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POP CULTURAL ARTEFACT ANALYSIS TOPIC 02.2

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POP CULTURAL ARTEFACT ANALYSIS TOPIC 02.2

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Medium: Song/music

Artist: Various - Jung-kook (BTS), Yenny Park (Wonder Girls) and more along with prominent South Korean politicians like the Yong Pyo Hong, then Unification Minister, Moo-sung Kim, former leader of the right-wing Saenuri (renamed Liberty Korea) Party and Moon Jae-in, leader of the opposition New Politics Alliance for Democracy Party and now the current president of South Korea

Title: One Dream, One Korea

Released: 4 October 2015 (link)

The title One Dream, One Korea clearly implies a song about the reunification of what are currently two separate and starkly different Koreas; this is reinforced by the repetition of the word ‘we’ to refer to both North and South Korea as a single entity along with the word unification as one of the lyrics. Whilst not a likely inspiration, the simple lyrics of the song do fit within the framework of the 1972 July 4th Joint Communicate between North Korea’s Kim Il-sung and South Korea’s Park Chung-hee most notably in the agreement that reunification has to happen through peaceful means and must transcend political, ideological and economic differences which are wide-ranging and not very specific things. On the second point, the lyrics We were never different is best interpreted in the lens of North and South Korea sharing the same language, albeit with contrasting accents and dialects, and it is interesting that Kim and Park did not feel like it was necessary to transcend cultural differences.

The song also fits within the framework of the policy towards North Korea that Park Guen-Hye (President at the time of the song’s release) had in her campaign but did not fully follow. That policy according to the 2014 White Paper (p. 3) by the ROK Ministry of Unification was taking a strong stance against North Korea’s nuclear tests and its ‘closing of the Gaesong (Kaesong) Industrial Complex’ whilst making efforts to use dialogue to resolve long-standing issues between the two Koreas; in theory, it sounds great but in practice it is difficult to implement and yield preferable results like less and not more nuclear tests, similar to how the theme of ‘One Dream, One Korea’  is more likely to remain a dream rather than a reality so long as Kim Jong-un remains in power. Lyrics like I (ROK) want you (DPRK). Let us hold our hands is a clear message towards the North Koreas to join up with the South Koreans and become a family (one country) once again, but incrementally and not immediately, which is demonstrated in the lyrics: We will meet again one step at a time.

Just as reunification has constantly been touted by South Korean officials, it is also something of constant rhetoric in North Korea, which is why Kim Il-sung tried to take over South Korea in the early 1950s and would have succeeded had the United States not militarily intervened. In 1972 Kim Il-sung proclaimed that ‘nothing is more urgent for the Korean people than national unification’ (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2011, p. 2). The reason why this quote was chosen was that it does not distinguish between North and South Koreans, which is the central theme of the song, ‘One Dream, One Korea’. However, this is also more of the case in Pyongyang and Seoul claiming to be the legitimate government.

Bibliography

Foreign Languages Publishing House 2011, Kim Il Sung Three Charters for National Reunification, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang

Ministry of Unification 2014, White Paper on Unification, Ministry of Unification, Seoul
https://youtu.be/oEn2E1-RqnE

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Title: Collaborating with China on Common Economic and National Security Interests

To: The South Korean Ministries of Economy and Finance; Foreign Affairs and Trade, Industry and Energy, and Unification

From: Han Gon-joo

Issue: China-ROK-USA-DPRK relations

Classification: China is South Korea’s most important economic partner; the United States is South Korea’s most important strategic/security partner; it is in South Korea’s national interest to have a working relationship with both countries

Analysis: According to Yun Sun (2018, p. 168) both China and the US recognise the Republic of Korea (South Korea to most) as a strategically salient partner but ‘neither really sees South Korea as a legitimate, autonomous player’. In other words, South Korea is not an equal partner. While South Korea certainly does not have a military or economy that can match that of China or the United States, it does have some capability of having a limited foreign policy. Limited in the sense that it has to navigate the ripple effects of worlds or actions pursued by the two countries and limited in the sense that security dynamics do not lend the leeway to become more adventurous in foreign policy.

There have been times in which South Korea had to risk offending China in order to placate the US, which was the case when it agreed to install a Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system in 2017, something which President Moon was not comfortable with (Habib) but nevertheless did not oppose as the United States under current President Trump would not budge. This resulted in Beijing slapping both official and unofficial sanctions onto South Korean businesses operating in China for quite some time until concessions were made. The key takeaway from the debacle is that Seoul should always be prepared to offer alternative arrangements to placate both Beijing and Washington D.C.

From Beijing's perspective, North Korea is a ‘strategic buffer’ (ed. Freeman 2015, p. 37) to contain the US, meaning they cannot be too strong or too weak. The way in which China exerts influence over North Korea is through economic power, which is considerable since eighty per cent of North Korea’s imports come from China and ‘Beijing has deliberately used its commercial advantage to exert influence over Pyongyang’ (ed. Freeman 2015, p. 39) but often not in the way the US and ROK would like, and the latter has always been able to avoid being a puppet of Beijing even though their long-term survival is gone if they severe economic ties with them.

Recommendations:

• Persuade the United States not to install more THAAD systems in South Korea especially since a good working relationship with China is critical for making sure North Korea is constrained in its nuclear arsenal development, but also do not remove existing the existing THAAD system

• Do not embrace China’s Belt and Road Initiative but also do not reject it in its entirety so long as there are aspects that fit within the framework of South Korea’s economic and national security interests

• Continue working with the United States to continue efforts to persuade China to persuade North Korea to further moderate their behaviour and undergo further marketisation

Strengthen existing economic partnerships with China such as the free trade agreement ratified in 2015.

Bibliography

Freeman, C.P. (ed.) 2015, China and North Korea: Strategic and Policy Perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan, New York

Sun, Y 2018 ‘The Chinese Perception of the U.S.-China-ROK Triangle’, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, pp. 166-175

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HISTORY WARS ARE OF NO BENEFIT TO JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA

Anyone who was thoroughly studied Japan’s relationship with Korea will no that it has mostly been brittle, which is evident since South Korea only began official diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965 through the Treaty on Basic Relations, which at the time was deeply unpopular among South Koreans as the scars of Japanese occupation were still prevalent for many of them. But in hindsight, it was beneficial for both countries in the long-term due to the fact they are major economic partners and are the two key allies of the United States in Northeast Asia. But while economic relations between Japan and South Korea have drastically improved, the same cannot be said for social relations.

In his lecture on the relations between Japan and the two Koreas, Euan Graham mentioned how many Japanese youth felt like they were been blamed for what Japan did long before they were born, which can be seen in how only 9.6% of 423 Japanese college students in 2001 strongly agreed that they (as individuals and/or as a generation) felt they were personally/morally responsible for the comfort women (sex slaves for Japanese soldiers) issue in World War II (Kim, MY 2014, pp. 86-87) while 13.3% strongly disagreed. The interpretation of the personal/moral responsibility part of the question likely affected how respondents answered, since those who disagreed said they should not be held responsible for something that happened before they were born. Younger Japanese people should not be blamed for the negative aspects of their country’s history as should be the case with any country in the world, but being able to address the atrocities committed by past generations can be a healthy sign of Japanese democracy at work (Kim, MY 2014, p. 87).

The best way to resolve the comfort is to have the Japanese Prime Minister make an official apology and for the South Korean President to give a speech forgiving the Japanese for their past actions and this will show that Japan is willing to acknowledge an uncomfortable fact and that South Korea is willing to not hold onto past grievances. But unlike South Korea where its Left and Right have been fairly unified in its perspective on Japanese colonial rule (Kim, JY 2014, p. 32), the Japanese have been fairly divided and if the majority of the Japanese population is not in demand for a public acknowledgement of past atrocities, an apology from the Japanese Prime Minister is unlikely.

Bibliography

Kim, MY 2014 ‘Memorializing Comfort Women: Memory and Human Rights in Korea-Japan Relations’, Asian Politics and Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 83-96

Kim, JY 2014 ‘Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes Between South Korea and Japan’, Asian Perspective, Vol. 38, pp. 31-60

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Event: Gwangju Uprising

When: 18-27 May 1980

Lead-up:

1979

• 26 October: KCIA Director Kim Jae-Gyu assassinates South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee who had ruled South Korean since 1961

• 12 December: General Chun Doo-hwan successfully launches a coup d’état that places an unofficial grouping within the military known as the Hanahoe in a peak position

17 May 1980: Chun Doo-hwan successfully launches another coup d’état that cements his position and subsequent actions are taken to silence political opposition.

Gwangju Uprising

18 May 1980: Around 500 residents in Gwangju march on the streets, demanding an end to martial law (Cumings 1997 p. 30), something which was familiar to them as they had been living under military rule for over a decade. While the exact number of deaths is not too clear, it is certain that over 1000 were killed.

What made Gwangju different from prior demonstrations, particularly the ones that lead to Syngman Rhee’s exile to Hawaii or the one more recent (timeline-wise) that involved 70,000-100,000 predominately university students protesting in Seoul, the demonstrators were having the upper hand and while it was eventually put down, the events that transpired during the demonstrations in 1980 provided useful lessons for the 6.10 Movement in 1987.

As a city that is a considerable distance from Seoul, it could be said that Gwangju was an unexpected place for the spark of democratisation. But when it came to the economy, Gwangju as part of the Honam Region was at the receiving end of the negative impacts of Park’s export-driven developmental state policy especially agriculture becoming economically unviable (Ahn 2003, p. 171), which was devastating as agriculture was the largest sector in Honam at the time.

Whilst not born in Gwangju, Kim Dae-Jung did have geographic links in the city as he was born in Hauido, an island located within the same region as the city. And the relationship he had South Korea’s security apparatus was quite reflective of the general relationship it had with the democracy movement.

Bibliography:

Ahn, J 2003 ‘The Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 159-176

Cumings, B 1997, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York, London

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Media outlet: The Korea Times

Writer: Yi Whan-yoo

Article headline: Moon may send special envoy to North Korea soon

Published: 14 August 2019 (updated on 15)

Link: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/04/103_267144.html

As the article says, South Korean President, Moon Jae-in might appoint a special envoy to North Korea within something with days to weeks to the next month. The two people most likely to get  appointed are Chung Eui-yong  and Suh Hoon. The former serves the Cheong Wa Dae (Blue House’s) National Security Chief (South Korea’s equivalent of the US National Security Advisor) and the latter serves as the Director of the National Intelligence Service (deals with both internal and external security). As two highly ranked officials as part of South Korea’s security apparatus, both would have expertise on security issues regarding North Korea and have also been part of Moon’s team during his three meetings with Kim Jong-un.

This possibility that Moon might send a special envoy, which is like an ambassador of sorts but one dealing with a specific issue or set of issues is not something new and is quite consistent with his generally pro-engagement stance towards North Korea. The context for the potential appointment of a special envoy to North Korea relates to the second summit between North Korean and the United States in Hanoi, Vietnam, which unlike the first one Singapore was largely considered by observers as a failure with neither party coming to a concrete agreement as a result of differing definitions of denuclearisation. Both Yi in his article and David Hundt in his lecture on March 25 made the observation that both Trump and Kim were open to a third round of talks. And Hundt also describes President Moon (not a participant in the Hanoi Summit) as being disappointed in a lack of a concrete agreement.

Whilst perhaps not all that significant in terms of the greater picture, the possibility of sending a special envoy to the DPRK is one of the indications that South Korea is moving away from the hawkish postures of the Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) administrations towards North Korea. The main reason for why Moon became president in the first place was the disarray of the conservative side of politics in South Korea that came about as a result of the scandals that plagued Park Geun-hye, with one of those been the Sewol Ferry Disaster in 2014 where the crew knew it was over-exceeding its capacity to take in passengers but still proceeded (Park & Pak 2017 p. 3), which resulted in 300 deaths. This scandal along with others lead to the Candlelight Protests, which resulted in Park get impeached and Moon elected president with 41.1% of the vote, demonstrating a general desire to change course, which included challenging the chaebol whose influence was reflected in the fact that Lee used to be the CEO of Hyundai Construction (Shin 2012, p. 304).

Bibliography

Pak, J and Park, P 2017, ‘Liberal democracy in South Korea’, Brookings Institution

Shin K-Y 2012 ‘The Dilemmas of Korea’s New Democracy in an Age of Neoliberal Globalisation’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 293-309

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COMPARATIVE READING ANALYSIS: KOREA'S HISTORIC STRATEGIC POSITION, 01.2

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COMPARATIVE READING ANALYSIS: KOREA'S HISTORIC STRATEGIC POSITION, 01.2

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One major takeaway from Ben Habib’s second lecture and the readings by Alexis Dudden and Seung-Young (SY) Kim in regards to Korea’s historic strategic position was that the great powers generally had a habit of ignoring the Korean perspective, which is why they are sometimes referred to as the ‘shrimp between two whales’ in Northeast Asian geopolitics.

Dudden (2005, p. 8) makes the point about how it was still legal in the early Twentieth Century while Kim (2011, p. 8) makes the point of how theorists like Hobson and Lenin hypothesised that capitalist states expanded because consumption within its own defined territory was not at an adequate level. While both Dudden and Kim make similar points about colonisation, they are not identical in nature as the point Dudden makes a simple, observable fact while Kim himself made the observation that the idea capitalist states pursued imperial expansion because of underconsumption within their own state is one largely believed by the political Left and the way he writes that observation gives the impression that he is not giving his personal take. In relation to how each of their  comments relate to the topic of Korea’s strategic position, Dudden’s (2005, p. 7) comment on colonisation still being legal at the time gives context to why the three Korean delegates got at best, a lukewarm reception on the Second International Conference on Peace at The Hague in 1907, while Kim’s point is more relevant to broader US and Western foreign/colonial policy at the time.

In his second lecture, Habib explains how Japanese victories the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese of 1904-1905, both of which were due to the military technological advantage Japan had at the time paved the path for its dominance and occupation of Korea from 1905-1945 as well as greater involvement in mainland Asia without having nearby states that were powerful enough to contain them. Dudden makes a point about how the Meiji Government or rather some in the government, particularly Itō Hirobumi claimed that Japan fought the two conflicts on behalf of Korea and gives an example of Hirobumi meeting with Korean cabinet ministers in 1905 (Dudden 2005, p. 74) where he basically insults them while Kim talks about how US policy towards Korea during the late 19th Century was one of limited assistance (i.e. avoiding the military option) - Kim 2009, pp. 14-20  -, which became more limited overtime to the point that the Koreans sought the help of the Russians as a means to counterbalance the Chinese and Japanese. The example provided by Dudden is a demonstration of what the ruling class of Japan at that time truly thought of Korea and the repercussions it would have later on, and the point Kim makes about limited assistance can be tied to his point about Realist (both Classical and Structural) IR theories (Kim 2009, pp. 3-5) being used to explain how the US conducted their foreign policy back then. And a key component of Realist IR thinking is that a state should not go beyond its periphery.

Bibliography:

Dudden, A 2005 Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power

Kim, SY 2009 American Diplomacy and Strategy Toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882-1950 and After, Perception of Polarity and US Commitment of Periphery.