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The American government confirmed the killing of the leader of the Taliban Atman Al-Zawahiri, but Afghanistan's leaders say they are unable to uncover his body amidst the rubble of destruction, which left the everything near unidentifiable after the drone strike that was said to kill him. They also said they are committed to keeping influential countries from threatening its security such as Russia, and that it is maintaining its dedication to the Doha agreement. The Doha agreement is a peace agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban on February 29, 2020 in Doha, Qatar, to bring an end to the 2001–2021 war in Afghanistan. This latest drone strike of the Taliban leader is only confirmed through US intelligence.

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زعيم تنظيم القاعدة أيمن الظواهري (الجزيرة)

قال المتحدث باسم الحكومة الأفغانية ذبيح الله مجاهد اليوم الخميس إن الحكومة لم تعثر على جثمان زعيم تنظيم القاعدة أيمن الظواهري في المنزل الذي استُهدف بغارة جوية أميركية، رغم إعلان الولايات المتحدة أنها قتلته بغارة جوية في العاصمة كابل.

وأضاف أنهم يحاولون معرفة هوية الشخص المستهدف لأن جثته تحولت إلى أشلاء، وأن التحقيقات ما زالت مستمرة في هذا الحادث، لكنه لم يكشف عن المرحلة التي وصلت إليها تلك التحقيقات في شأن مقتل الظواهري في يوليو/تموز الماضي خلال غارة جوية على منزل في العاصمة كابل.

وأكد أن حكومته ملتزمة بضبط الأمن والاستقرار في عموم أفغانستان، مؤكدا التزامها باتفاق الدوحة وأنها لن تسمح لأحد بأن يهدد أمن دول أخرى بما فيها روسيا.

وفي وقت سابق، قال سهيل شاهين، ممثل الحكومة -التي تقودها طالبان- المُعين لدى الأمم المتحدة ومقره الدوحة، إن الحركة تحقق في "مزاعم" أميركية بأن زعيم تنظيم القاعدة أيمن الظواهري قُتل في غارة أميركية بطائرة مسيرة في كابل، مما يشير إلى أن القيادة لم تكن على علم بوجوده هناك.

وقال سهيل شاهين، في رسالة اطلعت عليها وكالة رويترز "لم تكن الحكومة أو القيادة على علم بهذه المزاعم".

وكان مسؤولون أميركيون قد قالوا إن الولايات المتحدة قتلت الظواهري بصاروخ أطلقته طائرة مسيرة بينما كان يقف في شرفة منزل يختبئ فيه في يوليو/تموز، وذلك ضمن أكبر ضربة للتنظيم منذ أن قتلت قوات خاصة من البحرية الأميركية أسامة بن لادن قبل أكثر من عقد من الزمن في باكستان.

وذكر المتحدث باسم مجلس الأمن القومي في البيت الأبيض جون كيربي حينها أن الإدارة الأميركية "ليس لديها تأكيد بالحمض النووي" لمقتل زعيم تنظيم القاعدة أيمن الظواهري.

وقال كيربي في مقابلة مع شبكة "سي إن إن" (CNN) إن الولايات المتحدة "ليس لديها تأكيد بواسطة الحمض النووي لمقتل زعيم القاعدة أيمن الظواهري في وسط كابل، لكنها تأكدت من هويته عبر مصادر ووسائل أخرى".

المصدر : الجزيرة + رويترز

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من القتيل في منزل كابل؟ الحكومة الأفغانية تعلن عدم عثورها على جثمان أيمن الظواهري

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قال المتحدث باسم الحكومة الأفغانية ذبيح الله مجاهد اليوم الخميس إن الحكومة لم تعثر على جثمان زعيم تنظيم القاعدة أيمن الظواهري في المنزل الذي استُهدف بغارة جوية أميركية، رغم إعلان الولايات المتحدة أنها قتلته بغارة جوية في العاصمة كابل.

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Today, the Free Constitutional Party in Tunisia gave the country's president, Kais Saied, a 72 hour deadline to announce his vacancy of the presidential position and call for early presidential elections.

The leader of this party, Abir Moussa, stated that he is no longer the elected president under the new constitution, as the oath he swore in under is in violation of the constitutional oath. On top of that, his dissolution of the Parliament meant getting rid of the institution under which he swore in, which also rescinds the validity of his presidency.

Moussa stated that if this is not done within the next 72 hours, her party will conduct protests and file an official grievance with the United Nations.

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رئيسة الحزب الدستوري الحر عبير موسي خلال تجمع سابق مع أنصارها في تونس (الفرنسية)

أمهل الحزب الدستوري الحر في تونس اليوم الاثنين رئيس البلاد قيس سعيّد 72 ساعة لإعلان شغور منصب الرئيس واعتبار نفسه بمثابة قائم بأعماله والدعوة إلى انتخابات رئاسية مبكرة، متوعدا بتحركات احتجاجية وتصعيد دولي.

وخلال مؤتمر صحفي في العاصمة تونس قالت رئيسة الحزب عبير موسي إن "حزبها معني بالانتخابات الرئاسية وله مرشحة (عبير موسي نفسها)"، علما أن حزب موسي كان يضم 16 نائبا من أصل 217 في البرلمان المنحل.

واعتبرت موسي أن "سعيّد بمقتضى الفصل 92 للدستور الجديد لم يعد رئيسا منتخبا للجمهورية التونسية". وفاز سعيّد في انتخابات 2019 بفترة رئاسية تستمر 5 سنوات.

وأوضحت أن "اليمين الدستورية التي أداها سعيد عند انتخابه في 2019 مخالفة لليمين الدستورية المنصوص عليها في الدستور الجديد، إضافة إلى غياب المؤسسات التي يؤدي أمامها هذه اليمين"، وفق قولها.

وأضافت موسي أن "حزبها طالب رسميا قيس سعيّد بإعلان الشغور في منصب رئاسة الجمهورية واعتبار نفسه قائما بأعمال رئاسة الجمهورية والدعوة إلى تنظيم انتخابات رئاسية سابقة لأوانها".

وأفادت بأن حزبها "حدد لرئيس الجمهورية مهلة 72 ساعة للاستجابة لهذه المطالب، وإذا لم يتم ذلك فسيشرع الحزب في التحركات الاحتجاجية والتوجه إلى المنتظم الأممي (الأمم المتحدة) للتظلم".

كما قالت موسي "نطالب بالإعلان الرسمي عن موعد الانتخابات التشريعية، ونحن معنيون بمعرفة القانون".

انتخابات مبكرة

ومن المقرر إجراء انتخابات مبكرة في 17 ديسمبر/كانون الأول المقبل ضمن إجراءات استثنائية بدأ سعيّد فرضها في 25 يوليو/تموز 2021 وشملت إقالة الحكومة وتعيين أخرى، وحل مجلس القضاء والبرلمان، وإصدار تشريعات بمراسيم رئاسية، وتمرير دستور جديد للبلاد في 25 يوليو/تموز الماضي.

واعتبرت موسي أنه "لا سبيل لأي تغييرات في قانون الانتخابات أو إصدار نص جديد، لأن في ذلك انتهاكا للمعايير الدولية للانتخابات التي تقول إنه لا يمكن تغيير تقسيم الدوائر الانتخابية قبل عام على الأقل من موعد الانتخابات".

ولم يتسن الحصول على تعليق فوري من الرئاسة التونسية على ما تضمنه مؤتمر موسي.

والأربعاء الماضي، أعلن سعيّد في كلمة متلفزة بدء العمل بالدستور الجديد، وقال إنه "سيتم وضع قانون انتخابي جديد، والقوانين الانتخابية أثرها على سير المؤسسات ليس أقل من أحكام الدستور".

وأفاد بأنه "سيتم في أقرب الآجال إرساء المحكمة الدستورية لحماية الحقوق والحريات والمحافظة على علوية القانون".

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حزب تونسي يمهل قيس سعيد 72 ساعة لإعلان شغور منصب الرئيس

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أمهل الحزب الدستوري الحر في تونس اليوم الاثنين رئيس البلاد قيس سعيّد 72 ساعة لإعلان شغور منصب الرئيس واعتبار نفسه بمثابة قائم بأعماله والدعوة إلى انتخابات رئاسية مبكرة، متوعدا بتحركات احتجاجية وتصعيد دولي.

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Al-Shabab emerged as a radical Islamic group with some ties to Al-Qaeda and once controlled the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu before being forced out by Ethiopian forces. It emerged after Somalia's inability to form a strong national government for more than 20 years. They then gained support as they promised security for the citizens of this war-torn country. However, many citizens lost their trust in the group as they rejected food aid from Western countries to help with the famine/drought in the country.

Al-Shabab has committed many terrorist attacks all across Somalia including a large  attack on a Kenyan military base in 2016, killing around 180 soldiers.

This extremist military group has been pushed out of many of the small towns it once controlled, though it still remains a threat in fighting the UN-backed government in Somalia.

Yesterday, Aug. 21, a hotel in the capital of Somalia was attacked, resulting in the killing of 21 people and the injuring of more than 100 others. It took more than 30 hours for Somali forces to gain control of the situation, though police have not yet released an explanation of how the events unfolded. Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for this attack, adding to the list of their recent attempts to target government officials.

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Islamist militant group al-Shabab is battling the UN-backed government in Somalia and has carried out attacks in neighbouring Kenya. Who are they?

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https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal

The first Iranian nuclear deal was signed in 2015 and within it, were restrictions on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief and aid. However, President Trump withdrew from this deal in 2018, claiming that the deal had not succeeded in limiting Iran's nuclear power.

Now, world leaders are working to come to a second Iranian nuclear deal which aims to contain their nuclear program and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear weapons crisis.

As of now, there are only 3 points standing between this deal and reality: 1) Iran wants the U.S. to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the designated terrorist list. 2) Iran also wants a guarantee that this deal will be binding regardless of what administration is in office (Biden can't legally promise this to them.). 3) Iran also wants the investigation of traces of uranium found at undeclared nuclear sites shut down.

Many people believe that this iteration of the deal is now or never, as Iran has reached 60% enrichment in its Uranium stockpile (90% is needed for a bomb, and 3.47% enrichment was the limit placed on it in the 2015 deal). Iran knows it has the upper hand in this situation and is trying to take advantage of this by putting otherwise extraneous demands on the table of negotiations.

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Introduction

The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and several world powers, including the United States, in July 2015. Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars' worth of sanctions relief.

Proponents of the deal said that it would help prevent a revival of Iran's nuclear weapons program and thereby reduce the prospects for conflict between Iran and its regional rivals, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, the deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from it in 2018. In retaliation for the U.S. departure and for deadly attacks on prominent Iranians in 2020, including one by the United States, Iran has resumed some of its nuclear activities.

In 2021, President Joe Biden said the United States would return to the deal if Iran came back into compliance. Renewed diplomacy initially seemed promising, but after stop-and-go talks, it remains unclear if the parties can come to an agreement.

Who are the participants?

The JCPOA, which went into effect in January 2016, imposes restrictions on Iran's civilian nuclear enrichment program. At the heart of negotiations with Iran were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Germany-collectively known as the P5+1. The European Union also took part.

Some Middle Eastern powers, such as Saudi Arabia, said they should have been consulted or included in the talks because they would be most affected by a nuclear-armed Iran. Israel explicitly opposed the agreement, calling it too lenient.

What were the goals?

The P5+1 wanted to unwind Iran's nuclear program to the point that if Tehran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, it would take at least one year, giving world powers time to respond. Heading into the JCPOA negotiations, U.S. intelligence officials estimated that, in the absence of an agreement, Iran could produce enough nuclear material for a weapon in a few months. Negotiating nations feared that Iran's moves to become a nuclear weapons state risked thrusting the region into a new crisis. Israel had taken preemptive military action against suspected nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria and could do the same against Iran, perhaps triggering reprisals by Lebanon-based Hezbollah or disruptions to the transport of oil in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has since signaled a willingness to obtain a nuclear weapon if Iran successfully detonates one.

Iran had previously agreed to forgo the development of nuclear weapons as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has been in force since 1970. However, after the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, Iranian leaders secretly pursued this technology. (In 2007, U.S. intelligence analysts concluded that Iran halted its work on nuclear weapons in 2003 but continued to acquire nuclear technology and expertise.)

Prior to the JCPOA, the P5+1 had been negotiating with Iran for years, offering its government various incentives to halt uranium enrichment. After the 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani, who was viewed as a reformer, the parties came to a preliminary agreement to guide negotiations for a comprehensive deal.

For its part, Iran sought the JCPOA for relief from international sanctions, which starved its economy [PDF] of more than $100 billion in revenues in 2012-2014 alone.

Does it prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons?

Many experts say that if all parties adhered to their pledges, the deal almost certainly could have achieved that goal for longer than a decade. Many of the JCPOA's restrictions on Iran's nuclear program have expiration dates. For example, after ten years (from January 2016), centrifuge restrictions will be lifted, and after fifteen years, so too will limits on the amount of low-enriched uranium Iran can possess. Some of the deal's opponents faulted these so-called sunset provisions, saying they would only delay Iran building a bomb while sanctions relief would allow it to underwrite terrorism in the region.

What did Iran agree to?

Nuclear restrictions. Iran agreed not to produce either the highly enriched uranium or the plutonium that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It also took steps to ensure that its Fordow, Natanz, and Arak facilities pursued only civilian work, including medical and industrial research.

The accord limits the numbers and types of centrifuges Iran can operate, the level of its enrichment, as well as the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium. (Mined uranium has less than 1 percent of the uranium-235 isotope used in fission reactions, and centrifuges increase that isotope's concentration. Uranium enriched to 5 percent is used in nuclear power plants, and at 20 percent it can be used in research reactors or for medical purposes. High-enriched uranium, at some 90 percent, is used in nuclear weapons.)

Monitoring and verification. Iran agreed to eventually implement a protocol that would allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, unfettered access to its nuclear facilities and potentially to undeclared sites. Inspections are intended to guard against the possibility that Iran could develop nuclear arms in secret, as it has allegedly attempted before. The IAEA has issued quarterly reports to its board of governors and the UN Security Council on Iran's implementation of its nuclear commitments.

A body known as the Joint Commission, which includes representatives of all the negotiating parties, monitors implementation of the agreement and resolves disputes that may arise. A majority vote by its members can gain IAEA inspectors access to suspicious, undeclared sites. The body also oversees the transfer of nuclear-related or dual-use materials.

What did the other signatories agree to?

Sanctions relief. The EU, United Nations, and United States all committed to lifting their nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. However, many other U.S. sanctions on Iran, some dating back to the 1979 hostage crisis, remained in effect. They cover matters such as Iran's ballistic missile program, support for terrorist groups, and human rights abuses. Though the United States committed to lifting its sanctions on oil exports, it kept restrictions on financial transactions, which have deterred international trade with Iran.

Weapons embargo. The parties agreed to lift an existing UN ban [PDF] on Iran's transfer of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles after five years if the IAEA certifies that Iran is only engaged in civilian nuclear activity.

How is the Iran deal enforced?

If any signatory suspects Iran is violating the deal, the UN Security Council may vote on whether to continue sanctions relief. This "snapback" mechanism remains in effect for ten years, after which the UN sanctions are set to be permanently removed.

In April 2020, the United States announced its intention to snap back sanctions. The other P5 members objected to the move, saying the United States could not unilaterally implement the mechanism because it left the nuclear deal in 2018.

Did Iran comply initially?

The agreement got off to a fairly smooth start. The IAEA certified in early 2016 that Iran had met its preliminary pledges; and the United States, EU, and United Nations responded by repealing or suspending their sanctions. Most significantly, U.S. President Barack Obama's administration dropped secondary sanctions on the oil sector, which allowed Iran to ramp up its oil exports to nearly the level it was prior to sanctions. The United States and many European nations also unfroze about $100 billion worth of frozen Iranian assets.

However, the deal has been near collapse since President Trump withdrew the United States from it in 2018 and reinstated devastating banking and oil sanctions. Trump said the agreement failed to address Iran's ballistic missile program and its proxy warfare in the region, and he claimed that the sunset provisions would enable Iran to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.

Iran accused the United States of reneging on its commitments, and faulted Europe for submitting to U.S. unilateralism. In a bid to keep the agreement alive, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched a barter system, known as INSTEX, to facilitate transactions with Iran outside of the U.S. banking system. However, the system is only meant for food and medicine, which are already exempt from U.S. sanctions.

Following the U.S. withdrawal, several countries-U.S. allies among them-continued to import Iranian oil under waivers granted by the Trump administration, and Iran continued to abide by its commitments. But a year later, the United States ended the waivers with the aim of halting Iran's oil exports completely.

What is Iran's current nuclear activity?

In response to the other parties' actions, which Tehran claimed amounted to breaches of the deal, Iran started exceeding agreed-upon limits to its stockpile of low-enriched uranium in 2019, and began enriching uranium to higher concentrations (though still far short of the purity required for weapons). It also began developing new centrifuges to accelerate uranium enrichment; resuming heavy water production at its Arak facility; and enriching uranium [PDF] at Fordow, which rendered the isotopes produced there unusable for medical purposes.

In 2020, Iran took more steps away from its nuclear pledges, following a series of attacks on its interests. In January, after the U.S. targeted killing of a top Iranian general, Qasem Soleimani, Iran announced that it would no longer limit its uranium enrichment. In October, it began constructing a centrifuge production center at Natanz to replace one that was destroyed months earlier in an attack it blamed on Israel. And in November, in response to the assassination of a prominent nuclear scientist, which it also attributed to Israel, Iran's parliament passed a law that led to a substantial boost in uranium enrichment at Fordow.

The following year, Iran announced new restrictions on the IAEA's ability to inspect its facilities, and soon after ended its monitoring agreement with the agency completely.

How has the deal affected Iran's economy?

Prior to the JCPOA, Iran's economy suffered years of recession, currency depreciation, and inflation, largely because of sanctions on its energy sector. With the sanctions lifted, inflation slowed, exchange rates stabilized, and exports-especially of oil, agricultural goods, and luxury items-skyrocketed as Iran regained trading partners, particularly in the EU. After the JCPOA took effect, Iran began exporting more than 2.1 million barrels per day (approaching pre-2012 levels, when the oil sanctions were originally put in place). However, these improvements did not translate to a significant increase in the average Iranian household's budget.

The end of sanctions waivers on oil exports and the restoration of U.S. sanctions in 2018 has once again cut deeply into a vital source of national revenue: oil and petroleum products account for 80 percent [PDF] of Iran's exports. By mid-2020, oil exports had plummeted [PDF] to below three hundred thousand barrels per day. Additionally, in October of that year, the United States imposed sanctions on eighteen major Iranian banks, causing the Iranian rial to fall further against the U.S. dollar.

Meanwhile, the wide range of U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear program have added to the damage. Multinational firms fear being punished by the United States for transacting with sanctioned Iranian entities associated with, for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) which holds sway over many industries. With sanctions deterring international trade, black markets have boomed, enriching the IRGC at the expense of the regular economy.

What is the outlook for the agreement?

The fate of the nuclear deal remains uncertain. JCPOA signatories began talks to bring Washington and Tehran back into the agreement in April 2021, but they've since been off and on, complicated by Iran's election of conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi as president and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, among other developments. Moreover, Tehran and Washington still disagree on several issues, including the IRGC's designation as a terrorist organization. U.S. officials have warned against more delays, saying further nuclear advances by Iran could make returning to the original deal impossible. Amid reports that Iran was days away from enriching enough uranium for a bomb, President Biden declared in July that the United States will use "all elements of its national power" to prevent the country from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

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The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and several world powers, including the United States, in July 2015. Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars' worth of sanctions relief.

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As of late the Palestinian president compared what's being done to the Palestinian people to what happened to the Jews during the Holocaust stirring up controversy between Germany and Israel.

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بن غفير يرفع العلم الإسرائيلي في بداية مسيرة الأعلام التي نظمتها الأحزاب القومية الإسرائيلية بالقدس في 20 أبريل/نيسان 2022 (الفرنسية)

حذرت أورلي نوي رئيسة مركز المعلومات الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة (بتسيلم) من تهديدات رئيس حزب القوة اليهودية إيتمار بن غفير بترحيل الفلسطينيين، قائلة إن التعامل معها باستخفاف سيكون خطأ سياسيا وأخلاقيا فادحا.

وأضافت نوي في مقال لها بموقع "ميدل إيست آي" البريطاني (Middle East Eye) أن تاريخ إسرائيل يظهر أن تهديدات القادة الصهاينة بإبعاد الفلسطينيين يجب أن تؤخذ على محمل الجد.

وكان عضو الكنيست الإسرائيلي بن غفير قال في مقابلة يوم الثلاثاء مع محطة إذاعة الجيش الإسرائيلي غالي تزاهال، إنه إذا كان عضوا في الحكومة المقبلة، فسيعمل على تقديم قانون يجرد كل من يعمل ضد إسرائيل من داخلها من الجنسية ويطرده.

وزارة إسرائيلية لطرد وترحيل الفلسطينيين

وللمساعدة في تحقيق هدفه، أعلن بن غفير أنه سيؤسس وزارة حكومية لتشجيع "هجرة المواطنين الفلسطينيين من إسرائيل".

وقالت نوي إنه "عند الاستماع إلى المقابلة، يمكن للمرء أن يستنتج أن اثنين من محاوري بن غفير كانا مستمتعين تقريبا بمقترحاته، والتي عاملاها باستخفاف: كيف تطرد الناس؟ في القطارات؟ الحافلات؟ الطائرات؟ وترسلهم إلى أين؟ حتى الأشخاص الذين يكتبون في فيسبوك؟".

وأضافت أن المحاورين كان يقصدان، على ما يبدو، تقديم أفكاره على أنها وهمية وعبثية، ولكن، بالنظر إلى واقع إسرائيل اليوم وسياساتها التاريخية تجاه الشعب الفلسطيني، فإن تهديدات بن غفير بعيدة كل البعد عن كونها مجرد تمرين نظري.

سيرته تؤكد تهديداته

وأشارت إلى أن سيرة بن غفير نفسه تؤكد بوضوح مدى سهولة خضوع المواقف السياسية الأكثر عنفا لعملية تطهير ثم ظهورها كجزء شرعي من الخطاب العام. فقد كان منسقا للشباب في منظمة مئير كهانا "المتطرفة" -حركة كاخ- التي تم تصنيفها كمنظمة إرهابية من قبل وزارة الخارجية الأميركية وتم حظرها في إسرائيل، كما أدين بدعم منظمة "إرهابية"، وهو اليوم عضو عادي في البرلمان الإسرائيلي.

وقالت إن رئيس الوزراء السابق بنيامين نتنياهو يعمل بلا كلل للحفاظ على الاتحاد بين بن غفير وبتسلئيل سموتريتش، عضو آخر بالكنيست في أقصى اليمين، من أجل تعزيز سلطتهما البرلمانية، مضيفة أنه ووفقا لاستطلاع نُشر مؤخرا، إذا خاض بن غفير الانتخابات بمفرده، فمن المتوقع أن يفوز بـ8 مقاعد، وهو أكثر من العدد الذي فاز به حزب رئيس الوزراء السابق نفتالي بينيت في الانتخابات الأخيرة.

التجربة التاريخية تؤكد أيضا

واستمرت الحقوقية الإسرائيلية تقول يجب عدم الاستخفاف بتهديدات بن غفير ليس فقط من حيث الحسابات حول المستقبل، ولكن أيضا استنادا إلى التجربة المريرة، مشيرة إلى أن تاريخ إسرائيل يظهر أن تهديدات القادة الصهاينة بالترحيل يجب أن تؤخذ على محمل الجد.

ولم تعد إسرائيل، كما تقول الكاتبة، تنكر طرد مئات الآلاف من اللاجئين الفلسطينيين خلال النكبة فحسب، بل أصبح نموذجا يحتذى به بين بعض قادتها. فقد تعرض مؤخرا الطلاب العرب الذين رفعوا العلم الفلسطيني في حرم جامعي في إسرائيل للتهديد من قبل عضو الكنيست ووزير الليكود السابق يسرائيل كاتس بنكبة ثانية، كما أن عوزي دايان عضو الكنيست السابق في الليكود ونائب رئيس الأركان السابق وجه تهديدات مماثلة، وهذان الشخصان ليسا الوحيدين.

الطرد خيار مطروح بالفعل

وأكدت أن الخطاب السياسي الإسرائيلي، عموما، يظهر أن الترحيل الجماعي للمواطنين الفلسطينيين في إسرائيل هو خيار مطروح على الطاولة.

وأوضحت أن هناك شيئا أعمق يحوّل تصريحات بن غفير من تهديدات خاملة من قبل سياسي يميني متطرف إلى سيناريو يمكن أن يثبت أنه واقعي، وهو التقدير العالي لدى الجمهور الإسرائيلي والمسؤولين لفكرة الطاعة. ففي مجتمع متطرف عسكريا مثل إسرائيل، تصبح الطاعة أمرا ذا قيمة، خاصة عندما تكون مغطاة بدثار القومية، وهي حجر الزاوية الوجودي للمجتمع الإسرائيلي.

واستمرت تقول إنه في بلد تأسس على جريمة الترحيل الجماعي للسكان الأصليين، حيث يهدد كبار المسؤولين في المستويات الحاكمة بلا تردد وبشكل صريح بنكبة ثانية، وحيث يُنظر إلى الطاعة على أنها قيمة حتى بين الأوساط اليسارية، يجب عدم إهمال أحدث خطة تفصيلية لبن غفير.

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حقوقية إسرائيلية: تهديدات برلماني إسرائيلي بإبعاد فلسطينيين ليست مزحة

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حذرت أورلي نوي رئيسة مركز المعلومات الإسرائيلي لحقوق الإنسان في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة (بتسيلم) من تهديدات رئيس حزب القوة اليهودية إيتمار بن غفير بترحيل الفلسطينيين، قائلة إن التعامل معها باستخفاف سيكون خطأ سياسيا وأخلاقيا فادحا. وأضافت نوي في مقال لها بموقع "ميدل إيست آي" البريطاني (Middle East Eye) أن تاريخ إسرائيل يظهر أن تهديدات القادة الصهاينة بإبعاد الفلسطينيين يجب أن تؤخذ على محمل الجد.

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Short Aljazeera video on the matter- in English

The war in Yemen is believed to be a Proxy war against the Iran backed Houthi forces occupying it, and Saudi Arabia. But Yemen is also facing issues with its own civil war, and issues with Al-Qaeda as well. After the Arab spring in 2011 with the help of the GGC and Saudi Arabia, Yemens president Ali Abdullah-Saleh was overthrown. Saudi Arabia favored the Vice President Monsour Hadi, and made him president during the fall. But the revolution led to small factions of minorities in Yemen to grow stronger, one of which being the Houthis, a group of Zaydi muslims who desire a theocratic government. After the fall of Saleh there was also his supporters who claimed they wanted him back in power. These two factions formed an alliance against the VP Hadi, and since Saleh was the former president he still had control over parts of the military and the majority of his supporters came from his old governmental powers. This forced Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia, leaving Yemen defenseless against the Houthi-Saleh alliance. Saudi Arabia and Hadi started suspecting the the Houthis were gaining help from Iran after they attempted to regain control of Yemen multiple times but were faced with extreme military power. Then came the fall of the Houthi and Saleh alliance when Saleh released a statement wanting to talk about a solution with Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis assassinated him. With no alliance and the military leader gone, the Houthis now control majority of the power in Yemen, forcing Saudi Arabia, America, and Europe to create an air sea and land barrier preventing any aid from getting to the Houthis. This is what is causing Yemen to be the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. And the war between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia isn't all, there are also Yemeni separatists in the south wanting to return Southern Yemen to a separate country, and Al-Qaeda and ISIL operations being held in the East. Recently though the situation has seen improvement with Sanaa(the capital) having its first commercial flight in 6 years for the month of Ramadan and a two month truth agreement being signed, but the cities of Marib(oil rich) and Taiz still belongs to the Houthis, and these are some of the bloodiest battles seen since 2021.

https://www.hstoday.us/featured/should-the-houthis-have-remained-on-u-s-foreign-terrorist-organizations-list/

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The Houthis control Yemen's capital Sanaa, and much of northern Yemen [File: Khaled Abdullah/Reuters]

A truce between the Yemeni government and the country's Houthi rebels has been extended for two months, the United Nations has announced.

The initial two-month truce, the first since 2016, began on April 2 and was set to expire on Thursday. Still, after days of negotiations, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg announced that parties to the conflict had agreed to an extension.

"I would like to announce that the parties to the conflict have agreed to the United Nations' proposal to renew the current truce in Yemen for two additional months," Grundberg said.

Grundberg added the truce extension would come into effect "when the current truce period expires, today 2 June 2022 at 19:00 Yemen time (1600 GMT)".

"The announcement of the truce extension today shows a serious commitment from all parties to end the senseless suffering of millions of Yemenis," the Norwegian Refugee Council's (NRC) Yemen Country Director, Erin Hutchinson, said in a statement after Grundberg's announcement. "The last two months have shown that peaceful solutions to the conflict are a real option."

It is unclear what eventually convinced the warring sides to agree to a renewal of the truce at the last minute.

Though the provisions of the truce were not fully implemented - roads leading to the largely government-held city of Taiz continue to be closed by the Iran-aligned Houthis, for example - there have been some significant breakthroughs.

As part of the truce deal that went into effect on April 2, the parties to the conflict had agreed to halt all military operations inside Yemen and across its borders, operate two commercial flights a week from Houthi-controlled Sanaa to Jordan and Egypt, allow 18 fuel vessels into the port of Houthi-controlled Hodeidah, and open the roads in Taiz and other governorates.

According to the NRC, the number of civilians killed and injured in Yemen dropped by more than 50 percent in the first month of the truce.

Another major success of the truce was the resumption of commercial flights from Sanaa Airport on April 16, the first in six years. A Saudi-led coalition blockade had banned commercial flights from using the airport.

The flight took off from Sanaa to Amman, Jordan, after the government and the Saudi-led coalition agreed to allow passports issued by the Houthi rebel authorities in the Yemeni capital to be used for travel.

The flight had been initially scheduled for April 2, but it was delayed as the government rejected the use of the Houthi-issued travel documents.

Ahmed, a 31-year-old Sanaa resident, told Al Jazeera that he was now looking forward to being able to travel from the capital rather than go on treacherously long journeys across the front line to airports in government-held areas of the country.

"We've been waiting so long for this moment," Ahmed said. "I am, like so many Yemenis, so happy now because I will be able to travel with my sick father for treatment outside Yemen, specifically to Cairo."

"My father has refused to travel through the airports in Seiyun or Aden because it takes so long by car and he can't bear the hardship of long-distance travelling," he added.

Flights from Sanaa to Cairo, Egypt, resumed on June 1.

No progress in Taiz

However, despite an end to the blockade on Sanaa Airport, the Houthis have not yet agreed to open the main routes leading into Taiz, the country's third-biggest city.

Removing that blockade, which has been in place since 2015, was supposed to be part of the truce, and the delay in reopening the routes was the main barrier to the extension of the truce.

Last week, thousands of people protested in Taiz, calling for the UN to pressure the Houthis to end the blockade of the city, with many Taizis feeling that their plight has been ignored.

To travel in and out of Taiz, people are forced to use perilous routes through the mountains, and journey times have increased by several hours.

Taiz has been the central topic at talks that were held in Amman for three days, beginning on May 25, between the government and the Houthis.

However, by the time the talks wrapped up, the two parties had failed to reach an agreement, with the government delegation saying that the Houthis had rejected a proposal to open the main roads that were used prior to 2015 and instead only offered to open minor roads.

The head of the Houthi delegation at the talks, Yahya al-Razami, said that they had instead proposed that roads be opened not just in Taiz but in Marib and al-Dhale, other areas of the country where the Houthis blame the government for road closures.

However, the Yemeni government only discussed the opening of roads "in specific areas, in violation of the truce deal," al-Razami said, according to the Houthi version of the state news agency Saba.

Road closures in Marib and al-Dhale, however, affect a much smaller number of people than Taiz, which has a larger population.

Civilians in Taiz blame the UN for not pressing hard enough for the Houthis to lift the blockade.

"As a result of the Houthi siege, around four million people are suffering a human tragedy that you can hardly find anywhere else," said Anwar al-Taj, a resident of the city. "But no pressure is put on the Houthis to force them to open the roads and end the stifling siege on civilians who suffer every day."

"The United Nations is adopting a policy of double standards. The opening of Sanaa Airport and the port of Hodeidah is a humanitarian mission that the UN took upon itself and was able to implement," al-Taj added.

Front lines quiet

Despite violations reported by both sides, the front lines have generally seen a reduction in hostilities compared with previous months.

However, the battle for Marib city, the last big city under the total control of the government in northern Yemen, has not stopped although the intensity has reduced.

The Houthis have been trying to capture the city, which has become a refuge for hundreds of thousands of people fleeing Houthi-controlled territory, since early 2020.

A government military official in Marib told Al Jazeera that the Houthis had continued to construct new trenches and positions, and were mobilising forces and positioning heavy equipment to the west, south, and north of the city.

Therefore, while beneficial for civilians, the truce has not brought the parties closer to a deal that brings the conflict to an end.

Yemen has been at war since the Houthis took control of Sanaa in 2014. A Saudi-led coalition intervened militarily on the side of the government in 2015 and continues to conduct air attacks across the country, although they have stopped since the onset of the truce.

The war has caused the world's worst humanitarian disaster, according to the UN.

With increasing focus now on how to end the war, Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, a senior researcher at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, says she is wary that the truce might fall apart.

"If the truce is extended without going to the negotiating table, there is a risk of it collapsing," Shuja al-Deen told Al Jazeera.

"The Saudi-led coalition is arranging for its own withdrawal from the war in Yemen, and does not want to engage in any battles," she added. "So the government is aware that it can't stand on its own without the coalition's fighter jets, as it has failed to build any of its own capabilities over the past few years."

"The Houthis are ready for war. For them, peace means accepting their conditions, most notably not making any concessions regarding the territory under their control, and that has become their own state."

Shuja al-Deen said that the Houthi acceptance of the truce may be a result of pressure from Iran, which is seeking to resurrect its nuclear deal with the United States, rather than any internal desire for peace.

"Peace is the only viable option for the Saudi-led coalition, and the government - and the Houthis know that, so they are pressing for as much as they can," Shuja al-Deen said. "I think they may try again to seize Marib, as their preparations on the ground imply."

US President Joe Biden praised the ceasefire's continuation.

"The last two months in Yemen ... have been among the most peaceful periods since this terrible war began seven years ago," he said in a statement. "Thousands of lives have been saved as fighting receded... It's important that we work from here to make it permanent."

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Yemen truce extended for two months, but warring sides far apart

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A truce between the Yemeni government and the country's Houthi rebels has been extended for two months, the United Nations has announced. The initial two-month truce, the first since 2016, began on April 2 and was set to expire on Thursday.

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Wikipedia page about the issue

After the Balkan wars and WWII, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Turkey the Kurdish people were either forced to be anti-Armenian and join the Turkish ideology of Turkish nationalism, or move out of Turkey. Turkish nationalism at the time was also known as Kemalism- an ideology that basically equates to "we are the best and must kill everyone else". This is the main reason why so many Kurds have become displaced into Iraq and Syria. Eventually  the Paris Peace conference took place and Western countries promised the Kurds and Armenians they're own separate country from Turkey, but this promise got disrupted by the Greeks and Italians conquering parts of Turkey, and the Kurds were left with no other option other than to declare their adherence to Turkey ideology. Thus creating tension between them and the Armenians. After some time the Treaty of Sevres came about, giving the Kurds another chance to establish their own government, but Istanbul saw that they lacked a proper motive, leader or form of government, and the treaty also failed to establish a solid border between the tension ridden Kurds and Armenians. The West also saw the killing by Turkey as dangerous, but favored their economic state over the Kurds. So abandoning the Treaty of Sevres, they created the Treaty of Lausanne, which completely ignored the Kurds and Armenians and granted what would be their land to Turkey and Iraq. This resulted in the Turkish community in Syria to grow and create a separatists movement and fight for the southern area of Turkey as their own land. While in Iraq- though they fought at first, Iraq granted saftey to the Kurds as long as they let them benefit from the oil and goods within their occupied land. Therefore Iraq and the Kurdish people within in face no serious struggle at the moment, and the Kurdish Labor Party is almost treated as an autonomous government. But tensions surrounding bigotry against the Kurds, and the Kurds desire for their own country to be officially recognized still causes fighting today.

The Kurds in make up around 18% of Turkeys population, 15%-20% of Iraqs, and around 10% of Syrias.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish%E2%80%93Turkish_conflict_(1978%E2%80%93present)#:~:text=The%20Kurdish%E2%80%93Turkish%20conflict%20is,inside%20the%20Repub

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The Iraqi arena is witnessing a state of political confrontation between the supporters of the coordination framework , which insists on pushing its candidate, Muhammad Shia'a Al-Sudani to head the government, and the Sadrist movement, whose supporters are camping in front of the House of Representatives, to protest against Al-Sudani's nomination and to demand the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of early elections.
Muqtada al-Sadr is a well known Shiite cleric who achieved large success in the 2021 Iraqi elections. He was tasked with forming a new government- he formed a tripartite "Save the Homeland" with Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and parliamentary speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi’s Sovereignty Alliance, a Sunni political bloc. On June 12th Sadr asked 73 parliamentary members to resign in order to "break the political deadlock". Now Sadr's pro Iranian opponents were tasked with forming a new government and July 25, they announced Mohammed al-Sudani as their prime ministerial candidate. This began the extended sit in of the Parliament building after protests toppled the security walls outside of Parliament. The "Sadrists" have been protesting since then and while Sadr has not visited the location he continues to tweet and keep the "revolution" alive. Most recently: a meeting in Baghdad with many political leaders in attempt to find a solution for the current political crisis, Sadrists didn't attend although they demanded a solution from Parliament and early elections. Government calls for the Sadrists to be a part of international dialogue.

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In recent months, Iraqi populist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has gone from the forefront of efforts to formulate a government in Iraq to leading the country toward what he calls a "revolution." Sadr's supporters are now protesting in and occupying Iraq's parliamentary building and the International (Green) Zone of Baghdad, catapulting Iraq's government formation process into chaos.

After his success in Iraq's October 2021 parliamentary elections, Sadr appeared to shake up Iraqi politics by forming a government that excluded his Iranian-backed opponents from power. As the leader of the bloc with the largest number of seats, Sadr rejected the formula for consensus-based power-sharing governments that has been the norm since former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003.

Instead, Sadr formed a tripartite "Save the Homeland" alliance with the largest Kurdish party, Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as well as parliamentary speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi's Sovereignty Alliance, a Sunni political bloc-thereby cementing a majority in Iraq's parliament. The alliance was then tasked with forming Iraq's government.

For many, the alliance signaled a fresh start and what some hoped would be dwindling Iranian influence in the country. International and regional endorsements came flooding in, with some commentators calling Sadr Iraq's (and the United States') " best hope "-a notable shift from commentary on Sadr post-2003 when Sadr's Mahdi Army militia was leading a violent insurgency in Iraq, including against U.S. troops. Many Western analysts as well as regional leaders now believe Sadr could save Iraq from unruly Shiite militias or at least align Iraq with the anti-Iran camp of the United States and its regional allies.

But on June 12, Sadr upended the government formation process when he asked all of his 73 parliamentary members to resign to allegedly help break the political deadlock that has left Iraq without a government around nine months after parliamentary elections. His more pro-Iranian political opponents, the Coordination Framework alliance, were then tasked with forming a government, and on July 25, they announced Mohammed al-Sudani as their prime ministerial candidate. Subsequently, Sadr called for protests against Sudani's candidacy. Hundreds of Sadr's supporters took to the streets, storming Iraq's parliament and Green Zone while chanting anti-Iran slogans and holding up images of Sadr.

Just days earlier, on July 18, the first of a series of leaked audio recordings of former Iraqi Prime Minister and Coordination Framework head Nouri al-Maliki insulting and criticizing fellow members of the Coordination Framework and Sadr were released by a U.S.-based Iraqi journalist. The audio allegedly reveals Maliki hinting at a coming intra-Shiite war. The leak has undoubtedly played a part in the recent developments, emboldening Sadr to make his recent moves. Working to Sadr's benefit, the recordings have affected Maliki's standing both within the Shiite front and vis-a-vis Tehran, which has traditionally pushed for a large, unified Shiite bloc in Iraq.

There is no doubt that Sadr has played the nationalist card in recent years. However, like many of Iraq's political power brokers, his relationship with Iran is complex and multifaceted, and the West needs to understand this.

Despite Sadr's apparent efforts to act as a bulwark against Iranian influence in Iraq, his chief inspiration is perhaps Iran's founder and most famous supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Sadr's strategic mix of Iraqi nationalism, anti-Westernism, and Shiite Islamism is straight out of Khomeini's playbook.

For decades, Sadr has made calculated political moves. He has maintained a careful balancing act between various interests in Iraq, including those of Iran and the Persian Gulf states. In the past, where Iraqi political actors have thrown off this balance, the country has faced increased instability. Someone as well versed in Iraqi politics as Sadr would be acutely aware that a majority government designed to exclude pro-Iranian parties and figures from the outset would not be feasible and could easily erupt into civil war.

Which raises the question: Is Sadr's recent strategy wishful thinking or a deliberate effort at destabilization?

Over the years, Sadr has shifted from presenting himself as a Shiite sectarian militia leader to a pro-democracy reformist and Iraqi nationalist, carefully and pragmatically cultivating his political endorsements and rhetoric to seize Iraq's political mood. Despite what one may think about his authenticity, Sadr has, unlike any other Iraqi leader of his time, framed his politics and rhetoric to capture popular sentiment on the Iraqi streets. Anti-Iran sentiments, anti-Turkish sentiments, Iraqi nationalism, and general dissatisfaction with corruption and status quo politics have all featured in his rhetoric.

Sadr's politics are not necessarily inherently anti-Iran nor are they wholly driven by personal rivalries, such as the one with Maliki. Instead, it is Sadr's pragmatism, political deftness, and cautious self-posturing that have allowed him to take advantage of and create moments of instability.

Based on his years of tactical shifts, it is unlikely that Sadr ever wanted to be part of a majority government, and he was likely counting on the alliance to fail. In doing so, Sadr would be able to say that he tried to work in the country's best interests, but that ultimately, his efforts were unsuccessful thanks to what he calls the country's corrupt elite.

Much like Khomeini did in Iran, Sadr and his father before him built their appeal in Iraq over the years based on their popularity with the country's poor and disenfranchised Shiites: Iraq's very own mostazafin (meaning the "oppressed" or "downtrodden" and used by Khomeini and others to describe Iranians whom the monarchy had neglected and on whose behalf the Iranian Revolution was supposedly waged). Sadr has cleverly shaped his politics around growing sentiments in Iraq and the wider Middle East, where an overwhelming majority of people are rejecting the ideology of politicized religious movements and instead favoring pragmatic governments that can create more jobs for young people, reform religious institutions, and enhance public services.

Sadr has shown flexibility in his political alliances and rhetoric to reflect these desires. He has attempted to support and hijack the rise in protests Iraq has witnessed since 2018 because he knows that the country's future requires a deep understanding of its street politics. It was Iraq's Tishreen ("October") protests beginning in 2019 that eventually pushed Iraq's former premier out and resulted in early elections. Tishreen saw Iraqis take to the streets demanding an end to sectarian governance, foreign interference, and state-sanctioned corruption as well as calling for better employment, public services, and living conditions.

Sadr is no stranger to the modern history of the Middle East and the power of street mobilization to overthrow regimes, including in Iran in 1979. But like Khomeini before him, despite Sadr's efforts to seize the moment, he is also constrained by his image: his family history, his religious background, and a particular brand of Shiite Islamist politics.

Sadr comes from a highly revered line of Iraqi Shiite clerics. One of Moqtada's great uncles was among the leaders of the 1920 Iraqi revolt against the British occupation. Moqtada's father-in-law and cousin once removed, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980), is widely considered to be one of the most significant Shiite scholars of the 20th century. His ideas helped develop models of clerical activism distinct from the more quietist approach dominant in the Najaf clerical establishment of the time.

Baqir al-Sadr was one of the founders of the Shiite Islamic Dawa Party in the 1960s and served as its guiding ideological leader. After the establishment of Khomeini's Islamic Republic in neighboring Iran, which was arguably in part inspired by Baqir al-Sadr's ideas, Hussein's regime accused Baqir al-Sadr of trying to lead a similar revolution in Iraq. Fearing this, the regime executed Baqir al-Sadr in 1980. More than 40 years later, Moqtada al-Sadr seems to want to realize that revolution.

Like Sadr, Khomeini's politics have long been analyzed and interpreted. The multiplicity of Iranian identities as well as ideas that Khomeini evoked included a populist assortment of Shiite Islamism, Marxism, and popular anti-colonial, anti-Western, and anti-Israel rhetoric at the time-all of which were instrumental to his pre-1979 appeal and later ability to hijack Iran's 1979 revolution.

Sadr's rhetoric has similarly evolved over the years. He encapsulated anti-U.S. sentiment following the 2003 invasion and has maintained staunch anti-imperialism and anti-Israel rhetoric throughout the past two decades, but he also adapted his ideology and focus to change with the times, morphing from explicit Shiite sectarianism in the years following the U.S. invasion to Iraqi nationalism in more recent years. His anti-Iran rhetoric has simultaneously grown alongside increasing anti-Iran sentiment within the country, and when Iraqis took to the streets to denounce Turkish missile strikes on a tourist resort on July 20, Sadr called on his supporters to take to the streets and fight against Turkey.

Sadrists and their affiliates have long held key positions in Iraq's post-2003 governments, but by refusing to ever hold a direct role in government, Sadr has been able to maintain that he is not accountable for the government's discrepancies and faults. Instead, he has tried to cultivate a "man of the people" image. Sadr uses his unpredictability to maintain his outsider position because appearing to remain outside of Iraq's political system is part of his larger goal.

Events of the last week have catapulted Iraq's government formation process into total chaos. After Sadr's supporters stormed the parliament and Green Zone following his call for a revolution, tensions became high. Moqtada's opponents threatened a "counterrevolution," and many Iraqis feel they are on the brink of a civil war. Now, Sadr has called for a reelection while his supporters continue to gather in and around parliament, prolonging the country's political instability further. But that is precisely Sadr's eventual goal: to stir the nation and hijack popular sentiment to become the most powerful man in Iraq.

Sadr stands up rhetorically against Iran because that matches the popular mood, but in reality, Sadr is as close as anyone to it. Sadr wisely recognizes that Iran is still a-if not the most-powerful external actor in Iraq, and his relationship with it is not as strained as he'd like people to think. Iran still has sway over Sadr, and Sadr knows better than to cut off those ties completely.

Sadr continues to visit Iran frequently for family and religious reasons. In 2019, Sadr marked the Islamic holy day of Ashura by visiting Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran. A few months later, in November 2019, during the peak of the Tishreen protests, Sadr was seen in Qom, his former place of study and considered to be the religious capital of Iran. In February of this year, following a meeting with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force Brig. Gen. Esmail Qaani, Sadr came out with a statement in regard to Iraq's government formation and directly quoted Khomeini saying, "Neither East nor West-a national majority government." Sadr is not anti-Iran; he just wants to be the primary figure Iranians (and everyone else) have to deal with.

Sadr has positioned himself rhetorically as anti-Iran and anti-foreign imperialism, but despite the many rumors accusing Sadr of collaborating against Iranian interests in Iraq, it is notable, for example, that Iranian-backed factions hit back against the idea of a majority government and possible anti-Iranian activity by targeting not Sadr but the KDP, the smallest party in Sadr's coalition with just 31 seats, and the KDP-led semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil.

Sadr has his ear to the streets, which has allowed him to play to them with some degree of success. But that audience may be changing more rapidly than even Sadr can keep up with. Iraq's Tishreen protesters called for a starkly different future for Iraq, one that was progressive and democratic. Despite Sadr's electoral successes, Iraq's last elections saw very low voter turnout, and Sadr's successes seem to be more attributable to his ability to organize and mobilize than to his popularity.

But just as Khomeini's revolution would likely not win support in Iran today, Sadr's Iraq project will not cut it for today's Iraqis. Iran's high young population today shares different grievances than their parents' generation. For many of these youth, finding jobs and opportunities, being connected to the world, and enjoying life is of a higher priority than Islamic revolutionary ambitions. Iraq's youth-led Tishreen movement tells a similar tale: The protesters were ethnically and religiously diverse and progressive, focused on reforming and modernizing Iraq's political system and preserving its democracy, not overthrowing it. Iraq does not need another strongman dictator; that would be a short-term solution to a sea of problems.

Sadr is playing a long game in Iraq, cautiously posturing himself as the reasonable alternative for Iraq's leader, both in the country and to regional and international policymakers. Like Khomeini and other populists before him, he is willing to steer Iraq onto a very worrying course to achieve that goal. There is no doubt that Iraq's politics were already messy and deeply uncertain at times. Yet Sadr's willingness to worsen Iraq's political turmoil, delay Iraq's government formation, and escalate protests further-threatening an all-out war with rival Shiite groups-should surely serve as a warning that he is capable of catapulting the country into something even worse.

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Moqtada al-Sadr Wants to Be Iraq's Ayatollah Khomeini

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In recent months, Iraqi populist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has gone from the forefront of efforts to formulate a government in Iraq to leading the country toward what he calls a "revolution." Sadr's supporters are now protesting in and occupying Iraq's parliamentary building and the International (Green) Zone of Baghdad, catapulting Iraq's government formation process into chaos.

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Chinas and Taiwans economic value.- in arabic(lilassif)

China's President Xi Jinping has said "reunification" with Taiwan "must be fulfilled" - and has not ruled out the possible use of force to achieve this. Most recently China has shown its largest show of force in the air and seas around Taiwan including firing ballistic missiles. This followed Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan which Beijing warned strongly against. The US recognizes China as one government but has stated that it will support Taiwan militarily.

China views Taiwan as a breakaway province and is attempting to reunite.
Taiwan views itself as its own island with a constitution and democratically elected leaders.
Taiwan is located 100 miles from the coast of China.

Experts speculate that China's military move is an effort to push further into the western Pacific region and could even threaten Guam and Hawaii.

Realistically China's military force is the easiest way to "reunify" as it spends, second to the US, on defense and has  a huge range of capabilities, from naval power to missile technology, aircraft and cyber attack. So far China's military exercises focused on six danger zones around Taiwan, three of which overlap the island's territorial waters. These drills were to end August 7th but were continued until August 8th. Tensions are increasing but statistics say the majority of people in Taiwan are not worried about military conflict.

Why is Taiwan important to the world? Much of the world's everyday electronic equipment - from phones to laptops, watches and games consoles - is powered by computer chips made in Taiwan. A Chinese takeover in Taiwan could give Beijing some control over one of the world's most important industries.

https://www.voanews.com/a/explainer-why-pelosi-went-to-taiwan-and-why-china-s-angry-/6684414.html

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China has sent warships, including an aircraft carrier, into the seas around Taiwan.

Beijing's latest show of military force followed a meeting on Wednesday in California between Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen and US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy.

China sees self-ruled Taiwan as a breakaway province that will eventually be under Beijing's control.

But Taiwan sees itself as distinct from the Chinese mainland, with its own constitution and democratically-elected leaders.

Where is Taiwan?

Taiwan is an island, roughly 100 miles from the coast of south-east China.

It sits in the so-called "first island chain", which includes a list of US-friendly territories that are crucial to US foreign policy.

But China insists that its intentions are purely peaceful.

Historical sources suggest that the island first came under full Chinese control in the 17th Century when the Qing dynasty began administering it. Then, in 1895, they gave up the island to Japan after losing the first Sino Japanese war.

China took the island again in 1945 after Japan lost World War Two.

But a civil war erupted in mainland China between nationalist government forces led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong's Communist Party.

The communists won in 1949 and took control in Beijing.

Chiang Kai-shek and what was left of the nationalist party - known as the Kuomintang - fled to Taiwan, where they ruled for the next several decades.

China points to this history to say that Taiwan was originally a Chinese province. But the Taiwanese point to the same history to argue that they were never part of the modern Chinese state that was first formed after the revolution in 1911 - or the People's Republic of China that was established under Mao in 1949.

The Kuomintang has been one of Taiwan's most prominent political parties ever since - ruling the island for a significant part of its history.

Currently, only 13 countries (plus the Vatican) recognise Taiwan as a sovereign country.

China exerts considerable diplomatic pressure on other countries not to recognise Taiwan, or to do anything which implies recognition.

Can Taiwan defend itself?

China could attempt to bring about "reunification" by non-military means such as strengthening economic ties.

But in any military confrontation, China's armed forces would dwarf those of Taiwan.

China spends more than any country except the US on defence and could draw on a huge range of capabilities, from naval power to missile technology, aircraft and cyber attacks.

Much of China's military power is focused elsewhere but, in overall terms of active duty personnel for example, there is a huge imbalance between the two sides.

That help could come from the US which sells arms to Taiwan.

Until now, Washington's policy of "strategic ambiguity" has meant the US has been deliberately unclear about whether or how it would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack.

Diplomatically, the US currently sticks to the "One-China" policy, which recognises only one Chinese government - in Beijing - and has formal ties with China rather than Taiwan.

But in May last year, US President Joe Biden appeared to harden Washington's position.

Asked whether the US would defend Taiwan militarily, Mr Biden replied: "Yes."

The White House insisted that Washington had not changed its position.

Is the situation getting worse?

Relations between Taiwan and China deteriorated sharply following a visit to the island by the then US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, in August 2022.

Beijing condemned Ms Pelosi's visit as "extremely dangerous".

China launched a series of military exercises, including the firing of ballistic missiles, focused on six danger zones around Taiwan, three of which overlapped the island's territorial waters.

Taiwan said the move, which forced ships and planes to find routes around those areas, violated its sovereignty and amounted to a blockade.

Tensions between China and Taiwan had already been increasing.

In 2021, China appeared to ramp up pressure by sending military aircraft into Taiwan's Air Defence Zone, a self-declared area where foreign aircraft are identified, monitored, and controlled in the interests of national security.

The numbers of aircraft reported peaked in October 2021 at 56 incursions in a single day, with Taiwan's defence minister saying relations were the worst they had been for 40 years.

Since then there have been 22 days with more than 20 incursions reported.

Taiwan made data on plane incursions public in 2020.

China's coastguard claims it has the legal authority to stop and inspect shipping in the area around Taiwan.

On Wednesday, it said "on-site inspections" on some vessels would commence.

Taiwan has objected to the move and has instructed Taiwanese vessels not to co-operate with attempts to board and inspect them.

Taiwan's economy is hugely important.

Much of the world's everyday electronic equipment - from phones to laptops, watches and games consoles - is powered by computer chips made in Taiwan.

TSMC is a so-called "foundry" - a company which makes chips designed by consumer and military customers. It is a vast industry, worth almost $100bn (£73bn) in 2021.

A Chinese takeover in Taiwan could give Beijing some control over one of the world's most important industries.

Are the Taiwanese people worried?

Despite the recent tensions between China and Taiwan, research suggests that many Taiwanese people are relatively untroubled.

Almost two thirds (64.3%) replied that they did not.

Separate research indicates that most people in Taiwan identify as Taiwanese - embracing a distinctly different identity.

This article was amended in July 2022 to provide more historical background about Taiwan's status.

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Tension between China and Taiwan has risen and what happens next matters to us all.

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Tunis: Political crisis Pres. Kais Saied amends the Constitution 

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Tunis: Political crisis Pres. Kais Saied amends the Constitution 

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President Kais Saied of Tunis, one of the successful democracies formed after the Arab Spring, is pushing towards a absolute presidential government. The Tunisian political crisis began 25 July 2021, after Saied announced the dismissal of the government and the freezing of Parliament. This was seen by many as a "self coup" and was denounced by many human rights organizations. Saied's decision came after a series of protests against Ennahda, economic difficulties, and a significant rise in COVID-19 cases in Tunisia, which led to the collapse of the Tunisian health system. Tunisian Parliament Speaker and Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi declared this an attack on democracy and called for his supporters to protest. Initially Saied implemented a 30 day curfew but has now been extended until further notice. After a series of power grabs on  22 September, Saied issued a decree that granted him full presidential powers, allowing him to make changes to Tunisia's constitution and government, including the potential dissolution of the parliament. The most recent developments are the amendments made to the Constitution which include: the term which he can serve is now 2 consecutive 5 year terms, there is no ability in Parliament to fire the President, he can appoint the members of Parliament, he can appoint the judges. Summary: President Saied increases the amount of power which the president holds- creates lots of controversy. Claims he's moving towards a total presidential government seems more like dictatorship disguised as presidency.

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The 2021-2022 Tunisian political crisis is an ongoing political crisis in Tunisia between President Kais Saied and the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (the latter led in large part by Ennahda). The crisis began on 25 July 2021, after Saied announced the dismissal of the government and the freezing of Parliament. The president's decisions were denounced by human rights organizations and considered by several foreign media outlets and Tunisian political entities as a self-coup. The decisions came after a series of protests against Ennahda, economic difficulties, and a significant rise in COVID-19 cases in Tunisia, which led to the collapse of the Tunisian health system.

On the day of the dismissal, Tunisian Parliament Speaker and Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi said the president's actions were an attack on democracy and called on his supporters to take to the streets to oppose it. Protests erupted in Tunisia in support of and opposition to the decisions of President Saied. Saied issued a decision imposing a month-long curfew, starting from 26 July from 7 p.m. until 6 a.m. After the 30-day period expired, the President issued a decision on 24 August 2021 to extend the period of "extraordinary measures" he had announced a month before "until further notice."

By Autumn, the crisis had escalated. In October 2021, Najla Bouden was appointed Prime Minister, making her the first female prime minister both in Tunisia and the Arab world. She formed a new government to deal with the turbulent economic crisis.

On February 6, Kais Saied dissolved the country's top independent judiciary, a move that was condemned by the opposition as a power grab.

On February 24, 2022, Saied announced that foreign funding for civil society organizations will be prohibited. He said, "Non-governmental organisations must be prevented from accessing external funds... and we will do that."

The crisis began on 25 July 2021, after Tunisian President Kais Saied dismissed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and suspended the activities of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People by invoking emergency powers from Article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution. The decisions of the president were taken in response to a series of protests against Ennahdha, economic hardship, and a historic spike in COVID-19 cases in Tunisia. The speaker of the Tunisian parliament and leader of Ennahda Rached Ghannouchi said the president's actions were an assault on democracy and called on his supporters to take to the streets in opposition.

Protests have taken place in Tunisia both in favor of and in opposition to the president's actions, while the Tunisian Armed Forces have expressed their support for the president's actions. (See more individual and organizational responses during this period under "Reactions," below.) On 26 July, Saied sacked Minister of Defence Ibrahim Bartaji and acting Minister of Justice Hasna Ben Slimane. Mechichi said that he would hand over power to whoever the president chooses, in a step that could ease the crisis. He said that he would serve Tunisia "from any location." Saied also announced a one-month curfew from 26 July to 27 August 2021.

Since 25 July, a number of parliamentarians and political and human rights activists have been prosecuted for denouncing the president's actions.

On 30 July, Yassin Ayari, a member of parliament and a known critic of President Saied, was arrested at his house by security forces. President Saied's suspension of the Parliament had stripped lawmakers of their immunity. A military judiciary source said that Ayari was imprisoned due to a previous sentence in 2018 which he incurred for criticizing the military. Later on the same day, Maher Zid, another member of parliament, was detained after being sentenced in 2018 to two years in prison for insulting the late President Beji Caid Essebsi. On 23 August, Saied extended the suspension of parliament despite the constitution, which states that parliament can only be suspended for a month. As a result, concerns were raised about the future of democracy in the country.

On 22 September, Saied issued a decree that granted him full presidential powers, allowing him to make changes to Tunisia's constitution and government, including the potential dissolution of the parliament. Earlier that day, Seifeddine Makhlouf and Fayçal Tebbini, both members of parliament, were jailed. Organizations and parties called for a quick resolution to the crisis and formation of a new government. On 29 September, President Saied named Najla Bouden as prime minister and tasked her with forming a new government. She is the first female prime minister in Tunisia and the Arab world.

According to Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, several Tunisian judges' freedom of movement was restricted under various pretexts, without appropriate judicial decisions. On 5 August, Al-Bashir Al-Akrimi, the former republic's attorney for the First Instance Court in the capital, and Al-Tayeb Rashid, the first president of the Court of Appeal, were placed under house arrest on charges of corruption and collusion with terrorists. Judge Iman Al-Obaidi, advisor in the criminal department of the Karmbalia Court of First Instance, was prevented from traveling while on her way to Turkey.

On 8 November, a student attacked a History-Geography teacher in Ibn Rachik High School in Ezzahra with a cleaver and a knife.

On the same day, a protester was killed by security forces during a demonstration against the reopening of a controlled landfill in Aguereb. The protester died from asphyxiation after inhaling tear gas. The following day, angry protesters burned down a National Guard station in retaliation after security forces withdrew from the area.

On May 17, 2022, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor and Journalists for Human Rights documented the Tunisian authorities' imposition of restrictions and violations of the rights of journalists as a result of the exceptional measures on July 25, 2021, announced by President Kais Saied. As a result of the exceptional measures, journalists and local and Arab media outlets in Tunisia were subjected to multiple violations, including repression, arbitrary detention, and security and judicial prosecution. Moreover, the report added that the executive authority in Tunisia had issued orders to impose illegal censorship on the media and to restrict journalistic work.

Political parties: Several opposition parties have called for a national unity government as the only political solution to ongoing turmoil.[28] Ennahda continues to voice strong opposition to Saied's actions[42][43] despite internal strife,[44] and four other parties (Democratic Current, Ettakatol (FDTL), the Republican party, and Afek Tounes) formed a coalition against Saied in late September.[45]

Civil society / NGOs / unions: Unlike opposing parties, Tunisian civil society organizations (such as ATFD, LTDH, SNJT, UGTT, UNFT, UTAP, and UTICA) have had meetings with Saied directly beginning in July. These organizations, associations, and unions have, for the most part, adopted a moderate position toward the president's actions, expressing skepticism toward Saied's one-man rule but applauding his bold stance on entrenched corruption and sharing his acknowledgment of the situation as having reached emergency levels for average Tunisians' living conditions.[36][46][47]

Popular response: In regards to the response of the wider populace, Tunisian analyst Ouiem Chettaoui observed: "Once Saied announced his measures, there was celebrations on the streets of few cities across the country-something Tunisians witnessed and felt first-hand with a power no observer who was not there is able to fully understand. Neighborhoods that have been eerily quiet for months in the evenings due to Covid-related curfews erupted in cheers, car honks, and fireworks. Even poorly managed and neglected urban spaces with few parks had their roundabouts turned into impromptu squares filled with dancing, chanting people."[27][48]

Select individuals: Former President Moncef Marzouki condemned the actions of the President as a clear coup, and that "the main idea we have when writing the constitution is to say that the President is no longer the guy who has all the power... Tunisia was supposed to be a success story in the Arab world. But it's no longer a success story. But let me remind you that we have this political crisis amidst the worst health crisis that we have ever had in Tunisia."[28]

Qatar: The Qatar News Agency cited a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Qatar hopes that Tunisian parties will adopt the path of dialogue to overcome the crisis".[50]

Saudi Arabia: Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud stated that he spoke with Tunisian Foreign Minister Othman Jerandi, and that he "stressed the kingdom's keenness on the security and stability of Tunisia, and supports everything that would achieve this."[28]

Greece: Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Dendias said that Greece is backing Tunisia's efforts to maintain the stability from the influence of extremists and supporting the efforts undertaken by the president.[51]

Spain: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation issued a statement declaring that it was following with "concern" the latest developments in Tunisia while calling for "calm and stability" and appealing to the "regular functioning of institutions, with the necessary respect for the rule of law and political freedoms and rights."[52][53]

United States: White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said that the United States was "concerned" about the developments, further stating "We are in touch at a senior level from both the White House and the State Department with Tunisian leaders to learn more about the situation. We urge calm and support Tunisian efforts to move forward in line with democratic principles... There have been a lot of developments even over the last 24 hours. we will look to the State Department to conduct a legal analysis before making a determination [on whether it's a coup]". William Lawrence of the American University said that there was also no way to review the constitutionality of the president's actions,[28] as a Constitutional Court required by the 2014 constitution hadn't yet been established amongst a lack of consensus between various levels of government.[54]

Arab League: The Arab League issued a statement, saying "The...League urges Tunisia to quickly get through the current turbulent phase, restore stability and calm and the state's ability to work effectively to respond to the aspirations and requirements of the people."[55]

European Union: A spokeswoman for the European Commission stated that "We are closely following the latest developments in Tunisia, [and] call on all Tunisian actors to respect the Constitution, its institutions and the rule of law. We also call on them to remain calm and to avoid any resort to violence in order to preserve the stability of the country."[28]

The International Monetary Fund offered to continue assisting the country with the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic: "Tunisia continues to face extraordinary socio-economic pressures, including as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is causing tragic loss of life, and Tunisian's unmet aspirations for higher, job-rich, and inclusive growth." Tunisia had requested a three-year $4 billion loan "to help stabilise its balance of payments position after its current account deficit widened to 7.1 percent of GDP last year."[50]

United Nations: A spokesperson for Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres, Farhan Haq, called on both sides to "exercise restraint, refrain from violence and ensure that the situation remains calm. All disputes and disagreements should be resolved through dialogue."[28]

Al Jazeera said that their Tunisian bureau was raided by security forces on 26 July, and that journalists were expelled from the country.[56]

Amnesty International called for the government to "publicly commit to respecting and protecting human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly." Both it and Reporters Without Borders condemned the raid on Al Jazeera.[50]

Human Rights Watch stated that the declaration of Presidential Decree No. 117 implicitly revoking the constitutional order in Tunisia is a first step towards authoritarianism. The decision threatens the human rights and democratic aspirations of the Tunisian people.[57]

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2021-2022 Tunisian political crisis - Wikipedia

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The 2021-2022 Tunisian political crisis is an ongoing political crisis in Tunisia between President Kais Saied and the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (the latter led in large part by Ennahda). The crisis began on 25 July 2021, after Saied announced the dismissal of the government and the freezing of Parliament.

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Russia and Ukraine have a long history of armed conflict which began 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. In 2019 Russia began moving troops and military equipment towards the Ukrainian border and there was concern over a potential invasion.  Russia demanded in late 2019 that the US and NATO to cease military activity in East Europe and Central Asia as well as to cease NATO expansion towards Russia and lastly to prevent Ukraine from entering NATO. The US and NATO refused and in the most recent news is Russia launched a full scale invasion February 24, 2022. According to the United Nations this has resulted in many casualties as well as Ukrainian citizens fleeing to other countries for asylum. This conflict has provoked a lot of controversy around the world and has affected many things among them being: prices of basic needs such as food and water. Gas prices and economies around the world. As of right now the war is continuing and President Putin shows no signs that he will agree to a peace treaty any time soon. Many countries have issued sanctions against Russia including the US. The UN, G7 and EU condemn Russia and demand Russia cease force in Ukraine. Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, has been the center for many raids and attacks as it would be the biggest step for Russia in this war. Russia has control of two nuclear plants in Ukraine: 1 of them the decommissioned Chernobyl and the second Zaporizhia which it stormed on February 24th. Ukrainian workers remain inside Zaporizhia to keep it operating as it supplies electricity to the area. The plant is reportedly in critical condition and it stands as a threat of nuclear disaster.

https://www.bbc.com/arabic/world-62605159

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In the year and a half since Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine has recaptured 54 percent of occupied territory, while Russia still occupies 18 percent of the country. Ukraine's 2023 offensive has achieved minor territorial gains, but the frontlines have remained stable for almost a year. Both sides have dug in, making breakthroughs increasingly difficult, and the number of military casualties has climbed to an estimated half a million. Meanwhile, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities and blockade its ports, and Ukraine has stepped up drone attacks on Russian ships and infrastructure. Since January 2022, Ukraine has received nearly $350 billion in aid, including $77 billion from the United States, though it warns of donor fatigue. Fighting and air strikes have inflicted nearly 22,000 civilian casualties, while 5.1 million people are internally displaced, and 6.2 million have fled Ukraine. 17.6 million people need humanitarian assistance.

Armed conflict in eastern Ukraine erupted in early 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea. The previous year, protests in Ukraine's capital, Kyiv, against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's decision to reject a deal for greater economic integration with the European Union (EU) were met with a violent crackdown by state security forces. The protests widened, escalating the conflict, and President Yanukovych fled the country in February 2014.

One month later, in March 2014, Russian troops took control of the Ukrainian region of Crimea. Russian President Vladimir Putin cited the need to protect the rights of Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea and southeast Ukraine. Russia then formally annexed the peninsula after Crimeans voted to join the Russian Federation in a disputed local referendum. The crisis heightened ethnic divisions, and two months later, pro-Russian separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk held their own independence referendums.

Armed conflict in the regions quickly broke out between Russian-backed forces and the Ukrainian military. Russia denied military involvement, but both Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reported the buildup of Russian troops and military equipment near Donetsk and Russian cross-border shelling immediately following Crimea's annexation. The conflict transitioned to an active stalemate, with regular shelling and skirmishes occurring along frontlines separating Russian- and Ukrainian-controlled eastern border regions.

Beginning in February 2015, France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine attempted to kickstart negotiations to bring an end to the violence through the Minsk Accords. The agreement framework included provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian government control throughout the conflict zone. Efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement and satisfactory resolution, however, were largely unsuccessful.

In April 2016, NATO announced the deployment of four battalions to Eastern Europe, rotating troops through Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to deter possible future Russian aggression elsewhere on the continent, particularly in the Baltics. In September 2017, the United States also deployed two U.S. Army tank brigades to Poland to further bolster NATO's presence in the region.

In January 2018, the United States imposed new sanctions on twenty-one individuals-including a number of Russian officials-and nine companies linked to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In March 2018, the U.S. Department of State approved the sale of anti-tank weapons to Ukraine, the first sale of lethal weaponry since the conflict began. In October 2018, Ukraine joined the United States and seven other NATO countries in a series of large-scale air exercises in western Ukraine. The exercises came after Russia held its own annual military exercises in September 2018, the largest since the fall of the Soviet Union.

In October 2021, months of intelligence gathering and observations of Russian troop movements, force build-up, and military contingency financing culminated in a White House briefing with U.S. intelligence, military, and diplomatic leaders on a near-certain mass-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The only remaining questions were when the attack would take place and whether the United States would be able to convince allies to act preemptively. Both were answered on February 24, 2022, when Russian forces invaded a largely unprepared Ukraine after Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized a " special military operation " against the country. In his statement, Putin claimed that the goal of the operation was to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and end the alleged genocide of Russians in Ukrainian territory.

In the days and weeks leading up to the invasion, the Joe Biden administration made the unconventional decision to reduce information-sharing constraints and allow for the broader dissemination of intelligence and findings, both with allies-including Ukraine-and publicly. The goal of this strategy was to bolster allied defenses and dissuade Russia from taking aggressive action. Commercial satellite imagery, social media posts, and published intelligence from November and December 2021 showed armor, missiles, and other heavy weaponry moving toward Ukraine with no official explanation from the Kremlin. By the end of 2021, more than one hundred thousand Russian troops were in place near the Russia-Ukraine border, with U.S. intelligence officials warning of a Russian invasion in early 2022. In mid-December 2021, Russia's foreign ministry called on the United States and NATO to cease military activity in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, commit to no further NATO expansion toward Russia, and prevent Ukraine from joining NATO in the future. The United States and other NATO allies rejected these demands and threatened to impose severe economic sanctions if Russia took aggressive action against Ukraine.

In early February 2022, satellite imagery showed the largest deployment of Russian troops to its border with Belarus since the end of the Cold War. Negotiations between the United States, Russia, and European powers-including France and Germany-failed to bring about a resolution. In late February 2022, the United States warned that Russia intended to invade Ukraine, citing Russia's growing military presence at the Russia-Ukraine border. President Putin then ordered troops to Luhansk and Donetsk, claiming the troops served a "peacekeeping" function. The United States responded by imposing sanctions on the regions and the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline a few days later. Nevertheless, just prior to the invasion, U.S. and Ukrainian leaders remained at odds regarding the nature and likelihood of an armed Russian threat, with Ukrainian officials playing down the possibility of an incursion and delaying the mobilization of their troops and reserve forces.

Since the summer of 2022, fighting has largely been confined to Ukraine's east and south, with Russian cruise missiles, bombs, cluster munitions, and thermobaric weapons devastating port cities along the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The Russian seizure of several Ukrainian ports and subsequent blockade of Ukrainian food exports compounded an already acute global food crisis further exacerbated by climate change, inflation, and supply chain havoc. Prior to the conflict, Ukraine had been the largest supplier of commodities to the World Food Program (WFP), which provides food assistance to vulnerable populations. In July, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement to free more than twenty million tons of grain from Russian-controlled Ukrainian ports. The first grain shipments to leave Ukraine since the Russian invasion departed from Odesa on August 1, 2022; they arrived in Russian-allied Syria on August 15, although their originally presumed destination had been Lebanon. On October 29, Russia suspended the grain deal in response to an alleged Ukrainian attack on Russian naval forces, which Ukraine called a "false pretext." Nonetheless, Russia did not enforce the blockade when Ukraine defiantly continued shipments, and Turkey quickly negotiated Russia's return to the deal, which has been consistently extended to date.

The current conflict has severely strained U.S.-Russia relations and increased the risk of a wider European conflict. Tensions are likely to increase between Russia and neighboring NATO member countries that would likely involve the United States, due to alliance security commitments. The conflict will also have broader ramifications for future cooperation on critical issues like arms control; cybersecurity; nuclear nonproliferation; global economic stability; energy security; counterterrorism; and political solutions in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere. Additionally, Russia's isolation has not only destabilized global energy and resource markets but also pushed the country to seek stronger strategic ties with those states (e.g., China) still willing to partner with it, largely in opposition to the West. The war has also compounded other global crises, with military operations and violence hindering the delivery and distribution of much-needed aid, including food, and exacerbating an already severe shortage of available global humanitarian assistance and resources.

On June 6, 2023, a breach in the Nova Kakhovka dam, sixty kilometers north of Kherson on the Dnipro River, caused severe flooding in southwest Ukraine, affecting over eighty thousand people who live in the riparian zone. Ukraine accuses Russia of blowing up the dam to prevent a southeastern offensive, while Russia claims Ukraine carried out the attack to deprive Crimea of water and distract from the battlefront. The Ukrainian dam operator says it has been destroyed beyond repair. Furthermore, the draining of the reservoir raises concerns over the availability of water to cool the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reactors, though the cooling ponds are reportedly stable.

In June 2023, Ukraine launched a much-anticipated counteroffensive, attempting to break through Russian defenses eastward in Donetsk province, including around Bakhmut, and southward in Zaporizhzhia province, which forms the " land corridor" to Crimea. Zelenskyy said Ukraine aims to liberate 18 percent of occupied territory in the current phase, but Ukrainian forces have met stiff resistance and suffered heavy losses against hardened Russian defensive positions, air superiority, and minefields. Nonetheless, Ukraine has made small gains on the ground and has stepped up attacks on bridges to Crimea, Russian ships, and buildings in Moscow.

Since February 24, 2022, the United States has committed nearly forty billion dollars in security assistance to Ukraine, including nineteen billion in immediate military aid and sixteen billion in humanitarian aid. Additionally, in early 2023 the Biden administration approved the provision of increasingly advanced weaponry, such as the Patriot air defense system, crucial for defending against Russian airstrikes, and top-tier battle tanks. The United States has also dramatically increased U.S. troop presence in Europe, bringing the total to more than one hundred thousand. On June 8, 2023, in a joint press conference with British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Biden said he believes the United States has the funds to "support Ukraine as long as it takes." A day later, the Department of Defense announced another 2.1 billion dollars in military aid. While the United Nations, Group of Seven member states, EU, and others continue to condemn Russia's actions and support Ukrainian forces, Russia has turned to countries like North Korea and Iran for intelligence and military equipment and continues to sell discounted oil and gas to India and China, among others.

By June 2023, the UN Human Rights Office recorded nearly nine thousand civilian deaths and over fifteen thousand civilian injuries since Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The violence has internally displaced nearly six million people and forced nearly eight million to flee to neighboring countries, including Moldova and Poland, a NATO country where the United States and other allies are helping to accommodate the influx of refugees.

On June 23, Putin faced a major internal challenge when Yevgeniy Prigozhin released a video claiming the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) shelled Wagner forces and announced a "march of justice" to unseat the military leadership. The mutiny follows months of tensions with the MoD, which Prigozhin often insulted and accused of not supplying adequate munitions, and an attempt by the MoD to reign in Wagner fighters. Wagner forces quickly occupied Rostov-on-Don and seized Russia's southern military headquarters. Wagner convoys then advanced more than halfway to Moscow; Putin declared the march " treason" and offered amnesty for soldiers who stopped. On June 24, Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko negotiated for Wagner soldiers to return to their bases and for Prigozhin to move to Belarus. Prigozhin's true aims remain unknown, but the incident left both the Wagner Group and Putin weakened.

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War in Ukraine | Global Conflict Tracker

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Understand the conflict in Ukraine since it erupted in 2014 and track the latest developments around Russian and U.S. involvement on the Global Conflict Tracker from the Center for Preventive Action.