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This publication is produced under the Wilson Center and Ohio State University joint project: Cultivating US and Chinese Climate Leadership on Food and Agriculture, supported in part by the US Embassy in Beijing. The project was launched in September 2022, and today we succinctly call it the Cool Agriculture Project. While the United States and China are starting to decarbonize food production, it is not yet an area of significant bilateral collaboration or dialogue. Over the past year, we have engaged with US and Chinese agriculture, food system, and climate experts with two goals in mind to: (1) illustrate the complex climate footprint from US and Chinese agriculture and (2) highlight opportunities for bilateral cooperation on policies, projects, and strategies to reduce agriculture's climate footprint. See flipbook of the roadmap below.

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Cultivating US and Chinese Climate Leadership on Food and Agriculture: A Roadmap for Collaboration

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This publication is produced under the Wilson Center and Ohio State University joint project: Cultivating US and Chinese Climate Leadership on Food and Agriculture, supported in part by the US Embassy in Beijing. The project was launched in September 2022, and today we succinctly call it the Cool Agriculture Project.

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Ensuring National Food Security: Simultaneous Efforts to Increase Production and Reduce Losses - Interpret: China

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Scholars at Guizhou University and Renmin University see the availability, quality, and productivity of arable land in China under pressure, and outline steps Beijing should take to increase agricultural production and reduce food waste. Among other approaches, they recommend Beijing encourage greater investment in food storage and transportation R&D, shape consumption patterns, and improve the application of innovative technologies to the sector.

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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

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State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023

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What Is Food Security and How Is the World Bank Supporting the Most Vulnerable Households?

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Global cooperation is needed to address food security issues: World Bank

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China’s intensifying focus on food security | FT Food Revolution

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Japan's Initiatives for Strengthening Global Food Security

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【JICA Chair】How Japanese agriculture contributed to food security and rural life？(Digest ver.)

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Rapid and substantial economic transformations over the past 35 years in the People's Republic of China have translated into remarkable progress in poverty reduction and social development. By lifting millions out of hunger, the country met its Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of hungry people by 2015 and reduced the global hunger rate by two thirds.

However, large pockets of poverty still exist - especially in remote, mountainous areas - and there are large income disparities and gaps in nutritional status between rural and urban areas. Almost 150.8 million people are malnourished. Given the size of China's population, rates of 9.4 percent for stunting in children, 19.6 percent for anemia and 25 percent for overweight represent significant national and global burdens.

The rural landscape is dominated by more than 200 million smallholder farmers, who produce the majority of the food consumed nationally and manage 95 percent of the cultivated land. For those living in the most remote locations, with poor infrastructure and limited access to financial and other services, markets and value chains, it is difficult to partake in the national progress and efficiency gains.

China is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. More than 186 million people are exposed to the effects of droughts and floods, which are estimated to reduce the country's potential grain output by about 20 million tons per year. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the expansion of agricultural activities into areas prone to disasters, and by poor maintenance of water conservation systems.

Based on a memorandum of understanding signed in March 2016, the World Food Programme (WFP) works with the Chinese Government to reduce poverty in targeted counties, enhance the livelihoods and resilience of smallholder farmers, and improve the capacity of communities in areas vulnerable to disasters to withstand and respond to climate shocks. This is in line with government plans and priorities, including the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020).

Given China's increasing role as a donor for international development and its outstanding experience in reducing poverty, WFP is also working with the Government to share best practices and extend support to developing countries in their efforts to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 2 on Zero Hunger. WFP's Country Office in China also hosts a Centre of Excellence devoted to promoting South-South cooperation.

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Rapid and substantial economic transformations over the past 35 years in the People's Republic of China have translated into remarkable progress in poverty reduction and social development. By lifting millions out of hunger, the country met its Millennium Development Goal of halving the number

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CPT Gustavo Ferreira

Agricultural Officer, 353rd Civil Affairs Command, U.S. Army Reserves; Senior Agricultural Economist, U.S. Department of Agriculture

Professor of Food, Agricultural and Biological Engineering and Water Quality Specialist, The Ohio State University

Deputy Director and Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies

Even Pay

Director, Agriculture, Trivium China

Director, Global Food and Water Security Program

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China's Food Security Challenges | CSIS Events

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Please join the Interpret: China project and a panel of experts for a discussion of China's food security challenges.

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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to face a wide range of food and nutrition security challenges, which add to the protracted humanitarian situation in the country. Agriculture annually falls short of meeting food needs, due to shortages of arable land, lack of access to

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The Global Food Security Index (GFSI) is an annual assessment measuring food security through affordability, availability, quality and safety, and sustainability and adaptation metrics worldwide.

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The world is currently experiencing a global food crisis. Record-high food prices have driven millions more into extreme poverty, magnifying hunger and malnutrition. This ongoing global food crisis was triggered, and continues to be fueled, by several key factors, most notably COVID-19, climate shocks, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and trade-distorting government policies. Amid the worsening global food crisis, there have been growing domestic and international concerns regarding the food security of China, the world's most populous country and largest food importer.

There have been mounting concerns regarding China's food security situation amid growing threats from climate shocks and worsening ties with the United States and other Western countries, which are among the top agricultural suppliers to China. In response, the country's foremost leaders have repeatedly stressed the strategic importance of safeguarding the country's food security. For instance, in April 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that "food security is an important foundation for national security." Having publicly linked food security to China's national security, he has also called for further efforts to safeguard grain security and protect farmland to increase domestic production.
2022: A Tough Year for China's Food Security
For China, 2022 was an undoubtedly challenging year for agriculture, primarily due to climate shocks and the continued disruptions caused by its zero COVID policy. Notably, the past summer was the country's driest and hottest since consistent records began being kept in 1961. The severe heatwave resulted in a drought in the Yangtze River Basin (YRB), which affected over 900 million people in China in over 17 provinces and an estimated 2.2 million hectares of agricultural land, including land used for rice. As the YRB produces two-thirds of China's rice (mainly Indica rice), the most widely consumed staple in the country, the drought is likely to have had a significant impact on national rice production, while exacerbating the structural imbalances in China's rice supply.

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As heatwaves and drought scorched much of southern China, northern China and southern China were both affected by record rainfall and significant flooding. Although summer floods are common in various parts of China, extreme weather events have become more frequent and intense in recent years due to the effects of climate change. In July 2022, in Guangxi autonomous region, one of the worst-hit areas, rain-induced disasters affected agricultural production, houses, and roads. Estimates suggest that this caused direct economic losses of over 12.48 billion yuan ($1.86 billion).

Aside from COVID-19 and extreme weather events, the Ukraine-Russia War has further impacted China's external agricultural supplies and domestic agricultural production. Take corn for an example. As the largest corn importer in the world, in 2021, China had to import 28.35 million metric tons of the staple, up 152 percent from 2020, representing 9.4 percent of domestic corn consumption. Most imports came from the United States, Ukraine, and Brazil, with Ukrainian imports accounting for a third of the total amount.

China has also for many years imported wheat, mainly from agricultural powerhouses like Australia, Canada, and the United States. However, due to the trade war with the U.S. and strained relations with Western nations, China has been seeking to diversify its wheat import sources by looking toward Russia and Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan. As part of China's wheat import diversification efforts, China and Russia signed an agreement on wheat supplies during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Beijing for the opening of the Winter Olympics in February 2022. Under the agreement, China can import wheat from all of Russia, thereby potentially improving its wheat supply.
China's Grain Miracles in 2022
However, the Ukraine-Russia War has significantly impacted the global food supply, affecting China's external food suppliers. On the one hand, the war disrupted the flow of agricultural products and fertilizers through the region, causing delays and increasing the costs of food exports. On the other hand, the economic sanctions imposed by various countries on Russia and Belarus last year have further impacted agricultural and fertilizer trade, leading to reduced exports and higher prices for food products.
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Despite numerous challenges, official statistics from China suggest that the country's food security has actually been well safeguarded due to China's growing domestic production and massive stockpiles. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the country's grain output reached 686.53 billion kilograms, an increase of 0.5 percent from the previous year. It marked the eighth consecutive year that China's total grain production has exceeded 650 billion kilograms. Furthermore, cultivated land has increased by 0.6 percent year-on-year to 1.775 billion mu (approximately 118.33 million hectares), while per unit output of grain reached 387 kilograms per mu.

Furthermore, China holds significant quantities of the world's grain reserves. China's rice, wheat, and corn reserves have grown steadily in recent decades. According to the Economist, which cited the U.S. Department of Agriculture, by mid-2022, China was expected to hold 69 percent of the world's corn reserves, 60 percent of its rice, 51 percent of its wheat, and 37 percent of its soybeans. Although China has not released details regarding its stockpiles, officials from the country's National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration noted that the supply in the domestic grain market is "fully guaranteed," while grain reserves are at a "historical high level."
Skepticism Regarding Chinese Official Statistics
To reassure China's public and the international community that the country will not face imminent grain security risks, the Chinese government has publicly pointed to its bumper grain harvests and massive grain reserve systems. For instance, in his 2023 New Year Address, Xi Jinping said, "Despite a global food crisis, we have secured a bumper harvest for the 19th year in a row, putting us in a stronger position to ensure the food supply of the Chinese people."

Accurate production statistics are necessary for research, monitoring, planning, and decision-making. The China Statistical Yearbook, which produces the country's statistics, has generally reported an annual increase in domestic grain production, with rare exceptions. However, there is some skepticism regarding Chinese official statistics, both outside and inside China.
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For instance, an article by ScienceNet in China, published in 2014, questioned the 11th consecutive increase in total grain production reported. The article noted that given the severity of the drought in 2014, it is unlikely that agricultural output could have increased that year. Additionally, various researchers in the article pointed out that China's grain production data is inaccurate. From their perspective, China's ever-increasing grain imports prove that grain production in China cannot keep up with the total grain consumption and that the country's actual grain production is much lower than the officially announced level.

Further, a study by Zhang et al. (2020) found that the subsidies provided by the central government to the major grain-producing counties have resulted in the over-reporting of these counties' grain production. Similarly, another study finds "some evidence of potential misreporting problems from the lower administration level where the risk of manipulation of statistics is higher."

Various studies have highlighted the role played by lower levels of administration in China, noting that there is some evidence of potential misreporting problems and data manipulation. Likewise, research has acknowledged that technical difficulties and the potential for political manipulation can influence statistics in China. Meanwhile, other studies have emphasized that the problem lies in inconsistent grain production and consumption data.

It is also worth noting that researchers and media have also questioned the accuracy of the Chinese official reserve statistics. For instance, in November 2022, a Reuters article mentioned that most industry players questioned the reliability of China's official grain statistics, as they suspected that China's corn stocks might no longer be plentiful. Indeed, corruption relating to China's grain reserve system has been well-publicized, while questions over the lack of transparency about the grain reserve data have also been raised. Over the past few years, thousands of officials were arrested or investigated in China's grain reserve system at both local and central levels for corruption and other charges. The widespread corruption has further raised questions about the accuracy and reliability of the government's reported data.
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Further linking food insecurity concerns in China to data accuracy is the quality of the grain stored in the reserves. Due to a number of concerns raised about the condition of the grain, including contamination and issues with pests, there have been calls for the Chinese authorities to improve the storage and management of its grain reserves to ensure optimal grain quality.
Looking Ahead
At present, it is hard to judge the reliability of China's official agricultural data and, thus, the state of the country's food security. Nevertheless, at least in the short term, there seems to be no significant concern. Against a backdrop of rising global food prices and worsening food insecurity, it should be noted that food prices in China, except for pork, have remained largely stable. For instance, in November 2022, food prices in China rose 3.7 percent compared to 2021, a decrease from the 7 percent increase in October, while pork prices saw a significant surge of 32.2 percent.

However, from a long-term perspective, China's food security status remains much less certain. Given increases in the frequency, duration, and intensity of extreme climate events like droughts and severe flooding in China, alongside poor quality and quantity of water resources and severely contaminated land, it remains to be seen to what extent Beijing can solve these problems to increase domestic production to safeguard China's food security. Because China plays a critical role in the global food supply and global food trade, it is in both the world's and China's interest to further improve the reliability and transparency of the country's key agricultural statistics.

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What Do We Really Know About China's Food Security?

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Advertisement The world is currently experiencing a global food crisis. Record-high food prices have driven millions more into extreme poverty, magnifying hunger and malnutrition. This ongoing global food crisis was triggered, and continues to be fueled, by several key factors, most notably COVID-19, climate shocks, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and trade-distorting government policies.

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Although definitions of "food security" vary, most formulations of the term focus on the ability to reliably satisfy a population's basic nutrition requirements despite friction and adverse circumstances with domestic production or imports. Historically, food security has been a critical Chinese strategic goal, and achieving it through a balance of domestic self-sufficiency and stable trade relations that deliver reliable imports is a key objective of the Chinese Communist Party's domestic and foreign policy. This article examines whether China's reliance on food imports constitutes a potential near to mid-term strategic vulnerability that might be exploited using a carefully calibrated and targeted approach incorporating humanitarian safeguards to influence Chinese domestic and foreign policy. The weight of evidence indicates that a shift toward coordinated, multilateral action as an element of whole-of-government engagement selectively linking agricultural exports to Chinese actions offers strategic coherence and potential leverage for beneficially shaping interactions with China.

When goods are expensive, the hundred surnames' wealth will be exhausted. When their wealth is exhausted, they will be extremely hard pressed [to supply] their village's military impositions.

Xi Jinping's consolidation of power has coincided with a rollback of the market-oriented reforms in favor of state control, an increasingly confrontational foreign policy, and rising tensions with the United States and other Western countries as Xi directs China's overtly nationalistic and authoritarian leverage of economic power and influence to promote Chinese interests in an all-inclusive fashion. At the same time, China under Xi is an ascendant power increasingly pushing irredentist claims to the territory of its neighbors by asserting historic Chinese territorial patrimony. Enabled by strategic investment in military capability and capacity, military clashes in the remote Karakoram Mountains along the disputed India-China border, a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine incursion within a few miles of Japanese territorial waters near the island of Amami Oshima, and expanding blue water power projection including a military presence in the South China Sea along with use of selective suspension of food imports from Australia, Canada, and the United States to send political signals are all indicative of an increasingly confident and assertive China. In parallel, China's new Hong Kong national security law, Sinicization of religion, and forced cultural assimilation and suppression of human rights in Tibet, among Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang Province in northwestern China, as well as the non-Han population of Inner Mongolia are forging a new consensus that China is a disruptive competitor whose underlying system is antithetical to the principles of liberal democracy including but not limited to openness, human rights, and democracy. As a result, Beijing's blunt use of the instruments of national power are stressing and potentially decoupling Beijing's relationship with the United States and other Western countries as well as Japan, India, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and the Philippines. Simultaneously, the evolving COVID-19 pandemic has raised concerns about heavy reliance on Chinese-based supply chains even as China and the United States maintain the world's biggest bilateral trade relationship.

Although not necessarily emulating the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union if for no other reason than Chinese economic power dwarfs that of the former USSR, the current situation reflects an aphorism falsely attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte that asserts: "China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world." It portends a divided world with a shift away from de minimis cooperation and deconfliction based on alignment of shared interests to overt geopolitical confrontation and competition. These changes to the status quo underscore the importance of Western governments prioritizing what the West seeks to achieve in its relationship with China and determining how to employ statecraft to get those desired results going forward, especially given growing mutual animus and shrinking opportunities for open dialogue.

Viewed in this light, current events and changed perceptions raise questions about whether uncoordinated deployment of a suite of relatively narrow options on tactical timelines by the West-especially hard and soft economic power-will by themselves deliver sufficient leverage to strategically shape outcomes in a confrontational environment characterized by souring relations between China and the West over global trade and influence, intellectual property, market access, human rights, and territorial claims in the Asia-Pacific region.

The geopolitical situation is complicated by the fact that China under Mao Zedong and his successors consistently has taken the long view strategically and is insulated from democratic politics. However, because Western policies are tied inextricably to short-term electoral cycles within individual countries, they tend to fluctuate and potentially are subject to gaming by adversaries and competitors if they have longer timelines. Nonetheless, because the Xi regime relies on access to external markets to support economic growth and meet domestic demand, the selective and coordinated application of economic power as an element of a whole-of-government effort offers a way to adapt to the inherent temporal variability induced by democratic politics when Western governments interact with China. A combination of leveraging positive and negative economic incentives such as favorable trade agreements, sanctions, boycotts or embargoes, market access and pricing, and tariffs has the potential to shape policy if applied discretely. Moreover, like diplomacy, economic power is attractive-particularly when done multilaterally as opposed to unilaterally or bilaterally-as a tool for constraining or incentivizing behaviors because it may facilitate advancing and attaining strategic interests without resorting to military measures. This underscores the importance of elucidating whether China's reliance on food imports constitutes a potential near- to mid-term strategic vulnerability that might be exploited to influence Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Put simply: Is food insecurity an Achilles' heel for China that can be leveraged while addressing the normative implications inherent in using food exports as a tool of statecraft?

Although definitions of food security vary, strategically the term refers to the enduring ability to dependably meet a population's basic nutrition requirements through domestic production, imports, or a mix of the two. China has a history of intermittent but major famines dating from antiquity to the modern era, with its most recent and avoidable famine occurring between 1959 and 1961 as a direct result of Mao's policies during his Great Leap Forward. China's periodic famines consistently caused large-scale disruptions as rural populations left their regions in search of food. With an estimated population of 1.44 billion people (19 percent of the world's total population), China is the world's most populous country. More than 100 million farmers and their families still experience poverty and are highly vulnerable to many forms of food sufficiency stress. Moreover, although China's population is projected to decrease by approximately 2.2 percent between 2019 and 2050, this decrease is insufficient to make food insecurity moot as a critical issue facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the foreseeable future. Thus, it is realistic to posit that food insecurity is one of several factors which may be China's twenty-first-century Achilles' heel.

Although China's leadership recognizes that food security is a strategic concern, a potential vulnerability is not synonymous with an actual vulnerability. Chinese financial resources provide a substantial base for funding food imports, simultaneously extending its diplomatic power globally and enhancing its capability to project military force far beyond its borders. In essence, China has the requisite capital to pay market prices for its commodity imports, so unless sanctions, a boycott, or an embargo are instituted, the normative implications of using food as a tool of statecraft are avoided. For example, China's overall positive trade surplus in 2019 was approximately USD 421.9 billion, while its gold reserves in mid-2020 totaled USD 108.29 billion, and China held USD 3.102 trillion in foreign currency reserves with one-third of those reserves consisting of US debt. China has used this economic power to provide approximately USD 1.5 trillion in direct loans and credits to more than 150 countries to accrue diplomatic leverage in a focused attempt to offset its perceived vulnerabilities.

For example, the new Silk Road component of China's Belt and Road Initiative-previously known as One Belt One Road (Chinese:

Broadly speaking, two approaches are plausible going forward. The first involves avoidance or minimization of linkage between food exports and Chinese behavior, which the West finds objectionable. The second approach involves coordinated and coherent multilateral action selectively employing food exports to affect Chinese actions. The strategy pursued by the United States, Australia, and Canada as well as other democratically oriented producers-especially if they choose coordinated, multilateral action in lieu of individual national action-will determine whether Chinese food insecurity is effectively and strategically leveraged by the West and partner nations in the near- to mid-term timeframe. Each strategy option involves risk and inevitably will have unanticipated consequences. Both may fail to varying degrees, and neither one is assured of being successful, although ample evidence already is available on the relative success of the first approach in affecting Chinese behavior.

The non- or minimal linkage approach, however, embodies the cliché commonly misattributed to Albert Einstein of doing the same thing and expecting a different result. The weight of evidence demonstrates that the presumption that a rising China would liberalize economically and politically by integrating with the world has proven illusory. China, instead, has created a thriving state capitalism economy and failed to democratize. In the almost 20 years since China joined the WTO, the original Western assumption proved to be erroneous if not naïve as China became a rival with burgeoning diplomatic, economic, and military power. As a nascent great power, China has acquired sufficient capacity to mitigate or diffuse any lasting strategic effects of unilateral action-even by the United States-that relies on the non- or minimal linkage approach. Thus, it is highly dubious that actions embodying this scenario, essentially perpetuating the status quo going forward, will alter substantially Chinese behavior and policies deemed objectionable by the West.

The second approach is a sharp break from the status quoembodied by the traditional approach. It seeks to adapt to the dramatic evolution of the geopolitical environment, emphasizes the use of economic power coupled with diplomacy, and is grounded in attempting to leverage the strategic uncertainty that China faces in terms of food security. It also is sensitive to the normative implications of using food exports as a tool of statecraft. In fact, the linkage approach confronts the issue directly by recognizing that sanctions, boycotts, and embargoes can affect the most vulnerable. As a result, instead of reliance on those blunt instruments that are used routinely under the traditional approach, the linkage strategy is grounded in using more targeted and transactional measures such as selective pricing to avoid or minimize the likelihood of contributing to morally ambiguous or ill-advised consequences. Additionally, China has the option of internally reallocating resources away from projects such as the expansion of its strategic force projection capabilities (e.g., the blue water navy, the port at Gwadar, Pakistan, etc.) to support increased food import costs and prevent the impact from affecting the food purchasing power of the average Chinese citizen. In effect, if street-level food costs increase as a consequence of a rise in import costs, this means that Beijing has made a deliberate choice to pass them on to Chinese citizens instead of absorbing the increase from the center.

This strategy explicitly links concerns about Chinese policies and relations with the West and food exports presumably to incentivize desired outcomes. Implicit in the linkage approach is the assumption that Chinese food insecurity is a vulnerability that can be exploited by increasing prices but not embargoing exports without causing a humanitarian disaster or war to happen. It also reflects the premise that, rather than keeping them on separate tracks diplomatically and implemented through individual national action, selective but coherent multilateral linkage of the West's food exports as an element of long-term (e.g., multi-electoral cycle) whole-of-government efforts aimed at the strategic geopolitical objective of tangibly shaping Chinese actions is viable politically and economically.

There is no guarantee that policies embodying the second approach will be adopted or will modify China's increased assertiveness and confidence that it can act autonomously to pursue its self-interest without costs internationally while benefiting from the rules of global commerce. Unlike Russia's foreign policy outlook, which is grounded more in image and optimism than geopolitical dynamics, China's narrowly self-interested policies and near- to mid-term prospects reflect a more realistic understanding of its current economic power vis-à-vis its competitors and rivals.

Consequently, successful implementation of targeted measures that leverage Chinese reliance on food imports is dependent on meeting several conditions. First, it requires a long-term commitment to collective action by the governments of major Western producers acting jointly. Success is predicated on a critical mass of food producers acting cooperatively, thereby emulating OPEC to increase commodity price levels for Chinese imports of food relative to supply and demand. Put simply, despite its position as a leading exporter of food products, the United States cannot act alone, because America does not control enough of the food export market to implement this strategy unilaterally. Thus, the United States needs the willing cooperation of major food-producing allies such as Australia and Canada and partners such as Argentina and Brazil to implement and sustain a policy that explicitly links the West's food exports and its geopolitical objectives to tangible Chinese actions. Moreover, because the US dollar is the reserve currency for global financial transactions, attempting to execute this strategy is sensitive to Chinese retaliation in global markets, potentially creating unintended adverse consequences for the US economy as well as the economies of other countries. In addition, and most critically, it also requires long-term strategic vision and patience to calibrate those measures and provide mutually acceptable off-ramps by encouraging cooperation and rewarding Chinese behavior consistent with the rule of law to minimize risks of actually falling into Thucydides' Trap, which would have catastrophic consequences for all parties.

More broadly, were it created and sustainable, this multilateral coalition of agricultural commodity producers might be extended over time. By working to gain the participation of other major producers of agricultural commodities, the explicit linkage approach might be expanded beyond the United States, Canada, and Australia to include food exports from other nations whose own interests align generally with the West or who would benefit from an increase in commodity prices offsetting the current balance of trade favoring China. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico as well as many Central American and sub-Saharan African countries reliant on food exports for growing their gross domestic product are plausible targets for inclusion in such a producers' alliance.

A shift away from the traditional approach toward the selective linkage approach might accomplish any of the following:

demonstrate clarity of purpose, energize critical alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and beyond that region essential for balancing China;

reinforce the strategic position of countries sharing liberal democratic values;

foster greater global parity in commodity-based trade;

decrease the overall global trade imbalance between China and Western countries; and/or

force China to pay a geopolitical penalty for its increasingly confrontational and revisionist actions.

Achieving any single one of those end states would be no small accomplishment and create optimism about the future. In fact, because the selective linkage approach is grounded in principled realism, pursuing such action ultimately might increase the likelihood that China conforms to global norms, thereby deescalating conflict and avoiding the worst possible outcomes of an intensely competitive great-power relationship.

John S. Beddows is a retired Canadian Army officer.

Dr. Regens is Regents Professor and Director of the Center for Intelligence and National Security-an Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence-at the University of Oklahoma.

1 The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or the US government. This research was supported in part by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, Grant #2020-20061700004 (PI: Regens). The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

2 China's WTO accession was premised on four key assertions: (1) WTO membership would accelerate China's transition to a market economy; (2) China would adhere to WTO rules by reducing tariffs and guaranteeing intellectual property rights; (3) it would further legitimize the WTO because China would have a greater stake in setting global rules; and (4) free trade leads to democracy which would act as a check on China's communist government.

3 See, e.g, Patrick Diamond, ed., The Crisis of Globalization: Democracy, Capitalism, and Inequality in the Twenty-First Century (London: I. B. Tauris, 2019); and Karen Halverson, "China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications," Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 27, no. 2 (2004): 319-70, https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/.

), literally meaning "everything under heaven," the concept offers an organizing principle for world order and geopolitics grounded in creating new non-Western structures. See Suisheng Zhao, Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn, Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 535-53, doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.766379; William A. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?," International Studies Review 10 (2008): 749-61; and Tingyang Zhao, The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution [Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun] (Nanjing, China: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005).

5 Shale Horowitz and Steven B. Redd, "International Norms in Ethno-Territorial Disputes: Legitimacy and Efficacy in Outsiders' Views of Independence and Irredentism," Civil Wars 20, no. 1 (2018): 66-88, https:// doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2018.1466088; David S. Siroky and Christopher W. Hale, "Inside Irredentism: A Global Empirical Analysis," American Journal of Political Science 61, no. 1 (2017): 117-28, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12271.

6 See, e.g., Chun Han Wong, "Xi Recalls Anti-U.S. Fight in Korean War," Wall Street Journal, 23 Oct. 2020; Chao Deng and Liza Lin, "Nationalism Takes Dark Turn in China," Wall Street Journal, 23 Oct. 2020; Barbara Demick, Eat the Buddha: Life and Death in a Tibetan Town (New York: Random House, 2020); Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, "China's National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress," CRS Report R46473, Congressional Research Service, 3 Aug. 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/; Sean R. Roberts, The War on the Uyghurs (Princeton University Press, 2020); and Julia Bowie and David Gitter, "The CCP's Plan to 'Sinicize' Religions," The Diplomat, 14 June 2018, https://thediplomat.com/.

7 For discussions of China's goal of global preeminence and regional leadership and its implications for liberal internationalism, see, e.g., G. John Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020); Rana Mitter, China's Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020); and Howard W. French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China's Push for Global Power (New York: Knopf, 2017).

8Dan Blumenthal, The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020); and Christopher Layne, "Coming Storms: The Return of Great-Power War," Foreign Affairs 99, no. 6 (2020): 42-48.

9 Issued on 2 December 1823 by President James Monroe in his Seventh Annual Message to Congress, the Monroe Doctrine was a cornerstone of US foreign policy from 1823 to the mid-1930s and was symbolically invoked during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Monroe Doctrine had four key elements: (1) The United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of or the wars between European powers; (2) the United States recognized and would not interfere with existing colonies and dependencies in the Western Hemisphere; (3) the Western Hemisphere was closed to future colonization; and (4) any attempt by a European power to oppress or control any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be viewed as a hostile act against the United States. See Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill & Wang, 2011); Ernest R. May, The Making of the Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications," Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): 5-16, https://jstor.org/; and US Department of State, "Message from the President of the United States, to both Houses of Congress," US Congressional Serial Set: Documents on Monroe Doctrine (The Americas) before 1861 Serial Set Vol. No. 93, Session Vol. No. 1, 18th Congress, 1st Session, H. Doc. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian), https://history.state.gov/.

10 Although this observation has an element of truth, it does not appear in any of Napoleon's writings or in the principal source for his statements during his exile on St. Helena prior to his death. China has its own version of the quote, referring to the country as a "sleeping lion," where it may be a bigger cliché there than in the West with President Xi Jinping using a version of the quote in a March 2014 speech in France. See Isaac S. Fish, "Crouching Tiger, Sleeping Giant," Foreign Policy, 19 Jan. 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/.

11 In this case, "tactical timeline" is defined as less than 60 months to encompass foreign policy initiatives designed to deliver results within a single electoral cycle of the Western democracies. Strategic timelines inherently require sustaining policies across multiple electoral cycles as a whole-of-government effort to achieve enduring national interests rather than transitory partisan objectives.

12 Sören Scholvin and Mikael Wigell, "Power Politics by Economic Means: Geoeconomics as an Analytical Approach and Foreign Policy Practice," Comparative Strategy 37, 1 (2018): 73-84, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2018.1419729; Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew, "The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft: How Washington Is Abusing Its Financial Might," Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (November/December 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/; and Michael Mastanduno, "Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 825-54.

13 Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price, eds., The Struggle for Power: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, 2020); Robert C. O'Brien, "How China Threatens American Democracy: Beijing's Ideological Agenda Has Gone Global," Foreign Affairs, 21 Oct. 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/; Richard Fontaine and Ely Ratner, "The U.S.-China Confrontation is Not Another Cold War. It's Something New," Washington Post, 2 July 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/; Ely Ratner et al., Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2019), https://www.cnas.org/; Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Boston: Mariner Books, 2018); John M. Weaver, "Dissecting the 2017 National Security Strategy: Implications for Senior Administrators (the Devil in the Details)," Global Policy 9, no. 2 (2018): 283-84, https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12542; and Ely Ratner, "There Is No Grand Bargain with China," Foreign Affairs, 27 Nov. 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.

15 The concept of a whole-of-government approach refers to the coordinated activities performed jointly by multiple government agencies to formulate and implement a common solution to a particular problem or issue. See, e.g., Olubukola S. Adesina, "Foreign Policy in an Era of Digital Diplomacy," Cogent Social Sciences 3, no. 1 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1297175; and M. L. Gagnon and R. Labonté, "Understanding How and Why Health is Integrated into Foreign Policy - A Case Study of Health is Global, a UK Government Strategy 2008-2013," Globalization and Health 9, no. 24 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1186/1744-8603-9-24.

16 It is worth noting that unless one party is economically dominant in terms of market position-which is not the case vis-à-vis China-economic power can constrain or incentivize but cannot autonomously force behaviors and drive long-term change by other parties. See Christopher R. Thomas and William F. Shughart II, The Oxford Handbook of Managerial Economics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Charles E. Hyde and Jeffrey M. Perloff, "Can Market Power Be Estimated?," Review of Industrial Organization 10, no. 4 (1995): 465-85, https://www.jstor.org/.

17 The principal normative implication of using food as a tool of statecraft in such action may foster malnutrition and cause a humanitarian disaster. Selective use of economic measures such as favorable trade agreements, market access and pricing, and tariffs can avoid this problem while sanctions, boycotts, and embargoes-especially boycotts and embargoes-are blunter instruments with greater potential to generate undesirable normative consequences.

20 Xin Meng, Nancy Qian, and Pierre Yared, "The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959-1961," Review of Economic Studies 82 (2015): 1568-1611, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv016; Vaclav Smil, "China's Great Famine: 40 Years Later," British Medical Journal 319, no. 7225 (1999): 1619-21, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.319.7225.1619; Frederick J. Simoons, Food in China: A Cultural and Historical Inquiry (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1991), and Basil Ashton et al., "Famine in China, 1958-61," Population and Development Review 10, no. 4 (1984): 613-45.

23 Yanzhong Huang, Toxic Politics: China's Environmental Health Crisis and Its Challenge to the Chinese State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Jingjing Yuan et al., "Ecology of Industrial Pollution in China," Ecosystem Health and Sustainability 6, no. 1 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/20964129.2020.1779010; Yonglong Lu et al., "Impacts of Soil and Water Pollution on Food Safety and Health Risks in China," Environment International 77 (2015): 5-15, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.12.010; Zhiyong Huang et al., "Subregional‐scale Groundwater Depletion Detected by GRACE for both Shallow and Deep Aquifers in North China Plain," Geophysical Research Letters 42, no. 6 (2015): 1791-99, https://doi.org/10.1002/2014GL062498; and Shilu Tong et al., "Climate Change, Food, Water and Population Health in China," Bulletin of the World Health Organization 94 (2016):759-65, https://doi.org/10.2471/BLT.15.167031.

27 Center for Strategic and International Studies, "How is China Feeding its Population of 1.4 Billion?," China Power, 25 Jan. 2017, https://chinapower.csis.org/; "Xi Focus: Xi Stresses Stopping Wasting Food, Promoting Thrift," Xinhua, 8 Nov. 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/; and "China Launches 'Clean Plate' Campaign against Food Waste," BBC News, 13 Aug. 2020, https://www.bbc.com/.

28 "China's 2019 Trade Surplus with U.S. Narrows to $295.8 Billion vs $323.3 Billion in 2018," Reuters, 14 Jan. 2020, https://www.reuters.com/; and Judy Hua, Yawen Chen, and Ryan Woo, "China's Forex Reserves Unexpectedly Rise in May, Regulator Sees Stability," Financial Post, 7 June 2020, https://financialpost.com/

29 Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, 'How Much Money Does the World Owe China?," Harvard Business Review, 26 Feb. 2020, https://hbr.org/; Jordan Calinoff and David Gordon, "Port Investments in the Belt and Road Initiative: Is Beijing Grabbing Strategic Assets?," Survival 62, no. 4 (202): 59-80, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1792134; and Nadège Rolland, "Mapping the Footprint of Belt and Road Influence Operations," Sinopsis, 8 Dec. 2019, https://sinopsis.cz/. For a positive assessment of the Belt and Road initiative see Christopher Mott, "Don't Fear China's Belt and Road Initiative," Survival 62, no. 4 (2020): 47-55, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1792097.

30 Daniel S. Markey, China's Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); Jonathan E. Hillman, The Emperor's New Road: China and the Project of the Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020); Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order (London: Hurst, 2019); and Tom Miller, China's Asian Dream: Empire Building along the New Silk Road (London: Zed Books, 2017).

31 Andrew Philips and J.C. Sharman, Outsourcing Empire: How Company-States Made the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020); Jonathan Barth, "Reconstructing Mercantilism: Consensus and Conflict in British Imperial Economy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," William and Mary Quarterly 73, no. 2 (2016): 257-90, https://doi.org/10.5309/willmaryquar.73.2.0257; Brantly Womack, "Asymmetry and China's Tributary System," Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 1 (2011): 37-54, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pos003; Robert B. Ekelund Jr. and Robert D. Tollison, Politicized Economies: Monarchy, Monopoly, and Mercantilism (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1997); and John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yü Têng, "On The Ch'ing Tributary System," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6, no. 2 (1941): 135-246, https://doi.org/10.2307/2718006.

34 The concept of Thucydides's Trap was introduced by Graham Allison in Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Boston: Mariner Books, 2018): xiv-xvii, to characterize whether the dynamics and structural stress of a rising power confronting an established power inevitably lead to war. Thucydides in History of the Peloponnesian War provides the definitive narrative of how the interplay between the rise of Athens threatened Sparta's preeminent role among the Greek city-states, ultimately evolving from cooperation to peaceful strategic competition to catastrophic warfare. See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, edited by Robert B. Strassler and translated by Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press, 1996).

35Peter Wallensteen, "Scarce Goods as Political Weapons: The Case of Food," Journal of Peace Research 13, no. 4 (1976): 277-98.

36 The oil embargo imposed on the United States from October 1973 to March 1974 by the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to punish the United States for its support of Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (i.e., the Yom Kippur War) is an example of the use of targeted economic action in response to foreign policy decisions. Ian Seymour, "OPEC in the 1990s," Energy Policy 20, no. 10 (1992): 909-12, https://doi.org/10.1016/0301-4215(92)90177-4; Robert K. Kaufmann et al., "Does OPEC Matter? An Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices," Energy Journal 25, no. 4 (2004): 67-90, https://iaee.org/; James M. Griffin, "OPEC Behavior: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses," American Economic Review 75, no. 5 (1985): 954-63, https://www.jstor.org/; and US Department of State, "Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations: Oil Embargo, 1973-1974," Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/.

37Abraham M. Denmark, U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century: Empowering Allies and Partners (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020); Julian Gewirtz, "China Thinks America Is Losing: Washington Must Show Beijing It's Wrong," Foreign Affairs 99, no. 6 (2020): 62-72, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/; and Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy (New York: PublicAffairs, 2020).

38Barry Eichengreen, "Sterling's Past, Dollar's Future: Historical Perspectives on Reserve Currency Competition," NBER Working Paper 11336, National Bureau of Economic Research, https://www.nber.org/.

39 For example, China along with 14 other countries-including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea-and 10 Southeast Asian nations signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 15 November 2020. RCEP, if fully implemented, will result in a more unified trading system and reduce or remove tariff barriers for approximately one-third of global output. RCEP might complicate but does not preclude automatically Australian participation in an alliance of food exporters.

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Dragons Must Eat: China's Food Insecurity and Strategic Vulnerability

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Although definitions of “food security” vary, most formulations of the term focus on the ability to reliably satisfy a population’s basic nutrition requirements despite friction and adverse circumstances with domestic production or, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs Article Display

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Hit by intense heat, it is reported that some European countries will see their soft-wheat output drop by 7%, lower than their five-year average, another bad news for the already strained global food supply.

But the problem did not pop up just this summer. In recent years, the consequences of the climate crisis, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, have significantly driven up food prices, tipping millions of people into hunger, especially in developing countries.

A recent UN report paints a dire picture. It shows the number of people affected by hunger across the world has risen to as many as 828 million in 2021, an increase of about 46 million since 2020 and 150 million since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. "The world is moving in the wrong direction on the SDG targets to end hunger, food insecurity, and all forms of malnutrition," warns the report, projecting that 8% of the world's population will still be affected by hunger in 2030.

Long haunted by hunger in its history, China has this saying that food is the primary need of the people, who are the foundation of the country. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government has always put food security as its top priority.

After decades of hard work, China's grain output reached a record of 682 million tons in 2021, the seventh consecutive year that the country's grain production exceeded 650 million tons, making it the world's largest grain producer and the third largest grain exporter. Currently, the country is able to produce 95% of its domestic grain consumption. It's even more remarkable that China managed to produce about one-fourth of the world's food and feed nearly one-fifth of the world's population with less than 9% of the world's arable land.

Such achievements in themselves are China's contribution to world food security, not to mention the inspiration it provides to other developing countries in this process. However, some media reports these days attribute China's self-sufficiency of food to grain hoarding and further accuse China of disrupting the global food market. These are nothing but lies made out of ill intentions.

China, as a matter of fact, has been doing its best to help build a world free of hunger, though it remains a developing country with its own food problems. President Xi Jinping made food security one of the eight priority areas of cooperation in the Global Development Initiative, and in his recent speech at the High-level Dialogue on Global Development, he further announced that China would allocate more resources for global development cooperation, work with all sides to deepen global cooperation on poverty reduction and eradication as well as to build capacity for food production and supply.

On the multilateral front, China has continuously deepened international cooperation on food supply. It has supported the WPF in setting up a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China and established and sponsored the China-FAO South-South Cooperation Trust Fund. In cooperation with the FAO and the WFP, China has implemented more than 40 cooperation projects under the Fund. China has established agricultural cooperation zones with other developing countries, carried out exchanges on agricultural know-how with more than 140 countries and regions, and promoted more than 1,000 agricultural technologies in developing countries, driving up the crop yield in the project areas from 30 percent to 60 percent on average and benefiting more than 1.5 million small-scale farmers.

Chinese hybrid rice has been planted in dozens of countries and regions in Asia, Africa and the Americas, with an annual planting area of eight million hectares and an average yield per hectare two tons higher than that of fine local varieties. Since the beginning of this year, China has provided more than 15,000 tons of emergency humanitarian food aid to developing countries in need, which has been widely praised by the international community.

At the recent G20 Foreign Ministers Meeting, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed China's eight-point initiative on global food security, contributing China's wisdom to solving the problem. China's initiative includes supporting the central role of the United Nations in coordination; not imposing export restriction on humanitarian food purchases by the WFP; facilitating the entry of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian agricultural products and inputs into the international market; releasing the export potential by major food-producing and net-exporting countries, reducing trade and technical barriers, and curbing the use of food as energy resources to ease the food supply tension in the market; emergency measures taken by countries for food trade should be short-term, transparent, targeted and appropriate, and conform to the WTO rules; supporting the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research and the cooperation on agricultural science and technology innovation among countries, and reduce restrictions on high-tech exchange; reducing food loss and waste; and helping developing countries enhance their capacity for food production, storage and loss reduction in terms of capital, technology, market and others.

Together, we can make a difference. The graver the challenges are, the more countries need to put aside their differences and work side by side. In a bid to achieve the SDGs, countries must work with one mind and support each other. Furthermore, there is no time to waste and it is important to increase investment and take swift action now.

China sincerely hopes that Russia and Ukraine will agree on a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities as soon as possible and restore peace through dialogue and consultation. It is also hoped that developed countries will offer more support to developing countries. China stands ready to further strengthen cooperation with all parties and make unremitting efforts to make due contributions in safeguarding world food security.

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Ensuring Global Food Security: What China Says and Does

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Hit by intense heat, it is reported that some European countries will see their soft-wheat output drop by 7%, lower than their five-year average, another bad news for the already strained global food supply. But the problem did not pop up just this summer.

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I n the maize-producing areas around the city of Chengde, in northern China, the heat arrived early this year. With it came drought, the worst in decades. The needle-shaped leaves on the region's pine trees are turning brown. Worse, much of its maize is now stunted.

The central province of Henan faces the opposite problem. There it was the rain that came early, causing floods and drowning fields. The region produces a quarter of China's wheat. But much of it is now unfit for human consumption.

Heavy rains elsewhere in China threaten the rice harvest. Heatwaves across the country have killed fish, pigs and rabbits. Extreme weather is hitting Chinese farmers from all sides this year.

Attributing a single drought, flood or heatwave to climate change is complicated. But scientists believe the phenomenon is playing a role in increasing the frequency and severity of extreme-weather events. That should concern all countries. China, though, may be more worried than most.

Officials in Beijing are obsessed with food security. Many Chinese are old enough to remember the famine caused by Mao Zedong's policies in the late 1950s. That catastrophe killed tens of millions of people. Today the legitimacy of the Communist Party rests in part on its ability to provide affordable food to the people, who are eating an increasingly rich diet. China's leader, Xi Jinping, has therefore pushed for more self-sufficiency in the food supply.

That was always going to be a challenge. China accounts for about 20% of the world's population, but it has less than 10% of its arable land. In recent decades, as the country developed and urbanised, its farmland shrank. Imports still play an important role in the food supply. But they risk being affected by testy relations with countries such as America and Australia, or by conflicts like the war in Ukraine.

Weather-related shocks will make life even harder for Mr Xi and the farmers on which he depends. Take the staple grains that supply about half of the average Chinese person's calories. More droughts could reduce yields of maize, wheat and rice by 8% by 2030, according to research funded by the agriculture ministry. Heavy rainfall could have a similar effect on some crops. Vegetables and fruits are just as vulnerable to extreme weather-and harder to store for long periods, making it difficult for the government to stockpile reserves. One big effect of a severe drought last year in southern China was a spike in the price of cucumbers and lettuce.

The geography of Chinese farming is likely to change in ways that cannot be fully foreseen. Our maps show how the maximum yields of wheat, maize and rice might be affected in a high-emissions scenario. (Emissions at these levels look highly unlikely, but similar effects might well be seen in less extreme scenarios.) If, as expected, northern China grows warmer, it would make sense to move more grain cultivation there.

Another response would be to bring more of China's food production indoors, where temperature and humidity can be controlled and output increased. This year the state called for 40% of vegetables to be grown inside facilities such as greenhouses by 2030 (the current number is 30%). Fertiliser and water can be used more efficiently in these settings. A report on the plan in state media spoke of farms "freed from a dependence on nature" and boasted of an enormous greenhouse already growing dragon fruit and figs in the Gobi desert.

Out in the extreme heat, pigs fatten up more slowly, cows produce less milk and chickens lay fewer eggs. All of them are also at greater risk of dying. So livestock is moving indoors, too. A 26-storey pig farm in central China is the biggest in the world. It can slaughter 1.2m pigs a year (pork is China's favourite meat).

With cows, it is harder. But many now spend their days in sheds being cooled down. At a farm in the northern province of Hebei, cows are periodically doused with water and blasted with air from giant fans hung from the roof. Each cow's location is monitored by a computer and the sprays automatically adjusted to avoid waste. Such practices have spread rapidly through the dairy industry, says James Su, whose company supplies the cooling equipment. "Everyone is praying before each summer starts," he says.

Magic seeds

Grains are a tougher challenge still. Most need to be grown at scale, so an open field is the best option. China has been developing drought- and heat-resistant varieties of rice, wheat and other crops. The planting of genetically modified ( GM) maize has been allowed in some areas (Mr Xi visited one in May). But, in general, the government takes a cautious approach to such technology. For the moment it is still reliant on GM seeds from countries such as Argentina. (America, which supplies China with some GM crops, has accused it of intellectual-property theft.) In the future, "the hope is that China's seed companies will be able to develop varieties at pace with the changing climate," says Even Pay of Trivium China, a consultancy.

China is also banking on better irrigation techniques to offset the impact of droughts. Public spending on water infrastructure topped 1trn yuan ($129bn) in 2022, 44% more than the year before. The main goal is to improve the "capillaries" of China's irrigation systems, says Xu Yinlong of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. That means building a denser network of pipes and storage tanks, and reducing waste from evaporation and leaks. The infrastructure that pumps millions of gallons of water from the lush south to elsewhere is also set to be expanded.

The dry facts image: Getty Images

If that doesn't work, perhaps China can try to create more rain where it is needed. The country is the world's foremost user of cloud-seeding technology, where chemicals are shot into existing clouds to try to encourage water vapour to condense and fall as rain. Last summer, the hottest and driest since the government began recording temperature and rainfall 61 years ago, cloud-seeding planes were especially active. But there is little evidence to show that China's efforts are effective at causing much more water to fall than would have been the case otherwise.

With so much attention paid to China's food supply, it easy to forget about the toll extreme weather takes on farmers themselves. Most are elderly. If emissions stay high, dangerous heatwaves are likely to become more common across the north China plain, an important agricultural base. Irrigation channels cool the air, but also make it more humid, increasing the risk of deadly "wet-bulb" conditions, when sweat can no longer cool the body down. A survey of Chinese smallholders found that labourers were increasingly unwilling to work in the summer.

Li Man, a 76-year-old maize farmer near Chengde, is putting in the time. But China's efforts to prepare for weather-related shocks have been of little help to him. He planted drought-resistant seeds. The local government tried cloud seeding. Neither worked. Mr Li, who saves his money to help put his grandson through university, expects to lose 60-70% of his crop this year. That would be the case even if the weather improves. The crucial growing period has already passed. "If it rained now, it wouldn't help much," he says. ■
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China is obsessed with food security. Climate change will challenge it

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Extreme weather in China is a harbinger of challenges to come | China

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Prevalence of severe food insecurity in the population (%) - China from The World Bank: Data

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Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population (%) - Japan from The World Bank: Data

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In recent years, the growth in China's food consumption has outpaced its domestic supply, forcing the government to import large volumes of agricultural products every week to satisfy its 1.4 billion population. China is now the leading purchaser of soybeans, corn, wheat, rice, beef, pork, barley and sorghum, and it is also one of the top buyers of poultry.

China's economic growth in the past couple of decades has put a lot of pressure on the country's food supply chain. In 1998, China's gross domestic product crossed $1-trillion mark for the first time. In a span of 24 years, the country's GDP is estimated at $18 trillion in 2022, making it the second-largest economy in the world behind the US.

According to the US Department of Agriculture's economic research report, China's rising income and living standards, increasing urbanization and food safety concerns have fueled the surge in the country's agricultural imports in the last 20 years. As incomes rose, the average Chinese diet changed to include more meat, dairy and processed foods, while grain consumption declined. In the past 20 years, per capita consumption of poultry meat increased 32%, soybean oil consumption more than quadrupled and fluid milk intake more than tripled, the USDA said.

Food security threats

Being the world's leading importer of food is not a tag Beijing wants in its quest to compete with the US. China knows all too well about the vulnerabilities associated with depending on foreign food supplies.

In 2018, when the African swine fever -- a disease fatal to pigs -- spread across the country, the administration had to cull nearly 60% of its hog population. By late 2019, local pork prices spiked to a record high and pulled up overall food prices. Eventually, to satisfy local demand of the staple, the government had to import a lot of expensive pork from the US.

If that was not enough, the US-China trade spat that began in May 2018 exposed Beijing's over-reliance on US food supplies. Since then, the Xi administration has tried to diversify its food sources and turned towards South America, especially Brazil.

China's vulnerabilities on food imports were further laid bare by the double blow of COVID-19 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Food security is not a new issue to China. It has been the most important topic in the country for the better part of the last 100 years.

Since the early 20th century, the country has witnessed seven famines which claimed tens of millions of lives. The worst of these catastrophes, infamously called the Great Chinese Famine, took place during 1959-61. This tragic event also has the distinction of being the largest famine in human history, claiming up to 30 million lives.

While most famines originate from severe droughts, many historians attribute this tragedy to the government's rapid industrialization policy at the cost of agriculture, known as the Great Leap Forward. During this period, millions of farmers were diverted toward metal mining and industrialization, leading to a sharp decline in agricultural production. China's grain reserves started dwindling, chaos in food supply chain ensued, mass starvation and resentment followed.

This was the period when China learned a harsh lesson and realized how food diplomacy shapes people governance.

In his re-election speech during the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Oct. 16 2022, President Xi Jinping mentioned food security several times.

"We must reinforce the foundations for food security on all fronts," Xi said.

More from his speech below:

We will ensure that both party committees and governments assume responsibility for ensuring food security and that China's total area of farmland does not fall below the redline of 120 million hectares. We will work to gradually develop all permanent basic cropland into high-standard cropland. We will invigorate the seed industry, support the development of agricultural science, technology, and equipment, and refine the mechanisms for ensuring the incomes of grain growers and for compensating major grain-producing areas. With these efforts, we will ensure that China's food supply remains firmly in its own hands.

Challenges in attaining food security

Ever since Xi's re-election speech, agricultural ministry officials have been repeatedly citing his food security mission in their farm policies and announcements.

The agricultural ministry has announced some key decisions, such as expanding farmlands, technology intervention in raising crop yields, research and development on producing saline-alkali-tolerant varieties of crops, import diversification and reducing the usage of imported crops in animal feed mix.

The Xi administration is also turning back the clock and revitalizing the rural economy through enhanced rural financing and stepping-up loan support to entice people toward farming.

But is it too little too late to feed 1.4 billion people without foreign supplies coming in weekly? Most likely.

China faces formidable challenges in attaining self-sufficiency in food supply chain.

Global warming has made China the focal point of natural disasters, such as floods and droughts, limiting the country's farm production. Another impending issue facing the Xi administration is the availability of land resources. Despite its colossal size of 9.6 million square kilometers, China has only 13% of arable land, according to the World Bank data.

A major portion of the country's land resource has saline-alkali content, making it difficult to produce crops. Rapid urbanization has also negatively impacted agriculture as it is much more profitable to lease out land for commercial purpose than ploughing the fields.

Not surprisingly, China is forecast to remain world's top food importer in the coming years, according to the US Department of Agriculture's long-term projections.

This means the government has its hands full and quoting Xi's speech every day is not going to be enough.

Beijing needs to take drastic actions to realize Xi's dream of making sure "the rice bowls of the Chinese people must be firmly in our own hands" does not remain a pie in the sky.

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China's quest for food security is bound to be a long drawn saga

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In recent years, the growth in China's food consumption has outpaced its domestic supply, forcing the government to import large volumes of agricultural products every week to satisfy its 1.4 billion

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What is the Global Report on Food Crises?

The GRFC is the reference document for a comprehensive analysis of global, regional and country-level acute food insecurity. The result of a collaborative effort among 16 partners, the report aims to inform humanitarian and development action by providing independent and consensus-based evidence and analysis.
Learn more

The foundation of the GRFC: an evidence-based public good

A strong partnership

A highly consultative process

A compilation of multiple consensus-based food security and nutrition analyses

A technical document of reference on food crises

How does the GRFC contribute to the narrative on food security?

When it comes to estimating hunger, there are different measures for different purposes. The GRFC focuses on acute food insecurity in countries experiencing food crises. It is part of an annual suite of products including regional reports.

The GRFC defines a food crisis as a situation where acute food insecurity requires urgent action to protect and save lives and livelihoods at local or national levels and exceeds the local resources and capacities to respond.

Acute food insecurity refers to a situation in which populations face food deprivation that threatens their lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration.

Action becomes a matter of life or death when the situation is particularly severe, such as in IPC/CH Phases 3, 4 or 5.

More on how hunger is measured Explore the reports and events related to food security

Consensus-based analysis to inform decision-making, planning and action.

Annual (global and regional reports)

IPC/CH, FEWS NET, WFP CARI, HNO

Global, based on agreed selection criteria (73 food-crisis countries/territories in 2023, 59 of which have data)

Food Security Information Network (FSIN), with 16 partner organizations.

Countries/territories included in the GRFC 2024

The GRFC follows a rigorous process to identify food-crisis countries/territories through the application of multiple, agreed-upon criteria. For more information, please refer to the GRFC Technical Notes .

Countries/ territories that require external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS in 2023.

Low or upper/lower-middle-income countries/territories not selected for analysis by FAO-GIEWS, but who either: requested external assistance in response to experiencing a shock or shocks to food security from conflict/insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks; had an influx of refugees; or had over one million or 20% of the country population forcibly displaced.

Countries that have a Humanitarian Appeal/ Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).

Refugee populations (colour coding as legend)

experienced high levels of acute food insecurity requiring urgent food and livelihood assistance.

Numbers of people and share of analysed population in GRFC countries/territories facing high levels of acute food insecurity 2016-2023.

In the graph, the orange bars show that the numbers of people facing these conditions have been increasing every year since 2019. The graph also shows that the total population analysed has increased each year since 2020. It shows that the share of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased sharply from 14 percent in 2018 to more than 20 percent each year since 2020, reaching an eight-year high in 2022 (23 percent).

Acute food insecurity overview, 2023

The three maps below show different levels of information. You can move through them by clicking on the tabs.

Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories, 2023
The map below is interactive, and you can discover more information at the country level by clicking on the countries.

Share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories, 2023
The map below is interactive, and you can discover more information at the country level by clicking on the countries.

Why were an additional 23.8 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity between 2022 and 2023?
The map below is interactive, and you can discover more information at the country level by clicking on the countries.

Percentage change in number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity

<1% change/same peak for 2022 and 2023

Non comparable data due to

Increase in coverage/new countries

Decrease in coverage/change in methodology

Data gap/data not meeting GRFC technical requirements

Country not selected for analysis

Indicates migrants/refugee populations (colour coding as this key)

Source: FSIN, GRFC 2024.

Severity of acute food insecurity, 2023

Out of 281.6 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, around 203 million were in 41 countries/territories with IPC/CH analyses and had data disaggregated by phase. The other 79 million were in 18 countries with FEWS NET, HNO or WFP CARI data with no phase disaggregation.

Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident.

Households have large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality OR face extreme loss of livelihood assets OR resort to emergency coping strategies.

Households have food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition OR accelerated depletion of livelihoods assets OR resort to crisis coping strategies.

Drivers of acute food insecurity

The drivers of food crises are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Acute food insecurity is rarely driven by a single shock or hazard, but rather by the interaction between shocks and underlying poverty, structural weaknesses and other vulnerability factors. Still, it is possible to identify a primary driver for each country/territory.

Nutrition overview

Acute malnutrition among children and women in food-crisis countries continued to worsen in 2023, particularly among displaced populations and those affected by conflicts.

Displacement overview

New, escalating and protracted conflicts, extreme climatic events and economic hardship resulted in another year of increasing numbers of people forced to flee their homes in 2023.

Chapter 2

Regional overviews

The Gaza Strip, Palestine

By late 2023, besiegement, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure indispensable to survival and severely restricted humanitarian access drove the Gaza Strip to become the most severe food crisis in IPC and GRFC history. Its entire population of about 2.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Between early December 2023 and early February 2024, 26 percent of the population were estimated to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), rising to half by March 2024. Famine was considered imminent in the governorates of Gaza and North Gaza, with a risk of Famine across the rest of the Gaza Strip through July 2024.
Read more

Conflict in the Sudan

Heavy fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces since April 2023 has had devastating consequences across the Sudan and in neighbouring countries including Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan. The humanitarian situation is dire. The country has become the largest food crisis in East Africa and the world's biggest internal displacement situation. Millions of people among the displaced and host communities, especially women and children, are experiencing severe access constraints to basic goods and services, including food, water and shelter, with profound and prolonged impacts on their food security and nutrition.
Read more

Acute food insecurity and displacement

New, escalating and protracted conflicts, extreme climatic events and economic shocks resulted in another year of increasing numbers of people forced to flee their homes in 2023. In 59 food-crisis countries/territories, the number of displaced people reached over 90 million, most of them displaced internally (64 million) and the rest as refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants.

Available data paint a dire picture of acute food insecurity and malnutrition among displaced populations as they face specific vulnerabilities such as protection risks, limited access to employment, livelihoods, food and shelter, and reliance on dwindling humanitarian assistance. Without concerted action among governments and the international community to meet funding requirements, the situation will likely continue to deteriorate in 2024.
Read more

The far-reaching impact of the war in Ukraine

Over 7 million people in Ukraine faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023, which represents an improvement since 2022. While the Ukrainian economy stabilized somewhat in 2023, with positive shifts in real GDP growth and inflation, unemployment levels were the highest in over a decade and lack of livelihood opportunities hindered financial access to food and other necessities.

Ukraine's agrifood sector has suffered massive damage and losses that have negatively impacted crop and livestock activities within the country, as well as global markets.
Read more

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Full report

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Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) 2024

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The Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) is the reference document for a comprehensive analysis of global, regional and country-level acute food insecurity. The result of a collaborative effort among 16 partners, the report aims to inform humanitarian and development action by providing independent and consensus-based evidence and analysis.

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China has increased its reliance on food imports over the past two decades, prompting concerns among officials who worry that disruptions to food supply chains could trigger domestic unrest. In particular, this reliance has heightened China's sensitivity to food supply disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions, such as Russia's war in Ukraine.

What is China's current food security situation?

With less than 10 percent of the planet's arable land, China produces one-fourth of the world's grain and feeds one-fifth of the world's population. Data from the country's National Bureau of Statistics showed that in 2022, China's grain output reached a record high of 686.53 million tons [page in Chinese] despite delayed plantings, extreme weather, and COVID-19 disruptions. China ranks first globally in producing cereals (such as corn, wheat, and rice), fruit, vegetables, meat, poultry, eggs, and fishery products.

Despite its domestic production, China has been a net importer [DOC] of agricultural products since 2004. Today, it imports more of these products-including soybeans, corn, wheat, rice, and dairy products-than any other country. Between 2000 and 2020, the country's food self-sufficiency ratio decreased from 93.6 percent to 65.8 percent. Changing diet patterns have also driven up China's imports of edible oils, sugar, meat, and processed foods. In 2021, the country's edible oil import-dependency ratio reached nearly 70 percent [article in Chinese], almost as high as its crude oil import dependence.

Why does China now depend on imported food?

A primary factor has been Chinese people's increasingly sophisticated dietary demands, driven by a growing city-dwelling middle class pursuing safer, more diverse, and higher-quality food. Concerns about food safety in particular have increased demand for imports. While the Chinese government improved its national food safety standards in 2022, the country's prolonged lack of strict food safety regulations has allowed opportunistic domestic producers to produce unsafe or toxic food. Several deadly food safety scandals over the past two decades have hurt Chinese people's trust in local brands, leading them to prefer foreign ones. For example, contaminated baby formula killed six babies and poisoned three hundred thousand children in 2008; today, Chinese parents still favor foreign baby formula.

Additionally, imports tend to be cheaper than local options because of higher costs and lower efficiency to grow certain food products in China. For example, the cost to grow soybeans in China is 1.3 times [article in Chinese] than it is in the United States, and the yield is 60 percent less. Because wages are lower for farmers than for factory workers and other urban occupations, farmers feel incentivized to abandon the profession altogether.

China's food import dependence will likely increase as the amount of arable land continues to diminish. Between 2013 and 2019, China lost more than 5 percent of its arable land due to factors such as excess fertilizer use and land neglect, according to Chinese government figures. Extreme weather, environmental degradation, water scarcity and pollution, and climate change could exacerbate the problem. Scholars from the United States and China estimate that climate change and ozone pollution together reduced China's national average crop yields by 10 percent (fifty-five million tons per year) from 1981 to 2010.

What's at stake for the Chinese government if the country suffers a food crisis?

Famines and food crises were graveyards for Imperial China's dynasties. They repeatedly sparked peasant rebellions and political uprisings that led to regime collapses. Since 1949, Chinese Communist Party leaders and policymakers have consistently prioritized food security as an indispensable prerequisite to maintaining power.

China's last nationwide food crisis was the Great Famine in 1959-1961, the largest famine in human history. Sparked by the Great Leap Forward, a series of radical industrialization policies, it led to thirty million people starving to death and about the same number of lost or postponed births. The Great Famine sowed the seed for the decade-long sociopolitical turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1976. Although current Chinese leaders do not publicly discuss such policy-induced catastrophes, they lived through these events. Their continued prioritization of food self-sufficiency suggests they would not want to repeat such mistakes.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, food supply disruptions and lockdown-induced food shortages showed that the political system remains vulnerable to food insecurity. Collective grievances aggravated by food shortages contributed to a burst of protests in more than a dozen cities, with demonstrators chanting, "We want food, not COVID tests," in a rare show of dissent since China's mass protests in 1989. Local officials apologized for food shortages in areas including Changchun, Guiyang, and Xinjiang. In Shanghai, three officials were fired for failing to resolve food shortage complaints during a lockdown.

How is the Chinese government trying to boost the country's food security?

Today, Chinese leaders consider food security an integral part of national security, with Article 22 of the 2015 China National Security Law [PDF in Chinese] requiring the state to take comprehensive measures to ensure food security, safety, and quality. The " No. 1 Document," [page in Chinese] the first policy document issued by China's top authorities every year, has consistently focused on the "three issues of agriculture, the countryside, and farmers" since 2004.

Chinese President Xi Jinping's approach to food security [page in Chinese] aims to achieve self-sufficiency with an emphasis on domestic supply. Since he took office in 2013, Xi has frequently said that "the rice bowls of the Chinese people must always be held firmly in our own hand and filled mainly with Chinese grain."

On the domestic supply side, the government has established stockpiles of food such as corn, rice, wheat, and pork. In 2006, it introduced a support price for wheat to protect farmers from losses. It also set a "farmland red line" policy with a target of preserving no less than 120 million hectares (an area slightly larger than Sweden) of arable land for crop farming. So far, it has been able to maintain this target. The government has worked to boost high-quality farmland, achieving in 2020 [article in Chinese] a target to develop 53.3 million hectares of such farmland. In 2022, Xi raised the target for high-quality farmland to 66.7 million hectares and called for the protection of fertile black soil. The government has also worked to bolster food supply chains, providing funds to stabilize domestic agricultural production and investing in the global agriculture industry and overseas farmland. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Chinese investors owned 383,935 acres [PDF] of agricultural land in the United States in 2021, slightly less than 1 percent of foreign-owned acres.

On the demand side, most notably, the government has worked to reduce food waste through initiatives such as the "clean plate campaign." A Chinese Academy of Sciences survey found that Chinese consumers in big cities wasted up to eighteen million tons of food in 2015, enough to feed up to fifty million people annually. In addition, the government has used legislative measures to combat food waste, improve food safety, protect seeds and the seed industry [PDF] and safeguard farmland [article in Chinese].

The Chinese government has also sought to diversify import sources and advance global agricultural cooperation through its Belt and Road Initiative. The United States used to be China's largest agricultural supplier, but its position weakened following the U.S.-China trade war in 2018. In 2021, Brazil replaced the United States as China's largest agricultural supplier, providing 20 percent of China's agricultural imports.

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China Increasingly Relies on Imported Food. That's a Problem.

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China has so far been able to feed its 1.4 billion people, but climate change and a dependence on imports could pose challenges.

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doi: 10.3390/ijerph20010451.

Affiliations

¹ School of Public Policy and Administration, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China.

² Gongqing Institute of Science and Technology, Jiujiang 332020, China.

Abstract

China's food security has attracted global attention as the various drivers of its instability and uncertainty have intensified. This study developed a new framework for food security evaluation in China by analyzing its availability, distribution, utilization, vulnerability, sustainability, and regulation. The entropy weight method (EWM) and the matter-element extension model (MEEM) were combined to examine China's food security status between 2001 and 2020. Additionally, an obstacle degree model (ODM) was used to investigate the key factors functioning as obstacles to food security. The results show that China's overall food security improved greatly but experienced a slight downward trend in 2003. The main obstacles initially entailed grain distribution but then spread to vulnerability- and sustainability-related issues. Ultimately, the key factors restricting China's food security were the amount of fertilizer application per unit sown area (AFA) and the grain self-sufficiency rate (GSR). The next 40 years could be the most critical period for ensuring China's food security, which incorporates demographic, climate change, and resource shortage factors. China appears to be implementing its national strategies through sustainable farmland use and agricultural technology innovation to facilitate the high-quality development of its grain industries and strengthen its food security. This study provides an overall picture of China's food security and can serve as a reference for those concerned with China's future national security.

Keywords: China; comprehensive evaluation; food security; matter-element extension model; obstacle factors.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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References

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Grants and funding

This research was funded by the National Social Science Fund of China, grant number 17BGL008; and the Science and Technology Project of the Education Department of Jiangxi Province, grant numbers GJJ207105, GJJ216802, and GJJ216810.

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The World Food Security Outlook is an innovative model-based data series designed to monitor and analyze global food security, providing essential information to complement official statistics and help understand the evolving landscape.

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Latest Update - October 30, 2023

Domestic food price inflation remains high. Inflation higher than 5% is experienced in 57.1% of low-income countries, 83% of lower-middle-income countries, and 59% of upper-middle-income countries and many experiencing double-digit inflation. In addition, 64.3% of high-income countries are experiencing high food price inflation. The most-affected countries are in Africa, North America, Latin America, South Asia, Europe, and Central Asia. In real terms, food price inflation exceeded overall inflation in 77% of the 170 countries.
Download the latest brief on rising food insecurity and World Bank responses
The agricultural and export price indices closed 3% and 7% higher than two weeks ago respectively, while the cereal price index was unchanged. Increases in cocoa and coffee (arabica and robusta) prices drove the increase in the export price index. Maize prices remained unchanged, wheat prices increased by 4%, and rice prices decreased by 2%. On a year-on-year basis, maize and wheat prices are 28% and 35% lower, respectively, while rice prices are 39% higher. Compared to January 2021, maize prices are 6% lower, wheat prices 12% lower, while rice prices are 19% higher (See " pink sheet" data for agricultural commodity and food commodity prices indices, updated monthly.)

The International Food Policy Research Institute highlighted the 2023 World Food Day theme of "Water is Life, Water is Food. Leave No One Behind," which underscores the often-underestimated role of water in food systems. Although water is vital, it tends to be invisible in many critical processes, including ecosystem health, energy production, and manufacturing. This lack of awareness is problematic as water systems are near a breaking point. The consequences of paying insufficient attention to water's vital roles in sustaining ecosystems, communities, and agriculture are profound and include the increasing risk of food systems "breaking," which would increase undernutrition and lead to humanitarian crises. IFPRI proposes several actions to address this challenge.

A new FAO report found that global agricultural losses due to natural disasters amounted to $3.8 trillion from 1991 to 2021-equivalent to annual losses of $123 billion, or about 5 percent of global agricultural gross domestic product (GDP). It is likely that this is an underestimate of the true amount of damage, because it focuses on crops and livestock. Lack of data prevented comprehensive analysis of damage to forestry, fisheries, and aquaculture. Despite that, estimated losses over the past 31 years could have met the daily dietary requirements of 400 million to 500 million people. Within the context of natural disasters, the two factors that caused the most damage to agriculture were varying levels of water supply and extreme temperatures. Climate change is exacerbating the situation.

The Global Alliance for Food Security has launched a new module on its Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard that tracks Food Security Crisis Preparedness Plan (FSCPP) progress and mobilizes early action when crises are detected. This module is based on a collaborative effort to enhance crisis preparedness by sharing timely information and standardizing crisis recognition processes. The system's early impacts are evident in various countries, such as Yemen, where FSCPPs have encouraged collaborative efforts to produce high-frequency food and nutrition security reports. FSCPPs have also contributed to establishment or revitalization of decision-making structures such as food security councils in countries like Somalia and South Sudan.

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, trade-related policies imposed by countries have surged. The global food crisis has been partially made worse by the growing number of food trade restrictions put in place by countries with a goal of increasing domestic supply and reducing prices. As of October 23, 2023, 19 countries have implemented 27 food export bans, and 8 have implemented 16 export-limiting measures.

World Bank Action

In May 2022, the World Bank made a commitment of making available $30 billion over a period of 15 months to tackle the crisis. We have surpassed that goal. The World Bank has scaled up its food and nutrition security response, to now making $45 billion available through a combination of $22 billion in new lending and $23 billion from existing portfolio.

Our food and nutrition security portfolio now spans across 90 countries. It includes both short term interventions such as expanding social protection, also longer-term resilience such as boosting productivity and climate-smart agriculture.

The Bank's intervention is expected to benefit 335 million people, equivalent to 44% of the number of undernourished people. Around 53% of the beneficiaries are women - they are disproportionately more affected by the crisis. Some examples include:

1. The $766 million West Africa Food Systems Resilience Program is working to increase preparedness against food insecurity and improve the resilience of food systems in West Africa. The program is increasing digital advisory services for agriculture and food crisis prevention and management, boosting adaption capacity of agriculture system actors, and investing in regional food market integration and trade to increase food security. An additional $345 million is currently under preparation for Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

2. A $150 million grant for the second phase of the Yemen Food Security Response and Resilience Project, which will help address food insecurity, strengthen resilience and protect livelihoods.

3. $50 million grant of additional financing for Tajikistan to mitigate food and nutrition insecurity impacts on households and enhance the overall resilience of the agriculture sector.

4. A $125 million project in Jordan aims to strengthen the development the agriculture sector by enhancing its climate resilience, increasing competitiveness and inclusion, and ensuring medium- to long-term food security.

5. A $300 million project in Bolivia that will contribute to increasing food security, market access and the adoption of climate-smart agricultural practices.

6. A $315 million loan to support Chad, Ghana and Sierra Leone to increase their preparedness against food insecurity and to improve the resilience of their food systems.

7. A $500 million Emergency Food Security and Resilience Support Project to bolster Egypt's efforts to ensure that poor and vulnerable households have uninterrupted access to bread, help strengthen the country's resilience to food crises, and support to reforms that will help improve nutritional outcomes.

8. A $130 million loan for Tunisia, seeking to lessen the impact of the Ukraine war by financing vital soft wheat imports and providing emergency support to cover barley imports for dairy production and seeds for smallholder farmers for the upcoming planting season.

9. The $2.3 billion Food Systems Resilience Program for Eastern and Southern Africa, helps countries in Eastern and Southern Africa increase the resilience of the region's food systems and ability to tackle growing food insecurity. The program will enhance inter-agency food crisis response also boost medium- and long-term efforts for resilient agricultural production, sustainable development of natural resources, expanded market access, and a greater focus on food systems resilience in policymaking.

In May 2022, the World Bank Group and the G7 Presidency co-convened the Global Alliance for Food Security, which aims to catalyze an immediate and concerted response to the unfolding global hunger crisis. The Alliance has developed the publicly accessible Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard, which provides timely information for global and local decision-makers to help improve coordination of the policy and financial response to the food crisis.

The heads of the FAO, IMF, World Bank Group, WFP, and WTO released a Third Joint Statement on February 8, 2023. The statement calls to prevent a worsening of the food and nutrition security crisis, further urgent actions are required to (i) rescue hunger hotspots, (ii) facilitate trade, improve the functioning of markets, and enhance the role of the private sector, and (iii) reform and repurpose harmful subsidies with careful targeting and efficiency. Countries should balance short-term urgent interventions with longer-term resilience efforts as they respond to the crisis.

Last Updated: Oct 30, 2023

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Food Security | Rising Food Insecurity in 2023

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The World Bank's response to the food insecurity crisis, the solutions it's working on, including financing food and fertilizer-and commodities and agricultural data.

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Despite rising U.S.-China tensions, cooperation on discrete issues is in the national interests of both countries-and the world. CSIS and Brookings convened U.S. and Chinese experts to explore the potential promises of collaboration on climate-smart agriculture.

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Global Food and Water Security Program | CSIS

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Leading research, analysis, and policy recommendations to improve global food and water security.

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Primary investigators Name Affiliation Bo Pieter Johannes Andree World Bank

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Abstract --------------------------- Key components of the WFSO database cover the [prevalence of severe food insecurity](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SN.ITK.SVFI.ZS), including estimates for countries lacking official data, population sizes of the severely food insecure, and required safety net financing. Data is presented in a user-friendly format. WFSO data primarily relies on hunger and malnutrition data from the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) report, led by the Food and agriculture Organization (FAO) in collaboration with multiple UN agencies. WFSO complements SOFI data by providing estimates for unreported countries. Historical estimates are produced with a [machine learning model](http://hdl.handle.net/10986/38139) leveraging [World Development Indicators](https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators) (WDI) for global coverage. Financing needs for safety nets are calculated similarly to past approaches by the International Development Association (IDA) to assess food insecurity response needs ([IDA (2020)](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/775981606955884100/pdf/Responding-to-the-Emerging-Food-Security-Crisis.pdf) and [IDA (2021)](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/252271636587686210/pdf/IDA19-Mid-Term-Review-of-the-Crisis-Response-Window-Early-Response-Financing.pdf)). Preliminary estimates and projections rely on the same model and incorporate International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s [World Economic Outlook](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO) (WEO) growth and inflation forecasts. WEO data reflects the IMF’s expert analysis from various sources, including government agencies, central banks, and international organizations. Minor gaps in WDI data inflation data are replaced with unofficial WEO estimates. Minor inflation data gaps not covered by both, are replaced with unofficial inflation estimates from the World Bank’s [Real Time Food Prices](https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4509) (RTFP) data. The WFSO is updated three times a year, coinciding with IMF’s WEO and SOFI releases. It provides food security projections that align with economic forecasts, aiding policymakers in integrating food security into economic planning. The WFSO database serves various purposes, aiding World Bank economists and researchers in economic analysis, policy recommendations, and the assessment of global financing needs to address food insecurity. Additionally, the WFSO enhances transparency in global food security data by tracking regional and global figures and breaking them down by individual countries. Historical estimates support research and long-term trend assessments, especially in the context of relating outlooks to past food security crises. Geographic coverage --------------------------- World Geographic coverage notes --------------------------- 191 countries and territories mutually included by the World Bank’s WDI and IMF’s WEO databases. Analysis unit --------------------------- Country Kind of data --------------------------- Process-produced data [pro]

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Global Food Crisis Finding Solutions with the Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard

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Center for Strategic and International Studies

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China’s Food Security: Key Challenges and Emerging Policy Responses

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Scholars from the CSIS Freeman Chair and Brookings John L. Thornton China Center examine key challenges to China’s food supply and the policy responses Beijing is adopting to increase its food security.

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Center for Strategic and International Studies

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The Case for U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate-Smart Agriculture

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Despite rising U.S.-China tensions, cooperation on discrete issues is in the national interests of both countries—and the world. CSIS and Brookings convened U.S. and Chinese experts to explore the potential promises of collaboration on climate-smart agriculture.

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Hunger in South Korea - The Borgen Project

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The South Korean government has launched various programs to help fight hunger in South Korea. It has a Food Safety Management System…

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The Global Food Security Index (GFSI) is an annual assessment measuring food security through affordability, availability, quality and safety, and sustainability and adaptation metrics worldwide.

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Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard | Data on food crisis

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The Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard, from the World Bank, G7 and partners, is a tool that provides timely, high-quality data at country and global levels on the food crisis.

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Global Food Crisis Finding Solutions with the Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard

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The latest analysis and real-time data on food crisis severity, global food security financing. Research and innovations to strengthen crisis response and resilience to food insecurity.

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Country and subnational food security data

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The latest analysis and real-time data on food crisis severity, global food security financing, and food insecurity in the country and subnational level – including nutrition and malnutrition rates.

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Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard | Data on food crisis

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The Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard, from the World Bank, G7 and partners, is a tool that provides timely, high-quality data at country and global levels on the food crisis.

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On December 27, 2022, the Government of Japan (GOJ) released the "Food Security Reinforcement Policy Framework," which aims to lower Japan's dependence on imports and to push increased domestic production of wheat, soybeans, feed grains, hay, and fertilizer inputs. The GOJ will fund new food security reinforcement measures through the Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 2022 second supplementary budget and JFY2023 annual budget.

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Japan: Japan Announces Measures to Strengthen Food Security

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On December 27, 2022, the Government of Japan (GOJ) released the "Food Security Reinforcement Policy Framework," which aims to lower Japan's dependence on...

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The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries released 2030 targets for its "Green Food System Strategy," including a 10.6 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, a 20 percent reduction in use of chemical fertilizers, and a 10 percent reduction in use of chemical pesticides. MAFF previously set both 2030 and 2050 targets for other key performance indicators, including electrification of agricultural equipment, expansion of organic production, and consideration of sustainability for imported food and agricultural products.

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Japan: Japan Sets New 2030 Targets for Green Food System Strategy

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The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries released 2030 targets for its "Green Food System Strategy," including a 10.6 percent reduction in carbon...

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The number of chronically undernourished people in the world is estimated at 821 million (one in nine people in the world) in 2017, according to the "2018 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World" jointly published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Although the number of chronically undernourished people had been on a declining trend for more than 10 years until 2014, the trend was reversed in 2015 and has since continued to rise. In order to achieve Goal 2 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), "End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture," it is vital to put in greater effort. Furthermore, climate change and extreme weather phenomenon in recent years have given rise to severe food crisis, making it one of the important factors leading to the recent increase in the starving population. Hence, there are calls around the world to accelerate and expand action toward strengthening resilience and adaptability (see here for details on "Issues regarding Climate Change").

In order to achieve food security (a state where all people, at all times, can access sufficient, safe and nutritious food), there is a need for multifaceted measures based on international coordination. These measures include not only a sustainable increase in the production of food, but also improvement of nutrition, establishment of a social safety net (a mechanism in which people can live safely with peace of mind), provision of necessary food assistance, and implementation of countermeasures against infectious diseases among livestock. Nutrition improvement during the first 1,000 days from pregnancy to second birthday is particularly seen as important as it has a significant impact on the child's growth thereafter.

■Japan's Efforts

Japan proactively addresses global food security issues, giving priority to cooperation that develops agriculture, forestry and fisheries, including the development of food value chains. In the short term, Japan provides food assistance to developing countries to avert food shortages, and in the medium to long-term, it aims to help increase and improve agricultural production and productivity in developing countries in order to prevent and eliminate the causes of food-related problems including hunger. Specifically, Japan uses its knowledge and experience to strengthen research and technology development, along with capacity-building in disseminating this technology in a way that is suited to the cultivation environment, promote the sustainable use of fishery resources, strengthen organizations of farmers, assist in policymaking, as well as to improve infrastructure such as irrigation facilities, farm roads, and fishing ports.

●Efforts to Provide Food Assistance and Improve Nutrition

Japan is providing food assistance based on requests from developing countries confronting food shortages. In FY2017, Japan contributed a total of ¥5.87 billion as bilateral food assistance in 16 countries, and provided approximately 80,000 tons of grains (rice, wheat flour, etc.) which mainly include Japanese government rice. In 2018, Japan served as the chair of the Food Aid Committee, which comprises of all the Parties of the "Food Assistance Convention."

Japan, in cooperation with international organizations, is also engaged in efforts to provide food assistance from the perspective of preventing the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts, which is a cause of starvation. For example, through WFP, Japan implements measures such as emergency food assistance, school feeding programs to improve access to education, and food assistance encouraging people, through the distribution of food, to participate in the development of agricultural land and social infrastructure in order to support the self-reliance of local communities. In 2017, WFP conducted activities including the distribution of approximately 3.8 million tons of food to 91.4 million people in 83 countries around the world. In 2018, Japan contributed a total of $132.4 million to WFP projects. Furthermore, Japan has provided assistance in technical cooperation for the agricultural and rural development of developing countries, establishment of international standards and norms in the food and agriculture fields, and the development of statistics, etc. through FAO. In addition, Japan also provides support for research on the variety development conducted by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which is comprised of 15 agricultural research centers, and facilitates cooperation through exchanges among researchers. Moreover, Japan provides support for developing countries to enhance their own food safety. In this area, concerning transboundary zoonotic diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease, Japan is reinforcing countermeasures in the Asia-Pacific region, in cooperation with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and FAO, and has created the Global Framework for Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs), among other efforts.

As for initiatives for nutritional improvement, in addition to bilateral assistance for the promotion of breastfeeding and the training of health professionals, Japan also provides assistance through multilateral cooperation by contributing to organizations such as UNICEF and WFP. Japan also participates in the international nutritional improvement initiative, Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) as a donor country. In recent years, Japan is also putting effort into promoting nutritional improvement programs in collaboration with private companies, and launched the Nutrition Japan Public Private Platform (NJPPP) in 2016. Through this platform, in cooperation with partners from private companies, civil society, and academic research institutions, Japan contributes to nutrition improvement specifically by creating an environment that can boost initiatives of Japanese food-related enterprises, etc. for nutritional improvement in developing countries. Additionally, Japan-led efforts for nutrition improvement have started in earnest including the launch of the "Initiative for Food and Nutrition Security in Africa (IFNA)" initiated by JICA with the aim of accelerating nutritional improvement in Africa. Japan also positions nutrition as an important fundamental area for the achievement of UHC. In 2020, Japan will host Tokyo Nutrition for Growth Summit 2020, and through this event, contribute to increasing international momentum for improving nutrition.

●Promotion of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and Development of Food Value Chains

Japan is promoting the establishment of a food value chain for developing countries through public-private partnership, based on the Global Food Value Chain Strategy formulated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) in June 2014. In FY2017, based on this Strategy, Japan organized bilateral policy dialogues with the Philippines, Russia, Brazil, India, Cambodia, Myanmar, Argentina, and Australia. In the dialogue held with Viet Nam in April 2018, the two countries agreed on revising the Medium- to Long-Term Vision for Japan-Viet Nam Agricultural Cooperation, and on cooperating toward the utilization of standards and certifications for agricultural produce and food quality, with the aim of building a food value chain in Viet Nam.

Furthermore, with the aim of realizing food security and eradicating poverty in Africa, Japan places emphasis on agriculture as an industry that plays an important role in Africa's economic growth, and contributes to its development. For instance, Japan supports the research of (New Rice for Africa), a cross-breed between Asian rice and African rice, and the spread of its production techniques, as well as support for increasing rice production based on the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). Moreover, at the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) held in 2008, Japan established the Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD)* , and announced the CARD Initiative. Since then, Japan has established the goal of doubling rice production in Sub-Saharan Africa from 14 million tons as of 2008 to 28 million tons by 2018. As a matter of fact, the annual rice production in Sub-Saharan Africa had increased to 26.11 million tons by 2016, meaning that approximately 93% of the targeted increase in production has been achieved.

Moreover, in order to promote the transition from self-sufficiency to profitable agriculture, on the occasion of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) held in 2016, Japan announced that it would transfer rice cultivation skills to 60,000 farmers and 2,500 extension workers by 2018 under the CARD initiative in order to strengthen food security in Africa, and that it would promote market-oriented agriculture and provide support for developing the food value chain, from the perspective of reducing post-harvest loss* , promoting the food production industry, and improving incomes in agricultural communities. Since 2016, Japan has provided training for 30,393 people (60,381 people since 2013) through the Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment & Promotion (SHEP) approach* , toward the promotion of market-oriented agriculture, as well as transferred rice cultivation skills through CARD to more than 50,000 people.

In response to requests for greater cooperation in the agricultural field, put forth by the respective countries at TICAD VI, Japan has also launched a platform that connects African countries and the local sites. Based on this platform, Japan dispatched three experts from May 2018 to carry out the transfer of outstanding agricultural technology and advance human resources development. At the same time, they are also engaged in promoting excellent projects in the field of agriculture.

●Food Security through a Multilateral Cooperation Approach

Japan proposed the "Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI)"* initiative at the G8 L'Aquila Summit (Italy) in 2009. With the growing problem of large-scale agricultural investments in developing countries (acquisition of agricultural lands by foreign investors) in response to rising international food prices, this initiative aims to coordinate and maximize profits for the three parties-host country government, local people, and investors-while easing the negative impact of agricultural investment and promoting agricultural development in the country of investment. Based on this concept, the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (CFS-RAI), for which discussions had been held at the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), supported by a secretariat comprising the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the World Food Programme (WFP), were adopted at the 41st CFS Session in 2014. In 2018, the ASEAN-RAI Guidelines were adopted by the ASEAN secretariat as the regional version of the CFS-RAI.

With regard to the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which was established at the G8 Camp David Summit (the United States) in 2012, it has been operating autonomously under the New Alliance secretariat of the African Union Commission (AUC), and now has ten partner countries. In addition, under the framework of the New Alliance, the relevant international organizations are implementing the "Forward-looking research and analysis programme for responsible agricultural investment" with financial support from Japan.

Furthermore, Japan has been involved in initiatives such as providing assistance to the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS)* in the G20, which aims to enhance the transparency of the international agricultural market. Through this inter-organizational platform launched in 2011 by the G20 as a measure to counter the wild fluctuations of food prices, the G20 member countries, major importing and exporting countries, corporations, and international organizations participate in a system for sharing information on the agricultural and food market (such as production volumes and prices) in a timely, accurate, and transparent manner. Japan has provided support for efforts in ASEAN countries to improve the accuracy of agricultural statistical information of ASEAN countries that will be utilized as AMIS data. In addition, Japan provides assistance in the agricultural sector through international organizations such as FAO, IFAD, a global research partnership for a food-secure future (CGIAR), and WFP.

* New Rice for Africa (NERICA)

NERICA is a general term for rice developed in 1994 by the Africa Rice Center (formerly West Africa Rice Development Association [WARDA]) through the hybridization of high-yield Asian rice with African rice, which is resistant to weeds, diseases and insect pests. In order for NERICA to suit the natural conditions of each region in Africa, they are characterized by (i) a higher yield, (ii) a shorter growth period, (iii) higher resistance to dryness (drought), and (iv) higher resistance to diseases and insect pests than conventional rice. Since 1997, Japan has partnered with international organizations and NGOs to provide support for research and development related to new types of NERICA, test cultivation, and increased production and popularization of seeds. In addition, Japan has dispatched agricultural experts and JOCVs to offer cultivation training, and has also accepted trainees from Africa for training in Japan.

*Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD)

CARD is a consultative group composed of donor countries, African regional organizations, and international organizations, partnered with rice-producing countries in Africa that are interested in rice production and development.

*Post-harvest loss

Post-harvest loss refers to harvested food that is discarded because it is unable to fulfill its originally intended purpose (for use as food, etc.). This can be caused by improper harvest timing, and overexposure to rain or dryness, extremely high or low temperatures, germ contamination, or any other physical damage that reduces the value of the products due primarily to a lack of adequate storage facilities.

*Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment Project (SHEP) approach

The SHEP approach refers to an effort to assist smallholder farmers to enhance their agricultural organizations through training and research on local markets, and to provide guidance on cultivation techniques and development of agricultural roads while taking into account gender issues, in order to help them improve their capacities to manage their market-oriented agricultural businesses. Japan is supporting the adoption of SHEP in Africa.

*Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS)

AMIS was launched as a countermeasure against food price volatility by the G20 in 2011. It allows each of the G20 members, the main exporting and importing countries, companies, and international organizations to share agricultural and food market information (production output, price, etc.) in a timely, precise, and transparent manner. Japan has supported the efforts of ASEAN countries aimed at improving the accuracy of ASEAN statistical information on agriculture used as AMIS data.

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White Paper on Development Cooperation 2018 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

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The number of chronically undernourished people in the world is estimated at 821 million (one in nine people in the world) in 2017, according to the "2018 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World" jointly published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

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Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (also referred to as prevalence of undernourishment) shows the percentage of the population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously. Data showing as 5 may signify a prevalence of undernourishment below 5%.

Japan hunger statistics for 2022 was 0.00%, a 3.2% decline from 2021.

Japan hunger statistics for 2021 was 3.20%, a 0.5% increase from 2020.

Japan hunger statistics for 2020 was 2.70%, a 0.2% increase from 2019.

Japan hunger statistics for 2019 was 2.50%, a 0% increase from 2018.

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Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (also referred to as prevalence of undernourishment) shows the percentage of the population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously. Data showing as 5 may signify a prevalence of undernourishment below 5%.

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Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (also referred to as prevalence of undernourishment) shows the percentage of the population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously. Data showing as 5 may signify a prevalence of undernourishment below 5%.

South Korea hunger statistics for 2022 was 0.00%, a 2.5% decline from 2021.

South Korea hunger statistics for 2021 was 2.50%, a 0% increase from 2020.

South Korea hunger statistics for 2020 was 2.50%, a 0% increase from 2019.

South Korea hunger statistics for 2019 was 2.50%, a 0% increase from 2018.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (also referred to as prevalence of undernourishment) shows the percentage of the population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously. Data showing as 5 may signify a prevalence of undernourishment below 5%.

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A Deepening Crisis

The connection between food banks and municipal governments run deep. Fujita Makoto, who is director of Food Bank Kanagawa in Yokohama's Kanazawa Ward, says his organization relies on information from these and other community-based organizations to connect with people in need. He says that one group of particular concern are senior citizens living alone.

Under Japan's two-tiered pension system, an older couple whose main breadwinner was self-employed would have only contributed to the National Pension scheme. The pair will start drawing basic benefits when they reach 65 years old, but Nakashima Kunio, a senior researcher at Tokyo-based NLI Research Institute, notes that households relying solely on basic social security payouts are in a precarious position, as income will plummet if one spouse dies. "Let's say the husband passes away," Nakashima explains. "Barring special circumstances, the wife won't be eligible to collect survivor benefits, as the National Pension system typically only pays these to families with children under the age of eighteen. This means she'll be left to scrape by just on her pension check."

A person whose spouse was enrolled in a company's Employee Pension Insurance would be in a better position, as they are eligible for survivor benefits. However, a considerable portion of the population, particularly those who are self-employed or have spent their careers as nonregular workers, never enrolled in EPI.

According to the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, basic monthly pension benefits in 2021 averaged out to a little over ¥56,000 per person. For a senior citizen who is not a homeowner or has no supplemental income, surviving on such a scant amount is next to impossible.

Such individuals are eligible for public welfare programs, but Fujita points out that many never apply for benefits, often because they do not want to be seen as a burden or are unsure of the application process. He mentions that it is not unusual for older residents to tell visiting government welfare officers that they are doing fine even when they are in dire financial straits. "We know that many people who rely solely on basic pension benefits are wallowing in poverty," Fujita declares. "But in reality, we don't have a true grasp on the scale of the problem."

Member of Japan's so-called lost generation, those who graduated during the "employment ice age" of the 1990s and 2000s following the collapse of the 1980s asset-price bubble, are at particular risk as they near retirement age. Now largely in their forties and fifties, many in this group have spent their careers in low-paying, nonregular positions with meager pension benefits, and many experts argue that Japan's public pension system will be unable to adequately support them in old age.

No Rice for Dinner

Another group at economic risk are single-parent households. In particular, incomes of single mothers, who are more likely to be employed in casual or part-time positions, fell steeply during the COVID-19 pandemic. This was due in large part to mothers leaving their jobs to care for their children when schools closed, or being furloughed as businesses shut down. According to 2020 national census figures, there are some 5 million single-parent households in Japan, or 9% of the total.

Fujita relates how rising utility costs in Japan are further impacting these vulnerable households. "The food bank includes rice in the packages we provide to single-parent families," he says. "But we've seen several households who have no means of cooking what they receive because they've had their gas and electricity stopped after falling behind on payments." In response, Fujita has turned to companies and neighborhood organizations who are rotating their stores of emergency food rations to donate their old stock of "no-cook" items like rice that can be prepared by just adding water.

Food Bank Kanagawa holds regular events to support single-parent households. A single mother of two who attended a March gathering in Yokohama's Seya Ward says she quit her job two years ago after falling ill and has been unable to work while being treated for her condition. The family relies on her meager savings, public welfare, and income provided by her eldest son, who works part time while attending university on a grant scholarship, which unlike most public scholarships has no repayment requirement.

The mother explains that she learned about the food bank service from the internet and uses it two to three times a month to help keep her family fed. As prices rise in Japan, she says that she has been able to find some items that she can no longer afford to buy at stores. Even with food assistance, she still must cut costs where she can. To help save money, the family in winter makes do with a single kotatsu, a table with a built-in heating element. "The three of us huddle around it to stay warm," she declares.

Compounding the issues of falling incomes and higher prices confronting single-parent households is the fact that many public assistance programs stop providing benefits after the fiscal year when a child turns 18. The mother, for instance, will soon lose the family's government allowance and free medical care once her youngest child, who is in the second year of high school, turns 18 in a few months. "I honestly don't know what we're going to do after that."

Students Going Hungry

Food banks over the last several years have seen an uptick in students seeking food assistance. Many students seeking aid come from less affluent families in rural areas. Having moved to the city to attend school, they must work part-time jobs to help pay tuition and other education costs. When the pandemic hit, though, many from this group saw their incomes shrink or disappear entirely. Faced with looming school fees, they had little recourse but to curtail their food budgets.

Since 2020, Food Bank Kanagawa has taken part in monthly events in Sagamihara for students living in the city. One such gathering in March of this year was attended by some 90 people, a significant turnout for an event held during spring break, a time between academic years when students traditionally return home.

One attendee, a second-year university student, says she has been coming to events since the previous year, when the restaurant where she works cut her hours. The young woman, who hails from Nagano Prefecture, says she borrowed money for school from her parents rather than rely on loan-based scholarships, which would have left her with significant debt after graduation. "Although income from my part-time job has dropped, I scrimp and save where I can so I can pay back my folks, even just a little bit," she explains. While borrowing from family offers her more leeway in repaying her debt, she says her parents' economic situation makes her reluctant to lean on them any more than she already has. "I don't want to be a burden."

The food bank is supported in its efforts by businesses and other organizations in the community. At the event, local growers offered rice and fresh produce like potatoes and carrots, and area bakers provided a selection of snack breads. Students browsed through items, placing their selections in bags. One female student who attended admitted that she had reservations at first about turning to the food bank for assistance, but has since come to rely on the service, taking part in over 10 events.

A third-year university student explains that he had to drastically tighten his belt after the sushi chain where he works reduced his hours during the pandemic. He points out that expenses like rent, utilities, and education costs are fixed, which left him little recourse but to slash his food budget to just ¥10,000 a month. At the event he chooses items like rice, retort foods, and canned goods, declaring that what he receives at the monthly events "makes a big difference."

He had just entered university when the pandemic struck. With classes being held online and needing to hold down a part-time job, he says that he missed out on most of the opportunities for socializing that college provides. "I'll be graduating soon without ever getting a real taste of university life," he laments.

Serving Greater Roles
(Originally published in Japanese. Banner photo: Attendees choose food items at a distribution event for students in Sagamihara, Kanagawa Prefecture. © Mochida Jōji.)
Japan has long clung to the belief of a society consisting of "a hundred million people, all middle class" that first emerged in the postwar years. However, the bursting of the asset bubble revealed cracks in this myth, rifts that have only grown more pronounced over time.

Satō Junko, a lecturer at Bukkyō University and an expert on the history of food banks, says that the uptick in people facing food hardships tracks the steady increase in nonregular workers Japan has seen since 1995. "Japan has largely ignored the plight of low-income earners, leaving them to fend for themselves," Satō explains. "It's this group, particularly single mothers and senior citizens living off their pensions, who have borne the economic brunt wrought by the pandemic and burgeoning inflation." She points to the government's flailing attempts to address growing social inequality. "Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees for all people 'the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living.' But the programs that are in place are no longer adequate to keep the growing numbers of vulnerable people from falling through the cracks."

Satō points out that food insecurity and inequality go hand-in-hand, aiming her criticism at inefficiencies in the way economic resources are distributed in Japan. "Single mothers, for instance, receive child-rearing allowances from the government," she explains. "Tying redistribution programs to this would be an efficient way to help parents who are scraping by at part-time jobs put food on the table." She also argues that Japanese leaders need to consider altering policies with an eye to improving food security for single-parent households, including changing income restrictions and other eligibility limits for assistance programs and raising the amount of child-rearing allowances.

At the same time, she says that food banks and other assistance programs have the potential to provide more comprehensive services beyond just distributing food. "The government can't just throw money at every problem," she says. "There are cases of elderly couples with dementia, for instance, becoming weak and dehydrated because they are no longer able to cook for themselves." She says that when making deliveries, food bank staff can check on the wellbeing of such vulnerable people, listen to their concerns and needs, and pass along any pertinent information to support organizations. "It's important going forward to make the most of the capabilities of food banks."

Satō argues that the government will need to throw its full support behind food banks and similar organizations-currently staffed primarily by volunteers-if they are to expand beyond food distribution, including investing in training staff and expanding warehouse and refrigerator space to improve the ways and varieties of food that can be stored.

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Japanese Food Banks Cross Generational Lines to Meet Rising Demand for Assistance

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Japanese food banks are seeing a rise in people experiencing food insecurity, with an alarming uptick in single-parent and one-person households, including students and senior citizens. A look at how poverty is affecting people across generational divides.

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Food Self-Sufficiency and Food Insecurity in Japan - The Borgen Project

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The nation has made tremendous strides across many domains. However, food insecurity remains one significant shortcoming in Japan…

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Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences | JIRCAS

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948. Trends and Outlook of Food Self-Sufficiency Ratio ―Toward Revision of the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas

The Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, enacted in 1999, serves as the basic framework for Japan's agricultural policy. In 2024, a proposed amendment to this law is scheduled for deliberation during the ordinary session of the Diet. The primary focus of the amendment is to enhance food security, transition to environmentally sustainable industries, promote highly productive agricultural management, and ensure the preservation of rural areas, agricultural populations, and communities.

The legislative framework is underpinned by the Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, which is subject to periodic review every five years. The current target, set for 2030, is a self-sufficiency rate of 45% on a calorie basis and 75% on a production value basis. However, as of FY2022, Japan's food self-sufficiency stands at 38% on a calorie basis and 58% on a production value basis, indicating a shortfall in achieving the set targets.

In particular, global comparisons highlight the varying degrees of food self-sufficiency among nations. Countries such as Canada and Australia have already surpassed 100%, while others, such as the United Kingdom (61% on a production value basis in 2021) and South Korea (44% on a production value basis in 2021), fall short of complete self-sufficiency.

To address these critical issues, a symposium entitled "Trends and Outlook of Food Self-Sufficiency Ratio: Toward Revision of the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas" is scheduled for Saturday, February 3. This event, organized under the auspices of the Committee on Agricultural Science and the Committee on Food Science of the Science Council of Japan (SCJ), invites your participation. We anticipate a valuable exchange of insights and perspectives and encourage you to join us in shaping the discourse on Japan's agricultural and rural policies.

Trends and Outlook of Food Self-Sufficiency Ratio― Toward Revision of the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas

Date & Time：Saturday, February 3, 202413:00～17:00
Venue：Ichijo Hall, Yayoi Auditorium, The University of Tokyo, Hybrid event
For registration and inquiries, please see the following
https://www.agc.a.u-tokyo.ac.jp/wp/fg1_240203/

References
農林水産省　知ってる？日本の食料事情 https://www.maff.go.jp/j/zyukyu/index.html　(Accessed on Jan 30, 2024)
MAFF　The Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas https://www.maff.go.jp/j/kanbo/kihyo02/basic_law/pdf/basic_law_agri.pdf (Accessed on Jan 30, 2024)
GOV.UK　National Statistics Chapter 14: the food chain https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/agriculture-in-the-united-king... (Accessed on Jan 30, 2024)
Sustainable Japan 【韓国】政府、2027年までに食料自給率を55.5%へ。食料安全保障強化計画策定 https://sustainablejapan.jp/2022/12/23/korea-food-security/80397 (Accessed on Jan 30, 2024)

Contributor: SHIRATORI Sakiko (Information and Public Relations Office)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
948. Trends and Outlook of Food Self-Sufficiency Ratio ― Toward Revision of the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas | 国際農研

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
A bill to revise the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, which sets the basic direction of Japan's agricultural policy, is scheduled to be submitted to the 2024 ordinary Diet session for deliberation.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In addition, it will also be necessary to develop a stockpile system and promote agriculture, stabilizing the production base and ensuring workers for agricultural production in order to maintain the necessary self-sufficiency capacity. In that respect, it will also be important to increase exports and realize profitable agriculture. Furthermore, in the event of an emergency, the problem will be from which country to procure urgently necessary food supplies. Currently, Japan purchases food from friendly countries such as the United States and Australia, which are able to provide a stable supply. Nevertheless, in order to prepare for an interruption to supplies from these countries, we could consider deploying "food security diplomacy" prior to an emergency situation in order to build relationships that will prioritize food supplies to Japan.

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Japan's Food Security Challenges Considered From Domestic and Global Perspectives｜My Vision｜Papers｜NIRA

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The protracted crisis in Ukraine has affected the world's food supply.This should act as a spur that...

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Food security is an extremely important issue for Japan, which is reliant on food imports. To ensure a stable supply of comestibles, basic policies must be reviewed in line with the changing times.

An expert panel of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry has released an interim summary report aimed at revising the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas - the country's basic agricultural policy. The summary emphasizes that a food security system should be established during normal times. The government intends to submit a bill to revise the law to the ordinary Diet session next year.

The current law, which was enacted in 1999, reflects low awareness of food security issues as it was likely molded on the assumption that Japan would be able to import as much food as it needed in light of its economic strength at that time.

In recent years, however, crop failures have been increasing due to climate change-driven droughts. Additionally, Japan's purchasing power has declined. The coronavirus pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have further exacerbated the situation.

It can be said that food procurement is at a turning point. It is quite natural that food security should be emphasized during normal times.

The current law has placed improved food self-sufficiency at the center of agricultural policy.

However, in addition to foodstuffs, Japan relies heavily on imports of raw materials for fertilizers, such as urea and phosphoric acid, which are essential for agriculture. The crisis in Ukraine had led to a fertilizer shortage. Though this does not affect food self-sufficiency, it has hindered aspects of agricultural production.

Following revision of the law, the government intends to set targets for fertilizers, too. The sludge from treated sewage contains raw materials for fertilizers. It would be effective to utilize this resource and expand domestic fertilizer production.

Japan is also highly dependent on certain countries, including China, for the majority of its fertilizer procurement. Diverse sources should therefore be sought out.

The interim summary also emphasizes the importance of securing agricultural workers. Farmers are aging, and based on the current age structure, the number of people whose primary job is farming is expected to decrease from about 1.2 million in 2022 to about 300,000 in 20 years.

It is essential to promote labor-saving measures through the use of information technology and robots. It is hoped that the government, research institutes, IT companies and other entities will work together to accelerate technological innovation for that purpose.

It is also vital to make agriculture a profitable industry that is attractive to workers. To this end, the value attached to agricultural products must be increased and the government must support their export.

The interim report also identifies the issue of dealing with contingencies, such as conflicts and poor harvests. The government plans to consider the establishment of a law that would allow it to instruct farmers to increase grain production or to demand the sale of grain.

However, careful discussions will be necessary to avoid possible restrictions on private rights. It is hoped that relief measures will be included for those who could be disadvantaged by the legislation.

(From The Yomiuri Shimbun, June 9, 2023)

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Japan's Food Security Situation Becoming Increasingly Severe

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Food security is an extremely important issue for Japan, which is reliant on food imports. To ensure a stable supply of comestibles, basic policies must be reviewed in line with the changing times. An expert panel of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry has released an interim summary revising the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas - the country's basic agricultural policy.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The government plans to boost the rate to 45 per cent by 2030, but faces several challenges, starting with a decline in the size of the labour force and farmland. Today, Japan imports most of the food it consumes due to changes in the eating habits of the Japanese.

Tokyo (AsiaNews) - Japan's food self-sufficiency rate on a caloric intake basis stood at 38 per cent in fiscal 2022, unchanged from the previous year but still near a record low of 37 per cent in 2020, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry said yesterday.

The percentage indicates the country's capacity to produce food for its population in terms of caloric intake. When measured by production value, the rate was 58 per cent, down 5 percentage points over fiscal 2021.

Among developed economies, Japan has one of the lowest levels of food self-sufficiency. For this reason, the government wants to reach 45 per cent in caloric intake and 75 per cent in production value by 2030.

To this end, the government plans to revise the 1999 food security law, adopted at a time when Japanese leaders assumed that the country could import as much food as it needed.

Owing to changes in eating habits, almost 60 per cent of the food consumed by the Japanese is imported today. The latter now eat much less rice and much more meat and oils; in 1965 more than 40 per cent of daily calories came from rice, almost twice as much as in 2020, government figures show.

In 1960, Japan's food self-sufficiency rate was 102 per cent for rice, 100 per cent for fruits and vegetables, and 91 per cent for meat, while in 2021 the country produced 98 per cent of the rice consumed, 30 per cent of its fruit, 76 per cent of its vegetables, and 16 per cent of its livestock products.

In 2022, the number of shellfish and fish caught and the amount of wheat harvested decreased, but imports of oils and fats also fell.

Although imports did not change in absolute terms, rising wheat prices and the depreciation of the yen made imports more expensive. Its corn imports from China have jumped 10-fold since 2016.

As some critics point out, Japan has reduced its agriculture budget in favour of defence spending during the pandemic. At the same time, Japan is also dependent on foreign fertilisers, which are critical to agricultural production, especially from China.

The government plan would boost local production of wheat by 40 per cent, soya beans by 60 per cent, vegetables by 15 per cent, and animal feed by 48 per cent, partly through the introduction of new crops more resistant to diseases.

Experts warn though that these goals may be too ambitious, as they would require a major overhaul of the agricultural sector, which is losing 50,000 farmers and lots of land every year, two factors the government has not considered.

Based on current estimates, the number of people whose primary job is farming is expected to drop from about 1.2 million in 2022 to about 300,000 in 20 years.

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JAPAN Japan's food self-sufficiency at 38 per cent, close to the all-time low

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The government plans to boost the rate to 45 per cent by 2030, but faces several challenges, starting with a decline in the size of the labour force and farmland. Today, Japan imports most of the food it consumes due to changes in the eating habits of the Japanese.

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Research

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International Journal for Equity in Health 22, Article number: 148 (2023) Cite this article

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Abstract

Background

Food insecurity is a significant risk factor for chronic and infectious diseases. It is also a barrier to accessing healthcare because food insecurity tends to co-occur with other socioeconomic disadvantages. The objective of this study is to examine whether food insecure individuals in South Korea can access desired level of healthcare when needed.

Methods

This repeated cross-sectional study used data from the 2013-2015 and 2019-2021 waves of the Korean National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. Multivariable logistic regression models were used to examine the association between household food insecurity and two indicators of unmet healthcare needs - any experience of forgoing medical service and the reasons for unmet needs (problems with availability, acceptability, and accessibility). Covariates indicating predisposing, enabling, and need factors were included in the regression analyses.

Results

Of the 19,394 participants aged 19-64 years, 4.5% were moderately food insecure, 0.9% were severely food insecure, and 9.3% reported unmet healthcare needs. In the adjusted model, moderate food insecurity (OR, 1.47; 95% CI, 1.19-1.82) and severe food insecurity (OR, 3.32; 95% CI, 2.27-4.85) were associated with higher odds of unmet healthcare needs in a dose-graded manner. These associations were largely due to the increased odds of accessibility-related unmet needs among participants with moderate (OR, 2.31; 95% CI, 1.68-3.19) and severe food insecurity (OR, 6.15; 95% CI, 3.91-9.68).

Conclusions

Food insecurity was associated with higher odds of unmet healthcare needs among Korean adults. Competing life demands may have a cumulative impact on health over the short and long term. Efforts to address trade-offs between healthcare needs and food insecurity may improve the health and well-being of marginalized populations.

Background

Ensuring universal access to healthcare is an internationally recognized goal, proposed by the United Nations' agenda for sustainable development [ 1]. However, inequalities in healthcare access persist across marginalized populations, with poorer individuals having the least entitlement to medical services [ 2]. "Unmet healthcare need" is a multifaceted construct that refers to the gap between healthcare needs and the services actually received [ 3]. It is defined as "a failure to obtain care when people believed it to be medically necessary" [ 4], thereby increasing morbidity and mortality risks [ 5]. Reasons for unmet healthcare needs include problems with availability (e.g., long waiting time, shortage of services), accessibility (e.g., financial and transportation barriers), and acceptability (e.g., attitudes toward care, competing responsibilities) of services. In 2018, approximately 7.8-10.8% of the Korean population reported that they could not obtain the medical services that they needed, and 1.2-2.5% reported having unmet healthcare needs due to cost [ 6].

Food insecurity, defined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as "limited or uncertain availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods, or limited or uncertain ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways" [ 7], is an important social determinant of health. Difficulty in access to food harms health by promoting the intake of cheap and processed foods [ 8] and forces people to forgo required medical services [ 9]. Empirical research has demonstrated a link between food insecurity and adverse health conditions, including cardiovascular disease [ 10, 11, 12], diabetes [ 8, 13, 14], allostatic load [ 15, 16], mental illness [ 17, 18, 19, 20], and reduced grip strength [ 19]. Prior research has identified 5.4% of Korean adults as food insecure, with 1.1% having experienced disrupted eating patterns or reduced food intake [ 21]. Food insecurity is closely related to other socioeconomic disadvantages, which compound the healthcare burden on low-income households [ 22].

Coping with food insecurity poses a unique challenge to low-income households as they face a greater need for medical services but have limited financial resources and insurance coverage. Individuals in food insecure households are more likely to use medical services while spending larger amounts on healthcare [ 23]. However, they often postpone necessary care because of competing demands on their limited financial resources. Food insecurity tends to co-occur with other socioeconomic challenges, such as housing instability [ 23] and job insecurity [ 24], which could further tighten healthcare budgets [ 25]. Prior research has documented an association between food insecurity and healthcare underuse in at-risk populations in the US [ 9, 23, 26].

In the current study, we aim to understand the extent of unmet healthcare needs among food-insecure households in Korea. Despite Korea's universal healthcare system, the citizens continue to pay a large share of medical expenses out of pocket. In 2019, the share of healthcare in total household consumption was more than 5%, which is higher than the OECD average of 3.1% [ 27]. The co-payment burden is disproportionately higher for low-income households as they face a greater need for costly medical treatments [ 28]. The dual challenges of healthcare financing and food insecurity are critically important, but they were yet to be fully understood in the Korean context. To fill this gap in the literature, we conduct a retrospective, population-based cohort study investigating the association between food insecurity and unmet healthcare needs among Korean adults. We hypothesize that (a) food insecurity is associated with unmet healthcare needs adjusted for sociodemographic covariates and that (b) the association is dose graded so that severe food insecurity is associated with greater unmet needs for medical services. We also examine the reasons for unmet needs to examine the mechanism through which food insecurity restricts healthcare access.

Methods

Data description

Data were drawn from the 2013-2015 and 2019-2021 waves of the Korean National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (KNHANES).1 The KNHANES is an annual cross-sectional survey administered by the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( https://knhanes.kdca.go.kr/knhanes/main.do). The survey employed a multistage stratified cluster sampling method to obtain a nationally representative sample of the Korean population. The questionnaire consists of three modules: a health interview, physical examination, and nutrition survey. These surveys offer data on sociodemographic factors, health and health behaviors, healthcare access, and nutritional characteristics that include food insecurity. The study sample was restricted to participants aged 19-64 years who provided valid responses to the variables used for the analyses. Those older than 64 years were removed from the sample to minimize the confounding effects of retirement [ 29] and old age pension [ 30] on health and healthcare. The final sample includes 19,394 participants.

Unmet healthcare needs

The outcome variables include (a) an indicator of self-perceived unmet need for healthcare and (b) indicators of the reasons for unmet healthcare needs. Any unmet healthcare need was assessed with a question, " During the past 12 months, have you felt you needed healthcare but did not receive it? ". Participants who answered yes to this question were determined to have unmet healthcare needs in the past year. Those who answered no were considered to have fulfilled their treatment needs.

Participants who provided an affirmative response were further asked about the reasons for their unmet healthcare needs. Seven possible reasons were presented along with an open-ended response option to indicate one's own reason (Table 1). These response options are classified into three distinct categories: problems with availability, acceptability, and accessibility of medical services [ 31]. Unmet healthcare needs due to limited availability indicate a situation in which healthcare access is restricted owing to supply side problems (e.g., long waiting time and difficulty in making reservations). Unmet healthcare needs due to limited acceptability are related to personal preferences or circumstances (e.g., not having enough time, symptoms not severe, and afraid of medical tests or treatments). Finally, unmet healthcare needs due to limited accessibility include cost-related concerns and restrictions on transportation to get to healthcare providers. We defined binary indicators for each subcategory to confirm the source of unmet healthcare needs in response to food insecurity. Unmet healthcare needs due to availability and accessibility issues have strong policy implications as they can be modified by the government and health authorities.

Food insecurity

Food insecurity was measured using an 18-item questionnaire scale obtained from the U.S. Household Food Security Survey Module. The scale consists of three items on household food conditions, seven items on food access of households with adults only, and eight items on food access of households with children (Appendix, Table A1). These items are designed to measure food insecurity caused by resource constraints in the preceding year. Affirmative responses indicating inadequate food access were assigned a score of 1, and all other responses were assigned a score of 0. Binary scores were summed to construct an aggregate score for household food insecurity. The aggregate score ranges from 0 to 10 for households without children and from 0 to 18 for households with children.

Households with an aggregate score of 0-2 were determined to be food secure. An aggregate score of 3 to 5 for households without children or a score of 3 to 7 for households with children under the age of 18 years was categorized as having moderate food insecurity. A score of 6 to 10 for households with no children or a score of 8 to 18 for households with children was defined as having severe food insecurity. The Cronbach's α for the food insecurity scale was 0.85 in the study sample. A detailed description of the scale development and validation is available in the literature [ 32, 33].

Statistical analysis

Multivariable logistic regression analysis was estimated to examine the association between unmet healthcare needs and household food insecurity. Given that this study examines two types of outcome variables, i.e., any unmet healthcare need and the reasons for unmet healthcare needs, we estimated two sets of logistic regressions corresponding to each outcome variable. In all regressions, the food secure group was omitted as a reference category, and moderate and severe food insecurity were included along with covariates. Coefficient estimates were shown as odds ratios (OR) with a 95% confidence interval (CI). All analyses were adjusted using the sampling weights for the nutrition submodules in the KNHANES. Statistical significance was determined as p  < 0.05. All analyses and estimations were performed using STATA SE version 17.0 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX).

Covariates

Demographic and socioeconomic covariates were selected according to Andersen's behavioral model of healthcare utilization [ 34]. Andersen's model postulates that predisposing, enabling, and need factors jointly determine the medical service use of vulnerable populations. Predisposing factors represent individuals' baseline characteristics that may determine health risks and healthcare service needs [ 35]; examples include age, gender, marital status, educational attainment, and employment status. Enabling factors include resource-related impediments or enablers [ 35], such as household income, home ownership, household size, health insurance ownership, urbanicity, housing type, and city/province of residence. Need factors determine one's need and propensity to access healthcare [ 35] and include doctor-diagnosed chronic conditions (arthritis, asthma, diabetes, hypertension)2 and self-rated health.

Age was calculated as the year of the survey minus the year of birth. Education attainment was recorded as ≤ middle school, high school, and ≥ college education. Marital status was categorized as married, single, separated, divorced, and widowed. Employment status was divided into four mutually exclusive categories: full-time workers, temporary or daily workers, employers or self-employed, and unemployed or retired. Household income is the monthly average income of all household members reported in 10k KRW. Chronic conditions were binary coded for each disease diagnosed by a doctor. Self-rated health was categorized as poor and good or better.

Results

The average sample statistics for 11,500 women [50.4%] and 7894 men [49.6%] are presented in Table 2. All frequency figures are unweighted; percentages, means, and standard errors are weighted. The mean [SD] age of the participants was 41.8 [12.6] years. A total of 13,717 [66.0%] participants were married, and 8626 [47.2%] were college-educated. There were 7030 [38.8%] full-time wage workers, 2449 [12.6%] temporary workers, and 6934 [33.3%] unemployed or retired. By food security status, 191 [0.9%] were classified as having severe food insecurity, 925 [4.5%] with moderate food insecurity, and 18,278 [94.6%] with food security. The prevalence of food insecurity was higher in the group that reported unmet healthcare needs in the preceding 12 months (249 [11.3%]) than in the other groups with sufficient healthcare access (867 [4.9%]).

Table 3 reports results from the logistic regression of any unmet healthcare need on food insecurity, adjusted for predisposing, enabling, and need factors. The model based on the full sample shows that being moderately food insecure is associated with 1.47 (95% CI, 1.19-1.82) times higher odds of any unmet healthcare need, and that being severely food insecure is associated with 3.32 (95% CI, 2.27-4.85) times higher odds of any unmet healthcare need. For women, moderate food insecurity is associated with odds ratio for any unmet healthcare need of 1.72 (95% CI, 1.35-2.20), and severe food insecurity is associated with odds ratio of 3.36 (95% CI, 2.07-5.44). For men, moderate food insecurity is associated with 1.10 (95% CI, 0.73-1.66) times higher odds of any unmet healthcare need, and severe food insecurity is associated with 3.38 (95% CI, 1.86-6.15) times higher odds of any unmet need.

The following results show the logistic regression of the three subcategories of unmet needs (availability, acceptability, and accessibility unmet) on food insecurity, adjusted for predisposing, enabling, and need factors (Table 4). Moderate (OR, 1.21; 95% CI, 0.49-2.98) and severe (OR, 0.70; 95% CI, 0.09-5.61) food insecurity are not associated with having availability-related unmet needs. Similarly, moderate (OR, 1.01; 95% CI, 0.76-1.34) and severe (OR, 1.06; 95% CI, 0.58-1.92) food insecurity are not associated with having acceptability-related unmet needs. However, moderate food insecurity is associated with 2.31 (95% CI, 1.68-3.19) times higher odds of accessibility-related unmet needs, and severe food insecurity is associated with 6.15 (95% CI, 3.91-9.68) times higher odds of accessibility-related unmet needs.

Discussion

Using a nationally representative Korean sample, we demonstrate that the problem of food insecurity and unmet healthcare needs remains significant in Korea, with 5.4% reporting food insecurity and 9.3% reporting unmet healthcare needs in the past 12 months. The prevalence of food insecurity and unmet healthcare needs highlights the potential tradeoffs between securing healthy and nutritious meals and paying off medical bills among at-risk populations [ 9, 23, 26]. Previous studies have shown an association between economic insecurity and cost-related medical service underuse in the U.S. and European contexts [ 23, 36, 37]; however, to our knowledge, little is known about inadequate healthcare access among food-insecure households in Korea. With the growing interest in addressing patients' socioeconomic concerns as a routine part of clinical practice, this study investigated the associations between food insecurity and unmet healthcare needs.

Our descriptive analyses found that 9.3% of the sample had experienced any unmet healthcare needs in the past year. Of the sample with unmet needs, 0.5% were due to limited availability of healthcare, 6.9% were due to limited acceptability, and 1.9% were due to cost or transportation-related concerns. The experience of any unmet need was more pronounced among women, unmarried individuals, less educated, and temporary workers. It was also associated with socioeconomic variables such as income, homeownership, housing type, and health insurance coverage. These results were similar to those of previous research, highlighting that the prevalence of unmet care needs systematically varies based on health and socioeconomic characteristics [ 38, 39, 40].

We also found that unmet care needs were more prevalent in respondents with arthritis and asthma. However, it showed no association with other chronic conditions such as diabetes and hypertension. The health belief model suggests that individuals will take action to control ill-health if they perceive they are susceptible to a condition, the condition would have serious effects, and taking action would be beneficial [ 41]. Arthritis and asthma may be perceived as less severe compared to diabetes and hypertension. Therefore, participants who face lower risk from less severe diseases like arthritis and asthma would exhibit reduced use of needed medical services.

Consistent with our research questions, food insecurity was associated with having experienced unmet healthcare needs in the past 12 months. This association arose in a graded manner, suggesting that severely food-insecure individuals were more likely to experience unmet healthcare needs. Splitting the sample by gender, we found that both moderate and severe food insecurity were associated with unmet healthcare needs among women. However, for men, only severe food insecurity was indicative of unmet healthcare needs. Examining the reasons for unmet needs showed that these associations were largely due to cost- and transportation-related concerns regarding healthcare access. Other reasons for unmet healthcare needs (limited availability and acceptability of medical services) were not associated with food insecurity.

This study contributes to prior evidence reporting an increased health risk among food insecure populations. Previous studies have documented the association between food insecurity and adverse health conditions, such as cardiovascular disease [ 10, 11, 12], diabetes [ 8, 13, 14], allostatic load [ 15, 16], mental illness [ 17, 18, 19, 20], and reduced grip strength [ 19]. Additionally, researchers have explored the mortality implications of these health conditions at a population level [ 42, 43]. Interpreting our findings in relation to prior research suggests that unmet healthcare is the likely pathway underlying the links between food insecurity, chronic disease, and mortality. This channel is particularly salient in Korea, where the healthcare system is characterized by high co-payment for tertiary care and outpatient medical services [ 44]. In 2019, a typical Korean citizen paid 1065 USD or 30.3% of their annual healthcare costs out-of-pocket [ 45]. Co-payment rates were as low as 20% but could escalate to 50-60% for patients who frequently seek care at upper-level medical institutions [ 44]. Under the current healthcare system, unmet healthcare needs may occur more often in marginalized populations that have greater needs to treat life threatening conditions. As this group lacks access to costly treatment options, they might be exposed to greater risk of acute conditions and eventually mortality.

The policy response to food insecurity should aim to provide healthy and nutritious meals to at-risk populations while also incorporating fundamental measures that address systemic factors that create competing demands on household finances. Government nutrition assistance programs in Korea (congregate meal program and home-delivered meal services) mainly target older adults and those with disabilities. These two national programs and temporary food support from local authorities constitute the main pillars of food assistance in Korea [ 17, 46]. Currently, food-insecure adults in Korea have no standalone food aid packages that consistently provide adequate and nutritious meals over the long term [ 46]. Although income support programs provide supplemental cash benefits to resource-constrained households, they do not consider the competing needs for nutrition and healthcare faced by marginalized individuals and households. Thus, policy reforms need to consider concomitant healthcare challenges that arise with food insecurity and offer comprehensive interventions that address systemic factors contributing to food insecurity and healthcare underuse among low-income adults and their family members.

Our findings highlight the importance for healthcare providers to consider patients' food insecurity and related socioeconomic challenges when developing treatment plans. Clinicians need to be aware that patients may forgo opportunities to receive appropriate care because of cost-related concerns and other competing needs and thus require more affordable medical services to complete the recommended treatment dose [ 9, 47]. Knowledge of patients' socioeconomic backgrounds may allow referrals for nutritional support, food assistance benefits, and other government aids that enhance the clinical efficacy of treatments. Given that individual clinicians may not rectify the root causes of diseases, the government needs to implement an organized and holistic aid package that addresses socioeconomic risk factors for ill health.

This study has several limitations. First, food insecurity was measured at the household level, while healthcare access was assessed at the individual level. Given that the measurement of food insecurity involves a subjective assessment of food access, the way this variable is measured could vary depending on who in the household responded to the survey. If the respondent lacked knowledge about the family's food access, the measurement could be inaccurate, potentially leading to attenuation bias. Second, the cross-sectional study design limits our ability to examine the changes in food access over time. Food insecurity exhibits a complex time pattern depending on the receipt and duration of food assistance benefits [ 48], and this fluctuation in food supply may lead to a comparable cyclical pattern in healthcare utilization among food assistance beneficiaries. As our data are not longitudinal, the time pattern in the association between food insecurity and healthcare access remains underexplored in this study. Third, although we controlled for a large number of covariates, other competing needs that could confound the association between food insecurity and healthcare access, such as housing instability, excessive medical expenses, and participation in social welfare program, were left out of the regressions. Controlling for additional confounders may help delineate the mechanisms that link food insecurity to unmet healthcare needs. Finally, our key measures were based on participants' self-reports, which could be influenced by recall or social desirability bias [ 9, 26, 47]. Future research should consider using administrative data to obtain more direct measures of food insecurity and unmet healthcare needs.

Conclusions

Food insecurity tends to co-occur with unmet healthcare needs among disadvantaged populations. In this nationally representative study of Korean adults aged 19-64 years, we found that food insecurity is independently associated with unmet healthcare needs in a prior year, and that severe food insecurity leads to greater unmet healthcare needs in a dose-graded manner. Among various reasons for unmet care needs, limited accessibility due to cost and transportation was related to food insecurity outcomes. Limited food access needs to be considered as a modifiable risk factor for unmet care needs and prioritized in government interventions. Policies that improve food access may have positive spillover effects on healthcare utilization and produce health benefits over the short and long term, especially for marginalized minority groups.

Data Availability

All data available in the Korean National Health and Nutrition Survey website: https://knhanes.kdca.go.kr/knhanes.

Notes

1. This study omits the 2016-2018 wave of the KNHANES, as it used different questions for food insecurity.

2. Other chronic health conditions (cancer, stroke, cardiovascular disease, osteoporosis, tuberculosis, and pulmonary disease) were not incorporated into empirical analyses due to the insufficient number of food insecure participants diagnosed with these conditions.

Funding

This research was supported by the BK21 FOUR (Fostering Outstanding Universities for Research) funded by the Ministry of Education (MOE) of Korea and National Research Foundation (NRF) of Korea.

Author information

Author notes

Hwi Choe and Tae-Young Pak are joint first authors.

Authors and Affiliations

Department of Consumer Science and Convergence Program for Social Innovation, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, South Korea

Hwi Choe & Tae-Young Pak

Contributions

HC and TYP conceived the study. HC collated and analyzed the data. TYP reviewed the data analysis and interpreted results. All authors reviewed drafts and provided input into writing the article. TYP supervised the study. The authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tae-Young Pak.

Ethics declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate

This research received Institutional Review Board (IRB) exemption from the Bioethics Committee at the Sungkyunkwan University (no. 2023-02-050).

Consent for publication

Not applicable.

Competing interests

The authors have no competing interests to declare.

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Choe, H., Pak, TY. Food insecurity and unmet healthcare needs in South Korea. Int J Equity Health 22, 148 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-023-01937-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-023-01937-z

Keywords

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Food insecurity and unmet healthcare needs in South Korea - International Journal for Equity in Health

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Background Food insecurity is a significant risk factor for chronic and infectious diseases. It is also a barrier to accessing healthcare because food insecurity tends to co-occur with other socioeconomic disadvantages. The objective of this study is to examine whether food insecure individuals in South Korea can access desired level of healthcare when needed.

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Hunger in South Korea - The Borgen Project

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The South Korean government has launched various programs to help fight hunger in South Korea. It has a Food Safety Management System…

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Select a country

South Korea

Asia and Pacific | High income

2.5%

Prevalence of undernourishment

2.2%

Percentage of children stunted

0.7%

Percentage of children underweight

4.9%

Prevalence of Obesity

0.92

Human Development Index

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The Global Food Security Index (GFSI) is an annual assessment measuring food security through affordability, availability, quality and safety, and sustainability and adaptation metrics worldwide.

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【What is Japan?】Food self-sufficiency ratio in Japan

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【JICA Chair】How Japanese agriculture contributed to food security and rural life？（Full ver.)

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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

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Food security in North Korea is expected to deteriorate

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Food security crises, how should S. Korea prepare?