlands protection. China has signed, but not ratified, the Kyoto Protocol (but is not yet required to reduce its carbon emission under the agreement, as is India) and the Nuclear Test Ban treaty.

The water resources of China are affected by both severe water quantity shortages and severe water quality pollution. An increasing population and rapid economic growth as well as lax environmental oversight have increased water demand and pollution. China has responded by measures such as rapidly building out the water infrastructure and increased regulation as well as exploring a number of further technological solutions. Water usage by its coal-fired power stations is drying-up Northern China.

According to Chinese government in 2014 59.6% of groundwater sites are poor or extremely poor quality.

A 2016 research study indicated that China's water contains dangerous amounts of the cancer-causing agent nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA). In China, NDMA is thought to be a byproduct of local water treatment processes (which involve heavy chlorination).

Although China's forest cover is only about 20% the country has some of the largest expanses of forested land in the world, making it a top target for forest preservation efforts.

Two large reforestation programs, the Natural Forest Protection Program and the Returning Farmland to Forest program, were announced in late 1998. The programs were piloted in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu in 1999. They became widely implemented in 2000. The Natural Forest Protection Program called for major reductions in timber harvest, forest conservation, and instituted logging bans in most of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Tibet. The program provided for alternative employment opportunities for former logging industry workers, including hiring them for reforestation work. The Returning Farmland to Forest program paid farmers to plant trees on less productive farmland and provided them with a yearly subsidy for lost income.

In 2001, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) listed China among the top 15 countries with the most "closed forest," i.e., virgin, old growth forest or naturally regrown woods. 12% of China's land area, or more than 111 million hectares, is closed forest. However, the UNEP also estimates that 36% of China's closed forests are facing pressure from high population densities, making preservation efforts especially important. In 2011, Conservation International listed the forests of south-west Sichuan as one of the world's ten most threatened forest regions.

By 2023 the Chinese government was encouraging deforestation to attempt to gain food independence.

The three gorges dam produces 3% of the electricity in China but has displaced houses and caused environmental problems within the local environment. Due to the construction of the dam over one million people have been displaced from their homes. The dam has also caused frequent major landslides due to the erosion in the reservoir. These major landslides included two incidents in May 2009 when somewhere between 20,000 and 50,000 cubic metres (26,000 and 65,000 cu yd) of material plunged into the flooded Wuxia Gorge of the Wu River.

China's marine environment, including the Yellow Sea and South China Sea, are considered among the most degraded marine areas on earth. Loss of natural coastal habitats due to land reclamation has resulted in the destruction of more than 65% of tidal wetlands around China's Yellow Sea coastline in approximately 50 years. Rapid coastal development for agriculture, aquaculture and industrial development are considered the primary drivers of coastal destruction in the region.

Desertification remains a serious problem, consuming an area greater than the area used as farmland. Although desertification has been curbed in some areas, it is still expanding at a rate of more than 67 km ² every year. 90% of China's desertification occurs in the west of the country. Approximately 30% of China's surface area is desert. China's rapid industrialization could cause this area to drastically increase. The Gobi Desert in the north currently expands by about 950 square miles (2,500 km ²) per year. The vast plains in northern China used to be regularly flooded by the Yellow River. However, overgrazing and the expansion of agricultural land could cause this area to increase. In 2009, it was estimated that over 200 high-altitude lakes in Zoigê Marsh, which provides 30% of the Yellow River's water, had dried up.

Climate change had already impacted China. It increased mortality from extreme weather events, infectious disease, poor air and water quality. The effects of air pollutions are exacerbated by the rise in temperatures. In the future climate change may lead to "typhoons, floods, blizzards, windstorms, drought, and landslides" and to more severe damage from infectious diseases In the years 1970-2016 the occurrence of crop pest and diseases increased 4 times. 22% of that rise are due to climate change. By the year 2100 the occurrence will rise 243% under a low emission scenario and by 460% under a high emissions scenario. China is the biggest producer of wheat and rice in the world. It is in the second place in maize production.

One of the main problems is the melting of glaciers and permafrost in Tibet. These glaciers and permafrost supply water to approximately 2 billion people. The temperatures in the region rise 4 times faster than anywhere in Asia. According to Xinhua News Agency 18% of glaciers already melted from the middle of the 20th century. The water level in big rivers is lowering. This has an impact on the water supply of China because many rivers, including the Yangtze and Yellow River are getting water from the Tibet glaciers. According to China's Ministry of Water Resources 28,000 of rivers disappeared in China by the year 2013 and the melting of Tibet glaciers and permafrost can be one of the causes. The melting also has an impact on the water supply of others countries in eastern Asia, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and more, that can lead to conflicts over water. According to Chinese Academy of Science "more than 80 percent of Tibetan Plateau permafrost could be gone by the year 2100, and that almost 40 percent of it would be gone within the "near future." Some researchers predict that most of the Himalayan glaciers will disappear in 20 years.

Various forms of pollution have increased as China has further industrialized, which has caused widespread environmental and health problems. China has responded with increasing environmental regulations and a build-up of pollutant treatment infrastructure which have caused improvements on some variables. As of 2013 Beijing, which lies in a topographic bowl, has significant industry, and heats with coal, is subject to air inversions resulting in extremely high levels of pollution in winter months. In response to an increasingly problematic air pollution problem, the Chinese government announced a five-year, US$277 billion plan to address the issue. Northern China will receive particular attention, as the government aims to reduce air emissions by 25 percent by 2017, compared with 2012 levels, in those areas where pollution is especially serious. According to a report published by Greenpeace and Peking University's School of Public Health in December 2012, the coal industry is responsible for the highest levels of air pollution (19 percent), followed by vehicle emissions (6 percent). Ambient air pollution is measured by the amount of particulate matter in the air. This is a result of burning fossil fuels. "Because coal is the primary fuel used to power China's industrial sector, it is responsible for about 40 percent of the deadly fine particulate matter found in China's atmosphere." In January 2013, fine airborne particulates that pose the largest health risks, rose as high as 993 micrograms per cubic meter in Beijing, compared with World Health Organization guidelines of no more than 25. The World Bank estimates that 16 of the world's most-polluted cities are located in China.

Coastal pollution is widespread, leading to declines in habitat quality and increasing harmful algal blooms. The largest algal bloom recorded in history occurred in China around the southern Yellow Sea in 2008, and was easily observed from space.

Rising affluence is another indirect cause of pollution. In particular, car ownership has skyrocketed. In 2014, China added a record 17 million new cars to the road and car ownership reached 154 million.

China is the biggest producer of single use plastic which causes severe pollution. The biggest landfill of the country was filled 25 years before it was planned.

In July 2015, Council on Foreign Relations Director of Asia Studies Elizabeth Economy writing in The Diplomat listed soil contamination as a "poor stepchild" of the Chinese environmental movement, and questioned whether or not recent measures from the Ministry of Environmental Protection would be adequate in combating the problem. In her 2004 book The River Runs Black, she wrote, "China's spectacular economic growth over the past two decades has dramatically depleted the country's natural resources and produced skyrocketing rates of pollution. Environmental degradation has also contributed to significant public health problems, mass migration, economic loss, and social unrest."

According to a 2005-2006 survey by Peter J. Li, many farming methods that the European Union is trying to reduce or eliminate were commonplace in China, including gestation crates, battery cages, foie gras, early weaning of cows, and clipping of ears/beaks/tails. In a 2012 interview, Li mentioned that many livestock in China may be transported over long distances and there are currently no humane-slaughter requirements. He also mentioned that China is the biggest fur-producing nation, and - while the government had been trying to standardize slaughtering procedures - there were cases where fur animals have been skinned alive or beaten to deaths with sticks.

About 10,000 Asiatic black bears are farmed for bile production-an industry worth roughly $1.6 billion per year. The bears are permanently kept in cages, and bile is extracted from cuts in their stomachs. Jackie Chan and Yao Ming have publicly opposed bear farming. In 2012, over 70 Chinese celebrities took part in a petition against an IPO application by Fujian Guizhentang Pharmaceutical Co. due to the company's selling of bear-bile medicines.

According to Jared Diamond, the six main categories of environmental problems of China are: air pollution, water problems, soil problems, habitat destruction, biodiversity loss and mega projects. He also explained that "China is noted for the frequency, number, extent, and damage of its natural disasters". Some natural disasters in China are "closely related to human environmental impacts", especially: dust storms, landslides, droughts and floods.

Since 2002, the number of complaints to the environmental authorities increased by 30 percent every year, reaching 600,000 in 2004; meanwhile, according to an article by the director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs Ma Jun in 2007, the number of mass protests caused by environmental issues grew by 29 percent every year since that time. The growing attention upon environmental matters caused the Chinese government to display an increased level of concern towards environmental issues and the creation of sustainable growth. For example, in his annual address in 2007, Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the People's Republic of China, made 48 references to "environment," "pollution," and " environmental protection", and stricter environmental regulations were subsequently implemented. Some of the subsidies for polluting industries were cancelled, while some polluting industries were shut down. However, although the promotion of clean energy technology occurred, many environmental targets were missed.

In March 2014, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping "declared war" on pollution during the opening of the National People's Congress. After extensive debate lasting nearly two years, the parliament approved a new environmental law in April. The new law empowers environmental enforcement agencies with great punitive power, defines areas which require extra protection, and gives independent environmental groups more ability to operate in the country. The new articles of the law specifically address air pollution, and call for additional government oversight. Lawmaker Xin Chunying called the law "a heavy blow [in the fight against] our country's harsh environmental realities, and an important systemic construct". Three previous versions of the bill were voted down. The bill is the first revision to the environmental protection law since 1989.

In 2019, it launched the Belt and Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition.

In 2020, Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak emissions before 2030 and go carbon-neutral by 2060 in accordance with the Paris climate accord. According to Climate Action Tracker, if accomplished it would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2 - 0.3 degrees - "the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker".

In September 2021 Xi Jinping announced that China will not build "coal-fired power projects abroad". The decision can be "pivotal" in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021.

During COP26 the United States and China agreed on a framework to reduce GHG emission by co-operating on different measures, including lowering the use of methane, phasing down the use of coal and increasing protection of forests.

According to the Chinese government website, the Central Government invested more than 40 billion yuan between 1998 and 2001 on protection of vegetation, farm subsidies and conversion of farmland to forest. Between 1999 and 2002, China converted 7.7 million hectares of farmland into forest.

33.8 million hectares (338,000 km ²) of forest had been planted in China in the years 2013 - 2018. The Chinese government pledged to increase the forest cover of the country from 21.7% to 23% in the years 2016 - 2020 and to 26% by the year 2035 According to the government's plan, by 2050, 30% of China's territory should be covered by forests. According to the govrment's Xinhua News Agency one third of the population of China participated in tree planting in the first half on 2020. 1.69 billion trees were planted, increasing the forest cover by 4.43 million hectares.

Ou Hongyi the single climate striker of China created an initiative named "Plant for survival". In 2 - 3 months, more than 300 trees were planted.

According to South China Morning Post reforestation in China increased the world tree canopy cover by 25%. The trees were first planted for stopping soil erosion and flooding but now can act as a tool to fight climate change.

In the years 2012-2022 China restored more than 70 million hectares (700,000 km ²) of forests. China committed to plant and conserve 70 billion trees by the year 2030 as part of the Trillion Tree Campaign. A special organization: "1t.org China Action" will assist to China with achieving its reforestation and forest conservation goals.

In 1994, China started the Loess Plateau Watershed Rehabilitation Project.

In 2001, China initiated a " Green Wall of China" project. It is a project to create a 2,800-mile (4,500 km) "green belt" to hold back the encroaching desert. The first phase of the project, to restore 9 million acres (36,000 km ²) of forest, will be completed by 2010 at an estimated cost of $8 billion. The Chinese government believes that, by 2050, it can restore most desert land back to forest. The project is possibly the largest ecological project in history. It has also been criticized on various grounds such as other methods being more effective.

In 2020, a sweeping law was passed by the Chinese government to protect the ecology of the Yangtze River. The new laws include strengthening ecological protection rules for hydropower projects along the river, banning chemical plants within 1 kilometer of the river, relocating polluting industries, severely restricting sand mining as well as a complete fishing ban on all the natural waterways of the river, including all its major tributaries and lakes.

Since 2000, rising CO₂ emissions in China and the rest of world have eclipsed the output of the United States and Europe.[78]

Per person, the United States generates carbon dioxide at a far faster rate than other primary regions.[78]

The position of the Chinese government on climate change is contentious. China is the world's current largest emitter of carbon dioxide although not the cumulative largest. China has ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but as a non-Annex I country was not required to limit greenhouse gas emissions under terms of the agreement.

In September 2020, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping announced that China will "strengthen its 2030 climate target (NDC), peak emissions before 2030 and aim to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060". According to Climate Action Tracker if it will be accomplished it will lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2 - 0.3 degrees - "the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker". The announcement was made in the United Nations General Assembly. Xi Jinping mentioned the link between the corona pandemic and nature destruction as one of the reasons for the decision, saying that "Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of nature."

On the 27 September 2020, China's climate scientists presented a detailed plan how to achieve the target, described as "The most ambitious climate goal the world's ever seen". According to the plan GHG emission will begin to decline between 2025 and 2030, while total energy consumption will do so in 2035. By 2050 China will stop producing electricity with coal. By 2025, 20% of energy will be produced without fossil fuels. According to the plan GHG emissions will reach 10.2 billion tons between 2025 and 2030, decline to 9 billion by 2035, 3 billion by 2050 and 200 million by 2060. The emissions that will rest by 2060 will be mitigated with Carbon capture and storage, Carbon sequestration, Bioenergy.

During COP26 the United States and China agreed on a framework to reduce GHG emission by co-operating on different measures. The framework includes commitments to:

Working for achieving halt in temperature rise on 2 and preferably 1.5 degrees, global Carbon neutrality.

Establishing environmental standards and policies needed for the transition to clean economy.

Moving toward Circular economy.

Control and reduce Methane emissions. China will adopt a national methane reduction plan as the USA has already done. In the first half of 2022 both countries will convene a meeting to accelerate the process.

Increase Energy efficiency and usage of Renewable energy. The USA will make its electricity sector, carbon pollution-free by the year 2035.

Working to stop globally the use of unabated thermal coal power generation. China will lower the use of coal how much it can during the 15th Five Year Plan.

Working to stop illegal deforestation by stopping illegal imports.

Giving financial and capacity building help to other countries.

Submitting new NDC to the year 2035 by the year 2025.

Create a special body: ""Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s," that will coordinate the implementation of this agreement.

In January 2022 the government of China called for a transition to "green consumption" and issued some guidelines how to do it. This includes different types of products, but especially transportation. It directed local authorities to encourage "consumers to buy light, small and low-emission vehicles".

A 2011 report by a project facilitated by World Resources Institute stated that the 11th five-year plan (2005 to 2010), in response to worsening energy intensity in the 2002-2005 period, set a goal of a 20% improvement of energy intensity. The report stated that this goal likely was achieved or nearly achieved. The next five-year plan set a goal of improving energy intensity by 16%. In 2022 China published a plan of energy conservation for the 14th five-year plan (2021 to 2025) with a target of cutting energy consumption per unit of GDP by 13.5% by the year 2025 in comparison to the level of 2020. The plan regards 17 different sectors in the economy. In some sectors 20% - 40% of the capacities are not meeting the standards they need to meet by 2025. This policy expects to benefit the biggest companies who have the possibility to reach the targets.

Sponge cities in China are a way of adaptation to flooding exacerbated by climate change and urbanization. China has been noted for its effort in adopting the Sponge City initiative. In 2015, China was reported to have initiated a pilot initiative in 16 districts.

There are currently no nationwide animal welfare laws in China. However, the World Animal Protection notes that some legislation protecting the welfare of animals exists in certain contexts, especially ones used in research and in zoos.

In 2006, Zhou Ping of the National People's Congress introduced the first nationwide animal-protection law in China, but it didn't move forward. In September 2009, the first comprehensive Animal protection law of the People's Republic of China was introduced, but it hasn't made any progress.

In 2016, the Chinese government adopted a plan to reduce China's meat consumption by 50%, for achieving more sustainable and healthy food system.

As a result of more incidents relating to natural disasters and negative health consequences tied to environmental issues, sociologists Deng Yanhua and Yang Guobin write that more people in China are "becoming increasingly environmentally concerned and may organize protests against anticipated pollution." According to Ronggui Huang and Xiaoyi Sun, "many environmental protests are tolerated by the Chinese authority, because protests are seen by the central government as an information-gathering channel to identify the dangerously discontented social groups and to monitor local officials." This increase in environmental action in the late 20th century has accomplished the growth of awareness which led to the rise of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). ENGOs have engaged in campaigns that have seen some success. The world and scholars all over have been interested in ENGOs given their existence in an authoritarian state and position that some expect will "counterbalance environment-unfriendly economic forces". Some of these scholars argue that ENGOs have become more legitimate given new environmental laws that aim to curb negative environmental practices in China.

Alongside the rise of ENGOs, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (formerly known as the State Environmental Protection Administration or SEPA) began to rise in power since its creation in the 1970s. Bureaucratic constraints forced the Ministry to partner with organizations outside of the government to be more successful. The ENGOs with their vast networks and methods appeared to be a good choice in partner for the ministry.

Opposition to the Nujiang dam project was one campaign in which shows the partnership between the ENGOs and SEPA. The project introduced in 2003 indented to build reservoirs and dams along the Nujiang River. The movement against the project, which halted construction in 2016 was "a peak in the history of China's environmental movement." According to sociologists Yanfei Sun and Dingxin Zhao reasons for this was the higher risk involved following the environmental action and government response to the Three Gorges Dam. According to the South China Morning Post cooperation from different activist groups developed during the opposition to the project. Previously these groups "tended to work alone due to the strong personalities of their leaders." Wang Yongchen, founder of the ENGO Green Earth Volunteers has been a strong voice in this campaign against the dam project.

Organizers employ a variety of methods that have developed in response to potential issues that environmental action faces. Some of these issues include environmental science not being widely accessible and understood by the general population, bureaucratic constraints in legal channels, fear of government suppression, the difficulty in proving the health-related consequences of pollution, economic blackmail, and the antagonistic relationships between local governments and ENGOs.

Success in environmental action would also appear to depend on the organizers themselves and how effective they can be overall. Several scholars argue that framing environmental issues properly has been a successful method "used by environmental activists to mobilize citizens behind the protests". Deng Yanhua and Yang Guobin write that piggybacking onto other political issues is another successful method. For example, instead of following through with environmental claims, there has been success in piggybacking onto the issue of land claims in order "to maximize the vulnerability of their opponents." In order to work, the issue in question must be framed not as an environmental issue, but a land-related one. This happened during the 2005 Huashui protest targeting factory pollution that took place in Zhejiang Province where organizers framed the issue as illegal land acquisition.

The protests that began on June 28, 2019 in Wuhan against a proposed incinerator typify the anti-incinerator movement in China. People took to the streets to force the local government to move the location of the proposed incinerator. The protests were met with violence from the police. Other examples of environmental action include the China PX protest and the Qidong Protest of 2012. Residents of Qidong were successful in protesting a pipeline from the Japanese Oji Paper Company. The organizers framed "their collective actions in opposition to Oji Paper and even the Japanese." This played on the anti-Japanese sentiment in China. It also deflected blame away from the government. Shifting blame away from the government, "reduced the chance of activists' protest being repressed." Being aware of possible repression is important when engaging in any kind of action in China.

In December 2021 China and 53 African countries signed a memorandum on cooperation in the fight against climate change. The action will include both mitigation and adaptation measures. It will be linked to South-South cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative. The signed countries emphasis the importance of the Congo tropical forest for climate. China will support initiatives like the Great Green Wall (Africa), the Initiative for the Adaptation of African Agriculture and the Initiative for the Adaptation of Africa.

1. ^ China Weighs Environmental Costs; Beijing Tries to Emphasize Cleaner Industry Over Unbridled Growth After Signs Mount of Damage Done Archived 30 September 2019 at the Wayback Machine 23 July 2013

2. "China Has Successfully Improved Air Quality, but the Efforts Could Unmask Further Global Warming". .

3. Frankfurt School - UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance (2018). ^ Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2018. Available online at: https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/unep/documents/global-trends-renewable-energy-investment-2018

4. ^ Water Demands of Coal-Fired Power Drying Up Northern China Archived 14 December 2013 at the Wayback Machine 25 March 2013 Scientific American

5. ^ On China's Electricity Grid, East Needs West-for Coal Archived 15 August 2014 at the Wayback Machine 21 March 2013 BusinessWeek

6. ^ Chinese Utilities Face $20 Billion Costs Due to Water, BNEF Says 24 March 2013 BusinessWeek

7. ^ Liu, Jianguo and Jordan Nelson. "China's environment in a globalizing world", Nature, Vol. 434, pp. 1179-1186, 30 June 2005. Retrieved 2 April 2008.

8. ^ Harrell, Stevan (2023). An Ecological History of Modern China. Seattle: University of Washington Press. ISBN 9780295751719.

9. ^ "International Effort To Save Forests Should Target 15 Countries," Archived 12 September 2009 at the Library of Congress Web Archives United Nations Environment Program, 20 August 2001. Retrieved 2 April 2008.

10. ^ "China's Threatened Forest Regions". Pulitzer Center. 12 July 2011. Archived from the original on 27 August 2013.

11. ^ Grantham, H. S.; Duncan, A.; Evans, T. D.; Jones, K. R.; Beyer, H. L.; Schuster, R.; Walston, J.; Ray, J. C.; Robinson, J. G.; Callow, M.; Clements, T.; Costa, H. M.; DeGemmis, A.; Elsen, P. R.; Ervin, J.; Franco, P.; Goldman, E.; Goetz, S.; Hansen, A.; Hofsvang, E.; Jantz, P.; Jupiter, S.; Kang, A.; Langhammer, P.; Laurance, W. F.; Lieberman, S.; Linkie, M.; Malhi, Y.; Maxwell, S.; Mendez, M.; Mittermeier, R.; Murray, N. J.; Possingham, H.; Radachowsky, J.; Saatchi, S.; Samper, C.; Silverman, J.; Shapiro, A.; Strassburg, B.; Stevens, T.; Stokes, E.; Taylor, R.; Tear, T.; Tizard, R.; Venter, O.; Visconti, P.; Wang, S.; Watson, J. E. M. (2020). "Anthropogenic modification of forests means only 40% of remaining forests have high ecosystem integrity - Supplementary Material". Nature Communications. 11 (1): 5978. doi:10.1038/s41467-020-19493-3. ISSN 2041-1723. PMC . PMID 33293507.

12. ^ https://www.lemonde.fr/en/environment/article/2023/06/27/china-imposes-deforestation-in-the-pursuit-of-food-independence_6038140_114.html

13. ^ UNDP/GEF. (2007) The Yellow Sea: Analysis of Environmental Status and Trends. p. 408, Ansan, Republic of Korea.

14. Murray N. J., Clemens R. S., Phinn S. R., Possingham H. P. & Fuller R. A. (2014) Tracking the rapid loss of tidal wetlands in the Yellow Sea. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 12, 267-72. doi:10.1890/130260

15. ^ MacKinnon, J.; Verkuil, Y.I.; Murray, N.J. (2012), IUCN situation analysis on East and Southeast Asian intertidal habitats, with particular reference to the Yellow Sea (including the Bohai Sea), Occasional Paper of the IUCN Species Survival Commission No. 47, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK: IUCN, p. 70, ISBN 9782831712550, archived from the original on 24 June 2014

16. HAN, Jun ^ "EFFECTS OF INTEGRATED ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT ON LAND DEGRADATION CONTROL AND POVERTY REDUCTION." Archived 24 September 2015 at the Wayback Machine Workshop on Environment, Resources and Agricultural Policies in China, 19 June 2006. Retrieved 26 March 2008.

17. ^ Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Penguin Books, 2005 and 2011 (ISBN 9780241958681). See chapter 12 entitled "China, Lurching Giant" (pages 258-377).

18. ^ Wang, Chenzhi; Wang, Xuhui (9 December 2021). "Occurrence of crop pests and diseases has largely increased in China since 1970". Nature Food. 3 (1): 57-65. doi:10.1038/s43016-021-00428-0. PMID 37118481. S2CID 245017229.

19. ^ Wong, Edward (17 August 2016). "Coal Burning Causes the Most Air Pollution Deaths in China, Study Finds". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 7 October 2019.

20. ^ McGrath, Matt (9 February 2016). "'Wrong type of trees' in Europe increased global warming". BBC News. Archived from the original on 9 February 2016.

21. Friedlingstein et al. 2019, Table 7.

22. Cheung, Ray (17 June 2004). "Greens' United Voice Shifts Policy in Right Direction". South China Morning Post.

Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Penguin Books, 2005 and 2011 (ISBN 9780241958681). See chapter 12 entitled "China, Lurching Giant" (pages 258-377).

Elizabeth Economy. The River Runs Black. Cornell University Press, 2005.

Judith Shapiro. [1]. China's Environmental Challenges. Polity Books, 2012.

Judith Shapiro. Mao's War Against Nature. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Jianguo Liu and Jared Diamond, "China's environment in a globalizing world", , volume 435, pages 1179-1186, 30 June 2005.

Shunsuke Managi and Shinji Kaneko. Chinese Economic Development and the Environment (Edward Elgar Publishing; 2010) 352 pages; Analyzes the driving forces behind trends in China's CO₂ emissions.

World Health Organization and the United Nations Development Programme, "Environment and People's Health in China", 2001

World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme, "Indoor air pollution database for China", Human Exposure Assessment Series, 1995.

Rachel E. Stern. Environmental Litigation in China: A Study in Political Ambivalence (Cambridge University Press, 2013)

Joanna Lewis. Green Innovation in China: China's Wind Power Industry and the Global Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy (Columbia University Press 2015)

Anna Lora-Wainwright. Fighting for Breath: Living Morally and Dying of Cancer in a Chinese Village (University of Hawaii Press, 2013)

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Environmental issues in China - Wikipedia

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Environmental issues in China had risen in tandem with the country's rapid industrialisation, as well as lax environmental oversight especially during the early 2000s. China was ranked 120th out of the 180 countries on the 2020 Environmental Performance Index.

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What is Google News - Definition [Marketing Dictionary]

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Find out what Google News means in online marketing. Click and read more.

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Research is the practice of exploring an idea to find innovative information. Learn the different types and methods of research.

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Research is a process of systematic inquiry that entails collection of data; documentation of critical information; and analysis and interpretation of that data/information, in accordance with suitable methodologies set by specific professional fields and academic disciplines.

Research is conducted to...

Evaluate the validity of a hypothesis or an interpretive framework.

To assemble a body of substantive knowledge and findings for sharing them in appropriate manners.

To help generate questions for further inquiries.

If you would like further examples of specific ways different schools at Hampshire think about research, see School Definitions of Research.

What is "research" that needs to be reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Hampshire before proceeding?

Research should be reviewed by the IRB only when human subjects are involved, and the term research should be considered under a more narrow definition. Specifically, when the researcher is conducting research as outlined above AND has direct interaction with participants or data linked to personal identifiers, it should always fall under the purview of the IRB. Even if you have not directly collected the data yourself, as the researcher, your research may fall under the purview of the IRB.

In reviewing such research, the IRB is concerned with the methodology of data collection in the "field" (e.g. collection, experimentation, interview, participant observation, etc.) and the use of the data. The broader validity of the hypotheses or research questions, and the quality of inferences that may result (unless, of course, the research methodologies severely compromise the data collection and data usage directly), is not something they will be evaluating.

What if I am using information that is already available?

If you are doing research that is limited to secondary analysis of data, records, or specimens that are either publicly available, de-identified, or otherwise impossible to be linked to personal identities, you may still need IRB approval to do your project. Sometimes a data use agreement between the researcher and the data custodian may still be required to verify that the researcher will not have access to identifying codes. This "de-linking" of data from personal identifiers allows the IRB to make this determination. Regardless, you should submit an IRB proposal so the IRB can determine whether your project needs IRB review, and if so, the type of review required.

For specifics of what research should be reviewed by the IRB and the category of review required, see this flow chart and examples.

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Research is a process of systematic inquiry that entails collection of data; documentation of critical information; and analysis and interpretation of that data/information, in accordance with suitable methodologies set by specific professional fields and academic disciplines.

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Full-text coverage of core scholarly journals in various subjects, many from the first issue up to 3 to 5 years ago.

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Padlet (formerly Wallwisher) is an educational technology startup company based in San Francisco, California and Singapore. Padlet provides a cloud-based software-as-a-service, hosting a real-time collaborative web platform in which users can upload, organize, and share content to virtual bulletin boards called "padlets".

Originally named Wallwisher, the company was started in 2008 by Nitesh Goel and Pranav Piyush, two friends from India, and was incorporated in 2012 with funding from the startup accelerator Start-Up Chile. In 2013, Padlet was additionally backed by accelerators Y Combinator and ImagineK12. As of November 2020, the company has raised over $13 million across three Series A rounds of funding.

In 2018, the company drew criticism for its abrupt switch from a free service to a paid pricing model.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Padlet saw an increase in users, attributed to its use by educators and students following a rise in remote learning worldwide. In 2021, the platform adopted stronger content moderation practices in response to multiple cases of offensive content - including racist, anti-semitic, and pornographic material - being published on student Padlet accounts.

In August 2024, Padlet launched Sandbox, a collaborative digital whiteboard with an ability to create interactivity using links.

Padlet has emphasized the importance of accessibility, intuitiveness, and collaboration in the design of its interface.

Padlet is widely used among teachers; its use as a pedagogical tool has been studied in various academic journals and conferences including the Association for Computing Machinery Conference on Education Technology and Computers, and the IEEE International Conference of Educational Innovation through Technology.

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Padlet (formerly Wallwisher) is an educational technology startup company based in San Francisco, California and Singapore. Padlet provides a cloud-based software-as-a-service, hosting a real-time collaborative web platform in which users can upload, organize, and share content to virtual bulletin boards called "padlets".

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The Opium Wars in the mid-19th century were a critical juncture in modern Chinese history. The first Opium War was fought between China and Great Britain from 1839 to 1842. In the second Opium War, from 1856 to 1860, a weakened China fought both Great Britain and France. China lost both wars. The terms of its defeat were a bitter pill to swallow: China had to cede the territory of Hong Kong to British control, open treaty ports to trade with foreigners, and grant special rights to foreigners operating within the treaty ports. In addition, the Chinese government had to stand by as the British increased their opium sales to people in China. The British did this in the name of free trade and without regard to the consequences for the Chinese government and Chinese people.

The lesson that Chinese students learn today about the Opium Wars is that China should never again let itself become weak, 'backward,' and vulnerable to other countries. As one British historian says, "If you talk to many Chinese about the Opium War, a phrase you will quickly hear is 'luo hou jiu yao ai da,' which literally means that if you are backward, you will take a beating." ¹
Two Worlds Collide: The First Opium War
In the mid-19th century, western imperial powers such as Great Britain, France, and the United States were aggressively expanding their influence around the world through their economic and military strength and by spreading religion, mostly through the activities of Christian missionaries. These countries embraced the idea of free trade, and their militaries had become so powerful that they could impose such ideas on others. In one sense, China was relatively effective in responding to this foreign encroachment; unlike its neighbours, including present-day India, Burma (now Myanmar), Malaya (now Malaysia), Indonesia, and Vietnam, China did not become a full-fledged, formal colony of the West. In addition, Confucianism, the system of beliefs that shaped and organized China's culture, politics, and society for centuries, was secular (that is, not based on a religion or belief in a god) and therefore was not necessarily an obstacle to science and modernity in the ways that Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism sometimes were in other parts of the world.

But in another sense, China was not effective in responding to the "modern" West with its growing industrialism, mercantilism, and military strength. Nineteenth-century China was a large, mostly land-based empire (see Map 1), administered by a c. 2,000-year-old bureaucracy and dominated by centuries old and conservative Confucian ideas of political, social, and economic management. All of these things made China, in some ways, dramatically different from the European powers of the day, and it struggled to deal effectively with their encroachment. This ineffectiveness resulted in, or at least added to, longer-term problems for China, such as unequal treaties (which will be described later), repeated foreign military invasions, massive internal rebellions, internal political fights, and social upheaval. While the first Opium War of 1839-42 did not cause the eventual collapse of China's 5,000-year imperial dynastic system seven decades later, it did help shift the balance of power in Asia in favour of the West.
Map 1: China's Borders as of 1820. Opium and the West's Embrace of Free Trade
In the decades leading up to the first Opium War, trade between China and the West took place within the confines of the Canton System, based in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou (also referred to as Canton). An earlier version of this system had been put in place by China under the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), and further developed by its replacement, the Qing Dynasty, also known as the Manchu Dynasty. (The Manchus were the ethnic group that ruled China during the Qing period.) In the year 1757, the Qing emperor ordered that Guangzhou/Canton would be the only Chinese port that would be opened to trade with foreigners, and that trade could take place only through licensed Chinese merchants. This effectively restricted foreign trade and subjected it to regulations imposed by the Chinese government.

For many years, Great Britain worked within this system to run a three country trade operation: It shipped Indian cotton and British silver to China, and Chinese tea and other Chinese goods to Britain (see Map 2). In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the balance of trade was heavily in China's favour. One major reason was that British consumers had developed a strong liking for Chinese tea, as well as other goods like porcelain and silk. But Chinese consumers had no similar preference for any goods produced in Britain. Because of this trade imbalance, Britain increasingly had to use silver to pay for its expanding purchases of Chinese goods. In the late 1700s, Britain tried to alter this balance by replacing cotton with opium, also grown in India. In economic terms, this was a success for Britain; by the 1820s, the balance of trade was reversed in Britain's favour, and it was the Chinese who now had to pay with silver.
The Scourge and Profit of Opium Figure 1: A "stacking room" in an opium factory in Patna, India. On the shelves are balls of opium that were part of Britain's trade with China. Map 2: Great Britain's Three-Country Trade, Early 19th Century. Figure 2: Opium smoking in China.
The opium that the British sold in China was made from the sap of poppy plants, and had been used for medicinal and sometimes recreational purposes in China and other parts of Eurasia for centuries. After the British colonized large parts of India in the 17th century, the British East India Company, which was created to take advantage of trade with East Asia and India, invested heavily in growing and processing opium, especially in the eastern Indian province of Bengal. In fact, the British developed a profitable monopoly over the cultivation of opium that would be shipped to and sold in China.

By the early 19th century, more and more Chinese were smoking British opium as a recreational drug. But for many, what started as recreation soon became a punishing addiction: many people who stopped ingesting opium suffered chills, nausea, and cramps, and sometimes died from withdrawal. Once addicted, people would often do almost anything to continue to get access to the drug. The Chinese government recognized that opium was becoming a serious social problem and, in the year 1800, it banned both the production and the importation of opium. In 1813, it went a step further by outlawing the smoking of opium and imposing a punishment of beating offenders 100 times.
The Users Versus Pushers Debate
In response, the British East India Company hired private British and American traders to transport the drug to China. Chinese smugglers bought the opium from British and American ships anchored off the Guangzhou coast and distributed it within China through a network of Chinese middlemen. By 1830, there were more than 100 Chinese smugglers' boats working the opium trade.

This reached a crisis point when, in 1834, the British East India Company lost its monopoly over British opium. To compete for customers, dealers lowered their selling price, which made it easier for more people in China to buy opium, thus spreading further use and addition.
Figure 3: Lin Zexu.
In less than 30 years-from 1810 to 1838-opium imports to China increased from 4,500 chests (the large containers used to ship the drug) to 40,000. As Chinese consumed more and more imported opium, the outflow of silver to pay for it increased, from about two million ounces in the early 1820s to over nine million ounces a decade later. In 1831, the Chinese emperor, already angry that opium traders were breaking local laws and increasing addiction and smuggling, discovered that members of his army and government (and even students) were engaged in smoking opium.
Figure 4: British officers in their tent during the first Opium War, circa 1839. Figure 5: Chinese swordsman, 1844. The War's Aftermath Figure 6: The British bombardment of Guangzhou/Canton.
By 1836, the Chinese government began to get more serious about enforcing the 1813 ban. It closed opium dens and executed Chinese dealers. But the problem only grew worse. The emperor called for a debate among Chinese officials on how best to deal with the crisis. Opinion were polarized into two sides.
One side took a pragmatic approach (that is, an approach not focused on the morality of the issue). It focused on targeting opium users rather than opium producers. They argued that the production and sale of opium should be legalized and then taxed by the government. Their belief was that taxing the drug would make it so expensive that people would have to smoke less of it or not smoke it at all. They also argued that the money collected from taxing the opium trade could help the Chinese government reduce revenue shortfalls and the outflow of silver.

Another side vehemently disagreed with this 'pragmatic' approach. Led by Lin Zexu, a very capable and ambitious Chinese government official, they argued that the opium trade was a moral issue, and an "evil" that had to be eliminated by any means possible. If they could not suppress the trade of opium and addiction to it, the Chinese empire would have no peasants to work the land, no townsfolk to pay taxes, no students to study, and no soldiers to fight. They argued that instead of targeting opium users, they should stop and punish the "pushers" who imported and sold the drug in China.
Figure 7: Opium War Imports into China, 1650-1880.
In the end, Lin Zexu's side won the argument. In 1839, he arrived in Guangzhou (Canton) to supervise the ban on the opium trade and to crack down on its use. He attacked the opium trade on several levels. For example, he wrote an open letter to Queen Victoria questioning Britain's political support for the trade and the morality of pushing drugs. More importantly, he made rapid progress in enforcing the 1813 ban by arresting over 1,600 Chinese dealers and seizing and destroying tens of thousands of opium pipes. He also demanded that foreign companies (British companies, in particular) turn over their supplies of opium in exchange for tea. When the British refused to do so, Lin stopped all foreign trade and quarantined the area to which these foreign merchants were confined.
Second Opium War (1856-1860)
After six weeks, the foreign merchants gave in to Lin's demands and turned over 2.6 million pounds of opium (over 20,000 chests). Lin's troops also seized and destroyed the opium that was being held on British ships-the British superintendent claimed these ships were in international waters, but Lin claimed they were anchored in and around Chinese islands. Lin then hired 500 Chinese men to destroy the opium by mixing it with lime and salt and dumping it into the bay. Finally, he pressured the Portuguese, who had a colony in nearby Macao, to expel the uncooperative British, forcing them to move to the island of Hong Kong.
Map 3: China's Treaty Ports, 1860.
Taken together, these actions raised the tensions that led to the outbreak of the first Opium War. For the British, Lin's destruction of the opium was an affront to British dignity and their concepts of trade. Many British merchants, smugglers, and the British East India Company had argued for years that China was out of touch with "civilized" nations, which practised free trade and maintained "normal" international relations through consular officials and treaties. More to the point, British representatives in Guangzhou requested that merchants turn over their opium to Lin, guaranteeing that the British government would compensate them for their losses. The idea was that in the short term, this would prevent a major conflict, and that it would keep the merchants and ship captains safe while reopening the extremely profitable China trade in other goods. The huge opium liability (the opium was worth millions of pounds sterling), and increasingly shrill demands from merchants in China, India, and London when they discovered their profits were destroyed, gave politicians in Great Britain the excuse they were looking for to act more forcefully to expand British imperial interests in China. War broke out in November 1839 when Chinese warships clashed with British merchantmen.

In June 1840, 16 British warships and merchantmen-many leased from the primary British opium producer, Jardine Matheson & Co.-arrived at Guangzhou. Over the next two years, the British forces bombarded forts, fought battles, seized cities, and attempted negotiations. A preliminary settlement called for China to cede Hong Kong to the British Empire, pay an indemnity, and grant Britain full diplomatic relations. It also led to the Qing government sending Lin Zexu into exile. Chinese troops, using antiquated guns and cannons, and with limited naval ships, were largely ineffective against the British. Dozens of Chinese officers committed suicide when they could not repel the British marines, steamships, and merchantmen.

The first Opium War ended in 1842, when Chinese officials signed, at gunpoint, the Treaty of Nanjing. The treaty provided extraordinary benefits to the British, including:
Thinking About the Opium War

an excellent deep-water port at Hong Kong;

a huge indemnity (compensation) to be paid to the British government and merchants;

five new Chinese treaty ports at Guangzhou (Canton), Shanghai, Xiamen (Amoy), Ningbo, and Fuzhou, where British merchants and their families could reside;

extraterritoriality for British citizens residing in these treaty ports, meaning that they were subject to British, not Chinese, laws; and

a "most favoured nation" clause that any rights gained by other foreign countries would automatically apply to Great Britain as well.

For China, the Treaty of Nanjing provided no benefits. In fact, Chinese imports of opium rose to a peak of 87,000 chests in 1879 (see Figure 1). After that, imports of opium declined, and then ended during the First World War, as opium production within China outgrew foreign production. However, other trade did not expand as much as foreign merchants had hoped, and they continued to blame the Chinese government for this. Among Chinese officials, the aftermath of the war led to a bitter political struggle between two factions: a peace faction, which was roughly aligned with the 'users' faction in the opium trade debate; and a 'war' faction, which was roughly aligned with the 'pushers' faction in that debate. The peace faction was in nominal control.

In addition, the Treaty of Nanjing ended the Canton System that had been in place since the 17th century. This was followed in 1844 by a system of unequal treaties between China and western powers. Through the most favoured nation clauses, these treaties allowed westerners to build churches and spread Christianity in the treaty ports. Western imperialism and free trade had its first great victory in China with this war and its resulting treaties.

When the Chinese emperor died in 1850, his successor dismissed the peace faction in favour of those who had supported Lin Zexu. The new emperor tried to bring Lin back from exile, but Lin died along the way. The Chinese court kept finding excuses not to accept foreign diplomats at the capital city of Beijing, and its compliance with the treaties fell far short of western countries' expectations.

In 1856, a second Opium War broke out and continued until 1860, when the British and French captured Beijing and forced on China a new round of unequal treaties, indemnities, and the opening of 11 more treaty ports (see Map 3). This also led to increased Christian missionary work and legalization of the opium trade.
About the Author
Even though new ports were opened to British merchants after the first Opium War, the Chinese dragged their feet on implementing the agreements, and legal trade with China remained limited. British merchants pressed their government to do more, but the government's hands were tied because the Chinese government in the capital city of Beijing restricted who it met with.
End Notes:
In October 1856, Chinese authorities arrested the Chinese crew of a ship operated by the British. The British used this as an opportunity to pressure China militarily to open itself up even further to British merchants and trade. France, using the execution in China of a French Christian missionary as an excuse, joined the British in the fight. Joint French-British forces captured Guangzhou before moving north to the city of Tianjin (also referred to as Tientsin). In 1858, the Chinese agreed-on paper-to a series of western demands contained in documents like the Treaty of Tientsin. But then they refused to ratify the treaties, which led to further hostilities.

In 1860, British and French troops landed near Beijing and fought their way into the city. Negotiations quickly broke down and the British High Commissioner to China ordered the troops to loot and destroy the Imperial Summer Palace, a complex and garden where Qing Dynasty emperors had traditionally handled the country's official matters.

Shortly after that, the Chinese emperor fled to Manchuria in northeast China. His brother negotiated the Convention of Beijing, which, in addition to ratifying the Treaty of Tientsin, added indemnities and ceded to Britain the Kowloon Peninsula across the strait from Hong Kong. The war ended with a greatly weakened Qing Dynasty that was now confronted with the need to rethink its relations with the outside world and to modernize its military, political, and economic structures.

In 1839, the British imposed on China their version of free trade and insisted on the legal right of their citizens (that is, British citizens) to do what they wanted, wherever they wanted. Chinese critics point out that while the British made lofty arguments about the 'principle' of free trade and individual rights, they were in fact pushing a product (opium) that was illegal in their own country.

There are different viewpoints on what was the main underlying factor in Britain's involvement in the Opium Wars. Some in the west claim that the Opium Wars were about upholding the principle of free trade. Others, however, say that Great Britain was acting more in the interest of protecting its international reputation while it was facing challenges in other parts of the world, such as the Near East, India, and Latin America. Some American historians have argued that these conflicts were not so much about opium as they were about western powers' desire to expand commercial relations more broadly and to do away with the Canton trading system. Finally, some western historians say the war was fought at least partly to keep China's balance of trade in a deficit, and that opium was an effective way to do that, even though it had very negative impacts on Chinese society.

It is important to point out that not everyone in Britain supported the opium trade in China. In fact, members of the British public and media, as well as the American public and media, expressed outrage over their countries' support for the opium trade. ²

From China's historical perspective, the first Opium War was the beginning of the end of late Imperial China, a powerful dynastic system and advanced civilization that had lasted thousands of years. The war was also the first salvo in what is now referred to in China as the "century of humiliation." This humiliation took many forms. China's defeat in both wars was a sign that the Chinese state's legitimacy and ability to project power were weakening. The Opium Wars further contributed to this weakening. The unequal treaties that western powers imposed on China undermined the ways China had conducted relations with other countries and its trade in tea. The continuation of the opium trade, moreover, added to the cost to China in both silver and in the serious social consequences of opium addiction. Furthermore, the many rebellions that broke out within China after the first Opium War made it increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to pay its tax and huge indemnity obligations.

Present-day Chinese historians see the Opium Wars as a wars of aggression that led to the hard lesson that "if you are 'backward,' you will take a beating." These lessons shaped the rationale for the Chinese Revolution against imperialism and feudalism that emerged, and then succeeded, decades later.

Jack Patrick Hayes, PhD, is a professor of Chinese and Japanese history at Kwantlen Polytechnic University in Vancouver. His research focuses on late imperial and modern Chinese and Tibetan environmental history, resource development, and ethnic relations in western China.

¹ Andrew Moody, "Lessons of the Opium War," China Daily, February 24, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2012-02/24/content_14681839.htm.

² See, for example, Peter Perdue, "The First Opium War: The Anglo-Chinese War of 1839-1842," MIT Visualizing Cultures, p. 29, https://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/opium_wars_01/ow1_essay01.html.

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The Opium Wars in the mid-19th century were a critical juncture in modern Chinese history. The first Opium War was fought between China and Great Britain from

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Opium Wars ( simplified Chinese: 鸦片战争; traditional Chinese: 鴉片戰爭 Yāpiàn zhànzhēng) were two conflicts waged between China and Western powers during the mid-19th century. The First Opium War was fought from 1839 to 1842 between China and the United Kingdom, and was triggered by the Chinese government's campaign to enforce its prohibition against opium trafficking by British merchants. The Second Opium War was waged by Britain and France against China from 1856 to 1860. In each war, the superior military advantages enjoyed by European forces led to several easy victories over the Chinese military, with the consequence that China was compelled to sign unequal treaties to grant favourable tariffs, trade concessions, reparations and territory to Western powers.

The two conflicts, along with the various treaties imposed during the " century of humiliation", weakened the Chinese government's authority and forced China to open specified treaty ports (including Shanghai) to Western merchants.[1][2] In addition, China ceded sovereignty over Hong Kong to the British Empire, which maintained control over the region until 1997. During this period, the Chinese economy also contracted slightly as a result of the wars, though the Taiping Rebellion and Dungan Revolt had a much larger economic effect.[3]

The First Opium War broke out in 1839 between China and Britain and was fought over trading rights (including the right of free trade) and Britain's diplomatic status among Chinese officials. In the eighteenth century, China enjoyed a trade surplus with Europe, trading porcelain, silk, and tea in exchange for silver. By the late 17th century, the British East India Company (EIC) expanded the cultivation of opium in the Bengal Presidency, selling it to private merchants who transported it to China and covertly sold it on to Chinese smugglers.[4] By 1797, the EIC was selling 4,000 chests of opium (each weighing 77 kg) to private merchants per annum.[5]

In earlier centuries, opium was utilised as a medicine with anesthetic qualities, but new Chinese practices of smoking opium recreationally increased demand tremendously and often led to smokers developing addictions. Successive Chinese emperors issued edicts making opium illegal in 1729, 1799, 1814, and 1831, but imports grew as smugglers and colluding officials in China sought profit.[6] Some American merchants entered the trade by smuggling opium from Turkey into China, including Warren Delano Jr., the grandfather of twentieth-century President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Francis Blackwell Forbes; in American historiography this is sometimes referred to as the Old China Trade.[7] By 1833, the Chinese opium trade soared to 30,000 chests.[5] British and American merchants sent opium to warehouses in the free-trade port of Canton, and sold it to Chinese smugglers.[6][8]

In 1834, the EIC's monopoly on British trade with China ceased, and the opium trade burgeoned. Partly concerned with moral issues over the consumption of opium and partly with the outflow of silver, the Daoguang Emperor charged Governor General Lin Zexu with ending the trade. In 1839, Lin published in Canton an open letter to Queen Victoria requesting her cooperation in halting the opium trade. The letter never reached the Queen. It was later published in The Times as a direct appeal to the British public for their cooperation. An edict from the Daoguang Emperor followed on 18March, emphasising the serious penalties for opium smuggling that would now apply henceforth. Lin ordered the seizure of all opium in Canton, including that held by foreign governments and trading companies (called factories),[12] and the companies prepared to hand over a token amount to placate him.[13][page needed ] Charles Elliot, Chief Superintendent of British Trade in China, arrived 3 days after the expiry of Lin's deadline, as Chinese troops enforced a shutdown and blockade of the factories. The standoff ended after Elliot paid for all the opium on credit from the British government (despite lacking official authority to make the purchase) and handed the 20,000 chests (1,300 metric tons) over to Lin, who had them destroyed at Humen.[citation needed ]

Elliott then wrote to London advising the use of military force to resolve the dispute with the Chinese government. A small skirmish occurred between British and Chinese warships in the Kowloon Estuary on 4 September 1839.[12] After almost a year, the British government decided, in May 1840, to send a military expedition to impose reparations for the financial losses experienced by opium traders in Canton and to guarantee future security for the trade. On 21 June 1840 a British naval force arrived off Macao and moved to bombard the port of Dinghai. In the ensuing conflict, the Royal Navy used its superior ships and guns to inflict a series of decisive defeats on Chinese forces.[14]

The war was concluded by the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, the first of the Unequal treaties between China and Western powers.[15] The treaty ceded the Hong Kong Island and surrounding smaller islands to Britain, and established five cities as treaty ports open to Western traders: Shanghai, Canton, Ningbo, Fuzhou, and Xiamen (Amoy).[16] The treaty also stipulated that China would pay a twenty-one million dollar payment to Britain as reparations for the destroyed opium, with six million to be paid immediately, and the rest through specified installments thereafter.[17] Another treaty the following year gave most favoured nation status to Britain and added provisions for British extraterritoriality.[15] France secured the same concessions in treaties of 1843 and 1844.[18]

In 1853, northern China was convulsed by the Taiping Rebellion, which established its capital at Nanking. In spite of this, a new Imperial Commissioner, Ye Mingchen, was appointed at Canton, determined to stamp out the opium trade, which was still technically illegal. In October 1856, he seized the Arrow, a ship claiming British registration, and threw its crew into chains. Sir John Bowring, Governor of British Hong Kong, called up Rear Admiral Sir Michael Seymour's East Indies and China Station fleet, which, on 23 October, bombarded and captured the Pearl River forts on the approach to Canton and proceeded to bombard Canton itself, but had insufficient forces to take and hold the city. On 15 December, during a riot in Canton, European commercial properties were set on fire and Bowring appealed for military intervention.[16] The execution of a French missionary inspired support from France.[citation needed ]

Britain and France now sought greater concessions from China, including the legalisation of the opium trade, expanding of the transportation of coolies to European colonies, opening all of China to British and French citizens and exempting foreign imports from internal transit duties.[19] The war resulted in the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin, in which the Chinese government agreed to pay war reparations for the expenses of the recent conflict, open a second group of ten ports to European commerce, legalise the opium trade, and grant foreign traders and missionaries rights to travel within China.[16] After a second phase of fighting which included the sack of the Old Summer Palace and the occupation of the Forbidden City palace complex in Beijing, the treaty was confirmed by the Convention of Peking in 1860.[citation needed ]

1. ^ Taylor Wallbank; Bailkey; Jewsbury; Lewis; Hackett (1992). "A Short History of the Opium Wars". Civilizations Past And Present. Chapter 29: "South And East Asia, 1815-1914" - via Schaffer Library of Drug Policy.

2. ^ Kenneth Pletcher. "Chinese history: Opium Wars". Encyclopædia Britannica Online.

3. ^ Desjardins, Jeff (15 September 2017). "Over 2000 years of economic history, in one chart". World Economic Forum.

4. ^ "Opium trade - History & Facts". Encyclopedia Britannica.

5. Hanes III, Wiliam Travis; Sanello, Frank (2004). The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another. United States: Sourcebooks. pp. 21, 24, 25. ISBN 978-1402201493.

6. "A Century of International Drug Control" (PDF). UNODC.org.

7. ^ Meyer, Karl E. (28 June 1997). "The Opium War's Secret History". The New York Times.

8. Haythornthwaite, Philip J., ^ The Colonial Wars Source Book, London, 2000, p.237. ISBN 1-84067-231-5

9. Haythornthwaite, 2000, p.237.

10. ^ Hanes, W. Travis; Sanello, Frank (2002). Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another. Sourcebooks. ISBN 9781402201493.

11. Tsang, Steve (2007). ^ A Modern History of Hong Kong. I. B. Tauris. pp. 3-13, 29. ISBN 1-84511-419-1.

12. Treaty of Nanjing inBritannica.

13. ^ Haythornthwaite 2000, p. 239.

14. ^ Treaty Of Nanjing (Nanking), 1842 on the website of the US-China Institute at University of Southern Carolina.

15. ^ Xiaobing Li (2012). China at War: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 468. ISBN 9781598844160.

16. ^ Zhihong Shi (2016). Central Government Silver Treasury: Revenue, Expenditure and Inventory Statistics, ca. 1667-1899. BRILL. p. 33. ISBN 978-90-04-30733-9.

Beeching, Jack. The Chinese Opium Wars (Harvest Books, 1975)

Fay, Peter Ward (1975), The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar, University of North Carolina Press.

Gelber, Harry G. Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: Britain's 1840-42 War with China, and Its Aftermath. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Hanes, W. Travis and Frank Sanello. The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another (2014)

Kitson, Peter J. "The Last War of the Romantics: De Quincey, Macaulay, the First Chinese Opium War" Wordsworth Circle (2018) 49#3 online

Lovell, Julia. The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and the Making of Modern China (2011).

Marchant, Leslie R. "The War of the Poppies," History Today (May 2002) Vol. 52 Issue 5, pp 42-49, online popular history

Platt, Stephen R. (2018), Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age, New York: Knopf, ISBN 9780307961730 556 pp.

Polachek, James M., The inner opium war (Harvard Univ Asia Center, 1992).

Wakeman, Frederic E. (1966). Strangers at the Gate; Social Disorder in South China, 1839- 1861. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0520212398.

Waley, Arthur, ed. The Opium War through Chinese eyes (1960).

Wong, John Y. Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism, and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China. (Cambridge UP, 2002)

Yu, Miles Maochun. "Did China Have A Chance To Win The Opium War?" Military History in the News July 3, 2018

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Toggle the table of contents From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Opium Wars ( simplified Chinese: 鸦片战争; traditional Chinese: 鴉片戰爭 Yāpiàn zhànzhēng) were two conflicts waged between China and Western powers during the mid-19th century.

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Just as 2015 entered its final weeks, Beijing's municipal government declared an air pollution " red alert " for the first time since the policy was established in 2013. The move typified a year when air pollution once again dominated environmental coverage, at home and abroad.

The announcement was sent out very late in the day. The entire city, including its officials, scrambled to make sense of the measures that had never been implemented before. People were asking: which kind of cars with what kind of plate numbers are allowed on the road tomorrow? (The government asked motorists to stay at home on certain days in an emergency bid to bring down car emissions).

To some extent, Beijing's "red alert" experience epitomises China's environmental journey of 2015: lots of good signals, with largely mixed results.

The sudden announcement that caught the entire city off guard (pollution levels were not nearly as bad as the 'Airpocalypse' episode days before) seemed to be the direct result of instructions from the top leadership, according to information released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP).

While this once again shows how responsive the current leadership is toward public sentiments, it also demonstrates the gap between intention and reality: it has taken the top leadership and repeated appeals from the Environment Minister to get China's capital city to implement what is clearly written on paper.

Distinguishing between intention and reality is the key to a fair assessment of China's 2015 environmental achievements. Too often, intentions are expressed loud and clear, whereas results are muddled and messy. A look at the country's environmental scorecard this year will show that while well-intentioned policy declarations are not always "empty words", it takes calculated, strategic efforts to translate them into actual progress.
The new environmental protection law
Laws often embody noble intentions. On 1 January 2015, China's new Environmental Protection Law came into force amid high expectations. From the text of the law, observers both within and outside China could clearly sense the urgency with which the country was taking environmental issues.

Polluting companies will face fines without a ceiling; NGOs are welcome to initiate public interest lawsuits; and local governments will be held accountable for implementing environmental policies.

But the law has to navigate a reality that is defined by fundamental features of how governance in China is structured, which leads to unbalanced results. On the one hand, the law seems to enhance enforcement on the local level, largely by removing arbitrary and out-of-date limitations that bind the hands of local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs).

The new law authorises EPBs to fine violating companies on an accumulative basis, without a ceiling, which is a departure from the long-time practice of one-off fines capped to amounts that are trivial to most companies today. According to data released by the Ministry of Environment Protection, during the first eight months of new law's implementation in 2015, there were 405 cases of "accumulative fines", worth a total of 330 million yuan.

It means on average each case involved more than 800,000 yuan in fines, already exceeding the highest 500,000 yuan fine limit in the previous version of the law.

But like other measures in the new law that are meant to strengthen the teeth of local law enforcement, they are valuable when local authorities intend to use them.

When they don't, neither the central government nor the public has effective ways to compel them to enforce the rules. The new law aims to change that by including accountability clauses for government officials. But so far result in this area is unclear.

A recent review states that the "sleeping beauty" phenomenon (when laws and regulations never get activated) is still a widespread problem on the local level.

Moreover, law enforcement is often driven by the "personal interest and temperament" of the officials, which tends to further complicate the problem.

Similarly, despite a strong push to encourage public interest environmental lawsuits by NGOs, so far only 36 such cases have been brought to court, which is dwarfed by the number of pollution incidents and violations that are actually happening all over the country. Interference from local government is still considered a reason why courts hesitate to accept such cases.
Peaking carbon emissions
This year was also marked by increasing detail and engagement from China on the country's efforts to stabilise the global climate. Following a ground-breaking announcement in November 2014, that China would peak carbon emissions by 2030, this year the Chinese government further elaborated on this target, by proposing a fairly ambitious carbon intensity goal and a timeline for a nationwide carbon trading system. These commitments from China made a big contribution to the successfully negotiated Paris Agreement on 12 December.

Climate change is an example of where the intention of China's top leadership matches well with reality on the ground. For one thing, the Chinese economy is already undergoing significant changes that put downward pressure on demand for coal, China's single biggest source for primary energy. These changes include a shift away from heavy industries, such as steel and cement, towards higher energy efficiency.

In January, China recorded a drop in coal production for the first time in this century, a trend that many say will be irreversible. Latest data released by the Chinese authority suggests that the decline of coal output is continuing. China's resolute battle against air pollution is also a major risk to China's production and use of coal, and such issues became increasingly seared on the public consciousness this year in light of the environmental documentary " Under the Dome," made by former CCTV journalist Chai Jing.

The instant popularity of the documentary released in February, 200 million clicks in a matter of days, underlined the depth of public concern on the air pollution issue. Notwithstanding the somewhat perplexing fate of the documentary afterward, the strong signal sent by the public reaction did create more urgency and political momentum. More stringent measures against coal were put in place later in the year. Such factors all indicate that China's carbon pledges have a solid foundation.
See also: Will China's environmental law help to win 'war on pollution'? The new minister and his reforms
When China appointed its new Environment Minister at the beginning of this year, it was hailed internationally as a wise move. For the first time an established environmental scientist holds the country's green gavel. As soon as he stepped into his new role, Minister Chen Jining made it clear to the nation that reforming the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system would be at the top of his agenda.

China's EIA system has long suffered from being a rubber stamp. Loopholes in the system have also encouraged rampant rent-seeking. Those EIA agencies affiliated with the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) or local EPBs enjoy popularity among those who seek to have their projects approved.

Government officials sat on the boards of EIA firms, creating a clear conflict of interest, while companies that were overseen by the MEP also had shares in companies carrying out assessments. This served to guarantee "green lights" for projects that all too often were flawed in their design or were clearly detrimental to the environment.

The huge blast s in Tianjin on 12 August that killed 173 people and injured hundreds of others illustrated the deadly consequences of shoddy gate-keeping.

In that instance however, the EIA only played a partial role in a string of fateful decisions that allowed the dangerous warehouse to operate in the vicinity of a densely populated neighbourhood.

Minister Chen vowed to clean up the EIA system by first severing the link between his ministry and its affiliated EIA agencies. So far, results look promising: six prominent EIA consultancies have transformed into privately owned companies and two have completely given up their certificates to provide EIA services.

But for Mr Chen, this is an easy task to start with. After all, those EIA-related agencies all fall under the ministry's leadership, and therefore have to follow the directives of their big boss. The true test would be pushing the reform into provinces, where local governments have more incentives to keep such affiliated agencies under their control.

What's even more challenging is the MEP's initiative to further embed EIAs into the country's decision making process, especially in the early planning stages, where blueprints of entire regions are being drafted. A new regulatory agenda, unveiled in October, included the revamping of China's EIA Law and its Planning Environmental Impact Assessment (PEIA) regulation.

But such initiatives would have to overcome resistance from departments that are traditionally in charge of planning, and are accustomed to treating environmental impacts as an afterthought. They are often not bound by directives from their environmental colleagues.

In this regard, the MEP has made a smart move by harnessing the political shockwaves of the Tianjin accident. In October, the ministry dispatched numerous teams to check the integrity of PEIA processes of major chemical installations all over China, as a way to boost the status of PEIA in the political agenda.
Conservation
The past 12 months was also a big year in efforts to protect endangered species. In May, China implemented a crackdown on ivory trade. In a matter of months, the country increased the intensity of its response from an import ban to a nationwide ban on trading products. A presidential commitment to eliminate the ivory trade was a further attempt to buttress government efforts.

According to a recent investigation by conservation groups, those measures appear to have cut ivory prices in the Chinese market by half, indicating a weakening demand for products that are driving elephants towards extinction in many parts of Africa. It is an example of how effective awareness campaigns combined with measures to save endangered species, are able to curb consumption.

The growing Chinese middle class and its demand for products, ranging from fireflies to pangolins, just to name a few, is a reality that every serious conservation campaign should address.

The panda's fate in 2015 depicts a much more complex picture. Despite new data reported in March showing the total number of wild pandas is growing, the trend of increasingly fragmented communities is more disconcerting to conservationists. Later in the year, we saw reports showing the habitats of pandas threatened by questionable "forest regeneration" projects. The challenge faced by panda, a national symbol and an element in Chinese diplomacy and 'soft power', exemplifies the difficulty in bridging intention with reality.

The plight of China's most cherished animal highlights the importance of addressing the fundamentals underlying the country's ecological crisis, including: proper ownership regimes for natural resources; science-based spatial planning that ensures the integrity of ecosystems; and a strong governance system that make sure policies are honoured on the ground.

All these elements are included in the recently announced, grand " Eco-civilisation " initiative from the top echelon of the Party. Putting those concepts into practice will be another huge task for the country's environmental policy makers and practitioners.
Cleaning up water and soil
China also made headlines this year by releasing a " 10-point water plan " in April that contains many far-sighted measures against widespread water pollution in the country. It is believed that a similar soil plan is also in the making. What is interesting about the 10-point plan is that for each action point, a leading ministry and its supporting ministries are clearly assigned.

This could be the policy-makers' way to overcome bureaucratic buck-passing that is characteristic of the Chinese system. Given the current disciplinary pressure on the Chinese officialdom, this trick might actually work.

For many years, people have been talking about a potential "turning point" in China's environmental trajectory.

With air pollution in China showing signs of mild improvement and a carbon peak almost in sight, there are reasons to believe that Chinese society might be at a tipping point of fundamental environmental transformation.

The ironic thing is that the tipping point, where every problem seems to be at its worst, is also the most uncomfortable place to be at right now.

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China's environment in 2015: a year in review

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This year saw China introduce bold new regulation to tackle its environmental crisis. But can these laws be enforced effectively?

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China's environmental crisis, the result of decades of rapid industrialization, not only threatens the health and livelihoods of the country's 1.4 billion people but also the global fight against climate change. As the world's largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in recent years, China suffers from notoriously bad air pollution. Its carbon-intensive industries have caused additional environmental challenges, including water scarcity and soil contamination. And, like the rest of the world, China will face increasingly harsh consequences of climate change in the coming decades, including flooding and droughts.

In response, Beijing has implemented policies to curb emissions and stem further degradation, such as by signing the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate and pledging to be carbon neutral by 2060. However, following through won't be easy, experts say, as the government struggles to maintain economic growth; ease public discontent; and overcome tensions with the United States, the second-largest emitter.

How high are China's greenhouse gas emissions?

China's economic rise-national gross domestic product (GDP) grew 10 percent on average each year for more than a decade-has greatly accelerated its emissions. In the past ten years, China has emitted more greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, per year than any other country in the world. It surpassed the United States as the top emitter in 2005, according to Climate Watch. (Emissions per capita in the United States are still more than double those in China.)

Coal, which makes up nearly two-thirds of China's energy consumption, is largely to blame. The country is the world's largest coal producer and accounts for about half of coal consumed globally. The government banned the construction of new coal-fired power plants in 2016, and coal use appeared to decline. However, when the ban expired in 2018, construction of new plants ramped up again. In 2020, China built over three times more [PDF] new coal-power capacity than the rest of the world combined, according to Global Energy Monitor and the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air.

China's staggering pace of urbanization has also contributed. Urbanization increases energy demands to power new manufacturing and industrial centers, and construction of these centers relies on high energy-consuming products such as cement and steel. Another contributor is the increase in cars on the road: In 2018, people in China owned 240 million vehicles, up from about 27 million in 2004.

Internationally, China is the largest financier of fossil fuel infrastructure. Through its massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has built or is planning to build hundreds of coal-fired power plants in countries around the world. More than 60 percent of BRI-specific energy financing has gone toward nonrenewable resources. Greenhouse gas emissions in more than a dozen BRI countries have soared. Researchers found in 2019 that BRI could drive the global average temperature to increase by 2.7°C, significantly higher than the Paris Agreement's goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C.

How is climate change expected to affect China?

Like the rest of the world, China will increasingly suffer over the next few decades from the effects of climate change, which include sea-level rise, stronger storms, and more intense heat waves. China's average temperature and sea levels have risen faster than the global average, according to a 2020 report from China's National Climate Center.

Some of China's coastal cities, such as Shanghai, could be submerged if the global average temperature continues to rise. An estimated forty-three million people in China live on land that could be underwater by the end of the century if the global average temperature rises by 2°C.

Additionally, experts predict that China will experience more frequent extreme weather events, such as heavy rainfall. Every year, natural disasters kill hundreds of Chinese people and destroy millions of acres of crops. As temperatures rise, China's glaciers will continue to melt at an alarming rate, which will likely lead to more devastating floods. Extreme heat events and droughts will also become more common.

What is China doing to reduce its emissions?

President Xi Jinping has recognized climate change as one of his administration's top concerns, and Beijing has made a variety of pledges to address it. These include:

achieving carbon neutrality by 2060;

reaching peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030;

having renewable energy sources account for 25 percent of total energy consumption by 2030;

reducing carbon intensity, or the amount of carbon emitted per unit of GDP, by more than 65 percent by 2030;

installing enough solar and wind power generators to have a combined capacity of 1.2 billion kilowatts by 2030; and,

boosting forest coverage by around six billion cubic meters by 2030.

However, experts say many of these goals aren't ambitious enough and point out that they don't align with each other or with the Paris Agreement. For example, China would need to reach peak emissions by 2025 at the latest to be in line with the Paris accord's goal.

Transitioning from coal to renewable energy is critical to China's efforts, and the country has already made some progress. In 2019, renewables accounted for nearly 15 percent of China's energy mix, compared to 7 percent a decade earlier. China has used hydropower for years, and it is installing more solar panels and wind power generators as the world's leading manufacturer of those technologies. It is also boosting its nuclear power capacity, with seventeen reactors under construction as of mid-2021. Moreover, Beijing and some provinces are incentivizing electric vehicle use. In 2020, 1.37 million so-called new energy vehicles-which include battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles-were sold in China, a nearly 11 percent increase from the previous year. Still, experts point out that the vast majority of electricity for such vehicles is produced with fossil fuels.

Like the European Union and several other countries, China is working to launch a national emissions trading scheme, which would force polluters to pay for environmental harm and thus incentivize them to reduce their emissions. It would initially focus on coal- and gas-fired power plants. However, the rollout has been delayed since the scheme was first announced in 2017, and many details remain unclear.

Even if China reaches its domestic goals, its financing of nonrenewable energy projects abroad through BRI could make it "much harder for the planet to curb climate change," says American University's Judith Shapiro, coauthor of the book China Goes Green: Coercive Environmentalism for a Troubled Planet. Beijing has attempted to make BRI more environmentally sustainable by announcing environmental standards, but so far these have only been voluntary.

How has China cooperated with the rest of the world on climate change?

China only recently started actively helping to formulate global responses to climate change. For decades, China resisted making commitments under the UN framework. Chinese diplomats argued that China shouldn't have to sacrifice its economic development for environmental protection and that developed countries, such as the United States, should carry more of the burden because they were able to grow their economies without limitations.

As climate change and environmental degradation became a top priority for the Chinese government, it participated more in global climate talks, eventually becoming " a leader on climate change," write CFR Fellows Yanzhong Huang and Joshua Kurlantzick. In 2016, China announced its participation in the Paris Agreement, and in the years since, it has ramped up its commitments.

China has been open to working with other countries. Environmental ministers from Japan and South Korea, whose governments have expressed concerns about smog and acid rain that crosses their countries' borders from China, have held yearly meetings with their Chinese counterparts. The European Union agreed to support China's implementation of its emissions trading scheme. India, the world's third-largest emitter, has signed climate agreements with China, but heightened tensions in 2020-21 raised doubts about future collaboration.

Have China and the United States worked together?

Despite deep-seated political and economic tensions, the rivals have worked together in the past and experts see opportunities for future cooperation. Under the Barack Obama administration, the countries expanded collaboration among Chinese and American companies, scientists, and experts on clean energy and carbon-capture technologies. In 2014, they jointly announced commitments to reduce emissions.

Much of that cooperation stopped under President Donald Trump, who took a confrontational stance toward Beijing and questioned the science of climate change.

President Joe Biden, who has committed to reducing U.S. emissions and restoring American leadership on climate change, has said engagement with China is essential. In April 2021, during a visit to Shanghai by Biden's climate envoy, John Kerry, the two countries agreed to make more ambitious pledges under the Paris accord. Days later, Xi participated in a U.S.-hosted virtual climate summit. At the same time, the Biden administration has emphasized competition with Beijing, including aims to boost U.S. clean energy industries in response to China's dominance in that area.

What other environmental challenges does China face?

Carbon-intensive industries often harm the environment in additional ways. Climate change can further exacerbate environmental challenges, including air pollution, water scarcity, and desertification.

Air pollution. Increased public awareness of China's notoriously low air quality in the past decade-especially after Beijing suffered a prolonged bout of smog in 2013 that was so severe that citizens dubbed it an "airpocalypse"-has sparked government action. A plan released later in 2013 ordered cities to lower concentrations of tiny hazardous particles known as PM2.5 and directed local governments to implement tougher controls on pollution and coal use. As a result, much of China has seen a significant drop in air pollution. But many regions continue to experience stretches of extreme pollution, and hundreds of mostly northern cities still suffer from high levels of PM2.5.

Water insecurity. China is home to about 20 percent of the world's population but only 7 percent of its freshwater sources. Overuse has led to severe shortages, and industry along China's major water sources has polluted supplies. Construction of hydropower dams along major rivers has also damaged ecosystems. The government released a plan in 2015 for preventing water pollution that included placing controls on polluting industries. The quality of surface waters-bodies such as lakes, rivers, and streams- has since improved. However, groundwater continues to fall short of targets, with more than 80 percent categorized as "bad to very bad."

Desertification. More than one-quarter of China's arable land is becoming desert due to the water crisis, negligent farming practices, overgrazing, and the effects of climate change. The government has responded by planting billions of trees, among other measures to increase vegetation. Desertified land is now shrinking on average by nearly one thousand square miles each year, according to government figures.

Soil pollution. The government estimated in 2014 that nearly one-fifth of arable land is contaminated. This has consequences for China's food security: An estimated 12 million tons of the 664 million tons of grain produced annually are polluted by heavy metals. Chemical factories and other industrial sites are mainly to blame, but trash, electronic waste, rare-earth-metal mining, overuse of pesticides, and contaminated water also contribute. In 2019, China's first comprehensive law to prevent soil pollution took effect, requiring polluters to limit their output or pay for contamination. Two years later, China banned the import of all waste from other countries.

Nuclear waste. China has not suffered a nuclear accident in its three decades of operating nuclear power plants, but some experts are concerned [PDF] that the risk will rise as the country ramps up new construction and as existing plants age.

How does pollution affect China's population?

Pollution of the air, water, and soil has major consequences for the health and livelihoods of China's massive population. It has been linked to acute and chronic disease and preventable death.

"China cannot regain its greatness in the world if its people continue to breathe polluted air, drink toxic water, and eat tainted food."

Yanzhong Huang,

Air pollution contributes to an estimated 1.1 million premature deaths in China annually. Epidemiological studies conducted since the 1980s suggest that poor air quality in northern Chinese cities causes significant health complications [PDF], including respiratory, cardiovascular, and cerebrovascular diseases. An estimated sixty thousand people in China die of illnesses caused by water pollution every year.

Moreover, environmental issues cost the economy billions of dollars each year, with some recent estimates putting the toll at up to 10 percent of GDP. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment calculated the cost of pollution to be around 1.5 trillion RMB ($227 billion), or roughly 3.5 percent of GDP, in 2010. (The ministry only releases such figures intermittently.)

Is this a threat to the Chinese Communist Party?

CFR's Huang argues in his book Toxic Politics: China's Environmental Health Crisis and Its Challenge to the Chinese State that pollution and environmental degradation are among the "biggest obstacles to China's future economic growth and political stability." The government's failure to meaningfully address pollution could lead citizens to question the legitimacy of China's leaders and political system, he writes.

Indeed, as public awareness of environmental degradation has increased over the past two decades, public dissatisfaction and the number of petitions and protests have grown. Citizens have organized hundreds of protests, including in the cities of Guangdong, Kunming, Shanghai, and Wuhan. In 2013, the number of " abrupt environmental incidents," including protests, rose to 712, a 31 percent jump from the previous year. Citizen petitions related to environmental issues increased from 1.05 million in 2011 to 1.77 million in 2015.

Environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have pushed the government to confront problems. Thousands of these groups-domestically based but often working with foreign counterparts-have advocated for transparency, investigated suspected corruption, and led grassroots campaigns. They have had some success, taking advantage of a 2015 law that made it easier to file cases against polluters.

But the Chinese Communist Party fears activism could catalyze democratic social change, and so has constrained the efforts of organizations, activists, and grassroots movements. For example, a 2016 law made it harder for international NGOs to work in China. Under Xi, the government has shown more resolve to crack down on public dissent, including by arresting activists and censoring documentaries and social media commentary.

The government's inability to curb pollution could damage China's international standing, experts say. "China cannot regain its greatness in the world if its people continue to breathe polluted air, drink toxic water, and eat tainted food," writes Huang.

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China's Fight Against Climate Change and Environmental Degradation

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China's environmental crisis, the result of decades of rapid industrialization, not only threatens the health and livelihoods of the country's 1.4 billion people but also the global fight against climate change. As the world's largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in recent years, China suffers from notoriously bad air pollution.