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Genocidal politics and the Somali famine

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Genocidal politics and the Somali famine

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Somali militia, as well as other armed forces active in the region, have played a major role in creating the conditions for the current famine in Somalia [EPA]

Droughts are common in the Somali peninsula, but only an exceptional one produces famine. For instance, the Horn of Africa drought of 1984 did not produce famine in Somalia, while the Ethiopian population was devastated. The latter country suffered famine because the military government of the time was engaged in a civil war, and did not come to the rescue of its people.

Ten years earlier, in the mid-1970s, there was a prolonged drought, known as " dabadeer" ["the long-tailed"], in several parts of Somalia. Fortunately, this drought did not lead to mass starvation because the Somali government moved quickly to assist the people. They mobilised the population and sought the assistance of international allies to deliver food and water to the needy.

Somalia's last major famine was in 1992 and was not caused by drought. Nearly 300,000 innocent people starved to death because of sectarian politics. The epicentre of that famine was in Bay, one of the country's most productive agricultural regions, and starvation was induced by warlords who used food as a weapon against farmers and pastoralists.

Marauding gangs had invaded the region after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and looted farmers' harvests. The country's major warlord wanted to capture the region, so did not allow food aid to reach the desperate population. Reports told of unimaginable suffering long before TV images of ruined lives reached millions around the world. It was only then that US president George HW Bush decided to send US troops to the country to enable food to reach the indigent population.

The climatic record show that droughts frequently occur in the Somali peninsula, but have not produced famines over the past fifty years, until 2011. However, the UN and other international actors have been arguing about the devastating drought in the area for nearly a year, while only a handful of scholars and activists were alarmed by the creeping famine. What thoughtful people must ask is: "Why famine now?"
Who is to blame?

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The Somali people in the affected regions have been made vulnerable to ecological disturbances because of several political and military forces. These include the US "War on Terror", the al-Shabaab terrorist group, Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and its continuous political and military involvement there, and finally East Africa's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the UN.

These actors have created circumstances in which local food resources were exhausted and assistance from outside was denied or delayed until tens of thousands of people starved.

Exactly what role did each of these forces play in manufacturing the famine? First, the US agenda in Somalia has been to fight what it calls "Islamic terrorists", and al-Shabaab in particular. Since the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and especially since 9/11, clandestine operations were conducted to snatch "terrorists" and dry up their support base in Somalia. These operations sought assistance from several of Mogadishu's warlords, who formed the "Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism" in 2005.

Somalis despised this alliance and their patron, and ultimately turned against them under the leadership of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. The UIC defeated the warlords, restored peace to Mogadishu for the first time in 15 years, and brought most of southern Somalia under its ambit.

Consequently, the US and its Ethiopian ally claimed that these Islamists were terrorists and therefore a menace to the region. In contrast, the vast majority of Somalis supported the UIC and pleaded with the international community to engage them peacefully. But the peace did not last. The US-supported Ethiopian invasion begun in December 2006 and displaced more than a million people and killed close to 15,000 civilians. Those displaced then are part of today's famine victims. Somalia counterattacked, and Ethiopia was compelled to withdraw the bulk of its troops from Somalia. But the dynamics generated by the Ethiopian invasion continue to destabilise the country.

Second, IGAD and the international community picked up where the Ethiopians left off, by designing a new TFG - led by the faction of the UICs most amenable to the international community, and particularly to the US agenda. The new regime marginalised the forces that compelled Ethiopia to withdraw from Somalia. Consequently, the TFG came to control only those areas in Mogadishu under the command of the African Union force.

A new civil war ensued between the TFG and its opponents, and within a month much of southern Somalia fell under the sway of al-Shabaab and its affiliates. Once in power, the TFG became known for its corruption, incompetence, and internal strife. Propped up by the international community, the regime in Mogadishu has been oblivious to the growing crisis, which ultimately led to the death of nearly 80,000 of its "citizens". It has yet to articulate a plan of actions to rescue its population. Engulfed in an internal power struggle, the regime has failed to put aside sectarian politics to save the population.
Al-Shabaab fails to govern

The drought was declared a famine when "it was no longer possible to conceal the deaths of almost 80,000 people from starvation"

Third, al-Shabaab - originally the youth wing of the UIC - declared its affiliation with al-Qaeda, and were identified as a terrorist group by the UN and the US, and have been consequently targeted by US forces. The UN and the US have blocked food shipment to the areas that al-Shabaab controls in order to deny them these supplies. Al-Shabaab wants to establish an Islamic state, but unfortunately, it has failed to put in place even the most rudimentary infrastructure to govern the region or provide services.

Furthermore, al-Shabaab has denied the population the opportunity to organise itself to meet the challenges of the livelihood crisis. Thus, despite the fact that the two epicentres (Lower Shabeele and Bakool) of the famine are in al-Shabaab hands, they have failed to appeal even to the Islamic world for assistance. Most insidiously, they continue to deny the existence of significant famine conditions in the area and have consequently reneged on the permission they recently gave to the world community to deliver food to the starving.

Normally, societies have three lines of defence against mass starvation: local capacity, national government and the international community. When a disaster hits a region, the first help comes from local administrations and the communities themselves. If events overwhelm the first responders, then the national government takes charge of operations; and when the crisis exceeds the wherewithal of the nation, international actors come to the rescue.

It is clear that all three levels of livelihood protections have failed in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has prohibited the local population from organising their municipal governments and charities to fend off the disaster. Similarly, Somalia's national government, which is beholden to sectarian leadership and international patrons, has been oblivious to the emerging calamity, and has thwarted the international community from coming to its aid.

The African Union, the UN, the EU, and the US continued to describe the famine as a drought until July 18, when it was no longer possible to conceal the deaths of almost 80,000 people from starvation. The United States and its allies have been so obsessed with defeating al-Shabaab that they have ignored the fate of the millions of people who live in areas controlled by al-Shabaab.

Finally, callous uses of military and political power by all actors against poor people have produced a catastrophic famine. Altering the behaviour of the powerful would be tantamount to a revolution. But before such a transformation can be imagined, lives must be saved by immediately dropping food and water in villages and settlements in the region. Such urgent distribution of life's necessities will keep people in their homes before a humane scheme of reconstruction could begin.

What is ultimately required is the establishment, by Somalis with the genuine assistance of others, of a national government that is accountable to the people. Such a government is the best defence against famine, as well as against terrorism.
Abdi Ismail Samatar is a professor of geography at the University of Minnesota and a research fellow at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Abdi Ismail Samatar

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Genocidal politics and the Somali famine

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Somali militia, as well as other armed forces active in the region, have played a major role in creating the conditions for the current famine in Somalia [EPA] Droughts are common in the Somali peninsula, but only an exceptional one produces famine.

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"The worst humanitarian disaster in the world today," were the words used to describe Somalia by Andrew Natsios, the former director of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). 1 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is spending 20% of its entire worldwide budget on assistance to Somalia, has come to the same conclusion.

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CJA runs a lean and efficient operation, but this work is not simple. Countless hours are required from investigators, researchers, interpreters and lawyers - many of whom volunteer their time. As a result, every dollar you give has 2-4x the impact!

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Bibliography of Background Sources from Library Databases

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Bibliography of Background Sources from Library Databases

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(with apologies for less than totally perfect MLA citation!)
Abdullahi,M. (2004). Somalia: 1990 to the present. In Kevin Shillington (Ed.), Encyclopedia of African history. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.lmunet.edu/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com.ezproxy.lmunet.edu/content/entry/routafricanhistory/somalia_1990_to_the_present/0

Graff,Ann-Barbara. "Ben Okri." British Novelists Since 1960: Fourth Series. Ed. Merritt Moseley. Detroit: Gale Group, 2001. Dictionary of Literary Biography Vol. 231. Literature Resource Center. Web. 25 Sept. 2014.

Hemminger, Bill. "The Way of the Spirit." Research in African Literatures 32.1 (Spring 2001): 66-82. Rpt. in Short Story Criticism. Ed. Jelena O. Krstovic. Vol. 127. Detroit: Gale, 2010. Literature Resource Center. Web. 25 Sept. 2014.

Okri, Ben."An African Biographical Dictionary. Amenia: Grey House Publishing, 2006. Credo Reference. Web. 24 September 2014.

"Overview:'In the Shadow of War'." Short Stories for Students. Ed. Ira Mark Milne. Vol. 20. Detroit: Gale, 2005. Literature Resource Center. Web. 29 Sept. 2014.

"Somalia,United Nations Intervention in (1991-1995)." Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2002. Credo Reference. Web. 26 September 2014.

Somalia conflict. (2004). In The great American history fact-finder. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.lmunet.edu/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com.ezproxy.lmunet.edu/content/entry/hmgahff/somalia_conflict/0

The colonial legacy. (2003). In Nigeria's diverse peoples: A reference sourcebook. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.lmunet.edu/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/abcnigeria/the_colonial_legacy/0

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Hunger and poverty in Ethiopia: local perceptions of famine and famine response

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Hunger and poverty in Ethiopia: local perceptions of famine and famine response

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Famine Ravages Somalia in a World Less Likely to Intervene

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Famine Ravages Somalia in a World Less Likely to Intervene

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"There's no mood for intervention," said one American official, who was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. "People remember what happened in the 1990s. 'It doesn't work' was the conclusion."

Foreign military force, analysts say, has never succeeded in solving Somalia's problems and it is not going to solve them now. This famine is not just about the Shabab's blocking food aid. It is about a broken state and the human wreckage it is causing.

Take Mogadishu, the capital. The Shabab more or less pulled out in August, leaving Somalia's transitional government in control of large swathes of the city, including the sprawling camp for displaced refugees. But government "control" - and that term seems more aspirational than meaningful - does not translate into a smooth aid operation. Instead, government soldiers have looted aid trucks and shot starving people.

Somalia's politicians have been too busy squabbling with one another to build institutions like a functioning health ministry or a sanitation department that would help drought victims. Some of the informal clusters of people in Mogadishu camped out for aid are already breaking up, and it is not clear where the displaced people are trudging to. Many aid agencies - and Western militaries - are justifiably wary of this environment, and so far the response to the famine has been well short of what is needed to stem the crisis.

"I don't think that there's a case to be made that the famine can be mitigated through military intervention," said Bronwyn E. Bruton, a democracy and governance expert who wrote a provocative essay published by the Council on Foreign Relations urging the West to withdraw from Somalia.

The African Union, which has 9,000 peacekeepers in Mogadishu, "isn't able to safeguard the delivery of aid in Mogadishu," Ms. Bruton said. "How could they possibly extend their reach outside the capital?"

"Theft, corruption and violence are endemic," she added. "The problem extends past Al Shabab to anybody with a gun."

In Somalia, there are many of them. This was the problem in the 1990s. The United Nations urged American forces to disarm the warlords and their flip-flop-clad militias, but the Pentagon did not want to risk many American lives to do that. Instead, the United States opted for a narrowly scoped intervention and then hastily withdrew after 18 servicemen were killed in an epic street battle immortalized in the "Black Hawk Down" book and movie (and video game). According to a study by the Refugee Policy Group, the American-led operation and the attendant relief effort saved around 110,000 lives, while 240,000 were lost to the famine.

It is grim math, especially considering how enormous the aid operation was. The Refugee Policy Group study has a graph showing famine casualties, which tend to come in two spikes: one at the onset of the crisis, before the bulk of aid arrives; the other when the rains come. For the current famine, analysts are now bracing for possibly hundreds of thousands of deaths.

"We've lost this round," said Ken Menkhaus, a political science professor at Davidson College. "The numbers are going to be horrifying. We're too late."

Famines do not turn on a dime. Bodies are depleted by months of malnutrition and stress. Many Somalis, as evidenced by the throngs of half-living people stumbling into the camps in Mogadishu or the ones here in Dolo, a little town on the Ethiopian border, are too far gone.

"One or two people are surviving from each family," said Lul Mahamoud Ali, a mother of four who recently arrived from a famine-stricken village. Her children were listless and glassy-eyed, and Mrs. Lul carried with her all she owned - a thin mattress, a red mat and a wooden chest, which was empty.

Mr. Menkhaus worked as an aid consultant in Somalia in the 1990s and said: "Back then, we were just making it up as we went along. Today it's so much more scientific."

For instance, the American government has helped set up the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, which tracks everything from rainfall to the price of goats to forecast potential famines worldwide. This has helped aid groups pre-position food in Somalia and prepare for the deluge of refugees, though it seems that few anticipated just how bad this famine would be.

Another lesson learned was how to feed people. The approach in the 1990s was to flood Somalia with food aid, which empowered militias, set off conflict between them and created a flourishing criminal network of war profiteers who stood to make millions off looted grain. This time around, the World Food Program and others are still handing out food, but more aid agencies are turning to cash or to food vouchers, enabling hungry people to buy their own supplies, which is intended to encourage private enterprise and not make enemies of Somalia's powerful businessmen.

The other day, Chris Smoot, an official with the World Vision aid group, arrived in Dolo with a thick book of food vouchers. He presented them to the young district commissioner, who sat in a twig hut and revealed that he had little experience in dealing with emergencies and little schooling.

"Imagine," Mr. Smoot said. "You're 35 years old, you have a primary school education, you're the D.C., and now you're confronted with this?"

Twenty years after the central government collapsed, this is the story across so much of Somalia. And given the world's limited interest in a major intervention, that is not likely to change anytime soon.

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Famine Hits Somalia in World Less Likely to Intervene

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"There's no mood for intervention," said one American official, who was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter. "People remember what happened in the 1990s. 'It doesn't work' was the conclusion." Foreign military force, analysts say, has never succeeded in solving Somalia's problems and it is not going to solve them now.

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Poet and novelist Ben Okri was born in 1959 in Minna, northern Nigeria, to an Igbo mother and Urhobo father. He grew up in London before returning to Nig...

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Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993: Recalling Air Mobility Operations in Somalia

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Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993: Recalling Air Mobility Operations in Somalia

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Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993: Recalling Air Mobility Operations in Somalia - Air Power History | HighBeam Research

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ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In 1992, Somalia was already a failed state. An earlier and... | Article from Air Power History June 22, 2013

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Ben OKRI - Informations about Ben OKRI sur African Success, Literature , about his business, the actions in Africa,...

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In Somalia, new famine born of out of old failures

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In Somalia, new famine born of out of old failures

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Since 1991, clan warfare has besieged Somalia. The United Nations has called the current situation in Somalia the "world's worst humanitarian disaster." At the end of January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was elected President of Somalia with the hope that his administration will bring stability to Somalia and implement the Djibouti Peace Process of 2000. However, violence has continued unabated. At the end of 2009, nearly 700,000 Somalis were under the responsibility of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, constituting the third largest refugee group in the world after war-afflicted Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively.

The Republic of Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa. It shares a border with Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, and touches the Gulf of Aden to the North, and the Indian Ocean to the East. Mogadishu, the capital city, is in the southeastern part of the country, along the coast of the Indian Ocean.

In 1991, after the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland in the northwestern area of Somalia. Although not recognized by any government, Somaliland has remained stable, and leaders continue to try to establish a constitutional democracy.

Puntland is a self-declared, self-governing autonomous state in the northeastern area of Somalia. There have been efforts to create a legitimate, representative government, but this has not been without civil strife. There are border disputes between Puntland and neighboring Somaliland.

In 1991, the Somali government was overthrown by opposing clans. The clans failed to agree on a replacement for the national leader and Somalia plunged into turmoil, clan warfare, and lawlessness. Power struggles between clan warlords displaced, wounded, and killed thousands of civilians.

In August 2000, clan elders and other lead figures appointed Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president and set up a transitional government at a conference in Djibouti. The goal was to reconcile warring militias, but, as its mandate drew to a close, the Somali administration had made little progress.

A two-year peace process, led by the Government of Kenya, ended in October 2004. During the talks, the main warlords and politicians signed an agreement to set up a new parliament. They elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, and formed an interim government, known as the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). The TFIs were created based on the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which suggests the government follow a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government following national elections. The new administration was Somalia's fourteenth attempt to establish a central government since 1991.

The transitional government's authority was further compromised in 2006 by the rise of militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts. These militias gained control of much of the south, including Mogadishu, after they kicked out the clan warlords that had ruled for the past fifteen years.

In September of 2006, the transitional government and the Union of Islamic Courts began peace talks in Khartoum, Sudan.

With the backing of Ethiopian troops, forces loyal to the interim administration seized control of Mogadishu from the Islamists at the end of 2006. Islamists abandoned their last stronghold in January 2007, and President Abdullahi Yusuf was able to enter Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004.

In February-March of 2007, Islamist insurgents fought back against the government and Ethiopian forces, regaining control of most of southern Somalia by late 2008.

Ethiopia withdrew all of its troops by January 2009. As this happened, fighters from the Islamist radical militia group Al-Shabab took control of the town of Baidoa, formerly a key stronghold of the transitional government.

In late January 2009, Somalia's parliament met in Djibouti to swear in 149 new members from the main opposition movement, Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. The Parliament elected a moderate Islamist, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, president, and extended the transitional government's mandate until 2011. While not completely in control, the government continues to help build capacity to work toward national elections. In February, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke became prime minister. A former diplomat, he is seen as a bridge between Islamists within the Somali government and the international community.

In May 2009, the government was set back again when Islamist insurgents launched an attack on Mogadishu. President Ahmed declared a state of emergency and appealed for help from abroad. Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said Ethiopia would intervene in Somalia if the situation starts to impose a national security threat to his country, and troops are present, with arms and support provided by the United States.

On October 21st, 2010, the African Union appealed to the United Nations for an air and naval blockade of Somalia. The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security insisted that such an action was necessary to curb the flow of weapons to Islamist militants in the region, and also called for a total of 20,000 AU peacekeepers to be deployed to Somalia, up from the current deployment of 8,000 peacekeepers.

In 2011, the UN declared famine in three regions of Somalia. Al-Shabab allowed the UN to deliver aid to Mogadishu for the first time in five years. The militants pulled out of Mogadishu later that year for "tactical reasons."

Somalia swore in its first formal parliament in over 20 years at the Mogadishu airport in August 2012. In September, MPs elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud president in the first presidential election since 1967. Al-Shabab lost critical strongholds in Baidoa, Afgoye, Merca, and Kismayo that year.

Violence by Islamist militants increased between 2013 and 2015. In 2013, Al-Shabab carried out attacks on Somalia's presidential palace and a UN compound in Mogadishu. The militants carried out attacks on Kenyan civilians for their military involvement in Somalia. Over 120 Kenyans were killed between 2013 and 2014. In 2015, Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for killing 148 Kenyan students at Garissa University College.

In 2017, parliament elected former prime minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed as president. While militants still pose a substantial threat to Somalia's security, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said conditions are now in place for Somalia to become a success story. Nearly 50,000 Somali refugees are returning from Kenya, but extreme drought has displaced over 615,000 people since November 2016.

Somali insurgents, the transitional government's armed forces, and intervening Ethiopian troops have destroyed the lives of tens of thousands civilians throughout the country, particularly in Mogadishu, with bombings and crimes against humanity. These violations include indiscriminate attacks, killings, rape, use of civilians as human shields, and looting. More than 1 million people have been displaced, and aid agencies report that some 4 million people in Somalia - or about one-third of the population - need food aid. Increasing attacks on aid workers in the past year have severely limited relief operations and contributed to an emerging humanitarian crisis.

In 1992, U.S. Marines landed near Mogadishu ahead of a U.N. peacekeeping force sent to restore order and safeguard relief supplies. Somali militias shot down two U.S. helicopters. Eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed, beheaded, and paraded through the streets. The battle that ensued between U.S. forces and Somali militias killed hundreds of Somalis. This tragedy, known in the US as 'Blackhawk Down,' refers to the name of the helicopters used by the Marines. The loss of the U.S. soldiers resulted in then-President Clinton being exhorted to refrain from subsequent involvement in African affairs. To a large extent, Blackhawk Down's legacy influenced the US to refrain from intervention of any sort during the genocide in Rwanda two years later.

Following the arrival of the U.S. Marines, a two-year U.N. humanitarian effort attempted to relieve famine conditions in the country. The U.N. mission withdrew shortly thereafter, having suffered significant casualties.

In December 2006, a U.N. Security Council resolution endorsed African peacekeepers. Islamist leaders reacted by saying that they would view foreign forces as invaders. The African Union and Arab League urged Ethiopia to pull out its troops, but failed, and a joint Ethiopian and Somali government force captured Mogadishu.

Beginning in February 2007, the U.N. Security Council authorized a six-month African Union peacekeeping mission for Somalia. The previous U.N. force had withdrawn in 2005.

In October 2007, Ethiopian forces fired on demonstrators in Mogadishu protesting at the presence of what they called foreign invaders. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said that he would keep troops inside Somalia until "jihadists" were defeated. In June 2008, the government signed a three-month ceasefire pact with opposition Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia. The deal, which said that Ethiopian troops would leave Somalia within 120 days, was rejected by Islamist leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, who said that the Union of Islamic Courts would not stop fighting until all foreign troops left the country. In December Ethiopia announced plans to withdraw all forces by end of 2008, which was completed by January 2009. However, Ethiopian troops returned to the central town of Guriel by 2011.

The US carried out air strikes in southern Somalia in 2007, targeting suspected Al-Qaeda members. Though the strikes were supported and defended by President Yusuf, they ultimately ended up killing innocent civilians.

In 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia. The United States began flying drones from a base in Ethiopia. The next year, Al-Shabab lost their hold on all major cities. Baidoa, Afgoye, Merca, and Kismayo were recaptured by Kenyan, African Union, and Somali government forces.

After increased attacks on Kenyan civilians, the US killed Al-Shabab's leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, in a drone strike in 2014.

Overall, this conflict has involved a number of different international organizations, such as the UN, the AU, and the EU. Multiple countries have also taken part in the conflict itself or in seeking resolution including the United States, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Italy, among others. Despite the attempts at resolution, however, the violence continues. With so many factions and interests involved, and such a long history of turmoil, finding a solution to the conflict remains a complex and complicated process.

Download a one page PDF summary of this information here.
This page was created by Guled Ibrahim, J.D., World Without Genocide Associate.

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Since 1991, clan warfare has besieged Somalia. The United Nations has called the current situation in Somalia the "world's worst humanitarian disaster." At the end of January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was elected President of Somalia with the hope that his administration will bring stability to Somalia and implement the Djibouti Peace Process of 2000.

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"I found this particular article about US/UN intervention in Somalia that sheds some light on the famine and political issues faced in the 1990's. In Okri's story, he points out that rival clans stole much needed food from those attempting to provide relief. Reading this article gave me some insight into our country's stance on the issue at the time, which was kind of shocking, but somewhat understandable considering the circumstance." - Clarissa
Somalia conflict. (2004). In The great American history fact-finder. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.lmunet.edu/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com.ezproxy.lmunet.edu/content/entry/hmgahff/somalia_conflict/0

U.S./U.N. military intervention. Years of civil war and a devastating famine in Somalia led the United Nations (U.N.) to officially begin to provide humanitarian relief for the nation in 1992. When the U.N. asked its members for assistance, President George H. W. Bush, in one of his last acts as president, sent more than 25,000 U.S. troops in a deployment called Operation Restore Hope. Objectives to restore trade routes and provide security for the safe passage of relief supplies were somewhat successful, but incidents of violence continued among warring clans and against U.S. and U.N. peacekeepers. Although newly elected President Bill Clinton supported the action in Somalia, he ordered the number of U.S. troops reduced in preparation for a transition to a U.N. peacekeeping force in May 1993. U.N. efforts to reestablish a central government were unsuccessful, due largely to forcible resistance by Somali clan leader Mohammad Farah Aidid. Months of attacks and efforts to capture Aidid climaxed in October 1993 in the capital city of Mogadishu when eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed and eighty-four were wounded by Somali militiamen. International news reports showed bodies of the dead Americans dragged through the streets, and President Clinton responded by withdrawing U.S. troops from Somalia. Clan-based fighting increased in 1994 as the United States and other nations withdrew their forces; the last U.N. peacekeepers left the following year.

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"Since Okri is originally from Nigeria, I did research on Nigeria in the 1960s and found some pretty supportive evidence as to why Okri talked about death and famine." - Kendra

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Five weeks after its secession from Nigeria, the breakaway Republic of Biafra is attacked by Nigerian government forces.

In 1960, Nigeria gained independence from Britain. Six years later, the Muslim Hausas in northern Nigeria began massacring the Christian Igbos in the region, prompting tens of thousands of Igbos to flee to the east, where their people were the dominant ethnic group. The Igbos doubted that Nigeria's oppressive military government would allow them to develop, or even survive, so on May 30, 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu and other non-Igbo representatives of the area established the Republic of Biafra, comprising several states of Nigeria.

After diplomatic efforts by Nigeria failed to reunite the country, war between Nigeria and Biafra broke out in July 1967. Ojukwu's forces made some initial advances, but Nigeria's superior military strength gradually reduced Biafran territory. The state lost its oil fields-its main source of revenue-and without the funds to import food, an estimated one million of its civilians died as a result of severe malnutrition. On January 11, 1970, Nigerian forces captured the provincial capital of Owerri, one of the last Biafran strongholds, and Ojukwu was forced to flee to the Ivory Coast. Four days later, Biafra surrendered to Nigeria.

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Civil war in Nigeria - Jul 06, 1967 - HISTORY.com

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Five weeks after its secession from Nigeria, the breakaway Republic of Biafra is attacked by Nigerian government forces. In 1960, Nigeria gained independence from Britain. Six years later, the Muslim Hausas in northern Nigeria began massacring the Christian Igbos in the region, prompting tens of thousands of Igbos to flee to the east, where their people were the dominant ethnic group.

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Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has condemned a series of air strikes by British, French and US forces on targets in Syria.

"Bombs won't save lives or bring about peace," Corbyn said in a statement, calling the strikes, which were undertaken without a vote in Parliament, "legally questionable" and saying that they risk escalating the conflict further. "Britain should be playing a leadership role to bring about a ceasefire in the conflict, not taking instructions from Washington and putting British military personnel in harm's way."

In the early hours of Saturday morning prime minister Theresa May confirmed that she authorised British armed forces to conduct strikes co-ordinated with France and the US against the Assad regime. The object of the strikes, May said, is to "degrade" the Syrian regime's chemical weapons capability, after reports that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against the population of a rebel-held area.

In a statement the Prime Minister said: "In Douma, last Saturday a chemical weapons attack killed up to 75 people, including young children, in circumstances of pure horror. The fact of this attack should surprise no-one. The Syrian Regime has a history of using chemical weapons against its own people in the most cruel and abhorrent way."

There was a "significant body of information" pointing to the regime, she added. The UK had pursued diplomatic means to prevent the use of such weapons, she said, but had been continually thwarted, most recently this week when the Russians vetoed a Resolution at the UN Security Council which would have established an independent investigation into the Douma attack.

Fire lit up the night sky near Damascus as missiles struck on the outskirts of the city. According to US authorities, the target was a research facility that had been used to develop chemical weapons. Two other strikes hit chemical weapons storage facilities, general Joseph Dunford, the chair of the US joint chiefs of staff, told reporters Friday after president Trump gave a brief statement announcing the strikes.

Trump singled out Russia for specific criticism in his statement. "In 2013 President Putin and his government promised the world that they would guarantee the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons. Assad's recent attack and today's response are the direct result of Russia's failure to keep that promise" Trump said. "Russia must decide if it will continue down this dark path or if it will join with civilised nations as a force for stability and peace.Hopefully some day we'll get along with Russia and maybe even with Iran."

"But maybe not," the President added.

It is unclear whether Russia, whose government supports the Assad regime, was forewarned of the strike specifically, though Trump had tweeted during the week that missiles were "coming". Anatoly Antonov, the Russian ambassador to the US, said darkly on Friday that "such actions will not be left without consequences."

May sought to downplay parallels to British intervention in Iraq and Libya, saying: "This is not about intervening in a civil war. It is not about regime change. It is about a limited and targeted strike that does not further escalate tensions in the region and that does everything possible to prevent civilian casualties.ust defend the global rules and standards that keep us all safe."

The prospect of airstrikes has been clear since Donald Trump released a series of tweets, one of which referred to Bashar al-Assad as a "Gas Killing Animal".

US defence secretary James Mattis said that if Assad does not use chemical weapons again then the strikes would be a "one-time shot".

But president Donald Trump appeared to have regime change in mind, hitting out at Assad in his speech from the White House announcing the strikes. "The evil and the despicable attack left mothers and fathers, infants and children, thrashing in pain and gasping for air. These are not the actions of a man; they are crimes of a monster instead," Trump said.

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Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has condemned a series of air strikes by British, French and US forces on targets in Syria. "Bombs won't save lives or bring about peace," Corbyn said in a statement, calling the strikes, which were undertaken without a vote in Parliament, "legally questionable" and saying that they risk escalating the conflict further.