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Dāvida zvaigzne, jūdaisma kā reliģijas un visas ebreju tautas simbols. Tas tika uzskatīts arī par ķēniņa Dāvida vairogu (vai vismaz emblēmu uz tā).

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2. Jaunā pareizticīgo sinagoga Košicē (Nová ortodoxná synagóga v Košiciach)

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2. Jaunā pareizticīgo sinagoga Košicē (Nová ortodoxná synagóga v Košiciach)

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Uzcelta: 1926-1927. Gadā

Atrodas: Puškinova ielā netālu no Košices vēsturiskā centra, Slovākijā

Tā aizstāja vecāko pareizticīgo sinagogu Zvonárska ielā, kas celta 1899. Gadā.

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Ortodoksālais jūdaisma ir daži galvenie pamatprincipi kā ticība vienam visvarenam dievam, kas rādijis visumu un turpina pār to valdīt. Dieva un ebreju derību, kas noslēgta Sinajā un Toru kā dieva likumu krājumu.

Maimonida trīspadmit principi - Šie trīspadsmit principi ir centrāli jūdaisma ticībai un tika izklāstīti, lai nodrošinātu pareizu izpratni par Dievu un novērstu kādas netiešas ticības formas. Maimonīda uzskatīja, ka šie principi ir būtiski ikvienam ticīgajam ebrejam un ka tos vajadzētu mācīt un saprast, lai stiprinātu ebreju ticību.

Maimonida trīspadsmit principi:

1. Dieva pastāvēšana: Pirmajā pamatprincipā Maimonīda uzsvēra ticību vienīgajam un absolūti pirmajam Dievam, kas ir bez fiziskas būtnes. Viņš izceļ Dieva vienīgumu un pilnīgumu, noraidot jebkādas citādas dievības vai spējas, kas konkurētu ar Viņa augstāko varu.

2. Dieva vienīgums: Otrajā principā Maimonīds apstiprina Dieva vienīgumu, kas nozīmē, ka nav nevienas citu dievību vai būtņu, kas varētu būt līdzīgas Dievam vai dalīties Viņa varā. Šis princips nošķir jūdaisma monoteismu no citu ticību formām.

3. Dieva nematerialitāte un ķermeņa noraidīšana: Trešais pamatprincips uzsver Dieva nemateriālo dabu un noraida ideju, ka Viņš varētu būt ierobežots ar fizisku ķermeni. Maimonīds uzskata, ka Dievs ir bezformīgs un bez ķermeņa, un tāpēc nav ietekmējams vai ierobežots fiziskā veidā.

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Maimonids

Gadsimtu gaitā ir radušies dažādi jūdaisma ticības principu formulējumi, un lai arī tie atšķiras dažās detaļās, tiem visiem ir vienota pamatideja. Gandrīz universālu akceptu ir guvuši Maimonida trīspadsmit ticības pamatprincipi. Sākotnēji tie tika uztverti diezgan pretrunīgi un pat ignorēti, taču laika gaitā tie ir akceptēti un lielākā daļa ortodoksālo rabīnu uzskata, ka to ievērošana ir obligāta.

1. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību, ka Radītājs, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, ir Radītājs un Vadonis visam kas ir radīts; Viņš viens pats ir radījis, rada un radīs visas lietas.

2. Es zinu ar pilnību pārliecību, ka Radītājs, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, ir Viens, un ka Viņam nav līdzīgo, ka Viņš viens ir mūsu Dievs, kas bija, ir un būs.

3. Es zinu ar pilnību pārliecību, ka Radītājs, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, nav ķermenis, un ka Viņš ir brīvs no visām fiziskām īpašībām un ka ar Viņu nekas nevar fiziski līdzināties.

4. Es zinu ar pilnību pārliecību, ka Radītājs, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, ir pirmais un pēdējais.

5. Es zinu ar pilnību pārliecību, ka tikai Radītāju, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, un tikai Viņu vienu ir pareizi pielūgt, un ka nav pareizi pielūgt kādu citu bez Viņa.

6. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību, ka visi pareģu darbi ir patiesi.

7. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību, ka Mozus, mūsu skolotāja, lai miers ir viņam, pareģojumi bija patiesi un ka viņš bija galvenais pareģis gan starp tiem, kas nāca pirms viņa, gan starp tiem, kas nāca pēc viņa.

8. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību ka visa Tora, kas mums ir pašlaik, ir tā pati kas tika dota Mozum, mūsu skolotājam, lai miers ir viņam.

9. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību, ka šī Tora netiks mainīta, un ka nekāda cita Likuma no Radītāja, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, nekad nebūs.

10. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību, ka Radītājs, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, zin visus cilvēku darbus un visas viņu domas; jo ir teikts: "[Viņš] kas radījis viņu visu sirdis, [Viņš] kas izprot visas viņu darbības."

11. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību, ka Radītājs, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, apbalvo tos, kas ievēro Viņa baušļus un soda tos, kas pārkāpj tos.

12. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību, ka Mesija nāks, un lai arī viņš var kavēties, es tik un tā katru dienu gaidu viņa atnākšanu.

13. Es zinu ar pilnīgu pārliecību, ka mirušie augšāmcelsies brīdī, kad Radītājs, lai svētīts ir Viņa vārds, to vēlēsies un lai slavēts Viņa vārds mūžīgi mūžos.

Daži, kā piemēram, rabīns Jozefs Albo un Raavads critizēja Maimonida sarakstu, jo tajā ir pārāk daudz punktu, kas lai arī patiesi, nav ticības pamatbūtības, un tādējādi pārāk daudziem ebrejiem draudot kļūšana par ķeceriem. Taču ne Maimonids, nedz viņa laikabiedri šo sarakstu neuzskatīja par tādu, kas aptvertu visus ebreju ticējumus, bet drīzāk, tikai kā centrālās pamatidejas, kas raksturīgas jūdaismam.

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Gadsimtu gaitā ir radušies dažādi jūdaisma ticības principu formulējumi, un lai arī tie atšķiras dažās detaļās, tiem visiem ir vienota pamatideja. Gandrīz universālu akceptu ir guvuši Maimonida trīspadsmit ticības pamatprincipi. Sākotnēji tie tika uztverti diezgan pretrunīgi un pat ignorēti, taču laika gaitā tie ir akceptēti un lielākā daļa ortodoksālo rabīnu uzskata, ka to ievērošana ir obligāta.

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Judaisma redzamākie pārstāvji ir patriarhi Ābrahāms, Īzaks un Jēkabs, kuri tiek uzskatīti par ebreju tautas dibinātājiem. Turklāt svarīgi judaismā ir arī Mozus kā Bībeles likteņa vadītais, kā arī pravieši kā Jesaja un Jeremija.

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1. "Kā novērst neatgriezenisku plaisu starp abām lielākajām kopienām un visām pārējām — starp to, ko es saucu par Jeruzalemi un Babilonu, 7 miljoniem ebreju Izraēlā un 7 miljoniem ebreju Ziemeļamerikā?

Tas ir liels izaicinājums, un mūsu pašu pienākums ir izglītot savus bērnus un mācīt vienam otru labāk iepazīt vienam otru."

2. "Otrs izaicinājums, kurā mēs visi esam pārņemti, ir saistīts ar faktu, ka tieši šajā laikmetā – kur demokrātisko diskursu pārņem naids un bailes, kur pēc Otrā pasaules kara tiek iedragāta pasaules kārtība, un mācības Holokausts dažās sabiedrībās nedaudz izzūd — kā mēs kopīgi cīnāmies pret naidu, bailēm un antisemītismu? Tas ir nopietns izaicinājums, ar kuru saskaras visas mūsu kopienas, tostarp Ziemeļamerika, bet noteikti arī citur."

3. "trešais izaicinājums ir ļoti pozitīvs, bet tomēr milzīgs izaicinājums mūsu cilvēkiem. Ir miljoniem cilvēku, kas klauvē pie mūsu durvīm un saka: "Mēs vēlamies būt neatņemama ebreju tautas sastāvdaļa." Mums ir jāatver durvis un jāatver savas sirdis, un mums tās visas jāsaņem ar lielu mīlestību un pieķeršanos visā pasaulē."

Risinājumi:

1. Izglītība un Savstarpēja Izpratne: Veicināt izglītību par savstarpējo izpratni un cieņu, gan iekšēji savā kopienā, gan ārpus tās. Izglītības programma var ietvert gan reliģiskus, gan laicīgus aspektus, lai stiprinātu izpratni par ebreju kultūru un vēsturi.

2. Dialogs un Komunikācija: Veidot aktīvu dialogu starp Izraēlu un Ziemeļamerikas ebrejiem, daloties ar idejām un pieredzi. Starpšanas un dialoga platformas var palīdzēt saprast dažādas perspektīvas un risināt jebkādas neskaidrības.

3. Mācības par Holokaustu un Atmiņas Saglabāšana: Pastiprināt centienus saglabāt mācības par Holokaustu un veicināt atmiņas saglabāšanu. Tas ne tikai stiprina kopienas apziņu par saviem vēsturiskajiem traģēdijas notikumiem, bet arī sniedz pamatu sapratnei un solidaritātei.

4. Aktīvā līdzdalība un Ietekme: Aktīvi piedalīties sabiedriskajā dzīvē un veicināt vērtību, kas izceļ kopienas stiprināšanu un savstarpējo cieņu. Tas var ietvert ne tikai reliģiskas aktivitātes, bet arī pilsonisku dalību un sadarbību ar citām kopienām.

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The Three Main Challenges of Global Judaism Today

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How do we prevent an irreversible rift between the two major communities together with all others – between what I call Jerusalem and Babylon, 7 million Jews in Israel and 7 million Jews in North America?

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6.  The top 12 problems in the catholic church today - Ron Conte

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6.  The top 12 problems in the catholic church today - Ron Conte

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1. Lielākā daļa bīskapu ir vairāk administratori nekā apustuļi

2. Daudzi priesteri nav svēti un nav uzticīgi Baznīcas mācībām

3. Ķeceri ir kļuvuši par cienījamiem skolotājiem Baznīcā

4. Daudzi katoļi anonīmi māca smagas kļūdas, izmantojot internetu

5. Viltus skolotāji ir radikāli pārskatījuši Baznīcas doktrīnu par iekšējo ļaunumu

6. Ticība Baznīcas mācībai tiek aizstāta ar dogmatizētu personīgo viedokli

7. Nepatiesi apgalvojumi par privātām atklāsmēm daudzus noved pie maldiem

8. Lielākā daļa ticīgo nezina katoļu pamatmācības

9. Lielākā daļa katoļu nepieņem mācības vai labojumus no Maģistērija

10. Vairums katoļu, kas pieņem Komūniju, nenožēlo objektīvo nāves grēku

11. Lielākā daļa katoļu, kas pieņem Dievgaldu, neiet uz grēksūdzi Lielākā daļa katoļu ir noraidījuši Baznīcas mācību par kontracepciju un seksuālajiem grēkiem

Risinājumi:

1. Izglītība un Mācības: Pastiprināt centienus sniegt ticīgajiem pilnīgāku izglītību par katoļu mācībām un pamatprincipiem. Tas ietver pieeju gan katoļu skolām, gan mācībām baznīcās, lai cilvēki labāk saprastu savas ticības pamatus.

2. Svētīgo Priedēšana un Mācītāju Apmaiņa: Veidot programmas un iniciatīvas, kas veicina svēto un uzticīgu priesteru un bīskapu izaugsmi. Mācītāju apmaiņa un kopīga svētīgo lūgšana var palīdzēt stiprināt Baznīcas vadību.

3. Ticīgumu veicinošas Iniciatīvas: Ieviest iniciatīvas, kas veicina ticīgo aktīvu līdzdalību un saistību ar Baznīcu. Kopīgi notikumi, semināri un mācību grupas var palīdzēt stiprināt kopienas un reliģisku saikni.

4. Baznīcas Mācību Skaidrojums: Veikt papildu centienus skaidrot Baznīcas mācības un doktrīnas, it īpaši par jautājumiem, kas var radīt neskaidrības vai nesaprašanu. Publikācijas, lekcijas un diskusijas var būt noderīgi līdzekļi.

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1. Most Bishops are more Administrators than Apostles

2. Many priests are not holy and are not faithful to Church teaching

3. Heretics have become respected teachers in the Church

4. Many Catholics anonymously teach grave errors via the internet

5. False teachers have radically revised Church doctrine on intrinsic evil

6. Faith in Church teaching is being replaced with dogmatized personal opinion

7. False claims of private revelation are leading many astray

8. Most of the faithful are ignorant of basic Catholic teaching

9. Most Catholics do not accept teaching or correction from the Magisterium

10. Most Communion-receiving Catholics are unrepentant from objective mortal sin

11. Most Communion-receiving Catholics do not go to Confession

12. Most Catholics have rejected Church teaching on contraception and on sexual sins

This entry was posted in the Church. Bookmark the permalink.

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The Top 12 Problems in the Catholic Church today

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1. Most Bishops are more Administrators than Apostles 2. Many priests are not holy and are not faithful to Church teaching 3. Heretics have become respected teachers in the Church 4. Many Catholics anonymously teach grave errors via the internet 5. False teachers have radically revised Church doctrine on intrinsic evil 6.

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1. Ebreju bībele (Tanah) - Tas ir galvenais jūdaisma svētais teksts, iedalīts trīs daļās (Tora, Praviešu raksti un Raksti). Tora ir svarīgākā un viņai ir piecas grāmatas (Beresita, Šemot, Vaikra, Bemidbar un Devari)

2. Talmuds - Talmuds ir centrālais teksti, kas izskaidro ebreju likumu, etiku, dzīvesveidu un reliģiozos noteikumus. Tam ir divas galvenās daļas - Mišna un Ģemara.

3. Mišna - Mišna ir Talmuda pirmais daļa un tajā ir apkopoti likumi un noteikumi par dažādām jomām

4. Ģemara - Ģemara ir Mišnas komentāri un papildinājumi, kuros tiek izskaidroti un apspriesti Mišnas likumi.

5. Midraši - Midraši ir interpretatīvi teksti, kas sniedz komentārus par Bībeli un talmūda stāstiem, atklājot to simboliku un dziļāku nozīmi.

6. Sidur - Sidur ir ebreju lūgšanu grāmata, kas tiek izmantota kopīgās lūgšanās un svētbrīžos.

7. Hagada - Hagada ir teksti, kas tiek izmantoti Pasahas svinēšanā

8. Kabalas teksti - Kabala ir ebreju mistikas tradīcija, un tās teksti sniedz izpratni par Dieva dabu, pasaules veidošanos un cilvēka dzīves mērķi.

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Both Symptom and Cause: Four Problems in Eastern Orthodoxy Reflected in the Ukraine War - Jerry G. Pankhurst

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Both Symptom and Cause: Four Problems in Eastern Orthodoxy Reflected in the Ukraine War - Jerry G. Pankhurst

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1. Endēmisks jurisdikcijas konflikts: Autokefālā statusa piešķiršana, ko Konstantinopoles patriarhs Bartolomejs ar viņa Tomosa starpniecību, kas 2019. gada janvārī nodeva Ukrainas baznīcniekiem pret Maskavas un visas Krievijas patriarha Kirila gribu, noveda līdz vārīšanās temperatūrai dziļo konfliktu starp patriarhātiem. pareizticīgo dievgaldu. Centrā ir Konstantinopoles un Maskavas patriarhātu relatīvā vara un prestižs.

2. Baznīcas un valsts sadarbība: Balstoties uz baznīcas etnonacionālo struktūru, Putina režīma un Maskavas patriarhāta simbioze liecina, ka šai struktūrai ir nereti agrāk un citur novērotas baznīcas un valsts sadarbības problēmas, kas nav veselīgas reliģiskai dzīvei.

3. Fundamentālisms un etnodoksija: Austrumu pareizticības problēma, kas daudzās vietās un jurisdikcijās ir ilgstoša, ir “fundamentālisms”. Šis fundamentālisms prasa stingru kristietības iespējamo noteikumu ievērošanu, kas prasa pakļaušanos hierarhiskajai vadībai, kas ir piesātināta ar “tradīcijām”, kas it kā mantotas no senajiem Baznīcas tēviem un Ekumeniskajām padomēm. Taču šis fundamentālisms parasti tiek destilēts līdz “atkārtojumu un uzslavu” teoloģijai, neaptverot mūsdienu cilvēku garīgās vajadzības.

Risinājumi:

1. Diplomātija un Dialogs: Lai risinātu endēmiskos jurisdikcijas konfliktus un īpaši Ukrainas jautājumu, diplomātija un dialogs ir būtiski. Starptautiskā kopiena, ieskaitot starptautiskās reliģiskās organizācijas, var piedāvāt starpniecību un veicināt dialogu starp iesaistītajām pusēm.

2. Neitralitāte un neatkarība: Lai novērstu baznīcas un valsts sadarbības problēmas, būtu svarīgi, lai baznīcas būtu neatkarīgas no valsts un varētu izpildīt savu garīgo lomu neatkarīgi no politiskā spiediena. Valsts iestādēm jānodrošina reliģiskās brīvības ievērošana.

3. Baznīcas reformas: Iekšējās reformas, kas atbilst mūsdienu cilvēku garīgajām vajadzībām, var palīdzēt pārvarēt fundamentālisma un etnodoksijas problēmas. Pievēršot uzmanību mūsdienu humānajām vērtībām un piemērojot elastīgākas pieejas, var veicināt ticības atjaunošanu un izaugsmi.

4. Starptautiskā sadarbība: Lai risinātu problēmas, kas saistītas ar prestižu un varu Konstantinopoles un Maskavas patriarhātos, var būt noderīga starptautiska sadarbība un augstākā līmeņa sarunas, lai veicinātu abpusēju sapratni un mieru.

5. Izglītība un informētība: Palielinot izglītību un informētību, var samazināt konfliktu un nesaprašanās iespējamību. Baznīcām jācenšas nodrošināt izglītojošas programmas un informāciju par reliģisko daudzveidību un mūsdienu cilvēka vajadzībām.

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is professor emeritus of sociology and of Russian and Central Eurasian studies at Wittenberg University.
From its first phase starting in the Euromaidan protests and the "Revolution of Dignity" of 2014 to the present calamitous phase, the war in Ukraine has precipitated a deep review of the state of Eastern Orthodoxy among theologians and among secular scholars who understand the societal impact of religion as well as the personal influence of one's own faith.

In one sense, the war in Ukraine is a symptom of problems endemic to Eastern Orthodoxy; in some measure, the war is only possible against the backdrop of these broader problems. On the other hand, given the free actions of Russian Patriarch Kirill and others in leadership in the Russian Orthodox Church, the war is also a cause of the current manifestation of these problems across the Orthodox world.

This reassessment of Orthodoxy, seeking reform, has had four major problematic dimensions.

(1) Endemic Jurisdictional Conflict. The conferral of autocephalous status by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew, through his Tomos delivered to Ukrainian churchmen in January 2019 against the will of the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', Kirill, brought to a boil the deep conflict among the patriarchates that make up the Orthodox communion. At center stage is the relative power and prestige of the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow.

Divisive issues of jurisdictional control in the complex globalized world have brought into focus the overall problem of linking the church structures of Orthodoxy to ethno-national identities. These issues are especially acute among diaspora groups that have been created by the out-migration of Orthodox people to various places in the world as they seek freedom and opportunity. In the Ukrainian case, however, one historically Orthodox population has been invaded by another historically Orthodox power in a most cruel way. It is only ecclesiastical boundaries that divide them in the first instance. How can it be that these Orthodoxies can be so at odds that one can cruelly attack another with military violence? How is it possible that Russia and Ukraine, two so closely connected Slavic nations, are in deadly combat? How is it that Russia can define Ukrainian nationality as the evil "other?" Does some flaw in the global ethno-national structure exist here that requires repair?

(2) Church-State Collaboration. Based in the ethno-national structure of the church, the symbiosis between the Putin regime and the Moscow Patriarchate indicates that this structure has problems of church-state collaboration, often seen before and elsewhere, that are not healthy for religious life. Well before Ukraine's 2014 EuroMaidan "Revolution of Dignity" when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and sponsored the occupation of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine by rebellious forces, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) was providing self-serving religious legitimizing narratives for the power manipulations of the Putin regime. Following the advice of Machiavelli to his prince, the ROC permitted Putin to always "appear [to be] . . . a religious man. And there is nothing so important as to seem to have this last quality." [1]

Putin has used this narrative of religious self-identification to argue in favor of the right to attack Ukraine and take Ukraine for Russia, it being part of the "Russian World" or the mystical "Holy Russia." In that sense, the Russian Orthodox legitimation of Putin's rule and interpretation of the role of greater Russia is part of the cause for the Ukraine war.

Patriarch Kirill and the ROC are not simply passive facilitators in this regard. Kirill and his church leadership have concretely articulated the modern Russian imperial vision in their denunciations of the Ukrainian religious scene and condemnations of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). They also demonstrate this imperial vision in their support for the Russian military not just as a defensive force but as an aggressive, conquering force.

(3) Fundamentalism and Ethnodoxy. A long-simmering problem for Eastern Orthodoxy in many places and jurisdictions is that of "fundamentalism." This fundamentalism demands strict adherence to the putative rules of Christianity, which require obeisance to hierarchical leadership that is steeped in "Tradition" allegedly inherited from the ancient Fathers of the Church and the Ecumenical Councils. But this fundamentalism is usually distilled to the theology of "repetition and praises" [2] without capturing the spiritual needs of modern people.

One church leader describes the "episcopolatry" [3] that has devolved into worship of form-adulation of pageantry led by bishops-but that avoids the movement of the spirit and Christian mission. Furthermore, fundamentalism rejects ecumenical relations, even among closely related groups, and is often supported by what sociologists have dubbed "ethnodoxy: a collectively held belief system that rigidly links a group's ethnic identity to its dominant faith" and supports a culture of intolerance. [4](Note the link with point 1 above.)

(4) Morality and the Orthodoxy of War. The behavior and preaching of the Patriarch of Moscow in support of the invasion of Ukraine has been nearly universally condemned by Christian leaders around the world, excluding only those who have a prior alliance with Patriarch Kirill. Alongside the foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, the Russian Church under Kirill's leadership has pursued an expansionist agenda that steps on the prerogatives of other Orthodox leaders and apes-or sometimes prefigures-the policies of the Russian government itself.

We can see that within the internal workings of Orthodoxy there are important problems of moral obligations and responsibilities. But above all, the very stance of the leaders of the Russian Church as unequivocally on the side of the aggressor war maker in Ukraine raises the basic issue of the church's moral status, the supposed protector and promoter of morality in society.

The Russian Church is on a moral crusade of sorts advocating "traditional values" in family relations, anti-LGBTQ policies, and similar matters [5] that can be seen as within the sphere of religion no matter one's specific stance on the social issues. But advocacy of the war against Ukraine and of the vicious attacks by Russian forces, without any significant pushback for peace, points to the church's own message of immorality.

Most Orthodox churches have few explicitly stated moral doctrines as such, and they rely on teaching the scriptures and lives of saints to provide what guidance is needed in this regard. In 2000, however, the Russian Orthodox Church, led by Kirill when he was head of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, created an important statement of doctrine on moral matters. The Basis of the Social Concept demands that the Russian Orthodox Church call upon the "powers that be" to seek a just and quick peace.

The Russian Orthodox Church seeks to carry out her peace service both on national and international scale, trying to help resolve various contradictions and bring nations, ethnic groups, governments and political forces to harmony. To this end, she makes appeals to the powers that be and other influential sections of society and takes efforts to organise negotiations between hostile parties and to give aid to those who suffer. The Church also opposes the propaganda of war and violence, as well as various manifestations of hatred capable of provoking fratricidal clashes. [6]

Patriarch Kirill has not "called upon" Putin to end the invasion of Ukraine or to stop the broader war to take over Ukraine. And Kirill seems to be a master, not a condemner, of the "propaganda of war and violence." The Patriarch's own words condemn him and also demand others to answer how this could be the behavior of a major Christian leader.

This outline represents a description of problems of Orthodoxy that the war of Russia against Ukraine has brought to prominence. This war is a catalyst for the current expansion of the debate on these issues within global Orthodoxy. The horrors of war should stimulate a sense of urgency for authentic and creative resolution.

[1] Niccolò Michiavelli, The Prince 58 (George Bull trans., Penguin Books 2003) (1961).

[2] Pantelis Kalaitzidis, The 'Kairos' of the L ate Metropolitan of Pergamon John D. Zizioulas, Pub. Orthodoxy (16 Feb. 2023) (translation of eulogy given by Kalaitzidis at the funeral of Metropolitan Zizioulas, 4 February 2023).

[3] John A. Jillions, Episcopolatry, Pub. Orthodoxy (27 Oct. 2022).

[4] Vyacheslav Karpov, Elena Lisovskaya & David Barry, Ethnodoxy: How Popular Ideologies Fuse Religious and Ethnic Identities, 51 J. for Sci. Study Religion 638, 638 (2012).

[5] Kristina Stoeckl & Dmitry Uzlaner, The Moralist International: Russia in the Globalist Culture Wars (2022).

[6] Russ. Orthodox Church, War and Peace, in The Basis of the Social Concept at chap. VIII.
Return to the Series introduction

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Both Symptom and Cause: Four Problems in Eastern Orthodoxy Reflected in the Ukraine War - Talk About: Law and Religion

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In one sense, the war in Ukraine is a symptom of problems endemic to Eastern Orthodoxy; in some measure, the war is only possible against the backdrop of these broader problems.

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Islam and its Challenges in the Modern World - Dr. I. Bruce Watson

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Islam and its Challenges in the Modern World - Dr. I. Bruce Watson

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"Islāms mūsdienās saskaras ar izaicinājumiem gan no iekšpuses, gan no plašākas pasaules. Kritiskās problēmas ir fundamentālā spriedze islāmā. Ārpasaulē izplatīto attieksmi un kritiku var ignorēt kā maldīgu vai naidīgu, taču ir jācīnās pret spriedzi islāmā visā pasaulē. Vienkāršā ģeogrāfiskā nozīmē islāmam ir jātiek galā ar tā mainīgajiem centriem." - Dr. I. Bruce Watson

Vel info no Mir Farooq Ali (https://www.quora.com/profile/Mir-Farooq-Ali-2):

1. "Līderība: Līderība tagad ir korumpēta un bez idejām kopienas un sabiedrības atdzīvināšanai. Līderi ir kļuvuši resni, laupot vājos un pārdodot ietekmi, lai gūtu nelielus ieguvumus. Un musulmaņi kopumā ir ļāvuši tam notikt, jo šie vadītāji izdod simboliskus paziņojumus par to, kā "musulmaņiem ir jābūt vienotiem" vai "cik daudz pūļu viņi iegulda" utt., utt. Musulmaņiem ir vajadzīgi labi cilvēki, kas piecelties un uzņemties šo vadības mantiju."

2. "Izglītība: arvien lielāka uzmanība gan reliģiskajai, gan laicīgajai izglītībai, īpaši sievietēm. Jo vairāk musulmaņi būs izglītoti par savu reliģiju, jo vairāk viņi atzīs sabiedrības pārkāpumus un iestāsies pret to. Tas jau ir sācies sabiedrībās, kurās cilvēki ir atvērtāki izteikties pret radikalizāciju."

3. "“Upura mentalitātes” sajūtas likvidēšana: Man pārāk ilgi šķiet, ka musulmaņiem ir sajūta, ka “visa pasaule ir pret mums”. Tā vietā, lai vainotu visu pasauli, musulmaņiem ir jāskatās uz savu sabiedrību un rīcību, pēc tam jāveic pasākumi, lai tos atrisinātu. Vainot kādu citu ir vienkāršs attaisnojums, lai atsēstos un ļautu lietām ritēt tā, kā tās ir."

4. "Mošeju un sabiedrību padarīšana par iekļaujošāku telpu: izolēšana no ārējiem novērojumiem ir reakcionāra un nepalīdz nevienam mērķim. Mošejas ir jāpadara iekļaujošākas, lai ikviens varētu apmeklēt, spēlēt un mācīties islāmu. Tas ne tikai palīdzēs pašai musulmaņu sabiedrībai, bet arī ļaus tiem, kas nav musulmaņi, novērot un uzzināt par islāmu un musulmaņiem, kas ļoti palīdzēs veidot saiknes starp dažādām kopienām."

Risinājumi:

1. Islāmiskā līderība ar integritāti: Veidot un atbalstīt musulmaņu līderus, kas izceļas ar integritāti, ētiskumu un lielāku atbildības sajūtu pret savu kopienas labklājību. Šie līderi var spēlēt būtisku lomu sabiedrības veidošanā un attīstīšanā.

2. Izglītība par reliģiju un laicīgajiem jautājumiem: Veicināt sabiedrības izglītotību par islāmu, ne tikai reliģiskajā, bet arī laicīgajā aspektā. Īpaša uzmanība jāpievērš sievietēm, nodrošinot viņām piekļuvi izglītībai un iespēju piedalīties sabiedrības dzīvē.

3. Iekšējas pārmaiņas un paškritika: Veicināt kritisku domāšanu un paškritiku musulmaņu kopienās, lai mazinātu "upura mentalitātes" sajūtu. Šāda pieeja ļautu koncentrēties uz iekšējām problēmām un atrisināt tās, nevis automātiski vainot ārējo pasauli.

4. Aktīva dalība sabiedrībā: Veidot atvērtas un iesaistošas mošejas, kas ne tikai kalpo reliģiskiem mērķiem, bet arī kļūst par kopienas centriem, kur cilvēki var sazināties, mācīties un piedalīties kopīgās aktivitātēs. Tas veicina iekļaušanu un izpratni starp dažādām kopienām.

5. Starptautiska sadarbība: Atbalstīt starptautisko sadarbību musulmaņu kopienās, lai kopīgi risinātu problēmas un veidotu dialogu starp dažādām kultūrām un reliģijām. Šāda sadarbība var veicināt mieru un sapratni pasaules mērogā.

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By: Dr. I. Bruce Watson
[Article first appeared in Insight, vol. 12, issue 1 May 1997, no. 33]
Islam today is facing challenges from within and from the wider world. The critical problems are the fundamental tensions within Islam. The attitudes and criticisms common in the outside world can be ignored as misguided or hostile, but the tensions within Islam throughout the world must be confronted. In a simple geographical sense, Islam has to come to grips with its changing centres. The religious centres define the heartland: Saudi Arabia maintains its guardianship of the shrines at Mecca and Medina, and the conduct of the hajj, against the claims of Shii Iran, the Shii tradition, and other sects disillusioned with Saudi Arabia's credentials within the ummah. Saudi Arabia enjoys much of its strength to repudiate other claims because it remains the economic centre of the ummah. It takes a combination of the incomes of Kuwait, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Yemen even to come close to Saudi Arabia's oil wealth. However, this wealth is based on finite resources, and in the years to come the economic centre will shift to those parts of the Muslim world with sustainable resources and reproductive assets. West Asian financial investments recognise this long-term problem, but they remain overwhelmingly located in the Western and non-Muslim economies. The intellectual centre of Islam is Al-Azhar in Cairo. The ideas and attitudes taught here are spread throughout the ummah, particularly through the population centres of Islam: Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Malaysia. The relative power of the different centres is shifting. Over time the claims on and against the heartland from and by the peripheral Muslim communities will exacerbate the tensions already present. The conservative centre will be under greater pressure from the more vigorous, prolific and liberal Muslim societies on the periphery.

Despite the ideals promoting an equitable and productive material life, the overwhelming majority of Muslims experience living standards which are hardly enviable by any standard. This frequently appears to be a greater paradox in the wealthy oil-producing Muslim countries. Where justice and brotherhood are recommended by the ideals, in such countries we see the conspicuous consumption of the very rich, the purchase of very expensive military technology and armaments, and we see the exploitation of ' guest workers': fellow Muslims from Palestine, Pakistan, the Philippines, among others. The plight of these groups was obvious during and after the Gulf War in 1990-1991. Unemployment of masses of people; rapid urbanisation; unbalanced development - all need to be addressed quickly by the ummah, if the ummah is to become the social force of international Islam. The wide imbalances in the distribution of incomes and wealth between Muslim societies are obvious, but since effective redistribution is not happening within most Muslim societies it is unlikely to occur to any major degree between different Muslim societies.

Development investment in Muslim countries is slow simply because investors are put off by the more extremist agitations and the perceptions in the West about Islamic legal proscriptions of such financial mechanisms as interest. Muslim investors appear quite happy to send their money into the non-Muslim economies, where greater profits are available and the political and social circumstances are much more settled. In other cases, where people are trying to help their communities they often encounter problems from unlikely sources. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has been lending small sums of money, mostly to rural women so that they can engage in small enterprises, but also to collective groups. The sums are small and the interest is fixed, with the principal being repaid first and the interest calculated on the diminishing principal. Twenty per cent interest per year still seems high, but it is tiny when compared with the twenty per cent per month or ten per cent per day demanded by the traditional money-lenders, or the compound interest at Bangladesh's commercial banks. The Grameen Bank lends money to people who would not be eligible in the normal commercial sense. People are helped to determine the best way to satisfy their needs and are helped by the bank's officers in the villages. The Grameen Bank goes out to its clients and it permits the good sense and honesty of its clients to prevail: it has a recovery rate of some ninety eight per cent. The bank faces conflict from the traditional money-lenders, the commercial banks which claim that the scheme is too small to create the economic growth necessary in Bangladesh, and from the Muslims who see the scheme emancipating women in the villages. The bank fulfils the ideals of Islamic thinking, but is attacked by established interest groups defending their interpretation of Islamic practice.

Economic frustration and unequal opportunities are fertile breeding grounds for dissent and protest. Equally important is the failure of most Muslim governments to confront the demands of general education. "Modernity, the circumstance of being 'modern', is, in a central sense, inescapable. It is the necessary context for every tolerably well-informed life-journey undertaken in the contemporary world." Being modern does not mean being Western but it does mean that some degree of secular knowledge will have to be given far greater prominence in Muslim epistemologies. Dr Mahathir bin Mohamed has made the point that there can be no separation between secular and religious knowledge because all knowledge, all life, is encompassed by Islam. It is interesting that so prominent and successful a Muslim leader as Dr Mahathir had to tread a fine line: advocating on the one hand an independent and progressive Muslim attitude to acquiring the widest possible knowledge, while placating the traditional sensibilities by insisting on the moral rectitude of learning as the only way to protect the faith. There are Muslim intellectuals working to understand what it means to be a Muslim in the modern world, but they do not receive the prominence given to the extremists in Western reports. Western media are more interested in the violent and emotional than they are in quiet, but deeply significant, debates about the eternal values that remain, despite the anarchic individualism of Western communities, the essence of being human. Not only are Muslim intellectuals under pressure from the conservative elements of their own societies, they are not receiving the recognition and support they deserve from the West. Yet it is at this level of ideas and reassessments that Muslim leaders will have to convert the de facto modernisation of their societies into general acceptance. The renaissance of ijtihad will be needed to reinterpret the principles of Islam, to retain the critical moral core while jettisoning the dubious accretions of traditional and worldly Muslim authorities.

The whole panoply of modern knowledge and technology is acceptable, but its Western manifestations are to be avoided if all they achieve is the perpetuation of the Muslim world's dependence on Western developments. A fundamental problem here is that which bedevils Western societies: can the use of and reliance upon new technologies alter perceptions, change desires, force social changes? Do the people who create and maintain the new technologies become the new high-priests. All knowledge and technology entail more than the physical and objective characteristics; they also contain the moral questions about how the new technologies should be used, what controls should be placed on them and who should be responsible for the implementation of the regulations. These are moral questions the simply secular authorities cannot answer, if only because utilitarian arguments lead us only to numerical quantities not qualitative priorities.

There is a very real danger involved if Muslims are not critical enough of Western world perceptions and if they take things for granted. There needs to be an increase in criticism in the light of Islam criteria. Without a heightened critical faculty Muslims are in danger of considering

"Islam as a partial view of things to be complemented by some modern deology rather than as a complete system and perspective in itself, whose very totality excludes the possibility of its becoming a mere adjective to modify some other noun which is taken almost unconsciously as central in place of Islam...He who understands the structure of Islam in its totality knows that it can never allow itself to become reduced to a mere modifier or contingency vis-a-vis a system of thought which remains independent of it or even hostile to it."

The main danger arises if Muslims accept the more extreme view of the difference of Islam and the insistence on establishing 'the third way'. If everything Western is to be discarded, then the creative and productive dynamism inherent in Islamic traditions will be suppressed yet again. Is Islamic resurgence giving enough attention to the challenges of poverty and hunger, disease and illiteracy? Have Islamic resurgents gone past, or are they still stuck on, their rhetoric regarding education and knowledge, science and technology, politics and administration, economics and management in their preferred Islamic order? To what extent have Islamists become pre-occupied with forms and symbols, rituals and practices? Do they regard laws and regulations in a static rather than a dynamic manner ? Is there a tension between the extremists' positions and the principles of the Quran and sunnah about the roles of women in society and the place of minorities in Muslim societies? Is the main problem a betrayal of the spirit of the Quran in the extremists' exclusiveness in a variety of matters ranging from charity to politics? Are the activities of extremists encouraging sectarianism in the umma through their insistence on their interpretations being the only correct ones? Have extremist views contributed to the factionalism and fragmentation of the ummah.

The moral question is at the heart of the matter. Fazlur Rahman stated the position precisely. Islam needs: "some first-class minds who can interpret the old in terms of the new as regards substance and turn the new into the service of the old as regards ideals". Can the modernists who want modernisation without Westernisation expect to realise their hopes? There is evidence enough in Western society that modernisation, with all its technological developments, has radically changed values by putting traditional attitudes under pressure and then instituting a new ethic.

Untrammelled economic growth and development has resulted in consumerism, institutionalised selfishness, ill-gotten wealth, rising expectations, laxity in sexual behaviours, the dissolution of the family, essentially independent electronic media, the influx of foreigners and foreign values, the materialism of modern science and technology and greater amounts of secularism.

In an Increasing Secular World, can Islam unite a Modern Society?

Western secular politics is based on the notion that sovereignty belongs to individuals who select their governors through political consensus arrived at during free and regular elections. Islam believes, in theory at least, that sovereignty belongs only to God and that a legitimate temporal government is so only for as long as it implements God's will and the Sacred Laws. Whatever the theory asserts, the reality is that governments have to find the equilibrium that produces social prosperity and harmony under the guiding impulses of a strong moral code. The problem is made more complex when the moral code is itself subject to sectarian divisions: between orthodox and heterodox claims to revelation and legitimacy. We have to return to the questions: whose Islam, what Islam, where and when? It is clear that in states which have declared Islam as the ideology of political order, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, there has been little reduction in domestic conflict or the reduction of conflict with their neighbours, Muslim or otherwise. In these states there is little real evidence of effective redistribution of wealth or substantial economic and social benefits flowing down to the general population. The benefits promised by Islam are not being realised.

In the Muslim communities with an emphasis on the secular ideology of politics, such as Turkey and Egypt, the general welfare is only slightly better, although there appears to be a greater freedom of belief and action. The majority of Muslims live under governments with a qualified acceptance of a secular ideology. These states have taken Western models for modern political and social institutions and have imbued them with a strong Islamic character. The problem remains: how does Islam deal with public morality and public order? What institutional frameworks can define, separate, and regulate private vice and public morality? What arguments can be raised in favour of, and against, the devout who insist that there exists already a definitive, well-known and comprehensive path revealed by God? In our reflections on the issues, we must remember to distinguish between the genuinely devout people and those utilising religious symbols to promote their own positions.

Political Islam is under challenge from its own rhetoric and message to be self-critical: to live up to its own standards; to live up to the principles it espouses and demands of others; to avoid and denounce excesses committed by governments and movements that identify themselves as Islamic; to take or share responsibility for the failures of Muslim societies, and not simply to blame the West for all the problems. One of the central questions will be the treatment of minorities under Islamic governments, and the behaviour of Muslim minorities in other countries. At present the political ideology of Islam cannot entertain an equal and pluralist society of Muslims and non-Muslims. This is not just a matter of tolerance: it entails the recognition in ideal and reality of the unqualified equality and citizenship rights of people of all faiths irrespective of whether they are male or female. The role and influence of political dissent, trade unions, and the media will have to be re-examined along with the social and legal issues. A new equilibrium will have to be reached between the legitimate demands of the individual and the legitimate demands of the society in which he or she lives.

In the same way, Muslim minorities will need to reach a new accommodation with the ruling groups in their countries. Indian Muslims (about one hundred millions, or twelve per cent of the population), and Muslims in the Philippines (about six millions, or eight per cent of the population), will have to control the extremist elements within their communities. The examples of Pakistan and Bangladesh are clear demonstrations that separatism is not a viable option. Religious homogeneity is no more capable of establishing a harmonious society than is the ethnic homogeneity being attempted by the Bosnian Serbs. The spread of Islamic terrorism into the emerging Muslim states in Central Asia, in Africa, as well as the sporadic outbreaks in Western countries, will need to be suppressed. At the same time the legitimate demands of Muslim minorities must be recognised by the governments of their countries. Some fifty million Chinese Muslims cannot be ignored even within a population as large as China's.

In international terms, Islamic states are increasingly significant economically, financially and politically. Across the ummah local interests and national politics appear to be more important than simple identification of interests based on Islamic traditions. The Islamic states antipathetic to the West (Libya, Iran, Iraq, Yemen) are balanced by those which are firmly supportive (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei). This is not to say that the states with positive relations with the West are not critical of the West. Many of the criticisms of leaders such as Dr Mahathir, Lee Kuan Yew, and Goh Chok Tong (Prime Minister of Singapore), among others, are incisive and go to the heart of many of the problems in the West.

Despite the overwhelming global influence of Western ideas, the West, of course, is not a monolithic presence. The twentieth century has proved beyond any doubt that the ideals espoused in the West do not prevent hypocritical justifications for untenable attitudes towards the rest of the world, nor do they prevent total war between European nations.

The West has to understand Islam; not because Islam is the next great threat, but because Islam contains so many ideas and moral values that the West, for all its rampant secularism, still shares. The West must also recognise the diversity of Muslim experiences across the world. Muslim societies do not only suffer from 'Islamic' problems; they suffer the same problems long familiar in the West: political, economic, ecological, social and moral development. As such, these are shared human experiences and the beneficial resolutions: in science, technology, medicine, education should also be shared equitably. If Western nations believe in the value of their defining concepts: individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and the separation of church and state then they will have to be shared through sympathetic dialogue, not forced upon others. The idea of contending world views which define the good states from the bad states will have to be scrapped. It has not worked in the West's relationships with China, where the hypocrisy of the West's stance on human rights has been highlighted by the West's attitudes towards Algeria and Bosnia. Western support, especially that by the United States, for the authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan while denigrating other exclusive Islamic authorities in Iran, Syria, Iraq, and the Sudan, does not generate confidence among Muslim societies around the world. Western nations supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, yet helped to oppress Palestinians through support for Israel. The continued existence of Israel is not negotiable, but the ways in which Western nations have treated the concerns and sensibilities of the Palestinians have not been sympathetic enough. Neither have the more aggressive Muslim attitudes helped the situation.

Western attempts to propagate ideas about Western civilisation as 'universal civilisation' have resulted in significant reactions against a new imperialism: 'cultural imperialism', 'human rights imperialism', and so on. The religious revivals and reaffirmations of local, traditional values, among the younger generations in Islamic and Hindu cultures especially, are often reactions against the insidiousness of Western cultural influences.

Just as Western societies must reassess their ideas about the superiority of their ideals, so too must Muslim societies understand that their traditions need reinterpretation. It is pointless for the ulama to keep on insisting that Islam is not simply a different tradition: it is a superior tradition. In this light Western ideas are not only inferior, they are inapplicable and irrelevant to Islam and Muslim society. At the level of ideals the arguments depend eventually on the leap of faith: whether divine authority rests in the Torah, the Bible or the Quran. People who accept the superior divinity of only one of these not only have the problem of repudiating other claims, they must also address the people who do not accept the authority of any divine revelation. It is useless to quote the authority of the Quran to people who do not accept it. The arguments have to be conducted on other levels: rational and empirical levels. Here the ideals can be seen to have been debased over the centuries by the practical realities of living. This does not mean that the ideals are worthless, but it does mean that demands for a return to the simplicity of Islamic principles must be tempered by courageous and clear-sighted analysis of the differences between the Quranic ideals and their historical development.

Islam and the West have much to offer each other. Nothing productive will develop while the dominant attitudes are those of suspicion, bigotry, and fear. Islam once played an essential role in preserving knowledge during the ignorance and barbarism of Europe's 'dark ages'. The rediscovery and refinement of this knowledge helped to set Europe on the road to its modern dominance of science and technology. The grip of worldly and corrupted religious leaders was broken in Europe. At the same time the suppression of ijtihad and rational dissent within Islamic societies by similar sorts of rulers caused the decline of the Islamic world, permitting the Europeans to indulge in imperialism and colonialism from the eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. A sympathetic exchange of knowledge, flowing this time from Western societies to Islamic societies, may well revivify Islam and permit Islamic societies to enjoy a more creative and significant role in the modern world.

Simple material transfers are not enough. There has to be a reworking of the central ideas in both societies. It may seem an obvious point, but in the bigotry of the religious confrontation it is necessary to emphasise that non-Muslims must recognise as a fact God's revelation of truth to Muhammad. If we can accept our own monotheistic traditions and the role of prophets we must recognise the genuine prophetic claims of others. We can critically examine the traditions but we must do so from recognition and knowledge not from denigration and outright rejection. Islam offers much to Western societies presently dominated by the anarchic demands of rampant 'isms': individualism, materialism, consumerism and secularism.

Islam has preserved the central position of moral values as the defining character of human society. Francis Lamand, President of the French Association 'Islam and the West', considers that: "Islam can contribute to the rebirth, in the West, of three essential values: the sense of community, in a part of the world that has become too individualistic; the sense of the sacred; and the legal sense. This can be the contribution of Islam to Western societies". In return the West has to control its arrogance and reassess its stance towards the rest of the world. The notion of there even being a 'rest of the world', from whatever perception, is something we all have to change.

Notes

1. Shabbir Akhtar, A Faith for All Seasons: Islam and Western Modernity (London, Bellew, 1990), p. 104.

2. Sayyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man (London, Longman, 1975), pp. 131-132.

3. For an interesting treatment of this issue see Chandra Muzaffar, 'Dominant Western Perceptions of Islam and the Muslim', The Thatched Patio, Vol. 6, no.3 (1993), pp. 25-26. See also Shayk Fadhlalla Haeri, The Elements of Islam (Shaftesbury, Element Books, 1993), esp. pp. 129-35, 143.

4. Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual tradition, (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 139.

5. P. J. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State [1987], (rep. London, Routledge, 1991), p. 67.

6. J. L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York, Oxford, 1992), p. 78.

7. Ibid., pp. 206, 209.

8. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State, p. 97.

9. S. P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations?', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, no. 3 (1993), p. 40.

10. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State, p. 16.

11. Cited in M. A. Yamani, 'Islam is not an enemy of the West', rep. Australian Muslim News, Vol 1, no. 5 (1994), p. 9.

Copyright: [ IFEW 1997] This material is published in Insight and is the property of the Islamic Foundation for Education and Welfare (IFEW) [http://www.IFEW.com/].

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[Dr I. Bruce Watson is a Lecturer in South Asian and Islamic History at the University of New England, Armidale, Australia; Coordinator of the Graduate Program in Islamic Studies at UNE; Assistant Editor of "South Asia"; Member of the International Editorial Committee of "Periodica Islamica".]

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Islam and its Challenges in the Modern World

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Pareizticība jeb Ortodoskā baznīcā, ir termins austrumu pareizticīgās baznīcas apzīmēšanai. Pareizticība ir kristietībuaustrumu atzars, viens no trim konceptuālajiem kristietības pamatvirzieniem paralēli Romas Katoļi baznīcai un protestantismas.

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Pareizticīgā baznīca Latvijā vēsturiski pārstāv vienu no tradicionālajām kristīgajām konfesijām. Pareizticības pirmsākumi mūsdienu Latvijas teritorijā meklējami kontaktos starp Austrumlatvijas pilsnovadu valdniekiem un Polocku, kā arī ar Pleskavu un Novgorodu. Arheoloģiskās liecības norāda uz pareizticības izplatīšanos starp latgaļiem jau 11.–12. gadsimtā.

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Pareizticības dogmatikas un baznīcas organizācijas pamati veidojās laikā no 2. līdz 8. gadsimtam, un te nozīmīgākie bija pareizticīgās baznīcas tēvi Atansijs, Basilijs Lielais, Jānis Zeltmute, Damaskas Jānis, Gregors, kā arī koncili Efesā un Halkedonā, kas tika sasaukti, lai precizētu mācību par Kristus dievišķo un cilvēcisko dabu.

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Galvenie ir Konstantinopoles, Aleksandrijs, Antiohijas un Jeruzalemes patriarhāti. Konstantinopoles ekumeniskais patriarhāts ir pareizticīgo visaugstākais sēdeklis, tas ir arī visas pasaules pareizticīgo centrs.

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Katoļticība ir vispārīgs termins, ar kuru apzīmē vienu no kristietības virzieniem, kas izveidojās, kad Kristīgā baznīca sašķēlās katoļticīgajos un pareizticīgajos.

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Svētā Pētera bazilika ir bazilika, kas atrodas Vatikānā un ir Romas pavēstā mājvieta. Tā ir uzcelta vietā, kur Romas Impērijas laikā imperators Nerons esot sodijis ar nāvi vairākus kristiešus utt.