# data[].attributes.body
Our body is integral to our self-identity as we are not merely disembodied, experiencing 'subjects', but persons whose deeds are achieved via a physical organism, a brain and its attendant psychological states. We establish our sense of self through our bodies and our interaction with the world and others. Examples?

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Importance of the body to numerical identity 

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Importance of the body to numerical identity 

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Arguably, the body bears the evidence of persistence over time in a more reliable way than memory, which fluctuates. While the body undeniably changes, continuity is clearly evident in normal cases (in a Lockean sense of an organism that partakes in a common life: scars, illnesses, care etc). WE can also insist that as the body is necessary for the psychological relation (consciousness) that Locke posits, then we should not exclude it from our definition of 'persons'.

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Our memories are contained within our physical organism, in our muscles, not purely in our consciousness. An example is bike riding or playing a musical instrument. Example: Clive Wearing.
There is no guarantee that Schwanda will be able to presently do what she remembers doing with her body (such as riding a bike) in the sense that her new body will not possess the automated, habitual memories in its muscle to perform the task. Thus, the body is more important to body over time than classical theories allow and the brain, while necessary, is not sufficient.

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Merit 1: Challenges Locke's determinism by showing how questions of personal identity often have equivocal answers. SPECTRUM.  

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Merit 1: Challenges Locke's determinism by showing how questions of personal identity often have equivocal answers. SPECTRUM.  

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Locke argues for an unequivocal, determined view of identity which this experiment successfully challenges. Consider Parfit's example of a combined spectrum detailing degrees of physical and psychological connections. The near end of each spectrum is a person who is fully continuous with me both physically and psychologically. The far end of the spectrum is a person with no physical or psychological continuity, such as Greta Garbo. In between the two ends are series of minute changes to body and mind.

While we can agree that the person (you) on the near side of the spectrum is not the same person on the far side, it is not clear at which point ‘you’ cease to survive. In other words, there is no single minute change to mind and body along the spectrum that unequivocally determines the difference between survival and death. In other words, identity is indeterminate and to many questions concerning identity, there is no clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. Consider the inconclusive case of patients with alzheimer’s, who while losing some of their memories, often retain muscular memory as well as their character dispositions. In the Schwanda case, there is a strong physical connection to you, but a weak psychological one. Whereas there is a strong psychological and some physical connection (in the form of the brain) to Wanda.  Neither case fits into the unambiguous ends of the spectrum, therefore we can dismiss Locke's view that identity is always determined.

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Merit: A person's belief in who they are is prone to error. 

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Merit: A person's belief in who they are is prone to error. 

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While we usually are able to affirm who we are, this is no guarantee that this is the case, due to the possibility of delusion. Examples?

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Limitation: Introspection and subjective experience as the only means to verify the self

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Limitation: Introspection and subjective experience as the only means to verify the self

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We often have no other means of verifying someone other than their introspective reports. Also, even if we take other criteria into account (such as biological criteria such as body or DNA) if the person does believe they are nor 'feels like' a particular person, then it is difficult for posit self-identity. Example: transgender people. For example, even if we claim that due to the radical change in body, Schwanda is an entirely new person. she may respond that she still feels like Wanda. In other words, the power of the delusion remains as a verifiable, subjective fact for the personhood experiencing the self.

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Merit 2: Challenges Locke's dismissal of the body as important. 

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Merit 2: Challenges Locke's dismissal of the body as important. 

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See notes under bicycle example on the importance of the body to self-identity and memory.

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Merit 1: Proves that our intuitions do not lead automatically to agree that consciousness 'alone' makes identity (challenge to Locke). 

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Merit 1: Proves that our intuitions do not lead automatically to agree that consciousness 'alone' makes identity (challenge to Locke). 

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It is clear from the first person perspective that fear of torture will not be lessened, and we still regard the pain as our pain regardless of the chain of information in our brain.

Why:

It is plausible that at each stage of the Dr Nefarious process, (from the first person perspective) that I can rationally fear the possibility of torture despite the fact I will have my memories erased and/or replaced. It is rational to fear not only physical pain but a future amnesiac state when one is in pain but with no understanding of why. In addition, the possibility of having one’s memories replaced and then being in pain resembles mental derangement and torture combined, and should be feared. This is analogous to the fear a person may hold for both their physical and mental self after a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s. Knowing that late in life we will lose our memories does not alter our concernment for our future physical self. Thus, my undergoing physical pain in the future is not excluded by any psychological state I may be in at the time, with the exception of psychological states which by their nature, exclude experiencing pain (such as unconsciousness) example: anaesthesia.

YET....
Yet, this is arguable mainly in relation to the physical, as the case of pain does not necessarily exclude the impact of other psychological states in concernment for the future. For example, if I were due to meet my teenage love for the first time in twenty years, but then would have my memories of that love erased beforehand, the feelings that characterised my concernment (anticipation or excitement) would potentially disappear. Yet, in the case of physical concernment, no predicted change in character, beliefs or dispositions can unseat the fear or desires I have. Thus, the body matters.

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See Butler example and reiterate the problem.

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Merit 1: Plausibility of 'interrelated connections' claim. 

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Merit 1: Plausibility of 'interrelated connections' claim. 

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Michael's ‘interrelated’ connections is supported by the fact that the psychological conditions necessary for accountability and reidentification necessitate a physical body. Thus, our notion of identity does seem dependent on both a body and psychological states. To exclude one from the picture offers an incomplete idea of ‘person’. Examples?

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Limitation: Ronald Reagan scenario is not directly analogous to Schwanda. 

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Limitation: Ronald Reagan scenario is not directly analogous to Schwanda. 

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The body transplant case in Schwanda involves an entire brain and its cerebrum, which will bring about all elements of Wanda's psychology, including dispositions, intentional states, and memories. Whereas the Ronald Reagan case is simply memories, which will presumably be 'mapped over' your brain structure. Arguably, the notion of delusion is more plausible in the Reagan case than Schwanda, as there is still 'your' brain with its 'false' memories in it, whereas in the Schwanda case, she has her full cerebrum, and all of Wanda's psychological characteristics, in addition to memory.

Also, in the case of Schwanda, we know the person who we have exchanged bodies with, and thus will arguably experience a feeling of disconnection, but will still arguably be aware of the potential delusion that has taken place. For example, Schwanda, believing herself to be Wanda, will wake up in hospital, see your body, remember the previous night and possibly understand what has happened. In contrast, the you-body who has their memories replaced with Ronald Reagan’s is arguably deluded.

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Limitation (as a challenge): Affirms the notion of self constituted by consciousness. 

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Limitation (as a challenge): Affirms the notion of self constituted by consciousness. 

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While we can argue that the body may have a role in identity, Schwanda will never ever feel like you as she does not possess your consciousness or psychological state. Even if we agree that memory does not constitute self, it is clear self-identity is

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The thought experiment of Dr Nefarious and Schwanda lacks neutrality as Michaels constantly uses the word ‘you’, which may have a rhetorical impact on our intuitions. Thus, the thought experiment is question begging by presuming a ‘you’ that survives.

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The thought experiment of Dr Nefarious and Schwanda lacks neutrality as Michaels constantly uses the word ‘you’, which may have a rhetorical impact on our intuitions. Thus, the thought experiment is question begging by presuming a ‘you’ that survives.

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Thought experiments attend to what is conceptually possible rather than factually necessary or possible, although this does not necessarily entail a negation of the findings of the experiment.  While a brain transplant is still a physical impossibility, we may ask if a transplanted brain into a different body will automatically bring with it the character, disposition and memories of Wanda without the physical body previously attached to it. Since we have no way of understanding what actually happens to the brain when it is transplanted into another body, the assumption is unjustified.

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Michaels’ claim that our identity is a matter of degrees is vindicated by the types of changes we encounter during our life. For example, our bodies change gradually over time, but the strong connection we have to our physical self in both the past and the future (as part of normal life) enables our self-identification with the body. A weak degree of connection (such as a total body transplant) would arguably negate our claim to self-identity. Similarly, the strong psychological connections (in the form of memory, intentional acts and character dispositions) allow for reidentification (in an intransitive sense) to occur.

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See spectrum argument.

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Limitation: Ambiguity poses practical problems when determining survival. 

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Limitation: Ambiguity poses practical problems when determining survival. 

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The fact that many of the cases the extent to which a connection is maintained or severed is unclear. Consider the difference between a sudden, traumatic loss of memory and personality (say in a car accident leading to a brain injury) versus a gradual loss of memory and personality due to Alzheimer's. In the later, there are degrees of connection and continuity maintained throughout the transformation process. So, despite the fact that a person in late stage Alzheimer's is a radically different person to their younger self, the gradual rate of transformation has not severed connections in a way that suggests survival has ceased.

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Merit: Body as integral to action ownership (three points)

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Merit: Body as integral to action ownership (three points)

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+In the world as we know it, it is bodies and brains who do things as persons, not merely brains or experiencing subjects. Examples?

+Action ownership requires consciousness, which is dependent upon a body.

+If action-ownership is dependent upon memory, then many memories are embodied (such as riding bicycles, typing or playing a musical instrument) and thus require the body to be ‘remembered’.

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Limitation: Body criterion lacks explanatory power for action ownership 

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Limitation: Body criterion lacks explanatory power for action ownership 

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Yet, while biological continuity is a necessary ingredient in real life cases, it fails to provide a sufficient criteria for action ownership, as it lacks explanatory power for attibutability. For example, attributability (and thus accountability) has to do with one’s performance of actions. This includes the execution of intentions, being a legitimate subject of intentions (being receptive to praise and blame) etc. All of these are psychological states and are the only states relevant to attributability.

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Merit: Prudential rationality is grounded in concerns for a future self that considers the body

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Merit: Prudential rationality is grounded in concerns for a future self that considers the body