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The plot

The September 11 attacks were precipitated in large part because Osama bin Laden, the leader of the militant Islamic organization al-Qaeda, held naive beliefs about the United States in the run-up to the attacks. Abu Walid al-Masri, an Egyptian who was a bin Laden associate in Afghanistan in the 1980s and '90s, explained that, in the years prior to the attacks, bin Laden became increasingly convinced that America was weak. "He believed that the United States was much weaker than some of those around him thought," Masri remembered, and "as evidence he referred to what happened to the United States in Beirut when the bombing of the Marines base led them to flee from Lebanon," referring to the destruction of the marine barracks there in 1983 ( see 1983 Beirut barracks bombings), which killed 241 American servicemen. Bin Laden believed that the United States was a "paper tiger," a belief shaped not just by America's departure from Lebanon following the marine barracks bombing but also by the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia in 1993, following the deaths of 18 U.S. servicemen in Mogadishu, and the American pullout from Vietnam in the 1970s.

The key operational planner of the September 11 attacks was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often referred to simply as "KSM" in the later 9/11 Commission Report and in the media), who had spent his youth in Kuwait. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed became active in the Muslim Brotherhood, which he joined at age 16, and then went to the United States to attend college, receiving a degree from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in 1986. Afterward he traveled to Pakistan and then Afghanistan to wage jihad against the Soviet Union, which had launched an invasion against Afghanistan in 1979.

According to Yosri Fouda, a journalist at the Arabic-language cable television channel Al Jazeera who interviewed him in 2002, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed planned to blow up some dozen American planes in Asia during the mid-1990s, a plot (known as " Bojinka ") that failed, "but the dream of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed never faded. And I think by putting his hand in the hands of bin Laden, he realized that now he stood a chance of bringing about his long awaited dream."

In 1996 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed met bin Laden in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The 9-11 Commission (formally the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States), set up in 2002 by U.S. Pres. George W. Bush and the U.S. Congress to investigate the attacks of 2001, explained that it was then that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed "presented a proposal for an operation that would involve training pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the United States." Khalid Sheikh Mohammed dreamed up the tactical innovation of using hijacked planes to attack the United States, al-Qaeda provided the personnel, money, and logistical support to execute the operation, and bin Laden wove the attacks on New York and Washington into a larger strategic framework of attacking the "far enemy"-the United States-in order to bring about regime change across the Middle East.

The September 11 plot demonstrated that al-Qaeda was an organization of global reach. The plot played out across the globe with planning meetings in Malaysia, operatives taking flight lessons in the United States, coordination by plot leaders based in Hamburg, Germany, money transfers from Dubai, and recruitment of suicide operatives from countries around the Middle East-all activities that were ultimately overseen by al-Qaeda's leaders in Afghanistan.

Key parts of the September 11 plot took shape in Hamburg. Four of the key pilots and planners in the "Hamburg cell" who would take operational control of the September 11 attacks, including the lead hijacker Mohammed Atta, had a chance meeting on a train in Germany in 1999 with an Islamist militant who struck up a conversation with them about fighting jihad in the Russian republic of Chechnya. The militant put the Hamburg cell in touch with an al-Qaeda operative living in Germany who explained that it was difficult to get to Chechnya at that time, because many travelers were being detained in Georgia. He recommended they go to Afghanistan instead.

Although Afghanistan was critical to the rise of al-Qaeda, it was the experience that some of the plotters acquired in the West that made them simultaneously more zealous and better equipped to carry out the attacks. Three of the four plotters who would pilot the hijacked planes on September 11 and one of the key planners, Ramzi Binalshibh, became more radical while living in Hamburg. Some combination of perceived or real discrimination, alienation, and homesickness seems to have turned them all in a more militant direction. Increasingly cutting themselves off from the outside world, they gradually radicalized each other, and eventually the friends decided to wage battle in bin Laden's global jihad, setting off for Afghanistan in 1999 in search of al-Qaeda.

Atta and the other members of the Hamburg group arrived in Afghanistan in 1999 right at the moment that the September 11 plot was beginning to take shape. Bin Laden and his military commander Muhammad Atef realized that Atta and his fellow Western-educated jihadists were far better suited to lead the attacks on Washington and New York than the men they had already recruited, leading bin Laden to appoint Atta to head the operation.

The hijackers, most of whom were from Saudi Arabia, established themselves in the United States, many well in advance of the attacks. They traveled in small groups, and some of them received commercial flight training.

Throughout his stay in the United States, Atta kept Binalshibh updated on the plot's progress via e-mail. To cloak his activities, Atta wrote the messages as if he were writing to his girlfriend "Jenny," using innocuous code to inform Binalshibh that they were almost complete in their training and readiness for the attacks. Atta wrote in one message, "The first semester commences in three weeks...Nineteen certificates for private education and four exams." The referenced 19 "certificates" were code that identified the 19 al-Qaeda hijackers, while the four "exams" identified the targets of the attacks.

In the early morning of August 29, 2001, Atta called Binalshibh and said he had a riddle that he was trying to solve: "Two sticks, a dash and a cake with a stick down-what is it?" After considering the question, Binalshibh realized that Atta was telling him that the attacks would occur in two weeks-the two sticks being the number 11 and the cake with a stick down a 9. Putting it together, it meant that the attacks would occur on 11-9, or 11 September (in most countries the day precedes the month in numeric dates, but in the United States the month precedes the day; hence, it was 9-11 in the United States). On September 5 Binalshibh left Germany for Pakistan. Once there he sent a messenger to Afghanistan to inform bin Laden about both the day of the attack and its scope.

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September 11 attacks | History, Summary, Location, Timeline, Casualties, & Facts

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September 11 attacks, series of airline hijackings and suicide attacks committed in 2001 by 19 militants associated with Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda against targets in the United States, the deadliest terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in U.S. history. Over 3,000 people died in the attacks and rescue efforts.

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Beirut port explosions

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United Airlines Flight 585 was a scheduled passenger flight on March 3, 1991, from Denver to Colorado Springs, Colorado, carrying 20 passengers and 5 crew members on board. The plane experienced a rudder hardover while on final approach to runway 35 at Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, causing the plane to roll over and enter an uncontrolled dive. All 25 people on board were killed.

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United Airlines Flight 585 was a scheduled passenger flight on March 3, 1991, from Denver to Colorado Springs, Colorado, carrying 20 passengers and 5 crew members on board. The plane experienced a rudder hardover while on final approach to runway 35 at Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, causing the plane to roll over and enter an uncontrolled dive. All 25 people on board were killed.

The NTSB was initially unable to resolve the cause of the crash, but after similar accidents and incidents involving Boeing 737 aircraft, the crash was determined to be caused by a defect in the design of the 737's rudder power control unit.

Flight 585 was operated by a Boeing 737-291, registered N999UA. The 737 was originally manufactured for the original incarnation of Frontier Airlines in 1982 and was acquired by United Airlines in 1986 when the former went out of business (a new airline company with the same name formed eight years later). On the date of the accident, the aircraft had accumulated approximately 26,000 flight hours.

The captain of the flight was Harold Green, age 52. He had over 10,000 hours as a United Airlines pilot (including 1,732 hours on the Boeing 737), was regarded by colleagues as a conservative pilot who always followed standard operating procedures. The first officer was Patricia Eidson, age 42. She had accumulated over 4,000 flight hours (including 1,077 hours on the Boeing 737), and she was considered by the captain to be a very competent pilot.

On February 25, 1991, the aircraft was flying at 10,000 feet (3,000 m) when the rudder abruptly deflected 10 degrees to the right. The crew on board reduced power and the aircraft returned to normal flight. A similar event occurred two days later. Four days later, the aircraft crashed.

Flight 585 was a regularly scheduled flight, originating at General Wayne A. Downing Peoria International Airport in Peoria, Illinois to Colorado Springs, Colorado, making intermediate stops at Quad City International Airport in Moline, Illinois, with an intended final stop at the now-decommissioned Stapleton International Airport in Denver, Colorado, at 09:46 Mountain Standard Time (16:46 UTC). On March 3, 1991, the flight operated from Peoria to Denver without incident.

At 09:23 (16:23 UTC), Flight 585 departed Denver with 20 passengers and 5 crew members on board. At 09:30:37 (16:30:37 UTC), the aircraft received Automatic terminal information service "Lima", that was about 40 minutes old, stating "Wind three one zero at one three gust three five; low level wind shear advisories are in effect, local aviation wind warning in effect calling for winds out of the northwest gust to 40 knots (74 km/h; 46 mph) and above." The flight crew added 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph) to their target landing airspeed based on this information.

At 09:32:35, First Officer Eidson reported to Colorado Springs Approach Control that their altitude was 11,000 feet (3,400 m). Colorado Springs Approach then cleared the flight for a visual approach to runway 35 and instructed the flight to contact Colorado Springs Tower.

At 09:37:59 (16:37:59 UTC) Colorado Springs Tower cleared Flight 585 to land on runway 35, notifying the flight that wind was 320 degrees at 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph) with gusts to 29 knots (54 km/h; 33 mph). At this moment, the aircraft was at 8,000 feet (2,400 m). First Officer Eidson inquired about reports from other aircraft about airspeed changes, and at 09:38:29 (16:38:29 UTC) the tower replied that another 737 had reported a 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph) loss at 500 feet (150 m), a 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph) gain at 400 feet (120 m), and a 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph) gain at 150 feet (46 m), at approximately 09:20 (16:20 UTC), 17 minutes prior. Eidson replied, "Sounds adventurous... United five eighty-five, thank you."

At 09:40:07 (16:40:07 UTC), Flight 585 was informed of traffic, a Cessna at their eleven o'clock, 5 miles (8.0 km) northwest bound, landing at runway 30. The crew was unable to locate the traffic, but 37 seconds after it was reported, the tower informed the flight that the traffic was now behind them. This Cessna was located about 4 miles (6.4 km) northeast of the accident when it occurred, and he had also reported slight, occasional, moderate chop at 7,000 feet (2,100 m). The Cessna pilot had also noted indicated airspeed fluctuations between 65 knots (120 km/h; 75 mph) and 105 knots (194 km/h; 121 mph) with vertical speed indications of approximately 500 feet (150 m) per minute.

At 09:41:23 (16:41:23 UTC), air traffic control directed Flight 585 to hold short of runway 30 for departing traffic. Eidson replied "We'll hold short of three-zero, United five eighty five." This was the last transmission received from the flight.

In the final minute of the flight, normal acceleration varied between 0.6-1.3g, with an airspeed of 155 knots (287 km/h; 178 mph) with 2 to 10 knot excursions.

At 09:42 (16:42 UTC), about 20 seconds prior to the crash, the aircraft entered into a controlled 20-degree bank and turn for alignment with the runway. Four seconds later, First Officer Eidson informed Captain Green that they were at 1,000 feet (300 m).

Within the next four seconds, at 09:43:33 (16:43:33 UTC), the aircraft suddenly rolled to the right, heading rate increasing to about 5-degrees per second as a result, nearly twice that of a standard rate turn, and pitched nose down. First Officer Eidson stated "Oh God, [flip]!", and in the same moment Captain Green called for 15-degrees of flaps while increasing thrust, in an attempt to initiate a go-around. The altitude decreased rapidly and acceleration increased to over 4G until, at 09:43:41 (16:43:41 UTC), the aircraft crashed at an 80-degree nose-down angle, yawed 4-degrees to the right, into Widefield Park, less than four miles (6 km) from the runway threshold, at a speed of 245 miles per hour (215 kn; 395 km/h). The aircraft was destroyed on impact and by the post-crash fire. According to the accident report, the crash carved a crater 39 by 24 feet (12 m × 7.3 m) and 15 ft (5 m) deep. Segments of the 737 were buried deep within this crater, requiring excavation. Everyone on board was killed instantly. The aircraft narrowly missed a row of apartments, and a little girl standing in the doorway of one of these apartments was knocked backwards by the force of the explosion, hitting her head, but she was released from a local hospital with no further issues after treatment.

Nationality

Passengers

Crew

Total

United States

16[6]

5[6]

21

Total

20

5

25

Initial investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) commenced an investigation, which lasted for 21 months.

Although the flight data recorder (FDR) outer protective case was damaged, the data tape inside was intact and all of the data were recoverable. Five parameters were recorded by the FDR: heading, altitude, airspeed, normal acceleration ( G loads), and microphone keying. The FDR did not record rudder, aileron or spoiler deflection data, which could have aided the NTSB in reconstructing the plane's final moments. The data available proved insufficient to establish why the plane suddenly went into the fatal dive. The NTSB considered the possibilities of a malfunction of the rudder power control unit servo (which might have caused the rudder to reverse) and the effect that powerful rotor winds from the nearby Rocky Mountains may have had, but there was not enough evidence to prove either hypothesis.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was also damaged, but the data tape inside was also intact. However, the data tape had creases in it, resulting in the playback quality being poor. The CVR determined that the pilots made a verbal (and possible physical) response to the loss of control.

The following is an excerpt of the last two minutes Flight 585 CVR, starting two minutes before impact (the full CVR recording started before Flight 585 took off from Stapleton):

Transcript of the last two minutes of United Airlines Flight 585's Cockpit Voice Recorder (Times are expressed in MST)

# = Expletive deleted; * = Unintelligible word; () = Questionable text; [] = Commentary; - = Break in continuity; Shading = Radio communication

09:41:23

Colorado Springs

tower control

United five eighty-five, after landing hold short of runway three zero for departing traffic on runway... three zero.

09:41:25

[Sound similar to that of an engine power increase]

09:42:05

[Sound of "CO" ident on radio channel two]

09:43:03

[Sound similar to that of flap lever actuation]

09:43:09

[Sound similar to that of an engine power reduction]

09:43:35.5

[Click sound similar to that of a flap lever actuation]

09:43:36.1

[Click sound similar to that of a flap lever actuation]

09:43:37.4

[Click sound similar to that of a flap lever actuation]

09:43:41.5

[Sound of impact - end of tape]

Thus, the first NTSB report (issued on December 8, 1992) did not conclude with the usual "probable cause". Instead, it stated:

The National Transportation Safety Board, after an exhaustive investigation effort, could not identify conclusive evidence to explain the loss of United Airlines Flight 585.

Intervening events

Following the failure to identify the cause of Flight 585's crash, another Boeing 737 crash occurred under very similar circumstances when USAir Flight 427 crashed while attempting to land in Pennsylvania in 1994.

Renewed investigation and probable cause

The NTSB reopened its investigation into Flight 585 in parallel with the USAir Flight 427 investigation, due to the similar nature of the circumstances.

During the NTSB's renewed investigation, it was determined that the crash of Flight 585 (and the later Flight 427 crash) was the result of a sudden malfunction of the aircraft's rudder power control unit. Another incident (non-fatal) that contributed to the conclusion was that of Eastwind Airlines Flight 517, which had a similar problem upon approach to Richmond on June 9, 1996. On March 27, 2001, the NTSB issued a revised final report for Flight 585, which found that the pilots lost control of the airplane because of a mechanical malfunction. The renewed investigation concluded with a "probable cause" that stated:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the United Airlines flight 585 accident was a loss of control of the airplane resulting from the movement of the rudder surface to its blowdown limit. The rudder surface most likely deflected in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots as a result of a jam of the main rudder power control unit servo valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide.

A memorial garden honoring the victims is located at Widefield Park. The garden consists of a gazebo and 25 trees planted in honor of the victims.

The Discovery Channel Canada / National Geographic TV series dramatized the crash of Flight 585 and the subsequent 737 rudder investigation in a 2007 episode titled Hidden Danger.

The crash is dramatized in the episode "Fatal Flaws" of Why Planes Crash.

1. ^ Aircraft Accident Report: Uncontrolled Descent and Collision With Terrain, United Airlines Flight 585, Boeing 737-200, N999UA, 4 Miles South of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, Colorado Springs, Colorado, March 3, 1991 (PDF). National Transportation Safety Board. March 27, 2001. NTSB/AAR-01/01. Archived (PDF) from the original on October 2, 2015.

2. ^ Aircraft Accident Report: United Airlines Flight 585, Boeing 737-291, N999UA, Uncontrolled Collision With Terrain for Undetermined Reasons, 4 Miles South of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, Colorado Springs, Colorado, March 3, 1991 (PDF). National Transportation Safety Board. December 8, 1992. NTSB/AAR-92/06. Archived (PDF) from the original on March 3, 2016.

3. ^ Kaye, Ken; Staff, Writer (February 28, 1993). "Mystery Crash". South Florida Sun-Sentinel. Archived from the original on June 29, 2021.

4. ^ Weeks, Paige (March 3, 2022). "Remembering United Airlines Flight 585 over three decades later". FOX 21 Local News.

5. ^ Aircraft Accident Report: Uncontrolled Descent and Collision With Terrain, USAir Flight 427, Boeing 737-300, N513AU, Near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, September 8, 1994 (PDF). National Transportation Safety Board. March 24, 1999. NTSB/AAR-99/01. Archived (PDF) from the original on October 14, 2012.

6. ^ Byrne, Gerry (2002). Flight 427: Anatomy of an Air Disaster. New York: Copernicus Books. pp. 207-210. ISBN 0-387-95256-X.

This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the National Transportation Safety Board.

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United Airlines Flight 585 was a scheduled passenger flight on March 3, 1991, from Denver to Colorado Springs, Colorado, carrying 20 passengers and 5 crew members on board. The plane experienced a rudder hardover while on final approach to runway 35 at Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, causing the plane to roll over and enter an uncontrolled dive.

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This flight was considered to be the worst plane crash in history this is because 2 planes crashed into each other on a runway during a foggy day killing 583 people

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Ironically, the very airplane crashes that give air travelers the most pause serve as the chief catalysts for increased safety, as most key improvements to flight protocols and equipment follow large-scale investigations into the most terrible disasters. The 1977 crash in Tenerife, the worst commercial aviation accident in history, was no exception. In this overview, learn about a handful of major crashes, beginning with Tenerife, that resulted in extensive inquiries and consequent changes. While safety experts caution that much still needs improvement-including reducing the more than 300 runway incursions that occur in the U.S. alone each year-these changes have made flying safer than ever.- Lexi Krock

KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736, March 27, 1977

This crash remains the deadliest ever, claiming the lives of 583 people when two 747s collided on a foggy runway on the island of Tenerife in the Canary Islands. It occurred after a series of miscommunications between the two flight crews and Air Traffic Control (see The Final Eight Minutes). The KLM plane initiated takeoff while the Pan Am plane, unseen in the fog, was taxiing midway down the same runway. As the KLM plane began to lift off the tarmac, the lower part of its fuselage struck the upper fuselage of the Pan Am plane, which was in the process of turning off the runway. After Tenerife, officials made sweeping changes to international airline regulations, requiring that all control towers and flight crews worldwide use standardized English phrases. Also, cockpit procedures were modified so that the hierarchy among crew members was deemphasized and decision-making by mutual agreement was the rule. Known in the industry as "crew resource management," this modus operandi is now standard worldwide.

Avianca Flight 52 | January 25, 1990

This Boeing 707 on service from Bogota, Colombia, crashed while approaching its destination at New York's JFK International Airport. Seventy-three of the 158 people aboard were killed. The accident occurred after the plane flew in a holding pattern for 77 minutes while awaiting landing clearance at JFK and ran out of fuel. The NTSB attributed the crash to the failure of the flight crew to manage the aircraft's fuel load and to communicate to ground controllers what had become an urgent fuel situation. The board also criticized the airline for failing to provide the crew with the latest wind shear information in New York, which could have helped the pilot anticipate landing delays there and plan for an alternative destination. The FAA subsequently mandated stricter flight planning and communication requirements for all foreign carriers operating in the U.S.

USAir Flight 427 | September 8, 1994

It took one of the longest air crash investigations in U.S. history to determine what happened (if not why) to cause this accident near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which killed all 132 people aboard. En route from Chicago, the Boeing 737 went down in a wooded area 10 miles north of its destination at Greater Pittsburgh International Airport just seconds after the captain declared an emergency. In its final report released five years after the crash, the NTSB concluded that the aircraft's rudder, a moveable control surface hinged to the tail fin, became jammed for still unknown reasons, forcing the plane into an almost vertical roll at about 3,600 feet. NTSB recommendations prompted Boeing to completely redesign the 737's rudder control system and revise the aircraft's flight manual to include a procedural checklist for pilots faced with rudder-control problems.

American Eagle Flight 4184 | October 31, 1994

Heavy air traffic and poor weather postponed the arrival of this flight at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, where it was to have landed en route from Indianapolis, Indiana. The ATR-72, a twin-engine turboprop carrying 68 people, entered a holding pattern 65 miles southeast of O'Hare, which it maintained for over an hour in freezing rain. As the plane circled, a ridge of ice formed on the upper surface of its wings, eventually causing the aircraft's autopilot to suddenly disconnect and the pilots to lose control. The ATR disintegrated on impact with a field below, killing everyone aboard. Following an NTSB investigation, the FAA required that all ATR aircraft be fitted with expanded de-icing equipment. It also issued 18 "airworthiness directives" for all pilots operating small commuter aircraft, instructing them on how to recognize and respond to dangerous icing conditions.

American Airlines Flight 965 | December 20, 1995

Just 40 miles from its destination in Cali, Colombia, this nighttime flight from Miami, Florida, careened into the crest of an Andean mountain at about 8,900 feet, killing all but four of the 163 people aboard. Investigators identified a series of operational errors committed by the flight's two pilots. Their primary mistake was failure to correctly input heading instructions into an automated Flight Management System, which brought the airplane into an unfamiliar and dangerous landing approach. Furthermore, the inquiry found the 757's Ground Proximity Warning System to be inadequate. The investigation report introduced the issue of pilots' potential overreliance on automated flight systems and motivated the NTSB to make sweeping recommendations to address this problem. As a result, the FAA ordered most American-registered passenger aircraft to use an Early Ground Proximity Warning System to add redundancy in this area. It also ordered standardization of the input codes for electronic navigational systems worldwide.

ValuJet Airlines Flight 592 | May 11, 1996

This tragedy, which caused the deaths of all 110 people aboard, led to significant aviation policy changes, a 24-count criminal indictment against the airline's maintenance contractors, and, ultimately, the downfall of the carrier. The crash occurred in the swampy Florida Everglades shortly after the DC-9 took off from Miami International Airport en route to Atlanta. An uncontrolled fire broke out in the cargo hold and disabled the plane's electrical system. NTSB investigators determined that volatile oxygen-generating canisters incorrectly labeled as empty and illegally stowed by maintenance technicians in the jet's cargo hold exploded, unleashing an inferno. After ValuJet 592, all planes would be retrofitted with smoke detectors and fire-suppression equipment in cargo holds. Furthermore, the FAA enacted stricter rules regarding the transportation of hazardous materials by air and banned chemical oxygen canisters. Finally, it initiated a formal review of its own procedures for overseeing airlines' maintenance contractors.

TWA Flight 800 | July 17, 1996

Flight 800, a Boeing 747 flying to Paris from New York's JFK International Airport, plunged into the ocean off Long Island, New York, after a catastrophic break-up shortly after take-off. None of the 230 people aboard survived. With the Summer Olympics set to begin in Atlanta in two days, speculation of a terrorist bombing immediately arose. But after one of the most intricate inquiries in aviation history, which included the first full-scale re-creation of a downed aircraft from its debris, NTSB investigators ruled out terrorism. They focused instead on the aircraft's near-empty center fuel tank, where, they determined, an explosion of still unknown origin brought the plane down. The NTSB's recommendations focused on the flammability of the 747's fuel tank, including its potential ignition sources, design, and certification standards, and on the maintenance and aging of the aircraft's other systems, particularly wiring and fittings that could spark or overheat. Within two years of the crash, new fuel-management procedures were required for all 747s.

Swissair Flight 111 | September 2, 1998

This flight on an MD-11 plummeted into the sea off Nova Scotia, Canada, while traveling from New York to Geneva at night (see NOVA's Crash of Flight 111 Web site). All 229 people on board were killed. The crash occurred after the pilot radioed that there was smoke in the cockpit and requested an emergency landing. As he dumped the aircraft's fuel, vectored for a runway at Halifax's airport, and reported an escalation of the emergency, Flight 111 disappeared from radar. After a four-and-a-half-year investigation, which revealed evidence of an in-flight fire above the cockpit caused by faulty wiring and fueled by flammable airframe insulation, Canada's Transportation Safety Board published its final recommendations. These included toughening flammability standards for all materials used in airplanes and more stringent testing and certification of electrical wires. The FAA ultimately issued an order requiring the replacement of insulation in 700 commercial jetliners in the U.S., including every MD-11 in service. At least 500 other MD-11s worldwide were also modified. (For more on the investigation and its aftermath, see Dissection of a Disaster. See also Update on FAA Regulations.)

Alaska Airlines Flight 261 | January 31, 2000

All 88 people aboard perished when this MD-83 aircraft nose-dived with devastating force into the Pacific Ocean off southern California. Flight 261 had left Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, and was en route to San Francisco when it ran into trouble. At 28,000 feet, the crew reported problems with the plane's stabilizer trim (small flaps on the horizontal portion of its tail) and were unable to control the pitch of the aircraft. Moments later, they began an uncontrolled descent. In its investigation, the NTSB found that too little grease on the jet's jackscrew, a tail component that helps move the plane's stabilizer, had promoted excessive wear on its threads. Their report blamed Alaska Airlines for shoddy maintenance standards and the FAA for approval of these standards, which increased the likelihood of inadequate greasing. Changes have since been made to Alaska Airlines' maintenance procedures and the FAA's oversight apparatus, but federal prosecutors eventually opened a criminal probe into the crash.

American Airlines Flight 587 | November 12, 2001

Just two months after the four airplane disasters of September 11, 2001, an Airbus A-300 taking off from New York's JFK International Airport for Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, crashed into a neighborhood in Belle Harbor, Queens, immediately raising fears of another terrorist attack. Five people on the ground and all 260 people aboard the plane were killed. The NTSB ruled out terrorism, focusing instead on the plane's vertical tail stabilizer and rudder, which snapped off as the plane fell from the sky. Several months after the accident, the NTSB issued two safety recommendations involving the A-300's vertical stabilizer and rudder, pointing out that some maneuvers can lead to structural failure. As a result of the warnings, Airbus is addressing these issues and American Airlines has implemented regular inspections of the tail sections on all its A-300s.

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Beginning with the tragic crash at Tenerife in 1977, examine several major airline crashes from the last three decades and learn how their investigations led to new key aviation safety improvements.

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https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/09/health/east-palestine-derailment-home-screening/index.html

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People in East Palestine were told their homes were clear of toxins last year. That might not have been the case | CNN

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When government officials lifted an evacuation order for people who lived near the site of a train derailment and toxic spill in East Palestine, Ohio, last year, many homes held on to an odd odor.

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The Chernobyl disaster began on 26 April 1986 with the explosion of the No. 4 reactor of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, near the city of Pripyat in the north of the Ukrainian SSR, close to the border with the Byelorussian SSR, in the Soviet Union. It is one of only two nuclear energy accidents rated at seven-the maximum severity-on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the other being the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. The initial emergency response and subsequent mitigation efforts involved more than 500,000 personnel and cost an estimated 18billion roubles -roughly US$68billion in 2019, adjusted for inflation. It is considered the worst nuclear disaster in history.

The accident occurred during a test of the steam turbine's ability to power the emergency feedwater pumps in the event of a simultaneous loss of external power and coolant pipe rupture. Following an accidental drop in reactor power to near-zero, the operators restarted the reactor in preparation for the turbine test with a prohibited control rod configuration. Upon successful completion of the test, the reactor was then shut down for maintenance. Due to a variety of factors, this action resulted in a power surge at the base of the reactor which brought about the rupture of reactor components and the loss of coolant. This process led to steam explosions and a meltdown, which destroyed the containment building. This was followed by a reactor core fire which lasted until 4 May 1986, during which airborne radioactive contaminants were spread throughout the USSR and Europe. In response to the initial accident, a 10-kilometre (6.2 mi) radius exclusion zone was created 36 hours after the accident, from which approximately 49,000 people were evacuated, primarily from Pripyat. The exclusion zone was later increased to a radius of 30 kilometres (19 mi), from which an additional ~68,000 people were evacuated.

Following the reactor explosion, which killed two engineers and severely burned two more, an emergency operation to put out the fires and stabilize the surviving reactor began, during which 237 workers were hospitalized, of which 134 exhibited symptoms of acute radiation syndrome (ARS). Among those hospitalized, 28 died within the following three months. In the following 10 years, 14 more workers (9 of whom had been hospitalized with ARS) died of various causes mostly unrelated to radiation exposure. 15 childhood thyroid cancer deaths were attributed to the disaster as of 2011. A United Nations committee found that to date fewer than 100 deaths have resulted from the fallout. Model predictions of the eventual total death toll in the coming decades vary. The most widely cited study conducted by the World Health Organization in 2006 predicted 9,000 cancer-related fatalities in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.

Background

Reactor cooling after shutdown

Reactor decay heat shown as % of thermal power from time of sustained fission shutdown using two different correlations. Due to decay heat, solid fuel power reactors need high flows of coolant after a fission shutdown for a considerable time to prevent fuel cladding damage, or in the worst case, a full core meltdown.

In power-generating operation, most of the heat generated in a nuclear reactor by its fuel rods is derived from nuclear fission, but a significant fraction (over 6%) is derived from the radioactive decay of the accumulated fission products, a process known as decay heat. This decay heat continues for some time after the fission chain reaction has been stopped, such as following a reactor shutdown, either emergency or planned, and continued pumped circulation of coolant is essential to prevent core overheating, or in the worst case, core meltdown. RBMK reactors, like those at Chernobyl, use water as a coolant, circulated by electrically driven pumps. The coolant flow rate is considerable - Reactor No. 4 had 1661 individual fuel channels, each requiring a coolant flow of 28 m ³/h (990 cu ft/h) at full reactor power, for a total of over 45 million litres per hour (12 million gallons per hour) for the entire reactor.

In case of a total power loss at the station, each of Chernobyl's reactors had three backup diesel generators, but they took 60-75 seconds to attain full load and generate the 5.5‑ megawatt output required to run one main pump. In the interim, special counterweights on each pump would enable them to provide coolant via inertia, thereby bridging the gap to generator startup. However, a potential safety risk existed in the event that a station blackout occurred simultaneously with the rupture of a 600-millimetre (24 in) coolant pipe (the so-called Design Basis Accident). In this scenario the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) needed to pump additional water into the core, replacing coolant lost to evaporation.

It had been theorized that the rotational momentum of the reactor's steam turbine could be used to generate the required electrical power to operate the ECCS via the feedwater pumps. The turbine's speed would run down as energy was taken from it, but analysis indicated that there might be sufficient energy to provide electrical power to run the coolant pumps for 45 seconds. This would not quite bridge the gap between an external power failure and the full availability of the emergency generators, but would alleviate the situation.

Safety test

The turbine run-down energy capability still needed to be confirmed experimentally, and previous tests had ended unsuccessfully. An initial test carried out in 1982 indicated that the excitation voltage of the turbine-generator was insufficient; it did not maintain the desired magnetic field after the turbine trip. The electrical system was modified, and the test was repeated in 1984 but again proved unsuccessful. In 1985, the test was conducted a third time but also yielded no results due to a problem with the recording equipment. The test procedure was to be run again in 1986 and was scheduled to take place during a controlled power-down of reactor No. 4, which was preparatory to a planned maintenance outage.

A test procedure had been written, but the authors were not aware of the unusual RBMK-1000 reactor behaviour under the planned operating conditions. It was regarded as purely an electrical test of the generator, not a complex unit test, even though it involved critical unit systems. According to the regulations in place at the time, such a test did not require approval by either the chief design authority for the reactor (NIKIET) or the Soviet nuclear safety regulator. The test program called for disabling the emergency core cooling system, a passive/active system of core cooling intended to provide water to the core in a loss-of-coolant accident, and approval from the Chernobyl site chief engineer had been obtained according to regulations.

The test procedure was intended to run as follows:

Test preparation

1. The test would take place prior to a scheduled reactor shutdown

2. The reactor thermal power was to be reduced to between 700 MW and 1,000 MW (to allow for adequate cooling, as the turbine would be spun at operating speed whilst disconnected from the power grid)

3. The steam-turbine generator was to be run at normal operating speed

4. Four out of eight main circulating pumps were to be supplied with off-site power, while the other four would be powered by the turbine

Electrical test

1. When the correct conditions were achieved, the steam supply to the turbine generator would be closed off, and the reactor would be shut down

2. The voltage provided by the coasting turbine would be measured, along with the voltage and RPMs of the four main circulating pumps being powered by the turbine

3. When the emergency generators supplied full electrical power, the turbine generator would be allowed to continue free-wheeling down

Test delay and shift change

The test was to be conducted during the day-shift of 25 April 1986 as part of a scheduled reactor shut down. The day shift crew had been instructed in advance on the reactor operating conditions to run the test, and, in addition, a special team of electrical engineers was present to conduct the one-minute test of the new voltage regulating system once the correct conditions had been reached. As planned, a gradual reduction in the output of the power unit began at 01:06 on 25 April, and the power level had reached 50% of its nominal 3,200 MW thermal level by the beginning of the day shift.

The day shift performed many unrelated maintenance tasks, and was scheduled to perform the test at 14:15. Preparations for the test were carried out, including the disabling of the emergency core cooling system. Meanwhile, another regional power station unexpectedly went offline. At 14:00, the Kiev electrical grid controller requested that the further reduction of Chernobyl's output be postponed, as power was needed to satisfy the peak evening demand, so the test was postponed.

Soon, the day shift was replaced by the evening shift. Despite the delay, the emergency core cooling system was left disabled. This system had to be disconnected via a manual isolating slide valve, which in practice meant that two or three people spent the whole shift manually turning sailboat-helm-sized valve wheels. The system would have no influence on the events that unfolded next, but allowing the reactor to run for 11 hours outside of the test without emergency protection was indicative of a general lack of safety culture.

The night shift had very limited time to prepare for and carry out the experiment. Anatoly Dyatlov, deputy chief-engineer of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, was present to supervise and direct the test. He was one of the test's chief authors and he was the highest-ranking individual present. Unit Shift Supervisor Aleksandr Akimov was in charge of the Unit 4 night shift, and Leonid Toptunov was the Senior Reactor Control Engineer responsible for the reactor's operational regimen, including the movement of the control rods. 25-year-old Toptunov had worked independently as a senior engineer for approximately three months.

Unexpected drop of the reactor power

The test plan called for a gradual decrease in reactor power to a thermal level of 700-1000 MW, and an output of 720 MW was reached at 00:05 on 26 April. However, due to the reactor's production of a fission byproduct, xenon-135, which is a reaction-inhibiting neutron absorber, power continued to decrease in the absence of further operator action, a process known as reactor poisoning. In steady-state operation, this is avoided because xenon-135 is "burned off" as quickly as it is created from decaying iodine-135 by the absorption of neutrons from the ongoing chain reaction, becoming highly stable xenon-136. With the reactor power reduced, high quantities of previously produced iodine-135 were decaying into the neutron-absorbing xenon-135 faster than the reduced neutron flux could "burn it off". Xenon poisoning in this context made reactor control more difficult, but was a predictable and well-understood phenomenon during such a power reduction.

When the reactor power had decreased to approximately 500 MW, the reactor power control was switched from LAR (Local Automatic Regulator) to the Automatic Regulators, in order to manually maintain the required power level. AR-1 then activated, removing all four of AR-1's control rods automatically, but AR-2 failed to activate due to an imbalance in its ionization chambers. In response, Toptunov reduced power to stabilize the Automatic Regulators' ionization sensors. The result was a sudden power drop to an unintended near- shutdown state, with a power output of 30 MW thermal or less. The exact circumstances that caused the power drop are unknown. Most reports attribute the power drop to Toptunov's error, but Dyatlov reported that it was due to a fault in the AR-2 system.

The reactor was now producing only 5% of the minimum initial power level prescribed for the test. This low reactivity inhibited the burn-off of xenon-135 within the reactor core and hindered the rise of reactor power. To increase power, control-room personnel removed numerous control rods from the reactor. Several minutes elapsed before the reactor was restored to 160 MW at 00:39, at which point most control rods were at their upper limits, but the rod configuration was still within its normal operating limit, with Operational Reactivity Margin (ORM) equivalent to having more than 15 rods inserted. Over the next twenty minutes, reactor power would be increased further to 200 MW.

The operation of the reactor at the low power level (and high poisoning level) was accompanied by unstable core temperatures and coolant flow, and, possibly, by instability of neutron flux. The control room received repeated emergency signals regarding the low levels in one half of the steam/water separator drums, with accompanying drum separator pressure warnings. In response, personnel triggered several rapid influxes of feedwater. Relief valves opened to relieve excess steam into a turbine condenser.

Reactor conditions priming the accident

The combined effect of these various actions was an extremely unstable reactor configuration. Nearly all of the 211 control rods had been extracted manually, and excessively high coolant flow rates through the core meant that the coolant was entering the reactor very close to the boiling point. Unlike other light-water reactor designs, the RBMK design at that time had a positive void coefficient of reactivity at low power levels. This meant that the formation of steam bubbles (voids) from boiling cooling water intensified the nuclear chain reaction owing to voids having lower neutron absorption than water. Unbeknownst to the operators, the void coefficient was not counterbalanced by other reactivity effects in the given operating regime, meaning that any increase in boiling would produce more steam voids which further intensified the chain reaction, leading to a positive feedback loop. Given this characteristic, reactor No. 4 was now at risk of a runaway increase in its core power with nothing to restrain it. The reactor was now very sensitive to the regenerative effect of steam voids on reactor power.

Test execution

Plan view of reactor No. 4 core. The number on each control rod indicates the insertion depth in centimeters one minute prior to the disaster.
neutron detectors (12)
control rods (167)
short control rods from below reactor (32)
automatic control rods (12)
pressure tubes with fuel rods (1661)

At 01:23:04, the test began. Four of the eight main circulating pumps (MCP) were to be powered by voltage from the coasting turbine, while the remaining four pumps received electrical power from the grid as normal. The steam to the turbines was shut off, beginning a run-down of the turbine generator. The diesel generators started and sequentially picked up loads; the generators were to have completely picked up the MCPs' power needs by 01:23:43. As the momentum of the turbine generator decreased, so did the power it produced for the pumps. The water flow rate decreased, leading to increased formation of steam voids in the coolant flowing up through the fuel pressure tubes.

Reactor shutdown and power excursion

At 01:23:40, as recorded by the SKALA centralized control system, a scram (emergency shutdown) of the reactor was initiated as the experiment was wrapping up. The scram was started when the AZ-5 button (also known as the EPS-5 button) of the reactor emergency protection system was pressed: this engaged the drive mechanism on all control rods to fully insert them, including the manual control rods that had been withdrawn earlier.

The personnel had already intended to shut down using the AZ-5 button in preparation for scheduled maintenance and the scram likely preceded the sharp increase in power. However, the precise reason why the button was pressed when it was is not certain, as only the deceased Akimov and Toptunov partook in that decision, though the atmosphere in the control room was calm at that moment. Meanwhile, the RBMK designers claim that the button had to have been pressed only after the reactor already began to self-destruct.

Steam plumes continued to be generated days after the initial explosion[37]

Consequently, injecting a control rod downward into the reactor in a scram initially displaced neutron-absorbing water in the lower portion of the reactor with neutron-moderating graphite. Thus, an emergency scram could initially increase the reaction rate in the lower part of the core. This behaviour was discovered when the initial insertion of control rods in another RBMK reactor at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in 1983 induced a power spike. Procedural countermeasures were not implemented in response to Ignalina. The IAEA investigative report INSAG-7 later stated, "Apparently, there was a widespread view that the conditions under which the positive scram effect would be important would never occur. However, they did appear in almost every detail in the course of the actions leading to the Chernobyl accident."

A few seconds into the scram, a power spike did occur, and the core overheated, causing some of the fuel rods to fracture. Some have speculated that this also blocked the control rod columns, jamming them at one-third insertion. Within three seconds the reactor output rose above 530 MW.

Instruments did not register the subsequent course of events; it was reconstructed through mathematical simulation. Per the simulation, the power spike would have caused an increase in fuel temperature and steam buildup, leading to a rapid increase in steam pressure. This caused the fuel cladding to fail, releasing the fuel elements into the coolant and rupturing the channels in which these elements were located.

Steam explosions

The reactor lid (upper biological shield)[39] nicknamed "Elena"[40] with torn off fuel channel piping is shown lying on its side where it came to rest in the explosion crater. The view transitions to showing the relative position of the paired steam tanks, reactor hall floor and roof trusses overlaid on the explosion crater. Source animation

As the scram continued, the reactor output jumped to around 30,000 MW thermal, 10 times its normal operational output, the indicated last reading on the power meter on the control panel. Some estimate the power spike may have gone 10 times higher than that. It was not possible to reconstruct the precise sequence of the processes that led to the destruction of the reactor and the power unit building, but a steam explosion-like the explosion of a steam boiler from excess vapour pressure-appears to have been the next event. There is a general understanding that it was explosive steam pressure from the damaged fuel channels escaping into the reactor's exterior cooling structure that caused the explosion that destroyed the reactor casing, tearing off and blasting the upper plate called the upper biological shield, to which the entire reactor assembly is fastened, through the roof of the reactor building. This is believed to be the first explosion that many heard.

This explosion ruptured further fuel channels, as well as severing most of the coolant lines feeding the reactor chamber, and as a result, the remaining coolant flashed to steam and escaped the reactor core. The total water loss combined with a high positive void coefficient further increased the reactor's thermal power.

A second, more powerful explosion occurred about two or three seconds after the first; this explosion dispersed the damaged core and effectively terminated the nuclear chain reaction. This explosion also compromised more of the reactor containment vessel and ejected hot lumps of graphite moderator. The ejected graphite and the demolished channels still in the remains of the reactor vessel caught fire on exposure to air, significantly contributing to the spread of radioactive fallout and the contamination of outlying areas. The explosion is estimated to have had the power equivalent of 225 tons of TNT.

After the larger explosion, several employees at the power station went outside to get a clearer view of the extent of the damage. One such survivor, Alexander Yuvchenko, recounts that once he stepped out and looked up towards the reactor hall, he saw a "very beautiful" laser-like beam of blue light caused by the ionized-air glow that appeared to be "flooding up into infinity".

Crisis management

Fire containment

Contrary to safety regulations, bitumen, a combustible material, had been used in the construction of the roof of the reactor building and the turbine hall. Ejected material ignited at least five fires on the roof of the adjacent reactor No. 3, which was still operating. It was imperative to put those fires out and protect the cooling systems of reactor No. 3. Inside reactor No. 3, the chief of the night shift, Yuri Bagdasarov, wanted to shut down the reactor immediately, but chief engineer Nikolai Fomin would not allow this. The operators were given respirators and potassium iodide tablets and told to continue working. At 05:00, Bagdasarov made his own decision to shut down the reactor, which was confirmed in writing by Dyatlov and Station Shift Supervisor Rogozhkin.

Shortly after the accident, firefighters arrived to try to extinguish the fires. First on the scene was a Chernobyl Power Station firefighter brigade under the command of Lieutenant Volodymyr Pravyk, who died on 11 May 1986 of acute radiation sickness. They were not told how dangerously radioactive the smoke and the debris were, and may not even have known that the accident was anything more than a regular electrical fire: "We didn't know it was the reactor. No one had told us." Grigorii Khmel, the driver of one of the fire engines, later described what happened:

We arrived there at 10 or 15 minutes to two in the morning ... We saw graphite scattered about. Misha asked: "Is that graphite?" I kicked it away. But one of the fighters on the other truck picked it up. "It's hot," he said. The pieces of graphite were of different sizes, some big, some small enough to pick them up [...] We didn't know much about radiation. Even those who worked there had no idea. There was no water left in the trucks. Misha filled a cistern and we aimed the water at the top. Then those boys who died went up to the roof-Vashchik, Kolya and others, and Volodya Pravik ... They went up the ladder ... and I never saw them again.

Anatoli Zakharov, a fireman stationed in Chernobyl since 1980, offered a different description in 2008: "I remember joking to the others, 'There must be an incredible amount of radiation here. We'll be lucky if we're all still alive in the morning.'" He also stated, "Of course we knew! If we'd followed regulations, we would never have gone near the reactor. But it was a moral obligation-our duty. We were like kamikaze."

It was thought by some that the core fire was extinguished by a combined effort of helicopters dropping more than 5,000 tonnes (11 million pounds) of sand, lead, clay, and neutron-absorbing boron onto the burning reactor. It is now known that virtually none of these materials reached the core. Historians estimate that about 600 Soviet pilots risked dangerous levels of radiation to fly the thousands of flights needed to cover reactor No. 4 in this attempt to seal off radiation.

From eyewitness accounts of the firefighters involved before they died (as reported on the CBC television series ), one described his experience of the radiation as "tasting like metal", and feeling a sensation similar to that of pins and needles all over his face. This is consistent with the description given by Louis Slotin, a Manhattan Project physicist who died days after a fatal radiation overdose from a criticality accident.

The explosion and fire threw hot particles of the nuclear fuel and also far more dangerous fission products (radioactive isotopes such as caesium-137, iodine-131, strontium-90, and other radionuclides) into the air. The residents of the surrounding area observed the radioactive cloud on the night of the explosion.

Radiation levels

The ionizing radiation levels in the worst-hit areas of the reactor building have been estimated to be 5.6 roentgens per second (R/s), equivalent to more than 20,000 roentgens per hour. A lethal dose is around 500 roentgens (~5 Gray (Gy) in modern radiation units) over five hours, so in some areas, unprotected workers received fatal doses in less than a minute. Unfortunately, a dosimeter capable of measuring up to 1,000 R/s was buried in the rubble of a collapsed part of the building, and another one failed when turned on. Most remaining dosimeters had limits of 0.001 R/s and therefore read "off scale". Thus, the reactor crew could ascertain only that the radiation levels were somewhere above 0.001 R/s (3.6 R/h), while the true levels were much higher in some areas.

Because of the inaccurate low readings, the reactor crew chief Aleksandr Akimov assumed that the reactor was intact. The evidence of pieces of graphite and reactor fuel lying around the building was ignored, and the readings of another dosimeter brought in by 04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that the new dosimeter must have been defective. Akimov stayed with his crew in the reactor building until morning, sending members of his crew to try to pump water into the reactor. None of them wore any protective gear. Most, including Akimov, died from radiation exposure within three weeks.

Evacuation

The nearby city of Pripyat was not immediately evacuated. The townspeople, in the early hours of the morning, at 01:23 local time, went about their usual business, completely oblivious to what had just happened. However, within a few hours of the explosion, dozens of people fell ill. Later, they reported severe headaches and metallic tastes in their mouths, along with uncontrollable fits of coughing and vomiting. As the plant was run by authorities in Moscow, the government of Ukraine did not receive prompt information on the accident.

Shevchenko then spoke over the phone to Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, general secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and de facto head of state, who said he anticipated a delegation of the state commission headed by Boris Shcherbina, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

A commission was established later in the day to investigate the accident. It was headed by Valery Legasov, First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, and included leading nuclear specialist Evgeny Velikhov, hydro-meteorologist Yuri Izrael, radiologist Leonid Ilyin, and others. They flew to Boryspil International Airport and arrived at the power plant in the evening of 26 April. By that time two people had already died and 52 were hospitalized. The delegation soon had ample evidence that the reactor was destroyed and extremely high levels of radiation had caused a number of cases of radiation exposure. In the early daylight hours of 27 April, approximately 36 hours after the initial blast, they ordered the evacuation of Pripyat. Initially it was decided to evacuate the population for three days; later this was made permanent.

By 11:00 on 27 April, buses had arrived in Pripyat to start the evacuation. The evacuation began at 14:00. A translated excerpt of the evacuation announcement follows:

For the attention of the residents of Pripyat! The City Council informs you that due to the accident at Chernobyl Power Station in the city of Pripyat the radioactive conditions in the vicinity are deteriorating. The Communist Party, its officials and the armed forces are taking necessary steps to combat this. Nevertheless, with the view to keep people as safe and healthy as possible, the children being top priority, we need to temporarily evacuate the citizens in the nearest towns of Kiev region. For these reasons, starting from 27 April 1986, 14:00 each apartment block will be able to have a bus at its disposal, supervised by the police and the city officials. It is highly advisable to take your documents, some vital personal belongings and a certain amount of food, just in case, with you. The senior executives of public and industrial facilities of the city has decided on the list of employees needed to stay in Pripyat to maintain these facilities in a good working order. All the houses will be guarded by the police during the evacuation period. Comrades, leaving your residences temporarily please make sure you have turned off the lights, electrical equipment and water and shut the windows. Please keep calm and orderly in the process of this short-term evacuation.

To expedite the evacuation, residents were told to bring only what was necessary, and that they would remain evacuated for approximately three days. As a result, most personal belongings were left behind, and residents were only allowed to recover certain items after months had passed. By 15:00, 53,000 people were evacuated to various villages of the Kiev region. The next day, talks began for evacuating people from the 10-kilometre (6.2 mi) zone. Ten days after the accident, the evacuation area was expanded to 30 kilometres (19 mi).: 115, 120-121  The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Exclusion Zone has remained ever since, although its shape has changed and its size has been expanded.

Official announcement

Evacuation began one and a half days before the accident was publicly acknowledged by the Soviet Union. In the morning of 28 April, radiation levels set off alarms at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden, over 1,000 kilometres (620 mi) from the Chernobyl Plant. Workers at Forsmark reported the case to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, which determined that the radiation had originated elsewhere. That day, the Swedish government contacted the Soviet government to inquire about whether there had been a nuclear accident in the Soviet Union. The Soviets initially denied it, and it was only after the Swedish government suggested they were about to file an official alert with the International Atomic Energy Agency, that the Soviet government admitted that an accident had taken place at Chernobyl.

At first, the Soviets only conceded that a minor accident had occurred, but once they began evacuating more than 100,000 people, the full scale of the situation was realized by the global community. At 21:02 the evening of 28 April, a 20-second announcement was read in the TV news programme : "There has been an accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. One of the nuclear reactors was damaged. The effects of the accident are being remedied. Assistance has been provided for any affected people. An investigative commission has been set up."

This was the entire announcement, and the first time the Soviet Union officially announced a nuclear accident. The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) then discussed the Three Mile Island accident and other American nuclear accidents, which Serge Schmemann of The New York Times wrote was an example of the common Soviet tactic of whataboutism. The mention of a commission also indicated to observers the seriousness of the incident, and subsequent state radio broadcasts were replaced with classical music, which was a common method of preparing the public for an announcement of a tragedy in the USSR.

Around the same time, ABC News released its report about the disaster. Shevchenko was the first of the Ukrainian state top officials to arrive at the disaster site early on 28 April. There she spoke with members of medical staff and people, who were calm and hopeful that they could soon return to their homes. Shevchenko returned home near midnight, stopping at a radiological checkpoint in Vilcha, one of the first that were set up soon after the accident.

There was a notification from Moscow that there was no reason to postpone the 1 May International Workers' Day celebrations in Kiev (including the annual parade), but on 30 April a meeting of the Political bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU took place to discuss the plan for the upcoming celebration. Scientists were reporting that the radiological background level in Kiev was normal. At the meeting, which was finished at 18:00, it was decided to shorten celebrations from the regular three and a half to four hours to under two hours.

Several buildings in Pripyat were officially kept open after the disaster to be used by workers still involved with the plant. These included the Jupiter factory (which closed in 1996) and the Azure Swimming Pool, used by the Chernobyl liquidators for recreation during the clean-up (which closed in 1998).

Core meltdown risk mitigation

Chernobyl lava-like corium, formed by fuel-containing mass, flowed into the basement of the plant.[69]

Bubbler pools

Two floors of bubbler pools beneath the reactor served as a large water reservoir for the emergency cooling pumps and as a pressure suppression system capable of condensing steam in case of a small broken steam pipe; the third floor above them, below the reactor, served as a steam tunnel. The steam released by a broken pipe was supposed to enter the steam tunnel and be led into the pools to bubble through a layer of water. After the disaster, the pools and the basement were flooded because of ruptured cooling water pipes and accumulated firefighting water.

The smoldering graphite, fuel and other material above, at more than 1,200 °C (2,190 °F), started to burn through the reactor floor and mixed with molten concrete from the reactor lining, creating corium, a radioactive semi-liquid material comparable to lava. It was feared that if this mixture melted through the floor into the pool of water, the resulting steam production would further contaminate the area or even cause a steam explosion, ejecting more radioactive material from the reactor. It became necessary to drain the pool. These fears ultimately proved unfounded, since corium began dripping harmlessly into the flooded bubbler pools before the water could be removed. The molten fuel hit the water and cooled into a light-brown ceramic pumice, whose low density allowed the substance to float on the water's surface.

Unaware of this fact, the government commission directed that the bubbler pools be drained by opening its sluice gates. The valves controlling it, however, were located in a flooded corridor in a subterranean annex adjacent to the reactor building. Volunteers in diving suits and respirators (for protection against radioactive aerosols), and equipped with dosimeters, entered the knee-deep radioactive water and managed to open the valves. These were the engineers Alexei Ananenko and Valeri Bezpalov (who knew where the valves were), accompanied by the shift supervisor Boris Baranov. All three men were awarded the Order For Courage by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in May 2018.

Foundation protection measures

The government commission was concerned that the molten core would burn into the earth and contaminate groundwater below the reactor. To reduce the likelihood of this, it was decided to freeze the earth beneath the reactor, which would also stabilize the foundations. Using oil well drilling equipment, the injection of liquid nitrogen began on 4 May. It was estimated that 25 tonnes (55 thousand pounds) of liquid nitrogen per day would be required to keep the soil frozen at −100 °C (−148 °F). This idea was quickly scrapped.

Bolshov's graphite cooling plate, alongside the prior nitrogen injection proposal, were not used following the drop in aerial temperatures and indicative reports that the fuel melt had stopped. It was later determined that the fuel had flowed three floors, with a few cubic meters coming to rest at ground level. The precautionary underground channel with its active cooling was therefore deemed redundant, as the fuel was self-cooling. The excavation was then simply filled with concrete to strengthen the foundation below the reactor.

Immediate site and area remediation

Debris removal

In the months after the explosion, attention turned to removing the radioactive debris from the roof. While the worst of the radioactive debris had remained inside what was left of the reactor, it was estimated that there was approximately 100 tons of debris on that roof which had to be removed to enable the safe construction of the "sarcophagus"-a concrete structure that would entomb the reactor and reduce radioactive dust being released into the atmosphere. The initial plan was to use robots to clear the debris off the roof. The Soviets used approximately 60 remote-controlled robots, most of them built in the Soviet Union itself. Many failed due to the difficult terrain, combined with the effect of high radiation fields on their batteries and electronic controls. In 1987, Valery Legasov, first deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, said: "We learned that robots are not the great remedy for everything. Where there was very high radiation, the robot ceased to be a robot-the electronics quit working."

Consequently, the most highly radioactive materials were shoveled by Chernobyl liquidators from the military wearing heavy protective gear (dubbed "bio-robots"). These soldiers could only spend a maximum of 40-90 seconds working on the rooftops of the surrounding buildings because of the extremely high doses of radiation given off by the blocks of graphite and other debris. Though the soldiers were only supposed to perform the role of the "bio-robot" a maximum of once, some soldiers reported having done this task five or six times. Only 10% of the debris cleared from the roof was performed by robots; the other 90% was removed by 3,828 men who absorbed, on average, an estimated dose of 25 rem (250 mSv) of radiation each.

Construction of the sarcophagus

With the extinguishing of the open air reactor fire, the next step was to prevent the spread of contamination. This could be due to wind action which could carry away loose contamination, and by birds which could land within the wreckage and then carry contamination elsewhere. In addition, rainwater could wash contamination away from the reactor area and into the sub-surface water table, where it could migrate outside the site area. Rainwater falling on the wreckage could also weaken the remaining reactor structure by accelerating corrosion of steelwork. A further challenge was to reduce the large amount of emitted gamma radiation, which was a hazard to the workforce operating the adjacent reactor No. 3.

The solution chosen was to enclose the wrecked reactor by the construction of a huge composite steel and concrete shelter, which became known as the "Sarcophagus". It had to be erected quickly and within the constraints of high levels of ambient gamma radiation. The design started on 20 May 1986, 24 days after the disaster, and construction was from June to late November. This major construction project was carried out under the very difficult circumstances of high levels of radiation both from the core remnants and the deposited radioactive contamination around it.

The construction workers had to be protected from radiation, and techniques such as crane drivers working from lead-lined control cabins were employed. The construction work included erecting walls around the perimeter, clearing and surface concreting the surrounding ground to remove sources of radiation and to allow access for large construction machinery, constructing a thick radiation shielding wall to protect the workers in reactor No. 3, fabricating a high-rise buttress to strengthen weak parts of the old structure, constructing an overall roof, and provisioning a ventilation extract system to capture any airborne contamination arising within the shelter.

Investigations of the reactor condition

During the construction of the sarcophagus, a scientific team, as part of an investigation dubbed "Complex Expedition", re-entered the reactor to locate and contain nuclear fuel to prevent another explosion. These scientists manually collected cold fuel rods, but great heat was still emanating from the core. Rates of radiation in different parts of the building were monitored by drilling holes into the reactor and inserting long metal detector tubes. The scientists were exposed to high levels of radiation and radioactive dust.

Area cleanup

The official contaminated zones saw a massive clean-up effort lasting seven months. The official reason for such early (and dangerous) decontamination efforts, rather than allowing time for natural decay, was that the land must be repopulated and brought back into cultivation. Within fifteen months 75% of the land was under cultivation, even though only a third of the evacuated villages were resettled. Defence forces must have done much of the work. Yet this land was of marginal agricultural value. According to historian David Marples, the administration had a psychological purpose for the clean-up: they wished to forestall panic regarding nuclear energy, and even to restart the Chernobyl power station.: 78-79, 87, 192-193

Although a number of radioactive emergency vehicles were buried in trenches, many of the vehicles used by the liquidators, including the helicopters, still remained, as of 2018, parked in a field in the Chernobyl area. Scavengers have since removed many functioning, but highly radioactive, parts. Liquidators worked under deplorable conditions, poorly informed and with poor protection. Many, if not most of them, exceeded radiation safety limits.

The urban decontamination liquidators first washed buildings and roads with "Barda", a sticky polymerizing fluid, designed to entrap radioactive dust.[dubious ]

A unique "clean up" medal was given to the clean-up workers, known as "liquidators".

Investigations and the evolution of identified causes

To investigate the causes of the accident the IAEA used the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), which had been created by the IAEA in 1985. It produced two significant reports on Chernobyl; INSAG-1 in 1986, and a revised report, INSAG-7 in 1992. In summary, according to INSAG-1, the main cause of the accident was the operators' actions, but according to INSAG-7, the main cause was the reactor's design. Both IAEA reports identified an inadequate "safety culture" (INSAG-1 coined the term) at all managerial and operational levels as a major underlying factor of different aspects of the accident. This was stated to be inherent not only in operations but also during design, engineering, construction, manufacture and regulation.

The INSAG-7 conclusion of major factors contributory to the accident was:

"The Accident is now seen to have been the result of concurrence of the following major factors: specific physical characteristics of the reactor; specific design features of the reactor control elements; and the fact that the reactor was brought to a state not specified by procedures or investigated by an independent safety body. Most importantly, the physical characteristics of the reactor made possible its unstable behaviour."

INSAG-1 report (1986)

The first official Soviet explanation of the accident was given by Soviet scientists and engineers to representatives of IAEA member states and other international organisations at the first Post-Accident Review Meeting, held at the IAEA in Vienna 25-29 August 1986. This explanation effectively placed the blame on the power plant operators. The IAEA INSAG-1 report followed shortly afterwards in September 1986, and on the whole also supported this view, based also on the information provided in discussions with the Soviet experts at the Vienna review meeting. In this view, the catastrophic accident was caused by gross violations of operating rules and regulations. For instance; "During preparation and testing of the turbine generator under run-down conditions using the auxiliary load, personnel disconnected a series of technical protection systems and breached the most important operational safety provisions for conducting a technical exercise."

It was stated that at the time of the accident the reactor was being operated with many key safety systems turned off, most notably the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), LAR (Local Automatic control system), and AZ (emergency power reduction system). Personnel had an insufficient understanding of technical procedures involved with the nuclear reactor, and knowingly ignored regulations to expedite the electrical test completion. Several procedural irregularities also helped to make the accident possible, one of which was insufficient communication between the safety officers and the operators in charge of the test.

Soviet criminal trial (1987)

The trial took place from 7 to 30 July 1987 in a temporary courtroom set up in the House of Culture in the city of Chernobyl, Ukraine. Five plant employees ( Anatoly S. Dyatlov, the former deputy chief engineer; Viktor P. Bryukhanov, the former plant director; Nikolai M. Fomin, the former chief engineer; Boris V. Rogozhin, the shift director of Reactor 4; and Aleksandr P. Kovalenko, the chief of Reactor 4); and Yuri A. Laushkin (Gosatomenergonadzor [USSR State Committee on Supervision of Safe Conduct of Work in Atomic Energy] inspector) were sentenced to ten, ten, ten, five, three, and two years respectively in labor camps. The families of Aleksandr Akimov, Leonid Toptunov and Valery Perevozchenko had received official letters, but prosecution against the employees had been terminated at their deaths.

Anatoly Dyatlov was found guilty "of criminal mismanagement of potentially explosive enterprises" and sentenced to ten years imprisonment-of which he would serve three-for the role that his oversight of the experiment played in the ensuing accident.

INSAG-7 report (1992)

A simplified diagram comparing the Chernobyl RBMK and the most common nuclear reactor design, the Light water reactor. RBMK issues: 1. Using a graphite moderator in a water-cooled reactor, permitting criticality in a total loss of coolant accident. 2. A positive steam void coefficient that made the destructive power excursion possible. 3. Control rods design; taking 18-20 seconds to be fully inserted, and with graphite tips that increased reactivity initially. 4. No reinforced containment building.[21][28][101]

In the INSAG-7 report, most of the earlier accusations against staff for breach of regulations were acknowledged to be either erroneous, being based on incorrect information obtained in August 1986, or were judged less relevant. The INSAG-7 report also reflected the view of the 1991 USSR State Commission account which held that the operators' actions in turning off the emergency core cooling system, interfering with the settings on the protection equipment, and blocking the level and pressure in the separator drum did not contribute to the original cause of the accident and its magnitude, although they may have been a breach of regulations. In fact, turning off the emergency system designed to prevent the two turbine generators from stopping was not a violation of regulations. Soviet authorities had identified a multitude of operator actions as regulation violations in the original 1986 report while no such regulations were in fact in place.

The primary design cause of the accident, as determined by INSAG-7, was a major deficiency in safety features, in particular the "positive scram" effect due to the control rods' graphite tips that actually initially increased reactivity when control rods entered the core to reduce reactivity. There was also an overly positive void coefficient of the reactor, whereby steam-generated voids in the fuel cooling channels would increase reactivity because neutron absorption was reduced, resulting in more steam generation, and thereby more voids; a regenerative process.

To avoid such conditions, it was necessary for the operators to track the value of the reactor operational reactivity margin (ORM) but this value was not readily available to the operators and they were not aware of the safety significance of ORM on void and power coefficients. However, regulations did forbid operating the reactor with a small margin of reactivity. Yet "post-accident studies have shown that the way in which the real role of the ORM is reflected in the Operating Procedures and design documentation for the RBMK-1000 is extremely contradictory", and furthermore, "ORM was not treated as an operational safety limit, violation of which could lead to an accident".

Even in this revised analysis, the human factor remained identified as a major factor in causing the accident; particularly the operating crew's deviation from the test programme. "Most reprehensibly, unapproved changes in the test procedure were deliberately made on the spot, although the plant was known to be in a very different condition from that intended for the test." This included operating the reactor at a lower power level than the prescribed 700 MW before starting the electrical test. The 1986 assertions of Soviet experts notwithstanding, regulations did not prohibit operating the reactor at this low power level.

Positive void coefficient

Control rod design

There was a significant flaw in the design of the control rods. The reactor core was 7 metres (23 feet) high. The upper half of the rod 7 metres (23 feet) was boron carbide, which absorbs neutrons and thereby slows the reaction. The bottom section of each control rod was a 4.5 meter graphite displacer, which prevented the channels from filling with water when rods were withdrawn. The flaw lay in the 1.25-metre (4.1-foot) gap between the bottom of the graphite displacer and the bottom of the reactor, meaning that the lowest portion of control rod channel was filled with water and not graphite. See page 123. Fig 11-10. With this design, when the rods were inserted from the fully retracted position to stop the reaction on the AZ-5 signal, the graphite displaced neutron-absorbing water, causing fewer neutrons to be absorbed and increasing reactivity. For the first 11 to 14 seconds of rod deployment until the boron was in position, reactor power across the floor of the reactor could increase, rather than decrease. This feature of control rod operation was counter-intuitive and not known to the reactor operators.

Management and operational deficiencies

Other deficiencies were noted in the RBMK-1000 reactor design, as were its non-compliance with accepted standards and with the requirements of nuclear reactor safety. While INSAG-1 and INSAG-7 reports both identified operator error as an issue of concern, the INSAG-7 identified that there were numerous other issues that were contributing factors that led to the incident. These contributing factors include:

1. The plant was not designed to safety standards in effect and incorporated unsafe features

2. "Inadequate safety analysis" was performed

3. There was "insufficient attention to independent safety review"

4. "Operating procedures not founded satisfactorily in safety analysis"

5. Safety information not adequately and effectively communicated between operators, and between operators and designers

6. The operators did not adequately understand safety aspects of the plant

7. Operators did not sufficiently respect formal requirements of operational and test procedures

8. The regulatory regime was insufficient to effectively counter pressures for production

9. There was a "general lack of safety culture in nuclear matters at the national level as well as locally"

Fizzled nuclear explosion hypothesis

Their evidence came from Cherepovets, a city 1,000 kilometres (620 mi) northeast of Chernobyl, where physicists from the V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute measured anomalous high levels of xenon-135 -a short half-life isotope-four days after the explosion. This meant that a nuclear event in the reactor may have ejected xenon to higher altitudes in the atmosphere than the later fire did, allowing widespread movement of xenon to remote locations. This was an alternative to the more accepted explanation of a positive-feedback power excursion where the reactor disassembled itself by steam explosion.

Pakhomov and Dubasov's nuclear fizzle hypothesis was examined in 2017 by Lars-Erik De Geer, Christer Persson and Henning Rodhe, who put the hypothesized fizzle event as the more probable cause of the first explosion. Both analyses argue that the nuclear fizzle event, whether producing the second or first explosion, consisted of a prompt chain reaction that was limited to a small portion of the reactor core, since self-disassembly occurs rapidly in fizzle events.

De Geer, Persson and Rodhe commented:

"We believe that thermal neutron mediated nuclear explosions at the bottom of a number of fuel channels in the reactor caused a jet of debris to shoot upwards through the refuelling tubes. This jet then rammed the tubes' 350kg plugs, continued through the roof and travelled into the atmosphere to altitudes of 2.5-3km where the weather conditions provided a route to Cherepovets. The steam explosion which ruptured the reactor vessel occurred some 2.7 seconds later."

This second explosion was estimated by the authors to have had the power equivalent of 225 tons of TNT.

Release and spread of radioactive materials

At Chernobyl, approximately 100,000 square kilometres (39,000 sq mi) of land was significantly contaminated with fallout, with the worst hit regions being in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Lower levels of contamination were detected over all of Europe except for the Iberian Peninsula. Most of the fallout with radioactive dust particles was released during the first ten days after the accident. By around May 2, a radioactive cloud had reached the Netherlands and Belgium.

It was Sweden's elevated radioactivity level, detected at noon on 28 April that, having been determined as not caused by a leak at the Swedish plant, first suggested a serious nuclear problem originating from the western Soviet Union. The evacuation of Pripyat on 27 April had been silently completed without the disaster being declared outside the Soviet Union. A rise in radiation levels in the subsequent days had also been measured in Finland, but a civil service strike delayed the response and publication.

Contamination from the Chernobyl accident was scattered irregularly depending on weather conditions, much of it deposited on mountainous regions such as the Alps, the Welsh mountains and the Scottish Highlands, where adiabatic cooling caused radioactive rainfall. The resulting patches of contamination were often highly localized, and localized water-flows contributed to large variations in radioactivity over small areas. Sweden and Norway also received heavy fallout when the contaminated air collided with a cold front, bringing rain. There was also groundwater contamination.

Rain was deliberately seeded over 10,000 square kilometres (3,900 sq mi) Belarus by the Soviet Air Force to remove radioactive particles from clouds heading toward highly populated areas. Heavy, black-coloured rain fell on the city of Gomel. Reports from Soviet and Western scientists indicate that the Belarusian SSR received about 60% of the contamination that fell on the former Soviet Union. However, the 2006 TORCH report stated that up to half of the volatile particles had actually landed outside the former USSR area currently making up of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. An unconnected large area in Russian SFSR south of Bryansk was also contaminated, as were parts of northwestern Ukrainian SSR. Studies in surrounding countries indicate that more than one million people could have been affected by radiation.

2016 data from a long-term monitoring program (The Korma Report II) shows a decrease in internal radiation exposure of the inhabitants of a region in Belarus close to Gomel. Resettlement may even be possible in prohibited areas provided that people comply with appropriate dietary rules.

In Western Europe, precautionary measures taken in response to the radiation included banning the importation of certain foods. A 2006 study by the French society for nuclear energy found that contamination was "relatively limited, diminishing from west to east", such that a hunter consuming 40 kilograms of contaminated wild boar in 1997 would be exposed to about one millisievert.

Relative isotopic abundances

At different times after the accident, different isotopes were responsible for the majority of the external dose. The remaining quantity of any radioisotope, and therefore the activity of that isotope, after 7 decay half-lives have passed, is less than 1% of its initial magnitude, and it continues to reduce beyond 0.78% after 7 half-lives to 0.10% remaining after 10 half-lives have passed and so on. Some radionuclides have decay products that are likewise radioactive, which is not accounted for here. The release of radioisotopes from the nuclear fuel was largely controlled by their boiling points, and the majority of the radioactivity present in the core was retained in the reactor.

All of the noble gases, including krypton and xenon, contained within the reactor were released immediately into the atmosphere by the first steam explosion. The atmospheric release of xenon-133, with a half-life of 5 days, is estimated at 5200 PBq.

50 to 60% of all core 1760×10radioiodine in the reactor, about 1760 PBq (¹⁵ becquerels), or about 0.4 kilograms (0.88 lb), was released, as a mixture of sublimed vapour, solid particles, and organic iodine compounds. Iodine-131 has a half-life of 8 days.

20 to 40% of all core caesium-137 was released, 85 PBq in all. Caesium was released in aerosol form; caesium-137, along with isotopes of strontium, are the two primary elements preventing the Chernobyl exclusion zone being re-inhabited. equals 24 kilograms of caesium-137. Cs-137 has a half-life of 30 years.

Tellurium-132, half-life 78 hours, an estimated 1150 PBq was released.

An early estimate for total nuclear fuel material released to the environment was %; this was later revised to %. This corresponds to the atmospheric emission of 6 tonnes (5.9 long tons; 6.6 short tons) of fragmented fuel.

Two sizes of particles were released: small particles of 0.3 to 1.5 micrometres, each an individually unrecognizable small dust or smog sized particulate matter and larger settling dust sized particles that therefore were quicker to fall-out of the air, of 10 micrometres in diameter. These larger particles contained about 80% to 90% of the released high boiling point or non-volatile radioisotopes; zirconium-95, niobium-95, lanthanum-140, cerium-144 and the transuranic elements, including neptunium, plutonium and the minor actinides, embedded in a uranium oxide matrix.

Environmental impact

Water bodies

The Chernobyl nuclear power plant is located next to the Pripyat River, which feeds into the Dnieper reservoir system, one of the largest surface water systems in Europe, which at the time supplied water to Kiev's 2.4 million residents, and was still in spring flood when the accident occurred. The radioactive contamination of aquatic systems therefore became a major problem in the immediate aftermath of the accident.

In the most affected areas of Ukraine, levels of radioactivity (particularly from radionuclides ¹³¹I, ¹³⁷Cs and ⁹⁰Sr) in drinking water caused concern during the weeks and months after the accident. Guidelines for levels of radioiodine in drinking water were temporarily raised to 3,700 Bq/L, allowing most water to be reported as safe. Officially it was stated that all contaminants had settled to the bottom "in an insoluble phase" and would not dissolve for 800-1000 years. A year after the accident it was announced that even the water of the Chernobyl plant's cooling pond was within acceptable norms. Despite this, two months after the disaster the Kiev water supply was switched from the Dnieper to the Desna River. Meanwhile, massive silt traps were constructed, along with an enormous 30-metre (98 ft) deep underground barrier to prevent groundwater from the destroyed reactor entering the Pripyat River.

Groundwater was not badly affected by the Chernobyl accident since radionuclides with short half-lives decayed away long before they could affect groundwater supplies, and longer-lived radionuclides such as radiocaesium and radiostrontium were adsorbed to surface soils before they could transfer to groundwater. However, significant transfers of radionuclides to groundwater have occurred from waste disposal sites in the 30 km (19 mi) exclusion zone around Chernobyl. Although there is a potential for transfer of radionuclides from these disposal sites off-site (i.e. out of the 30 km (19 mi) exclusion zone), the IAEA Chernobyl Report argues that this is not significant in comparison to current levels of washout of surface-deposited radioactivity.

Bio-accumulation of radioactivity in fish resulted in concentrations (both in western Europe and in the former Soviet Union) that in many cases were significantly above guideline maximum levels for consumption. Guideline maximum levels for radiocaesium in fish vary from country to country but are approximately 1000 Bq/kg in the European Union. In the Kiev Reservoir in Ukraine, concentrations in fish were in the range of 3000 Bq/kg during the first few years after the accident.

Chernobyl's radiocaesium deposits were used to calibrate sedimentation samples from Lake Qattinah in Syria. The provides a sharp, maximal, data point in radioactivity of the core sample at the 1986 depth, and acts as a date check on the depth of the in the core sample.

Flora, fauna, and funga

After the disaster, four square kilometres (1.5 sq mi) of pine forest directly downwind of the reactor turned reddish-brown and died, earning the name of the " Red Forest". Some animals in the worst-hit areas also died or stopped reproducing. Most domestic animals were removed from the exclusion zone, but horses left on an island in the Pripyat River 6 km (4 mi) from the power plant died when their thyroid glands were destroyed by radiation doses of 150-200 Sv. Some cattle on the same island died and those that survived were stunted because of thyroid damage. The next generation appeared to be normal. The mutation rates for plants and animals have increased by a factor of 20 because of the release of radionuclides from Chernobyl. There is evidence for elevated mortality rates and increased rates of reproductive failure in contaminated areas, consistent with the expected frequency of deaths due to mutations.

On farms in Narodychi Raion of Ukraine it is claimed that from 1986 to 1990 nearly 350 animals were born with gross deformities such as missing or extra limbs, missing eyes, heads or ribs, or deformed skulls; in comparison, only three abnormal births had been registered in the five years prior.

Subsequent research on microorganisms, while limited, suggests that in the aftermath of the disaster, bacterial and viral specimens exposed to the radiation (including Mycobacterium tuberculosis, herpesvirus, cytomegalovirus, hepatitis-causing viruses, and tobacco mosaic virus) underwent rapid changes. Activations of soil micromycetes have been reported. It is currently unclear how these changes in species with rapid reproductive turnover (which were not destroyed by the radiation but instead survived) will manifest in terms of virulence, drug resistance, immune evasion, and so on; a paper in 1998 reported the discovery of an Escherichia coli mutant that was hyper-resistant to a variety of DNA-damaging elements, including x-ray radiation, UV-C, and 4-nitroquinoline 1-oxide (4NQO). Cladosporium sphaerospermum, a species of fungus that has thrived in the Chernobyl contaminated area, has been investigated for the purpose of using the fungus' particular melanin to protect against high-radiation environments, such as space travel. The disaster has been described by lawyers, academics and journalists as an example of ecocide.

Human food chain

With radiocaesium binding less with humic acid, peaty soils than the known binding "fixation" that occurs on kaolinite rich clay soils, many marshy areas of Ukraine had the highest soil to dairy-milk transfer coefficients, of soil activity in ~ 200 kBq/m ² to dairy milk activity in Bq/L, that had ever been reported, with the transfer, from initial land activity into milk activity, ranging from 0.3 −2 to 20 −2 times that which was on the soil, a variance depending on the natural acidity-conditioning of the pasture.

In 1987, Soviet medical teams conducted some 16,000 whole-body count examinations on inhabitants in otherwise comparatively lightly contaminated regions with good prospects for recovery. This was to determine the effect of banning local food and using only food imports on the internal body burden of radionuclides in inhabitants. Concurrent agricultural countermeasures were used when cultivation did occur, to further reduce the soil to human transfer as much as possible. The expected highest body activity was in the first few years, where the unabated ingestion of local food, primarily milk consumption, resulted in the transfer of activity from soil to body; after the dissolution of the USSR, the now-reduced scale initiative to monitor the human body activity in these regions of Ukraine, recorded a small and gradual half-decadal-long rise, in internal committed dose, before returning to the previous trend of observing ever lower body counts each year.

This momentary rise is hypothesized to be due to the cessation of the Soviet food imports together with many villagers returning to older dairy food cultivation practices and large increases in wild berry and mushroom foraging, the latter of which have similar peaty soil to fruiting body, radiocaesium transfer coefficients.

After the disaster, four square kilometres (1.5 sq mi) of pine forest directly downwind of the reactor turned reddish-brown and died, earning the name of the "Red Forest", though it soon recovered.[135] This photograph was taken years later, in March 2009,[146] after the forest began to grow again, with the lack of foliage at the time of the photograph merely due to the local winter at the time.[147]

Of the 440,350 wild boar killed in the 2010 hunting season in Germany, approximately one thousand were contaminated with levels of radiation above the permitted limit of 600 becquerels of caesium per kilogram, of dry weight, due to residual radioactivity from Chernobyl. While all animal meat contains a natural level of potassium-40 at a similar level of activity, with both wild and farm animals in Italy containing "415 ± 56 becquerels kg−1 dw" of that naturally occurring gamma emitter.

Because Elaphomyces fungal species bioaccumulate radiocaesium, boars of the Bavarian Forest that consume these "deer truffles" are contaminated at higher levels than their environment's soil. Given that nuclear weapons release a higher ¹³⁵C/ ¹³⁷C ratio than nuclear reactors, the high ¹³⁵ C content in these boars suggests that their radiological contamination can be largely attributed to the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons testing in Ukraine, which peaked during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

In 2015, long-term empirical data showed no evidence of a negative influence of radiation on mammal abundance.

Precipitation on distant high ground

On high ground, such as mountain ranges, there is increased precipitation due to adiabatic cooling. This resulted in localized concentrations of contaminants on distant areas; higher in Bq/m ² values to many lowland areas much closer to the source of the plume. This effect occurred on high ground in Norway and the UK.

The Norwegian Agricultural Authority reported that in 2009 a total of 18,000 livestock in Norway required uncontaminated feed for a period before slaughter, to ensure that their meat had an activity below the government permitted value of caesium per kilogram deemed suitable for human consumption. This contamination was due to residual radioactivity from Chernobyl in the mountain plants they graze on in the wild during the summer. 1,914 sheep required uncontaminated feed for a time before slaughter during 2012, with these sheep located in only 18 of Norway's municipalities, a decrease from the 35 municipalities in 2011 and the 117 municipalities affected during 1986. The after-effects of Chernobyl on the mountain lamb industry in Norway were expected to be seen for a further 100 years, although the severity of the effects would decline over that period. Scientists report this is due to radioactive caesium-137 isotopes being taken up by fungi such as Cortinarius caperatus which is in turn eaten by sheep while grazing.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom restricted the movement of sheep from upland areas when radioactive caesium-137 fell across parts of Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and northern England. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster in 1986, the movement of a total of 4,225,000 sheep was restricted across a total of 9,700 farms, to prevent contaminated meat entering the human food chain. The number of sheep and the number of farms affected has decreased since 1986. Northern Ireland was released from all restrictions in 2000, and by 2009, 369 farms containing around 190,000 sheep remained under the restrictions in Wales, Cumbria, and northern Scotland. The restrictions applying in Scotland were lifted in 2010, while those applying to Wales and Cumbria were lifted during 2012, meaning no farms in the UK remain restricted because of Chernobyl fallout.

The legislation used to control sheep movement and compensate farmers (farmers were latterly compensated per animal to cover additional costs in holding animals prior to radiation monitoring) was revoked during October and November 2012, by the relevant authorities in the UK. Had restrictions in the UK not occurred, a heavy consumer of lamb meat would likely have received a dose of 4.1 mSv over a lifetime.

Human impact

Acute radiation effects and immediate aftermath

The only known, causal deaths from the accident involved workers in the plant and firefighters. The reactor explosion killed two engineers and severely burned two others who were among the 237 workers hospitalized in the immediate aftermath. Of the hospitalized workers, 134 exhibited symptoms of acute radiation syndrome, including one disputed case. 28 of the hospitalized workers died within the following three months, all of whom were hospitalized for ARS and 26 were among the 56 patients hospitalized for burns. Among the fatalities in the acute phase (approximately three months), all but one patient (with grade 2 ARS) were hospitalized for grade 3 or 4 ARS. Fifteen out of 22 patients with grade 3 ARS survived. Only one patient out of 21 with grade 4 ARS survived.

There were a number of fishermen on the reservoir a half-kilometer from the reactor to the east. Of these, two shore fishermen, Protosov and Pustavoit, are said to have sustained doses estimated at 400 roentgens and vomited, but survived. The vast majority of Pripyat residents slept through the distant sound of the explosion, including station engineer Breus, who only became aware at 6am, the beginning of his next work shift. He was later taken to hospital and, while there, made the acquaintance of one teen who had ventured out alone by bicycle to watch the roof fires during the night, stopping for a time and viewing the scene at the "Bridge of Death" . Contrary to this sensationalist label, the youthful night biker was treated and released from hospital, remaining in touch with Breus as of 2019.

Most serious cases of ARS were treated with the assistance of American specialist Robert Peter Gale, who documented a first of its kind treatment and supervized a number of bone marrow transplant procedures which were not successful. In 2019, Gale wrote a letter to correct the popularized, though egregious, portrayal of his patients as dangerous to visitors. All those who died were station operators and firefighters, over half of which from the continued wearing of dusty soaked uniforms, causing beta burns to cover large areas of skin. In the first few minutes to days, (largely due to Np-239, a 2.4-day half-life) the beta-to-gamma energy ratio is some 30:1. Owing to the large area of burned skin and sensitivity of the GI tract, bacterial infection was and remains the overarching concern to those affected with ARS, as a leading cause of death, quarantine from the outside environment is a part of the normal treatment protocol. Many of the surviving firefighters, continue to have skin that is atrophied, spider veined with underlying fibrosis due to experiencing extensive beta burns.

Long-term impact

In the 10 years following the accident, 14 more people who had been initially hospitalized (9 who had been hospitalized with ARS) died of various causes mostly unrelated to radiation exposure. Only two of these deaths were the result of myelodysplastic syndrome. Scientific consensus, in the form of the Chernobyl Forum, suggests that, although unexpected, there has been no statistically significant increase in the incidence rate of solid cancers among rescue workers. Follow-up studies have also found this to be the case, with apparent increases in thyroid cancer simply attributed to more meticulous cancer screening for rescue workers.

Childhood thyroid cancer is an exception, with approximately 4,000 new incidents in the general population by 2002 within contaminated regions of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, most of which are attributed to high environmental levels of radioactive iodine shortly after the accident. The recovery rate is ~99%, with only 15 terminal cases (9 deaths) at the time of the report. There has been no increase in mutation rate among the children of the liquidators or general population living in the contaminated areas.

From this same report is also a commonly cited estimate for potential future cancer fatalities in the form of an increase in cancer mortality (i.e. lethality) which speculated that, at worst, ~4,000 additional cancer-related fatalities were to be expected. Although it is reasonable and forward-thinking to assume that an increase in mortality has occurred among the affected population, studies have yet to confirm such an increase with meaningful statistical certainty.

Whether the area was publicly announced as a contaminated area is a better predictor of general health than the contamination itself. "Resettlement status" is an even stronger predictor: the residents of contaminated regions who were evacuated and resettled into uncontaminated regions can be compared with the residents who remained in the contaminated regions. Resettled citizens erroneously believed they had an illness related to radiation exposure more often than citizens who remained in the contaminated regions. This brings into question the effectiveness of resettlement.

By 2000, the number of Ukrainians claiming to be radiation "sufferers" ( poterpili) and receiving state benefits had jumped to 3.5 million, or 5% of the population. Many of these are populations resettled from contaminated zones or former or current Chernobyl plant workers. There was and remains a motivated "push" to achieve "sufferer" status as it gives access to state benefits and medical services that would otherwise not be made available. The apparent increases of ill health in this large group result partly from increased medical vigilance following the accident; many benign cases that would previously have gone unnoticed and untreated (especially of cancer) are now being registered.

In September 1987, the IAEA held an Advisory Group Meeting at the Curie Institute in Paris on the medical handling of the skin lesions relating to the acute deaths.

Effects of main harmful radionuclides

The four most harmful radionuclides spread from Chernobyl were iodine-131, caesium-134, caesium-137 and strontium-90, with half-lives of 8.02 days, 2.07 years, 30.2 years and 28.8 years respectively. The iodine was initially viewed with less alarm than the other isotopes, because of its short half-life, but it is highly volatile and now appears to have travelled furthest and caused the most severe health problems. Strontium is the least volatile of the four and is of main concern in the areas near Chernobyl itself.

Long term hazards such as caesium tends to accumulate in vital organs such as the heart, while strontium accumulates in bones and may thus be a risk to bone-marrow and lymphocytes. Radiation is most damaging to cells that are actively dividing. In adult mammals cell division is slow, except in hair follicles, skin, bone marrow and the gastrointestinal tract, which is why vomiting and hair loss are common symptoms of acute radiation sickness.

Disputed investigation

The two primary individuals involved with the attempt to suggest that the mutation rate among animals was, and continues to be, higher in the Chernobyl zone, are the Anders Moller and Timothy Mousseau group. Apart from continuing to publish experimentally unrepeatable and discredited papers, Mousseau routinely gives talks at the Helen Caldicott organized symposiums for " Physicians for Social Responsibility", an anti-nuclear advocacy group devoted to bring about a "nuclear free planet". In years past, Moller was previously caught and reprimanded for publishing papers that crossed the scientific "misconduct"/"fraud" line. The duo have more recently attempted to publish meta-analyses, in which the primary references they weigh-up, analyse and draw their conclusions from is their own prior papers along with the discredited book Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment.

Withdrawn investigation

In 1996, geneticist colleagues Ronald Chesser and Robert Baker published a paper on the thriving vole population within the exclusion zone, in which the central conclusion of their work was essentially that "The mutation rate in these animals is hundreds and probably thousands of times greater than normal". This claim occurred after they had done a comparison of the mitochondrial DNA of the "Chernobyl voles" with that of a control group of voles from outside the region. The paper appeared on the front cover of the journal Nature. Not long after publication, the authors discovered they had incorrectly classified the species of vole and therefore were genetically comparing two entirely different vole species. They issued a retraction in 1997.

Following the accident, journalists mistrusted many medical professionals (such as the spokesman from the UK National Radiological Protection Board), and in turn encouraged the public to mistrust them. Throughout the European continent, due to this media-driven framing of the contamination, many requests for induced abortions of otherwise normal pregnancies were obtained out of fears of radiation from Chernobyl.

Worldwide, an estimated excess of about 150,000 elective abortions may have been performed on otherwise healthy pregnancies out of fears of radiation from Chernobyl, according to Robert Baker and ultimately a 1987 article published by Linda E. Ketchum in the Journal of Nuclear Medicine which mentions but does not reference an IAEA source on the matter.

The available statistical data excludes the Soviet-Ukraine-Belarus abortion rates, as they are presently unavailable. From the available data, an increase in the number of abortions in what were healthy developing human offspring in Denmark occurred in the months following the accident, at a rate of about 400 cases. In Italy, a "slightly" above the expected number of induced abortions occurred, approximately 100. In Greece, following the accident, many obstetricians were unable to resist requests from worried pregnant mothers over fears of radiation. Although it was determined that the effective dose to Greeks would not exceed one mSv (100 mrem), a dose much lower than that which it was determined would induce embryonic abnormalities or other non- stochastic effects, there was an observed 2,500 increase of otherwise wanted pregnancies being terminated.

No evidence of changes in the prevalence of human deformities/birth congenital anomalies that might be associated with the accident are apparent in Belarus or Ukraine, the two republics that had the highest exposure to fallout. In Sweden and in Finland where no increase in abortion rates occurred, it was likewise determined that "no association between the temporal and spatial variations in radioactivity and variable incidence of congenital malformations [was found]." A similar null increase in the abortion rate and a healthy baseline situation of no increase in birth defects was determined by assessing the Hungarian Congenital Abnormality Registry. Findings were also mirrored in Austria.

In very high doses, it was known at the time that radiation could cause a physiological increase in the rate of pregnancy anomalies, but unlike the dominant linear no-threshold model of radiation and cancer rate increases, it was known, by researchers familiar with both the prior human exposure data and animal testing, that the "Malformation of organs appears to be a deterministic effect with a threshold dose" below which, no rate increase is observed. This teratology (birth defects) issue was discussed by Frank Castronovo of the Harvard Medical School in 1999, publishing a detailed review of dose reconstructions and the available pregnancy data following the Chernobyl accident, inclusive of data from Kiev's two largest obstetrics hospitals.

The Chernobyl liquidators, essentially an all-male civil defense emergency workforce, would go on to father normal children, without an increase in developmental anomalies or a statistically significant increase in the frequencies of germline mutations in their progeny. This normality is similarly seen in the children of the survivors of the Goiânia accident.

A 2021 study based on whole-genome sequencing of children of parents employed as liquidators indicated no trans-generational genetic effects of exposure of parents to ionizing radiation.

Cancer assessments

A report by the International Atomic Energy Agency examines the environmental consequences of the accident. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has estimated a global collective dose of radiation exposure from the accident "equivalent on average to 21 additional days of world exposure to natural background radiation"; individual doses were far higher than the global mean among those most exposed, including 530,000 primarily male recovery workers (the Chernobyl liquidators) who averaged an effective dose equivalent to an extra 50 years of typical natural background radiation exposure each.

Estimates of the number of deaths that will eventually result from the accident vary enormously; disparities reflect both the lack of solid scientific data and the different methodologies used to quantify mortality-whether the discussion is confined to specific geographical areas or extends worldwide, and whether the deaths are immediate, short term, or long term. In 1994, thirty-one deaths were directly attributed to the accident, all among the reactor staff and emergency workers.

In a peer-reviewed paper in the International Journal of Cancer in 2006, the authors expanded the discussion on those exposed to all of Europe (but following a different conclusion methodology to the Chernobyl Forum study, which arrived at the total predicted death toll of 4,000 after cancer survival rates were factored in) they stated, without entering into a discussion on deaths, that in terms of total excess cancers attributed to the accident:

The risk projections suggest that by now [2006] Chernobyl may have caused about 1000 cases of thyroid cancer and 4000 cases of other cancers in Europe, representing about 0.01% of all incident cancers since the accident. Models predict that by 2065 about 16,000 cases of thyroid cancer and 25,000 cases of other cancers may be expected due to radiation from the accident, whereas several hundred million cancer cases are expected from other causes.

Two anti-nuclear advocacy groups have publicized non-peer-reviewed estimates that include mortality estimates for those who were exposed to even smaller amounts of radiation. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) calculated that, among the hundreds of millions of people exposed worldwide, there will be an eventual 50,000 excess cancer cases, resulting in 25,000 excess cancer deaths, excluding thyroid cancer. However, these calculations are based on a simple linear no-threshold model multiplication and the misapplication of the collective dose, which the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) states "should not be done" as using the collective dose is "inappropriate to use in risk projections".

Thyroid cancer incidence in children and adolescents in Belarus

Adolescents, ages 15 to 18

While widely regarded as having a cause and effect relationship, the causality of Chernobyl with the increases in recorded rates of thyroid cancer is disputed,[221] as in both the US and South Korea, upon the advent of ultrasonography and widespread medical screening, the latter recorded an almost identical epidemic in thyroid cancer rates, with South Korea reporting a 15 fold increase upon the switch of diagnostic tool, the highest thyroid cancer rate in the world.[222]

Yet the death rate from thyroid cancer has remained the same as prior to the technology. For these and other reasons, it is suggested that no reliable increase has been detected in the environs of Chernobyl, that cannot otherwise be explained as an artifact of the globally well documented Screening effect. In 2004, the UN collaborative, Chernobyl Forum, revealed thyroid cancer among children to be one of the main health impacts from the Chernobyl accident. This is due to the ingestion of contaminated dairy products, along with the inhalation of the short-lived, highly radioactive isotope, Iodine-131. In that publication, more than 4,000 cases of childhood thyroid cancer were reported. It is important to note that there was no evidence of an increase in solid cancers or leukemia. It said that there was an increase in psychological problems among the affected population. The WHO's Radiation Program reported that the 4,000 cases of thyroid cancer resulted in nine deaths.

According to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, up to the year 2005, an excess of more than 6,000 cases of thyroid cancer had been reported. That is, over the estimated pre-accident baseline thyroid cancer rate, more than 6,000 casual cases of thyroid cancer have been reported in children and adolescents exposed at the time of the accident, a number that is expected to increase. They concluded that there is no other evidence of major health impacts from the radiation exposure.

Well-differentiated thyroid cancers are generally treatable, and when treated the five-year survival rate of thyroid cancer is 96%, and 92% after 30 years. the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had reported 15 deaths from thyroid cancer in 2011. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also states that there has been no increase in the rate of birth defects or abnormalities, or solid cancers-such as lung cancer-corroborating the assessments by the UN committee. UNSCEAR raised the possibility of long term genetic defects, pointing to a doubling of radiation-induced minisatellite mutations among children born in 1994. However, the risk of thyroid cancer associated with the Chernobyl accident is still high according to published studies.

The German affiliate of the anti-nuclear energy organization, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War suggest that 10,000 people are affected by thyroid cancer as of 2006, and that 50,000 cases are expected in the future.

Other disorders

The report went into depth about the risks to mental health of exaggerated fears about the effects of radiation. According to the IAEA the "designation of the affected population as 'victims' rather than 'survivors' has led them to perceive themselves as helpless, weak and lacking control over their future". The IAEA says that this may have led to behaviour that has caused further health effects.

Long-term radiation deaths

The number of potential deaths arising from the Chernobyl disaster is heavily debated. The World Health Organization's prediction of 4,000 future cancer deaths in surrounding countries is based on the Linear no-threshold model (LNT), which assumes that the damage inflicted by radiation at low doses is directly proportional to the dose. Radiation epidemiologist Roy Shore contends that estimating health effects in a population from the LNT model "is not wise because of the uncertainties".

According to the Union of Concerned Scientists the number of excess cancer deaths worldwide (including all contaminated areas) is approximately 27,000 based on the same LNT.

Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment is a 2007 Russian publication that concludes that there were 985,000 premature deaths as a consequence of the radioactivity released. The results were criticized by M. I. Balonov from the Institute of Radiation Hygiene in St. Petersburg, who described them as biased, drawing from sources that were difficult to independently verify and lacking a proper scientific base. Balanov expressed his opinion that "the authors unfortunately did not appropriately analyse the content of the Russian-language publications, for example, to separate them into those that contain scientific evidence and those based on hasty impressions and ignorant conclusions".

According to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission member and Professor of Health Physics Kenneth Mossman, the "LNT philosophy is overly conservative, and low-level radiation may be less dangerous than commonly believed." Yoshihisa Matsumoto, a radiation biologist at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, cites laboratory experiments on animals to suggest there must be a threshold dose below which DNA repair mechanisms can completely repair any radiation damage. Mossman suggests that the proponents of the current model believe that being conservative is justified due to the uncertainties surrounding low level doses and it is better to have a "prudent public health policy".

Another significant issue is establishing consistent data on which to base the analysis of the impact of the Chernobyl accident. Since 1991, large social and political changes have occurred within the affected regions and these changes have had significant impact on the administration of health care, on socio-economic stability, and the manner in which statistical data is collected. Ronald Chesser, a radiation biologist at Texas Tech University, says that "the subsequent Soviet collapse, scarce funding, imprecise dosimetry, and difficulties tracking people over the years have limited the number of studies and their reliability".

Socio-economic impact

It is difficult to establish the total economic cost of the disaster. According to Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union spent 18 billion Rbls (the equivalent of US$2.5 billion at that time, or $5.32 billion in today's dollars) on containment and decontamination, virtually bankrupting itself. In 2005, the total cost over 30 years for Belarus which includes the monthly payments to liquidators, was estimated at US$235 billion; about $318 billion in today's dollars given inflation rates. Gorbachev in April 2006 wrote "The nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl 20 years ago this month, even more than my launch of perestroika, was perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union."

Ongoing costs are well known; in their 2003-2005 report, The Chernobyl Forum stated that between five and seven percent of government spending in Ukraine is still related to Chernobyl, while in Belarus more than $13 billion is thought to have been spent between 1991 and 2003, with 22% of national budget having been Chernobyl-related in 1991, falling to six percent by 2002. In 2018, Ukraine spent five to seven percent of its national budget on recovery activities related to the Chernobyl disaster. Overall economic loss is estimated at $235 billion in Belarus. Much of the current cost relates to the payment of Chernobyl-related social benefits to some seven million people across the three countries.

A significant economic impact at the time was the removal of 784,320 ha (1,938,100 acres) of agricultural land and 694,200 ha (1,715,000 acres) of forest from production. While much of this has been returned to use, agricultural production costs have risen due to the need for special cultivation techniques, fertilizers and additives. Politically, the accident gave great significance to the new Soviet policy of glasnost, and helped forge closer Soviet-US relations at the end of the Cold War, through bioscientific cooperation. The disaster also became a key factor in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and a major influence in shaping the new Eastern Europe.

Ukrainians viewed the Chernobyl disaster as another attempt by Russians to destroy them, comparable to the Holodomor. Meanwhile, commentators have argued that the events of the Chernobyl disaster were uniquely inclined to occur in a communist country versus a capitalist country. It has been argued that Soviet power plant administrators were not empowered to make crucial decisions when time was of the essence.

Long term site remediation

Portraits of deceased Chernobyl liquidators used for an anti-nuclear power protest in Geneva

Following the accident, questions arose about the future of the plant and its eventual fate. All work on the unfinished reactors No. 5 and No. 6 was halted three years later. However, the trouble at the Chernobyl plant did not end with the disaster in reactor No. 4. The damaged reactor was sealed off and 200 cubic meters (260 cu yd) of concrete was placed between the disaster site and the operational buildings. The work was managed by Grigoriy Mihaylovich Naginskiy, the deputy chief engineer of Installation and Construction Directorate - 90. The Ukrainian government allowed the three remaining reactors to continue operating because of an energy shortage in the country.

Decommissioning of other reactors

In October 1991, a fire broke out in the turbine building of reactor No. 2; the authorities subsequently declared the reactor damaged beyond repair, and it was taken offline. Reactor No. 1 was decommissioned in November 1996 as part of a deal between the Ukrainian government and international organizations such as the IAEA to end operations at the plant. On 15 December 2000, then-President Leonid Kuchma personally turned off reactor No. 3 in an official ceremony, shutting down the entire site.

No. 4 reactor confinement

Soon after the accident, the reactor building was quickly encased by a mammoth concrete sarcophagus in a notable feat of construction under severe conditions. Crane operators worked blindly from inside lead-lined cabins taking instructions from distant radio observers, while gargantuan-sized pieces of concrete were moved to the site on custom-made vehicles. The purpose of the sarcophagus was to stop any further release of radioactive particles into the atmosphere, isolate the exposed core from the weather and provide safety for the continued operations of adjacent reactors one through three.

The concrete sarcophagus was never intended to last very long, with a lifespan of only 30 years. On 12 February 2013, a 600 m ² (6,500 sq ft) section of the roof of the turbine-building collapsed, adjacent to the sarcophagus, causing a new release of radioactivity and temporary evacuation of the area. At first it was assumed that the roof collapsed because of the weight of snow, however the amount of snow was not exceptional, and the report of a Ukrainian fact-finding panel concluded that the collapse was the result of sloppy repair work and aging of the structure. Experts warned the sarcophagus itself was on the verge of collapse.

In 1997, the international Chernobyl Shelter Fund was founded to design and build a more permanent cover for the unstable and short-lived sarcophagus. It received €864 million from international donors in 2011 and was managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The new shelter was named the New Safe Confinement and construction began in 2010. It is a metal arch 105 metres (344 ft) high and spanning 257 metres (843 ft) built on rails adjacent to the reactor No. 4 building so that it could be slid over the top of the existing sarcophagus. The New Safe Confinement was completed in 2016 and slid into place over top the sarcophagus on 29 November. The huge steel arch was moved into place over several weeks. Unlike the original sarcophagus, the New Safe Confinement is designed to allow the reactor to be safely dismantled using remotely operated equipment.

Waste management

Used fuel from units 1-3 was stored in the units' cooling ponds, and in an interim spent fuel storage facility pond, ISF-1, which now holds most of the spent fuel from units 1-3, allowing those reactors to be decommissioned under less restrictive conditions. Approximately 50 of the fuel assemblies from units 1 and 2 were damaged and required special handling. Moving fuel to ISF-1 was thus carried out in three stages: fuel from unit 3 was moved first, then all undamaged fuel from units 1 and 2, and finally the damaged fuel from units 1 and 2. Fuel transfers to ISF-1 were completed in June 2016.

A need for larger, longer-term radioactive waste management at the Chernobyl site is to be fulfilled by a new facility designated ISF-2. This facility is to serve as dry storage for used fuel assemblies from units 1-3 and other operational wastes, as well as material from decommissioning units 1-3 (which will be the first RBMK units decommissioned anywhere).

Fuel-containing materials

According to official estimates, about 95% of the fuel in reactor No. 4 at the time of the accident (about 180 tonnes (180 long tons; 200 short tons)) remains inside the shelter, with a total radioactivity of nearly 18 million curies (670 PBq). The radioactive material consists of core fragments, dust, and lava-like "fuel containing materials" (FCM)-also called " corium"-that flowed through the wrecked reactor building before hardening into a ceramic form.

It has been reported that the degradation of the lava is likely to be a slow, gradual process, rather than sudden and rapid. The same paper states that the loss of uranium from the wrecked reactor is only 10 kg (22 lb) per year; this low rate of uranium leaching suggests that the lava is resisting its environment. The paper also states that when the shelter is improved, the leaching rate of the lava will decrease. As of 2021, some fuel had already degraded significantly. The famous elephant's foot, which originally was so hard that it required the use of an armor piercing AK-47 round to remove a chunk, had softened to a texture similar to sand.

Exclusion zone

Mass media sources have provided a variety of generalized estimates for when the Zone could be considered habitable again. These informal estimates have ranged from approximately 300 years (corresponding to 10 half-lives of the widespread radionuclides Cesium-137 and Strontium-90), to multiples of 20,000 years, referring to the half-life of Plutonium-239 which contaminates the central portion of the Zone.

In the years following the disaster, residents known as illegally returned to their abandoned homes to regain their lives. Most people are retired and survive mainly from farming and packages delivered by visitors. As of 2016, 187 locals had returned to the zone and were living permanently there.

In 2011, Ukraine opened up the sealed zone around the Chernobyl reactor to tourists wishing to learn more about the 1986 tragedy. Sergii Mirnyi, a radiation reconnaissance officer at the time of the accident, and now an academic at National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, has written about the psychological and physical effects on survivors and visitors, and worked as an advisor to Chernobyl tourism groups.

Forest fire concerns

During the dry season, forest fires are a perennial concern in areas contaminated by radioactive material. Dry conditions and build-up of debris make the forests a ripe breeding ground for wildfires. Depending on prevailing atmospheric conditions, smoke from wildfires could potentially spread more radioactive material outside the exclusion zone. In Belarus, the Bellesrad organization is tasked with overseeing food cultivation and forestry management in the area.

Recovery projects

The Chernobyl Trust Fund was created in 1991 by the United Nations to help victims of the Chernobyl accident. It is administered by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which also manages strategy formulation, resource mobilization, and advocacy efforts. Beginning in 2002, under the United Nations Development Programme, the fund shifted its focus from emergency assistance to long-term development.

The Chernobyl Shelter Fund was established in 1997 at the G8 summit in Denver to finance the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP). The plan called for transforming the site into an ecologically safe condition through stabilization of the sarcophagus and construction of a New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure. While the original cost estimate for the SIP was US$768 million, the 2006 estimate was $1.2 billion. The SIP is being managed by a consortium of Bechtel, Battelle, and , and conceptual design for the NSC consisted of a movable arch, constructed away from the shelter to avoid high radiation, then slid over the sarcophagus. The NSC was moved into position in November 2016 and was expected to be completed by late 2017.

In 2003, the United Nations Development Programme launched the Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (CRDP) for the recovery of affected areas. The programme was initiated in February 2002 based on the recommendations in the report on Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. The main goal of the CRDP was supporting the Government of Ukraine in mitigating long-term social, economic, and ecological consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. CRDP works in the four most affected Ukrainian areas: Kyivska, Zhytomyrska, Chernihivska and Rivnenska.

The International Project on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident was created and received US$20 million, mainly from Japan, in hopes of discovering the main cause of health problems due to iodine-131 radiation. These funds were divided among Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, the three main affected countries, for further investigation of health effects. As there was significant corruption in former Soviet countries, most of the foreign aid was given to Russia, and no results from the funding were demonstrated.

In 2019, it became known that the Ukrainian government in power at the time aimed to make Chernobyl a tourist attraction.

Nuclear debate

The Chernobyl accident attracted a great deal of interest. Because of the distrust that many people had in the Soviet authorities, which engaged in a major cover-up of the disaster, a great deal of debate about the situation at the site occurred in the First World during the early days of the event. Because of defective intelligence based on satellite imagery, it was thought that unit number three had also had a dire accident. Journalists mistrusted many professionals, and they in turn encouraged the public to mistrust them.

The accident also raised concerns about the cavalier safety culture in the Soviet nuclear power industry, slowing industry growth and forcing the Soviet government to become less secretive about its operating procedures. The government coverup of the Chernobyl disaster was a catalyst for glasnost, which "paved the way for reforms leading to the Soviet collapse." Numerous structural and construction quality issues, as well as deviations from the original plant design, had been known to KGB since at least 1973 and passed on to the Central Committee, which took no action and classified the information.

In Italy, the Chernobyl accident was reflected in the outcome of the 1987 referendum. As a result of that referendum, Italy began phasing out its nuclear power plants in 1988, a decision that was effectively reversed in 2008. A 2011 referendum reiterated Italians' strong objections to nuclear power, thus abrogating the government's 2008 decision.

In Germany, the Chernobyl accident led to the creation of a federal environment ministry, after several states had already created such a post. The post has been held, among others, by Angela Merkel who would later become leader of the opposition and then chancellor. The German environmental minister was given the authority over reactor safety as well, a responsibility the current minister still holds today. The Chernobyl disaster is also credited with strengthening the anti-nuclear movement in Germany, which culminated in the decision to end the use of nuclear power made by the 1998-2005 Schröder government. A temporary reversal of this policy was in turn reverted after the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

In direct response to the Chernobyl disaster, a conference to create a Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident was called in 1986 by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The resulting treaty has bound signatory member states to provide notification of any nuclear and radiation accidents that occur within its jurisdiction that could affect other states, along with the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

The Chernobyl disaster, along with the space shuttle Challenger disaster, the Three Mile Island accident, and the Bhopal disaster have been used together as case studies, both by the US government and by third parties, in research concerning the root causes of such disasters, such as sleep deprivation and mismanagement.

Cultural impact

The Chernobyl tragedy has inspired many artists across the world to create works of art, animation, video games, theatre and cinema about the disaster. The HBO series and the book Voices from Chernobyl by the Ukrainian-Belarusian writer Svetlana Alexievich are two well-known works that talk about the catastrophe that destroyed millions of lives. The Ukrainian artist Roman Gumanyuk created a series of artworks called "Pripyat Lights, or Chernobyl shadows" that includes 30 oil paintings about the Chernobyl accident. The series of artwork was exhibited at the National Fine Art Museum of Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek, the Kasteev State Museum of Arts of Kazakhstan in Almaty, the Vashchenko Art Gallery of Gomel in Belarus, and at the Museum of Chernobyl in Kharkiv in Ukraine in the years 2012-2013.

The video game S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Shadows of Chernobyl released by THQ in 2007, is a first-person shooter set in the Exclusion Zone. A prequel called S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Clear Sky was released in 2008 following with a sequel S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Call of Pripyat released in 2010. Finally, the horror film Chernobyl Diaries released in 2012 is about six tourists that hire a tour guide to take them to the abandoned city of Pripyat where they discover they are not alone.

Filmmakers have created documentaries that examine the aftermath of the disaster over the years. Documentaries like the Oscar-winning Chernobyl Heart released in 2003, explore how radiation affected people living in the area and information about the long-term side effects of radiation exposure over the years that include mental disabilities, physical disabilities, and genetic mutations after the disaster. The Babushkas of Chernobyl released in 2015, is a documentary that explores the story of the three women who decided to return to the exclusion zone after the disaster. In the documentary, the Babushkas show the polluted water, their food from radioactive gardens, and explain how they manage to survive in this exclusion zone despite the radioactive levels of it. The documentary The Battle of Chernobyl, released in 2006, shows a rare original footage a day before the disaster in the city of Pripyat, then through different methods the documentary goes in depth on the chronological events that led to the explosion of the reactor No. 4 and the disaster response in which 50,000 men from Soviet Union engaged to liquidate the radioactivity of the damaged reactor.

In July 2019, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that the Chernobyl site would become an official tourist attraction. Zelenskyy said, "We must give this territory of Ukraine a new life," after Chernobyl saw an increase in visitors since the HBO mini-series. Dr. T. Steen, a microbiology and immunology teacher at Georgetown's School of Medicine, recommends tourists to wear clothes and shoes they are comfortable with throwing away. Most importantly, Steen suggests to avoid plant life, especially the depths of the forest due to the high levels of radiation. Because the areas were not cleaned in the aftermath of the disaster, they remain highly contaminated. Research showed that fungus, moss, and mushrooms are radioactive. Drinking or eating from there could be dangerous. Generally speaking, Chernobyl can be a safe place, Dr. Steen said, "but it depends on how people behave."

References

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The Chernobyl disaster began on 26 April 1986 with the explosion of the No. 4 reactor of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, near the city of Pripyat in the north of the Ukrainian SSR, close to the border with the Byelorussian SSR, in the Soviet Union.

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9/11 film

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| EARTHQUAKE | | MAKEUP TUTORIAL |

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STS-51-L: Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster

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The 10 largest magnitudes in recorded history

1. Valdivia, Chile 22 May 1960 (magnitude 9.5)

This earthquake killed 1655 people, injured 3000 and displaced two million. It caused US$550 million damage in Chile, while the tsunami that it spawned caused deaths and damage as far away as Hawaii, Japan and the Philippines. The 'rupture zone' of the quake was more than 1000 km long. Two days after the initial quake, the nearby volcano Puyehue erupted, sending ash and steam up to 6 km into the atmosphere over a period of several weeks.

2. Prince William Sound, Alaska 28 March 1964 (magnitude 9.2)

Compared to the Chilean earthquake, this earthquake was less damaging: the resulting tsunami took 128 lives and caused overall US$311 million in damage. The earthquake was felt mainly over Alaska, as well as some places in Canada, while the tsunami created by it caused damage as far away as Hawaii. The most damage was sustained by the city of Anchorage, 120 km north-west of the epicentre. Shaking from the quake itself is reported to have lasted for three minutes.

3. Sumatra, Indonesia 26 December 2004 (magnitude 9.1)

In terms of damage and loss of life, the scale of the disaster caused by the resulting Boxing Day Tsunami was enormous. In total, 227,900 people were killed or presumed dead, with around 1.7 million displaced over 14 countries in South Asia and East Africa. The epicentre was 250 km south-east of Band Aceh, Indonesia, at a depth of 30 km. Several days later on 28 December, a mud volcano began erupting near Baratang, Andamar Islands, which is thought to have been associated with the earthquake.

4. Sendai, Japan 11 March 2011 (magnitude 9.0)

So far the official death toll stands at several thousand from the combined effect of the powerful earthquake, aftershocks and the tsunami. However, the total is expected to rise, with some estimates of a final toll of over 10,000. Economic impacts are expected to be huge, with the shutting down of nuclear reactors which many industries rely on for power.

5. Kamchatka, Russia 4 November 1952 (magnitude 9.0)

This earthquake generated a tsunami that caused widespread damage in the Hawaiian Islands. Property damage was estimated at around US$1,000,000. Some reports describe waves of over 9 m high at Kaena Point, Oahu. A farmer on Oahu reported the loss of six cows to the tsunami, but no people were reported killed.

6. Bio-bio, Chile 27 February 2010 (magnitude 8.8)

This earthquake and subsequent tsunami killed at least 521 people, with 56 missing and 12,000 injured. More than 800,000 people were displaced with a total of 1.8m people affected across Chile, where damage was estimated at US$30 billion. The epicentre was 335 km south-west of Santiago, at a depth of 35 km. A minor tsunami travelled across the Pacific causing damage to boats as far away as San Diego, California.

7. Off the coast of Ecuador 31 January 1906 (magnitude 8.8)

This earthquake caused a tsunami that is reported to have killed between 500 and 1,500 in Ecuador and Colombia. The tsunami travelled as far north as San Francisco, on the west coast of the US, and west to Hawaii and Japan. The tsunami took roughly 12 hours to cross the Pacific to Hilo, Hawaii.

8. Rat Islands, Alaska 2 April 1965 (magnitude 8.7)

The worst of the damage attributed to this earthquake was caused by a tsunami, reported to be about 10 m high on Shemya Island. The wave caused flooding on Amchitka Island, causing US$10,000 in property damage. No deaths or injuries were reported.

9. Sumatra, Indonesia 28 March 2005 (magnitude 8.6)

This earthquake killed 1313, with over 400 people injured by the tsunami as far away as Sri Lanka. The epicentre was 205 km north-west of Sibolga, Sumatra, at a depth of 30 km. This region, also the site of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, is particularly geologically active, with three of the 15 biggest known earthquakes having happened here.

10. Assam - Tibet 15 August 1950 (magnitude 8.6)

This inland earthquake caused widespread damages to buildings as well as large landslides. 780 people were killed in eastern Tibet, with many villages and towns affected across Assam, China, Tibet and India. Oscillations to lake levels occurred as far away as Norway. The total death toll is likely to be higher, as no definitive total was ever estimated. While the earthquake itself is known as the Assam Earthquake, it is believed the epicentre may have been in Tibet.

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The 10 largest magnitudes ever recorded in modern history: the most powerful earthquakes since 1930

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California Wild Fires

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https://www.britannica.com/event/Deepwater-Horizon-oil-spill

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https://globalnews.ca/news/2094045/two-years-later-rebuilding-after-the-lac-megantic-train-derailment/

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The plane had run out of fuel and was unable to land at John F. Kennedy International Airport. It came to rest nose up on a steep hill in a sparse residential area after striking a number of trees. Lying broken into sections, parts of the plane had severed power lines and sealed off the single access road to the area. A patrol from the Nassau County Police Department's Second Precinct was first on the scene and radioed for numerous units to assist. The Nassau County Disaster Plan was put into effect; it identifies those to be notified as well as the specific procedures to be followed. Civil defense departments throughout the area responded to the call. News of the crash was broadcast on local television, causing hundreds of people to rush to the scene. The narrow access to the crash site was in danger of being completely choked off by the large number of people converging on the area. Police and firefighters worked feverishly to free the survivors, and a morgue area was established to photograph and tag the bodies of the dead. There were a total of 73 fatalities from the crash and 85 survivors. The crash proved that the department's disaster plan is a viable and valuable tool, albeit in need of some minor changes. The crash also demonstrated the value of the department's Peer Support Group formed to counsel officers involved in traumatic incidents. At a police and fire department critique of the accident held shortly after the incident, both organizations expressed concern over the number of well-intentioned, but unsolicited rescuers whose response to the scene nearly closed access to the area. Although this presented a problem, the response would likely have been appreciated had there been more passengers on the plane.

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The plane had run out of fuel and was unable to land at John F. Kennedy International Airport. It came to rest nose up on a steep hill in a sparse residential area after striking a number of trees. Lying broken into sections, parts of the plane had severed power lines and sealed off the single access road to the area.

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The intensity of extreme drought and rainfall has "sharply" increased over the past 20 years, according to a study published Monday in the journal Nature Water. These aren't merely tough weather events, they are leading to extremes such as crop failure, infrastructure damage and even humanitarian crises.

The big picture on water comes from data from a pair of satellites known as GRACE, or Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment, that were used to measure changes in Earth's water storage - the sum of all the water on and in the land, including groundwater, surface water, ice, and snow.
READ MORE: Iraqi prime minister promises action to tackle climate change, transition to renewables
"It's incredible that we can now monitor the pulse of continental water from outer space," said Park Williams, a bioclimatologist at the University of California, Los Angeles who was not involved with the study.

"I have a feeling when future generations look back and try to determine when humanity really began understanding the planet as a whole, this will be one of the studies highlighted," he said.

The researchers say the data confirms that both the frequency and intensity of rainfall and droughts are increasing due to burning fossil fuels and other human activity that releases greenhouse gases.

"I was surprised to see how well correlated the global intensity was with global mean temperatures," said Matthew Rodell, study author and deputy director of Earth sciences for hydrosphere, biosphere, and geophysics at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.

The strong link between these climate extremes and rising global average temperatures means continued global warming will mean more drought and rainstorms that are worse by many measures - more frequent, more severe, longer and larger.

Researchers looked at 1,056 events from 2002-2021 using a novel algorithm that identifies where the land is much wetter or drier than normal.

That showed the most extreme rains keep happening in sub-Saharan Africa, at least through December 2021, the end of the data. The rainfall extremes also took place in central and eastern North America from 2018-2021, and in Australia during 2011-2012.

The most intense droughts were a record-breaking one in northeastern South America from 2015-2016; an event in the Cerrado region of Brazil that began in 2019 and continues; and the ongoing drought in the American Southwest that has caused dangerously low water levels in two of the biggest U.S. reservoirs, Lake Mead and Lake Powell. Those remain low despite heavy rains this year.
READ MORE: At Davos, UN chief warns the world is in a 'sorry state' from climate change, Ukraine war
Drought events outnumbered heavy rain events by 10%. Their geographic extents and how long they lasted were similar.

A warmer atmosphere increases the rate at which water evaporates during dry periods. It also holds more water vapor, which fuels heavy rainfall events.

The study noted that infrastructure like airports and sewage treatment plants that were designed to withstand once-in-a-100-year events are becoming more challenged as these extremes happen more often and with more intensity.

"Looking forward into the future, in terms of managing water resources and flood control, we should be anticipating that the wetter extremes will be wetter and the dry extremes will get drier," said Richard Seager, a climate scientist at the Lamont Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia University, who was not involved with the study.

Seager said it's a mistake to assume that future wet and dry extremes can be managed the same as in the past because "everything's going to get amplified on both ends of the dry-wet spectrum."

According to the U.S. National Integrated Drought Information System, 20% of the annual economic losses from extreme weather events in the U.S. are from floods and droughts.

A drastic swing between extreme drought and unprecedented flooding, dubbed "weather whiplash," is becoming common in some regions.
WATCH: Will climate change lead to more intense weather events?
Water stress is expected to significantly affect poor, disenfranchised communities as well as ecosystems that have been underfunded and exploited.

For example, the United Nations has said that Somalia is experiencing its longest and most severe drought, an event that has caused the deaths of millions of livestock and widespread hunger. Venezuela, a country that has faced years of political and economic crises, resorted to nationwide power cuts during April 2016 as a result of the drought conditions affecting water levels of the Guri Dam.

As for solutions, using floodwaters to replenish depleted aquifers and improving the health of agricultural soil so it can absorb water better and store more carbon are just a few methods that could improve water resiliency in a warming world, the study says.
Associated Press climate and environmental coverage receives support from several private foundations. See more about AP's climate initiative here. The AP is solely responsible for all content.

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Scientists confirm global floods and droughts worsened by climate change

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Scientists can now see the big picture on water globally - which areas are repeatedly drying and which are getting hammered by extra-strong rainstorms, thanks to new analysis of satellite data.

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Hundreds Dead in Sinking of Overloaded Haiti Ferry : Disaster: Only 285 survivors are found from 2,000 believed aboard the boat when it capsized in a storm.

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A heavily overloaded ferry sank in a storm off the coast of Haiti, drowning most of the 2,000 passengers believed aboard, Haitian rescue workers and U.S. Coast Guard officials said Thursday.

Jonel Charles, head of the Haitian Red Cross, said in a telephone interview that only 285 survivors had been found by late Thursday afternoon, almost two days after the 150-foot boat Neptune went down.

The accident occurred late Tuesday night as the Neptune made its regular 12-hour, 150-mile run from the western port of Jeremie to Port-au-Prince. Besides passengers, the ferry ordinarily carries cargo, particularly tons of charcoal, and large numbers of animals for sale in the area of Port-au-Prince, Haiti's largest city.

When seen earlier this week, tied up at the docks of the Haitian capital, the vessel carried no visible lifeboats. Survivors told local reporters Thursday that there were no life jackets or other emergency gear, including radios, on board.

They added that the crew gave no help after the craft sank.

The captain, identified by radio reports as Benjamin St. Clair, survived and swam to shore. He was quoted as saying the passengers' panic contributed to the disaster.

Survivors told local radio stations that the passengers panicked when the Neptune began to pitch and roll in the wind and rain.

"Many of the people rushed to one side," a woman survivor told Radio Metropole, "and others rushed to the top" deck.

Radio Metropole also reported that the crush of people caused that deck to collapse onto hundreds of people below. Officials speculated that the collapse and the rush to one side caused the vessel to capsize, spilling people, cattle and cargo into the ocean.

Reporters on the scene said some of those on the ship had survived by holding on to the carcasses of dead cattle. Others spoke of holding on to crates of soda water.

A 33-year-old survivor said he frantically grabbed a bag of charcoal after being swept into the ocean and hugged it to his chest until a small fishing boat rescued him Wednesday afternoon.

"I was saved by this bucket," said one exhausted woman, pointing to a small white plastic bucket at her feet. "I swam for my life."

The sea around the vessel, officials and survivors said, was filled with people and debris.

One survivor, Madeleine Julien, 29, told the Associated Press, "I kept bumping into drowned people."

Lt. Cmdr. Larry Mizell, the U.S. Coast Guard representative here, said the triple-deck ship ran into a heavy rainstorm about halfway through the voyage and went down near the coastal town of Miragoane.

"This is one of the worst maritime disasters in recent history," Mizell said.

Reports of the disaster were delayed until Thursday morning because of the almost total lack of communications between the capital and the area where survivors managed to reach shore.

According to Mizell and local rescue workers, more than 200 bodies had been recovered. One Haitian Red Cross official said that, while more survivors might turn up, he thought the death toll would reach 1,500 or even more.

Petty Officer Steve Sapp, another Coast Guard spokesman, said in a telephone interview from his Miami office, "One of our cutters picked up so many bodies they stopped counting because there were just too many to keep track of."

Mizell said two Coast Guard cutters and American planes were searching the waters for bodies and survivors.

The Haitian navy is nearly inoperative and was able to put only two small motor boats into the search-and-rescue effort.

Because their impoverished country lacks usable roads and transport vehicles, thousands of Haitians use ferries to move about the island nation. Most of the vessels are small, aging and in bad condition. Passengers report constant engine failures; accidents and even deaths are frequent.

Officials said the Neptune should not have carried more than 650 or so passengers but almost always had more people aboard. The most conservative estimate of Tuesday night's passenger load was 850. But survivors and people familiar with the loading patterns of the ferries said that was undoubtedly low.

"We probably will never know exactly how many were on the vessel," said Petty Officer Joe Dye, a Coast Guard spokesman in Miami. "There are no passenger lists. They cram as many people on board as they can."

Mizell said that "there are a lot of debris and lots of bodies" floating in the water.

He and other American officials stressed that the accident was unrelated to the intermittent efforts of Haitians to sail to the United States to escape economic misery and political repression. More than 1,000 Haitians have drowned in those efforts to reach asylum over the last year and a half.

Survivors of this most recent wreck were found along a 30-mile stretch from Miragoane to Petit Goave and Leogane to the east.

Disasters at Sea

Some major passenger ship tragedies: Dec. 21, 1992: About 380 Haitians drown as refugee boat sinks off Great Inagua Island, Bahamas. Aug. 8, 1988: As many as 400 drown in India when a ferry capsizes in the Ganges River. Dec. 20, 1987: Dona Paz ferry collides with the tanker MT Victor in the Philippines. 1,749 confirmed drowned. May, 1986: 262 killed as overcrowded ferry sinks in the Sandhya River near Brisal, Bangladesh. Jan. 27, 1981: 580 killed when Indonesian passenger ship Tamponas II catches fire and sinks in Java Sea. Sept. 26, 1954: 1,172 killed when Japanese ferry Toya Maru sinks in Tsugaru Strait, Japan. Dec. 3, 1948: 3,920 die when refugee ship Kiangya explodes and sinks near Shanghai.

Source: Associated Press

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Hundreds Dead in Sinking of Overloaded Haiti Ferry : Disaster: Only 285 survivors are found from 2,000 believed aboard the boat when it capsized in a storm.

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A heavily overloaded ferry sank in a storm off the coast of Haiti, drowning most of the 2,000 passengers believed aboard, Haitian rescue workers and U.S.

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STS-51L was NASA's 25th mission and after 73 seconds of being airbone the rocket suddenly exploded which was due to a o-ring failure.

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American Human Spaceflight Accidents - NASA

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BOOKS - E-BOOKS - HEARINGS AND REPORTS - INTERNET RESOURCES

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Nathan B - Hurricanes & Floods in Louisiana

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Nathan B - Hurricanes & Floods in Louisiana

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https://goodmenproject.com/featured-content/disasters-and-vanishing-land-are-leaving-the-most-vulnerable-behind-in-southeastern-louisiana/

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On 3 October 2015, a United States Air Force AC-130U gunship attacked the Kunduz Trauma Centre operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders) in the city of Kunduz, in the province of the same name in northern Afghanistan.[excessive citations ] 42 people were killed and over 30 were injured. Médecins Sans Frontières condemned the incident, calling it a deliberate breach of international humanitarian law and a war crime. It further stated that all warring parties had been notified about the hospital and its operations well in advance.

The United States military initially said the airstrike was carried out to defend U.S. forces on the ground. Later, the United States commander in Afghanistan, General John F. Campbell, said the airstrike was requested by Afghan forces who had come under Taliban fire. Finally, Campbell said the airstrike was a US decision, made in the US chain of command and not requested by Afghan forces. Campbell said the attack was "a mistake," and, "We would never intentionally target a protected medical facility." The USCENTCOM 15-6 report stated that General Campbell's own lack of strategic guidance and dissemination of certain Rules of Engagement were major contributing factors that led to the command and control breakdown prior to the airstrike. Anonymous sources alleged that cockpit recordings showed the AC-130 crew questioned the strike's legality.

On 7 October 2015, President Barack Obama issued an apology and announced the United States would be making condolence payments of $6,000 to the families of those killed in the airstrike. Three investigations of the incident were conducted by NATO, a joint United States-Afghan group, and the United States Department of Defense. The Department of Defense released its findings on 29 April 2016. MSF has called for an international and independent probe, saying the armed forces who carried out the airstrike cannot conduct an impartial investigation of their own actions.

On 28 September 2015, Taliban militants seized the city of Kunduz, driving out government forces. After the reinforcements arrived, the Afghan army, backed by U.S. air support, began an offensive operation to regain control of the city. After several days of fighting, Afghan forces claimed to have retaken the city. However, fighting continued, and on 3 October, a US-led airstrike struck and practically destroyed Kunduz Trauma Centre operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), killing doctors, staff members and patients.

MSF had informed all warring parties of the location of its hospital complex. MSF personnel had contacted U.S. military officials as recently as 29 September to reconfirm the precise location of the hospital. Two days prior to the attack Carter Malkasian, adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, emailed MSF asking if the facility had Taliban militants "holed up" inside.

A US Air Force AC-130 Hercules firing its weapons

An M102 howitzer on an AC-130

Médecins Sans Frontières reported that between 02:08 and 03:15 local time ( UTC+04:30) on the night of 3 October, the organization's Kunduz hospital was struck by "a series of aerial bombing raids". The humanitarian organization said the hospital was "hit several times" in the course of the attack, and that the building was "partially destroyed". It further said the hospital had been "repeatedly & precisely hit" and that the attack had continued for 30 minutes after MSF staff contacted U.S. and Afghan officials. The Associated Press reported that US Special Forces were a half mile away from the hospital at the time of the attack, defending the governor of Kunduz province. Likewise, Afghan forces were a half mile away.

The U.S. military initially said there had been an airstrike in the area to defend U.S. forces on the ground, and that "there may have been collateral damage to a nearby medical facility". On 15 October NBC Nightly News reported that according to Defense Department sources, cockpit recordings from the attacking AC-130 gunship "reveal that the crew actually questioned whether the airstrike was legal". U.S. and NATO Commander John F. Campbell later confirmed that a U.S. AC-130 gunship made the attack on the hospital and that it was a US decision, contrary to earlier reports that the strike had been requested by local Afghan forces under Taliban fire. He specified that the decision to use aerial fire was "made within the US chain of command". Campbell said the attack was "a mistake", and "We would never intentionally target a protected medical facility." White House spokesman Josh Earnest defended U.S. forces, saying the U.S. Department of Defense "goes to greater lengths and places a higher premium on avoiding civilian casualties" than any other military in the world, and hinted the U.S. may compensate victims and their families. U.S. President Barack Obama apologized to MSF president Joanne Liu for the incident, saying it was a mistake and was intended to target Taliban fighters. The U.S. committed to making condolence payments to the families of the victims and to help with the rebuilding of the hospital.

The Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqi confirmed an airstrike on 3 October, saying that "10-15 terrorists were hiding in the hospital" and confirming that hospital workers had been killed. The Afghan Ministry of Defense and a representative of the police chief in Kunduz also said that Taliban fighters were hiding in the hospital compound at the time of the attack, the latter claiming that they were using it as a human shield.

Médecins Sans Frontières said no Taliban fighters were in the compound. Christopher Stokes, General Director of Médecins Sans Frontières Belgium, said in a statement late 4 October 2015: "MSF is disgusted by the recent statements coming from some Afghanistan government authorities justifying the attack on its hospital in Kunduz. These statements imply that Afghan and U.S. forces working together decided to raze to the ground a fully functioning hospital - with more than 180 staff and patients inside - because they claim that members of the Taliban were present. This amounts to an admission of a war crime." Stokes said, "If there was a major military operation going on there, our staff would have noticed. And that wasn't the case when the strikes occurred." On 5 October, the organization released a statement saying, "Their [U.S.] description of the attack keeps changing - from collateral damage, to a tragic incident, to now attempting to pass responsibility to the Afghanistan government...There can be no justification for this horrible attack."

Attacks on medical facilities are forbidden under international humanitarian law unless the facilities "are being used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit acts harmful to the enemy". Even if enemy combatants are inappropriately using the facility for shelter, the rule of proportionality usually forbids such attacks because of the high potential for civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch said the laws of war require the attacking force to issue a warning, and wait a reasonable time for a response, before attacking a medical unit being misused by combatants.

At the time of the airstrikes, MSF was treating women and children and wounded combatants from both sides of the conflict. MSF estimates that of the 105 patients present at the time of the attack, three or four of the patients were wounded government combatants and approximately 20 patients were wounded Taliban. MSF General Director Christopher Stokes said, "Some public reports are circulating that the attack on our hospital could be justified because we were treating Taliban. Wounded combatants are patients under international law, and must be free from attack and treated without discrimination. Medical staff should never be punished or attacked for providing treatment to wounded combatants." Furthermore the Hospital had a strictly enforced "NO WEAPONS" policy.

Original Geneva Conventions

Hospitals in war zones are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Former International Criminal Tribunal prosecutor M. Cherif Bassiouni suggested that the attack could be prosecuted as a war crime under the Conventions if the attack was intentional or if it represented gross negligence noting, "even if it were proven that the Kunduz hospital had lost that right of protection due to infiltration by Taliban, the U.S. military personnel responsible for the attack would have to prove it was a military necessity to strike that hospital", even if Taliban forces were indeed using it as a human shield, or else claim that the military was unaware of the hospital's location, risking prosecution for negligence. Nonetheless, he said it is unlikely that the case will ever be tried in an international court, because "the U.S. is unlikely to turn any of their service members over to an outside body for prosecution even after facing its own military legal system." Erna Paris speculated that concern over violation of international law may be the cause of the United States' delay in publishing its own report on the attack. She commented, "To leave MSF dangling would seriously undermine the established laws of war."

Writing about the attack, human rights lawyer Jonathan Horowitz noted of that "Under certain specific and narrowly tailored conditions, individuals can be attacked even when their actions fall short of carrying weapons or opening fire on the enemy. But this alone does not necessarily justify the attack on the hospital." He emphasized the need for an independent investigation, noting that secrecy from the US and Afghanistan would be damaging to any investigation.

Previous to 12 December when new figures were released, casualty reports listed 30 dead including 13 MSF staff (three of them doctors), ten patients, and seven burned beyond recognition and as yet unidentified. MSF reported that six intensive care patients were burned to death in their beds, and another patient died after staff had to leave the individual on the operating table. They reported that the 12 staff killed were all Afghan nationals, and that all three of their international staff members who were present survived. A review of the incident released on 7 November by MSF reported that some medical staff were decapitated and lost limbs to shrapnel and others were shot from the air as they tried to flee the burning building.

On 12 December, MSF released a new report following an "exhaustive investigation [that] included combing through the rubble of the hospital to find further human remains, interviewing family members of missing victims and crosschecking with other hospitals." The new figure for the number of deaths is "at least 42 people", including 14 staff members, 24 patients and four relatives of patients.

The attack made the hospital unusable. All critical patients were referred to other providers, and all MSF staff were evacuated from Kunduz. Before the bombing, the MSF's hospital was the only active medical facility in the area. It has been the only trauma center in northeastern Afghanistan. In 2014, more than 22,000 patients were treated at this emergency trauma center and more than 5,900 surgeries were performed.

Glenn Greenwald of The Intercept accused CNN and The New York Times of "deliberately obscuring who perpetrated the Afghan hospital attack" during the first thirty-six hours after the airstrike, stating that their reporting was "designed to obfuscate who carried out this atrocity." Ben Norton noted in FAIR, "Ambiguous, misleading and even downright dishonest language abounds throughout the coverage."

MSF's internal review

MSF does not ask the allegiance of its patients. However, judging from their patients' clothing and other indications, MSF estimated that of the 105 patients at the time of the attack, between three and four of the patients were wounded government combatants, while approximately 20 patients were wounded Taliban.

MSF's investigation confirmed that "the MSF's rules in the hospital were implemented and respected, including the 'no weapons' policy; MSF was in full control of the hospital before and at the time of the airstrikes; there were no armed combatants within the hospital compound and there was no fighting from or in the direct vicinity of the trauma centre before the airstrikes." MSF stated in their press release presenting the review that "wounded combatants are patients and must be free from attack and treated without discrimination; medical staff should never be punished or attacked for providing treatment to wounded combatants."

Afghan investigation

Afghan president Ashraf Ghani appointed a five-member commission to investigate the airstrike as well as the Battle of Kunduz more generally. As of 2018, no findings were made public.

NATO investigation

NATO said it was continuing its inquiry into the bombing and had appointed three US military officers from outside the chain of command to handle the investigation to ensure impartiality.

As of 2018, no findings were made public.

U.S. internal investigation, apology, and reparations

Eleven days after the attack, MSF said an American tank forcibly entered the hospital: "Their unannounced and forced entry damaged property, destroyed potential evidence and caused stress and fear." The tank smashed the gate of the hospital complex. The MSF executives who happened to be in the hospital at the time were told that the tank was carrying a US-Nato-Afghan team investigating the attack. A US captain claimed they were unaware of any remaining MSF staff at the site and were in the process of doing damage assessment.

MSF logo

On 25 November 2015, General John F. Campbell, the American commander in Afghanistan, spoke about the results of their internal investigation and described the incident as "the direct result of avoidable human error, compounded by process and equipment failures." Campbell said that the internal investigation had showed that the AC-130 gunship crew misidentified the clinic as a nearby Taliban-controlled government building. The American gunship had identified the building based on a visual description from Afghan troops, and did not consult their no-strike list, which included the coordinates of the hospital as provided by MSF. Campbell said electronic equipment malfunctions on the gunship prevented it from accessing email and images, while a navigation error meant its targeting equipment also misidentified the target buildings. The internal report states the aircraft fired 211 shells at the building in 29 minutes, before American commanders realized the mistake and ordered the attack to stop. The report found that the MSF facility "did not have an internationally-recognized symbol to identify it as a medical facility,". This finding was contested by Joe Goldstein stating that the facility had a MSF symbol on it. According to the report, 12 minutes into the operation, the US military was contacted by MSF, but the faulty electronics on the plane prevented the message from getting through until the attack was over.

A final report by the Pentagon, released 29 April 2016, reaffirmed the incident as an accident, and said it thus did not amount to a war crime. Sixteen members of the U.S. military were disciplined as a result of the investigation, though none were criminally charged. Twelve personnel involved in the strike were punished with "suspension and removal from command, letters of reprimand, formal counselling and extensive retraining". The U.S. government said that more than 170 condolence payments had been made, $3,000 for wounded people and $6,000 for dead, and $5.7 million was set aside for the hospital's reconstruction.

Calls for independent investigations

Médecins Sans Frontières called for an independent inquiry of the air attack on the hospital, accusing the United States of committing a "war crime" and calling an internal U.S. investigation insufficient. The call for an independent investigation was supported by , MSF suggested that the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, which is based in Bern, should undertake this work.

Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki Moon said "hospitals and medical personnel are explicitly protected under international humanitarian law" and called for an independent investigation. Nicholas Haysom, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan called "on all parties to the conflict to respect and protect medical and humanitarian personnel and facilities". UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein responded that "This event is utterly tragic, inexcusable, and possibly even criminal" and likewise called for an independent investigation.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) called the attack a "shocking development" and said "All forces are obligated to do their utmost to avoid causing civilian harm." They called for "an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation into the incident to establish the circumstances of the attack". Following the US internal investigation HRW urged the US to "establish an independent panel outside the military chain of command with the aim of establishing the facts and assessing possible culpability" and further said that "contradictory statements since the October 3 airstrike raise concerns about the credibility of these investigations".

Amnesty International expressed "serious concerns about the Department of Defense's questionable track record of policing itself" and called for an independent investigation.

The only investigations that have been done are by MSF, the US or Afghan government, and NATO; therefore, no independent investigation has ever occurred.

1. ^ "Afghanistan: MSF Demands Explanations After Deadly Airstrikes Hit Hospital in Kunduz". Doctors Without Borders. 3 October 2015. Archived from the original on 6 October 2015.

2. ^ Doctors Without Borders Enraged Over 'Deliberate' Kunduz Hospital Bombing. The Huffington Post, 6 October 2015.

3. Joshua Keating, "The Doctors Without Borders Bombing Is Looking More and More Like a War Crime", Slate (16 October 2015)

4. O'Donnell, Lynne (10 October 2015). "Afghan president orders investigation into fall of Kunduz". New York. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016.

5. ^ "Internal Review, Attack on Kunduz Trauma Centre" (PDF). Médecins Sans Frontières. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 February 2018.

6. ^ "In Memoriam: MSF Colleagues Killed in the Kunduz Trauma Hospital Attack". 23 November 2015. Archived from the original on 30 April 2020.

7. ^ Dromi, Shai M. (2020). Above the fray: The Red Cross and the making of the humanitarian NGO sector. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. pp. vii-viii. ISBN 9780226680101.

8. ^ "SUBJECT: Summary of the Airstrike on the MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz, Afghanistan on October 3, 2015; Investigation and Follow-on Actions" (PDF). US CENTCOM FOIA Library. United States Central Command. 28 April 2016. The investigation also concluded that the MSF Trauma Center did not have an internationally recognized symbol to identify it as a medical facility, such as a Red Cross Red Crescent that was readily visible to the aircrew at night.
Brendan O'Connor (29 April 2016). "U.S. Military Attributes Doctors Without Borders Hospital Bombing to "Fog of War"". Gawker. Gawker Media Group. Archived from the original on 29 June 2016. According to the report, the hospital "did not have an internationally- recognized symbol to identify it as a medical facility, such as a Red Cross or Red Crescent that was readily visible to the aircrew at night."

9. ^ Ben Mathis-Lilley (29 April 2016). "Times Reporter Says U.S. Is Wrong About Critical Detail in Doctors Without Borders Report". Slate. The Slate Group. Blaming the victims?Military says MSF hospital didn't have a visible "internationally-recognized symbol" such as red cross or crescent. 1/2 It was brightly lit. Spread on the hospital roof was a large white & red flag reading "Médecins Sans Frontières,"the group's French name. 2/2

10. ^ Wagner, Laura (28 April 2016). "16 U.S. Service Members Disciplined in Mistaken Airstrikes on Afghan Hospital". NPR.

11. ^ What are the Geneva Conventions for?, editorial, The Lancet, vol. 386, no. 10003, p. 1510, 17 October 2015

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On 3 October 2015, a United States Air Force AC-130U gunship attacked the Kunduz Trauma Centre operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders) in the city of Kunduz, in the province of the same name in northern Afghanistan.[excessive citations ] 42 people were killed and over 30 were injured.

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School bus-sized satellite crashes into Earth's atmosphere over North Pacific Ocean

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School bus-sized satellite crashes into Earth’s atmosphere over North Pacific Ocean

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A defunct European Space Agency 38-foot satellite came crashing down to Earth on Wednesday, more than a decade after the spacecraft finished its mission.

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"The tragic steamer Sultana." March 25, 1898. Lincoln County Leader (Toledo, OR), Image 6. Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers.

A boiler explodes, shattering the silence of the night and throwing the hopeless passengers of the SS Sultana into the Mississippi River. Legally allowed to carry 376 people, the Sultana was carrying over 2,300 passengers, most of whom were Union soldiers recently released from Confederate prisons. The estimated death toll increases steadily to 1,700 or 1,800 in the worst maritime disaster in American history. Read more about it!

The information in this guide focuses on primary source materials found in the digitized historic newspapers from the digital collection Chronicling America.

The timeline below highlights important dates related to this topic and a section of this guide provides some suggested search strategies for further research in the collection.

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Research Guides: Sinking of the SS Sultana: Topics in Chronicling America: Introduction

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In April 1865, the SS Sultana, carrying over 2,000 recently released Union soldiers, exploded. This guide provides access to material related to the "Sinking of the SS Sultana" in the Chronicling America digital collection of historic newspapers.

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the challenger disaster

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Challenger disaster, explosion of the U.S. space shuttle orbiter Challenger, shortly after its launch from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on January 28, 1986. The disaster claimed the lives of seven astronauts.

The primary goal of shuttle mission 51-L was to launch the second Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-B). It also carried the Spartan Halley spacecraft, a small satellite that was to be released by Challenger and picked up two days later after observing Halley's Comet during its closest approach to the Sun.

Greatest visibility among the crew went to teacher-in-space Christa McAuliffe of Concord, New Hampshire, the winner of a national screening begun in 1984. McAuliffe was to conduct at least two lessons from orbit and then spend the following nine months lecturing students across the United States. The goal was to highlight the importance of teachers and to interest students in high-tech careers. Other members of the crew were commander Francis (Dick) Scobee, pilot Michael Smith, mission specialists Ellison Onizuka, Judith Resnik, and Ronald McNair, and Hughes Aircraft engineer Gregory Jarvis.

The mission experienced trouble at the outset, as the launch was postponed for several days, partly because of delays in getting the previous shuttle mission, 61-C ( Columbia), back on the ground. On the night before the launch, central Florida was swept by a severe cold wave that deposited thick ice on the launch pad. On launch day, January 28, liftoff was delayed until 11:38 am. All appeared to be normal until after the vehicle emerged from "Max-Q," the period of greatest aerodynamic pressure. Mission Control told Scobee, " Challenger, go with throttle up," and seconds later the vehicle disappeared in an explosion just 73 seconds after liftoff, at an altitude of 14,000 metres (46,000 feet). Tapes salvaged from the wreckage showed that the instant before breakup Smith said "Uh-oh," but nothing else was heard. Debris rained into the Atlantic Ocean for more than an hour after the explosion; searches revealed no sign of the crew.

The incident immediately grounded the shuttle program. An intensive investigation by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and a commission appointed by U.S. Pres. Ronald Reagan and chaired by former secretary of state William Rogers followed. Other members of the commission included astronauts Neil Armstrong and Sally Ride, test pilot Chuck Yeager, and physicist Richard Feynman. What emerged was an appalling pattern of assumptions that the vehicle could survive minor mishaps and be pushed even further. The ill-fated launch brought to the fore the difficulties that NASA had been experiencing for many years in trying to accomplish too much with too little money.

The immediate cause of the accident was suspected within days and was fully established within a few weeks. The severe cold reduced the resiliency of two rubber O-rings that sealed the joint between the two lower segments of the right-hand solid rocket booster. (At a commission hearing, Feynman convincingly demonstrated the loss of O-ring resiliency by submerging an O-ring in a glass of ice water.) Under normal circumstances, when the shuttle's three main engines ignited, they pressed the whole vehicle forward, and the boosters were ignited when the vehicle swung back to centre. On the morning of the accident, an effect called "joint rotation" occurred, which prevented the rings from resealing and opened a path for hot exhaust gas to escape from inside the booster. Puffs of black smoke appeared on the far side of the booster in a spot not visible to most cameras.

As the vehicle ascended, the leak expanded, and after 59 seconds a 2.4-metre (8-foot) stream of flame emerged from the hole. This grew to 12 metres (40 feet) and gradually eroded one of three struts that secured the booster's base to the large external tank carrying liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen for the orbiter engines. At the same time, thrust in the booster lagged slightly, although within limits, and the nozzle steering systems tried to compensate. When the strut broke, the booster's base swiveled outward, forcing its nose through the top of the external fuel tank and causing the whole tank to collapse and explode. Through ground tracking cameras this was seen as a brief flame licking from a concealed spot on the right side of the vehicle a few seconds before everything disappeared in the fireball. Even if the plume had been seen at liftoff, there would have been no hope for crew escape, because the shuttle orbiter could not survive high-speed separation from the tank until the last seconds of the boosters' two-minute burn.

Challenger broke up in the explosion, but the forward section with the crew cabin was severed in one piece; it continued to coast upward with other debris, including wings and still-flaming engines, and then plummeted to the ocean. It was believed that the crew survived the initial breakup but that loss of cabin pressure rendered them unconscious within seconds, since they did not wear pressure suits. Death probably resulted from oxygen deficiency minutes before impact.

The boosters also survived the fireball and righted themselves to continue flying, something totally unexpected. Range safety officers finally detonated their charges 30 seconds later to prevent them from overflying land. After the accident, NASA immediately began work on a redesigned solid booster for future launches.

An intensive salvage operation was organized to retrieve as much of the wreckage as possible and the bodies of the crew. The task was complicated by the force of the explosion and the altitude at which it occurred, as well as the separate paths taken by the boosters.

The Rogers Commission report, delivered on June 6 to the president, faulted NASA as a whole, and its Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and contractor Morton Thiokol, Inc., in Ogden, Utah, in particular, for poor engineering and management. Marshall was responsible for the shuttle boosters, engines, and tank, while Morton Thiokol manufactured the booster motors and assembled them at the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida.

The Rogers Commission heard disturbing testimony from a number of engineers who had been expressing concern about the reliability of the seals for at least two years and who had warned superiors about a possible failure the night before 51-L was launched. One of the Rogers Commission's strongest recommendations was to tighten the communication gap between shuttle managers and working engineers. In response to this implied criticism that its quality-control measures had become slack, NASA added several more checkpoints in the shuttle bureaucracy, including a new NASA safety office and a shuttle safety advisory panel, in order to prevent such a "flawed" decision to launch from being made again.

Aside from these internal fixes at NASA, however, the Rogers Commission addressed a more fundamental problem. In NASA's efforts to streamline shuttle operations in pursuit of its declared goal of flying 24 missions a year, the commission said, the agency had simply been pushing too hard. The shuttle program had neither the personnel nor the spare parts to maintain such an ambitious flight rate without straining its physical resources or overworking its technicians.

This judgment cut to the core of the way in which the national space program had been conducted in the shuttle era. Indeed, the Challenger accident merely focused attention on more deeply seated problems that had existed for as long as 15 years. From the time it was approved by Pres. Richard Nixon in 1972, the shuttle had been conceived as a "do-everything" vehicle for carrying every kind of space payload, from commercial and scientific satellites to military spacecraft to probes bound for the outer planets. NASA's fleet of conventional "expendable" rockets such as the Delta and Atlas had been phased out in the shuttle era as a result and were being used primarily to reach polar orbits that the shuttle could not reach from Cape Canaveral.

Although this reliance on the shuttle was the officially stated national space policy, the Department of Defense had begun to retreat from relying exclusively on the shuttle even before the Challenger accident. Concerned that shuttle launch delays would jeopardize the assured access to space of high-priority national security satellites, the Air Force in 1985 began a program of buying advanced Titan rockets as "complementary expendable launch vehicles" for its own use.

Other, less powerful groups came forward after the Challenger accident to express their long-standing unhappiness with exclusive reliance on the shuttle for their access to space. Among those calling for a "mixed fleet" of shuttles and expendable launchers were scientists whose missions now faced long delays because the shuttle had become the only existing means of carrying their spacecraft.

By July, when NASA announced that the shuttle would not be ready to fly again until 1988, there was still no decision from Congress or the White House as to whether another orbiter would be built to replace Challenger. Proponents argued that another vehicle-perhaps two more-would be needed to meet the launch needs of the 1990s, which would include construction of NASA's international space station, a permanent facility in Earth orbit.

In mid-August Pres. Ronald Reagan announced that construction of a replacement shuttle orbiter (later named Endeavour) would begin immediately. When the shuttle resumed service, however, it would no longer be in the business of launching satellites for paying customers but would be devoted almost exclusively to defense and scientific payloads. The Reagan administration had long had the goal of stimulating a private space launch industry, and now, with the removal of a heavily subsidized competitor from the market, three different companies stepped forward within a week's time to announce plans for operating commercial versions of the Delta, Titan, and Atlas/Centaur launchers.

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Challenger disaster | Summary, Date, Cause, & Facts

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Challenger disaster, explosion of the U.S. space shuttle orbiter Challenger, shortly after its launch from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on January 28, 1986, which claimed the lives of seven astronauts, including Christa McAuliffe, who had won a national screening to become the first teacher in space.

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Yangtze River floods

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Yangtze River floods, floods of the Yangtze River (Chang Jiang) in central and eastern China that have occurred periodically and often have caused considerable destruction of property and loss of life. Among the most recent major flood events are those of 1870, 1931, 1954, 1998, and 2010.

The Yangtze River, the longest river in Asia, also is one of the world's major waterways. It originates at an elevation above 16,400 feet (5,000 metres) in the Plateau of Tibet and proceeds generally eastward along a winding course until it empties into its major delta system on the East China Sea. The primary flood region is the lower course, downstream of the Three Gorges Dam, an area in which the river flows through low-lying terrain dotted by lakes, marshes, and meandering streams. Increases in the region's population led to efforts to control the river. The Great Jinjiang Levee, completed in 1548, was one of many barriers constructed, and by the late 19th century the Yangtze could drain through only four openings on the south side of the river. Consequently, sediment was deposited only on the river bottom or in Dongting Lake, which caused the flood level to rise and created a lowland on the north bank. In addition, many of the lakes that had once acted as flood control either were cut off from the river by levees or were converted into cropland. Deforestation further reduced the capacity of the area to handle intense rains, which created more runoff.

As a result, when the lower Yangtze basin has experienced sustained heavy rains, the consequences have been catastrophic. The flood of 1931 covered more than 30,000 square miles (77,700 square km)-including the cities of Nanjing and Wuhan-killed more than 300,000 people, and left 40,000,000 more homeless. Subsequently, more-effective levees were built, but the floods of 1954 and 1998 were still highly destructive and killed some 30,000 and 3,650 people, respectively. One of the major objectives of the Three Gorges Dam project was to alleviate flooding on the lower Yangtze. The dam proved effective during the extraordinarily rainy summer of 2010 by holding back much of the resultant floodwaters and thus minimizing the impact of flooding downstream. However, the dam still had to open its floodgates to reduce the high water volume in the reservoir, and flooding and landslides in the Yangtze basin killed several hundred people and caused extensive property damage.

Kenneth Pletcher.

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Yangtze River floods, floods of the Yangtze River (Chang Jiang) in central and eastern China that have occurred periodically and often have caused considerable destruction of property and loss of life. Among the most recent major flood events are those of 1870, 1931, 1954, 1998, and 2010.

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On March 18, 1925, the Great Tri-State Tornado tore across Southeast Missouri, Southern Illinois, and Southwest Indiana. With its rapid movement, monstrous size, and long track, the tornado took hundreds of lives and injured thousands. By all means, the Tri-State Tornado was a rare event-an event that few people will ever experience in their lifetime. To give you some idea of this tornado's magnitude, this section is devoted to a list of incredible statistics on the tornado.

Missouri: Reynolds, Iron, Madison, Bollinger, Perry

Illinois: Jackson, Williamson, Franklin, Hamilton, White

Indiana: Posey, Gibson, Pike

Missouri: Ellington, Redford, Leadanna, Annapolis, Cornwall, Biehle, Frohna

Illinois: Gorham, Murphysboro, De Soto, Hurst-Bush, Zeigler, West Frankfort, Eighteen, Parrish, Crossville

Indiana: Griffin, Owensville, Princeton

Tornado Track | Weather Ingredients | First-Hand Accounts | Startling Statistics | Photographs

Interesting Quotes | 1925: Now vs. Then | General Information | Links/Resources | Contact Us

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On March 18, 1925, the Great Tri-State Tornado tore across Southeast Missouri, Southern Illinois, and Southwest Indiana. With its rapid movement, monstrous size, and long track, the tornado took hundreds of lives and injured thousands. By all means, the Tri-State Tornado was a rare event-an event that few people will ever experience in their lifetime.

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A highway in Brazil had very dense fog which ended up causing a large car pileup of over 300 cars which stretched over 1 mile.

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Hurricane Katrina was a devastating Category 5 Atlantic hurricane that caused 1,836 fatalities and damage estimated between $97.4 billion to $145.5 billion in late August 2005, particularly in the city of New Orleans and its surrounding area. At the time, it was the costliest tropical cyclone on record, later tied by Hurricane Harvey of 2017. Katrina was the twelfth tropical cyclone, the fifth hurricane, and the third major hurricane of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season. It was also the fourth-most intense Atlantic hurricane to make landfall in the contiguous United States, gauged by barometric pressure.

Katrina began on August 23, 2005, with the merger of a tropical wave and the remnants of Tropical Depression Ten. Early the following day, the depression intensified into a tropical storm and headed generally westward toward Florida. On August 25, two hours before making landfall at Hallandale Beach, it strengthened into a hurricane. After briefly weakening to tropical storm strength over southern Florida, Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico on August 26 and rapidly intensified. The storm strengthened into a Category 5 hurricane over the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico before weakening to a high-end Category 3 hurricane at its second landfall on August 29 over southeast Louisiana and Mississippi.

The largest loss of life in Hurricane Katrina was due to flooding caused by engineering flaws in the flood protection system, particularly the levee around the city of New Orleans. Eventually, 80% of the city, as well as large areas in neighboring parishes, were flooded for weeks. The flooding destroyed most of New Orleans's transportation and communication facilities, leaving tens of thousands of people who did not evacuate the city prior to landfall with little access to food, shelter, and other basic necessities. The disaster in New Orleans prompted a massive national and international response effort, including federal, local, and private rescue operations to evacuate those displaced from the city in the following weeks. After the storm, multiple investigations concluded that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which had designed and built the region's levees decades earlier, was responsible for the failure of the flood-control systems. However, federal courts later ruled that the Corps could not be held financially liable due to sovereign immunity in the Flood Control Act of 1928.

The emergency response from federal, state, and local governments was widely criticized, leading to the resignation of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) director Michael D. Brown and New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) Superintendent Eddie Compass. Many other government officials faced criticism for their responses, especially New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, and President George W. Bush. However, several agencies, such as the United States Coast Guard (USCG), National Hurricane Center (NHC), and National Weather Service (NWS), were commended for their actions, with the NHC being particularly praised for its accurate forecasts well in advance. Katrina was the earliest 11th named storm on record, before being surpassed by Tropical Storm Kyle on August 14, 2020. The destruction and loss of life caused by the storm prompted the name Katrina to be retired by the World Meteorological Organization in April 2006.

On January 4, 2023, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) updated the Katrina fatality data based on a report by Rappaport (2014) which reduced the number from an estimated 1,833 to 1,392. The same NHC report also revised the total damage estimate keeping Hurricane Katrina as the costliest storm ever--$190 billion according to NOAA's National Centers for Environmental Information.

Meteorological history

Map plotting the storm's track and intensity, according to the Saffir-Simpson scale

Hurricane Katrina originated from the merger of a tropical wave and the mid-level remnants of Tropical Depression Ten on August 19, 2005, near the Lesser Antilles. On August 23, the disturbance organized into Tropical Depression Twelve over the southeastern Bahamas. The storm strengthened into Tropical Storm Katrina on the morning of August 24. The tropical storm moved towards Florida and became a hurricane only two hours before making landfall between Hallandale Beach and Aventura on the morning of August 25. The storm weakened over land, but it regained hurricane status about one hour after entering the Gulf of Mexico, and it continued strengthening over open waters. On August 27, the storm reached Category 3 intensity on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale, becoming the third major hurricane of the season. An eyewall replacement cycle disrupted the intensification but caused the storm to nearly double in size. Thereafter, Katrina rapidly intensified over the "unusually warm" waters of the Loop Current, from a Category 3 hurricane to a Category 5 hurricane in just nine hours.

After attaining Category 5 hurricane status on the morning of August 28, Katrina reached its peak strength at 1800 UTC, with maximum sustained winds of 175 mph (280 km/h) and a minimum central pressure of 902 mbar (26.6 inHg). The pressure measurement made Katrina the fifth most intense Atlantic hurricane on record at the time, only to be surpassed by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma later in the season; it was also the strongest hurricane ever recorded in the Gulf of Mexico at the time, before Rita broke the record. The hurricane subsequently weakened due to another eyewall replacement cycle, and Katrina made its second landfall at 1110 UTC on August 29, as a high end Category 3 hurricane with sustained winds of 125 mph (201 km/h), near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana. At landfall, hurricane-force winds extended outward 120 miles (190 km) from the center and the storm's central pressure was 920 mbar (27 inHg). After moving over southeastern Louisiana and Breton Sound, it made its third and final landfall near the Louisiana-Mississippi border with 120 mph (190 km/h) sustained winds, still at a mid range Category 3 hurricane intensity. Katrina maintained strength well into Mississippi, finally losing hurricane strength more than 150 miles (240 km) inland near Meridian, Mississippi. It was downgraded to a tropical depression near Clarksville, Tennessee; its remnants were absorbed by a cold front in the eastern Great Lakes region on August 31. The resulting extratropical storm moved rapidly to the northeast and affected eastern Canada.

Preparations

Federal government

Flanked by Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, left, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, President Bush meets with members of the Task Force on Hurricane Katrina Recovery on August 31, 2005.

The United States Coast Guard began pre-positioning resources in a ring around the expected impact zone and activated more than 400 reservists. On August 27, it moved its personnel out of the New Orleans region prior to the mandatory evacuation. Aircrews from the Aviation Training Center, in Mobile, staged rescue aircraft from Texas to Florida. All aircraft were returning towards the Gulf of Mexico by the afternoon of August 29. Aircrews, many of whom lost their homes during the hurricane, began a round-the-clock rescue effort in New Orleans, and along the Mississippi and Alabama coastlines.

President George W. Bush declared a state of emergency in selected regions of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi on August 27. "On Sunday, August 28, President Bush spoke with Governor Blanco to encourage her to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans." However, during the testimony by former Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) chief Michael Brown before a U.S. House subcommittee on September 26, Representative Stephen Buyer (R-IN) inquired as to why Bush's declaration of state of emergency of August 27 had not included the coastal parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and Plaquemines. The declaration actually did not include any of Louisiana's coastal parishes, whereas the coastal counties were included in the declarations for Mississippi and Alabama. Brown testified that this was because Louisiana Governor Blanco had not included those parishes in her initial request for aid, a decision that he found "shocking". After the hearing, Blanco released a copy of her letter, which showed she had requested assistance for "all the southeastern parishes including the City of New Orleans" as well specifically naming 14 parishes, including Jefferson, Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines.

Voluntary and mandatory evacuations were issued for large areas of southeast Louisiana as well as coastal Mississippi and Alabama. About 1.2 million residents of the Gulf Coast were covered under a voluntary or mandatory evacuation order.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

On the afternoon of August 26, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) realized that Katrina had yet to make the turn toward the Florida Panhandle and ended up revising the predicted track of the storm from the panhandle to the Mississippi coast. The National Weather Service's New Orleans/Baton Rouge office issued a vividly worded bulletin on August 28 predicting that the area would be "uninhabitable for weeks" after "devastating damage" caused by Katrina, which at that time rivaled the intensity of Hurricane Camille. During video conferences involving the president later that day and on August 29, NHC director Max Mayfield expressed concern that Katrina might push its storm surge over the city's levees and flood walls. In one conference, he stated, "I do not think anyone can tell you with confidence right now whether the levees will be topped or not, but that's obviously a very, very great concern."

Florida and Gulf Coast

In Florida, Governor Jeb Bush declared a state of emergency on August 24 in advance of Hurricane Katrina's landfall. By the following day, Florida's Emergency Operations Center was activated in Tallahassee to monitor the progress of the hurricane. Before Katrina moved ashore, schools and businesses were closed in the Miami area. Cruise ships altered their paths due to seaports in southeastern Florida closing. Officials in Miami-Dade County advised residents in mobile homes or with special needs to evacuate. To the north in Broward County, residents east of the Intracoastal Waterway or in mobile homes were advised to leave their homes. Evacuation orders were issued for offshore islands in Palm Beach County, and for residents in mobile homes south of Lantana Road. Additionally, a mandatory evacuation was ordered for vulnerable housing in Martin County. Shelters were opened across the region. Officials closed the Miami International Airport, Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, Key West International Airport, and Florida Keys Marathon Airport due to the storm. In Monroe and Collier counties, schools were closed, and a shelter was opened in Immokalee.

Radar loop of Hurricane Katrina making landfall in Louisiana

On August 28, Alabama Governor Bob Riley declared a state of emergency for the approaching Hurricane Katrina. On the same day, he requested President Bush to declare "expedited major disaster declaration" for six counties of South Alabama, which was quickly approved. Three hundred fifty national guardsmen were called on duty by August 30. The state of Mississippi activated its National Guard on August 26 in preparation for the storm's landfall. Additionally, the state government activated its Emergency Operations Center the next day, and local governments began issuing evacuation orders. By 6:00 pm CDT on August 28, 11 counties and cities issued evacuation orders, a number which increased to 41 counties and 61 cities by the following morning. Moreover, 57 emergency shelters were established on coastal communities, with 31 additional shelters available to open if needed.

By Sunday, August 28, most infrastructure along the Gulf Coast had been shut down, including all freight and Amtrak rail traffic into the evacuation areas as well as the Waterford Nuclear Generating Station. Since Hurricane Katrina, Amtrak's Sunset Limited service has never been restored past New Orleans.

Vertical cross-section of New Orleans, showing maximum levee height of 23 feet (7 m). Vertical scale exaggerated.

In Louisiana, the state's hurricane evacuation plan calls for local governments in areas along and near the coast to evacuate in three phases, starting with the immediate coast 50 hours before the start of tropical-storm-force winds. Persons in areas designated Phase II begin evacuating 40 hours before the onset of tropical storm winds and those in Phase III areas (including New Orleans) evacuate 30 hours before the start of such winds. Many private caregiving facilities that relied on bus companies and ambulance services for evacuation were unable to evacuate their charges because they waited too long. Louisiana's Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1C (Part II, Section II, Paragraph D) calls for use of school and other public buses in evacuations. Although buses that later flooded were available to transport those dependent upon public transportation, not enough bus drivers were available to drive them as Governor Blanco did not sign an emergency waiver to allow any licensed driver to transport evacuees on school buses.

By August 26, many of the computer models had shifted the potential path of Katrina 150 miles (240 km) westward from the Florida Panhandle, putting the city of New Orleans directly in the center of their track probabilities; the chances of a direct hit were forecast at 17%, with strike probability rising to 29% by August 28. This scenario was considered a potential catastrophe because some parts of New Orleans and the metro area are below sea level. Since the storm surge produced by the hurricane's right-front quadrant (containing the strongest winds) was forecast to be 28 feet (8.5 m), while the levees offered protection to 23 feet (7.0 m), emergency management officials in New Orleans feared that the storm surge could go over the tops of levees protecting the city, causing major flooding.

At a news conference at 10 a.m. EDT on August 28, shortly after Katrina was upgraded to a Category 5 storm, New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin ordered the first-ever mandatory evacuation of the city, calling Katrina "a storm that most of us have long feared". The city government also established several "refuges of last resort" for citizens who could not leave the city, including the massive Louisiana Superdome, which sheltered approximately 26,000 people and provided them with food and water for several days as the storm came ashore. Some estimates claimed that 80% of the 1.3 million residents of the greater New Orleans metropolitan area evacuated, leaving behind substantially fewer people than remained in the city during the Hurricane Ivan evacuation.

On August 29, 2005, Katrina's storm surge caused 53 breaches to various flood protection structures in and around the greater New Orleans area, submerging 80% of the city. A June 2007 report by the American Society of Civil Engineers indicated that two-thirds of the flooding was caused by the multiple failures of the city's floodwalls. The storm surge also devastated the coasts of Mississippi and Alabama, making Katrina one of the most destructive hurricanes, the costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States (tied with Hurricane Harvey in 2017), and the deadliest hurricane since the 1928 Okeechobee hurricane. The total damage from Katrina is estimated at $125 billion (2005 U.S. dollars). However, in February 2021, a severe winter storm struck the United States, causing a major power failure in Houston, which caused at least $195 billion (2021 USD) in damage in Texas. It surpassed both Katrina and Harvey to become the single-costliest natural disaster recorded in the United States.

The death toll from Katrina is uncertain, with reports differing by hundreds. According to the National Hurricane Center, 1,836 fatalities can be attributed to the storm: 1 in Kentucky, 2 each in Alabama, Georgia, and Ohio, 14 in Florida, 238 in Mississippi, and 1,577 in Louisiana. However, 135 people remain categorized as missing in Louisiana, and many of the deaths are indirect, but it is almost impossible to determine the exact cause of some of the fatalities. A 2008 report by the Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness journal indicates that 966 deaths can be directly attributed to the storm in Louisiana, including out of state evacuees, and another 20 indirectly (such as firearm-related deaths and gas poisoning). Due to uncertain causes of death with 454 evacuees, an upper-bound of 1,440 is noted in the paper. A follow-up study by the Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals determined that the storm was directly responsible for 1,170 fatalities in Louisiana.

Federal disaster declarations covered 90,000 square miles (230,000 km ²) of the United States, an area almost as large as the United Kingdom. The hurricane left an estimated three million people without electricity. On September 3, 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff described the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as "probably the worst catastrophe or set of catastrophes", in the country's history, referring to the hurricane itself plus the flooding of New Orleans.

Even in 2010, debris remained in some coastal communities.

Florida, Bahamas, and Cuba

Hurricane Katrina first made landfall between Hallandale Beach and Aventura, Florida on August 25. The storm dropped heavy rainfall in portions of the Miami metropolitan area, with a peak total of 16.43 in (417 mm) in Perrine. As a result, local flooding occurred in Miami-Dade County, damaging approximately 100 homes. Farther south in the Florida Keys, a tornado was spawned in Marathon on August 26. The tornado damaged a hangar at the airport there and caused an estimated $5 million in damage. The rains caused flooding, and the combination of rains and winds downed trees and power lines, leaving 1.45 million people without power. Damage in South Florida was estimated at $523 million, mostly as a result of crop damage. Twelve deaths occurred in South Florida, of which three were caused by downed trees in Broward County, three from drowning in Miami-Dade County, three were from carbon monoxide poisoning caused by generators, one was due to a vehicle accident, one occurred during debris cleanup, and one was associated with a lack of electricity.

Significant impacts were also reported in the Florida Panhandle. Although Katrina moved ashore in Louisiana and Mississippi, its outer periphery produced a 5.37 ft (1.64 m) storm surge in Pensacola. High waves caused beach erosion and closed nearby roadways. There were five tornadoes in the northwestern portion of the state, though none of them caused significant damage. Throughout the Florida Panhandle, the storm resulted in an estimated $100 million in damage. There were two indirect fatalities from Katrina in Walton County as a result of a traffic accident. In the Florida Panhandle, 77,000 customers lost power. Overall, the hurricane killed 14 people and caused at least $623 million in damage.

Before striking South Florida, Katrina traversed the Bahamas as a tropical storm. However, minimal impact was reported, with only "fresh breezes" on various islands.

Although Hurricane Katrina stayed well to the north of Cuba, on August 28 it brought tropical-storm-force winds and rainfall of over 8 in (200 mm) to western regions of the island. Telephone and power lines were damaged and around 8,000 people were evacuated in the Pinar del Río Province. According to Cuban television reports the coastal town of Surgidero de Batabanó was 90% underwater.

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana, with 125 mph (200 km/h) winds, as a strong Category 3 hurricane. Although the storm surge to the east of the path of the eye in Mississippi was higher, a significant surge affected the Louisiana coast. The height of the surge is uncertain because of a lack of data, although a tide gauge in Plaquemines Parish indicated a storm tide in excess of 14 feet (4.3 m), and a 12-foot (3.7 m) storm surge was recorded in Grand Isle. The hurricane made its final landfall near the mouth of the Pearl River, with the eye straddling St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, and Hancock County, Mississippi, on the morning of August 29 at about 9:45 AM CST.

Hurricane Katrina also brought heavy rain to Louisiana, with 8-10 inches (200-250 mm) falling on a wide swath of the eastern part of the state. In the area around Slidell, the rainfall was even higher, and the highest rainfall recorded in the state was approximately 15 inches (380 mm). As a result of the rainfall and storm surge the level of Lake Pontchartrain rose and caused significant flooding along its northeastern shore, affecting communities from Slidell to Mandeville. Several bridges were destroyed, including the I-10 Twin Span Bridge connecting Slidell to New Orleans. Almost 900,000 people in Louisiana lost power as a result of Hurricane Katrina.

According to the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, in St. Bernard Parish, 81% (20,229) of the housing units were damaged. In St. Tammany Parish, 70% (48,792) were damaged and in Plaquemines Parish 80% (7,212) were damaged.

In addition, the combined effect of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was the destruction of an estimated 562 square kilometres (217 sq mi) of coastal wetlands in Louisiana.

New Orleans

As the eye of Hurricane Katrina swept to the northeast, it subjected the city to hurricane conditions for hours. Although power failures prevented accurate measurement of wind speeds in New Orleans, there were a few measurements of hurricane-force winds; based on this information, the NHC concluded that much of the city likely experienced sustained winds of Category 1 or 2 hurricane strength.

Katrina's storm surge caused 53 levee breaches in the federally built levee system protecting metro New Orleans and the failure of the 40 Arpent Canal levee. Failures occurred in New Orleans and surrounding communities, especially St. Bernard Parish. The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO) breached its levees in approximately 20 places, flooding much of eastern New Orleans, most of St. Bernard Parish and the East Bank of Plaquemines Parish. The major levee breaches in the city included breaches at the 17th Street Canal levee, the London Avenue Canal, and the wide, navigable Industrial Canal, which left approximately 80% of the city flooded.

Most of the major roads traveling into and out of the city were damaged. The only major intact highway routes out of the city were the westbound Crescent City Connection and the Huey P. Long Bridge, as large portions of the I-10 Twin Span Bridge traveling eastbound towards Slidell, Louisiana had collapsed. Both the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway and the Crescent City Connection only carried emergency traffic. However, access to downtown New Orleans and the "shelter of last resort" at the Convention Center was never closed because River Road in Jefferson Parish and Leake Avenue and Tchoupitoulas Street in New Orleans were not flooded, and would have allowed access throughout the immediate post-storm emergency period.

Levee breaches in New Orleans also caused a significant number of deaths, with over 700 bodies recovered in New Orleans by October 23, 2005. Some survivors and evacuees reported seeing dead bodies lying in city streets and floating in still-flooded sections, especially in the east of the city. The advanced state of decomposition of many corpses, some of which were left in the water or sun for days before being collected, hindered efforts by coroners to identify many of the dead.

A U.S. coast guardsman searches for survivors in New Orleans in the Katrina aftermath.

The first deaths reported from the city were reported shortly before midnight on August 28, as three nursing home patients died during an evacuation to Baton Rouge, most likely from dehydration. An estimated 215 bodies were found in nursing homes and hospitals in New Orleans, the largest number being at Memorial Medical Center where 45 corpses were recovered. Some 200 patients at Charity Hospital were not evacuated until Friday, September 2, having been without power or fresh water for five days. While there were also early reports of fatalities amid mayhem at the Superdome, only six deaths were confirmed there, with four of these originating from natural causes, one from a drug overdose, and one a suicide. At the Convention Center, four bodies were recovered. One of the four is believed to be the result of a homicide.

There is evidence that many prisoners were abandoned in their cells during the storm, while the guards sought shelter. Hundreds of prisoners were later registered as "unaccounted for".

Mississippi

The Gulf coast of Mississippi suffered extremely severe damage from the impact of Hurricane Katrina on August 29, leaving 238 people dead, 67 missing, and billions of dollars in damage: bridges, barges, boats, piers, houses, and cars were washed inland. Katrina traveled up the entire state; as a result, all 82 counties in Mississippi were declared disaster areas for federal assistance, 47 for full assistance.

After making a brief initial landfall in Louisiana, Katrina had made its final landfall near the state line, and the eyewall passed over the cities of Bay St. Louis and Waveland as a Category 3 hurricane with sustained winds of 120 mph (190 km/h). Katrina's powerful right-front quadrant passed over the west and central Mississippi coast, causing a powerful 27-foot (8.2 m) storm surge, which penetrated 6 miles (10 km) inland in many areas and up to 12 miles (19 km) inland along bays and rivers; in some areas, the surge crossed Interstate 10 for several miles. Hurricane Katrina brought strong winds to Mississippi, which caused significant tree damage throughout the state. The highest unofficial reported wind gust recorded from Katrina was one of 135 mph (217 km/h) in Poplarville, in Pearl River County.

The storm also brought heavy rains with 8-10 inches (200-250 mm) falling in southwestern Mississippi and rain in excess of 4 inches (100 mm) falling throughout the majority of the state. Katrina caused eleven tornadoes in Mississippi on August 29, some of which damaged trees and power lines.

Battered by wind, rain and storm surge, some beachfront neighborhoods were completely leveled. Preliminary estimates by Mississippi officials calculated that 90% of the structures within half a mile of the coastline were completely destroyed, and that storm surges traveled as much as 6 miles (10 km) inland in portions of the state's coast. One apartment complex with approximately thirty residents seeking shelter inside collapsed. More than half of the 13 casinos in the state, which were floated on barges to comply with Mississippi land-based gambling laws, were washed hundreds of yards inland by waves.

A number of streets and bridges were washed away. On U.S. Highway 90 along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, two major bridges were completely destroyed: the Bay St. Louis-Pass Christian bridge, and the Biloxi- Ocean Springs bridge. In addition, the eastbound span of the I-10 bridge over the Pascagoula River estuary was damaged. In the weeks after the storm, with the connectivity of the coastal U.S. Highway 90 shattered, traffic traveling parallel to the coast was reduced first to State Road 11 (parallel to I-10) then to two lanes on the remaining I-10 span when it was opened.

All three coastal counties of the state were severely affected by the storm. Katrina's surge was the most extensive, as well as the highest, in the documented history of the United States; large portions of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson counties were inundated by the storm surge, in all three cases affecting most of the populated areas. Surge covered almost the entire lower half of Hancock County, destroying the coastal communities of Clermont Harbor and Waveland, much of Bay St. Louis, and flowed up the Jourdan River, flooding Diamondhead and Kiln. In Harrison County, Pass Christian was completely inundated, along with a narrow strip of land to the east along the coast, which includes the cities of Long Beach and Gulfport; the flooding was more extensive in communities such as D'Iberville, which borders Back Bay. Biloxi, on a peninsula between the Back Bay and the coast, was particularly hard hit, especially the low-lying Point Cadet area. In Jackson County, storm surge flowed up the wide river estuary, with the combined surge and freshwater flooding cutting the county in half. Remarkably, over 90% of Pascagoula, the easternmost coastal city in Mississippi, and about 75 miles (120 km) east of Katrina's landfall near the Louisiana-Mississippi border was flooded from storm surge at the height of the storm. Other large Jackson County neighborhoods such as Porteaux Bay and Gulf Hills were severely damaged with large portions being completely destroyed, and St. Martin was hard hit; Ocean Springs, Moss Point, Gautier and Escatawpa also suffered major surge damage.

Mississippi Emergency Management Agency officials also recorded deaths in Forrest, Hinds, Warren, and Leake counties. Over 900,000 people throughout the state experienced power outages.

Southeast United States

Although Hurricane Katrina made landfall well to the west, Alabama and the Florida Panhandle were both affected by tropical-storm-force winds and a storm surge varying from 12 to 16 feet (3.7-4.9 m) around Mobile Bay, with higher waves on top. Sustained winds of 67 mph (108 km/h) were recorded in Mobile, Alabama, and the storm surge there was approximately 12 feet (3.7 m). The surge caused significant flooding several miles inland along Mobile Bay. Four tornadoes were also reported in Alabama. Ships, oil rigs, boats and fishing piers were washed ashore along Mobile Bay: the cargo ship M/V Caribbean Clipper and many fishing boats were grounded at Bayou La Batre.

An oil rig under construction along the Mobile River broke its moorings and floated 1.5 miles (2.4 km) northwards before striking the Cochrane Bridge just outside Mobile. No significant damage resulted to the bridge and it was soon reopened. The damage on Dauphin Island was severe, with the surge destroying many houses and cutting a new canal through the western portion of the island. An offshore oil rig also became grounded on the island. As in Mississippi, the storm surge caused significant beach erosion along the Alabama coastline. More than 600,000 people lost power in Alabama as a result of Hurricane Katrina and two people died in a traffic accident in the state. Residents in some areas, such as Selma, were without power for several days.

Eastern Arkansas received light rain from the passage of Katrina. Gusty winds downed some trees and power lines, though damage was minimal. Katrina also caused a number of power outages in many areas, with over 100,000 customers affected in Tennessee, primarily in the Memphis and Nashville areas.

Other U.S. states and Canada

In Kentucky, rainfall from Katrina compounded flooding from a storm that had moved through during the previous weekend. A 10-year-old girl drowned in Hopkinsville. Dozens of businesses were closed and several families evacuated due to rising floodwaters. As a result of the flooding, Kentucky Governor Ernie Fletcher declared three counties disaster areas and a statewide state of emergency. Additionally, wind gusts up to 72 mph (116 km/h) resulted in some damage. Downed trees and power lines were reported in several counties in western Kentucky, especially Calloway and Christian counties. Overall, more than 10,000 utility customers in western Kentucky experienced power outages. The remnants of Katrina spawned a tornado in Virginia, damaging at least 13 homes in Marshall. In addition, approximately 4,000 people lost electricity. Over 3 in (76 mm) of rain fell in portions of West Virginia, causing localized flooding in several counties. At least 103 homes and 7 buildings suffered some degree of water damage. A number of roads and bridges were inundated or washed out. The remnants of Katrina produced locally heavy precipitation in northeast Ohio, ranging from about 2 to 4 in (51 to 102 mm). Numerous streams and rivers overflowed their banks, forcing the closure of several roads, including Interstate 90 in Cleveland. Two deaths occurred due to a flood-related automobile accident in Huron County. Additionally, hundreds of homes and businesses suffered flood damage.

Katrina spawned five tornadoes in Pennsylvania, though none resulted in significant damage. Up to 5 in (130 mm) of rain fell in western New York. Gusty winds also left approximately 4,500 people in Buffalo without electricity. The remnants of Katrina brought 3 to 6 in (76 to 152 mm) of rain to portions of Massachusetts, causing flash flooding in Bristol and Plymouth counties. Several roads were closed due to floodwater inundation in Acushnet, Dartmouth, New Bedford, and Wareham, including Route 18 in New Bedford. Very minimal impact was reported in Rhode Island, with winds downing a tree and two electrical poles in the city of Warwick. In Vermont, 2.5 in (64 mm) of rain in Chittenden County caused cars to hydroplane on Interstate 89, resulting in many automobile accidents. The storm brought 3 to 5 in (76 to 127 mm) of precipitation to isolated areas of Maine and up to 9 in (230 mm) near Patten. Several roads were inundated or washed out by overflowing brooks and streams, including sections of U.S. Route 1 and Maine routes 11 and 159. Several structures and one parked vehicle were also affected by the waters. Wind gusts up to 60 mph (97 km/h) also impacted parts of Maine, felling trees and causing power outages in Bar Harbor, Blue Hill, Dover-Foxcroft, Sedgwick Ridge, and Sorrento.

In Canada, the remnants of Katrina brought rainfall amounts in excess of 3.94 in (100 mm) to many locations between the Niagara Peninsula and the Saint Lawrence River valley. Severe local flooding occurred in Quebec, forcing the evacuations of dozens of homes in some communities as rivers began overflowing their banks and sewage systems were becoming overwhelmed by the influx of precipitation. Inundated and washed out roads, including Route 138 along the north shore of the Saint Lawrence River, Route 172 north of Tadoussac, and Route 385 near Forestville left several communities isolated for at least a week.

Economic effects

The economic effects of the storm reached high levels. The Bush Administration sought $105 billion for repairs and reconstruction in the region, which did not account for damage to the economy caused by potential interruption of the oil supply, destruction of the Gulf Coast's highway infrastructure, and exports of commodities such as grain. Katrina damaged or destroyed 30 oil platforms and caused the closure of nine refineries; the total shut-in oil production from the Gulf of Mexico in the six-month period following Katrina was approximately 24% of the annual production and the shut-in gas production for the same period was about 18%. The forestry industry in Mississippi was also affected, as 1.3 million acres (5,300 km ²) of forest lands were destroyed. The total loss to the forestry industry from Katrina is calculated to rise to about $5 billion. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of local residents were left unemployed. Before the hurricane, the region supported approximately one million non-farm jobs, with 600,000 of them in New Orleans. It is estimated that the total economic impact in Louisiana and Mississippi may eventually exceed $150 billion. Forensic accountants were involved in the assessment of economic damages resulting from this catastrophe.

Katrina displaced over one million people from the central Gulf coast to elsewhere across the United States, becoming the largest diaspora in the history of the United States. Houston, Texas, had an increase of 35,000 people; Mobile, Alabama, gained over 24,000; Baton Rouge, Louisiana, over 15,000; and Hammond, Louisiana, received over 10,000, nearly doubling its size. Chicago, Illinois received over 6,000 people, the most of any non-southern city. By late January 2006, about 200,000 people were once again living in New Orleans, less than half of the pre-storm population. By July 1, 2006, when new population estimates were calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau, the state of Louisiana showed a population decline of 219,563 or 4.87%. Additionally, some insurance companies have stopped insuring homeowners in the area because of the high costs from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, or have raised homeowners' insurance premiums to cover their risk.

Environmental effects

Katrina also had a profound impact on the environment. The storm surge caused substantial beach erosion, in some cases completely devastating coastal areas. In Dauphin Island (a barrier island), approximately 90 mi (140 km) to the east of the point where the hurricane made landfall, the sand that comprised the island was transported across the island into the Mississippi Sound, pushing the island towards land. The storm surge and waves from Katrina also severely damaged the Chandeleur Islands, which had been affected by Hurricane Ivan the previous year. The US Geological Survey has estimated 217 sq mi (560 km ²) of land was transformed to water by the hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Before the storm, subsidence and erosion caused loss of land in the Louisiana wetlands and bayous. This, along with the canals built in the area, let Katrina keep more of its intensity when it struck. The lands that were lost were breeding grounds for marine mammals, brown pelicans, turtles, and fish, and migratory species such as redhead ducks. Overall, about 20% of the local marshes were permanently overrun by water as a result of the storm.

The damage from Katrina forced the closure of 16 National Wildlife Refuges. Breton National Wildlife Refuge lost half its area in the storm. As a result, the hurricane affected the habitats of sea turtles, Mississippi sandhill cranes, red-cockaded woodpeckers, and Alabama Beach mice.

Katrina produced massive tree loss along the Gulf Coast, particularly in Louisiana's Pearl River Basin and among bottomland hardwood forests. Before the storm, the standard mortality rate for the area's trees was 1.9%, but this interval increased to 20.5% by the end of 2006. Delayed mortality as an effect of the storm continued with rates up to 5% until 2011. This significant loss in biomass caused greater decay and an increase in carbon emissions. For example, by 2006 the decreased biomass in bottomland hardwood forests contributed an amount of carbon which equated to roughly 140% of the net annual U.S. carbon sink in forest trees.

The storm caused oil spills from 44 facilities throughout southeastern Louisiana, which resulted in over 7 million US gallons (26,000 m ³) of oil being leaked. Some spills were only a few hundred gallons and most were contained on-site, though some oil entered the ecosystem and residential areas. After a spill at the Murphy Oil refinery, for example, 1,800 homes were oiled in the towns of Chalmette and Meraux. Unlike Hurricane Ivan, no offshore oil spills were officially reported after Hurricane Katrina. However, Skytruth reported some signs of surface oil in the Gulf of Mexico.

Finally, as part of the cleanup effort, the floodwaters that covered New Orleans were pumped into Lake Pontchartrain, a process that took 43 days to complete. These residual waters contained a mix of raw sewage, bacteria, heavy metals, pesticides, toxic chemicals, and oil, which sparked fears in the scientific community of massive numbers of fish dying.

Reestablishing governance

U.S. Army Infantry on patrol in New Orleans in an area previously underwater, September 2005.

Shortly after the hurricane moved away on August 30, 2005, some residents of New Orleans who remained in the city began looting stores. Many were in search of food and water that were not available to them through any other means, as well as non-essential items. Additionally, there were reports of carjacking, murders, thefts, and rapes in New Orleans. Some sources later determined that many of the reports were inaccurate, greatly exaggerated or completely false, leading news agencies to print retractions.

Thousands of National Guard and federal troops were mobilized and sent to Louisiana, with 7,841 in the area on August 29, to a maximum of 46,838 on September 10. A number of local law enforcement agents from across the country were temporarily deputized by the state. "They have M16s and are locked and loaded. These troops know how to shoot and kill and I expect they will", Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco said. Congressman Bill Jefferson told ABC News: "There was shooting going on. There was sniping going on. Over the first week of September, law and order were gradually restored to the city." Several shootings occurred between police and New Orleans residents, some involving police misconduct; including an incident where police officers killed two unarmed civilians and seriously injured four others at Danziger Bridge. Five former police officers pleaded guilty to charges connected to the Danziger Bridge shootings in the aftermath of the hurricane. Six other former or existing officers appeared in court in June 2011.

Overall, a number of arrests were made throughout the affected area, including some near the New Orleans Convention Center. A temporary jail was constructed of chain link cages in the New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal, the city's main train station.

In West Virginia, where roughly 350 refugees were located, local officials took fingerprints to run criminal background checks on the refugees. The background checks found that 45% of the refugees had a criminal record of some nature, and that 22% had a violent criminal record. Media speculation fueled a popular perception that the displaced New Orleans residents brought a wave of crime into the communities where they relocated, however, detailed studies of crime statistics in these communities did not reveal a significant increase in violent crime.

Government response

President Bush stands with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao and Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike Leavitt during a press conference from the Rose Garden, regarding the devastation along the Gulf Coast caused by Katrina.

Within the United States and as delineated in the National Response Plan, disaster response and planning is first and foremost a local government responsibility. When local government exhausts its resources, it then requests specific additional resources from the county level. The request process proceeds similarly from the county to the state to the federal government as additional resource needs are identified. Many of the problems that arose developed from inadequate planning and back-up communication systems at various levels.

Of the 60,000 people stranded in New Orleans, the Coast Guard rescued more than 33,500. Congress recognized the Coast Guard's response with an official entry in the Congressional Record, and the Armed Service was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

The United States Northern Command established Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina based out of Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to act as the military's on-scene response on Sunday, August 28, with US Army Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré as commander. Approximately 58,000 National Guard personnel were activated to deal with the storm's aftermath, with troops coming from all 50 states. The Department of Defense also activated volunteer members of the Civil Air Patrol.

Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, decided to take over the federal, state, and local operations officially on August 30, 2005, citing the National Response Plan. This was refused by Governor Blanco who indicated that her National Guard could manage. Early in September, Congress authorized a total of $62.3 billion in aid for victims. Additionally, President Bush enlisted the help of former presidents Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush to raise additional voluntary contributions, much as they did after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. American flags were also ordered to be half-staff from September 2, 2005, to September 20, 2005, in honor of the victims.

FEMA provided housing assistance (rental assistance, trailers, etc.) to more than 700,000 applicants-families and individuals. However, only one-fifth of the trailers requested in Orleans Parish were supplied, resulting in an enormous housing shortage in the city of New Orleans. Many local areas voted to not allow the trailers, and many areas had no utilities, a requirement prior to placing the trailers. To provide for additional housing, FEMA has also paid for the hotel costs of 12,000 individuals and families displaced by Katrina through February 7, 2006, when a final deadline was set for the end of hotel cost coverage. After this deadline, evacuees were still eligible to receive federal assistance, which could be used towards either apartment rent, additional hotel stays, or fixing their ruined homes, although FEMA no longer paid for hotels directly. As of March 30, 2010, there were still 260 families living in FEMA-provided trailers in Louisiana and Mississippi.

Law enforcement and public safety agencies, from across the United States, provided a " mutual aid" response to Louisiana and New Orleans in the weeks following the disaster. Many agencies responded with manpower and equipment from as far away as California, Michigan, Nevada, New York, and Texas. This response was welcomed by local Louisiana authorities as their staff were either becoming fatigued, stretched too thin, or even quitting from the job.

Two weeks after the storm, more than half of the states were involved in providing shelter for evacuees. By four weeks after the storm, evacuees had been registered in all 50 states and in 18,700 zip codes-half of the nation's residential postal zones. Most evacuees had stayed within 250 miles (400 km), but 240,000 households went to Houston and other cities over 250 miles (400 km) away and another 60,000 households went over 750 miles (1,200 km) away.

Criticism of government response

USNS Comfort takes on supplies at Mayport, Florida, en route to the Gulf Coast.

The criticisms of the government's response to Hurricane Katrina primarily consisted of criticism of mismanagement and lack of leadership in the relief efforts in response to the storm and its aftermath. More specifically, the criticism focused on the delayed response to the flooding of New Orleans, and the subsequent state of chaos in the city. The neologism Katrinagate was coined to refer to this controversy, and was a runner-up for "2005 word of the year".

Within days of Katrina's August 29 landfall, public debate arose about the local, state and federal governments' role in the preparations for and response to the hurricane. Criticism was initially prompted by televised images of visibly shaken and frustrated political leaders, and of residents who remained stranded by floodwaters without water, food, or shelter. Deaths from thirst, exhaustion and violence days after the storm had passed fueled the criticism, as did the dilemma of the evacuees at facilities such as the Louisiana Superdome and the New Orleans Civic Center. Some alleged that race, class, and other factors could have contributed to delays in government response. For example, during A Concert for Hurricane Relief, a benefit concert for victims of the hurricane, rapper Kanye West veered off script and harshly criticized the government's response to the crisis, stating that "George Bush doesn't care about black people."

In accordance with federal law, President George W. Bush directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, to coordinate the Federal response. Chertoff designated Michael D. Brown, head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as the Principal Federal Official to lead the deployment and coordination of all federal response resources and forces in the Gulf Coast region. However, the President and Secretary Chertoff initially came under harsh criticism for what some perceived as a lack of planning and coordination. Brown claimed that Governor Blanco resisted their efforts and was unhelpful. Governor Blanco and her staff disputed this. Eight days later, Brown was recalled to Washington and Coast Guard Vice Admiral Thad W. Allen replaced him as chief of hurricane relief operations. Three days after the recall, Michael D. Brown resigned as director of FEMA in spite of having received recent praise from President Bush.

Politicians, activists, pundits, and journalists also directed criticism at the local and state governments headed by Mayor Nagin of New Orleans and Louisiana Governor Blanco. Nagin and Blanco were criticized for failing to implement New Orleans's evacuation plan and for ordering residents to a shelter of last resort without any provisions for food, water, security, or sanitary conditions. Perhaps the most important criticism of Nagin was that he delayed his emergency evacuation order until 19 hours before landfall, which led to hundreds of deaths of people who could not find any way out of the city.

The destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina raised other, more general public policy issues about emergency management, environmental policy, poverty, and unemployment. The discussion of both the immediate response and of the broader public policy issues may have affected elections and legislation enacted at various levels of government. The storm's devastation also prompted a Congressional investigation, which found that FEMA and the Red Cross "did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to fully support the massive number of Gulf coast victims". Additionally, it placed responsibility for the disaster on all three levels of government. An ABC News poll conducted on September 2, 2005, showed more blame was being directed at state and local governments (75%) than at the Federal government (67%), with 44% blaming Bush's leadership directly. A later CNN/ USAToday/ Gallup poll showed that respondents disagreed widely on who was to blame for the problems in the city following the hurricane-13% said Bush, 18% said federal agencies, 25% blamed state or local officials and 38% said no one was to blame.

International response

United States Navy personnel unload Canadian relief supplies from a Royal Canadian Air Force transport aircraft in Pensacola, Florida.

Over seventy countries pledged monetary donations or other assistance. Cuba and Venezuela (both considered as hostile to US government interest) were the first countries to offer assistance, pledging over $1 million, several mobile hospitals, water treatment plants, canned food, bottled water, heating oil, 1,100 doctors and 26.4 metric tons of medicine, though this aid was rejected by the U.S. government. Kuwait made the largest single pledge, $500 million; other large donations were made by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (each $100 million), South Korea ($30 million), Australia ($10 million), India, China (both $5 million), New Zealand ($2 million), Pakistan ($1.5 million), Norway ($1.8 million), and Bangladesh ($1 million).

India sent tarps, blankets, and hygiene kits. An Indian Air Force IL-76 aircraft delivered 25 tonnes of relief supplies for the Hurricane Katrina victims at the Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, on September 13, 2005.

Countries like Sri Lanka, which was still recovering from the Indian Ocean Tsunami, also offered to help. Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Germany sent supplies, relief personnel (like Technisches Hilfswerk), troops, ships and water pumps to aid in the disaster recovery. Belgium sent in a team of relief personnel. The United Kingdom's donation of 350,000 emergency meals did not reach victims because of laws regarding mad cow disease.

Russia's initial offer of two jets was declined by the U.S. State Department but accepted later. The French offer was also declined and requested later.

Non-governmental organization response

The American Red Cross, America's Second Harvest (now known as Feeding America), Southern Baptist Convention, Salvation Army, Oxfam, Common Ground Collective, Burners Without Borders, Emergency Communities, Habitat for Humanity, Catholic Charities, Direct Relief, Service International, "A River of Hope", The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and many other charitable organizations provided aid to victims in the aftermath of the storm. They were not allowed into New Orleans proper by the National Guard for several days after the storm because of safety concerns. These organizations raised US$4.25 billion in donations from the public, with the Red Cross receiving over half of these donations. Some smaller organizations and individuals ignored the access restrictions and provided early relief. For example, two privately chartered planes from FasterCures evacuated 200 patients from Charity Hospital in New Orleans.

Volunteers from the Amateur Radio Emergency Service provided communications in areas where the communications infrastructure had been damaged or totally destroyed, relaying everything from 911 traffic to messages home. In Hancock County, Mississippi, ham radio operators provided the only communications into or out of the area and even served as 911 dispatchers.

Many private corporations also contributed to relief efforts. On September 13, 2005, it was reported that corporate donations amounted to $409 million, and were expected to exceed $1 billion.

During and after the Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma and Rita, the American Red Cross had opened 1,470 shelters and registered 3.8 million overnight stays. None were allowed in New Orleans, however. A total of 244,000 Red Cross workers (95% of which were non-paid volunteers) were utilized throughout these three hurricanes. In addition, 346,980 comfort kits (including such basic necessities as toothpaste, soap, washcloths, and toys for children) and 205,360 cleanup kits (containing brooms, mops, and bleach) were distributed. For mass care, the organization served 68 million snacks and meals to victims of the disasters and to rescue workers. The Red Cross also had its Disaster Health services meet 596,810 contacts, and Disaster Mental Health services met 826,590 contacts. Red Cross emergency financial assistance was provided to 1.4 million families. Hurricane Katrina was the first natural disaster in the United States in which the American Red Cross utilized its "Safe and Well" family location website.

Direct Relief provided a major response in the Gulf states so health providers could treat the local patients and evacuees. Direct Relief furnished $10 million in medical material aid and cash grants to support clinics and health centers in the area.

In the year following Katrina's strike on the Gulf Coast, The Salvation Army allocated donations of more than $365 million to serve more than 1.7 million people in nearly every state. The organization's immediate response to Hurricane Katrina included more than 5.7 million hot meals and about 8.3 million sandwiches, snacks, and drinks served in and around New Orleans. Its SATERN network of amateur radio operators picked up where modern communications left off to help locate more than 25,000 survivors. Salvation Army pastoral care counselors were on hand to comfort the emotional and spiritual needs of 277,000 individuals. As part of the overall effort, Salvation Army officers, employees, and volunteers contributed more than 900,000 hours of service.

Analysis of New Orleans levee failures

View of the eyewall of Hurricane Katrina taken on August 28, 2005, as seen from a NOAA WP-3D hurricane hunter aircraft before the storm made landfall on the United States Gulf Coast

According to a modeling exercise conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), two-thirds of the deaths in Greater New Orleans were due to levee and flood wall failure. On April 5, 2006, months after independent investigators had demonstrated that levee failures were not caused by natural forces beyond intended design strength, Lieutenant General Carl Strock, chief of engineers and commander of the Corps of Engineers, testified before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water that "We have now concluded we had problems with the design of the structure."

A June 2007 report released by the American Society of Civil Engineers determined that the failures of the levees and flood walls in New Orleans were found to be primarily the result of system design and construction flaws. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been federally mandated in the Flood Control Act of 1965 with responsibility for the conception, design, and construction of the region's flood-control system. All of the major studies in the aftermath of Katrina concluded that the USACE was responsible for the failure of the levees. This was primarily attributed to a decision to use shorter steel sheet pilings during construction in an effort to save money. According to a report published in August 2015 in the official journal of the World Water Council, the Corps misinterpreted the results of a 1985 study and wrongly concluded that sheet piles in the flood walls needed to be driven to depths of only 17 feet (5 m) instead of between 31 and 46 feet (9 and 14 m). That decision saved approximately US$100 million, but significantly reduced overall engineering reliability.

In January 2008, Judge Stanwood Duval of the U.S. District Court ruled that despite the Corps' role in the flooding, the agency could not be held financially liable because of sovereign immunity in the Flood Control Act of 1928. Exactly ten years after Katrina, J. David Rogers, lead author of a new report in the official journal of the World Water Council, concluded that the flooding during Katrina "could have been prevented had the corps retained an external review board to double-check its flood-wall designs".

Other factors may have contributed to the flooding. According to the authors of Catastrophe in the Making (Island Press, 2009), the straight design and lack of outward flow into the Gulf allowed the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal to become "the perfect shortcut for salt-water intrusion" which damaged buffering cypress forests and wetlands which historically had protected New Orleans from storm surge. The Army Corps of Engineers built and maintained the canal. Furthermore, according to storm surge researcher Hassan Mashriqui:

Storm surge pushing across shallow Lake Borgne from the east is constrained by these MRGO levees to the south and, to the north, by the long-standing levees of the Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW). Initially ten or more miles apart, these two channels meet, and when they do, the water building between their levees is squeezed into a single channel - the Funnel - only 260 yards wide, constrained by levees 14 feet to 16 feet high....In concert with the denuded marshes, it could increase the local storm surge hitting the Intracoastal Waterway by 20 percent to 40 percent - a critical and fundamental flaw.

View of flooded New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina

The Corps of Engineers disputes these causalities. Nonetheless, in June 2008, the Army Corps of Engineers New Orleans District submitted a Deep-Draft De-authorization Study of the MRGO which stated that "an economic evaluation of channel navigation use does not demonstrate a Federal interest in continued operation and maintenance of the channel." Congress ordered the MRGO closed as a direct result.

Many of the levees have been reconstructed since Katrina. In reconstructing them, precautions were taken to bring the levees up to modern building code standards and to ensure their safety. For example, in every situation possible, the Corps of Engineers replaced I-walls with T-walls, which have a horizontal concrete base that protects against soil erosion underneath the flood walls.

Media involvement

Many representatives of the news media reporting on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina became directly involved in the unfolding events, instead of simply reporting. Because of the loss of most means of communication, such as land-based and cellular telephone systems, field reporters in many cases became conduits for information between victims and authorities. The authorities, who monitored local and network news broadcasts, as well as internet sites, would then attempt to coordinate rescue efforts based on the reports. One illustration was when Geraldo Rivera of Fox News tearfully pleaded for authorities to either send help or evacuate the thousands of evacuees stranded at the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center. The role of AM radio was also of importance to the hundreds of thousands of persons with no other ties to news, providing emergency information regarding access to assistance for hurricane victims. Immediately after Katrina, WWL-AM was one of the few area radio stations in the area remaining on the air. This emergency service, simulcasted on shortwave outlet WHRI, was named " United Radio Broadcasters of New Orleans". Their ongoing nighttime broadcasts continued to be available up to 500 mi (800 km) away. Announcers continued to broadcast from improvised studio facilities after the storm damaged their main studios. The cellular phone antenna network was severely damaged and completely inoperable for several months.

The storm also brought a dramatic rise in the role of websites-especially blogging and community journalism. One example was the effort of NOLA.com, the web affiliate of New Orleans's Times-Picayune. A group of reporters were awarded the Breaking News Pulitzer Prize and shared the Public Service Pulitzer with the Biloxi-based . The newspaper's coverage was carried for days only on NOLA's blogs, as the newspaper lost its presses and evacuated its building as water rose around it on August 30. The site became an international focal point for news by local media, and also became a vital link for rescue operations and later for reuniting scattered residents, as it accepted and posted thousands of individual pleas for rescue on its blogs and forums. NOLA was monitored constantly by an array of rescue teams-from individuals to the Coast Guard-which used information in rescue efforts. Much of this information was relayed from trapped victims via the SMS functions of their cell phones, to friends and relatives outside the area, who then relayed the information back to NOLA.com. The aggregation of community journalism, user photos, and the use of the internet site as a collaborative response to the storm attracted international attention and was called a watershed moment in journalism. In the wake of these online-only efforts, the Pulitzer Committee for the first time opened all its categories to online entries.

As the U.S. military and rescue services regained control over the city, there were restrictions on the activity of the media. On September 9, the military leader of the relief effort announced that reporters would have "zero access" to efforts to recover bodies in New Orleans. Immediately following this announcement, CNN filed a lawsuit and obtained a temporary restraining order against the ban. The next day the government backed down and reversed the ban.

In September 2022, the Associated Press issued a style guide change to Katrina stating that reporters when writing about the storm in New Orleans should note that "...levee failures played a major role in the devastation in New Orleans. In some stories, that can be as simple as including a phrase about Hurricane Katrina's catastrophic levee failures and flooding...."

Retirement of name

Because of the large death toll and destruction of property along the Gulf Coast, the name Katrina was officially retired on April 6, 2006, by the World Meteorological Organization at the request of the U.S. government. The name will never again be used for another North Atlantic hurricane. It was replaced by Katia on List III of the Atlantic hurricane naming lists, which was used in the 2011 Atlantic hurricane season.

Studies concerning post-Katrina victims

An article published in the Community Mental Health Journal from January 2016 revealed information about a recent study on the psychosocial needs of Hurricane Katrina evacuees that temporarily resided in Dallas, Texas. More than one-fourth of the sample met the criteria for major depressive disorder (MDD). About one-third of the individuals received a referral to mental health services for meeting symptom criteria for incident MDD and PTSD.

In a study published in Maternal and Child Health Journal, five to seven years after the disaster, 308 New Orleans pregnant women were interviewed about their exposure to Katrina. Researchers found that there were associations between experiencing damage during Katrina and birthweight, thus researchers concluded that natural disasters may have long-term effects on pregnancy outcomes. Furthermore, it was concluded that women who are most vulnerable to disaster may be more vulnerable to poor pregnancy outcome.

From a September 2015 journal of Current Psychology, a study examined the attitudes of older, long-term residents of Baton Rouge, Louisiana toward displaced newcomers to their community. After using multiple tests, analyses, and descriptive statistics, the study suggested residents grew to become more patient, tolerant, and friendly towards newcomers. The study also suggests, however, that residents felt more fearful and suspicious of the evacuees, as well as the fact that they were being taken advantage of more.

Reconstruction

Reconstruction of each section of the southern portion of Louisiana has been addressed in the Army Corps LACPR (Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration) Final Technical Report, which identifies areas to not be rebuilt and areas where buildings need to be elevated.

The Technical Report includes:

locations of possible new levees to be built

suggested existing levee modifications

"Inundation Zones", "Water depths less than 14 feet, Raise-In-Place of Structures", "Water depths greater than 14 feet, Buyout of Structures", "Velocity Zones" and "Buyout of Structures" areas for five different scenarios.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers submitted the report to the U.S. Congress for consideration, planning, and response in mid-2009.

Katrina is the costliest tropical cyclone on record, tying with Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The storm was the fourth-most intense Atlantic hurricane on record to make landfall in the contiguous United States, behind the 1935 Labor Day hurricane, Hurricane Camille in 1969, and Hurricane Michael in 2018. Katrina was also the earliest eleventh named storm in the Atlantic until Tropical Storm Kyle surpassed it on August 14, 2020, beating Katrina by 10 days, as it was named on August 24, 2005.

Other similar tropical cyclones

References

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3. ^ United States Congress (February 19, 2006). A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (PDF). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 26, 2009.

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7. ^ Blanco, Kathleen (August 28, 2005). Governor Blanco asks President to Declare an Emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina (PDF) (Report). Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Government of the State of Louisiana. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 4, 2012.

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21. ^ Federal Emergency Management Agency (November 2005). "Mississippi Hurricane Katrina Surge Inundation and Advisory Base Flood Elevation Map Panel Overview" (PDF). FEMA. Archived (PDF) from the original on November 20, 2015.

22. ^ Canadian Tropical Cyclone Season Summary for 2005 (Report). Gatineau, Quebec: Environment Canada. January 15, 2014. Archived from the original on February 20, 2015.

23. Fagot, Caryl; Winbush, Debra. ^ "Hurricane Katrina/Hurricane Rita Evacuation and Production Shut-in Statistics Report as of Wednesday, February 22, 2006". Archived May 10, 2006, at the Wayback Machine U.S. Government Minerals Management Service. Archived November 26, 2005, at the Wayback Machine February 22, 2006. Retrieved on June 5, 2006.

24. Anthony E. Ladd, John Marszalek, and Duane A. Gill. ^ The Other Diaspora: New Orleans Student Evacuation Impacts and Responses Surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Retrieved on April 14, 2010.

25. ^ United States Geological Survey (September 14, 2005). "Daupin Island - Pre- and Post-Storm 3D Topography". Hurricane Katrina Impact Studies. USGS. Archived from the original on March 12, 2015.

26. ^ "USGS Reports Latest Land Change Estimates for Louisiana Coast", USGS National Wetlands Research Center, Oct 3, 2006 Archived May 13, 2008, at the Wayback Machine, accessed May 7, 2008.

27. ^ Tidwell, Mike (2006). The Ravaging Tide: Strange Weather, Future Katrinas, and the Coming Death of America's Coastal Cities. Free Press. p. 22. ISBN 978-0-7432-9470-6. The Ravaging Tide: Strange Weather, Future Katrinas, and the Coming Death of America's Coastal Cities book.

28. United States Fish and Wildlife Service (September 9, 2005). "U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Conducting Initial Damage Assessments to Wildlife and National Wildlife Refuges". USFWS. Archived from the original on October 29, 2005.

29. ^ Chapman, Elise (2008). "Hurricane Katrina Impacts on Forest Trees of Louisiana's Pearl River Basin". Forest Ecology and Management. 256 (5): 883-889. doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2008.05.057.

30. ^ Henkel, Theryn (2016). "Delayed Tree Mortality and Chinese Tallow Explosion in Louisiana Bottomland Hardwood Forest Following Hurricane Katrina". Forest Ecology and Management. 378: 222-232. doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2016.07.036.

31. ^ Chambers, Jeffrey Q.; Fisher, Jeremy I.; Zeng, Hongcheng; Chapman, Elise L.; Baker, David B.; Hurtt, George C. (January 1, 2007). "Hurricane Katrina's Carbon Footprint on U.S. Gulf Coast Forests". Science. 318 (5853): 1107. Bibcode:2007Sci...318.1107C. doi:10.1126/science.1148913. JSTOR 20051600. PMID 18006740. S2CID 477946.

32. ^ "Hurricane Katrina : Aug 31: Looting in Mississippi". KLRT. Little Rock, Arkansas. August 31, 2005.

33. ^ Verano, Paul (January 1, 2010). "A Tale of Three Cities: Crime and Displacement after Hurricane Katrina". Journal of Criminal Justice. 38: 42-50. doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2009.11.006. Archived from the original on September 13, 2015.

34. ^ Settles, Tanya; Lindsay, Bruce (August 23, 2010). "Crime in post-Katrina Houston: the effects of moral panic on emergency planning". Disasters. 35 (1): 200-219. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01200.x. PMID 20735458.

35. ^ United States Government Accountability Office (July 2006). Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on September 1, 2006.

36. California Political Desk. ^ "Pelosi: Davis Report on Katrina Leaves Unfinished Business". Archived October 27, 2006, at the Wayback Machine California Chronicle. Archived June 17, 2006, at the Wayback Machine February 15, 2006. Retrieved on June 5, 2006.

37. ^ Times-Picayune, September 26, 2005, page A-12. Retrieved on June 5, 2006.

38. Staff Writer. ^ "U.S. Grateful for Pakistan's Assistance for Hurricane Katrina Victims". Embassy of the United States. September 8, 2005. Retrieved on April 14, 2010.

39. ^ Staff Writer (September 16, 2005). "ARRL President Submits Congressional Testimony on Hams' Katrina Response". 24 (36). American Radio Relay League. Archived from the original on December 21, 2010.

40. ^ "Hurricane Season 2005: Facts and Figures". American Red Cross. September 29, 2006. Archived from the original on May 1, 2006.

41. Charles F. Anderson, Jurjen A. Battjes; et al. (2007). "The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System: What Went Wrong and Why" ^ (PDF) Archived March 4, 2016, at the Wayback Machine. American Society of Civil Engineers. Retrieved July 25, 2016.

42. ^ Heerden, Ivor van; Bryan, Mike (May 18, 2006). The Storm: What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina - the Inside Story from One Louisiana Scientist. Penguin. ISBN 9781101201701. Archived from the original on April 28, 2016 - via Google Books.

43. ^ Burdeau, Cain (February 12, 2008). "White House Budget for Levee Work Riles Many Louisiana Elected Officials". Associated Press.

44. ^ ""Hurricane Tropical Guide". AP Stylebook The Associated Press". The Associated Press. September 27, 2022.

45. ^ King, Richard V.; Polatin, Peter B.; Hogan, David; Downs, Dana L.; North, Carol S. (January 1, 2016). "Needs Assessment of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees Residing Temporarily in Dallas". Community Mental Health Journal. 52 (1): 18-24. doi:10.1007/s10597-015-9938-5. ISSN 1573-2789. PMID 26507550. S2CID 9817578.

46. ^ Harville, Emily W.; Giarratano, Gloria; Savage, Jane; Barcelona de Mendoza, Veronica; Zotkiewicz, TrezMarie (November 1, 2015). "Birth Outcomes in a Disaster Recovery Environment: New Orleans Women After Katrina". Maternal and Child Health Journal. 19 (11): 2512-2522. doi:10.1007/s10995-015-1772-4. ISSN 1573-6628. PMC . PMID 26122255.

47. ^ Kamo, Yoshinori; Henderson, Tammy L.; Roberto, Karen A.; Peabody, Kimberly L.; White, Jamikka K. (August 2, 2015). "Perceptions of Older Adults in a Community Accepting Displaced Survivors of Hurricane Katrina". Current Psychology. 34 (3): 551-563. doi:10.1007/s12144-015-9356-4. ISSN 1046-1310. S2CID 146488181.

48. ^ United States Army Corps of Engineers (2009). "The LACPR Home Page". United States Army. Archived from the original on August 25, 2009.

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Further reading

Augustson, Alan (August 31, 2008). Bernstein, Jonathan (ed.). "Katrina: Three Years Later, The Lessons We Haven't Learned". Crisis Manager. Bernstein Crisis Management. ISSN 1528-3836.

Brennan, Virginia (2009). Natural Disasters and Public Health: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-9199-1.

Center for Public Integrity, ed. (2007). City Adrift: New Orleans Before and After Katrina. Baton Rouge: LSU Press. ISBN 978-0-8071-3284-5.

Dyson, Michael Eric (2006). Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster. New York: Perseus Books Group. ISBN 978-0-465-01761-4.

Eyerman, Ron (2015). Is This America? Katrina as Cultural Trauma. The Katrina Bookshelf. Austin: University of Texas Press. ISBN 9781477303689. OCLC 900609113.

Harris, Paul (2008). Diary From the Dome. New York: Vantage Press. ASIN B003M69KSC.

Hartman, Chester; Squires, Gregory D., eds. (2006). There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-95487-7.

Hirsch, Arnold R. "Fade to black: Hurricane Katrina and the disappearance of Creole New Orleans." Journal of American History 94.3 (2007): 752-761. https://doi.org/10.2307/25095136

Horowitz, Andy. Katrina: A History, 1915-2015 (Harvard University Press, 2020), long-term scholarly perspective.

Camden Burd, "How To Plan A Disaster: Politics, Nature, and Hurricane Katrina" Reviews in American History (2021) 49#2 pp. 303-309 doi:10.1353/rah.2021.0030 online review

Robinson, Sue. "A chronicle of chaos: Tracking the news story of Hurricane Katrina from The Times-Picayune to its website". Journalism 10.4 (2009): 431-450 online.

Rosenthal, Sandy. Words Whispered in Water: Why the Levees Broke in Hurricane Katrina (Mango, 2020), non-fiction account of author's battle to expose Army Corps of Engineers.

Saint-Saens, Alain (2010). Ordeal at the Superdome. Escaping Katrina's Wrath. New Orleans: University Press of the South. ISBN 978-1-889431-87-1.

Scott, Cathy (2008). Pawprints of Katrina: Pets Saved and Lessons Learned. Hoboken: Howell Book House. ISBN 978-0-470-22851-7.

Spielman, David G. (2007). Katrinaville Chronicles: Images and Observations from a New Orleans Photographer. Baton Rouge: LSU Press. ISBN 978-0-8071-3252-4.

Taylor, William M., ed. (2015). The "Katrina Effect": On the Nature of Catastrophe. London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 9781472595164. OCLC 893894307.

Usher, Nikki. "Recovery from disaster: How journalists at the New Orleans Times-Picayune understand the role of a post-Katrina newspaper". Journalism Practice 3.2 (2009): 216-232.

External links

Disaster recovery:

Images:

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Hurricane Katrina was a devastating Category 5 Atlantic hurricane that caused 1,836 fatalities and damage estimated between $97.4 billion to $145.5 billion in late August 2005, particularly in the city of New Orleans and its surrounding area. At the time, it was the costliest tropical cyclone on record, later tied by Hurricane Harvey of 2017.

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On December 23, 1988, a tractor-trailer tanker truck hauling liquefied propane crashed on an exit ramp at the Interstate 40/Interstate 240 (I-40/I-240) interchange in downtown Memphis, Tennessee, US. The crash ruptured the tank; the leaking gas exploded,

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Memphis tanker truck disaster - Wikipedia

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On December 23, 1988, a tractor-trailer tanker truck hauling liquefied propane crashed on an exit ramp at the Interstate 40/Interstate 240 (I-40/I-240) interchange in downtown Memphis, Tennessee, US. The crash ruptured the tank; the leaking gas exploded, setting multiple vehicles and structures on fire. The explosion propelled the tank 125 yards (114 m) into a residential complex and started additional fires. The accident caused nine deaths and ten injuries. The interchange where the accident occurred was considered unsafe and poorly designed, and had been the site of several previous accidents; it was completely rebuilt in the 2000s.

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Historical Resources

On January 28, 1986, NASA and the American people were rocked as tragedy unfolded 73 seconds into the flight of Space Shuttle Challenger's STS-51L mission. Presented below are documents and resources about the accident and its aftermath.

Payload Specialist "Teacher in Space Project"

The Challenger shuttle crew, of seven astronauts-including the pilot, aerospace engineers, and scientists-died tragically in the explosion of their spacecraft during the...

Read the Story

STS-51L

STS-51-L was the 25th mission of the NASA Space Shuttle program and the final flight of Space Shuttle Challenger.

Learn More

Discover More Topics From NASA

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Historical Resources On January 28, 1986, NASA and the American people were rocked as tragedy unfolded 73 seconds into the flight of Space Shuttle Challenger's STS-51L mission. Presented below are documents and resources about the accident and its aftermath.

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Duration

July-November 1931 (depending on river)

Fatalities

422,499-4,000,000

Areas affected

Central and eastern China

The 1931 China floods, or the 1931 Yangtze-Huai River floods, occurred from June to August 1931 in China, hitting major cities such as Wuhan, Nanjing and beyond, and eventually culminated in a dike breach along Lake Gaoyou on 25 August 1931.

Fatality estimates vary widely. A field survey by the University of Nanking led by John Lossing Buck immediately after the flood found "150,000 people had drowned, and that this number represented less than a quarter of all fatalities during the first 100 days of the flood." The official report found 140,000 drowned and claims that "2 million people died during the flood, having drowned or died from lack of food". A cholera epidemic in the subsequent year, from May 1932, was officially reported to have 31,974 deaths and 100,666 cases. While frequently featured in the list of disasters in China by death toll, a popular high-end estimate of 3.7 to 4.0 million fatalities is instrumental in "helping the 1931 flood to secure its position on sensationalist lists of the world's deadliest disasters."

From 1928 to 1930, China was afflicted by a long drought. The subsequent winter of 1930-31 was particularly harsh, creating large deposits of snow and ice in mountainous areas. In early 1931, melting snow and ice flowed downstream and arrived in the middle course of the Yangtze during a period of heavy spring rain. Ordinarily, the region experienced three periods of high water during the spring, summer and fall, respectively; however, in early 1931, there was a single continuous deluge. By June, those living in low areas had already been forced to abandon their homes. The summer was also characterized by extreme cyclonic activity. In July of that year alone, nine cyclones hit the region, which was significantly above the average of two per year. Four weather stations along the Yangtze River reported rain totalling over 600 mm (24 in) for the month. The water flowing through the Yangtze reached its highest level since record-keeping began in the mid-nineteenth century. That autumn, further heavy rain added to the problem and some rivers did not return to their normal courses until November.

The floods inundated approximately 180,000 square kilometres (69,000 sq mi) - an area equivalent in size to England and half of Scotland, or the states of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut combined. The high-water mark recorded on 19 August at Hankou in Wuhan showed water levels 16 m (53 ft) above the average, an average of 1.7 m (5.6 ft) above the Shanghai Bund. In Chinese, this event is commonly known as 江淮水灾, which roughly translates to "Yangtze-Huai Flood Disaster." This name, however, fails to capture the massive scale of flooding. Waterways throughout much of the country were inundated, particularly the Yellow River and Grand Canal. The eight most seriously affected provinces were Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Henan and Shandong. Beyond the core flood zone, areas as far south as Guangdong, as far north as Manchuria, and as far west as Sichuan were also inundated.

Victims of the flooding in August 1931

This flood is frequently featured in the list of disasters in China by death toll, sometimes topping lists of the world's deadliest disasters.

At the time the government estimated that 25 million people had been affected by the flood. Historians since have suggested that the true number may have been as many as 53 million. Estimated death tolls also vary widely. Contemporary studies conducted by John Lossing Buck allege that at least 150,000 people had drowned in the first few months of the flood, with hundreds of thousands more dying of starvation and disease over the following year. Using contemporary media reports, Chinese historians led by Li Wenhai have calculated the death toll at 422,420. Some Western sources allege that the death toll was between 3.7 and 4 million people based on their own claims of famine and disease. The Tanka people who traditionally live on boats along the Yangtze suffered greatly from the flooding.

The flood destroyed huge amounts of housing and farmland. Throughout the entire Yangtze Valley, around 15% of the wheat and rice crops were destroyed, with the proportion being much higher in the flood-affected areas. The disaster also caused an economic shock with the price of vital commodities rising rapidly. The combined ecological and economic impacts of the disaster caused many areas to descend into famine. With no food, people were reduced to eating tree bark, weeds, and earth. Some sold their children to survive, while others resorted to cannibalism. The most lethal effect of the flood was the diseases that swept through the refugee population due to displacement, overcrowding, and the breakdown of sanitation. These included cholera, measles, malaria, dysentery, and schistosomiasis.

As well as inundating rural areas, the flood caused widespread destruction to a number of cities. Refugees had been arriving in the city of Wuhan since the late spring. When the city itself was inundated in the early summer and after a catastrophic dike failure at just before 6:00 AM on 27 July, around 782,189 urban citizens and rural refugees were left homeless. The flood covered an area of 83 square kilometres (32 sq mi) and the city was flooded under many feet of water for close to three months. Large numbers gathered on flood islands throughout the city, with 30,000 sheltering on a railway embankment in central Hankou. With little food and a complete breakdown in sanitation, thousands soon began to succumb to diseases.

There was no warning, only a sudden great wall of water. Most of Wuhan's buildings in those days were only one story high, and for many people there was no escape- they died by the tens of thousands. ... I was just coming off duty at the company's main office, a fairly new three-story building near the center of town ... When I heard the terrible noise and saw the wall of water coming, I raced to the top story of the building. ... I was in one of the tallest and strongest buildings left standing. At that time no one knew whether the water would subside or rise even higher.

-  Jin Shilong, Senior Engineer at the Hubei Flood Prevention Agency,

The city of Nanjing, then the capital of Republican China, was also severely affected by the disaster. One of the most disastrous single events during the flood occurred on 25 August 1931, when the water rushing through the Grand Canal washed away dikes near Gaoyou Lake. In Gaoyou County alone, 18,000 people drowned and 58,000 died due to famine and diseases the following year.

Thomas Harnsberger, a missionary of the Presbyterian Church in Taizhou, Jiangsu, was one of the two central figures (alongside General Wang Shuxiang, a PhD in hydraulics) who supervised the rebuilding of the dikes at Lake Gaoyou, as well as securing the funds for it. However, the flood remains widely unknown to the Chinese. Steve Harnsberger, the grandson of Thomas Harnsberger, wrote in 2007, "The 1931 flood killed 15 times the number of people lost in the Indonesian tsunamis of December 2004, and yet scarcely a word has been written of it. History focused instead on other disasters that year. China's attention was on a civil war between the Communists and Nationalists and the Japanese were invading in the North, while the world was deep into the Great Depression."

Republican Era (1930s-1940s)

The 1931 flood was one of the first major tests for the Kuomintang Government. As the scale of the disaster became apparent, the government established the National Flood Relief Commission under the auspices of T.V. Soong, a prominent politician in the Kuomintang and brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek. The commission employed a range of Chinese and foreign experts, including figures such as famous epidemiologist Wu Liande, health minister Liu Ruiheng, public health worker John Grant, and hydraulic engineer Oliver Todd. It also secured the assistance of the League of Nations. Even the famous aviators Charles Lindbergh and his wife Anne Lindbergh became involved, as they were commissioned to conduct an aerial survey of the flood zone. Although Song Ziwen remained the head of the commission, the day-to-day running the relief effort was entrusted to John Hope Simpson, a British refugee expert. Charity poured in to help with the relief effort from throughout the world, with overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia being particularly generous. In the United States, the celebrated author Pearl Buck wrote short stories to encourage charitable donations. The relief effort became much more difficult following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in the autumn of 1931, which caused the Chinese bond market to collapse. Eventually, the government managed to secure a large loan of wheat and flour from the United States. In the wake of the disaster, the government set up organizations such as the Huai River Conservancy Commission to address flood problems. However, due to a lack of funding and the chaos of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent Chinese Civil War, the various commissions were only able to construct small dams along the Yangtze River.

As part of an anti-superstition campaign by the Kuomintang Government, a Dragon King Temple was demolished in Wuhan shortly before the flood-hit. This coincidence led to widespread discontent afterwards, as many locals linked the disaster to the anger of Dragon King, a rainmaking deity. As a response, prominent officials, including He Baohua, mayor of Wuhan, and Xia Douyin, then the local garrison commander and later governor of Hubei Province, held ritual ceremonies and kowtowed to the deity. Meanwhile, many believed that evacuation efforts were hindered by superstition. According to a contemporary report, thousands "are convinced that Hankow is doomed and refuse to help themselves or be helped. They sit stoically awaiting death."

Communist Era (1949-present)

In 1953, after the end of the Chinese Civil War, Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong travelled to areas neighbouring the Yangtze River to promote the Three Gorges Dam flood control project. "The Socialist Three Gorges Dam project should excel other major projects in Chinese history such as Qin Shi Huang's Great Wall and Sui Yang Di's Grand Canal", he stated.

Scientists and officials who raised doubts, such as Chen Mingshu, were persecuted as rightists. Li Siguang, a prominent scientist and minister of geological resources, told Mao he would commit suicide if he could not stop the construction of the dam. The project did not move beyond the planning stage in Mao's time, due to a lack of resources, rising Sino-Soviet tensions and the disruptions of the Great Leap Forward. The project was restarted in the 1980s, and the hydroelectric Three Gorges Dam began full operation in 2012, becoming the world's largest power station in terms of installed capacity.

Official report available free online

On food relief, refugee camps, farm rehabilitation, sanitation, etc

On the engineering aspect of dyke breaching and their reconstruction

Officially-sponsored report by universities

Buck, John Lossing (1932). The 1931 flood in China: an economic survey by the Department of Agricultural Economics, College of Agriculture and Forestry, the University of Nanking, in cooperation with the National Flood Relief Commission. Nanking: University of Nanking.

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Duration July-November 1931 (depending on river) Fatalities 422,499-4,000,000 Areas affected Central and eastern China The 1931 China floods, or the 1931 Yangtze-Huai River floods, occurred from June to August 1931 in China, hitting major cities such as Wuhan, Nanjing and beyond, and eventually culminated in a dike breach along Lake Gaoyou on 25 August 1931.

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There were clear blue skies and near perfect weather on Aug. 28, 1988, as approximately 300,000 people gathered at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, to observe the "Flugtag '88" air show.

The schedule for that Sunday afternoon included a full day of flying demonstrations and a large static display of aircraft representing a variety of North Atlantic Treaty Organization member nations. The highlight of the afternoon was a scheduled demonstration by the Italian Air Force precision aerobatic display team, the "Frecci Tricolori."

In coordination with the German national police agency and base security forces, special agents from Office of Special Investigations Detachment 7024 were assigned to various locations throughout the static display area to patrol and watch for any potential problems to include demonstrations and potential terrorist activities. A joint command post was established among all participating agencies to ensure a timely and efficient exchange of information. Though any potential protests were expected to be non-violent and the potential for terrorist activity was deemed to be low, Det. 7024 activated its traditional antiterrorist plan which ensured a robust presence of special agents and other personnel on scene throughout the air show.

As special agents observed the crowd, most of the spectator eyes focused on the sky as the Italian planes took off at 3:40 p.m. Just four minutes later, a mid-air collision occurred during a crossing pattern at very low altitude above the runway as one aircraft crashed into another which in turn caused that aircraft to strike another. The latter two of the stricken aircraft crashed into the adjacent taxiway, with one of those striking an idling U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. The aircraft that initiated the crash erupted into flames and cartwheeled onto the runway, rolling through a fence and across an emergency access road and into the crowd, scattering debris before coming to rest against an ice cream truck. The crash was estimated to have occurred at just 150 feet above the ground and it took less than seven seconds from the initial mid-air collision until the aircraft first entered the crowd.

There were 12 OSI special agents in the near vicinity of the main crash site. As the crowd began to flee in all directions away from the flames, these special agents instead headed towards the disaster where they proceeded to use their training and skills to render medical assistance to the wounded. After treating the injured, special agents assisted local emergency response authorities by helping move the victims to waiting helicopters and ambulances for transport to medical treatment facilities. A number of special agents helped with the dead and assumed duties at a temporary morgue that was established on site while others continued to help the living with crowd control responsibilities.

Emergency response efforts dwindled as night fell and OSI personnel shifted duties yet again when they transitioned from casualty and crowd control responsibilities to assist in answering questions for the hundreds of people who remained on site looking for information and help. OSI personnel even helped gather and distribute food from the air show's various concession stands for people who anxiously waited for any updates about missing friends and relatives.

The final casualty toll was staggering. In the air, the three Italian pilots lost their lives. One of them ejected but his parachute failed to open before he struck the ground. Sixty-six spectators were killed on the ground. Almost half of those were killed instantly during the impact of the aircraft into the crowd. The rest passed away in the days and weeks that followed, most as a result of severe burns, but some due to injuries suffered by flying debris. The pilot of the idling U.S. Army helicopter was also killed, passing away three weeks after the crash as a result of severe burns. Overall, four Americans were killed, three Italians, one person each from France and the Netherlands, and 61 Germans. Another 346 spectators suffered serious injuries with hundreds more having minor injuries. At the time, this was the deadliest air show accident in world history. Today, it ranks as the second deadliest behind only the July 27, 2002, Sknliv Air Show crash in Ukraine which killed 77 people.

OSI's efforts did not end with its first response. OSI forensics specialists from across Europe were deployed to Ramstein to assist German authorities with the investigation into the crash. Det. 7024 was host to a multinational task force of counterintelligence specialists who helped identify missing persons, to include both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens. For several days after the crash, people returned to the site looking for information. Det. 7024 processed more than 3,000 queries in person and by telephone. Detachment personnel assisted with the effort to identify and track down the owners of vehicles which had been left on base. On occasion, special agents also successfully located people who were originally reported as missing.

OSI was later recognized for its efforts by the German national police agency during a special function that was organized to thank the different agencies from across the region who provided support during the response effort. Det. 7024 was the only organization from Ramstein AB recognized at the event.

In response to this acknowledgment, the Det. 7024 commander later commented: "OSI special investigators worked literally nonstop for days. They functioned as go-betweens for the international task force and the American missing persons task force to ensure all information was properly exchanged and coordinated. The OSI detachment was commended for their unselfish and extensive support. It's a tremendous testament to the men and women assigned to OSI at Ramstein."
Editor's Note: This is the eighth installment in the Looking Back history series, spotlighting the storied legacy of OSI.

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There were clear blue skies and near perfect weather on Aug. 28, 1988, as approximately 300,000 people gathered at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, to observe the "Flugtag '88" air show. What they witnessed was the deadliest air show crash to date. ,

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Earthquakes are among the most devastating natural hazards. Japan introduced regulations to protect buildings from earthquakes in 1981 and is renowned for its disaster preparedness. Japan's investments, mandates and engineering practices adapted to seismic risk have saved lives during past earthquakes. However, many buildings in the affected areas may not have been built to withstand a strong earthquake. For example, many of Wajima's traditional wooden homes collapsed.

While natural hazards, such as earthquakes, are inevitable, their impact on society is not. Disaster risk results from the interaction between a natural hazard, such as an earthquake, and the physical, economic, environmental or social characteristics that make people and communities exposed and vulnerable. For this reason, the Center for Disaster Philanthropy does not use the term "natural disaster" and instead refers to these events simply as a disaster. How we talk about disasters matters.

Critical infrastructure

Roads, utilities and buildings are examples of critical infrastructure that has been damaged. Many roads have been covered by landslides or suffered damage because of the quake, making it difficult for trucks delivering supplies to reach those in need.

Many homes still did not have running water at the end of January.

All Nippon Airways resumed its flights to and from an airport on the Noto Peninsula on Jan. 27. The ability to more easily fly into disaster-affected areas may help with the recovery efforts.

Housing

Assessments are ongoing, but officials have said the earthquake seriously damaged or destroyed more than 43,000 homes. That scale of damage will likely take years to rebuild and require significant financial resources.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said on Jan. 8 that more evacuation centers were needed. Kishida also said the government was working to find hotel rooms for evacuees.

Food

With damage to critical infrastructure and at least a temporary disruption to supply chains, food assistance will be needed until market systems are restored.

In a BBC report on Jan. 4, Shigeru Sakaguchi, mayor of Wajima, said food and other aid supplies had reached only 2,000 out of 10,000 evacuees from the town.

Housing and non-food items

With significant damage to the earthquake-affected area's housing stock, disaster survivors reside with friends or family and in shelters. Ensuring survivors have access to safe shelter is critical in the immediate aftermath. The faster people can return home or find other permanent housing options, the more it will help accelerate their full recovery.

Snow and freezing temperatures mean that in addition to safe shelter, disaster survivors need blankets, warm clothes and heaters.

Water, sanitation and hygiene

Although Japan is well-known for its dependable disaster relief, some areas need water. Many cities were without water the day after the earthquake. As of Jan. 5, running water has not been fully restored in Anamizu.

The damaged infrastructure may take time to be fully restored, meaning alternative sources of water and sanitation services will be needed.

Residents of Nishiaraya, a village of 1,000 people on the outskirts of Kanazawa, reportedly had to brave the snow to collect drinking water.

Mental health and psychosocial support

Survivors of deadly earthquakes are forced to deal with lasting trauma, and the need for mental health and psychosocial support services increases.

According to Mark Lieber, who authored a 2017 study, "In the psychiatric literature, earthquakes have consistently been shown to be associated with mental health problems such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder in the months and years immediately following the disaster."

As summarized by Evidence Aid, the authors of a 2021 study that looked at post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among children and adolescents after earthquakes and floods suggested that rapid screening tests and continuous observation are needed for children and adolescents after disasters and that psychological support should be provided to them, especially girls.

CDP has a Global Recovery Fund that provides an opportunity for donors to meet the ongoing and ever-expanding challenges presented by global crises.

Support recovery now

Philanthropic contributions

If you have questions about donating to the CDP Global Recovery Fund, need help with your disaster-giving strategy or want to share how you're responding to this disaster, please contact development.
(Photo: The 4th Company, 14th Infantry Regiment, 10th Division conducted a search for a missing person in Otani-cho, Suzu City, Japan. Credit: Ground Self-Defense Force Kanazawa Garrison via X)

Japan is a wealthy country with the capacity to manage the emergency response and extensive experience responding to earthquake events. According to an Associated Press report, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida deployed about 4,600 soldiers to provide earthquake survivors with water and food and set up bathing facilities at evacuation centers. Kishida later said the government would provide an additional $1.02 billion (150 billion yen) from the state budget reserves for a relief package for the quake-hit areas.

In a statement released on Jan. 1, U.S. President Joe Biden said the U.S. "stands ready to provide any necessary assistance for the Japanese people."

On Jan. 5, the U.S. said it was preparing military logistical support and aid for affected regions in Japan. Reportedly, Japan rejected offers for help from other countries, including China, as of Jan. 5. Then, on Jan. 16, the U.S. said it would deploy two helicopters to Ishikawa Prefecture's disaster affected areas of Noto Peninsula to help with relief operations.
More ways to help
As with most disasters, disaster experts recommend cash donations, which enable on-the-ground agencies to direct funds to the greatest area of need, support economic recovery and ensure donation management does not detract from disaster recovery needs.

CDP has also created a list of suggestions for funders to consider related to disaster giving. These include:

Take the long view: Even while focusing on immediate needs, remember that it will take some time for the full range of needs to emerge. Be patient in planning for disaster funding. Recovery will take a long time, and funding will be needed throughout.

Recognize there are places private philanthropy can help that government agencies might not: Private funders have opportunities to develop innovative solutions to help prevent or mitigate future disasters that the government cannot execute.

Prioritize investments in local organizations: Local leaders and organizations play a vital role in providing immediate relief and setting the course for long-term equitable recovery in communities after a disaster. However, these leaders and organizations are mostly under-resourced and underfunded. Grant to locally-led entities as much as possible.

All funders are disaster philanthropists: Even if your organization does not work in a particular geographic area or fund immediate relief efforts, you can look for ways to tie disaster funding into your existing mission. If you focus on education, health, children or vulnerable populations, disasters present prime opportunities for funding.

Ask the experts: If you are considering supporting an organization that is positioned to work in an affected area, do some research. CDP and InterAction can provide resources and guidance about organizations working in affected communities.

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2024 Japan Earthquake - Center for Disaster Philanthropy

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Updates on the 2024 Japan Earthquake, the impact on communities, critical needs, and how donors can support recovery.

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Nathan B - Air leaks on the International Space Station

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Nathan B - Air leaks on the International Space Station

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https://hackaday.com/2024/03/11/on-an-aging-space-station-air-leaks-become-routine/

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On An Aging Space Station, Air Leaks Become Routine

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Anyone who’s ever owned an older car will know the feeling: the nagging worry at the back of your mind that today might be the day that something important actually stops working. Oh, it&#821…

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The wilhelm gustloff ship was torpedoed by a russian submarine in 1945 during WW2 which ended up killing over 9,000 people.

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These are protective Barriers that would help cities or businesses in case of a flood

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FloodWall Flood Protection - AquaFence Flood Protection

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AquaFence FloodWall is a leading, FEMA compliant and ANSI/FM 2510 certified, deployable flood barrier, used to secure commercial, municipal and industrial properties throughout the world.

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When did the Deepwater Horizon oil spill happen?

Who owned the rig responsible for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill?

What caused the Deepwater Horizon oil spill?

How did the Deepwater Horizon oil spill affect birds?

Deepwater Horizon oil spill, largest marine oil spill in history, caused by an April 20, 2010, explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig-located in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 41 miles (66 km) off the coast of Louisiana-and its subsequent sinking on April 22.

The explosion

The Deepwater Horizon rig, owned and operated by offshore-oil-drilling company Transocean and leased by oil company BP, was situated in the Macondo oil prospect in the Mississippi Canyon, a valley in the continental shelf. The oil well over which it was positioned was located on the seabed 4,993 feet (1,522 metres) below the surface and extended approximately 18,000 feet (5,486 metres) into the rock. On the night of April 20 a surge of natural gas blasted through a concrete core recently installed by contractor Halliburton in order to seal the well for later use. It later emerged through documents released by Wikileaks that a similar incident had occurred on a BP-owned rig in the Caspian Sea in September 2008. Both cores were likely too weak to withstand the pressure because they were composed of a concrete mixture that used nitrogen gas to accelerate curing.

Once released by the fracture of the core, the natural gas traveled up the Deepwater rig's riser to the platform, where it ignited, killing 11 workers and injuring 17. The rig capsized and sank on the morning of April 22, rupturing the riser, through which drilling mud had been injected in order to counteract the upward pressure of oil and natural gas. Without any opposing force, oil began to discharge into the gulf. The volume of oil escaping the damaged well-originally estimated by BP to be about 1,000 barrels per day-was thought by U.S. government officials to have peaked at more than 60,000 barrels per day.

Leaking oil

Although BP attempted to activate the rig's blowout preventer (BOP), a fail-safe mechanism designed to close the channel through which oil was drawn, the device malfunctioned. Forensic analysis of the BOP completed the following year determined that a set of massive blades known as blind shear rams-designed to slice through the pipe carrying oil-had malfunctioned because the pipe had bent under the pressure of the rising gas and oil. (A 2014 report by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board claimed that the blind shear rams had activated sooner than previously thought and may have actually punctured the pipe.)

Disasters of Historic Proportion

Efforts in May to place a containment dome over the largest leak in the broken riser were thwarted by the buoyant action of gas hydrates-gas molecules in an ice matrix-formed by the reaction of natural gas and cold water. When an attempt to employ a "top kill," whereby drilling mud was pumped into the well to stanch the flow of oil, also failed, BP in early June turned to an apparatus called the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) cap. With the damaged riser shorn from the LMRP-the top segment of the BOP-the cap was lowered into place. Though fitted loosely over the BOP and allowing some oil to escape, the cap enabled BP to siphon approximately 15,000 barrels of oil per day to a tanker. The addition of an ancillary collection system comprising several devices, also tapped into the BOP, increased the collection rate to approximately 25,000 barrels of oil a day.

In early July the LMRP cap was removed for several days so that a more permanent seal could be installed; this capping stack was in place by July 12. Though the leak had slowed, it was estimated by a government-commissioned panel of scientists that 4,900,000 barrels of oil had already leaked into the gulf. Only about 800,000 barrels had been captured. On August 3 BP conducted a "static kill," a procedure in which drilling mud was pumped into the well through the BOP. Though similar to the failed top kill, mud could be injected at much lower pressures during the static kill because of the stabilizing influence of the capping stack. The defective BOP and the capping stack were removed in early September and replaced by a functioning BOP.

The success of these procedures cleared the way for a "bottom kill," considered to be the most likely means of permanently sealing the leak. This entailed pumping cement through a channel-known as a relief well-that paralleled and eventually intersected the original well. Construction of two such wells had begun in May. On September 17 the bottom kill maneuver was successfully executed through the first relief well. The second had been intended to serve as a backup and was not completed. Two days later, following a series of pressure tests, it was announced that the well was completely sealed.

Claims by several research groups that subsurface plumes of dispersed hydrocarbons had been detected in May were initially dismissed by BP and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). However, it was verified in June that the plumes were in fact from the Deepwater spill. The effect of the microscopic oil droplets on the ecosystem was unknown, though their presence, along with that of a layer of oil several inches thick discovered on portions of the seafloor in September, cast doubt on earlier predictions about the speed with which the discharged oil would dissipate. Bacteria that had adapted to consuming naturally occurring gas and oil seeping from the seabed were thought to have consumed a portion of it.

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Deepwater Horizon oil spill | Summary, Effects, Cause, Clean Up, & Facts

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Deepwater Horizon oil spill, largest marine oil spill in history, caused by an April 20, 2010, explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig-located in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 41 miles (66 km) off the coast of Louisiana-and its subsequent sinking on April 22.

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45 tons of a very dangerous gas called Methyl Isocyanate escaped from a Carbide Plant in India.

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https://www.britannica.com/event/Hurricane-Camille

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(Jonas Guzman) Princess Diana car crash 

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(Jonas Guzman) Princess Diana car crash 

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During the early hours of 31 August 1997, Diana, Princess of Wales, died from injuries sustained earlier that night in a car crash in the Pont de l'Alma tunnel in Paris, France. Diana's partner, Dodi Fayed, and the driver of the Mercedes-Benz W140, Henri Paul, were found dead inside the car. Dodi's bodyguard, Trevor Rees-Jones, was seriously injured, but was the only survivor of the crash.

Some media claimed that the erratic behaviour of the paparazzi chasing the car, as reported by the BBC, caused the crash. In 1999, a French investigation found that Paul lost control of the vehicle at high speed while intoxicated by alcohol and under the effects of prescription drugs, and concluded that he was solely responsible for the crash. He was the deputy head of security at the Hôtel Ritz Paris and had earlier goaded paparazzi waiting for Diana and Fayed outside the hotel. Anti-depressants and traces of an anti-psychotic in his blood might have worsened Paul's inebriation.

Diana was 36 years old when she died. Her death sparked an outpouring of public grief in the United Kingdom and worldwide, and her televised funeral was watched by an estimated 2.5 billion people. The royal family were criticised in the press for their reaction to Diana's death. Public interest in Diana has remained high and she continues to retain regular press coverage in the decades since her death.

Diana, Princess of Wales, in June 1997

Mercedes-Benz S 280 saloon (W140[11] S-Class), similar to the one involved in the crash[12][13][14][15][16]

On Saturday, 30 August 1997, Princess Diana left the Olbia Airport, Sardinia, on a private jet and arrived at Le Bourget Airport in Paris with Egyptian film producer Dodi Fayed, son of businessman Mohamed Al-Fayed. They had stopped there en route to London, having spent the preceding nine days together on board Mohamed's yacht Jonikal on the French and Italian Riviera. They had intended to stay there for the night. Mohamed was owner of the Hôtel Ritz Paris and resided in an apartment on Rue Arsène Houssaye, a short distance from the hotel, just off the Avenue des Champs Elysées.

Henri Paul, deputy head of security at the Ritz, had been instructed to drive the hired black 1994 armoured Mercedes-Benz S 280 saloon (W140 S-Class) in order to elude the paparazzi; a decoy vehicle left the Ritz first from the main entrance on Place Vendôme, attracting a throng of photographers. Diana and Fayed then departed from the hotel's rear entrance, Rue Cambon, at around 00:20 on 31 August CEST (22:20 on 30 August UTC), heading for the apartment in Rue Arsène Houssaye. They did this to avoid the nearly 30 photographers waiting in front of the hotel. Diana and Fayed were the rear passengers; Trevor Rees-Jones, a member of the Fayed family's personal protection team, was in the (right) front passenger seat. None of the occupants were wearing seat belts. After leaving the Rue Cambon and crossing the Place de la Concorde, they drove along Cours la Reine and Cours Albert 1er - the embankment road along the right bank of the River Seine - into the Place de l'Alma underpass.

At 00:23, Paul lost control of the car at the entrance to the Pont de l'Alma underpass. The car reportedly struck a passing white Fiat, swerved to the left of the two-lane carriageway and collided head-on with the 13th pillar that supported the roof. It was travelling at an estimated speed of 105 km/h (65 mph) - more than twice the 50 km/h (31 mph) speed limit of the tunnel. It then spun, hit the stone wall of the tunnel backwards and finally came to a stop. The impact caused substantial damage, particularly to the front half of the vehicle, as there was no guard rail to prevent this. Witnesses arriving shortly after the crash reported smoke. Witnesses also reported that photographers on motorcycles "swarmed the Mercedes saloon before it entered the tunnel".

Pont de l'Alma Tunnel west entrance, 2007, showing pillars and lack of guard rails

The photographers had been driving slower and were some distance behind the Mercedes. When they reached the scene, some rushed to help, trying to open the doors and help the victims, while some of them took pictures. Police arrived around ten minutes after the crash at 00:30, and an ambulance was on site five minutes later, according to witnesses. France Info radio reported that one photographer was beaten by witnesses who were horrified by the scene. Five of the photographers were arrested directly. Later, two others were detained and around 20 rolls of film were taken directly from the photographers. Police also impounded their vehicles afterwards. Firefighters also arrived at the scene to help remove the victims.

Rees-Jones sustained multiple serious facial injuries and a head contusion, but he was still conscious. The front airbags had functioned normally. Diana was sitting in the right rear passenger seat and was critically injured, but still conscious. The crash mostly affected the righthand side of her body, indicating that she was sitting sideways in her seat at the time of impact. Her ribs and arm were fractured and her right collar bone was dislocated, and she suffered from swelling and bruising to the brain. She was reported to murmur repeatedly, "Oh my God", and after the photographers and other helpers were pushed away by police, "Leave me alone." In June 2007, the Channel 4 documentary Diana: The Witnesses in the Tunnel claimed that the first person to touch Diana was off-duty physician Frederic Mailliez, who chanced upon the scene. Mailliez reported that Diana had no visible injuries but was in shock. She was reported to have been extremely disturbed and removed an intravenous drip while shouting incoherently. After being sedated and removed from the car at 01:00, she went into cardiac arrest, but her heart started beating again following external cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Diana was moved to the ambulance at 01:18, left the scene at 01:41, and arrived at the Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital at 02:06.

Fayed was in the left rear passenger seat and was pronounced dead at the scene shortly afterwards. Paul was also pronounced dead at the scene on removal from the wreckage. Both were taken directly to the Institut Médico-Légal (IML), the Paris mortuary. Paul was later found to have a blood alcohol level of 1.75 grams per litre of blood, about 3.5 times the legal limit in France.

Diana's injuries were extensive, and resuscitation attempts were unsuccessful, including internal cardiac massage. Her heart had been displaced to the right side of the chest,[citation needed] which tore the upper left pulmonary vein and the pericardium. Diana died at the hospital at 03:00. Anaesthetist Bruno Riou announced her death at 06:00 at a news conference held at the hospital.

Later that morning, French prime minister Lionel Jospin and Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement visited the hospital. At around 17:00, Diana's former husband Charles and her two older sisters Lady Sarah McCorquodale and Lady Jane Fellowes arrived in Paris. The group visited the hospital along with French president Jacques Chirac and thanked the doctors for trying to save her life. Charles accompanied Diana's body to the UK later the same day. They departed from Vélizy - Villacoublay Air Base and landed at RAF Northolt, and a bearer party from the Queen's Colour Squadron transferred her coffin to the hearse. The coffin was draped with the royal standard with an ermine border. Her body was finally taken to the Hammersmith and Fulham mortuary in London for a post-mortem examination later that day.

Initial media reports stated that Diana's car had collided with the pillar at 190 km/h (120 mph), and that the speedometer's needle had jammed at that position. It was later announced that the car's speed upon collision was 95-110 km/h (59-68 mph), about twice as fast as the speed limit of 50 km/h (31 mph). In 1999, a French investigation concluded that the Mercedes had come into contact with a white Fiat Uno in the tunnel. The driver of the Fiat was never conclusively traced, although many believed that the driver was Le Van Thanh. Thanh was questioned by French detectives in 1997, who ruled him out as a suspect but friends and family members have noted inconsistences in his story. Thanh has since refused interviews or inquiries from investigators. The specific vehicle was not identified.

British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook remarked that, if the crash had been caused in part by being hounded by paparazzi, it would be "doubly tragic". Diana's younger brother, the Earl Spencer, also blamed tabloid media for her death. An 18-month French judicial investigation concluded in 1999 that the crash was caused by Paul, who lost control at high speed while intoxicated. As reported by the BBC, "No charges were brought against the paparazzi who had been pursuing the princess' car."

Members of the public were invited to sign a book of condolence at St James's Palace. A book of condolence was also set up by the British embassy in the US. All 11,000 light bulbs at Harrods department store, owned by Mohamed Al-Fayed, were turned off and not switched on again until after the funeral. Throughout the night, members of the Women's Royal Voluntary Service and the Salvation Army provided support for people queuing along the Mall. More than one million bouquets were left at her London residence, Kensington Palace, while at her family's estate of Althorp the public was asked to stop bringing flowers as the volume of both visitors and flowers in the surrounding roads was said to be causing a threat to public safety.

By 10 September, the pile of flowers outside Kensington Gardens was 5 feet (1.5 m) deep in places and the bottom layer had started to compost. The people were quiet, queuing patiently to sign the book and leave their gifts. Fresh flowers, teddy bears, and bottles of champagne were later donated and distributed among the sick, the elderly and children. Cards, personal messages and poems were collected and given to Diana's family.

Early on, it was uncertain that Diana would receive a ceremonial funeral, since she had lost the status of Her Royal Highness following her divorce from Prince Charles in 1996.

Diana's death was met with extraordinary public expressions of grief, and her funeral at Westminster Abbey on 6 September drew an estimated 3 million mourners and onlookers in London. Outside the Abbey and in Hyde Park crowds watched and listened to proceedings on large outdoor screens and speakers as guests filed in, including representatives of the many charities of which Diana was patron. Attendees included US First Lady Hillary Clinton and French First Lady Bernadette Chirac, as well as celebrities including Italian tenor Luciano Pavarotti and two friends of Diana, George Michael and Elton John. John performed a rewritten version of his song " Candle in the Wind" that was dedicated to her, known as "Goodbye England's Rose" or " Candle in the Wind 1997"; the single became the best-selling single since UK and US singles charts began in the 1950s, with total sales exceeding 33 million units. Protocol was disregarded when the guests applauded the speech by Earl Spencer, who strongly criticised the press and indirectly criticised the Royal Family for their treatment of her.[non-primary source needed ] The funeral is estimated to have been watched by 31.5 million viewers in Britain. Precise calculation of the worldwide audience is not possible, but it was estimated to be around 2.5 billion. The ceremony was broadcast in 44 languages.

After the end of the ceremony, Diana's coffin was driven to Althorp in a Daimler hearse. Mourners cast flowers at the funeral procession for almost the entire length of its journey and vehicles even stopped on the opposite carriageway of the M1 motorway as the cars passed.

In a private ceremony, Diana was buried on an island in the middle of a lake called The Oval, which is part of the Pleasure Garden at Althorp. The coffin bore a weight of a quarter of a tonne (250 kg / approx. 550 lb) as it was lined with lead, as is tradition with British royalty. In her coffin, she wears a black Catherine Walker dress and black tights, and is holding a rosary in her hands. The rosary had been a gift from Mother Teresa of Calcutta, a confidante of Diana, who had died the day before her funeral. A visitors' centre is open during summer months, with an exhibition about Diana and a walk around the lake. All profits were donated to the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.

Official correspondence by the New Zealand Government regarding Diana's death

Queen Elizabeth II expressed her dismay at Diana's death. Then-Prince Charles woke his sons before dawn to share the news. Upon announcement of the death, the website of the Royal Family temporarily removed all its content and replaced it with a black background, displaying a picture of Diana accompanied by her name and dates of birth and death. An online book of condolence was also made available on the website for the public to post their personal tributes. On Sunday morning after Diana's death, the Queen, Princes Charles, William and Harry all wore black to church services at Crathie Kirk near Balmoral Castle. The royal family later issued a statement, saying Charles, William and Harry were "taking strength from" and "deeply touched" by and "enormously grateful" for the public support. Princes Andrew and Edward met the mourners outside Kensington Palace as a precautionary measure to test the public mood, and Edward visited St James's Palace to sign the book of condolences. On their way from Crathie Kirk to Balmoral, the Queen, Prince Philip, Charles, William and Harry viewed the floral tributes and messages left by the public.

Charles and his sons returned to London on Friday, 5 September. They made an unannounced visit to see the floral tributes left outside Kensington Palace. The Queen, who returned to London from Balmoral accompanied by Prince Philip, the Queen Mother, and Princess Margaret, agreed to a television broadcast to the nation. She viewed the floral tributes in front of Buckingham Palace and visited the Chapel Royal at St James's Palace, where Diana's body was remaining, and met crowds that were in line to sign the books of condolence. Diana's brother, Earl Spencer, and her former sister-in-law, Sarah, Duchess of York, also visited St James's Palace.

The Queen and the rest of the Royal Family was criticised for a rigid adherence to protocol, and their efforts to protect the privacy of Diana's grieving sons were interpreted as a lack of compassion. In particular, the refusal of Buckingham Palace to fly the Royal Standard at half-mast provoked angry headlines in newspapers. The Palace's stance was one of royal protocol: no flag could fly over Buckingham Palace, as the Royal Standard is only flown when the monarch is in residence, and the Queen was then in Scotland. The Royal Standard never flies at half-mast as it is the Sovereign's flag and there is never an interregnum or vacancy in the monarchy, as the new monarch immediately succeeds his or her predecessor. Finally, as a compromise, the Union Flag was flown at half-mast as the Queen left for Westminster Abbey on the day of the funeral. This set a precedent, and Buckingham Palace has subsequently flown the Union Flag when the monarch is not in residence.

A rift between Prince Charles and the Queen's private secretary, Sir Robert Fellowes (Diana's brother-in-law), was reported in the media over the nature of the funeral, with Charles demanding a public funeral and Fellowes supporting the Queen's idea of a private one. The Palace later issued a statement denying such rumours. Discussions were also held with the Spencer family and the British royal family as to whether Diana's HRH style needed to be restored posthumously, but Diana's family decided that it would be against Diana's wishes and no formal offer was made. The funeral committee at Buckingham Palace wanted William and Harry to have a bigger role in their mother's funeral and Downing Street officials suggested that they could walk in the funeral cortège, but faced opposition from Prince Philip, who reportedly stated "They've just lost their mother. You're talking about them as if they are commodities." Prince Harry said in 2017 that the death of his mother caused severe depression and grief. He later stated that what he experienced after his mother's death "was very much" post-traumatic stress injury (PTSI). William was 15 and Harry was 12 when Diana died. The boys received locks of their mother's hair from their aunt Lady Sarah McCorquodale once she returned from Paris according to Harry.

Years later, William and Harry defended their father and grandmother's actions in the aftermath of their mother's death. Describing his father's role, Harry said: "[Our dad] was there for us - he was the one out of two left, and he tried to do his best and to make sure that we were protected and looked after." Speaking about his grandmother, William stated: "At the time, my grandmother wanted to protect her two grandsons and my father as well. Our grandmother deliberately removed the newspapers and things like that so there was nothing in the house to read." Diana's sister, Lady Sarah McCorquodale, also spoke in defence of the Queen's decision: "She did absolutely the right thing. If I'd been her, I'd have done that."

President Bill Clinton's remarks on Diana's death

British Prime Minister Tony Blair said that he was "utterly devastated by the death of the Princess". US President Bill Clinton said that he and his wife, Hillary Clinton, were "profoundly saddened" when they found out about her death. Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General said that her death "has robbed the world of a consistent and committed voice for the improvement of the lives of suffering children worldwide". In a telegram of condolences, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed the view that Diana had also become the victim of an "increasingly brutal and unscrupulous competition on the part of some of the media." In Australia, the Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer, condemned the paparazzi for their overzealous coverage of Diana. Russian President Boris Yeltsin praised Diana's charity work in a statement saying, "All know of Princess Diana's big contribution to charitable work, and not only in Great Britain". Among other politicians who sent messages of condolences were Australian Prime Minister John Howard, South African President Nelson Mandela, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Australian House of Representatives and the New Zealand House of Representatives also passed parliamentary motions of condolence. The Government of Canada, as well as individual provinces in the country, set up online and in-person books of condolences in their parliament buildings and memorial services were held across the country.

Following her death, delegates at an international conference in Oslo to ban landmines paid their tributes to Diana, who was an avid campaigner for banning the explosive devices. The Ottawa Treaty, which created an international ban on the use of anti-personnel landmines, was adopted in Oslo, in September 1997 and signed by 122 States in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. Diana's work on the landmines issue has been described as influential in the signing of the treaty.

In London, thousands of people carried bouquets and stood outside Buckingham Palace after the news of her death. People started bringing flowers within an hour after the news was shared. The BBC flew its flags at half-mast. Both radio and television aired the British national anthem, " God Save the Queen", in response to Diana's death, as is precedent for the death of a member of the Royal Family. An elegy was published by Ted Hughes to mark her death. Sporting events in the UK were rearranged, with demands for Scotland's Football Association chief executive to resign due to their delayed response to reschedule Scotland's World Cup qualifier.

People in the US were shocked at her death. In San Francisco, around 14,000 people marched through the city in a procession on 5 September to pay tribute to Diana, honouring her for her work on behalf of AIDS patients. In Los Angeles, more than 2,500 people transformed a baseball field into a candle-lit altar in a memorial service prepared by an AIDS organisation. In Paris, thousands of people visited the site of the crash and the hospital where Diana died, leaving bouquets, candles and messages. People brought flowers and also attempted to visit the Hotel Ritz. On the eve of the funeral, 300 members of the British community in Paris took part in a service of commemoration. Landmine victims in Angola and Bosnia also honoured Diana with separate services, pointing out how her efforts had helped raise awareness about the damage caused by landmines. In Bosnia, a landmine survivor, Jasminko Bjelic, who had met Diana only three weeks earlier, said, "She was our friend." In Egypt, the homeland of Dodi Fayed, people visited the British embassy in Cairo to pay their tributes and sign a book of condolences. Following her death many celebrities including actors and singers blamed the paparazzi and condemned their reckless behavior.

Mother Teresa, who met Diana a few months before her death, expressed her sorrow and prayers were held at the Missionaries of Charity for Diana. The Bishop of Bradford David Smith and the Bradford Council of Mosques held prayers by the Christian and Muslim communities. Jonathan Sacks led prayers by the Jewish community at the Western Marble Arch Synagogue, and Cardinal Basil Hume presided over the Roman Catholic requiem mass held at Westminster Cathedral. Mother Teresa died on 5 September 1997, the day before Diana's funeral.

Social and economic impact

During the four weeks following her funeral, the suicide rate in England and Wales rose by 17% and cases of deliberate self-harm by 44.3% compared with the average for that period in the four previous years. Researchers suggest that this was caused by the " identification" effect, as the greatest increase in suicides was by people most similar to Diana: women aged 25 to 44, whose suicide rate increased by over 45%. Another research showed that 50% of Britons and 27% of Americans were deeply affected by her death as if someone they knew had died. It also concluded that in general women were more affected than men in both of the countries. The same research showed that Diana's "charitable endeavors" and "ability to identify with ordinary people" were among the main factors that caused her to be admired and respected by the people. In the weeks after her death counselling services reported an increase in the number of phone calls by the people who were seeking help due to grief or distress.

Diana's death mostly affected people who were already vulnerable and could identify with her as "a public figure perceived as psychologically troubled but who seemed to have made a constructive adjustment". Another research described Diana's death and funeral as traumatic stressors with psychological impacts that could "be equated with traditional stressors identified in the trauma research literature". In the days after her funeral, an increase in the number of inappropriate hospital admissions was observed, whereas the number of admissions for traumatic injuries decreased for at least three months, showing a possible change in people's driving habits. Her death was also associated with "30% reduction in calls to the police and a 28% drop in public order offences", yet despite its effect on increasing depression and traumatic stress, no significant increase was observed in the number of psychiatric emergencies in Edinburgh.

The national grieving for Diana had economic effects. In the short term, the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) estimated that retail sales dropped 1% that week. Traffic congestion in central London as crowds went to the palaces to pay homage likewise adversely affected productivity, and the CEBR estimated that would cost businesses £200 million, or a total loss of 0.1% of gross domestic product for the third quarter of 1997. However, in the long run the CEBR expected that to be offset by increased tourism and memorabilia sales.

Some criticised the reaction to Diana's death at the time as being " hysterical" and "irrational". As early as 1998, philosopher Anthony O'Hear identified the mourning as a defining point in the "sentimentalisation of Britain", a media-fuelled phenomenon where image and reality become blurred. Oasis bandleader Noel Gallagher responded to the reaction with, "The woman's dead. Shut up. Get over it". These criticisms were repeated on the tenth anniversary of the crash, when journalist Jonathan Freedland of The Guardian expressed the opinion that, "It has become an embarrassing memory, like a mawkish, self-pitying teenage entry in a diary ... we cringe to think about it." In 2010, Theodore Dalrymple suggested "sentimentality, both spontaneous and generated by the exaggerated attention of the media, that was necessary to turn the death of the princess into an event of such magnitude thus served a political purpose, one that was inherently dishonest in a way that parallels the dishonesty that lies behind much sentimentality itself".

The reactions following Diana's death were subject to criticism by Christopher Hitchens. His 1998 documentary Princess Diana: The Mourning After accused the British media of playing an essential role in creating a national, unchallengeable, and at times hysterical cult of personality surrounding Diana, whereas previously they had been extremely critical of her and the monarchy after she had separated and divorced from Charles, and was having an affair with Dodi Fayed. Hitchens claimed the public were behaving irrationally and that many appeared to not even know why they were mourning. He also scrutinised the level of censorship against criticism of Diana and the monarchy but was accused, in a review by The Independent, of exaggerating on this point. Private Eye's sales dropped by one third after it ran a cover titled "Media to Blame", which attempted to criticise the instant switch in the media and the public's opinion of Diana after her death from critical to complimentary.

Hitchens's views were later supported by Jonathan Freedland of The Guardian, who also questioned the reason behind the "outburst of mass hysteria" following Diana's death and described it as "an episode when the British public lost its characteristic cool and engaged in seven days of bogus sentimentality, whipped up by the media, and whose flimsiness was demonstrated when it vanished as quickly as it had appeared". Comparing Diana's funeral to that of Winston Churchill, Peter Hitchens observed the "difference in the self-discipline of the people and their attitudes" at the two historical events, with them being more restrained at Churchill's funeral but "un-English" at Diana's.

Some cultural analysts disagreed. Sociologist Deborah Steinberg pointed out that many Britons associated Diana not with the Royal Family but with social change and a more liberal society: "I don't think it was hysteria, the loss of a public figure can be a touchstone for other issues." Carol Wallace of magazine said that the fascination with Diana's death had to do with "the fairy tale failing to end happily - twice, first when she got divorced and now that she died".

Reflecting back on the event in the 2021 Apple TV+ docuseries The Me You Can't See, Diana's son Prince Harry said that he was surprised by the extent to which the public reacted to his mother's death. Referring to the day of her funeral, he said: "I'm just walking along and doing what was expected of me, showing the one-tenth of the emotion that everybody else was showing. This was my mum, you never even met her." In his memoir , he mentions meeting members of the public following his mother's death and "Hundreds and hundreds of hands that planted us again and again in front of our faces, with our fingers often wet. Of what? I wondered. Tears, I understood. I disliked the touch of those hands. What's more, I disliked how they made me feel guilty. Why were all of those people crying when I was neither crying nor able to cry?"

The Flame of Liberty, the unofficial Diana memorial in Paris, France, the day after the 20th anniversary of her death. The ground is covered with flowers and other tributes, and the chain fence covered with love locks.

In the years after her death, many memorials were commissioned and dedicated to her. As a temporary memorial, the public co-opted the Flamme de la Liberté (Flame of Liberty), a monument near the Pont de l'Alma tunnel related to the French donation of the Statue of Liberty to the US. The messages of condolence have since been removed and its use as a Diana memorial has discontinued, though visitors still leave messages in her memory. A permanent memorial, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fountain, was opened by the Queen in Hyde Park in London on 6 July 2004, followed by a statue in the Sunken Garden of Kensington Palace, which was unveiled by her sons on 1 July 2021.

Following her death, a member of the Millennium Dome's board suggested the project be refashioned and extended "to accommodate, for example, a hospital, businesses, charities, private residences, and the whole thing named 'the Princess Diana Centre'". The idea was later scrapped.

Under English law, an inquest is required in cases of sudden or unexplained death. A French judicial investigation had already been carried out, but the 6,000-page report was never published. On 6 January 2004, six years after Diana's death, an inquest into the crash opened in London held by Michael Burgess, the coroner of the Queen's Household. The coroner asked the Metropolitan Police commissioner, Sir John Stevens, to make inquiries in response to speculation that the deaths were not an accident. Forensic scientist Angela Gallop was commissioned to examine the forensic evidence. The police investigation reported its findings in Operation Paget in December 2006.

In January 2006, Lord Stevens explained in an interview on that the case is substantially more complex than once thought. The Sunday Times wrote on 29 January 2006 that agents of the British secret service were cross-examined because they were in Paris at the time of the crash. It was suggested that these agents might have exchanged the blood test from Henri Paul with another blood sample (although no evidence for this has been forthcoming).

The inquests into the deaths of Diana and Fayed opened on 8 January 2007, with Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss acting as Deputy Coroner of the Queen's Household for the Diana inquest and Assistant Deputy Coroner for Surrey in relation to the Fayed inquest. Butler-Sloss originally intended to sit without a jury; this decision was later overturned by the High Court of Justice, as well as the jurisdiction of the coroner of the Queen's Household. On 24 April 2007, Butler-Sloss stepped down, saying she lacked the experience required to deal with an inquest with a jury. The role of coroner for the inquests was transferred to Lord Justice Scott Baker, who formally took up the role on 13 June as Coroner for Inner West London.

On 27 July 2007, Baker, following representations for the lawyers of the interested parties, issued a list of issues likely to be raised at the inquest, many of which had been dealt with in great detail by Operation Paget:

1. Whether driver error on the part of Henri Paul caused or contributed to the cause of the collision

2. Whether Henri Paul's ability to drive was impaired through drink or drugs

3. Whether a Fiat Uno or any other vehicle caused or contributed to the collision

4. Whether the actions of the Paparazzi caused or contributed to the cause of the collision

5. Whether the road/tunnel layout and construction were inherently dangerous and, if so, whether this contributed to the collision

6. Whether any bright/flashing lights contributed to or caused the collision and, if so, their source

7. Whose decision it was that Diana and Dodi Al Fayed should leave from the rear entrance to the Ritz and that Henri Paul should drive the vehicle

8. Henri Paul's movements between 7 and 10 pm on 30 August 1997

9. The explanation for the money in Henri Paul's possession on 30 August 1997 and in his bank account

10. Whether Andanson, a photographer who followed the princess in the week before her death, was in Paris on the night of the collision

11. Whether Diana's life would have been saved if she had reached hospital sooner or if her medical treatment had been different

12. Whether Diana was pregnant

13. Whether Diana and Dodi Al Fayed were about to announce their engagement

14. Whether and, if so in what circumstances, the Princess of Wales feared for her life

15. The circumstances relating to the purchase of the ring

16. The circumstances in which Diana's body was embalmed

17. Whether the evidence of Tomlinson throws any light on the collision

18. Whether the British or any other security services had any involvement in the collision

19. Whether there was anything sinister about (i) the Cherruault burglary[clarification needed ] or (ii) the disturbance at the Big Pictures agency

20. Whether correspondence belonging to Diana (including some from Prince Philip) has disappeared, and if so the circumstances.

The inquest heard evidence from people connected with Diana and the events leading to her death, including Rees-Jones, Mohamed Al-Fayed, Paul Burrell, Diana's stepmother, and the former head of MI6.

Lord Justice Baker began his summing up to the jury on 31 March 2008. He opened by telling the jury "no-one except you and I and, I think, the gentleman in the public gallery with Diana and Fayed painted on his forehead sat through every word of evidence" and concluded that there was "not a shred of evidence" that Diana's death had been ordered by Prince Philip or organised by the security services. He concluded his summing up on Wednesday, 2 April 2008. After summing up, the jury retired to consider five verdicts, namely unlawful killing by the negligence of either or both the following vehicles or Paul; accidental death or an open verdict. The jury decided on 7 April 2008 that Diana had been unlawfully killed by the "grossly negligent driving of the following vehicles [the paparazzi] and of the Mercedes driver Henri Paul". Princes William and Harry released a statement in which they said that they "agree with their verdicts and are both hugely grateful". Mohamed Al-Fayed also said that he would accept the verdict and "abandon his 10-year campaign to prove that Diana and Dodi were murdered in a conspiracy".

The cost of the inquiry exceeded £12.5 million, the coroner's inquest cost £4.5 million; a further £8 million was spent on the Metropolitan Police investigation. It lasted 6 months and heard 250 witnesses, with the cost heavily criticised in the media.

In his memoir, Diana's younger son Prince Harry mentions how the summary conclusion of investigations into his mother's death was "simplistic and absurd." He writes that even if the driver "had been drunk, he wouldn't have had any problem driving through such a short tunnel." He questions why the paparazzi that had been following her and the people who sent them were not in prison, unless it was all due to "corruption and cover-ups being the order of the day?" Harry claims that he and his brother were planning on issuing a statement to ask jointly for the investigation to be reopened but "those who decided dissuaded us."

Three photographers who took pictures of the aftermath of the crash on 31 August 1997 had their photographs confiscated and were tried for invasion of privacy for taking pictures through the open door of the crashed car. The photographers, who were part of the "paparazzi", were acquitted in 2003.

Although the initial French investigation found that Diana had died as a result of an accident, several conspiracy theories have been raised. Since February 1998, Fayed's father, Mohamed Al-Fayed, has claimed that the crash was a result of a conspiracy, and later contended that the crash was orchestrated by MI6 on the instructions of the Royal Family. His claims were dismissed by a French judicial investigation and by Operation Paget. On 7 April 2008, Lord Justice Baker's inquest into the deaths of Diana and Fayed ended with the jury concluding that they were the victims of an "unlawful killing" by Henri Paul and the drivers of the following vehicles. Additional factors were "the impairment of the judgment of the driver of the Mercedes through alcohol" and "the death of the deceased was caused or contributed to by the fact that the deceased was not wearing a seat belt, the fact that the Mercedes struck the pillar in the Alma Tunnel rather than colliding with something else".

A special After Dark television discussion - After Diana - broadcast on Channel 4 on 13 September 1997

Actor George Clooney was critical of several tabloids and paparazzi agencies following Diana's death. A few of the tabloids boycotted Clooney following the outburst, stating that he "owed a fair portion of his celebrity" to the tabloids and photo agencies in question. In September 1997, a number of supermarket chains in the US removed the September 9 issue of the National Enquirer, which bore the title "Di Goes Sex Mad". The paper's editor described the incident as "an unfortunate circumstance", which was not meant to coincide with her death. Another American tabloid, , issued an apology for its headline "To Di For".

Diana was ranked third in the 2002 Great Britons poll sponsored by the BBC and voted for by the British public, after Sir Winston Churchill (1st) (a distant cousin), and Isambard Kingdom Brunel (2nd), just above Charles Darwin (4th), William Shakespeare (5th), and Isaac Newton (6th). That same year, another British poll named Diana's death as the most important event in the country's last 100 years. Historian Nick Barrett criticised this outcome as being "a pretty shocking result".

Later in 2004, the CBS programme broadcast photos from the crash scene which were "part of a 4,000-page French government report". They showed an intact rear side and centre section of the Mercedes, including one of an unbloodied Diana with no outward injuries crouched on the rear floor with her back to the right passenger seat - the right rear door is fully open. The release of these pictures was poorly received in the UK, where it was felt that the privacy of Diana was being infringed. Buckingham Palace, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Diana's brother condemned the action, while CBS defended its decision saying that the pictures "are placed in journalistic context - an examination of the medical treatment given to Princess Diana just after the crash".

On 13 July 2006, Italian magazine published photographs that showed Diana amid the wreckage of the car crash; the photos were released despite an unofficial blackout on such photographs being published. The editor of Chi defended his decision by saying he published the photographs simply because they had not been previously seen, and he felt the images were not disrespectful to the memory of Diana.

British newspaper the Daily Express was criticised for continued and sustained coverage of Diana following her death. A 2006 report in The Guardian showed that the newspaper had mentioned her in numerous recent news stories, with headlines including, "Perhaps Diana should have worn seatbelt", "Diana inquiry chief's laptop secrets stolen", "£250,000 a year bill to run Diana fountain" and "Diana seatbelt sabotage probe".

The events from Diana's death to her funeral became the subject of a 2006 film, , with Helen Mirren in the title role.

Diana's death occurred at a time when Internet use in the developed world was booming, and several national newspapers and at least one British regional newspaper had already launched online news services. BBC News had set up online coverage of the general election earlier in 1997 and as a result of the widespread public and media attention surrounding Diana's death, BBC News swiftly created a website featuring news coverage of Diana's death and the events that followed it. Diana's death helped BBC News officials realise how important online news services were becoming, and a full online news service was launched on 4 November that year, alongside the launch of the BBC's rolling news channel BBC News 24 on 9 November.

In the UK, television schedules were dominated by news coverage of the death of the Princess of Wales. On ITV, Tim Willcox announced the crash at around 1am, and then Dermot Murnaghan announced her death at around 5am. On Sky, meanwhile, Kay Burley announced her death shortly after 5am. On BBC One (BBC1 at the time) the film Borsalino was interrupted by a short bulletin by Martyn Lewis who announced the crash at 1am. Shortly after, BBC World was simulcast for the first time ever on the domestic channel, with news anchor Nik Gowing in the newsroom. Nik announced her death at approximately 5am. Martyn Lewis had also done a bulletin an hour later, at 6am.

John Stevens, Baron Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (2006). The Operation Paget inquiry report into the allegation of conspiracy to murder: Diana, Princess of Wales and Emad El Din Mohamed Abdel Moneim Fayed (PDF). London: Metropolitan Police Service. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 September 2007.

Junor, Penny (1998). Charles: Victim or Villain?. London: Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0-00-255900-3.

Rees-Jones, Trevor; Moira Johnston (2000). The Bodyguard's Story: Diana, the Crash, and the Sole Survivor. London: Little, Brown. ISBN 978-0-316-85508-2.

Duncan Fallowell, How To Disappear, ch.5, reportage account of Princess Diana's funeral (London, 2011)

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Death of Diana, Princess of Wales - Wikipedia

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During the early hours of 31 August 1997, Diana, Princess of Wales, died from injuries sustained earlier that night in a car crash in the Pont de l'Alma tunnel in Paris, France. Diana's partner, Dodi Fayed, and the driver of the Mercedes-Benz W140, Henri Paul, were found dead inside the car.

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(Jonas Guzman) Space shuttle challenger explode 

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(Jonas Guzman) Space shuttle challenger explode 

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Date

January 28, 1986; 35 years ago

Time

11:39:13 EST (16:39:13 UTC)

Location

Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Florida
28°38′24″N 80°16′48″W ﻿ / ﻿ 28.64000°N 80.28000°W Coordinates: 28°38′24″N 80°16′48″W ﻿ / ﻿ 28.64000°N 80.28000°W

Outcome

Grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet for nearly three years during which various safety measures, solid rocket booster redesign, and a new policy on management decision-making for future launches were implemented.

Deaths

Inquiries
Rogers Commission

The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster was a fatal accident in the United States' space program that occurred on January 28, 1986, when the Space Shuttle Challenger (OV-099) broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members aboard. The mission carried the designation STS-51-L and was the tenth flight for the Challenger orbiter and twenty-fifth flight of the Space Shuttle. The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 11:39a.m. EST (16:39 UTC).

The disaster began after a joint in the Space Shuttle's right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at liftoff. The failure was caused by the failure of the two redundant O-ring seals used in the joint, in part because of the unusually cold temperatures at the time of launch. The seals' failure caused a breach in the SRB joint, which allowed pressurized burning gas from within the SRB to reach the outside and impinge upon the adjacent SRB's aft field joint attachment hardware and external fuel tank. This led to the separation of the right-hand SRB's aft field joint attachment and the structural failure of the external tank. Following the explosion, the orbiter was broken up by aerodynamic forces.

The crew compartment and many other vehicle fragments were recovered from the ocean floor after a three-month search and recovery operation. The exact timing of the deaths of the crew is unknown; several crew members are known to have survived the initial breakup of the spacecraft. By design, the orbiter had no escape system, and the impact of the crew compartment at terminal velocity with the ocean surface was too violent to be survivable.

The disaster resulted in a 32-month hiatus in the Space Shuttle program and the formation of the Rogers Commission, a special commission appointed by United States President Ronald Reagan to investigate the accident. The Rogers Commission found that issues with NASA's organizational culture and decision-making processes had been key contributing factors to the accident. Test data from as early as 1977 had revealed a potentially catastrophic flaw in the SRBs O-rings, but this was not addressed or corrected by NASA or Morton Thiokol. NASA managers also disregarded warnings from engineers about the dangers of launching in cold temperatures and did not report these technical concerns to their superiors. As a result of the disaster, NASA established the Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance to better address safety concerns within the organization. Additionally, commercial satellites would subsequently be launched on expendable launch vehicles rather than deployed from the crewed orbiter. To replace Challenger, construction of Endeavour was approved in 1987, and it first flew in 1992. Subsequent Space Shuttles launched with redesigned SRBs, and crews wore pressure suits during ascent and reentry.

Concerns over the safety of the systems that ultimately caused the Challenger disaster dated back to the early 1970s. At liftoff, most of the Space Shuttle's thrust was generated by two solid rocket boosters (SRBs), which were built by Morton Thiokol. Each SRB was constructed in four main sections at the factory in Utah and transported to Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The four sections were then assembled in the Vehicle Assembly Building at KSC with three tang-and-clevis field joints. Each field joint was sealed with two rubber O-rings around the circumference of the SRB and had a cross-section diameter of 0.280 inches (7.1 mm). These were required to contain the hot, high-pressure gases produced by the burning solid propellant inside the SRBs. The redundant O-rings were required for the SRBs to be rated to carry people, as failure to seal in the hot gas would likely cause the destruction of the Space Shuttle and the loss of its crew. The two O-rings were configured to create a double bore seal, and the gap between segments was filled with putty. When the motor was running, this configuration was designed to compress air in the gap against the upper O-ring, pressing it against the sealing surfaces of its seat. On the SRB Critical Items List, the O-rings were listed as Criticality 1R, which indicated that an O-ring failure could result in the destruction of the vehicle and loss of life, but it was considered a redundant system due to the secondary O-ring.

Evaluations of the proposed design in the early 1970s and subsequent testing showed that the wide tolerances between the mated parts allowed the O-rings to be extruded from their seats rather than compressed. This extrusion was judged to be acceptable by NASA and Morton Thiokol management despite concerns of NASA engineers. A 1977 test showed that up to .052 inches (1.3 mm) of joint rotation occurred during the simulated internal pressure of a launch. Joint rotation, which occurred when the tang and clevis bent away from each other, reduced the pressure on the O-rings which weakened their seals and made it possible for combustion gases to erode the O-rings. Engineers at the Marshall Space Flight Center contacted management of the Morton Thiokol Solid Rocket Booster project to voice their concerns that the O-rings were not creating an adequate seal and should be redesigned to include shims around the O-rings, but they received no response. In 1980, the NASA Verification/Certification Committee requested further tests on joint integrity to include testing in the temperature range of 40 to 90 °F (4 to 32 °C) and with only a single O-ring installed. The NASA program managers decided that their current level of testing was sufficient and further testing was not required. In December1982, the Critical Items List was updated to indicate that the secondary O-ring could not provide a backup to the primary O-ring, as it would not necessarily form a seal in the event of joint rotation. The O-rings were redesignated as Criticality1, removing the "R" to indicate it was no longer considered a redundant system.

The first occurrence of in-flight O-ring erosion occurred on the right SRB on in November1981. The O-ring erosion was not reported in the Marshall system to track flight anomalies, and was not included in the Flight Readiness Review in March 1983. In August1984, a post-flight inspection of the left SRB on revealed that soot had blown past the primary O-ring and was found in between the O-rings. While there was no damage to the secondary O-ring, this indicated that the primary O-ring was not creating a reliable seal and was allowing hot gas to pass. The amount of O-ring erosion was not sufficient to prevent the O-ring from sealing, and investigators concluded that the soot between the O-rings resulted from non-uniform pressure at the time of ignition. The January1985 launch of was the coldest Space Shuttle launch to date, with a 62 °F (17 °C) air temperature at the time of launch. The O-ring temperature was calculated to be 53 °F (12 °C), and the post-flight analysis revealed that the primary O-rings in both SRBs experienced erosion and soot in between the O-rings. Morton Thiokol engineers determined that the cold temperatures caused a loss of flexibility in the O-rings that decreased their ability to seal the field joints, which allowed hot gas and soot to flow past the primary O-ring. O-ring erosion occurred on all but one () of the Space Shuttle flights in 1985, with erosion of both the primary and secondary O-rings occurring on .

To correct the issues with O-ring erosion, engineers at Morton Thiokol, led by Allan McDonald and Roger Boisjoly, proposed a redesigned field joint that introduced a metal lip to limit movement in the joint. They also recommended adding a spacer to provide additional thermal protection and using an O-ring with a larger cross section. In July1985, Morton Thiokol ordered redesigned SRB casings, with the intention of using already-manufactured casings for the upcoming launches until the redesigned cases were available the following year.

The Space Shuttle mission, named STS-51-L, was the twenty-fifth flight of the Space Shuttle and the tenth flight of Challenger. The crew was announced on January27,1985, and was commanded by Francis Scobee. Michael Smith was assigned as the pilot, and the mission specialists were Ellison Onizuka, Judith Resnik, and Ronald McNair. The two payload specialists were Gregory Jarvis, who was assigned to conduct research for the Hughes Aircraft Company, and Christa McAuliffe, who flew as part of the Teacher in Space Project.

The primary mission of the Challenger crew was to deploy a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) aboard an Inertial Upper Stage (IUS). The satellite, named TDRS-B, would have been the second satellite in the TDRS constellation to enable constant communication with orbiting spacecraft. A secondary mission for the crew was to study Halley's Comet as it passed near the sun. The mission was scheduled to deploy the SPARTAN satellite on the second day of the mission and retrieve it three days later.

The mission was originally scheduled for July1985, but was delayed to November and subsequently to January1986. The mission was scheduled to launch on January22, but the delayed return of Columbia mission, STS-61-C, caused the launch to be postponed to January25. Adverse weather forced further delays, and the launch was postponed on January25, when weather conditions in Africa exceeded limits for a transoceanic abort landing. The launch was postponed again on January27, when an issue with the hatch handle was coupled with high winds at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility that exceeded limits for a return to launch site abort. While it was outside on the launchpad, the Space Shuttle was exposed to 7 inches (18 cm) of rainfall.

The air temperature on January 28 was predicted to be a record-low for a Space Shuttle launch; previously, the coldest O-ring temperatures at launch had been 53 °F (12 °C). The air temperature was forecast to drop to 18 °F (−8 °C) overnight before rising to 22 °F (−6 °C) at 6:00 a.m. and 26 °F (−3 °C) at the scheduled launch time of 9:38 a.m. Based upon O-ring erosion that had occurred in warmer launches, Morton Thiokol engineers were concerned over the effect the record-cold temperatures would have on the seal provided by the SRB O-rings for the launch. A conference call was set up on the evening of January 27 by Cecil Houston, the manager of the KSC office of the Marshall Space Flight Center, to discuss the safety of the launch. Morton Thiokol engineers expressed their concerns about the effect of low temperatures on the resilience of the rubber O-rings. As the colder temperatures lowered the elasticity of the rubber O-rings, the engineers feared that the O-rings would not be extruded to form a seal at the time of launch. The engineers argued that they did not have enough data to determine if the O-rings would seal at temperatures colder than 53 °F (12 °C), the coldest launch of the Space Shuttle to date. Robert Lund, the Vice President of Engineering at Morton Thiokol, stated that the launch should not occur until the temperature was above 53 °F (12 °C), and was supported by Joe Kilminster, the Vice President of the Space Booster Programs at Morton Thiokol.

The teleconference held a recess to allow for offline discussion for Morton Thiokol management. When it resumed, Morton Thiokol leadership had changed their opinion and stated that the evidence presented on the failure of the O-rings was inconclusive and that there was a substantial margin of error in the event of a failure or erosion. They stated that their decision was to proceed with the launch. Morton Thiokol leadership submitted a recommendation for launch, and the teleconference ended. Lawrence Mulloy, the NASA SRB project manager, subsequently called Arnold Aldrich, the NASA Mission Management Team Leader, to discuss the launch decision and weather concerns, but did not mention the O-ring discussion; the two agreed to proceed with the launch.

An overnight measurement taken by the KSC Ice Team recorded the left SRB was 25 °F (−4 °C) and the right SRB was 8 °F (−13 °C). These measurements were recorded for engineering data and not reported, as the temperature of the SRBs was not part of the Launch Commit Criteria. In addition to its effect on the O-rings, the cold temperatures caused ice to form on the fixed service structure. To keep pipes from freezing, water was slowly run from the system; it could not be entirely drained because of the upcoming Space Shuttle launch. As a result, ice formed from 240 feet (73 m) down in the freezing temperatures. Engineers at Rockwell International, which manufactured the orbiter, were concerned that ice would be violently thrown during launch and could potentially damage the orbiter's thermal protection system or be aspirated into one of the engines. Rocco Petrone, the head of Rockwell's space transportation division, and his team determined that the potential damage from ice made the mission unsafe to fly. Arnold Aldrich consulted with engineers at KSC and the Johnson Space Center (JSC) who advised him that ice did not threaten the safety of the orbiter, and he decided to proceed with the launch. The launch was delayed for an additional hour to allow more ice to melt. The ice team performed an inspection at T-20 minutes which indicated that the ice was melting, and Challenger was cleared to launch at 11:38 a.m. EST, with an air temperature of 36 °F (2 °C).

At T+0, Challenger launched from the Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B) at 11:38:00a.m. Beginning at T+0.678 until T+3.375 seconds, nine puffs of dark gray smoke were recorded escaping from the right-hand SRB near the aft strut that attached the booster to the external tank (ET). It was later determined that these smoke puffs were caused by joint rotation in the aft field joint of the right-hand SRB at ignition. The cold temperature in the joint had prevented the O-rings from creating a seal. Rainfall from the preceding time on the launchpad had likely accumulated within the field joint, further compromising the sealing capability of the O-rings. As a result, hot gas was able to travel past the O-rings and erode them. Molten aluminum oxides from the burned propellant resealed the joint and created a temporary barrier against further hot gas and flame escaping through the field joint. The Space Shuttle main engines (SSMEs) were throttled down as scheduled for maximum dynamic pressure (max q). During its ascent, the Space Shuttle encountered wind shear conditions beginning at T+37, but they were within design limits of the vehicle and were countered by the guidance system.

At T+58.788, a tracking film camera captured the beginnings of a plume near the aft attach strut on the right SRB, right before the vehicle passed through max q at T+59.000. The high aerodynamic forces and wind shear likely broke the aluminum oxide seal that had replaced eroded O-rings, allowing the flame to burn through the joint. Within a second from when it was first recorded, the plume became well-defined, and the enlarging hole caused a drop in internal pressure in the right SRB. A leak had begun in the liquid hydrogen (LH2) tank of the ET at T+64.660, as indicated by the changing shape of the plume. The SSMEs pivoted to compensate for the booster burn-through, which was creating an unexpected thrust on the vehicle. The pressure in the external LH2 tank began to drop at T+66.764 indicating that the flame had burned from the SRB into the tank. The crew and flight controllers made no indication they were aware of the vehicle and flight anomalies. At T+68, the CAPCOM Richard O. Covey told the crew that the SSMEs could throttle up to 104% thrust. In response to Covey, Scobee said, "Roger, go at throttle up"; this was the last communication from Challenger on the air-to-ground loop.

At T+72.284, the right SRB pulled away from the aft strut that attached it to the ET, causing lateral acceleration that was felt by the crew. At the same time, pressure in the LH2 tank began dropping, accompanied by a large fireball on the side of the ET. Pilot Mike Smith said "Uh-oh," which was the last speech recorded of the crew. At T+73.124, an explosion occurred at the aft dome of the LH2 tank, which pushed the LH2 tank forward into the liquid oxygen (LOX) tank, while the right SRB collided with the intertank structure. The resulting explosion engulfed the ET and orbiter. The orbiter, at an altitude of 46,000 feet (14 km), was broken into several large pieces from high aerodynamic forces as it traveled at Mach 1.92. The two SRBs separated from the ET and continued in uncontrolled powered flight until the range safety officer (RSO) on the ground initiated their self-destruct charges at T+110.

At T+73.191, there was a burst of static on the air-to-ground loop as the vehicle broke up, which was later attributed to ground-based radios searching for a signal from the destroyed spacecraft. NASA Public Affairs Officer Steve Nesbitt was initially unaware of the explosion and continued to read out flight information. At T+89, after video of the explosion was seen in Mission Control, flight director Jay Greene requested flight information from the Flight Dynamics Officer (FIDO), Brian Perry. Perry responded that "the [ radar] filter has discreting sources". The Ground Control Officer, N.R. Talbott, reported "negative contact (and) loss of downlink" as they were no longer receiving transmissions from Challenger.

Nesbitt stated, "Flight controllers here are looking very carefully at the situation. Obviously a major malfunction. We have no downlink." Soon afterwards, he said, "We have a report from the Flight Dynamics Officer that the vehicle has exploded. The flight director confirms that. We are looking at checking with the recovery forces to see what can be done at this point."

In Mission Control, Greene ordered that contingency procedures be put into effect, which included locking the doors, shutting down telephone communications, and freezing computer terminals to collect data from them.

The crew cabin was made of reinforced aluminum and separated in one piece from the rest of the orbiter. It then traveled in a ballistic arc, reaching the highest point ( apogee) of 65,000 feet (20 km) approximately 25 seconds after the explosion. At the time of separation, the maximum acceleration is estimated to have been between 12 and 20 times that of gravity ( g); within two seconds it had dropped below 4g, and within ten seconds the cabin was in free fall. The forces involved at this stage were probably insufficient to cause major injury to the crew.

At least some of the crew were alive and at least briefly conscious after the breakup, as three of the four recovered Personal Egress Air Packs (PEAPs) on the flight deck were found to have been activated. PEAPs were activated for Smith and two unidentified crewmembers, but not for Scobee. The PEAPs were not intended for in-flight use, and the astronauts never trained with them for an in-flight emergency. The location of Smith's activation switch, on the back side of his seat, indicated that either Resnik or Onizuka likely activated it for him. Investigators found their remaining unused air supply consistent with the expected consumption during the post-breakup trajectory.

While analyzing the wreckage, investigators discovered that several electrical system switches on Smith's right-hand panel had been moved from their usual launch positions. The switches had lever locks on top of them that were required to be pulled out before the switch could be moved. Later tests established that neither the force of the explosion nor the impact with the ocean could have moved them, indicating that Smith made the switch changes, presumably in a futile attempt to restore electrical power to the cockpit after the crew cabin detached from the rest of the orbiter.

On July 28, 1986, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight, former astronaut Richard H. Truly, released a report on the deaths of the crew from physician and Skylab 2 astronaut Joseph P. Kerwin. Kerwin's report concluded that it is unknown whether the crew remained conscious until ocean impact, because it is unknown whether the crew cabin remained pressurized. Depressurization would have caused the crew to quickly lose consciousness, as the PEAPs supplied only unpressurized air. Pressurization could have enabled consciousness for the entire fall until impact. The crew cabin hit the ocean surface at 207 mph (333 km/h) approximately two minutes and 45 seconds after breakup. The estimated deceleration was 200 g, far exceeding structural limits of the crew compartment or crew survivability levels. The mid-deck floor had not suffered buckling or tearing, as would result from a rapid decompression, but stowed equipment showed damage consistent with decompression, and debris was embedded between the two forward windows that may have caused a loss of pressure. Impact damage to the crew cabin was severe enough that it could not be determined if the crew cabin had been previously damaged enough to lose pressurization.

Unlike other crewed spacecraft, crew escape was not possible during powered flight of the Space Shuttle. Launch escape systems had been considered during the Space Shuttle's development, but NASA's conclusion was that the Space Shuttle's expected high reliability would preclude the need for one. Modified SR-71 Blackbird ejection seats and full pressure suits were used for the two-person crews on the first four Space Shuttle orbital test flights, which were disabled and subsequently removed for the operational flights. Escape options for the operational flights were considered, but were not implemented due to their complexity, high cost, and heavy weight. After the disaster, a system was implemented to allow the crew to egress in gliding flight, but this system would not have been usable to escape an explosion during ascent.

Immediately after the disaster, the NASA Launch Recovery Director launched the two SRB recovery ships, MV Freedom Star and MV Liberty Star, to proceed to the impact area to recover debris, and requested the support of US military aircraft and ships. Owing to falling debris from the explosion, the RSO kept recovery forces from the impact area until 12:37p.m. The size of the recovery operations increased through the day, with a total of 12 aircraft and 8 ships participating by 7:00p.m. Surface operations covered debris from the orbiter and ET. The surface recovery operations ended on February7.

On January31, the US Navy was tasked with submarine recovery operations. The search efforts prioritized the recovery of the right SRB, followed by the crew compartment, and then the remaining payload, orbiter pieces, and ET. The search for debris formally began on February8 with the rescue and salvage ship USS Preserver, and eventually grew to 16 total ships managed by NASA, the US Air Force, and independent contractors. The surface ships used side-scan sonar to make the initial search for debris and covered 486 square nautical miles (1,670 km ²) at water depths between 70 feet (21 m) and 1,200 feet (370 m). The sonar operations discovered 881 potential locations for debris, of which 187 pieces were later confirmed to be from the Space Shuttle.

The debris from the SRBs was widely distributed due to the detonation of their linear shaped charges. The identification of SRB material was primarily conducted by crewed submarines and submersibles. The vehicles were dispatched to investigate potential debris located during the search phase. Surface ships lifted the SRB debris with the help of technical divers and underwater remotely operated vehicles to attach the necessary slings to raise the debris with cranes. The solid propellant in the SRBs posed a risk, as it became more volatile after being submerged. Recovered portions of the SRBs were kept wet during recovery, and their unused propellant was ignited once they were brought ashore. The failed joint on the right SRB was first located on sonar on March1. Subsequent dives to 560 ft (170 m) by the NR-1 submarine on April5 and the SEA-LINK I submersible on April12 confirmed that it was the damaged field joint, and it was successfully recovered on April13. Of the 196,726 lb (89,233 kg) of both SRB shells, 102,500 lb (46,500 kg) was recovered, another 54,000 lb (24,000 kg) was found but not recovered, and 40,226 lb (18,246 kg) was never found.

On March 7, Air Force divers identified potential crew compartment debris, which was confirmed the next day by divers from the USS Preserver. The damage to the crew compartment indicated that it had remained largely intact during the initial explosion but was extensively damaged when it impacted the ocean. The remains of the crew were badly damaged from impact and submersion, and were not intact bodies. The USS Preserver made multiple trips to return debris and remains to port, and continued crew compartment recovery until April4. While recovering the remains of the crew, Jarvis's body floated away and was not recovered until April15, several weeks after the other remains had been positively identified. Once remains were brought to port, pathologists from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology worked to identify the human remains, but could not determine the exact cause of death for any of them. Medical examiners in Brevard County disputed the legality of transferring human remains to US military officials to conduct autopsies and refused to issue the death certificates; NASA officials ultimately released the death certificates of the crew members.

The IUS that would have been used to boost the orbit of the TDRS-B satellite was one of the first pieces of debris recovered. There was no indication that there had been premature ignition of the IUS, which had been one of the suspected causes for the disaster. Debris from the three SSMEs was recovered from February14 to28, and post-recovery analysis produced results consistent with functional engines suddenly losing their LH2 fuel supply. Deepwater recovery operations continued until April29, with smaller scale, shallow recovery operations continuing until August29. On December 17, 1996, two pieces of the orbiter were found at Cocoa Beach. All recovered non-organic debris from Challenger was buried in Cape Canaveral Air Force Station missile silos at LC-31 and LC-32.

On April 29, 1986, the astronauts' remains were transferred on a C-141 Starlifter aircraft from Kennedy Space Center to the military mortuary at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. Their caskets were each draped with an American flag and carried past an honor guard and followed by an astronaut escort. After the remains arrived at Dover Air Force base, they were transferred to the families of the crew members. Scobee and Smith were buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Onizuka was buried at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. McNair was buried in Rest Lawn Memorial Park in Lake City, South Carolina, but his remains were later moved within the town to the Dr. Ronald E. McNair Memorial Park. McAuliffe was buried at Calvary Cemetery in Concord, New Hampshire. Jarvis was cremated, and his ashes were scattered in the Pacific Ocean. Unidentified crew remains were buried at the Space Shuttle Challenger Memorial in Arlington on May 20, 1986.

President Ronald Reagan had been scheduled to give the 1986 State of the Union Address on January28,1986, the evening of the Challenger disaster. After a discussion with his aides, Reagan postponed the State of the Union, and instead addressed the nation about the disaster from the Oval Office of the White House with a speech written by Peggy Noonan. On January31, Ronald and Nancy Reagan traveled to the Johnson Space Center to speak at a memorial service honoring the crew members. During the ceremony, an Air Force band sang " God Bless America" as NASA T-38 Talon jets flew directly over the scene in the traditional missing-man formation.

Soon after the disaster, US elected officials expressed concern that White House officials, including Chief of Staff Donald Regan and Communications Director Pat Buchanan, had pressured NASA to launch Challenger before the scheduled January 28 State of the Union address, because Reagan had intended to mention the launch in his remarks. Three weeks before the State of the Union address was to have been given, NASA officials had suggested that Reagan mention Challenger launch and Christa McAuliffe's flight in his speech. In March 1986, The White House released a copy of the original State of the Union speech as it would have been given before the disaster. In that speech, Reagan had intended to mention an X-ray experiment launched on Challenger and designed by a guest he had invited to the address, but he did not further discuss the Challenger launch. In the rescheduled State of the Union address on February 4, President Reagan mentioned the deceased Challenger crew members and modified his remarks about the X-ray experiment as "launched and lost". In April1986, the White House released a report that concluded there had been no pressure from the White House for NASA to launch Challenger prior to the State of the Union.

Nationally televised coverage of the launch and explosion was provided by CNN. To promote the Teacher in Space program with McAuliffe as a crewmember, NASA had arranged for many US children to view the launch live at school. Press interest in the disaster increased in following days; the number of reporters at KSC increased from 535 on the day of the launch to 1,467 reporters three days later. In the aftermath of the accident, NASA was criticized for not making key personnel available to the press. In the absence of information, the press published articles suggesting the external tank was the cause of the explosion. Until 2010, the live broadcast of the launch and subsequent disaster by CNN was the only known on-location video footage from within range of the launch site. Additional amateur and professional recordings have since become publicly available.

The Challenger accident has been used as a case study for subjects such as engineering safety, the ethics of whistle-blowing, communications and group decision-making, and the dangers of groupthink. Roger Boisjoly and Allan McDonald became speakers who advocated for responsible workplace decision making and engineering ethics. Information designer Edward Tufte has argued that the Challenger accident was the result of poor communications and overly-complicated explanations on the part of engineers, and stated that showing the correlation of ambient air temperature and O-ring erosion amounts would have been sufficient to communicate the potential dangers of the cold-weather launch. Boisjoly contested this assertion and stated that the data presented by Tufte were not as simple or available as Tufte stated.

On February3, 1986, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12546, which established a committee to investigate the Challenger disaster. The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, also known as the Rogers Commission after its chairman, was formed on February6 following the swearing in of its members. The commission members were Chairman William P. Rogers, Vice Chairman Neil Armstrong, David Acheson, Eugene Covert, Richard Feynman, Robert Hotz, Donald Kutyna, Sally Ride, Robert Rummel, Joseph Sutter, Arthur Walker, Albert Wheelon, and Chuck Yeager.

The commission held hearings that discussed the NASA accident investigation and the Space Shuttle program as a whole. On February10, a hearing was held that discussed the issues with the O-rings in the SRBs and that Morton Thiokol engineers had advised against the launch. On February15, Rogers released a statement that established the commission's changing role to investigate the accident independent of NASA due to concerns of the failures of the internal processes at NASA. The commission created four investigative panels to research the different aspects of the Space Shuttle mission. The Accident Analysis Panel, chaired by Kutyna, used data from salvage operations and testing to determine the exact cause behind the accident. The Development and Production Panel, chaired by Sutter, investigated the contractors responsible for Space Shuttle components and how the contractors interacted with NASA. The Pre-Launch Activities Panel, chaired by Acheson, focused on the final assembly processes and pre-launch activities conducted at KSC. The Mission Planning and Operations Panel, chaired by Ride, investigated the planning that went into mission development, along with potential concerns over crew safety and pressure to adhere to a schedule. Over a period of four months, the commission interviewed over 160 individuals, held at least 35 investigative sessions, and involved more than 6,000 NASA employees, contractors, and support personnel. The commission's report was published on June 6, 1986.

The commission determined that the cause of the accident was hot gas blowing past the O-rings in the field joint on the right SRB, and found no other potential causes for the disaster. It attributed the accident to a faulty design of the field joint that was unacceptably sensitive to changes in temperature, dynamic loading, and the character of its materials. The report was critical of NASA and Morton Thiokol, and emphasized that both organizations had overlooked evidence that indicated the potential danger with the SRB field joints. It noted that NASA accepted the risk of O-ring erosion without evaluating how it could potentially affect the safety of a mission. The commission concluded that the safety culture and management structure at NASA was insufficient to properly report, analyze, and prevent flight issues. It stated that the pressure to increase the rate of flights negatively impacted the amount of training, quality control, and repair work that was available for each mission.

In addition to determining the causes and contributing factors to the disaster, the commission published a series of recommendations to improve the safety of the Space Shuttle program. It proposed a redesign of the joints in the SRB that would prevent gas from blowing past the O-rings. It also recommended that the Space Shuttle program's management should be restructured to keep project managers from being pressured to adhere to unsafe deadlines by the Space Shuttle organization, and should include astronauts to better address crew safety concerns. It proposed that an office for safety be established reporting directly to the NASA administrator to oversee all safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions in NASA programs. Additionally, the commission addressed issues with overall safety and maintenance for the orbiter, and it proposed a means for the crew to escape during controlled gliding flight.

During a televised hearing on February11, Feynman demonstrated the loss of rubber's elasticity in cold temperatures using a glass of cold water and a piece of rubber, for which he received subsequent media attention. Feynman, a Nobel Prize-winning physicist, advocated for harsher criticism towards NASA in the report and repeatedly disagreed with Rogers. He threatened to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations on the reliability of the Space Shuttle, which appeared as Appendix F. In the appendix, he lauded the engineering and software accomplishments in the Space Shuttle's development, but he argued that multiple components, including the avionics and SSMEs in addition to the SRBs, were more dangerous and accident-prone than original NASA estimates had indicated.

The U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology conducted an investigation of the Challenger disaster and released a report on October29, 1986. The committee, which had authorized the funding for the Space Shuttle, reviewed the findings of the Rogers Commission as part of its investigation. The committee agreed with the Rogers Commission that the failed SRB field joint was the cause of the accident, and that NASA and Morton Thiokol failed to act despite numerous warnings of the potential dangers of the SRB. The committee's report further emphasized safety considerations of other Space Shuttle components and recommended a risk management review for all critical systems.

In response to the commission's recommendation, NASA initiated a redesign of the SRB, later named the redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM), which was supervised by an independent oversight group. The redesigned joint included a capture feature on the tang around the interior wall of the clevis to prevent joint rotation. The space between the capture feature and the clevis was sealed with another O-ring. The capture feature reduced the potential of joint rotation to 15percent of that which had occurred during the disaster. Should joint rotation occur, any rotation that reduced the O-ring seal on one side of the clevis wall would increase it on the other side. Additionally, heaters were installed to maintain consistent, higher temperatures of the O-rings. The RSRM was first tested on August 30, 1987. In April and August 1988, the RSRM was tested with intentional flaws that allowed hot gas to penetrate the field joint, which allowed the engineers to evaluate if the improved field joint prevented joint rotation. Following the successful tests, the RSRM was certified to fly on the Space Shuttle.

In addition to the SRBs, NASA increased the safety standards on other components of the Space Shuttle. The critical items lists and failure modes for the SSMEs were updated, along with 18 hardware changes. The maximum thrust of the SSMEs was limited to 104%, with 109% only allowed in an abort scenario. The landing gear was updated to improve its steering and handling abilities while the Space Shuttle was landing. NASA implemented an escape option in which the astronauts would jettison the side hatch and extend a pole out of the orbiter; they would slide down the pole to avoid hitting the orbiter as bailed out before they activated their parachutes. The orbiter's software was modified to maintain stable flight while all of the flight crew left the controls to escape. This escape method would not have saved the crew in the Challenger disaster, but was added in the event of another Space Shuttle emergency.

NASA also created a new Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance, headed as the commission had specified by a NASA associate administrator who reported directly to the NASA administrator. Former Challenger flight director Greene became chief of the Safety Division of the directorate. After the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that NASA had not effectively set up an independent office for safety oversight. The CAIB concluded that the ineffective safety culture that had resulted in the Challenger accident was also responsible for the subsequent disaster.

The Teacher in Space program, which McAuliffe had been selected for, was cancelled in 1990 as a result of the Challenger disaster. In 1998, NASA replaced Teacher in Space with the Educator Astronaut Project, which differed in that it required the teachers to become professional astronauts trained as mission specialists, rather than short-term payload specialists who would return to their classrooms following their spaceflight. Barbara Morgan, who had been the backup teacher for McAuliffe, was selected to be part of NASA Astronaut Group 17 and flew on STS-118.

The projected Space Shuttle launch schedule of 24 launches per year was criticized by the Rogers Commission as an unrealistic goal that created unnecessary pressure on NASA to launch missions. In August 1986, President Reagan approved the construction of an orbiter, which would later be named Endeavour, to replace Challenger. Construction of Endeavour began in 1987 and was completed in 1990, with its first flight for STS-49 in May 1992. He also announced that the Space Shuttle would no longer carry commercial satellite payloads, and that these would be launched using commercial expendable launch vehicles.

The Space Shuttle fleet was grounded for two years and eight months while the program underwent investigation, redesign, and restructuring. On September 29, 1988, Discovery launched on STS-26 mission from LC-39B with a crew of five veteran astronauts. Its payload was TDRS-3, which was a substitute for the satellite lost with Challenger. The launch tested the redesigned boosters, and the crew wore pressure suits during the ascent and reentry. The mission was a success, and the Space Shuttle program resumed flying.

In 2004, President George W. Bush conferred posthumous Congressional Space Medals of Honor to all 14 crew members killed in the Challenger and Columbia accidents. An unpainted decorative oval in the Brumidi Corridors of the United States Capitol was finished with a portrait depicting the crew by Charles Schmidt in 1987. The scene was painted on canvas and then applied to the wall. The "Forever Remembered" exhibit at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex opened in July 2015 and includes a display of a 12 feet (3.7 m) section of Challenger's recovered fuselage. The exhibit was opened by NASA Administrator Charles Bolden along with family members of the crew. A tree for each astronaut was planted in NASA's Astronaut Memorial Grove at the Johnson Space Center, along with trees for each astronaut from the Apollo 1 and Columbia disasters. Seven asteroids were named after the crew members: 3350 Scobee, 3351 Smith, 3352 McAuliffe, 3353 Jarvis, 3354 McNair, 3355 Onizuka, and 3356 Resnik. The approved naming citation was published by the Minor Planet Center on March 26, 1986 (). In 1988, seven craters on the far side of the Moon, within the Apollo Basin, were named after the fallen astronauts by the IAU. The Soviet Union named two craters on Venus after McAuliffe and Resnik.

Several memorials have been established in honor of the Challenger disaster. The public Peers Park in Palo Alto, California features a Challenger Memorial Grove that includes redwood trees grown from seeds carried aboard Challenger in 1985. Schools and streets have been renamed to include the names of the crew or "Challenger." In 1990, a 1/10th scale replica of Space Shuttle Challenger in liftoff position was erected in Little Tokyo district of Los Angeles, California. Challenger Point, a peak of the Sangre de Cristo Range, commemorates the Challenger mission. The McAuliffe-Shepard Discovery Center, a science museum and planetarium in Concord, New Hampshire, is named in honor of McAuliffe, a Concord High School teacher, and Alan Shepard, who was from Derry, New Hampshire. The families of the Challenger crew established the Challenger Center for Space Science Education as educational non-profit organization.

An American flag, later named the Challenger flag, was carried aboard the Challenger. It was sponsored by Boy Scout Troop 514 of Monument, Colorado, and was recovered intact, still sealed in its plastic container. Onizuka had included a soccer ball with his personal effects that was recovered and later flown to the International Space Station aboard Soyuz Expedition 49 by American astronaut Shane Kimbrough. It is on display at Clear Lake High School in Houston, which was attended by Onizuka's children.

In the years immediately after the Challenger disaster, several books were published describing the factors and causes of the accidents and the subsequent investigation and changes. In 1987, Malcolm McConnell, a journalist who had been viewing the launch during the disaster, published Challenger-A Major Malfunction: A True Story of Politics, Greed, and the Wrong Stuff. McConnell's book was criticized for arguing for a conspiracy involving NASA Administrator Fletcher awarding the contract to Morton Thiokol because it was from Utah, his home state. The book Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory of Apollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle by Joseph Trento was also published in 1987. Trento's book argues that the Space Shuttle program had been a flawed and politicized program from its inception. In 1988, Feynman's memoir, What Do You Care What Other People Think? Further Adventures of a Curious Character, was published. The latter half of the book discusses his involvement in the Rogers Commission and his relationship with Kutyna.

Additional books were published years after the disaster. In 1996, Diane Vaughan published The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, which argued that NASA's structure and mission, rather than just Space Shuttle program management, created a climate of risk acceptance that resulted in the disaster. Also in 1996, Claus Jensen published No Downlink: A Dramatic Narrative About the Challenger Accident and Our Time that primarily discussed the development of rocketry prior to the disaster, and was criticized for its reliance on secondary sources with little original research conducted for the book. In 2009, Allan McDonald published his memoir written with space historian James Hansen, Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, which focused on his personal involvement in the launch, disaster, investigation, and return to flight, and was critical of NASA and Morton Thiokol leadership for agreeing to launch Challenger despite warnings from engineers concerned with the O-rings.

An ABC television movie titled Challenger was broadcast on February 25, 1990. It starred Barry Bostwick as Scobee and Karen Allen as McAuliffe. The movie was critical of NASA and positively portrayed the engineers who argued against launching. The movie was criticized by the widows of Smith, McNair, and Onizuka as an inaccurate portrayal of events. A BBC docudrama titled The Challenger Disaster was broadcast on March 18, 2013. It starred William Hurt as Feynman and portrayed the investigation into the causes of the disaster. A film directed by Nathan VonMinden, The Challenger Disaster, was released on January 25, 2019; it depicted fictional characters participating in the decision process to launch.

The first episode of History Channel's documentary titled Days That Shaped America is about Challenger. The four-part docuseries Challenger: The Final Flight, created by Steven Leckart and Glen Zipper, was released by Netflix on September 16, 2020. The docuseries used interviews with NASA and Morton Thiokol personnel involved in the decision to launch, and argues against the flawed decision making process that resulted in a preventable disaster.

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Space Shuttle Challenger disaster - Wikipedia

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Date January 28, 1986; 35 years ago Time 11:39:13 EST (16:39:13 UTC) Location Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Florida 28°38′24″N 80°16′48″W ﻿ / ﻿ 28.64000°N 80.28000°W Coordinates: 28°38′24″N 80°16′48″W ﻿ / ﻿ 28.64000°N 80.28000°W Outcome Grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet for nearly three years during which various safety measures, solid rocket booster redesign, and a new policy on management decision-making for future launches were implemented.

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10 Largest Industrial Disasters of the Last 25 Years

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See the top 10 most fatal industrial accidents in the United States over the last quarter century.

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https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2024/03/11/virginia-plane-crash-bath-county/72928156007/

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A small plane crashed into the woods in Virginia and caught fire, killing all five people on board, according to authorities.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration, a small, private jet, a twin-engine IAI Astra 1125, crashed near Ingalls Field Airport in Bath County, Virginia, specifically Hot Springs, around 3 p.m. Sunday afternoon.

Virginia State Police responded to the plane crash and told USA TODAY in a statement the plane crashed into the woods in the 6200 block of Airport Road and caught fire upon impact.

"At this time, it appears there were four adults and one juvenile onboard the aircraft. All five, which includes the pilot, died at the scene," Virginia State Police spokesperson Corinne Geller said in a statement to USA TODAY.

Geller also told USA TODAY state police is working with the FAA and National Transportation Safety Board to confirm the flight path of the aircraft and identify the occupants. The crash investigation remains ongoing, and the FAA said the NTSB is in charge of the investigation and will provide further updates.
Small plane crash: Nashville police identify Canadian family killed small plane crash near Interstate 40
Other recent small plane crashes in the U.S.

Five people died after a single-engine plane crashed near an airport in Nashville, Tennessee last week, officials said.

The aircraft crashed along Interstate 40 around 7:45 p.m. local time last Monday after the pilot of the plane reported engine failure and requested an emergency landing, Metro Nashville Police spokesperson Don Aaron said, according to the Tennessean, a part of the USA TODAY Network.

The plane was just three miles south of John C. Tune Airport when it landed in a grassy median along the interstate. The pilot had radioed that the plane was not going to make it to the airport just before it crashed. The aircraft did not hit any buildings or vehicles as it crashed.

Earlier this month, a small plane in the Florida Keys crashed on a golf course at a private resort, leaving one person hurt, officials said.

The Monroe County Sheriff's Office was called to the Ocean Reef Club shortly after 12:30 p.m. on Friday, March 1, spokesperson Becky Herrin said. The Ocean Reef Club is a private club in Key Largo with its own airport.
Contributing: Kirsten Fiscus, Craig Shoup, Rachel Wegner, Sarah Al-Arshani and Kinsey Crowley, USA TODAY Network
One person was injured, and officials believe he was the pilot, Herrin said. He was airlifted by helicopter to Jackson South hospital in Miami, but Herrin did not know what condition he is in. Miami-Dade Fire Rescue spokesperson Andrea Rudchenco said Air Rescue South transported one "trauma alert patient" to the trauma center.

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4 adults, 1 child killed after small plane crashes in Bath County, Virginia woods: Police

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A small plane crashed into the woods in Bath County, Virginia and caught fire, killing all five people on board, according to authorities.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Dhaka_Bailey_Road_fire

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Deepwater Horizon oil spill

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https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/maui-wildfires-facts-faqs-how-to-help

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Maui wildfires: Facts, FAQs, and how to help

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Wildfires in Maui claimed 100 lives and caused widespread destruction. Learn how World Vision is responding to the disaster.

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Piper Alpha was an oil platform located in the North Sea approximately 120 miles (190 km) north-east of Aberdeen, Scotland. It was operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Limited (OPCAL) and began production in 1976, initially as an oil-only platform but later converted to add gas production.

Piper Alpha exploded and sank on 6 July 1988, killing 165 of the men on board, 30 of whose bodies were never recovered, as well as a further two rescue workers after their rescue vessel, which had been trapped in debris and immobilized, was destroyed by the disintegrating rig. Sixty-one workers escaped and survived. The total insured loss was about £1.7 billion (£5 billion in 2021), making it one of the costliest man-made catastrophes ever. At the time of the disaster, the platform accounted for approximately 10% of North Sea oil and gas production. The accident is the world's worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and industry impact. The Inquiry blamed it on inadequate maintenance and safety procedures by Occidental, though no charges were brought.

In Aberdeen, the Kirk of St Nicholas on Union Street has dedicated a chapel in memory of those who died, containing a Book of Remembrance listing them. There is a memorial sculpture in the Rose Garden of Hazlehead Park.

Four companies that later became the OPCAL joint venture obtained an oil exploration licence in 1972. They discovered the Piper oilfield located at in early 1973 and began fabrication of the platform, pipelines and onshore support structures. Oil production started in 1976 with about 250,000 barrels (40,000 m ³) of oil per day, increasing to 300,000 barrels (48,000 m ³). A gas recovery module was installed by 1980. Production declined to 125,000 barrels (19,900 m ³) by 1988. OPCAL built the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkney Islands to receive and process oil from the Piper, Claymore, and Tartan oilfields, each with its own platform. One 30-inch (76 cm) diameter main oil pipeline ran 128 miles (206 km) from Piper Alpha to Flotta, with a short oil pipeline from the Claymore platform joining it some 20 miles (32 km) to the west. The Tartan field also fed oil to Claymore field and then onto the main line to Flotta. Separate 18-inch (46 cm) diameter gas pipelines were run from Tartan platform to the Piper, and from Piper to the gas compressing platform MCP-01 some 30 miles (48 km) to the northwest.

A large, fixed platform, Piper Alpha sat atop Piper oilfield, approximately 120 miles (190 km) northeast of Aberdeen in 474 feet (144 m) of water. It was built in four modules separated by firewalls.

The platform was constructed by McDermott Engineering of Ardersier and Union Industrielle d'Entreprise of Cherbourg, with the sections united at Ardersier before being towed out during 1975. Production commenced in late 1976. For safety reasons the modules were organised so that the most dangerous platform operations took place far from the personnel areas. The conversion from oil to gas broke this safety concept, with the result that sensitive areas were brought together; for example, the gas compression was next to the control room. The close position of these two areas played a role in the accident.

Piper Alpha produced crude oil and natural gas from 36 wells for delivery to the Flotta oil terminal on Orkney and to other installations by three separate pipelines. At the time of the disaster, Piper was one of the heaviest platforms operating in the North Sea, along with Magnus and Brae B.

In 1978, major works were carried out to enable the platform to meet UK Government gas conservation requirements, and to avoid waste from the flaring of excess gas. After this work had been completed, Piper Alpha was operating in what was known as "phase 2 mode" (operating with the Gas Conservation Module (GCM)). From the end of 1980 until July 1988 phase 2 mode was its normal operating state. In the late 1980s, major construction, maintenance, and upgrade works were planned by Occidental and by July 1988, the rig was already well into major reconstruction, with six major projects identified, including the change-out of the GCM unit. This meant that the rig was returned to its initial phase 1 mode (i.e., operating without a GCM unit). Despite the complex and demanding work schedule, Occidental made the decision to continue operating the platform in phase 1 mode throughout this period and not to shut it down, as had been originally planned. The planning and controls that were put in place were thought to be adequate. Therefore, Piper continued to export oil at just under 120,000 barrels (19,000 m ³) per day and to export Tartan gas at some 33 million cubic feet (930 thousand cubic metres) per day at standard conditions during this period.

Because the platform was completely destroyed, and many of those involved died, analysis of events can only suggest a possible chain of events based on known facts. Some witnesses to the events question the official timeline.

12:00, 6 July 1988: Two condensate pumps, designated A and B, were operating to displace the platform's condensate for transport to the coast. On the morning of 6 July, Pump A's pressure safety valve (PSV #504) was removed for routine maintenance. The pump's two-yearly overhaul was planned but had not started. The open condensate pipe was temporarily sealed with a disk cover (flat metal disc also called a blind flange or blank flange). Because the work could not be completed by 18:00, the disc cover remained in place. It was hand-tightened only. The on-duty engineer filled in a permit which stated that Pump A was not ready and must not be switched on under any circumstances.

18:00: The day shift ended, and the night shift started with 62 men running Piper Alpha. As the on-duty custodian was busy, the engineer neglected to inform him of the condition of Pump A. Instead, he placed the permit in the control centre and left. This permit disappeared and was not found. Coincidentally there was another permit issued for the general overhaul of Pump A that had not yet begun.

19:00: Fire-fighting system put under manual control: Like many other offshore platforms, Piper Alpha had an automatic fire-fighting system, driven by both diesel and electric pumps (the latter were disabled by the initial explosions). The diesel pumps were designed to suck in large amounts of sea water for fire fighting; the pumps had automatic controls to start them in case of fire (in this case they could not be started remotely/manually because the control room was near the centre of the explosion and had been evacuated). However, the fire-fighting system was under manual control on the evening of 6 July: the Piper Alpha procedure adopted by the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) required manual control of the pumps whenever divers were in the water (as they were for approximately twelve hours a day during summer) although in reality, the risk was not seen as significant for divers unless a diver was closer than 10-15 feet (3-5 m) from any of the four 120 feet (40 m) level caged intakes. A recommendation from an earlier audit had suggested that a procedure be developed to keep the pumps in automatic mode if divers were not working in the vicinity of the intakes as was the practice on the Claymore platform, but this was never implemented.

21:45: Pump B tripped and could not be restarted: Because of problems with the methanol system earlier in the day, methane clathrate (a flammable ice) had started to accumulate in the gas compression system pipework, causing a blockage. Due to this blockage, condensate (natural gas liquids NGL) Pump B stopped and could not be restarted. As the pumps normally fill condensate storage tanks, these tanks and pumps were equipped with timed safety systems to prevent overfilling or underfilling. As the entire electrical power on the platform was dependant on these safety systems (related to the pumps), they will trigger a complete and total power shutdown of the rig within 30 minutes if pump activity is not detected. Therefore the managers were under serious time pressure to avoid this. A search was made through the documents to determine whether Condensate Pump A could be started.

21:52: Permit for pump A PSV recertification not found and pump restarted: The permit for the overhaul was found, but not the other permit stating that the pump must not be started under any circumstances due to the missing safety valve. The valve was in a different location from the pump and therefore the permits were stored in different boxes, as they were sorted by location. None of those present were aware that a vital part of the machine had been removed. The manager assumed from the existing documents that it would be safe to start Pump A. The missing valve was not noticed by anyone, particularly as the metal disc replacing the safety valve was several metres above ground level and obscured by machinery.

21:55: First explosion due to condensate leak from PSV flange. Condensate Pump A was switched on. Gas flowed into the pump, and because of the missing safety valve, produced an overpressure which the loosely fitted metal disc did not withstand. Gas audibly leaked out at high pressure, drawing the attention of several men and triggering six gas alarms including the high level gas alarm. Before anyone could act, the gas ignited and exploded, blowing through the firewall made up of 2.5 by 1.5 m (8 by 5 ft) panels bolted together, which were not designed to withstand explosions. The explosion almost entirely destroyed the control room, killing key personnel responsible for coordination of the rig. Custodian Geoff Bollands, who had been in the room and witnessed the alarms going off, survived the blast and immediately activated the rig's emergency stop button before escaping, closing huge valves in the sea lines and ceasing all oil and gas extraction.

Theoretically, the platform would then have been isolated from the flow of oil and gas and the fire contained. However, because the platform was originally built for oil, the firewalls were designed to resist fire rather than withstand explosions. The first explosion broke the firewall and dislodged panels around Module (B). One of the flying panels ruptured a small condensate pipe, creating another fire.

22:04: Control room of Piper Alpha abandoned. A Mayday call was signalled via radio by the radio operator David Kinrade. Piper Alpha's design made no allowances for the destruction of the control room, and the platform's organisation disintegrated. No attempt was made to use loudspeakers or to order an evacuation. Despite Bollands' activation of the emergency stop, there were no alarms warning workers of the unfolding disaster, as much of their systems had been destroyed by the initial blast.

22:05: The Search and Rescue station at RAF Lossiemouth received its first call notifying them of the possibility of an emergency, and a No. 202 Sqn Sea King helicopter, "Rescue 138", took off at the request of the Coastguard station at Aberdeen. The station at RAF Boulmer was also notified, and a Hawker Siddeley Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft from RAF Kinloss was sent to the area to act as "on-scene commander" using the designation "Rescue Zero-One".

22:06: The heat from the flames ruptures crude oil storage tanks in Module B, flooding the area with crude oil, which ignites almost instantaneously, creating a black plume of smoke characteristic of oil fires, as seen in photographs from nearby ships. The burning oil later drips onto a lower platform used by the rig for diving operations. The platform floor consisted of steel grates and under normal circumstances would have allowed the burning oil to drip harmlessly into the sea, but divers on the previous shift had placed rubber matting on the metal grate (likely to cushion their bare feet from the sharp metal grates), allowing the oil to form a burning puddle on the platform.

22:20: The heat from the burning oil collecting on the diving platform causes the nearby Tartan pipeline, pressurized to 120 atmospheres, to rupture violently, releasing 15-30 tonnes (10,000 to 30,000 m³ (350,000 to 1,060,000 cu ft) of its highly flammable contents at immense pressure every second, which immediately ignited into a massive fireball, the heat and vibrations of which was felt by the crews in vessels as far away as one kilometer from the rig. From that moment on, the platform's destruction was inevitable.

22:30: The , a large semi-submersible fire fighting, diving / rescue and accommodation vessel, drew alongside Piper Alpha. The Tharos used its water cannon where it could, but it was restricted, because the cannon was so powerful it would injure or kill anyone hit by the water. Tharos was equipped with a hospital with an Offshore Medic assisted by Diver Paramedics from the Tharos Saturation Diving team. A triage and reception area was set up on the vessel's helideck to receive injured casualties.

22:50: The MCP-01 pipeline fails and explodes, shooting huge flames over 300 ft (90 m) into the air. The Tharos was driven off by the heat, which began to melt the surrounding machinery and steelwork. It was only after this explosion that the Claymore platform stopped pumping oil. Personnel still left alive were either desperately sheltering in the scorched, smoke-filled accommodation block or leaping from the various deck levels, including the helideck, 175 ft (50 m) into the North Sea. The explosion destroys a fast rescue boat launched from the standby vessel Sandhaven that had been trapped in debris during a rescue attempt, killing nearly all of the crewmen on board with the exception of driver Ian Letham, as well as the six Piper Alpha survivors they had rescued from the water. Sandhaven was the standby vessel for Santa Fe 135, several miles away.

23:18: The Claymore gas line ruptures and explodes, adding even more fuel to the already massive firestorm on board Piper Alpha. With thousands of cubic metres of highly volatile fuel burning every second, the 20,000-tonne steel platform melted over the next 80 minutes.

23:35: Helicopter "Rescue 138" from Lossiemouth arrives at the scene.

23:37: Tharos contacts Nimrod "Rescue Zero-One" to apprise it of the situation. A standby vessel has picked up 25 casualties, including three with serious burns, and another one with an injury. Tharos requests the evacuation of its non-essential personnel to make room for incoming casualties. "Rescue 138" is requested to evacuate 12 non-essential personnel from Tharos to transfer to Ocean Victory, before returning with paramedics.

23:50: With critical support structures burned away, and with nothing to support the heavier structures on top, the platform began to collapse. One of the cranes collapsed, followed by the drilling derrick. The generation and utilities Module (D), which included the fireproofed accommodation block, and was still occupied by crewmen who had sheltered there, slipped into the sea. The largest part of the platform followed it. "Rescue 138" lands on Tharos and picks up the 12 non-essential personnel, before leaving for Ocean Victory.

23:55: "Rescue 138" arrives at Ocean Victory and deposits the 12 passengers before returning to Tharos with four of Ocean Victory's paramedics.

00:07, 7 July: "Rescue 138" lands paramedics on Ocean Victory.

00:17: "Rescue 138" winches up serious burns casualties picked up by the Standby Safety Vessel, MV Silver Pit.

00:25: First seriously injured survivor of Piper Alpha is winched aboard "Rescue 138".

00:45: The entire platform is gone. Module (A) was all that remained of Piper Alpha.

00:48: "Rescue 138" lands on Tharos with three casualties picked up from MV Silver Pit.

00:58: Civilian Sikorsky S-61 helicopter of Bristow Helicopters arrives at Tharos from Aberdeen with medical emergency team.

01:47: Coastguard helicopter lands on Tharos with more casualties.

02:25: First helicopter leaves Tharos with casualties for Aberdeen Royal Infirmary.

03:27: "Rescue 138" lands on Tharos with the bodies of two fatalities. "Rescue 138" then leaves to refuel on the drilling rig Santa Fe 135.

05:15: "Rescue 137" arrives at Tharos, lands, then leaves taking casualties to Aberdeen.

06:21: Uninjured survivors of Piper Alpha leave Tharos by civilian S-61 helicopter for Aberdeen.

07:25: "Rescue 138" picks up remaining survivors from Tharos for transfer to Aberdeen.

At the time of the disaster 226 people were on the platform; 165 died and 61 survived. Two men from the Sandhaven, which was the standby vessel for the nearby Santa Fe 135, were also killed in attempts to pick up survivors in the Sandhaven's Fast Rescue Boat. The Coxswain (Iain Letham) was the only survivor. The standby vessel for Piper Alpha was the Silver Pit, which by co-incidence was also the standby vessel in the Ekofisk Field when the Alexander Kielland capsized on 27 March 1980.

There is controversy about whether there was sufficient time for a more effective emergency evacuation. The first explosion killed most of the personnel with the authority to order an evacuation when it destroyed the control room, and much of the control systems in the room responsible for sounding platform-wide alarms had also been lost with its destruction. This was a consequence of the platform design, which did not include blast walls. Another contributing factor was that the nearby connected platforms Tartan and Claymore continued to pump gas and oil to Piper Alpha until its pipeline ruptured in the heat in the second explosion. Their operations crews did not believe they had authority to shut off production, even though they could see that Piper Alpha was burning.

The nearby diving support vessel Lowland Cavalier reported the initial explosion just before 22:00, and the second explosion occurred 22 minutes later. By the time civil and military rescue helicopters reached the scene, flames over 100 metres in height and visible as far away as 100 km (120 km from the Maersk Highlander) away prevented safe approach. The largest number of survivors (37 out of 59) were recovered by the Fast Rescue Boat of the Standby Safety Vessel, MV Silver Pit; coxswain James Clark later received the George Medal as did Iain Letham of the Sandhaven. Others awarded the George Medal were Charles Haffey from Methil, Andrew Kiloh from Aberdeen, and James McNeill from Oban. Sandhaven crewmates Malcolm Storey, from Alness, and Brian Batchelor, from Scunthorpe, were awarded George Medals posthumously.

The blazing remains of the platform were eventually extinguished three weeks later by a team onboard MSV Tharos led by firefighter Red Adair, despite reported conditions of 80 mph (130 km/h) winds and 70-foot (20 m) waves. The part of the platform which contained the galley where about 100 victims had taken refuge was recovered by divers in late 1988 from the sea bed, and the bodies of 87 men were found inside.

The Cullen Inquiry was set up in November 1988 to establish the cause of the disaster. It was chaired by the Scottish judge William Cullen. After 180 days of proceedings, it released its report Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (short: Cullen Report) in November 1990. It concluded that the initial condensate leak was the result of maintenance work being carried out simultaneously on a pump and related safety valve. The inquiry was critical of Piper Alpha's operator, Occidental, which was found guilty of having inadequate maintenance and safety procedures, but no criminal charges were ever brought against the company.

The second part of the report made 106 recommendations for changes to North Sea safety procedures:

37 recommendations covered procedures for operating equipment, 32 the information of platform personnel, 25 the design of platforms and 12 the information of emergency services

The responsibility to implement was for 57 with the regulator, 40 for the operators, 8 for the industry as a whole and 1 for stand-by ship owners.

The recommendations led to the enactment of the Offshore Safety Act 1992 and the making of the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992.

Most significant of these recommendations was that operators were required to present a safety case and that the responsibility for enforcing safety in the North Sea should be moved from the Department of Energy to the Health and Safety Executive, as having both production and safety overseen by the same agency was a conflict of interest.

In 2013, on the 25th anniversary of the disaster, the video Remembering Piper - The Night That Changed Our Lives was released by Step Change in Safety. A three-day conference was held in Aberdeen to reflect on lessons learned from Piper Alpha and industry safety issues in general.

The disaster led to insurance claims of around US$1.4 billion, making it at that time the largest insured man-made catastrophe. The insurance and reinsurance claims process revealed serious weaknesses in the way insurers at Lloyd's of London and elsewhere kept track of their potential exposures, and led to their procedures being reformed.

Survivors and relatives of those who died went on to form the Piper Alpha Families and Survivors' Association, which campaigns on North Sea safety issues. The wreck buoy marking the remains of the Piper is approximately 1.1 nautical miles from the replacement Piper Bravo platform. A lasting effect of the Piper Alpha disaster was the establishment of Britain's first "post- Margaret Thatcher" trade union, the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee.

Beginning in 1998, one month after the tenth anniversary, Professor David Alexander, director of the Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research at Robert Gordon University carried out a study into the long-term psychological and social effects of Piper Alpha. He managed to find 36 survivors who agreed to give interviews or complete questionnaires. Almost all of this group reported psychological problems. More than 70% of those interviewed reported psychological and behavioural symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. Twenty-eight said they had difficulty in finding employment following the disaster; it appears that some offshore employers regarded Piper Alpha survivors as "Jonahs" - bringers of bad luck, who would not be welcome on other rigs and platforms. The family members of the dead and surviving victims also reported various psychological and social problems. Alexander also wrote that "some of these lads are stronger than before Piper. They've learned things about themselves, changed their values, some relationships became stronger. People realised they have strengths they didn't know they had. There was a lot of heroism took place."

On 6 July 1991, the third anniversary of the disaster, a memorial sculpture showing three oil workers was erected in the Rose Garden within Hazlehead Park in Aberdeen. The figures represent on the west the physical nature of offshore trades, the east youth and eternal movement and the north holds an unwinding spiral that represents oil in the left hand. The sculptor is Sue Jane Taylor, the Scottish artist who had visited the Piper platform the previous year, and based much of her work around what she saw in and around the oil industry. One of the survivors was used as a model for one of the figures. In 1991, Scottish composer James MacMillan wrote "Tuireadh", a piece for clarinet and string quartet, as a musical complement to the memorial sculpture. In 2008, to mark the 20th anniversary of the disaster, a stage play, Lest We Forget was commissioned by Aberdeen Performing Arts and written by playwright Mike Gibb. It was performed in Aberdeen in the week leading up to the anniversary with the final performance on 6 July 2008, the 20th anniversary.

The incident was featured in the 1990 STV documentary television series , about the RAF Search and Rescue Force at RAF Lossiemouth, in the episode "Piper Alpha". Coincidentally, the film crew had been documenting the rescue teams at Lossiemouth at the time of the Piper Alpha accident.

On 6 July 2008, BBC Radio 3 broadcast a 90-minute play entitled Piper Alpha. Based on the actual evidence given to the Cullen Inquiry, the events of that night were retold twenty years to the minute after they happened.

National Geographic featured this incident in its Seconds From Disaster documentary as the episode "Explosion in the North Sea".

The 2013 documentary film Fire in the Night is about the disaster. It was made by Berriff McGinty Films and co-produced by STV. Producer and cameraman Paul Berriff had been with Sea King R137 filming their search and rescue activities in the Scottish highlands for a television series, and was able to accompany the helicopter during the Piper Alpha disaster, filming events as they happened.

In 2018, the disaster was featured on the History documentary series James Nesbitt's Disasters That Changed Britain. Testimonials were heard from survivors and relatives of victims.

1. ^ The Hon Lord Cullen (November 1990). The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. HMSO. p. 14.

2. ^ "Piper Alpha pair 'wrongly blamed'". BBC News. Archived from the original on 5 September 2017.

3. ^ Pate-Cornell, M. Elisabeth (April 1993). "Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Postmortem Analysis of Technical and Organizational Factors". Risk Analysis. 13 (2): 215-232. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1993.tb01071.x.

4. ^ Drysdale, D. D.; Sylvester-Evans, R. (15 December 1998). "The explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha platform, 6 July 1988. A case study". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences. 356 (1748): 2929-2951. Bibcode:1998RSPTA.356.2929D. doi:10.1098/rsta.1998.0304. S2CID 83615637.

5. ^ Pask, Ed; Palmer, Andrew; Miles, John (October 2000). "Breakup of the Firewall Between the B and C Modules of the Piper Alpha Platform". Engineering Failure Analysis. 7 (5): 311-322. doi:10.1016/S1350-6307(99)00032-1.

6. ^ Department of Energy, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (The Hon Lord Cullen), Vol 2, Appendix H, p463.

7. ^ "CENTRAL CHANCERY OF THE ORDERS OF KNIGHTHOOD". The London Gazette. December 1990.

8. ^ "Engineering Disasters: The Failure, Explosion, and Sinking of the Piper Alpha Platform". www.brighthubengineering.com. 29 April 2011. Archived from the original on 28 March 2019.

9. ^ "Piper Alpha: The men who were honoured as heroes amid the horror". pressandjournal.co.uk. 5 July 2018.

10. ^ Cullen, The Hon. Lord William Douglas (November 1990). The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Energy by Command of Her Majesty (Report). London: H.M. Stationery Office. ISBN 0101113102. OCLC 23102869. 488 pages, 2 volumes

11. ^ "Deepwater aftermath - exploring the parallels with Piper Alpha". Risktec.tuv.com. 20 September 2018. Archived from the original on 29 December 2019.

12. ^ "The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992". legislation.gov.uk. 16 November 1992. Statutory Instruments: 1992 No. 2885. Archived from the original on 4 February 2017.

13. ^ "Piper Alpha rewrites the rules on offshore safety". New Scientist. Archived from the original on 27 October 2008.

14. ^ Keane, Kevin (18 June 2013). "Piper Alpha: Aberdeen offshore conference teaching disaster lessons". BBC News. Archived from the original on 28 February 2017.

15. ^ "Twenty years on - Piper Alpha's legacy". Lloyd's. July 2008. Archived from the original on 15 August 2014.

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Piper Alpha was an oil platform located in the North Sea approximately 120 miles (190 km) north-east of Aberdeen, Scotland. It was operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Limited (OPCAL) and began production in 1976, initially as an oil-only platform but later converted to add gas production.

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flight 370 malaysia alirline flight disappred on march 8 2014 and has been disapeard for 10 years up to this day

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/malaysian-airlines-flight-mh370-what-do-we-know/

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The space shuttle Challenger explodes after liftoff | January 28, 1986 | HISTORY

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The investigation into a close call with a spacesuit anomaly from last July provides lessons about spaceflight safety, design, and operations.

On February 26, 2014, International Space Station (ISS) Program leaders convened at a NASA press conference to discuss the findings and recommendations from a recent Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) report about a spacesuit water intrusion event that occurred during a spacewalk last summer.

On July 9, 2013, two American astronauts successfully completed Extravehicular Activity (EVA) 22 of Expedition 36. After safely returning to the US airlock, it was discovered that crewmember Luca Parmitano had approximately 0.5 to 1 liter of water inside of his spacesuit helmet. Unnoticed prior to the crew's reentry to the airlock, the ISS team concluded that the water originated from a leak in the drink bag attached to Parmitano's chest, which he likely squeezed as he leaned forward inside the airlock.

One week later, during EVA 23, Parmitano reported water inside of his helmet and behind his head. Unable to locate the water source, the spacewalk continued until the water had reached Parmitano's face, making it difficult for him to see and breathe. The spacewalk was terminated and Parmitano and his crewmate, Chris Cassidy, returned to the airlock. Inside, their inspection of Parminato's suit indicated an estimated that 1 to 1.5 liters of water had leaked into his helmet.

Due to the critical nature of the incident, which could have resulted in Parmitano's asphyxiation, the ISS Program called for an investigation. In their report, the MIB and identified the causes for the mishap had evolved from:

1. Inorganic materials causing blockage of the drum holes in the EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) water separator resulting in water spilling into the vent loop.

2. The NASA team's lack of knowledge regarding this particular failure mode.

3. Misdiagnosis of this suit failure when it initially occurred on EVA 22.

The MIB discovered that the water leak was due to a contamination and blockage inside of Parmitano's spacesuit and not the drink bag. While the MIB's investigation of the hardware is still ongoing, the ISS Program released their initial findings and recommendations pertaining to the factors that led to the mishap in an effort to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. "It's a very complicated problem," said Chris Hansen, ISS Chief Engineer and MIB Chairman. "It will take us time to work through."

While the investigation into actual cause of the mechanical failure continues, ISS Program leaders encouraged everyone to read through the report and learn from the MIB's findings and recommendations.

"It really makes us step back and think and challenge ourselves as a team to get better," said Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator for NASA's Human Exploration Operations Mission Directorate. "We're going to learn from this event and make sure that we're safer in the future."
Read the full report.
Listen to the NASA press conference and view the presentation.
Visit the International Space Station Program website for more updates. Water fills the empty spacesuit helmet of Italian astronaut Luca Parmitano in an Aug. 27, 2013 test of the faulty spacewalking gear which forced NASA to abort a July 16 spacewalk for safety reasons. The water leak confirmation will help NASA engineers devise repair methods for the spacesuit.
Featured Photo Credit: NASA TV

About the Author

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Mishap Investigation Board Briefing on Spacesuit Water Intrusion

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The investigation into a close call with a spacesuit anomaly from last July provides lessons about spaceflight safety, design, and operations. On February 26, 2014, International Space Station (ISS) Program leaders convened at a NASA press conference to discuss the findings and recommendations from a recent Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) report about a spacesuit water intrusion event that occurred during a spacewalk last summer.

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Piper Alpha was an oil platform located in the North Sea approximately 120 miles (190 km) north-east of Aberdeen, Scotland. It was operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Limited (OPCAL) and began production in 1976, initially as an oil-only platform but later converted to add gas production.

Piper Alpha exploded and sank on 6 July 1988, killing 165 of the men on board, 30 of whose bodies were never recovered, as well as a further two rescue workers after their rescue vessel, which had been trapped in debris and immobilized, was destroyed by the disintegrating rig. Sixty-one workers escaped and survived. The total insured loss was about £1.7 billion (£5 billion in 2021), making it one of the costliest man-made catastrophes ever. At the time of the disaster, the platform accounted for approximately 10% of North Sea oil and gas production. The accident is the world's worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and industry impact. The Inquiry blamed it on inadequate maintenance and safety procedures by Occidental, though no charges were brought.

In Aberdeen, the Kirk of St Nicholas on Union Street has dedicated a chapel in memory of those who died, containing a Book of Remembrance listing them. There is a memorial sculpture in the Rose Garden of Hazlehead Park.

Four companies that later became the OPCAL joint venture obtained an oil exploration licence in 1972. They discovered the Piper oilfield located at in early 1973 and began fabrication of the platform, pipelines and onshore support structures. Oil production started in 1976 with about 250,000 barrels (40,000 m ³) of oil per day, increasing to 300,000 barrels (48,000 m ³). A gas recovery module was installed by 1980. Production declined to 125,000 barrels (19,900 m ³) by 1988. OPCAL built the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkney Islands to receive and process oil from the Piper, Claymore, and Tartan oilfields, each with its own platform. One 30-inch (76 cm) diameter main oil pipeline ran 128 miles (206 km) from Piper Alpha to Flotta, with a short oil pipeline from the Claymore platform joining it some 20 miles (32 km) to the west. The Tartan field also fed oil to Claymore field and then onto the main line to Flotta. Separate 18-inch (46 cm) diameter gas pipelines were run from Tartan platform to the Piper, and from Piper to the gas compressing platform MCP-01 some 30 miles (48 km) to the northwest.

A large, fixed platform, Piper Alpha sat atop Piper oilfield, approximately 120 miles (190 km) northeast of Aberdeen in 474 feet (144 m) of water. It was built in four modules separated by firewalls.

The platform was constructed by McDermott Engineering of Ardersier and Union Industrielle d'Entreprise of Cherbourg, with the sections united at Ardersier before being towed out during 1975. Production commenced in late 1976. For safety reasons the modules were organised so that the most dangerous platform operations took place far from the personnel areas. The conversion from oil to gas broke this safety concept, with the result that sensitive areas were brought together; for example, the gas compression was next to the control room. The close position of these two areas played a role in the accident.

Piper Alpha produced crude oil and natural gas from 36 wells for delivery to the Flotta oil terminal on Orkney and to other installations by three separate pipelines. At the time of the disaster, Piper was one of the heaviest platforms operating in the North Sea, along with Magnus and Brae B.

In 1978, major works were carried out to enable the platform to meet UK Government gas conservation requirements, and to avoid waste from the flaring of excess gas. After this work had been completed, Piper Alpha was operating in what was known as "phase 2 mode" (operating with the Gas Conservation Module (GCM)). From the end of 1980 until July 1988 phase 2 mode was its normal operating state. In the late 1980s, major construction, maintenance, and upgrade works were planned by Occidental and by July 1988, the rig was already well into major reconstruction, with six major projects identified, including the change-out of the GCM unit. This meant that the rig was returned to its initial phase 1 mode (i.e., operating without a GCM unit). Despite the complex and demanding work schedule, Occidental made the decision to continue operating the platform in phase 1 mode throughout this period and not to shut it down, as had been originally planned. The planning and controls that were put in place were thought to be adequate. Therefore, Piper continued to export oil at just under 120,000 barrels (19,000 m ³) per day and to export Tartan gas at some 33 million cubic feet (930 thousand cubic metres) per day at standard conditions during this period.

Because the platform was completely destroyed, and many of those involved died, analysis of events can only suggest a possible chain of events based on known facts. Some witnesses to the events question the official timeline.

12:00, 6 July 1988: Two condensate pumps, designated A and B, were operating to displace the platform's condensate for transport to the coast. On the morning of 6 July, Pump A's pressure safety valve (PSV #504) was removed for routine maintenance. The pump's two-yearly overhaul was planned but had not started. The open condensate pipe was temporarily sealed with a disk cover (flat metal disc also called a blind flange or blank flange). Because the work could not be completed by 18:00, the disc cover remained in place. It was hand-tightened only. The on-duty engineer filled in a permit which stated that Pump A was not ready and must not be switched on under any circumstances.

18:00: The day shift ended, and the night shift started with 62 men running Piper Alpha. As the on-duty custodian was busy, the engineer neglected to inform him of the condition of Pump A. Instead, he placed the permit in the control centre and left. This permit disappeared and was not found. Coincidentally there was another permit issued for the general overhaul of Pump A that had not yet begun.

19:00: Fire-fighting system put under manual control: Like many other offshore platforms, Piper Alpha had an automatic fire-fighting system, driven by both diesel and electric pumps (the latter were disabled by the initial explosions). The diesel pumps were designed to suck in large amounts of sea water for fire fighting; the pumps had automatic controls to start them in case of fire (in this case they could not be started remotely/manually because the control room was near the centre of the explosion and had been evacuated). However, the fire-fighting system was under manual control on the evening of 6 July: the Piper Alpha procedure adopted by the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) required manual control of the pumps whenever divers were in the water (as they were for approximately twelve hours a day during summer) although in reality, the risk was not seen as significant for divers unless a diver was closer than 10-15 feet (3-5 m) from any of the four 120 feet (40 m) level caged intakes. A recommendation from an earlier audit had suggested that a procedure be developed to keep the pumps in automatic mode if divers were not working in the vicinity of the intakes as was the practice on the Claymore platform, but this was never implemented.

21:45: Pump B tripped and could not be restarted: Because of problems with the methanol system earlier in the day, methane clathrate (a flammable ice) had started to accumulate in the gas compression system pipework, causing a blockage. Due to this blockage, condensate (natural gas liquids NGL) Pump B stopped and could not be restarted. As the pumps normally fill condensate storage tanks, these tanks and pumps were equipped with timed safety systems to prevent overfilling or underfilling. As the entire electrical power on the platform was dependant on these safety systems (related to the pumps), they will trigger a complete and total power shutdown of the rig within 30 minutes if pump activity is not detected. Therefore the managers were under serious time pressure to avoid this. A search was made through the documents to determine whether Condensate Pump A could be started.

21:52: Permit for pump A PSV recertification not found and pump restarted: The permit for the overhaul was found, but not the other permit stating that the pump must not be started under any circumstances due to the missing safety valve. The valve was in a different location from the pump and therefore the permits were stored in different boxes, as they were sorted by location. None of those present were aware that a vital part of the machine had been removed. The manager assumed from the existing documents that it would be safe to start Pump A. The missing valve was not noticed by anyone, particularly as the metal disc replacing the safety valve was several metres above ground level and obscured by machinery.

21:55: First explosion due to condensate leak from PSV flange. Condensate Pump A was switched on. Gas flowed into the pump, and because of the missing safety valve, produced an overpressure which the loosely fitted metal disc did not withstand. Gas audibly leaked out at high pressure, drawing the attention of several men and triggering six gas alarms including the high level gas alarm. Before anyone could act, the gas ignited and exploded, blowing through the firewall made up of 2.5 by 1.5 m (8 by 5 ft) panels bolted together, which were not designed to withstand explosions. The explosion almost entirely destroyed the control room, killing key personnel responsible for coordination of the rig. Custodian Geoff Bollands, who had been in the room and witnessed the alarms going off, survived the blast and immediately activated the rig's emergency stop button before escaping, closing huge valves in the sea lines and ceasing all oil and gas extraction.

Theoretically, the platform would then have been isolated from the flow of oil and gas and the fire contained. However, because the platform was originally built for oil, the firewalls were designed to resist fire rather than withstand explosions. The first explosion broke the firewall and dislodged panels around Module (B). One of the flying panels ruptured a small condensate pipe, creating another fire.

22:04: Control room of Piper Alpha abandoned. A Mayday call was signalled via radio by the radio operator David Kinrade. Piper Alpha's design made no allowances for the destruction of the control room, and the platform's organisation disintegrated. No attempt was made to use loudspeakers or to order an evacuation. Despite Bollands' activation of the emergency stop, there were no alarms warning workers of the unfolding disaster, as much of their systems had been destroyed by the initial blast.

22:05: The Search and Rescue station at RAF Lossiemouth received its first call notifying them of the possibility of an emergency, and a No. 202 Sqn Sea King helicopter, "Rescue 138", took off at the request of the Coastguard station at Aberdeen. The station at RAF Boulmer was also notified, and a Hawker Siddeley Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft from RAF Kinloss was sent to the area to act as "on-scene commander" using the designation "Rescue Zero-One".

22:06: The heat from the flames ruptures crude oil storage tanks in Module B, flooding the area with crude oil, which ignites almost instantaneously, creating a black plume of smoke characteristic of oil fires, as seen in photographs from nearby ships. The burning oil later drips onto a lower platform used by the rig for diving operations. The platform floor consisted of steel grates and under normal circumstances would have allowed the burning oil to drip harmlessly into the sea, but divers on the previous shift had placed rubber matting on the metal grate (likely to cushion their bare feet from the sharp metal grates), allowing the oil to form a burning puddle on the platform.

22:20: The heat from the burning oil collecting on the diving platform causes the nearby Tartan pipeline, pressurized to 120 atmospheres, to rupture violently, releasing 15-30 tonnes (10,000 to 30,000 m³ (350,000 to 1,060,000 cu ft) of its highly flammable contents at immense pressure every second, which immediately ignited into a massive fireball, the heat and vibrations of which was felt by the crews in vessels as far away as one kilometer from the rig. From that moment on, the platform's destruction was inevitable.

22:30: The , a large semi-submersible fire fighting, diving / rescue and accommodation vessel, drew alongside Piper Alpha. The Tharos used its water cannon where it could, but it was restricted, because the cannon was so powerful it would injure or kill anyone hit by the water. Tharos was equipped with a hospital with an Offshore Medic assisted by Diver Paramedics from the Tharos Saturation Diving team. A triage and reception area was set up on the vessel's helideck to receive injured casualties.

22:50: The MCP-01 pipeline fails and explodes, shooting huge flames over 300 ft (90 m) into the air. The Tharos was driven off by the heat, which began to melt the surrounding machinery and steelwork. It was only after this explosion that the Claymore platform stopped pumping oil. Personnel still left alive were either desperately sheltering in the scorched, smoke-filled accommodation block or leaping from the various deck levels, including the helideck, 175 ft (50 m) into the North Sea. The explosion destroys a fast rescue boat launched from the standby vessel Sandhaven that had been trapped in debris during a rescue attempt, killing nearly all of the crewmen on board with the exception of driver Ian Letham, as well as the six Piper Alpha survivors they had rescued from the water. Sandhaven was the standby vessel for Santa Fe 135, several miles away.

23:18: The Claymore gas line ruptures and explodes, adding even more fuel to the already massive firestorm on board Piper Alpha. With thousands of cubic metres of highly volatile fuel burning every second, the 20,000-tonne steel platform melted over the next 80 minutes.

23:35: Helicopter "Rescue 138" from Lossiemouth arrives at the scene.

23:37: Tharos contacts Nimrod "Rescue Zero-One" to apprise it of the situation. A standby vessel has picked up 25 casualties, including three with serious burns, and another one with an injury. Tharos requests the evacuation of its non-essential personnel to make room for incoming casualties. "Rescue 138" is requested to evacuate 12 non-essential personnel from Tharos to transfer to Ocean Victory, before returning with paramedics.

23:50: With critical support structures burned away, and with nothing to support the heavier structures on top, the platform began to collapse. One of the cranes collapsed, followed by the drilling derrick. The generation and utilities Module (D), which included the fireproofed accommodation block, and was still occupied by crewmen who had sheltered there, slipped into the sea. The largest part of the platform followed it. "Rescue 138" lands on Tharos and picks up the 12 non-essential personnel, before leaving for Ocean Victory.

23:55: "Rescue 138" arrives at Ocean Victory and deposits the 12 passengers before returning to Tharos with four of Ocean Victory's paramedics.

00:07, 7 July: "Rescue 138" lands paramedics on Ocean Victory.

00:17: "Rescue 138" winches up serious burns casualties picked up by the Standby Safety Vessel, MV Silver Pit.

00:25: First seriously injured survivor of Piper Alpha is winched aboard "Rescue 138".

00:45: The entire platform is gone. Module (A) was all that remained of Piper Alpha.

00:48: "Rescue 138" lands on Tharos with three casualties picked up from MV Silver Pit.

00:58: Civilian Sikorsky S-61 helicopter of Bristow Helicopters arrives at Tharos from Aberdeen with medical emergency team.

01:47: Coastguard helicopter lands on Tharos with more casualties.

02:25: First helicopter leaves Tharos with casualties for Aberdeen Royal Infirmary.

03:27: "Rescue 138" lands on Tharos with the bodies of two fatalities. "Rescue 138" then leaves to refuel on the drilling rig Santa Fe 135.

05:15: "Rescue 137" arrives at Tharos, lands, then leaves taking casualties to Aberdeen.

06:21: Uninjured survivors of Piper Alpha leave Tharos by civilian S-61 helicopter for Aberdeen.

07:25: "Rescue 138" picks up remaining survivors from Tharos for transfer to Aberdeen.

At the time of the disaster 226 people were on the platform; 165 died and 61 survived. Two men from the Sandhaven, which was the standby vessel for the nearby Santa Fe 135, were also killed in attempts to pick up survivors in the Sandhaven's Fast Rescue Boat. The Coxswain (Iain Letham) was the only survivor. The standby vessel for Piper Alpha was the Silver Pit, which by co-incidence was also the standby vessel in the Ekofisk Field when the Alexander Kielland capsized on 27 March 1980.

There is controversy about whether there was sufficient time for a more effective emergency evacuation. The first explosion killed most of the personnel with the authority to order an evacuation when it destroyed the control room, and much of the control systems in the room responsible for sounding platform-wide alarms had also been lost with its destruction. This was a consequence of the platform design, which did not include blast walls. Another contributing factor was that the nearby connected platforms Tartan and Claymore continued to pump gas and oil to Piper Alpha until its pipeline ruptured in the heat in the second explosion. Their operations crews did not believe they had authority to shut off production, even though they could see that Piper Alpha was burning.

The nearby diving support vessel Lowland Cavalier reported the initial explosion just before 22:00, and the second explosion occurred 22 minutes later. By the time civil and military rescue helicopters reached the scene, flames over 100 metres in height and visible as far away as 100 km (120 km from the Maersk Highlander) away prevented safe approach. The largest number of survivors (37 out of 59) were recovered by the Fast Rescue Boat of the Standby Safety Vessel, MV Silver Pit; coxswain James Clark later received the George Medal as did Iain Letham of the Sandhaven. Others awarded the George Medal were Charles Haffey from Methil, Andrew Kiloh from Aberdeen, and James McNeill from Oban. Sandhaven crewmates Malcolm Storey, from Alness, and Brian Batchelor, from Scunthorpe, were awarded George Medals posthumously.

The blazing remains of the platform were eventually extinguished three weeks later by a team onboard MSV Tharos led by firefighter Red Adair, despite reported conditions of 80 mph (130 km/h) winds and 70-foot (20 m) waves. The part of the platform which contained the galley where about 100 victims had taken refuge was recovered by divers in late 1988 from the sea bed, and the bodies of 87 men were found inside.

The Cullen Inquiry was set up in November 1988 to establish the cause of the disaster. It was chaired by the Scottish judge William Cullen. After 180 days of proceedings, it released its report Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (short: Cullen Report) in November 1990. It concluded that the initial condensate leak was the result of maintenance work being carried out simultaneously on a pump and related safety valve. The inquiry was critical of Piper Alpha's operator, Occidental, which was found guilty of having inadequate maintenance and safety procedures, but no criminal charges were ever brought against the company.

The second part of the report made 106 recommendations for changes to North Sea safety procedures:

37 recommendations covered procedures for operating equipment, 32 the information of platform personnel, 25 the design of platforms and 12 the information of emergency services

The responsibility to implement was for 57 with the regulator, 40 for the operators, 8 for the industry as a whole and 1 for stand-by ship owners.

The recommendations led to the enactment of the Offshore Safety Act 1992 and the making of the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992.

Most significant of these recommendations was that operators were required to present a safety case and that the responsibility for enforcing safety in the North Sea should be moved from the Department of Energy to the Health and Safety Executive, as having both production and safety overseen by the same agency was a conflict of interest.

In 2013, on the 25th anniversary of the disaster, the video Remembering Piper - The Night That Changed Our Lives was released by Step Change in Safety. A three-day conference was held in Aberdeen to reflect on lessons learned from Piper Alpha and industry safety issues in general.

The disaster led to insurance claims of around US$1.4 billion, making it at that time the largest insured man-made catastrophe. The insurance and reinsurance claims process revealed serious weaknesses in the way insurers at Lloyd's of London and elsewhere kept track of their potential exposures, and led to their procedures being reformed.

Survivors and relatives of those who died went on to form the Piper Alpha Families and Survivors' Association, which campaigns on North Sea safety issues. The wreck buoy marking the remains of the Piper is approximately 1.1 nautical miles from the replacement Piper Bravo platform. A lasting effect of the Piper Alpha disaster was the establishment of Britain's first "post- Margaret Thatcher" trade union, the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee.

Beginning in 1998, one month after the tenth anniversary, Professor David Alexander, director of the Aberdeen Centre for Trauma Research at Robert Gordon University carried out a study into the long-term psychological and social effects of Piper Alpha. He managed to find 36 survivors who agreed to give interviews or complete questionnaires. Almost all of this group reported psychological problems. More than 70% of those interviewed reported psychological and behavioural symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. Twenty-eight said they had difficulty in finding employment following the disaster; it appears that some offshore employers regarded Piper Alpha survivors as "Jonahs" - bringers of bad luck, who would not be welcome on other rigs and platforms. The family members of the dead and surviving victims also reported various psychological and social problems. Alexander also wrote that "some of these lads are stronger than before Piper. They've learned things about themselves, changed their values, some relationships became stronger. People realised they have strengths they didn't know they had. There was a lot of heroism took place."

On 6 July 1991, the third anniversary of the disaster, a memorial sculpture showing three oil workers was erected in the Rose Garden within Hazlehead Park in Aberdeen. The figures represent on the west the physical nature of offshore trades, the east youth and eternal movement and the north holds an unwinding spiral that represents oil in the left hand. The sculptor is Sue Jane Taylor, the Scottish artist who had visited the Piper platform the previous year, and based much of her work around what she saw in and around the oil industry. One of the survivors was used as a model for one of the figures. In 1991, Scottish composer James MacMillan wrote "Tuireadh", a piece for clarinet and string quartet, as a musical complement to the memorial sculpture. In 2008, to mark the 20th anniversary of the disaster, a stage play, Lest We Forget was commissioned by Aberdeen Performing Arts and written by playwright Mike Gibb. It was performed in Aberdeen in the week leading up to the anniversary with the final performance on 6 July 2008, the 20th anniversary.

The incident was featured in the 1990 STV documentary television series , about the RAF Search and Rescue Force at RAF Lossiemouth, in the episode "Piper Alpha". Coincidentally, the film crew had been documenting the rescue teams at Lossiemouth at the time of the Piper Alpha accident.

On 6 July 2008, BBC Radio 3 broadcast a 90-minute play entitled Piper Alpha. Based on the actual evidence given to the Cullen Inquiry, the events of that night were retold twenty years to the minute after they happened.

National Geographic featured this incident in its Seconds From Disaster documentary as the episode "Explosion in the North Sea".

The 2013 documentary film Fire in the Night is about the disaster. It was made by Berriff McGinty Films and co-produced by STV. Producer and cameraman Paul Berriff had been with Sea King R137 filming their search and rescue activities in the Scottish highlands for a television series, and was able to accompany the helicopter during the Piper Alpha disaster, filming events as they happened.

In 2018, the disaster was featured on the History documentary series James Nesbitt's Disasters That Changed Britain. Testimonials were heard from survivors and relatives of victims.

1. ^ The Hon Lord Cullen (November 1990). The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. HMSO. p. 14.

2. ^ "Piper Alpha pair 'wrongly blamed'". BBC News. Archived from the original on 5 September 2017.

3. ^ Pate-Cornell, M. Elisabeth (April 1993). "Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Postmortem Analysis of Technical and Organizational Factors". Risk Analysis. 13 (2): 215-232. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1993.tb01071.x.

4. ^ Drysdale, D. D.; Sylvester-Evans, R. (15 December 1998). "The explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha platform, 6 July 1988. A case study". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences. 356 (1748): 2929-2951. Bibcode:1998RSPTA.356.2929D. doi:10.1098/rsta.1998.0304. S2CID 83615637.

5. ^ Pask, Ed; Palmer, Andrew; Miles, John (October 2000). "Breakup of the Firewall Between the B and C Modules of the Piper Alpha Platform". Engineering Failure Analysis. 7 (5): 311-322. doi:10.1016/S1350-6307(99)00032-1.

6. ^ Department of Energy, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (The Hon Lord Cullen), Vol 2, Appendix H, p463.

7. ^ "CENTRAL CHANCERY OF THE ORDERS OF KNIGHTHOOD". The London Gazette. December 1990.

8. ^ "Engineering Disasters: The Failure, Explosion, and Sinking of the Piper Alpha Platform". www.brighthubengineering.com. 29 April 2011. Archived from the original on 28 March 2019.

9. ^ "Piper Alpha: The men who were honoured as heroes amid the horror". pressandjournal.co.uk. 5 July 2018.

10. ^ Cullen, The Hon. Lord William Douglas (November 1990). The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Energy by Command of Her Majesty (Report). London: H.M. Stationery Office. ISBN 0101113102. OCLC 23102869. 488 pages, 2 volumes

11. ^ "Deepwater aftermath - exploring the parallels with Piper Alpha". Risktec.tuv.com. 20 September 2018. Archived from the original on 29 December 2019.

12. ^ "The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992". legislation.gov.uk. 16 November 1992. Statutory Instruments: 1992 No. 2885. Archived from the original on 4 February 2017.

13. ^ "Piper Alpha rewrites the rules on offshore safety". New Scientist. Archived from the original on 27 October 2008.

14. ^ Keane, Kevin (18 June 2013). "Piper Alpha: Aberdeen offshore conference teaching disaster lessons". BBC News. Archived from the original on 28 February 2017.

15. ^ "Twenty years on - Piper Alpha's legacy". Lloyd's. July 2008. Archived from the original on 15 August 2014.

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Piper Alpha was an oil platform located in the North Sea approximately 120 miles (190 km) north-east of Aberdeen, Scotland. It was operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Limited (OPCAL) and began production in 1976, initially as an oil-only platform but later converted to add gas production.

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Pemberton Mill in Lawrence collapses and burns, killing workers; January 10, 1860

Posted on January 2, 2023 by Gordon Harris

On Tuesday afternoon January 10, 1860, the Pemberton Mill in Lawrence buckled and crashed, killing dozens instantly and trapping the workers inside.

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On Tuesday afternoon January 10, 1860, the Pemberton Mill in Lawrence buckled and crashed, killing dozens instantly and trapping the workers inside.

Rescue teams rushed in, only to find "faces crushed beyond recognition." Around 9:30 p.m. an oil lamp was knocked over, and flames spread quickly, leaving only "brick, mortar and human bones ... promiscuously mingled".

The five-story Pemberton Mill, built in 1853 in Lawrence, was financed by John A. Lowell and his brother-in-law J. Pickering Putnam, who sold the mill to George Howe and David Nevins during a financial downturn. Howe and Nevins jammed new machinery into the building, hired more workers and made it profitable. The weight of the machinery exceeded the design capacity of the building, and steel plates were welded to the beams and girders by the new owners.

The Boston Journal reported:

"The moans and cries for help of those in the ruins whose lives had not been immediately crushed out, mingled with an alarm rung out by the factory bells, called almost the entire community to the spot. Darkness lent additional horror to the scene, for while a thousand hands were ready to rescue it was impossible to know whence the calls for assistance came."

The Boston Globe described the scene the next morning:

"The scene after the fall was one of indescribable horror. Hundreds of men, women, and children were buried in the ruins. Some assured their friends that they were uninjured, but imprisoned by the timbers upon and about them. Others were dying and dead. Every nerve was strained to relieve the poor unfortunates, when, sad to relate, a lantern broke and set fire to the wreck. In a few moments the ruins were a sheet of flames. Fourteen are known to have been burned to death in the sight of their loved ones, who were powerless to aid them."

Up to 145 people, mostly Irish and Scotch female workers, are believed to have been killed by the collapse and subsequent fire. There were also young children. Almost 300 more were injured. The Pemberton Mill collapse is the worst industrial accident in Massachusetts history. Engineer Charles Bigelow, who designed the mill, denied responsibility for the structural failure, but was found guilty of allowing malformed cast-iron columns to be used.

The Pemberton Mill was completely rebuilt and still stands. After the second Pemberton Mill was opened, new workers were brought in, who often reported seeing the apparitions of the dead workers walking the aisles, and then suddenly vanishing.

From An Authentic History of the Lawrence Calamity by John Dyer:

"Henry Nice, a brother of Thomas Nice, whose wife was killed in the ruins, relates an interesting narrative of his experience. He was employed in the boiler-house, and at the moment of the disaster was engaged in putting a wick into a lamp. He heard a noise which he cannot describe, and stood up for an instant, when he was struck on the shoulder by a heavy article. He thrust himself head foremost against a door opening outwards, and fell into the porch, the door and the space about him being instantly filled with brick, and his body confined to the most uncomfortable limits. A cloud of steam and dust penetrated the debris and nearly suffocated him, but by almost superhuman efforts he succeeded in digging a passage through the ruin and reaching a place of security.

Instead of fleeing from the scene of the disaster, he turned back to rescue those still living. Upon the floor of the card-room he found a girl, who boarded at No. 5 Pemberton Corporation, who subsequently informed her rescuer that she was alone in this country, but had a mother in Ireland. A piece of shafting lay across her neck, her knee was seriously lacerated, and the rim of a 'roping can' was pressing into her back.

Nice obtained a saw, and cutting away the boards and timbers from under her, had the satisfaction of seeing her borne away to a place of safety. He then continued the work of rescuing his unfortunate companions. Darius Nash, the third hand in the spinning-room, fell with the factory. Nice heard him scream for help, and creeping on his hands and knees amid the tangled ruins, he found Nash and a young girl lying close together. The latter was cheerful, and urged Nice to remove her companion first, as he was lying on her leg, being confined there by a spinning frame which rested on his side.

Nice thrust a strip of board through a hole above him, which attracted the notice of others, who cut a hole in the floor, through which Nash was drawn, badly hurt. Every effort was made to remove the machinery which imprisoned the heroic girl, without avail; and the fire sweeping over the spot, her young life went out amid the scorching heat."

Further Reading

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Pemberton Mill in Lawrence collapses and burns, killing workers; January 10, 1860

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The collapse of the Pemberton Mill in Lawrence is the worst industrial accident in Massachusetts history. On Tuesday afternoon January 10, 1860, hundreds of men, women, and children were buried alive in the ruins.

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Apollo 1

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Jan. 27, 1967, tragedy struck on the launch pad at Cape Kennedy during a preflight test for Apollo 204 (AS-204). The mission was to be the first crewed flight of Apollo, and was scheduled to launch Feb. 21, 1967. Astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White and Roger Chaffee lost their lives when a fire swept through the command module, or CM.

The exhaustive investigation of the fire and extensive reworking of the Apollo command modules postponed crewed launches until NASA officials cleared them for flight. Saturn IB schedules were suspended for nearly a year, and the launch vehicle that finally bore the designation AS-204 carried a lunar module, or LM, as the payload, instead of a CM. The missions of AS-201 and AS-202 with Apollo spacecraft aboard had been unofficially known as Apollo 1 and Apollo 2 missions. AS-203 carried only the aerodynamic nose cone.

In the spring of 1967, NASA's Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, Dr. George E. Mueller, announced that the mission originally scheduled for Grissom, White and Chaffee would be known as Apollo 1, and said that the first Saturn V launch, scheduled for November 1967, would be known as Apollo 4. The eventual launch of AS-204 became known as the Apollo 5 mission. No missions or flights were ever designated Apollo 2 or 3.
The second launch of a Saturn V took place on schedule in the early morning of April 4, 1968. Known as AS-502, or Apollo 6, the flight was a success, though two first-stage engines shut down prematurely, and the third-stage engine failed to reignite after reaching orbit.

Payload
Spacecraft-012

Apollo Pad Fire
Emergency Transmission: Jan. 27, 1967; 6:31:05 p.m. EST
Launch Complex 34
Saturn-IB AS-204
CSM-012

Houston We Have a Podcast: Apollo 1 Fire

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On Jan. 27, 1967, tragedy struck on the launch pad at Cape Kennedy during a preflight test for Apollo 204 (AS-204). The mission was to be the first crewed flight of Apollo, and was scheduled to launch Feb. 21, 1967. Astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White and Roger Chaffee lost their lives when a fire swept through the command module.

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https://today.tamu.edu/2023/02/01/how-the-columbia-shuttle-disaster-changed-space-travel/

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United Nations : Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation

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The Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident: An overview

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lt;p>On 11 March 2011, the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power station (FDNPS) suffered major damage after the magnitude 9.0 great east-Japan earthquake and subsequent tsunami. It was the largest civilian nuclear accident since the Chernobyl accident in 1986.

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The Leppings Lane end inside Hillsborough Stadium during the disaster (goalposts centre)

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**July 12, 2016 Update: The FBI has redirected resources allocated to the D.B. Cooper case to focus on other investigative priorities. Details

On the afternoon of November 24, 1971, a nondescript man calling himself Dan Cooper approached the counter of Northwest Orient Airlines in Portland, Oregon.

He used cash to buy a one-way ticket on Flight #305, bound for Seattle, Washington.

Thus began one of the great unsolved mysteries in FBI history.

Cooper was a quiet man who appeared to be in his mid-40s, wearing a business suit with a black tie and white shirt.

He ordered a drink-bourbon and soda-while the flight was waiting to take off.

A short time after 3:00 p.m., he handed the stewardess a note indicating that he had a bomb in his briefcase and wanted her to sit with him.

The stunned stewardess did as she was told. Opening a cheap attaché case, Cooper showed her a glimpse of a mass of wires and red colored sticks and demanded that she write down what he told her.

Soon, she was walking a new note to the captain of the plane that demanded four parachutes and $200,000 in twenty-dollar bills.

When the flight landed in Seattle, the hijacker exchanged the flight's 36 passengers for the money and parachutes. Cooper kept several crew members, and the plane took off again, ordered to set a course for Mexico City.

Somewhere between Seattle and Reno, a little after 8:00 p.m., the hijacker did the incredible: He jumped out of the back of the plane with a parachute and the ransom money. The pilots landed safely, but Cooper had disappeared into the night and his ultimate fate remains a mystery to this day.

The FBI learned of the crime in-flight and immediately opened an extensive investigation that lasted many years. Calling it NORJAK, for Northwest Hijacking, we interviewed hundreds of people, tracked leads across the nation, and scoured the aircraft for evidence. By the five-year anniversary of the hijacking, we'd considered more than 800 suspects and eliminated all but two dozen from consideration.

One person from our list, Richard Floyd McCoy, is still a favorite suspect among many. We tracked down and arrested McCoy for a similar airplane hijacking and escape by parachute less than five months after Cooper's flight. But McCoy was later ruled out because he didn't match the nearly identical physical descriptions of Cooper provided by two flight attendants and for other reasons.

Perhaps Cooper didn't survive his jump from the plane. After all, the parachute he used couldn't be steered, his clothing and footwear were unsuitable for a rough landing, and he had jumped into a wooded area at night-a dangerous proposition for a seasoned pro, which evidence suggests Cooper was not. This theory was given an added boost in 1980 when a young boy found a rotting package full of twenty-dollar bills ($5,800 in all) that matched the ransom money serial numbers.

Where did "D.B." come from? It was apparently a myth created by the press. We did question a man with the initials "D.B." but he wasn't the hijacker.

The daring hijack and disappearance remain an intriguing mystery-for law enforcement and amateur sleuths alike.

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D.B. Cooper Hijacking | Federal Bureau of Investigation

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July 12, 2016 Update: The FBI has redirected resources allocated to the D.B. Cooper case to focus on other investigative priorities. Details On the afternoon of November 24, 1971, a nondescript man calling himself Dan Cooper approached the counter of Northwest Orient Airlines in Portland, Oregon.

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Piper Alpha

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Summary

The investigation into the Piper Alpha disaster has much to teach us thirty years on. Most of the physical evidence sank to the bottom of the North Sea, so the testimony of survivors and witnesses had to be woven together into a coherent story. The Cullen inquiry uncovered not only what probably happened on the terrible night of 06 July 1988, but also the complex path leading up to it, the early warnings and missed opportunities that might have prevented a tragedy in which 167 people lost their lives.

The lessons to be learned are applicable far beyond the offshore oil industry, across all hazardous industries, and every bit as relevant today.

They include: Management of change (design issues); Personal safety over process safety (fire water pumps on manual start to protect divers); Isolation and permits for maintenance (pump started before maintenance complete); Handover (inadequate transfer of information between crews, shifts and disciplines); Safety culture (complacent - everything's fine); Emergency response - evacuation.

Introduction

Late in the evening of 06 July 1988, a series of explosions ripped through the Piper Alpha platform in the North Sea. Engulfed in fire, over the next few hours most of the oil rig topside modules collapsed into the sea. 167 men died and many more were injured and traumatised. The world's biggest offshore oil disaster affected 10% of UK oil production and led to financial losses of an estimated £2 billion (the equivalent of US$ 5 billion today).

What went wrong on Piper Alpha? Why did it have such disastrous consequences? And what lessons can still be learned today?

Background

The Piper oil field lies about 120 miles north-east of Aberdeen in Scotland. Discovered in January 1973, it was one of the first deep water reservoirs to be exploited in the northern North Sea. Production of oil started in December 1976, less than four years after discovery, a record that has only rarely been beaten. Oil was exported through a sub-sea line, 128 miles long, to the purpose-built refinery on the island of Flotta in the Orkneys.

Piper Alpha proved spectacularly productive and when the operator, Occidental, sought permission to increase rates, permission was granted on condition that gas should also be exported instead of being flared.

A gas treatment plant was retrofitted and gas export started in December 1978. After removal of water and hydrogen sulphide in molecular sieves, gas was compressed and then cooled by expansion. The heavier fractions of gas condensed as a liquid (essentially propane) and the rest of the gas (mainly methane) continued to export. The condensate was collected in a large vessel connected to two parallel condensate pumps (duty and standby) and injected into the oil for export to Flotta. Note that there were two modes of operation. Phase 1 mode where excess gas was flared and Phase 2 mode where gas was exported. Piper was operating in Phase 2 mode until three days before the disaster, when the molecular sieves were taken out of service for routine maintenance. The gas and condensate treatment facilities were then reconfigured so that Piper could operate in Phase 1 mode. Condensate was still removed from the gas and injected into the oil export line but gas in excess of that required for fuelling the turbo-generators and the gas lift system on Piper was flared.

The accident

At about 21.45 on 06 July 1988, condensate pump B tripped. Shortly afterwards, gas alarms activated, the first-stage gas compressors tripped and the flare was observed to be much larger than usual. At about 22.00 an explosion ripped through Piper Alpha.

Witnesses heard a sustained high-pitched screeching noise followed by the flash and whoomph of an explosion.

The men in the control room were knocked off their feet and thrown to floor. Most men were off duty in the accommodation block; they were lifted from chairs or thrown from their beds.

The initial explosion in Module C (gas compressor module) caused a condensate line teeing into the main oil line to rupture in Module B (oil separation module). Witnesses reported a second flash and bang as a huge fireball roared into the night sky.

Twenty minutes later, at about 22.20, a high-pressure gas line connected to the Tartan platform, operated by Texaco, ruptured releasing gas at an initial rate of about 3 tonnes per second.

Fifty minutes later, at about 22.50, a Total-operated gas line ruptured, releasing gas flowing though Piper Alpha from the Frigg field via MCP-01 to St Fergus. A fast rescue craft, launched from standby vessel Sandhaven, was destroyed by the explosion, killing two of the three-man crew and the six men they had just rescued from the sea.

Eighty minutes later, at about 23.20, the gas line to Claymore, another platform operated by Occidental, ruptured.

By this time the structure of Piper Alpha was so badly weakened by the intense fires that the topsides started to collapse. The main accommodation module, a four-storey building in which at least 81 men were sheltering, slid into the sea. All those inside died.

By the early morning of 07 July 1988, three-quarters of the original topsides, together with significant sections of the jacket, had been destroyed and lay in a tangled mass on the sea bed 140 metres below.

The fires from the wells and the oil and gas lines (all of which ruptured, one by one) had produced flames with a height of about 200 metres and a peak rate of energy consumption of ~100 gigawatts, three times the rate of UK total energy consumption.

It took over three weeks for the fires to be extinguished. The remains of Piper Alpha were toppled into the sea on 28 March 1989.

Of the 226 people on board that night, only 61 survived. Of the deceased, 109 died from smoke inhalation, 13 by drowning, 11 of injuries including burns. In 4 cases, the cause of death could not be established, and 30 bodies were never recovered.

Investigation and analysis

One week after the disaster, Lord Cullen was appointed to hold a Public Inquiry into the accident. The Public Inquiry sat for a total of 180 days. Lord Cullen's report ¹ was published on 13 November 1990. The inquiry heard evidence from a large number of witnesses, including most of the survivors, and from several experts.

It wasn't easy to establish the cause of the disaster. Little physical evidence remained, and no senior member of Piper Alpha's management team survived.

Many possible causes were advanced. Few could be conclusively discounted, but many were extremely improbable, requiring several successive unlikely events to have occurred - for which there was no evidence at all.

The inquiry concluded that the most likely cause of the first explosion was the release of as little as 30 kg of condensate (mainly propane) over thirty seconds though an unsecured blind flange in Module C where a pressure safety relief valve had been removed as part of maintenance on the standby condensate pump.

Findings

On the evening of 06 July 1988, condensate pump A was isolated for maintenance on its motor drive coupling. Pump A pressure relief valve had also been removed for maintenance under a separate permit and a blind flange almost certainly fitted in its place. The flange was not, however, leak-tested or pressure-tested. When pump B tripped at about 21.45, the operators tried unsuccessfully to restart it.

The operators would have been aware that pump A was out of commission for maintenance - but as maintenance had not yet started and the problem with pump A was not especially serious, it would not have been unreasonable to consider restarting it.

Because of the way in which work permits were organised on Piper Alpha, the operators would not have known that the pressure relief valve for pump A was missing.

It is believed that the operators took steps to reinstate pump A and condensate leaked from the blind flange which had been installed in place of the pressure relief valve, but not fully tightened up.

The escaping condensate ignited. The first explosion was quickly followed by an oil pipe rupture and fire. The sequential failure of the gas lines then caused a rapid escalation of the disaster.

Lessons learned

Many lessons can be drawn from the tragic events on Piper Alpha; this paper focusses on seven key areas.

1.Management of change (design issues);

2.Personal safety over process safety (fire water pumps on manual start to protect divers);

3.Permit to work and isolation for maintenance (pump re-started before maintenance complete);

4.Handover (inadequate transfer of information between crews, shifts and disciplines);

5.Interconnection (no rig is an island...);

6.Emergency response - evacuation;

7.Safety culture (complacency - everything's fine).

Management of Change (design issues)

Piper Alpha was designed to produce and export oil. The requirement to export gas - with the associated separation of condensate - was an afterthought and involved extensive modification. The retrofitting went on in several phases, starting with separation of condensate and ending with production of export-quality gas.

The new facilities were located beside the control room, under the electrical power, radio room and accommodation modules, so that when disaster struck, it did so with disastrous effect on the rest of Piper Alpha.

The control room was badly damaged in the first explosions (the control room operator survived and gave valuable evidence to the Public Inquiry on the sequence of alarms preceding those first explosions). The radio room was rendered useless; communications were lost almost at once.

In many retrofitting projects, non-ideal design solutions are required. However, in the case of Piper Alpha, the worst-case scenario on which the process safety design rested (fire) was not revisited effectively when the platform was modified to treat gas with additional risk of explosion.

Personal safety over process safety

Despite the extensive fixed fire protection system on Piper Alpha, not a single drop of water was applied from Piper Alpha itself to any of the fires. Water alone would not have put the oil fires out (and with gas fires one should not even attempt to do so) but it might have cooled the structure and pipelines and have prevented - or at least significantly delayed - the gas line rupture which was the major escalating factor in the Piper Alpha disaster. After the rupture of the first gas line, Piper Alpha was doomed.

So why didn't the fire protection system activate as intended?

For many years, the practice on Piper Alpha was to switch the fire pumps from automatic to manual when divers were in the sea. As diving was such a regular part of normal operation, in practice the pumps remained on manual most of the time.

It is much easier to imagine the horror of a close colleague being sucked into a pipe (as had happened a few years earlier although the diver survived) and prioritise it over the danger of leaving 226 men unprotected in the highly unlikely event of fire.

The assessment of risk was skewed. The suction pipes under Piper Alpha were protected with grilles to prevent divers from being sucked in, although anyone within 5 metres of the inlet could be drawn towards them when the fire pumps started with the risk of serious injuries. On other rigs this was managed by close communication with divers and a temporary override used only when the divers were working within a short distance of the inlets, a relatively rare occurrence.

When fire broke out on Piper Alpha, the only way to activate the fire-fighting system was to start the pumps locally. Despite valiant attempts, dense smoke and fire prevented anyone from reaching them.

It is not known whether the initial explosion on Piper ruptured the fire water ring main or damaged the control system for the fire pumps. It is likely that electrical power was knocked out, but there was a diesel back-up. It is not known how effective the deluge would have been had it deployed as the nozzles often blocked with scale and the fire-water pipework on Piper Alpha was undergoing phased replacement.

Permit to work and isolation for maintenance

The night shift operators were aware that condensate injection pump A was out of commission for maintenance and also that maintenance had not yet started: the maintenance and associated work permits had been suspended overnight.

The suspended work permits were not displayed in the control room but in the safety office. It appears that the operators were not aware of another suspended permit. The pressure relief valve for pump A had also been removed. Even if operators had gone to the safety office to check, permits in the safety office were filed by trade and not by location.

The pressure relief valves for the condensate injection pumps were located one floor above the pumps. Although it is almost always best practice for a pressure relief valve to be sited as close as possible to the unit that it is protecting, condensate on the downstream side had to be able to drain to an appropriate vessel, so the valve was placed about 8 metres above (and 15 metres away from) the pump.

In order to reinstate condensate injection pump A, two separate actions would have been required: reinstate electrical power and open the gas-operated suction and discharge valves. By reconnecting the air supplies to the valves, they could then be opened using toggle buttons on a local control panel by pump A. There was no locking of isolation valves, spading or double-block-and-bleed in order to prevent re-pressurisation of a system isolated for maintenance.

The permit to work system on Piper Alpha relied heavily on informal communication.

The Cullen inquiry asked four questions of the permit to work system:

1.Was the procedure adequate?

2.Was the procedure complied with?

3.Was there adequate training?

4.Was the procedure monitored?

The answer to all four questions was no.

Handover

On Piper Alpha, communications between departments, between shifts, and between crews was personal, informal and tailored to the job. While bespoke communications can have some benefits, minimum standards were not set or met.

Incoming crews were supposed to be given safety induction training by the safety department. There was a huge gap between what the safety department intended to convey, and what they actually conveyed. Communication is a two-way thing. According to witnesses, if the newcomer had worked offshore before, then training was brief to the point of non-existent. The safety induction consisted of a being handed a booklet and told to read it. Much of the information was out of date or inapplicable to Piper Alpha.

Operators kept a log but often failed to record maintenance activities. Shift handover was a busy time. The Occidental procedure required maintenance and operations to meet, inspect the work site and sign off permits together. However, the operators were busy with their own handovers at the same time, and the practice developed where maintenance would sign off the permit and leave it in the control room or safety office. At shift changeover lead production operators would not review or discuss suspended permits.

Interconnections

Communications between Piper Alpha, Claymore, Tartan and MCP-01 were lost from the first explosions. This delayed shut-down on the other platforms, particularly on Claymore and Tartan.

Could more rapid shutdown at the other platforms, and in particular blowdown or depressurization of the inter-platform gas lines have averted disaster? Almost certainly not. Claymore, Tartan or MCP-01 could not be depressurised quickly enough. Too little gas could have been flared at the other platforms in the time available to make any real difference.

However, shutting the inter-platform oil lines would probably have made a difference. The oil from Tartan to Claymore joined oil from Piper Alpha at a Y junction before flowing onwards to Flotta. Oil continued to be produced and exported into the line to Flotta for about an hour after the first explosion on Piper Alpha. The emergency shutdown valve on the Piper Alpha oil export line appears to have failed to close tightly, allowing the oil from Tartan and Claymore to take the easier reverse route onto Piper Alpha. Shutdown of oil production only started on Tartan at about 22.40 and on Claymore at about 23.00.

Oil exported from Tartan and Claymore flowed out of the ruptured oil line on Piper Alpha, flooded the floor and overflowed to the floor beneath, starting a large pool fire which impinged directly on the gas import and export lines, leading to their rupture - and hence to the inevitable escalation of events on Piper Alpha.

Emergency response - evacuation

One of the most shocking aspects of the Piper Alpha tragedy was the inability to evacuate the personnel on board. It was assumed that, whatever happened, evacuation would be (at least substantially) by helicopter. This assumption, so easy to criticise with hindsight, was based on several premises, the most important being that no event on Piper Alpha would render the helideck inoperative almost immediately and that sufficient helicopters would be available to evacuate everyone on board.

However, within about a minute of the first explosion, the helideck became enveloped in black smoke (presumably from oil fires) and helicopters could not land on it.

The multi-function support vessel Tharos was close to Piper Alpha throughout the disaster. Although not intended primarily as a fire-fighting vessel, Tharos had significant fire-fighting capabilities. The lack of communication from Piper Alpha led to a delay in deployment, then the demand for electrical power was so great that Tharos suffered an almost complete power failure, from which it took several minutes to recover. There was a subsequent delay, because so many monitors were opened that the water pressure fell to a level below that at which the discharge valve on the fire pump could be opened. The safety systems on Tharos, good as they were, had never been tested in such extreme conditions before. When it came to it, the systems failed that test.

No lifeboats or inflatable life rafts were launched successfully from Piper Alpha. All those who survived did so by making their way to the sea by whatever means they could. This included climbing down knotted ropes and jumping, from as high as the helideck, over 50 metres above sea level.

Safety culture

There were many warnings that all was not well with safety management systems on Piper Alpha long before the accident.

Less than a year earlier, on 07 September 1987, a contract rigger was killed in an accident on Piper Alpha. The accident highlighted the inadequacies of both the permit to work and the shift handover procedures. A golden opportunity to put these right was missed.

When the disaster occurred, offshore safety was governed through the use of prescriptive regulations. Such regulations have their uses, provided all eventualities have been considered. But a regulations-bound system falls down because practices not covered by regulations are simply not addressed. People become complacent when they are encouraged to think that safety can be ensured by rules enforced by inspectors: it is impossible to cover all eventualities in a set of general rules.

The Cullen enquiry recognised that

the primary responsibility for safety lies with those who create the risks and those who work with them, in other words with the management and operators of an installation;

safety management systems should be developed by the management and operators of the installation themselves, in order that they identify with the system and make it work;

critical safety procedures must be checked to see how they work in practice: auditing must include what is actually done and not just what is meant to be done or said to be done.

Conclusions

After any accident, there is a very human need to find out exactly what went wrong, to attribute clear causes for any accident, to implement specific recommendations to fix them and move on. It could be argued it was a good thing that the Cullen Inquiry left open the exact cause of the disaster. Those with excellent permit to work systems might have felt complacent and failed to learn the many other lessons that Cullen gives in his truly outstanding report.

The subset of lessons described here illustrate the widespread system failures that led to the Piper Alpha tragedy. It is clear that there were serious design flaws, but even perfectly engineered 'hardware' can always be operated incorrectly. While technical measures are essential for safety, they are in no sense sufficient. Safety also requires an appropriate management structure - and that structure must be maintained throughout the whole life of a project from design, through change to decommissioning.

What next?

Switch off the computer. Get up from your desk. Go for a walk and talk to some people, face to face. Ask yourself and your teams the following questions:

1.What changes have been made to the operation of my facility since it was built? How are those changes managed? Who has the technical knowledge to ensure changes don't compromise the fundamental process safety design?

2.Who is authorised to override automatic safety systems? How many overrides are in place today? Why are they overridden? Is it necessary? What process ensures that the problem that caused them to be overridden is fixed and they are re-instated or upgraded?

3.When did I last carry out a permit to work audit to see how thesystem actually works in practice? On a live maintenance job that spans several shifts? Or where several multidisciplinary permits are live on a single system? How many live permits can I find today?

4.When did I last audit a critical procedure on night shift? Tonight might be a good time to start.

5.How is my facility connected to other facilities, what could go wrong at the interface?

6.When did I last test each part of my emergency response in practice?

Don't be alarmed by what you find. But do something about it.
We have added fresh perspectives each day in the run up to the 30th anniversary of the Piper Alpha tragedy. Read the rest of the series here. This article was first published in IChemE's Loss Prevention Bulletin (LPB). The publication was launched in 1974 in response to the disastrous explosion at Flixborough, in order for the process industries to share information about accidents. Now with a 40-year archive of lessons learned from accidents, LPB is the leading source of process safety case studies. For more information, visit here
References

1.Cullen, W.D.: The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, HMSO, London, 1990

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Fiona Macleod, chair of the Loss Prevention Bulletin Editorial Panel, and Stephen Richardson, an expert witness in the Piper Alpha, review the causes of the Piper Alpha disaster, the findings of the investigation, and challenge you, the reader, to answer a series of questions about safety where you work.

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LA GRULLA, Texas (AP) - A National Guard soldier from New York who was seriously injured in the crash of a helicopter flying over the U.S.-Mexico border remained hospitalized Sunday while authorities released the names of the two National Guard soldiers and a Border Patrol agent onboard who were killed.

The three killed Friday in the crash in a field in Texas near Rio Grande City were: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Casey Frankoski, 28, and Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Grassia, 30, both with the New York National Guard; and Border Patrol Agent Chris Luna, 49. The cause of the crash remains under investigation.

The UH-72 Lakota helicopter was assigned to the federal government's border security mission when it went down while the helicopter was conducting aviation operations, according to a statement released by Joint Task Force North, a military unit that supports Customs and Border Protection. No other details were provided.

The injured soldier was from the New York National Guard, according to the National Guard Bureau. The soldier, whose name isn't being released, was the aircraft crew chief. The soldier remained hospitalized, according to a news release posted by the New York State Division of Military & Naval Affairs.

Major General Ray Shields, the adjutant general of New York, said in the release that they are "shocked and devastated" by the deaths of Frankoski and Grassia, and are "praying for the quick recovery" of the injured crew chief.

Troy Miller, acting commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, said in a statement that they were "heartbroken" by the death of Luna, who is survived by his wife and two children, parents and brother.

Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said in a statement that they are hoping for the injured national guardsman's "swift recovery," and said his thoughts and the "deepest condolences" of the department were with the families of those killed.

Grassia, who was a New York state trooper, was from Schenectady, New York, and he enlisted in the New York Army National Guard in 2013 as a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter maintenance specialist, according to the New York State Division of Military & Naval Affairs. The release said that Frankoski, of Rensselaer, New York, enlisted in the New York Army National Guard in 2016 and she trained to become a UH-60 Black Hawk and UH-72 Lakota helicopter pilot.

New York Gov. Kathy Hochul said in a statement that she was "deeply saddened" by the deaths of Grassia and Frankoski.

"There is no greater calling than service to and defense of your country," she said.

Frankoski and Grassia were assigned to Detachment 2, Company A, 1st Battalion, 244th Aviation Regiment. Luna was assigned to the Border Patrol's Rio Grande City Station.

The helicopter that crashed was assigned to the District of Columbia Army National Guard, according to the New York State Division of Military & Naval Affairs release.

The border region is heavily patrolled by both state and federal authorities, including routine aerial surveillance.

In January, a Texas Department of Public Safety helicopter patrolling the state's border with Mexico lost power and crashed, officials said at the time. The co-pilot suffered a minor hand injury and the helicopter was significantly damaged. That helicopter was flying as part of Operation Lone Star, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott's nearly $10 billion border mission that has tested the federal government's authority over immigration.

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2 National Guard soldiers, 1 Border Patrol agent killed in Texas helicopter crash are identified

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The UH-72 Lakota helicopter was assigned to the federal government's border security mission when it went down while the helicopter was conducting aviation operations.

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Manchester United Plane Crash 1958 (Nicolas)

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Manchester United Plane Crash 1958 (Nicolas)

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Munich Air Disaster was the darkest day in Manchester United history

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On 6 February 1958, 23 people - including eight Manchester United players and three officials - were fatally injured when their aeroplane crashed in Munich.

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History, Culture and Iconic Interests in the United States and Abroad
The R.M.S. is perhaps the most famous shipwreck in our current popular culture. was a British-registered ship in the White Star line that was owned by a U.S. company in which famed American financier John Pierpont "JP" Morgan was a major stockholder. was built in Belfast, Northern Ireland by Harland & Wolff for transatlantic passage between Southampton, England and New York City. It was the largest and most luxurious passenger ship of its time and was reported to be unsinkable. Titanic, launched on May 31, 1911, and set sail on its maiden voyage from Southampton on April 10, 1912, with 2,240 passengers and crew on board. On April 15, 1912, after striking an iceberg, Titanic broke apart and sank to the bottom of the ocean, taking with it the lives of more than 1,500 passengers and crew.

While there has been some salvage outside of the major hull portions, most of the ship remains in its final resting place, 12,000 feet below sea level and over 350 nautical miles off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada. Its famous story of disaster and human drama has been, and continues to be, recounted in numerous books, articles and movies. Titanic has been recognized by the United States Congress for its national and international significance and in many ways has become a cultural icon. The disaster also resulted in a number of memorials around the world. In the United States, there are major memorials in Washington D.C. and New York; the Widener Library at Harvard University is another major memorial commemorating Henry Elkins Widener, a victim of the sinking.

Investigation and the Development of Measures for Safety in Navigation
The sinking of Titanic was one of the deadliest peacetime maritime disasters in history and quickly became a catalyst for change. The United States Congress held hearings on the casualty that resulted in a report and measures to improve safety of navigation. Similar investigations were held in the United Kingdom. The international community readily came together for the purpose of establishing global maritime standards and regulations to promote safety of navigation, the most important of which was the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), widely regarded as the most important of all international agreements on the safety of merchant ships.

Radio acoustic ranging navigation, developed by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (USCGS, a NOAA predecessor agency) in 1924, had its roots in the sinking of the Titanic. The transmission and reception of sound waves led to the invention of sonar. USCGS and hydrographic offices around the world grasped the power of sonar as an underwater search tool, and also as a way to measure the depths of the ocean. Today, accurate and precise nautical charts are produced with the data acquired from survey vessels equipped with echo-sounding technology.

Discovery of the Titanic Wreck Site by a Team of Explorers from the United States and France
The wreck of Titanic was discovered on September 1, 1985, by a joint American-French expedition led by Dr. Robert Ballard of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and Jean-Louis Michel of the French Research Institute for Exploration of the Sea (IFREMER). The wreck was found approximately 350 nautical miles (nm) off the Canadian coast of Newfoundland in international waters two and a half miles below the ocean surface (depth of 12,500 feet or 3,800 meters). Shortly after the discovery, Dr. Ballard testified before the United States Congress to encourage the enactment of legislation to designate the wreck as a maritime memorial. In July 1986, a plaque was placed on R.M.S. Titanic recording its discovery the previous year and calling for the wreck to be left undisturbed in memory of those who perished aboard her. In 1987, a United States company working with IFREMER returned to the wreck and began to salvage in artifacts from the artifact field. For more information on salvage, please visit our related Salvage page.

United States Congress Acts to Protect Titanic Through International Cooperation
Recognizing the shipwreck as a site of great historical and cultural significance, Congress passed the R.M.S. Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986 (1986 Act), directing the United States to (1) begin negotiation of an international agreement to initiate multinational conservation efforts; and (2) develop guidelines for exploration, research and salvage. It also calls for the recognition of the site as an international maritime memorial on behalf of those who lost their lives in the tragic sinking.

National and International Significance of the R.M.S. Titanic
The R.M.S. Titanic shipwreck holds exceptional national and international significance. It is one of the greatest jewels of world maritime heritage.

National Significance
As a British-registered, American-owned ship, Titanic represents a tangible link to United States maritime history. The ship was owned and operated by the British White Star Line, a subsidiary of the American-owned International Mercantile Marine Co. of New Jersey of which industrial tycoon J.P. Morgan was the majority shareholder. Discovered in 1985 by American oceanographer Robert Ballard and a team from Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and their foreign partners, the Titanic remains closely connected to the academic fields of U.S. maritime history and marine science. As of its 100th birthday on May 31, 2010, Titanic is an "archaeological resource site" as defined within the Archaeological Resources Protection Act. Artifacts and data discovered at the wreck site continue to advance scientific understanding on the process of underwater archaeological preservation and bio-deterioration.

Titanic has inspired the creative genius of lawmakers, historians, filmmakers and ocean enthusiasts around the world. It has provided a storyline for countless books, articles, films and documentaries, including the Academy Award winning James Cameron megahit Titanic. These stand as testaments to the exceptional significance that the shipwreck as assumed in pop culture, as well as American history. However, the significance of the ship's status as a cultural icon is surpassed by its historical significance as the ultimate memorial in honor of those lives that were lost in its sinking. Of the 306 American passengers on board Titanic, 119 were never rescued. The surviving passengers, many of whom lost family and friends in the disaster, returned to the United States. In 2006, at age 99, Lillian Asplund, the last living American survivor of the Titanic, died in Massachusetts. At age five, she lost her father and three brothers (including her twin brother, five-year-old Carl) on the Titanic. Other passengers onboard Titanic were foreign-born immigrants traveling to the United States. A poignant and powerful artifact recovered from the wreck site was a declaration of intent to become a United States citizen filled out by a passenger who did not survive the sinking but whose well-preserved luggage was recovered. This artifact is a reminder that most of these individuals did not survive, and with them died their American dream. Today, the tragedy of the R.M.S. Titanic represents the hardship and struggle faced by many immigrants during this time period as they set off across the Atlantic Ocean in hopes for a better life and a brighter future for themselves and their families. Their lives tell the story of the millions of Americans who today are the living legacy of immigrants who made the same trans-Atlantic voyage intended by the R.M.S. Titanic. The story of the Titanic is the story of America.

International Significance
Much of the current international law relating to maritime shipping and safety developed as a result of the R.M.S. Titanic tragedy. In the immediate aftermath of its sinking on April 14-15, 1912, the Titanic sparked a lawmaking frenzy resonating throughout the international community. From this fervor emerged the adoption of the first International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 1914. SOLAS has been amended several times and is still the most important treaty addressing maritime safety. The establishment of the international organization to address maritime safety, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) may be traced to SOLAS and Titanic. On Sept. 27, 2012, in celebrating its 35th World Maritime Day, the IMO also recalled the 100th anniversary of the disastrous sinking of Titanic that was a catalyst for it establishment.

Additional reference information:
Last Updated July 10, 2018

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R.M.S Titanic - History and Significance

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A steering mechanism that held the ship's wheel. (NOAA Photo Library)History, Culture and Iconic Interests in the United States and Abroad The R.M.S. Titanic is perhaps the most famous shipwreck in our current popular culture. Titanic was a British-registered ship in the White Star line that was owned b

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PORTLAND, Ore. - The devastating flow released when a dam burst upstream of Johnstown, Pa., in May 1889 transformed a small, normally tranquil river into a raging torrent that briefly rivaled the mighty Mississippi, a new study reveals.

Johnstown, which lies about 100 kilometers east of Pittsburgh, was a thriving coal- and iron-producing town in the years following the Civil War, says Carrie Davis Todd, a hydrologist at the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown. Then, on the rainy afternoon of May 31, 1889, disaster struck: A dam about 23 kilometers upstream of the town burst, sending a wall of debris-filled water down the narrow valley of the Little Conemaugh River to ravage the town. More than 2,200 people died in the disaster - a death toll aggravated by the fact that even before the dam burst, flood waters filling the streets of Johnstown had trapped many residents in their homes, she reported here October 19 at the annual meeting of the Geological Society of America.

Despite the event's massive death toll, few detailed studies of the flood have been done, says Dan Ingram, curator at the Johnstown Area Heritage Association. "There's a ton of anecdotal information, but few people have ever looked at it in a scientific way," he notes.

Enter Davis Todd and her colleagues, who recently embarked on a project to analyze the Johnstown Flood. Using modern-day surveys of the area around the dam as well as archival photos, the researchers estimate that the 1.6-square-kilometer reservoir behind the dam held about 15 million cubic meters of water. The pressure of those accumulated waters, as well as erosion that occurred as water spilled over the top of the dam, triggered a sudden and catastrophic failure, says Davis Todd. Peak discharge through the 90-meter-wide, 13-meter-high breach in the dam exceeded 8,500 cubic meters per second - about three times the flow rate across Niagara Falls.

As devastating as that torrent would have been, the flow rate that slammed into Johnstown was even higher, the researchers estimate. Large amounts of rocks, trees and other debris swept along by the initial surge of floodwaters were temporarily trapped against a narrow bridge about four kilometers downstream of the dam. The deluge released by the dam's collapse carried more than 12,000 cubic meters of debris-filled water each second. Flow rates in the Mississippi River typically vary between 7,000 and 20,000 cubic meters per second, says Davis Todd.

Eyewitnesses in Johnstown said the mid-afternoon flood arrived as "a wall of black mist," says Ingram. That initial surge was quickly followed by a 10-meter-deep torrent chock-full of earth, trees, debris from hundreds of buildings and even the locomotives of trains swept off the rails running along the river's banks.

The new findings will help Ingram and his colleagues better explain the devastating force of the flood, as well as how the disaster unfolded. "This is one of those events that everyone's heard of but nobody knows the story behind," he notes.
Images: 1) Andrews, E. Benjamin. History of the United States, volume V. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1912. 2) Johnstown Area Heritage Association. See Also:

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1889 Pennsylvania Flood Was as Big as Mississippi River

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PORTLAND, Ore. - The devastating flow released when a dam burst upstream of Johnstown, Pa., in May 1889 transformed a small, normally tranquil river into a raging torrent that briefly rivaled the mighty Mississippi, a new study reveals. Johnstown, which lies about 100 kilometers east of Pittsburgh, was a thriving coal- and iron-producing town in [...]

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A sinkhole approximately 60 feet deep opened up in someone's front lawn over the weekend in Florida, local officials said.

The Polk County Fire Rescue department posted on Facebook about the massive pit, which occurred Saturday in Highland City, east of Tampa. As of Saturday, officials said it did not pose a risk to the county roadway.

ABC Action News reported that the family living on the property where the sinkhole occurred evacuated safely. Still, neighbors are nervous as it happened along the only road in and out of the subdivision, according to the outlet.

The hole continued to expand since it was discovered Saturday, Polk County Emergency Management director Paul Womble said in a statement provided to USA TODAY Tuesday. Originally measured at 15-feet wide, it is now 15- by 30-feet wide. Officials said the hole is being filled in, which is expected to take several days.
More: Busch Gardens sinkhole spills millions of gallons of wastewater, environmental agency says
Sinkholes are common in Florida

According to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, sinkholes are common in the Sunshine State.

Sinkholes happen when bedrock erodes over eons of time as acidic water wears down limestone or dolomite, which are the two most common carbonate rocks in Florida.

This empties drainage systems and creates voids, and when the ceilings of those cavities can no longer hold the matter on top, it collapses. The Florida DEP says few of the collapses occur near roadways or homes.

A recent report by the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation showed that insurance companies closed at least 300 claims related to sinkholes in 2022.

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60-foot sinkhole opened in Florida front lawn, leaving neighbors nervous

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A deep sinkhole opened in Florida, leaving neighbors nervous. But sinkholes are common in the state, carved out of porous bedrock.

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When we think of coral reefs, images of clear, warm water; gently swaying sea fans; and brightly colored fish tend to spring to mind. The coral reefs that we will be exploring during this expedition live in very different habitats from shallow reefs, but are remarkably similar in many ways.

Deep-sea corals are defined as corals that live at depths greater than 50 meters, but most species live in depths several hundred meters deep, in cold, dark, rocky habitats, often far from shore. Unlike shallow-water coral reefs, which are limited to warm tropical waters, deep-sea corals are found throughout the world's oceans, from tropical to polar regions. Like their shallow counterparts, deep-sea reefs are created by stony corals that form large geological structures over thousands of years.

While the diversity of corals that build reefs in shallow waters is very high, and includes hundreds of species, there are only six species of deep-sea stony corals that create reefs. The most common of these is Lophelia pertusa, which forms massive reefs throughout the Atlantic Ocean, including the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic Bight.

Shallow-water corals rely on photosynthetic algae that live within the corals and provide their hosts with nutrition. However, algae cannot survive where there is no light, so deep-sea corals need to rely on alternate sources of food to obtain their nutrition, either by feeding on organic material falling from the surface or by feeding on small plankton. Because deep-sea corals lack algae, they are bright white in coloration, rather than the brown and green colors than we see in shallow reefs. Other types of corals such as gorgonians, black corals, and soft corals, add diversity and color to deep-sea coral ecosystems.

As with shallow reefs, the structure created by deep-sea corals provides habitat for diverse communities of other invertebrates and fishes, some of which are economically valuable. The demise of shallow coral reefs from anthropogenic impacts has been documented for many years, and despite their extreme depths and distance from shore, deep-sea corals are not unaffected from human impacts.

As coastal resources become depleted, humans have begun to move deeper in search of new sources of food and energy. The greatest impact to deep-sea corals comes from commercial bottom trawls, which use heavy gear to harvest deep-sea fishes and in the process, damage structures that grow on the seafloor, such as deep-sea corals. This type of fishing has devastated large areas of deep-sea reefs in both national and international waters.

Corals are also harvested directly for their black, red, or gold skeletons, which are used to make jewelry and ornaments. These 'precious corals' are known to be ancient and slow growing - in fact the oldest known animal on Earth was a black coral that has been dated to over 4,250 years old.

Deep-sea corals are often found in areas of oil and gas operations, so there is potential for damage from drilling muds and oil spills. Deep-sea mining is fast becoming a reality, with vast areas of the high seas leased for exploration. These mining machines are large and may permanently remove large areas of deep-sea coral habitat. In addition, future impacts from climate change are not well understood, but increasing temperatures may shift species' distributions and increasing acidity may weaken coral skeletons, particularly in deeper waters where the impacts of ocean acidification are thought to be greatest.

Most of the deep coral research in the Gulf of Mexico has focused on the northern region, which is where energy interests are focused, but the eastern Gulf is relatively unexplored. One of the primary objectives of this expedition is to explore and describe deep-sea coral communities on the west Florida slope. Earlier surveys in this area discovered abundant and thriving Lophelia reefs, as well as aggregations of large black corals. However, multibeam surveys have revealed vast areas where there are many other promising features that have never been explored.

Some of the known coral habitats have been proposed as habitat areas of particular concern (HAPC) and any additional information we can provide will help support this process, as well as other management and conservation actions. While creating new protected areas cannot completely prevent damage from oil spills or climate change, these areas can improve the health and resilience of corals in the face of future threats.

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Southeast Deep Coral Initiative: Exploring Deep-Sea Coral Ecosystems off the Southeast U.S.: Coral Reef Ecosystems in the Deep Sea: NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research

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When we think of coral reefs, images of clear, warm water; gently swaying sea fans; and brightly colored fish tend to spring to mind. The coral reefs that we will be exploring during this expedition live in very different habitats from shallow reefs, but are remarkably similar in many ways.

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LONDON, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Worsening droughts, storms and torrential rain in some of the world's largest economies could cause $5.6 trillion in losses to the global economy by 2050, according to a report released on Monday.

This year heavy rains have triggered floods that inundated cities in China and South Korea and disrupted water and electricity supply in India, while drought has put farmers' harvests at risk across Europe. read more

Such disasters are costing economies hundreds of billions of dollars. Last year's extreme droughts, floods and storms led to global losses of more than $224 billion, according to the Emergency Events Database maintained by the Brussels-based Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.

But as climate change fuels more intense rainfall, flooding and drought in coming decades, these costs are set to soar, warns the report by engineering and environmental consultancy firm GHD. read more

Water - when there's too much or too little - can "be the most destructive force that a community can experience," said Don Holland, who leads GHD's Canadian water market programme.

GHD assessed the water risks in seven countries representing varied economic and climatic conditions: the United States, China, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates and Australia. Using global insurance data and scientific studies on how extreme events can affect different sectors, the team estimated the amount of losses countries face in terms of immediate costs as well as to the overall economy.

In the United States, the world's biggest economy, losses could total $3.7 trillion by 2050, with U.S. gross domestic product shrinking by about 0.5% each year up until then. China, the world's No. 2 economy, faces cumulative losses of around $1.1 trillion by mid-century.

Of the five business sectors most vital to the global economy, manufacturing and distribution would be hit hardest by disasters costing $4.2 trillion as water scarcity disrupts production while storms and floods destroy infrastructure and inventory. read more

The agricultural sector, vulnerable to both drought and extreme rainfall, could see $332 billion in losses by 2050. Other sectors facing major challenges are retail, banking and energy.

At this year's World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, a global group of experts launched a new commission to research the economics of water that aims to advise policymakers on water management. read more

We must "transform how we govern water and the climate together," said commission co-chair Tharman Shanmugaratnam. "The costs of doing so are not trivial, but they are dwarfed by the costs of letting extreme weather wreak havoc."

Reporting by Gloria Dickie; Editing by Katy Daigle and Susan Fenton

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Gloria Dickie

Thomson Reuters

Gloria Dickie reports on climate and environmental issues for Reuters. She is based in London. Her interests include biodiversity loss, Arctic science, the cryosphere, international climate diplomacy, climate change and public health, and human-wildlife conflict. She previously worked as a freelance environmental journalist for 7 years, writing for publications such as the New York Times, the Guardian, Scientific American, and Wired magazine. Dickie was a 2022 finalist for the Livingston Awards for Young Journalists in the international reporting category for her climate reporting from Svalbard. She is also the author of Eight Bears: Mythic Past and Imperiled Future (W.W. Norton, 2023).

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Floods, other water-related disasters could cost global economy $5.6 trillion by 2050 -report

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LONDON, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Worsening droughts, storms and torrential rain in some of the world's largest economies could cause $5.6 trillion in losses to the global economy by 2050, according to a report released on Monday.

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Wuhan Flood

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In 1931, China experienced arguably the most lethal flood in history. Rivers throughout the country rose onto their plains, inundating an area the size of England and half of Scotland combined. Around a tenth of the Chinese population was affected; over two million people died, either by drowning or by the subsequent famine and epidemics.

While the scale of this disaster was exceptional, devastating floods and droughts had become increasingly common in China since the nineteenth century. Political instability, economic turmoil and incessant warfare had left the population vulnerable to environmental hazards. In most cases, rural communities bore the brunt of these disasters, but the 1931 flood was so extensive that cities also suffered. Nowhere was more profoundly affected than Wuhan, a bustling metropolis in the middle Yangzi region.

Recently, while researching my book on the history of the flood, I found a short book of photographs taken in Wuhan during the disaster, published by the local Zenith Studios. The names of the photographers have long since been forgotten, but their pictures offer a fascinating insight into how a historic population coped with a deluge that inundated their homes for a number of months.

The problems began in the spring as river water began pouring into the streets and mingled with effluent disgorged from overflowing sewers. Soon the whole city was permeated by a horrific stench, which only grew worse under the heat of the sun. Rickshaw pullers and other menial workers had to wade through filthy water to earn a living, while customers perched precariously on the awnings. This was one of many inequalities to define experiences of the disaster.

As the floodwater crept higher, the streets were transformed into canals. Enterprising sampan owners - who ordinarily scraped a living by ferrying cargo around the harbours - began renting out their boats as water taxis. Those who could not afford the grossly inflated fares took to the water in a bizarre flotilla of improvised vessels: rafts made from doors, inflated goatskins and wooden bathtubs. Some people even emptied out coffins and used them as canoes.

In late July, the dykes that encircled Wuhan collapsed. The water that had been held back now cascaded into the city at terrifying speed. Flood waves scoured whole neighbourhoods from the landscape. Thousands of people living in houses constructed from timber and earth drowned or were buried alive. Those who survived salvaged what they could - a little food, religious artefacts, anything buoyant - and began their search for refuge.

As the value of dry space increased, hoteliers tripled their rates, packing rooms well beyond capacity. But buildings that were already compromised by water could not cope with this additional weight, and when one hotel collapsed in August, dozens of people sheltering inside were killed.

Amid the destruction and chaos, people sought to preserve a sense of normality. Workers in the United States consulate continued to hoist their national flag every morning in accordance with regulations, even though they had to row out to their flagpole. The local traffic police struggled to maintain order in streets overrun by sampans. At first they stood on boxes and tried to keep boats in lanes, but as the floodwater grew deeper they were forced to climb into the branches of trees. And when the water reached a depth of two metres, they could do little but sit back and watch as large cargo junks sailed into the city centre, careering into banks and godowns (warehouses).

One particularly careless junkman sailed his vessel into the Texaco oil depository, causing a huge fire that was too hot for the fire brigade to approach. The fire burned for three days, spewing flaming oil onto the surface of the water, and noxious smoke into the atmosphere. As the city's electrical system had long since failed, the Texaco fire offered a rare source of illumination, casting its flickering light over apocalyptic scenes: crumbling buildings, howling dogs stranded on rooftops, and thousands of floating corpses.

Electricity was not the only modern amenity lost to the flood. The telegraph office, telephone exchange and airport were all forced to close. And even if large stretches of the railway line had not washed away, it would have been impossible for trains to approach Wuhan as 30,000 refugees were now living on the embankment.

Though the flood seemed to have deprived Wuhan of many recent technological innovations, in many respects it was a thoroughly modern disaster. It generated risks specific to an industrial city. Loose benzene barrels bounced around the streets, kerosene fire engulfed buildings, and electric shocks killed more than 50 people. Worst of all, the sewerage system - a key emblem of hygienic modernity - emptied the bowels of the city into the streets. Soon residents were in the grip of an unprecedented health crisis. Thousands of people would succumb to dysentery, cholera and other waterborne diseases.

But residents of Wuhan were not passive in the face of the disaster. China boasted a proud tradition of charitable activity, with philanthropists often funding services that were vital to the survival of disaster-stricken communities. In 1931, the business community in Wuhan raised a substantial fund for flood relief. Some of this money was used to construct a wooden walkway, allowing pedestrians to wobble over the flooded streets. Funds were also used to sponsor rice porridge kitchens, boats to distribute boiled water, and crews to dispose of corpses. Benevolent Halls played an active role in the relief effort, as did Buddhist monks who turned their temples into refugee camps. Traditional medical practitioners massaged the stomachs of starving people and distributed herbal tinctures to prevent exposure.

Later, when the official history of the flood came to be written, the government in Nanjing would depict itself as the heroic saviour of Wuhan, using modern governance to tackle a crisis. But it was traditional institutions that fed and cared for more than half a million people months before shipments of wheat and vaccines arrived in the city.

This is not to suggest that refugees relied solely upon the assistance of benevolent elites. Like most people affected by disasters, they took responsibility for their own survival. In rural areas, those who had lost their farms foraged for aquatic plants such as lotus, water chestnuts, and wild rice. In Wuhan, people survived by catching fish swimming through the city streets.

The flood may have been a disaster for humans, but it created excellent ecological conditions for other species. Frogs and turtles swam into inundated homes, while one cinema became home to a whole flock of ducks. Some of these species were harmful to humans. The mosquitoes and water snails that thrived in vastly expanded territories caused epidemics of malaria and schistosomiasis. Yet some of the aquatic species that flourished as a result of the flood offered a nutritional windfall for refugees, allowing them to supplement their dwindling diets.

Reeds were another flood-resistant species that proved invaluable for refugees. Growing in large stands throughout this wetland region, reeds were a vital architectural material for the poor; they could be knitted together and stretched over bamboo frames to form instant shelters. Though hardly luxurious, these reed huts were both cheap and portable, allowing refugees to escape quickly when water levels rose - or when local communities proved unwelcoming. Refugees experienced both of these problems in 1931.

While some citizens of Wuhan treated displaced people with great generosity, others saw them as a threat to political and economic stability. The local military were convinced that communists were using the refugee crisis as a pretext to infiltrate Wuhan. They declared martial law and began patrolling the streets in sampans with mounted machine guns. Anyone suspected of looting or other subversive activities was executed on the spot. But even such draconian treatment could not quell the paranoia, and eventually soldiers expelled refugees from the city centre at gunpoint, relocating them to ill-prepared camps on the outskirts of Wuhan where thousands would die from disease.

Conditions could hardly have been more different for the relatively wealthy foreign population of Wuhan. Their exclusive concessions, located in one of the best-protected areas of the city, were among the last areas to be inundated by the flood. When the waters finally did arrive, foreign residents amused themselves by riding horses through the water or playing tennis on roofs.

But before long the novelty wore off. The flood stank, there was no electricity for lights and fans, and the price of vegetables and meat had become extortionate. The solution was to take a ferry to the foreign clubs in the northern part of the city. Unable to indulge in customary amusements - such as horse racing, polo and golf - club patrons stared out onto the flooded grounds, making idle chitchat and drinking. As the city's ice factory had ceased working, they took their drinks neat while a large number of refugees congregated on the grandstand next to the stables a short distance away. Concerned club owners hired boats to transport their horses to Shanghai, and then petitioned the city authorities to have the refugees removed to preserve the hygienic wellbeing of club members.

Those who whiled away their hours in the clubhouse were separated by little physical distance from those who sheltered in the grandstand, yet the experiences of these two parts of Wuhan's population could hardly have been more different. It was as if they were living through two separate floods; one that caused mild inconvenience and boredom, and another that destroyed lives.

On some occasions, disasters can bring communities together, creating what the historian Greg Bankoff has described as "crisis solidarity". Yet disasters are equally capable of amplifying societal divisions, laying bare the tensions that lie beneath the surface in normal times. Both of these processes were at work in Wuhan in 1931.

While the community was unified by charity and mutual aid, it was also divided by economic calculations and political violence. For refugees, these tensions were just as dangerous as the incessant rainfall and raging rivers. They established the social conditions that helped to translate a natural hazard into a humanitarian disaster.
The photographs in this article were originally published in 漢口水災攝影 Hankow Flood Pictures, 真光照相館 Zenith Studios, Wuhan, 1931. Despite considerable effort, regrettably it has not been possible to locate the copyright holder for this collection. Read more from China Dialogue's Environmental History Series

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Picturing disaster: The 1931 Wuhan flood

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In 1931, China experienced arguably the most lethal flood in history. Rivers throughout the country rose onto their plains, inundating an area the size of England and half of Scotland combined. Around a tenth of the Chinese population was affected; over two million people died, either by drowning or by the subsequent famine and epidemics.

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Manchester United Plane Crash 1958 (Nicolas)

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Manchester United Plane Crash 1958 (Nicolas)

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Munich Air Disaster was the darkest day in Manchester United history

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On 6 February 1958, 23 people - including eight Manchester United players and three officials - were fatally injured when their aeroplane crashed in Munich.

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The Bhopal disaster or Bhopal gas tragedy was a chemical accident on the night of 2-3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. Considered the world's worst industrial disaster, over 500,000 people in the small towns around the plant were exposed to the highly toxic gas methyl isocyanate ( MIC). Estimates vary on the death toll, with the official number of immediate deaths being 2,259. In 2008, the Government of Madhya Pradesh paid compensation to the family members of 3,787 victims killed in the gas release, and to 574,366 injured victims. A government affidavit in 2006 stated that the leak caused 558,125 injuries, including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries. Others estimate that 8,000 died within two weeks, and another 8,000 or more have since died from gas-related diseases.

The owner of the factory, UCIL, was majority owned by the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) of the United States, with Indian government-controlled banks and the Indian public holding a 49.1 percent stake. In 1989, UCC paid $470 million (equivalent to $907 million in 2021) to settle litigation stemming from the disaster. In 1994, UCC sold its stake in UCIL to Eveready Industries India Limited (EIIL), which subsequently merged with McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. Eveready ended clean-up on the site in 1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001, seventeen years after the disaster.

Civil and criminal cases filed in the United States against UCC and Warren Anderson, chief executive officer of the UCC at the time of the disaster, were dismissed and redirected to Indian courts on multiple occasions between 1986 and 2012, as the US courts focused on UCIL being a standalone entity of India. Civil and criminal cases were also filed in the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving UCC, UCIL, and Anderson. In June 2010, seven Indian nationals who were UCIL employees in 1984, including the former UCIL chairman Keshub Mahindra, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by Indian law. All were released on bail shortly after the verdict. An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before the judgement was passed.

Background

The UCIL factory was built in 1969 to produce the pesticide Sevin (UCC's brand name for carbaryl) using methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an intermediate. An MIC production plant was added to the UCIL site in 1979. The chemical process employed in the Bhopal plant had methylamine reacting with phosgene to form MIC, which was in turn reacted with 1-naphthol to form the final product, carbaryl. Another manufacturer, Bayer, also used this MIC-intermediate process at the chemical plant once owned by UCC at Institute, West Virginia in the United States.

After the Bhopal plant was built, other manufacturers (including Bayer) produced carbaryl without MIC, though at a greater manufacturing cost. UCIL's process differed from the MIC-free routes used elsewhere, in which the same raw materials were combined in a different manufacturing order, with phosgene initially reacting with naphthol to form a chloroformate ester, which was later reacted with methylamine. In the early 1980s, although the demand for pesticides had fallen, production continued leading to an accumulation of stores of unused MIC at the Bhopal site.

Earlier leaks

In 1976, two local trade unions complained of pollution within the plant. In 1981, a worker was accidentally splashed with phosgene as he was carrying out a maintenance job of the plant's pipes. In a panic, he removed his gas mask and inhaled a large amount of toxic phosgene gas, leading to his death 72 hours later. Following these events, journalist Rajkumar Keswani began investigating and published his findings in Bhopal's local paper Rapat, in which he urged "Wake up, people of Bhopal, you are on the edge of a volcano."

In January 1982, a phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective equipment. One month later in February 1982, an MIC leak affected 18 workers. In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30% of his body. In October 1982, there was another MIC leak. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. During 1983 and 1984, there were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.

Leakage and its effects

Liquid MIC storage

In late October 1984, tank E610 lost the ability to effectively contain most of its nitrogen gas pressure, which meant that the liquid MIC contained within could not be pumped out. At the time of this failure, tank E610 contained 42 tons of liquid MIC. Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at the Bhopal facility, and parts of the plant were shut down for maintenance. Maintenance included the shutdown of the plant's flare tower so that a corroded pipe could be repaired. With the flare tower still rendered useless, production of carbaryl was resumed in late November using MIC stored in the two tanks still in service. An attempt to re-establish pressure in tank E610 on 1 December failed, so the 42 tons of liquid MIC contained within still could not be pumped out of it.

Tank E610 in 2010. During the decontamination of the plant, the tank was removed from its foundations and set aside.

Methylamine (1) reacts with phosgene (2) to produce methyl isocyanate (3), which in turn reacts with 1-naphthol (4) to yield carbaryl (5).

By early December 1984, most of the plant's MIC related safety systems were malfunctioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service, as well as the steam boiler intended to clean the pipes. During the late evening hours of 2 December 1984, water was believed to have entered tank E610 via a side pipe during attempts to unclog it. The tank still contained the 42 tons of MIC that had been there since late October. The introduction of water into the tank resulted in a runaway exothermic reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures, and various other factors such as the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines. The pressure in tank E610, although initially nominal at 14 kilopascals (2 psi) at 10:30 p.m., reached 70 kilopascals (10 psi) as of 11 p.m. Two different senior refinery employees assumed the reading was instrumentation malfunction. By 11:30 p.m., workers in the MIC area were feeling the effects of minor exposure to MIC gas and began to look for a leak. One was found by 11:45 p.m. and reported to the MIC supervisor on duty at the time. The decision was made to address the problem after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and in the meantime, employees were instructed to continue looking for leaks. The problem was discussed by MIC area employees during the break.

When the tea break concluded at 12:40 a.m., the reaction in tank E610 escalated to a critical state at an alarming speed within five minutes. Temperatures in the tank were off the scale, maxed out beyond 25 °C (77 °F), and the pressure in the tank was indicated at 280 kilopascals (40 psi). One employee witnessed a concrete slab above tank E610 crack as the emergency relief valve burst open, and pressure in the tank continued to increase to 380 kilopascals (55 psi), despite atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas having begun. Direct atmospheric venting should have been prevented or at least partially mitigated by at least three safety devices which were malfunctioning, not in use, insufficiently sized, or otherwise rendered inoperable:

A refrigeration system meant to cool tanks containing liquid MIC had been shut down in January 1982 and the freon had been removed in June 1984. Since the MIC storage system assumed refrigeration, its high temperature alarm, set to sound at 11 °C (52 °F) had long since been disconnected, and tank storage temperatures ranged between 15 °C (59 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F)

A flare tower to burn the MIC gas as it escaped, which had had a connecting pipe removed for maintenance, and was improperly sized to neutralise a leak of the size produced by tank E610

A vent gas scrubber which had been deactivated at the time and was in 'standby' mode, and similarly had insufficient caustic soda and power to safely stop a leak of the magnitude produced.

About 30 tonnes of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45 to 60 minutes. This would increase to 40 tonnes within two hours. The gases were blown in a southeast direction over Bhopal.

A UCIL employee triggered the plant's alarm system at 12:50 a.m. as the concentration of gas in and around the plant became difficult to tolerate. Activation of the system triggered two siren alarms: one that specifically sounded inside the UCIL plant itself and a second directed to the exterior which would alert the general public and the city of Bhopal. The two siren systems had been decoupled from one another in 1982, so that it was possible to leave the factory warning siren on while the public one remained inactive. This is what had occurred; the public siren briefly sounded at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over inconsequential leaks. Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant, travelling upwind.

Bhopal's superintendent of police was informed via telephone by a town inspector that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were fleeing a gas leak at approximately 1 a.m. Calls to the UCIL plant by police between 1:25 and 2:10 a.m. elicited assurances twice that "everything is OK", and on the last attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir". With the lack of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then later phosgene. Finally, they received an updated report that it was "MIC" (rather than "methyl isocyanate"), which hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and knew no immediate information about.

The MIC gas leak emanating from tank E610 petered out at approximately 2:00 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, the plant's public siren was sounded for an extended period of time after having been quickly silenced an hour and a half earlier. Some minutes after the public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police control room to both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had ever occurred in the first place), and that "the leak had been plugged." Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself, or by opening their doors to investigate commotion, rather than having been instructed to shelter in place or to evacuate before the arrival of the gas in the first place.

Acute effects

The reversible reaction of glutathione (top) with MIC (middle) allows MIC to be transported into the body.

Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse, and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver, and necrotising enteritis. The individuals who did not die suffered from cancer, blindness, loss of livelihood, and financial strain.

Gas cloud composition

Apart from MIC, based on laboratory simulation conditions, the gas cloud most likely also contained chloroform, dichloromethane, hydrogen chloride, methylamine, dimethylamine, trimethylamine, and carbon dioxide that was either present in the tank or was produced in the storage tank when MIC, chloroform, and water reacted. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed close to the ground and spread in a southeast direction affecting the nearby communities. The chemical reactions may have produced a liquid or solid aerosol. Laboratory investigations by CSIR and UCC scientists failed to demonstrate the presence of hydrogen cyanide.

Immediate aftermath

Memorial to those killed and disabled at Bhopal by Dutch Holocaust survivor Ruth Waterman-Kupferschmidt[37]

In the immediate aftermath, the plant was closed to outsiders (including UCC) by the Indian government, which subsequently failed to make data public, contributing to the confusion. The initial investigation was conducted entirely by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation. The UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson, together with a technical team, immediately travelled to India. Upon arrival, Anderson was placed under house arrest and urged by the Indian government to leave the country within 24 hours. Union Carbide organized a team of international medical experts, as well as supplies and equipment, to work with the local Bhopal medical community, and the UCC technical team began assessing the cause of the gas leak.

The health care system immediately became overloaded. In the severely affected areas, nearly 70% were under-qualified doctors. Medical staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties. Doctors and hospitals were not aware of proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation.

There were mass funerals and cremations. Photographer Pablo Bartholemew, on commission with press agency Rapho, took an iconic colour photograph of a burial on 4 December, Bhopal gas disaster girl. Another photographer present, Raghu Rai, took a black and white photo. The photographers did not ask for the identity of the father or child as she was buried and no relative has since confirmed it. As such, the identity of the girl remains unknown. Both photos became symbolic of the suffering of victims of the Bhopal disaster, and Bartholomew went on to win the 1984 World Press Photo of the Year.

Within a few days, trees in the vicinity became barren, and bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries, and 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited, causing further supply shortages.

Lacking any safe alternative, on 16 December, tanks 611 and 619 were emptied of the remaining MIC by reactivating the plant and continuing the manufacture of pesticide. Despite safety precautions such as having water-carrying helicopters continually overflying the plant, this led to a second mass evacuation from Bhopal. The Government of India passed the "Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act" that gave the government rights to represent all victims, whether or not in India. Complaints of lack of information or misinformation were widespread. An Indian government spokesman said, "Carbide is more interested in getting information from us than in helping our relief work".

Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation, and foodstuffs were safe, but people were warned not to consume fish. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000. Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics, and mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat the victims. S. Ravi Rajan (Prof. Environmental Studies, U.C. Santa Cruz) outlines the financially driven undertones of the company's actions. UCC had participated in decades of previous instances of "environmental negligence in every part of the world", directing its "responsibility... to its shareholders", and numerous dealings with local and international political and economic powers. The company's response to the Bhopal accident was what Rajan describes as a "campaign of erasure", meaning the transfer of liability and responsibility of the cause of the gas leak, the event itself, and the aftermath. Rajan then argues that this type of response is to be expected "according to [the] established cultural practice" within large corporations such as UCC. Since UCC absolved itself from the situation, the Indian government was the next institution that was looked to by the people of Bhopal, but they had also not prepared for such an event. The government's attempts at short and long-term plans failed in successfully aiding victims and instead "created an ecology of opportunity... built largely at the expense of the victims."

Subsequent legal action

Victims of Bhopal disaster march in September 2006 demanding the extradition of Warren Anderson from the United States.

Legal proceedings involving UCC, the United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities, and the disaster victims started immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India to act as the legal representative for victims of the disaster, leading to the beginning of legal proceedings. Initial lawsuits were generated in the United States federal court system. On 17 April 1985, Federal District court judge John F. Keenan (overseeing one lawsuit) suggested that "'fundamental human decency' required Union Carbide to provide between $5 million and $10 million to immediately help the injured" and suggested the money could be quickly distributed through the International Red Cross. UCC, on the notion that doing so did not constitute an admission of liability and the figure could be credited toward any future settlement or judgement, offered a $5 million relief fund two days later. The Indian government turned down the offer.

In March 1986, UCC proposed a settlement figure, endorsed by plaintiffs' U.S. attorneys, of $350 million that would, according to the company, "generate a fund for Bhopal victims of between $500-600 million over 20 years". In May, litigation was transferred from the United States to Indian courts by a U.S. District Court ruling. Following an appeal of this decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer in January 1982, judging that UCIL was a "separate entity, owned, managed and operated exclusively by Indian citizens in India".

The Government of India refused the offer from Union Carbide and claimed US$3.3 billion. The Indian Supreme Court told both sides to come to an agreement and "start with a clean slate" in November 1988. Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster. The amount was immediately paid.

Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the settlement. In October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the original $470 million, dismissing any other outstanding petitions that challenged the original decision. The Court ordered the Indian government "to purchase, out of settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms" and cover any shortfall in the settlement fund. It also requested UCC and its subsidiary UCIL "voluntarily" fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated $17 million, to specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The company agreed to this.

Post-settlement activity

In 1991, the local Bhopal authorities charged Anderson, who had retired in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on 1 February 1992 for failing to appear at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief defendant. Orders were passed to the Government of India to press for an extradition from the United States. The United States declined to extradite him citing a lack of evidence.

In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Indian government to release any remaining settlement funds to victims. And in September 2006, the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims announced that all original compensation claims and revised petitions had been "cleared".

In 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City upheld the dismissal of remaining claims in the case of Bano v. Union Carbide Corporation. This move blocked plaintiffs' motions for class certification and claims for property damages and remediation. In the view of UCC, "the ruling reaffirms UCC's long-held positions and finally puts to rest-both procedurally and substantively-the issues raised in the class action complaint first filed against Union Carbide in 1999 by Haseena Bi and several organisations representing the residents of Bhopal".

In June 2010, seven former employees of UCIL, all Indian nationals and many in their 70s, were convicted of causing death by negligence: Keshub Mahindra, former non-executive chairman of Union Carbide India Limited; V. P. Gokhale, managing director; Kishore Kamdar, vice-president; J. Mukund, works manager; S. P. Chowdhury, production manager; K. V. Shetty, plant superintendent; and S. I. Qureshi, production assistant. They were each sentenced to two years' imprisonment and fined (equivalent to ₹220,000 or US$2,800 in 2023). All were released on bail shortly after the verdict.

A US federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, was filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for civil remedies for "crimes against humanity". It sought damages for personal injury, medical monitoring and injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the drinking water supplies for residential areas near the Bhopal plant. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and the subsequent appeal was denied.

Warren Anderson, then 92 years old, died on 29 September 2014.

On 14 March 2023 Indian Supreme Court dismissed curative petition for enhanced compensation.

Long-term effects

In 2018, The Atlantic called it the "world's worst industrial disaster". Lawyers, academics and journalists have described the disaster as an ecocide.

Long-term health effects

A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected", affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. The official immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been officially certified. Ingrid Eckerman estimated 8,000 died within two weeks.

A cohort of 80,021 exposed people was registered, along with a control group, a cohort of 15,931 people from areas not exposed to MIC. Nearly every year since 1986, they have answered the same questionnaire. It shows excess mortality and morbidity in the exposed group. Bias and confounding factors cannot be excluded from the study. Because of migration and other factors, 75% of the cohort is lost, as the ones who move out are not followed.

A number of clinical studies are performed. The quality varies, but the different reports support each other. Studied and reported long-term health effects are:

Eyes: Chronic conjunctivitis, scars on cornea, corneal opacities, early cataracts

Respiratory tracts: Obstructive and/or restrictive disease, pulmonary fibrosis, aggravation of tuberculosis and chronic bronchitis

Neurological system: Impairment of memory, finer motor skills, numbness, etc.

Psychological problems: Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)

Children's health: Peri- and neonatal death rates increased. Failure to grow, intellectual impairment, etc.

A 2014 report in Mother Jones quotes a "spokesperson for the Bhopal Medical Appeal, which runs free health clinics for survivors" as saying "An estimated 120,000 to 150,000 survivors still struggle with serious medical conditions including nerve damage, growth problems, gynaecological disorders, respiratory issues, birth defects, and elevated rates of cancer and tuberculosis."

Health care

The Government of India had focused primarily on increasing the hospital-based services for gas victims thus hospitals had been built after the disaster. When UCC wanted to sell its shares in UCIL, it was directed by the Supreme Court to finance a 500-bed hospital for the medical care of the survivors. Thus, Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) was inaugurated in 1998 and was obliged to give free care for survivors for eight years. BMHRC was a 350-bedded super speciality hospital where heart surgery and hemodialysis were done. There was a dearth of gynaecology, obstetrics and paediatrics. Eight mini-units (outreach health centres) were started and free health care for gas victims was to be offered until 2006. The management had also faced problems with strikes, and the quality of the health care being disputed. Sambhavna Trust is a charitable trust, registered in 1995, that gives modern as well as ayurvedic treatments to gas victims, free of charge.

Environmental rehabilitation

When the factory was closed in 1986, pipes, drums and tanks were sold. The MIC and the Sevin plants are still there, as are storages of different residues. Isolation material is falling down and spreading. The area around the plant was used as a dumping area for hazardous chemicals. In 1982 tube wells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned and tests in 1989 performed by UCC's laboratory revealed that soil and water samples collected near the factory and inside the plant were toxic to fish. Several other studies had also shown polluted soil and groundwater in the area. Reported polluting compounds include 1-naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residue, mercury, toxic organochlorines, volatile organochlorine compounds, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachloroethane, hexachlorobutadiene, and the pesticide HCH.

In order to provide safe drinking water to the population around the UCIL factory, the government of Madhya Pradesh proposed a water-supply improvement scheme. In December 2008, the Madhya Pradesh High Court decided that the toxic waste should be incinerated at Ankleshwar in Gujarat, which was met by protests from activists all over India. On 8 June 2012, the Centre for incineration of toxic Bhopal waste agreed to pay ₹250 million (US$3.1 million) to dispose of UCIL chemical plants waste in Germany. On 9 August 2012, Supreme court directed the Union and Madhya Pradesh Governments to take immediate steps for disposal of toxic waste lying around and inside the factory within six months.

A U.S. court rejected the lawsuit blaming UCC for causing soil and water pollution around the site of the plant and ruled that responsibility for remedial measures or related claims rested with the State Government and not with UCC. In 2005, the state government invited various Indian architects to enter their "concept for development of a memorial complex for Bhopal gas tragedy victims at the site of Union Carbide". In 2011, a conference was held on the site, with participants from European universities which was aimed for the same.

Occupational and habitation rehabilitation

Thirty-three of the 50 planned work-sheds for gas victims started. All except one was closed down by 1992. In 1986, the MP government invested in the Special Industrial Area Bhopal. One hundred and fifty-two of the planned 200 work sheds were built and in 2000, 16 were partially functioning. It was estimated that 50,000 persons need alternative jobs, and that less than 100 gas victims had found regular employment under the government's scheme. The government also planned 2,486 flats in two- and four-story buildings in what is called the "widow's colony" outside Bhopal. The water did not reach the upper floors and it was not possible to keep cattle which was their primary occupation. Infrastructure like buses, schools, etc. were missing for at least a decade.

Economic rehabilitation

Immediate relieves were decided two days after the tragedy. Relief measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short period along with ration cards. Madhya Pradesh government's finance department allocated ₹874 million (US$11 million) for victim relief in July 1985. Widow pension of (US$2.50)/per month (later (US$9.40)) was provided. The government also decided to pay (US$19) to families with monthly income (US$6.30) or less. As a result of the interim relief, more children were able to attend school, more money was spent on treatment and food, and housing also eventually improved. From 1990 interim relief of (US$2.50) was paid to everyone in the family who was born before the disaster.

The final compensation, including interim relief for personal injury, was for the majority (US$310). For death claims, the average sum paid out was (US$780). Each claimant was to be categorised by a doctor. In court, the claimants were expected to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" that death or injury in each case was attributable to exposure. In 1992, 44 percent of the claimants still had to be medically examined.

By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200.

In 2007, 1,029,517 cases were registered and decided. The number of awarded cases was 574,304 and the number of rejected cases was 455,213. Total compensation awarded was ₹15,465 million (US$190 million). On 24 June 2010, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India approved a ₹12,650 million (US$160 million) aid package which would be funded by Indian taxpayers through the government.

Other impacts

There are two main lines of argument involving the disaster.[page needed ] The "corporate negligence" point of view argues that the disaster was caused by a potent combination of under-maintained and decaying facilities, a weak attitude towards safety, and an under-trained workforce, culminating in worker actions that inadvertently enabled water to penetrate the MIC tanks in the absence of properly working safeguards.[page needed ]

The "worker sabotage" point of view, held by Union Carbide, argues that it was not physically possible for the water to enter the tank without concerted human effort, and that extensive testimony and engineering analysis leads to a conclusion that water entered the tank when a rogue individual employee hooked a water hose directly to an empty valve on the side of the tank. This point of view further argues that the Indian government took extensive actions to hide this possibility in order to attach blame to UCC.[page needed ]

Theories differ as to how the water entered the tank. At the time, workers were cleaning out a clogged pipe with water about 120 metres (400 ft) from the tank. They claimed that they were not told to isolate the tank with a pipe slip-blind plate. The operators assumed that owing to bad maintenance and leaking valves, it was possible for the water to leak into the tank.[page needed ]

This water entry route could not be reproduced despite strenuous efforts by motivated parties. UCC claims that a "disgruntled worker" deliberately connecting a hose to a pressure gauge connection was the real cause.

Early the next morning, a UCIL manager asked the instrument engineer to replace the gauge. UCIL's investigation team found no evidence of the necessary connection; the investigation was totally controlled by the government, denying UCC investigators access to the tank or interviews with the operators.

Corporate negligence

This point of view argues that management (and to some extent, local government) underinvested in safety, which allowed for a dangerous working environment to develop. Factors cited include the filling of the MIC tanks beyond recommended levels, poor maintenance after the plant ceased MIC production at the end of 1984, allowing several safety systems to be inoperable due to poor maintenance, and switching off safety systems to save money- including the MIC tank refrigeration system which could have mitigated the disaster severity, and non-existent catastrophe management plans. Other factors identified by government inquiries included undersized safety devices and the dependence on manual operations. Specific plant management deficiencies that were identified include the lack of skilled operators, reduction of safety management, insufficient maintenance, and inadequate emergency action plans.

Underinvestment

Underinvestment is cited as contributing to a dangerous environment. In attempts to reduce expenses, $1.25 million worth of cuts were placed upon the plant which affected the factory's employees and their conditions. Kurzman argues that "cuts ... meant less stringent quality control and thus looser safety rules. A pipe leaked? Don't replace it, employees said they were told ... MIC workers needed more training? They could do with less. Promotions were halted, seriously affecting employee morale and driving some of the most skilled ... elsewhere". Workers were forced to use English manuals, even though only a few had a grasp of the language.

Subsequent research highlights a gradual deterioration of safety practices in regard to the MIC, which had become less relevant to plant operations. By 1984, only six of the original 12 operators were still working with MIC and the number of supervisory personnel had also been halved. No maintenance supervisor was placed on the night shift and instrument readings were taken every two hours, rather than the previous and required one-hour readings. Workers made complaints about the cuts through their union but were ignored. One employee was fired after going on a 15-day hunger strike. Seventy percent of the plant's employees were fined before the disaster for refusing to deviate from the proper safety regulations under pressure from the management.

In addition, some observers, such as those writing in the Trade Environmental Database (TED) Case Studies as part of the Mandala Project from American University, have pointed to "serious communication problems and management gaps between Union Carbide and its Indian operation", characterised by "the parent companies [] hands-off approach to its overseas operation" and "cross-cultural barriers".

Adequacy of equipment and regulations

The factory was not well equipped to handle the gas created by the sudden addition of water to the MIC tank. The MIC tank alarms had not been working for four years and there was only one manual back-up system, compared to a four-stage system used in the United States. The flare tower and several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service for five months before the disaster. Only one gas scrubber was operating: it could not treat such a large amount of MIC with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), which would have brought the concentration down to a safe level. The flare tower could only handle a quarter of the gas that leaked in 1984, and moreover it was out of order at the time of the accident. To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system was idle. The MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius, not the 4.5 degrees advised by the manual. Even the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes, was non-operational for unknown reasons. Slip-blind plates that would have prevented water from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks if the valves had been faulty were not installed and their installation had been omitted from the cleaning checklist. As MIC is water-soluble, deluge guns were in place to contain escaping gases from the stack. The water pressure was too weak for the guns to spray high enough to reach the gas which would have reduced the concentration of escaping gas significantly. In addition to it, carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they were known to corrode when exposed to acid.

According to the operators, the MIC tank pressure gauge had been malfunctioning for roughly a week. Other tanks were used, rather than repairing the gauge. The build-up in temperature and pressure is believed to have affected the magnitude of the gas release. UCC admitted in their own investigation report that most of the safety systems were not functioning on the night of 3 December 1984. The design of the MIC plant, following government guidelines, was "Indianized" by UCIL engineers to maximise the use of indigenous materials and products. Mumbai-based Humphreys and Glasgow Consultants Pvt. Ltd., were the main consultants, Larsen & Toubro fabricated the MIC storage tanks, and Taylor of India Ltd. provided the instrumentation. In 1998, during civil action suits in India, it emerged that the plant was not prepared for problems. No action plans had been established to cope with accidents of this magnitude. This included not informing local authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals used and manufactured at Bhopal.

Safety audits

Safety audits were done every year in the US and European UCC plants, but only every two years in other parts of the world. Before a "Business Confidential" safety audit by UCC in May 1982, the senior officials of the corporation were well aware of "a total of 61 hazards, 30 of them major and 11 minor in the dangerous phosgene/methyl isocyanate units" in Bhopal. In the 1982 audit, it was indicated that worker performance was below standards. Ten major concerns were listed. UCIL prepared an action plan, but UCC never sent a follow-up team to Bhopal. Many of the items in the 1982 report were temporarily fixed, but by 1984, conditions had again deteriorated. In September 1984, an internal UCC report on the West Virginia plant in the United States revealed a number of defects and malfunctions. It warned that "a runaway reaction could occur in the MIC unit storage tanks, and that the planned response would not be timely or effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tanks". This report was never forwarded to the Bhopal plant, although the main design was the same.

Impossibility of the "negligence"

According to the "Corporate Negligence" argument, workers had been cleaning out pipes with water nearby. This water was diverted due to a combination of improper maintenance, leaking and clogging, and eventually ended up in the MIC storage tank. Indian scientists also suggested that additional water might have been introduced as a "back-flow" from a defectively designed vent-gas scrubber. None of these theoretical routes of entry were ever successfully demonstrated during tests by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and UCIL engineers.

1. The pipes being used by the nearby workers were only inch (13 mm) in diameter and were physically incapable of producing enough hydraulic pressure to raise water the more than 10 feet (3.0 m) that would have been necessary to enable the water to "backflow" into the MIC tank.

2. A key intermediate valve would have had to be open for the Negligence argument to apply. This valve was "tagged" closed, meaning that it had been inspected and found to be closed. While it is possible for open valves to clog over time, the only way a closed valve allows penetration is if there is leakage, and 1985 tests carried out by the government of India found this valve to be non-leaking.

3. In order for water to have reached the MIC tank from the pipe-cleaning area, it would have had to flow through a significant network of pipes ranging from 6 to 8 inches (150 to 200 mm) in diameter, before rising 3.0 metres (10 ft) and flowing into the MIC tank. Had this occurred, most of the water that was in those pipes at the time the tank had its critical reaction would have remained in those pipes, as there was no drain for them. Investigation by the Indian government in 1985 revealed that the pipes were bone dry.

Employee sabotage

The Union Carbide-commissioned Arthur D. Little report concluded that it was likely that a single employee secretly and deliberately introduced a large amount of water into the MIC tank by removing a meter and connecting a water hose directly to the tank through the metering port.

UCC claims the plant staff falsified numerous records to distance themselves from the accident and absolve themselves of blame, and that the Indian government impeded its investigation and declined to prosecute the employee responsible, presumably because it would weaken its allegations of negligence by Union Carbide.

The evidence advanced by UCC, alleged to support this hypothesis:

1. A key witness testified that when he entered the control room at 12:15 am, prior to the disaster, the "atmosphere was tense and quiet".

2. Another key witness (the "instrument supervisor") testified that when he arrived at the scene immediately following the accident, he noticed that the local pressure indicator on the critical Tank 610 was missing, and that he had found a hose lying next to the empty manhead created by the missing pressure indicator, and that the hose had had water running out of it. (This testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.)

3. Graphological analysis revealed major attempts to alter logfiles and destroy log evidence.

4. Other logfiles show that the control team had attempted to purge one ton of material out of Tank 610 immediately prior to the disaster. An attempt was then made to cover up this transfer via log alteration. Water is heavier than MIC, and the transfer line is attached to the bottom of the tank. The Arthur D. Little report concludes from this that the transfer was an effort to transfer water out of Tank 610 that had been discovered there.

5. Second-hand and third-hand recounting of events yielded two accounts that corroborated UCC's conspiracy hypothesis; an operator from a different unit stated that after the release, two MIC operators had told him that water had entered the tank through a pressure gauge. One employee stated that "he had been told by a close friend of one of the MIC operators that water had entered through a tube that had been connected to the tank." This had been allegedly discovered by the other MIC operators who then tried to open and close valves to prevent the release.

The Little report argues that this evidence demonstrates that the following chronology took place:

At 10:20 pm, the tank was at normal pressure, indicating the absence of water.

At 10:45 pm, a shift change took place, after which the MIC storage area "would be completely deserted". During this period, a "disgruntled operator entered the storage area and hooked up one of the readily available rubber water hoses to Tank 610, with the intention of contaminating and spoiling the tank's contents."

Water began to flow, beginning the chemical reaction that caused the disaster.

After midnight, control room operators noticed the pressure rising and realized there was a problem with Tank 610. They discovered the water connection and decided to transfer one ton of the contents out to try to remove the water. The MIC release then occurred.

The cover-up activities discovered during the investigation then took place.

After over 30 years, in November 2017, S. P. Choudhary, former MIC production manager, claimed in court that the disaster was not an accident but the result of a sabotage that claimed thousands of lives.

Chaudry's counsel, Anirban Roy, argued that the theory of design defects was floated by the central government in its endeavour to protect the victims of the tragedy. Everyone else involved in investigating the case "just toed the line of the central government. ... The government and the CBI suppressed the actual truth and saved the real perpetrators of the crime."

Roy argued to the district court that M. L. Verma, a disgruntled plant operator at odds with senior management, was behind the sabotage. The counsel argued there were discrepancies in statements given by persons operating the plant at that time but the central agency decided against a proper investigation in order to characterize the event as a mishap and not sabotage. He alleged that Verma was unhappy with Chaudhary and Mukund.

Additional Union Carbide actions

The corporation denied the claim that valves on the tank were malfunctioning and claimed that documented evidence gathered after the accident showed the valve closest to the plant's water-washing operation was closed and leak-tight. Furthermore, process safety systems had prevented water from entering the tank by accident. Carbide states that all safety concerns identified in 1982 were allayed before 1984 and had nothing to do with the accident.

The company admitted that safety systems in place would not have been able to prevent a chemical reaction of such magnitude from causing a leak. According to Carbide, "in designing the plant's safety systems, a chemical reaction of this magnitude was not factored in" because "the tank's gas storage system was designed to automatically prevent such a large amount of water from being inadvertently introduced into the system" and "process safety systems-in place and operational-would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident". Instead, they claim that "employee sabotage-not faulty design or operation-was the cause of the tragedy".

Tactical response

The company stresses the immediate action taken after the disaster and its continued commitment to helping the victims. On 4 December, the day following the leak, Union Carbide sent material aid and several international medical experts to assist the medical facilities in Bhopal.

Financial response

The primary financial restitution paid by UCC was negotiated in 1989, when the Indian Supreme Court approved a settlement of US$470 million (₹1,055 crore; equivalent to $907 million in 2021). This amount was immediately paid by UCC to the Indian government. The company states that the restitution paid "was $120 million more than plaintiffs' lawyers had told U.S. courts was fair" and that the Indian Supreme Court stated in its opinion that "compensation levels under the settlement were far greater than would normally be payable under Indian law."

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Union Carbide states on its website that it donated $2 million to the Indian prime minister's immediate disaster relief fund on 11 December 1984. The corporation established the Employees' Bhopal Relief Fund in February 1985, which raised more than $5 million for immediate relief. According to Union Carbide, in August 1987, they made an additional $4.6 million in humanitarian interim relief available.

Union Carbide stated that it also undertook several steps to provide continuing aid to the victims of the Bhopal disaster, including the sale of its 50.9% interest in UCIL in April 1992 and establishment of a charitable trust to contribute to the building of a local hospital. The sale was finalised in November 1994. Construction began in October 1995 and the hospital opened in 2001. The company provided a fund of around $90 million from sale of its UCIL stock. In 1991, the trust had amounted to approximately $100 million. The hospital specialized in the treatment of heart, lung and eye problems. UCC also provided a $2.2 million grant to Arizona State University to establish a vocational-technical center in Bhopal, which was opened, but was later closed by the state government. They also donated $5 million to the Indian Red Cross after the disaster. They also developed a Responsible Care system with other members of the chemical industry as a response to the Bhopal crisis, which was designed to help prevent such an event in the future.

Charges against UCC and UCIL employees

UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson was arrested and released on bail by the Madhya Pradesh Police in Bhopal on 7 December 1984. Anderson was taken to UCC's house after which he was released six hours later on $2,100 bail and flown out on a government plane. These actions were allegedly taken under the direction of then chief secretary of the state, who was possibly instructed from the chief minister's office, who himself flew out of Bhopal immediately. Later in 1987, the Indian government summoned Anderson, eight other executives and two company affiliates to appear in Indian court on homicide charges. In response, Union Carbide said the company is not under Indian jurisdiction.

In May 1988, Indian businessman J. R. D. Tata wrote a confidential letter to the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, conveying Henry Kissinger's concern about delay in reaching a settlement. At the time, Kissinger was an adviser to Union Carbide and other US corporations. Rajiv Gandhi indicated that he would consider Kissinger's advice. Bharatiya Janata Party claimed that Rajiv Gandhi, protected Warren Anderson in a secret political deal with President Ronald Reagan to pardon Adil Shahryar.

Dow was a named respondent in cases arising from Union Carbide's business in Bhopal.

Ongoing contamination

Deteriorating section of the MIC plant in 2008, decades after the gas leak

Chemicals abandoned at the plant continue to leak and pollute the groundwater. Whether the chemicals pose a health hazard is disputed. Contamination at the site and surrounding area was not caused by the gas leakage. The area around the plant was used as a dumping ground for hazardous chemicals and by 1982 water wells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned. UCC states that "after the incident, UCIL began clean-up work at the site under the direction of Indian central and state government authorities". The work was continued from 1994 by Eveready Industries India, Limited (EIIL) who was UCIL's successor. In 1998, the Madhya Pradesh State Government, which owned and had been leasing the property to EIIL, cancelled the lease, took over the facility and assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any remediation.

UCC's laboratory tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory were toxic to fish. Twenty-one areas inside the plant were reported to be highly polluted. In 1991 the municipal authorities declared that water from over 100 wells was hazardous for health if used for drinking. In 1994 it was reported that 21% of the factory premises were seriously contaminated with chemicals. Beginning in 1999, studies made by Greenpeace and others from soil, groundwater, well water and vegetables from the residential areas around UCIL and from the UCIL factory area show contamination with a range of toxic heavy metals and chemical compounds. Substances found, according to the reports, are naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residues, alpha naphthol, mercury, organochlorines, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachlorethane, hexachlorobutadiene, pesticide HCH ( BHC), volatile organic compounds and halo-organics. Many of these contaminants were also found in breast milk of women living near the area. Soil tests were conducted by Greenpeace in 1999. One sample (IT9012) from "sediment collected from drain under former Sevin plant" showed mercury levels to be at "20,000 and 6 million times" higher than expected levels. Organochlorine compounds at elevated levels were also present in groundwater collected from (sample IT9040) a 4.4-meter depth "bore-hole within the former UCIL site". This sample was obtained from a source posted with a warning sign which read "Water unfit for consumption". Chemicals that have been linked to various forms of cancer were also discovered, as well as trichloroethylene, known to impair foetal development, at 50 times above safety limits specified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In 2002, an inquiry by Fact-Finding Mission on Bhopal found a number of toxins, including mercury, lead, 1,3,5 trichlorobenzene, dichloromethane and chloroform, in nursing women's breast milk.

A 2004 BBC Radio 5 broadcast reported the site is contaminated with toxic chemicals including benzene hexachloride and mercury, held in open containers or loose on the ground. A drinking water sample from a well near the site had levels of contamination 500 times higher than the maximum limits recommended by the World Health Organization. In 2009, the Centre for Science and Environment, a Delhi-based pollution monitoring lab, released test results showing pesticide groundwater contamination up to three kilometres from the factory. Also in 2009, the BBC took a water sample from a frequently used hand pump, located just north of the plant. The sample, tested in UK, was found to contain 1,000 times the World Health Organization's recommended maximum amount of carbon tetrachloride, a carcinogenic toxin.

In 2010, a British photojournalist ventured into the abandoned UCIL factory to investigate allegations of abandoned, leaking toxins. He was hospitalized in Bhopal for a week after he was exposed to chemicals. Doctors at the Sambhavna Clinic treated him with oxygen, painkillers and anti-inflammatories following a severe respiratory reaction to toxic dust inside the factory.

In October 2011, the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment published an article and video by two British environmental scientists, showing the current state of the plant, landfill and solar evaporation ponds and calling for renewed international efforts to provide the necessary skills to clean up the site and contaminated groundwater.

Popular culture

Amulya Malladi's 2002 novel A Breath of Fresh Air relates the story of a mother and son who develop health issues as a result of exposure to gas at Bhopal. The book is based on Malladi's recollections of Bhopal during the accident.

Indra Sinha released Animal's People in 2007. The novel tells the story of a boy who is born with a spinal condition due to effects of the gas. The book was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize.[citation needed ]

Arundhati Roy's 2017 novel The Ministry of Utmost Happiness which deals with many contemporary political issues in India, also features several characters still dealing with the aftermath of the gas leak.

Annie Murray's novel Mother and Child (2019) is partly set in post-disaster Bhopal.

Films and television

Protest in Bhopal in 2010

Since 1984, individual activists have played a role in the aftermath of the tragedy. The best-known is Satinath Sarangi (Sathyu), a metallurgic engineer who arrived at Bhopal the day after the leakage. He founded several activist groups, as well as Sambhavna Trust, the clinic for gas affected patients, where he is the manager. Other activists include Rashida Bee and Champa Devi Shukla, who received the Goldman Prize in 2004, Abdul Jabbar and Rachna Dhingra. Soon after the accident, other representatives from different activist groups arrived. The activists worked on organising the gas victims, which led to violent repression from the police and the government.

Numerous actions have been taken: demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, marches combined with pamphlets, books, and articles. Every anniversary, actions are performed. Often these include marches around Old Bhopal, ending with burning an effigy of Warren Anderson.

When government aid was ineffective, activist groups such as Zahreeli Gas Khand Sangharsh Morcha (Poisonous Gas-Event Struggle Front) mobilized. Morcha was heterogenous in its membership, including gas victims, volunteers from smaller towns, and middle-class activists from large cities. Morcha outlined a four-pronged approach: 1) counter governmental and company efforts to remove the disaster from the press 2) mobilize gas victims 3) present alternatives to governmental programs 4) establish a larger network of organization to debate more systemic issues. Morcha took a revolutionary approach but lacked constructive engagement with the state. Afterwards the Bhopal Gas-Affected Women's Trade Union formed. BGPMUS protested the closing of a sewing center and saw effective action.

International

In 1992, a session of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights took place in Bhopal, and in 1996, the "Charter on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights" was adopted.

In 1994, the International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) met in Bhopal. Their work contributed to long-term health effects being officially recognised.

Organisations

Bhopal People's Health and Documentation Clinic

More than 14 different NGOs were immediately engaged and 15 international, national and local organisations have been engaged including:

International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal (ICJB), coordinates international activities

Bhopal Medical Appeal, collects funds for the Sambhavna Trust

Sambhavna Trust or Bhopal People's Health and Documentation Clinic. Provides medical care for gas affected patients and those living in water-contaminated area

Chingari Trust, provides medical care for children being born in Bhopal with malformations and brain damages

Students for Bhopal, based in the United States

International Medical Commission on Bhopal, provided medical information 1994-2000

Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila-Stationery Karmachari Sangh

Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangthan

Settlement fund hoax

On 3 December 2004, the twentieth anniversary of the disaster, a man falsely claiming to be a Dow representative named Jude Finisterra was interviewed on BBC World News. He claimed that the company had agreed to clean up the site and compensate those harmed in the accident, by liquidating Union Carbide for US$12 billion. Dow quickly issued a statement saying that they had no employee by that name-that he was an impostor, not affiliated with Dow, and that his claims were a hoax. The BBC later broadcast a correction and an apology.

Jude Finisterra was actually Andy Bichlbaum, a member of the activist prankster group The Yes Men. In 2002, The Yes Men issued a fake press release explaining why Dow refused to take responsibility for the disaster and started up a website, at "DowEthics.com", designed to look like the real Dow website, but containing hoax information.

Monitoring of activists

The release of an email cache related to intelligence research organisation Stratfor was leaked by WikiLeaks on 27 February 2012. It revealed that Dow Chemical had engaged Stratfor to spy on the public and personal lives of activists involved in the Bhopal disaster, including the Yes Men. E-mails to Dow representatives from hired security analysts list the YouTube videos liked, Twitter and Facebook posts made and the public appearances of these activists. Journalists, filmmakers and authors who were investigating Bhopal and covering the issue of ongoing contamination, such as Jack Laurenson and Max Carlson, were also placed under surveillance.[citation needed ] Stratfor released a statement condemning the revelation by Wikileaks while neither confirming nor denying the accuracy of the reports and would only state that it had acted within the bounds of the law. Dow Chemical also refrained to comment on the matter.

Ingrid Eckerman, a member of the International Medical Commission on Bhopal, has been denied a visa to visit India.

References

1. * ^ Mandavilli, Apoorva (9 July 2018). "The World's Worst Industrial Disaster Is Still Unfolding". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 23 August 2020.

2. Varma, Roli; Daya R. Varma (2005). "The Bhopal Disaster of 1984". Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society. 25: 37-45. doi:10.1177/0270467604273822. S2CID 109281859.

3. "Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, Bhopal. Immediate Relief Provided by the State Government". Government of Madhya Pradesh. Archived from the original on 18 May 2012.

4. AK Dubey (21 June 2010). "Bhopal Gas Tragedy: 92% injuries termed "minor"". First14 News. Archived from the original on 24 June 2010.

5. Eckerman, Ingrid (2005). The Bhopal Saga-Causes and Consequences of the World's Largest Industrial Disaster. India: Universities Press. doi:10.13140/2.1.3457.5364. ISBN 978-81-7371-515-0. Archived from the original on 10 November 2022.

6. ^ Narrator: Ashton Smith (10 October 2011). "Bhopal Nightmare". Seconds from Disaster. Season 4. Episode 6. 5:45 minutes in. Nat Geo.

7. "Bhopal: Vulnerability, Routinization, and the Chronic Disaster", The Angry Earth, Routledge, pp. 271-291, 1 November 1999, doi:10.4324/9780203821190-24, ISBN 9780429236488

8. ^ Havens J, Walker H, Spicer T (30 September 2012). "Bhopal atmospheric dispersion revisited". Journal of Hazardous Materials. 233-234: 33-40. doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2012.06.055. PMID 22819479.

9. ^ Maitra, Partha (4 December 2014). "Ruth wanted to be with midnight's children". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 7 July 2018.

10. ^ Lack of Evidence Held up Anderson Extradition: MEA The Times of India, June 10, 2010

11. ^ https://indianexpress.com/article/india/bhopal-gas-tragedy-sc-verdict-ucc-victims-compensation-8495596/

12. ^ Mandavilli, Apoorva (9 July 2018). "The World's Worst Industrial Disaster Is Still Unfolding". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 23 August 2020.

13. ^ Perinchery, Aathira (26 February 2022). "We're Killing the Environment, and There's a Word for It - Ecocide - The Wire Science".

14. ^ Pereira, Ricardo (1 June 2020). "After the ICC Office of the Prosecutor's 2016 Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation: Towards an International Crime of Ecocide?". Criminal Law Forum. 31 (2): 179-224. doi:10.1007/s10609-020-09393-y. ISSN 1572-9850.

15. Eckerman, Ingrid (2001). Chemical industry and public health. Bhopal as an example (PDF). Gothenburg, Sweden: Nordic School of Public Health. Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 October 2012.

16. ^ Lakshmi R (9 January 2012). "Curating a Bhopal People's Movement: An Opportunity for Indian Museums". Curator: The Museum Journal. 55: 35-50. doi:10.1111/j.2151-6952.2011.00119.x.

17. Broughton, Edward (2005). "The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review". Environmental Health. 4 (6): 6. doi:10.1186/1476-069X-4-6. PMC . PMID 15882472.

18. Kalelkar AS, Little AD (1988). Investigation of Large-magnitude Incidents: Bhopal as a Case Study. London: Presented at the Institution of Chemical Engineers conference on preventing major chemical accidents. Archived from the original on 8 December 2015.

19. Chouhan TR; et al. (2004) [1994]. Bhopal: the Inside Story - Carbide Workers Speak Out on the World's Worst Industrial Disaster. US and India: The Apex Press and Other India Press. ISBN 978-1-891843-30-3. and.

20. The Trade Union Report on Bhopal Archived 15 July 2009 at the Wayback Machine, Geneva, Switzerland: ICFTU-ICEF, 1985

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22. ^ "Frequently Asked Questions". Bhopal Information Center. Union Carbide Corporation. November 2009. Archived from the original on 8 April 2010. The Indian authorities are well aware of the identity of the employee [who sabotaged the plant] and the nature of the evidence against him. Indian authorities refused to pursue this individual because they, as litigants, were not interested in proving that anyone other than Union Carbide was to blame for the tragedy.

23. ^ "Bhopal Gas tragedy: In court, defence names former employee as 'saboteur'". Indian Express. 13 November 2017. Archived from the original on 15 November 2017.

24. United States ^ Gross Domestic Product deflator figures follow the Measuring Worth series.

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26. Labunska et al. (2003).

27. Down to Earth (2003).

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29. ^ Vickers, Paul (4 November 2004). "Bhopal 'faces risk of poisoning'". BBC news. Archived from the original on 6 December 2009.

30. ^ Vickers, Paul (14 November 2004). "Bhopal 'faces risk of poisoning'". BBC Radio 5 website. Archived from the original on 6 December 2009.

Further reading

Broughton E (10 May 2005). "The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review". Environmental Health. 4 (1): 6. doi:10.1186/1476-069X-4-6. PMC . PMID 15882472.

Carbon monoxide, Phosgene and Methyl isocyanate. Unit Safety Procedures Manual. Union Carbide India Limited, Agricultural Products Division: Bhopal (1978)

Cassels, J (1993). The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons From Bhopal. University of Toronto Press.

Chouhan TR, et al. (2004) [1994]. Bhopal: the Inside Story - Carbide Workers Speak Out on the World's Worst Industrial Disaster. US and India: The Apex Press and Other India Press. ISBN 978-1-891843-30-3. and. Main author Chouhan was an operator at the plant. Contains many technical details.

Chouhan TR (2005). "The Unfolding of Bhopal Disaster". Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 18 (4-6): 205-08. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2005.07.025.

Dhara VR, Gassert TH (September 2005). "The Bhopal gas tragedy: Evidence for cyanide poisoning not convincing" (PDF). Current Science. 89 (6): 923-25. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 October 2008.

D'Silva, T. (2006). The Black Box of Bhopal: A Closer Look at the World's Deadliest Industrial Disaster. Victoria, BC: Trafford. ISBN 978-1-4120-8412-3. Review Archived 29 August 2008 at the Wayback Machine Written by a retired former employee of UCC who was a member of the investigation committee. Includes several original documents including correspondence between UCIL and the Ministries of the Government of India.

Eckerman I (2001). Chemical Industry and Public Health - Bhopal as an example (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 October 2012. Essay for MPH. A short overview, 57 pages, 82 references.

Eckerman I (2006). "The Bhopal Disaster 1984 - working conditions and the role of the trade unions" (PDF). Asian Pacific Newsletter on Occupational Health and Safety. 13 (2). Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 July 2011.

Eckerman I (2011). "Bhopal Gas Catastrophe 1984: Causes and consequences". In Nriagu JO (ed.). Encyclopedia of Environmental Health. Vol. 1. Burlington: Elsevier. pp. 302-16. doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-52272-6.00359-7. ISBN 978-0-444-52272-6.

Eckerman I (2013). "Bhopal Gas Catastrophe 1984: Causes and Consequences". Reference Module in Earth Systems and Environmental Sciences. Elsevier. pp. 272-87. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-409548-9.01903-5. ISBN 978-0-12-409548-9.

Gassert TH, Dhara VR (September 2005). "Debate on cyanide poisoning in Bhopal victims" (PDF). Current Science. 89 (6). Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 October 2008.

Hanna B, Morehouse W, Sarangi S (2005). The Bhopal Reader. Remembering Twenty Years of the World's Worst Industrial Disaster. US: The Apex Press. ISBN 1-891843-32-X US, ISBN 81-85569-70-3 India. Reprinting and annotating landmark writing from across the years.

Johnson S, Sahu R, Jadon N, Duca C (2009). Contamination of soil and water inside and outside the Union Carbide India Limited, Bhopal. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment. In: Down to Earth

Kalelkar AS, Little AD (1998). Investigation of Large-magnitude incidents: Bhopal as a Case Study (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 October 2008. London: The Institution of Chemical Engineers Conference on Preventing Major Chemical Accidents

Kovel J (2002). The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World?. London: Zed Books. ISBN 978-1-55266-255-7.

Kulling P, Lorin H (1987). The Toxic Gas Disaster in Bhopal December 2-3, 1984. Stockholm: National Defence Research Institute. [In Swedish]

Kurzman, D. (1987). A Killing Wind: Inside Union Carbide and the Bhopal Catastrophe. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Labunska I, Stephenson A, Brigden K, Stringer R, Santillo D, Johnston PA (1999). The Bhopal Legacy. Toxic contaminants at the former Union Carbide factory site, Bhopal, India: 15 years after the Bhopal accident (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 October 2008. Greenpeace Research Laboratories, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter UK

Lepowski W (19 December 1994). "Ten Years Later: Bhopal". Chemical and Engineering News.

Methyl Isocyanate. Union Carbide F-41443A - 7/76. New York: Union Carbide Corporation. 1976.

Operating Manual Part II. Methyl Isocyanate Unit. Union Carbide India Limited, Agricultural Products Division (1979).

Ranjan N, Sarangi S, Padmanabhan VT, Holleran S, Ramakrishnan R, Varma DR (2003). "Methyl Isocyanate Exposure and Growth Patterns of Adolescents in Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Exposure and Growth Patterns of Adolescents in Bhopal". . 290 (14): 1856-57. doi:10.1001/jama.290.14.1856. PMID 14532313.

Sriramachari S (2004). "The Bhopal gas tragedy: An environmental disaster" (PDF). Current Science. 86: 905-20. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 October 2008.

Stringer R, Labunska I, Brigden K, Santillo D (2003). Chemical Stockpiles at Union Carbide India Limited in Bhopal: An investigation (Technical Note 12/2002) (PDF). Greenpeace Research Laboratories. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 November 2009.

Shrishti (2002). Toxic present - toxic future. A report on Human and Environmental Chemical Contamination around the Bhopal disaster site. Delhi: The Other Media.

Varadarajan S, et al. (1985). Report on Scientific Studies on the Factors Related to Bhopal Toxic Gas Leakage (PDF). New Delhi: Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. Archived (PDF) from the original on 23 December 2014.

Weir D (1987). The Bhopal Syndrome: Pesticides, Environment and Health. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. ISBN 978-0-87156-718-5.

Lapierre D, Moro J (2009). Five Past Midnight in Bhopal: The Epic Story of the World's Deadliest Industrial Disaster. Hachette Digital, Inc. ISBN 978-0446561242.

"Review 'Bhopal: A Prayer for Rain' an effective cautionary tale". Archived from the original on 24 December 2014.

See also http://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-st-indore/20160721/281603829819042 Archived 15 September 2016 at the Wayback Machine

Union Carbide Corporation

Methyl Isocyanate. Union Carbide F-41443A - 7/76. Union Carbide Corporation, New York (1976)

Carbon monoxide, Phosgene and Methyl isocyanate. Unit Safety Procedures Manual. Union Carbide India Limited, Agricultural Products Division: Bhopal (1978)

Operating Manual Part II. Methyl Isocyanate Unit. Union Carbide India Limited, Agricultural Products Division (1979).

Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Incident. Investigation Team Report. Union Carbide Corporation, Danbury, CT (1985).

Presence of Toxic Ingredients in Soil/Water Samples Inside Plant Premises. Union Carbide Corporation, US (1989).

External links

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The Bhopal disaster or Bhopal gas tragedy was a chemical accident on the night of 2-3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. Considered the world's worst industrial disaster, over 500,000 people in the small towns around the plant were exposed to the highly toxic gas methyl isocyanate ( MIC).

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LONDON, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Worsening droughts, storms and torrential rain in some of the world's largest economies could cause $5.6 trillion in losses to the global economy by 2050, according to a report released on Monday.

This year heavy rains have triggered floods that inundated cities in China and South Korea and disrupted water and electricity supply in India, while drought has put farmers' harvests at risk across Europe. read more

Such disasters are costing economies hundreds of billions of dollars. Last year's extreme droughts, floods and storms led to global losses of more than $224 billion, according to the Emergency Events Database maintained by the Brussels-based Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.

But as climate change fuels more intense rainfall, flooding and drought in coming decades, these costs are set to soar, warns the report by engineering and environmental consultancy firm GHD. read more

Water - when there's too much or too little - can "be the most destructive force that a community can experience," said Don Holland, who leads GHD's Canadian water market programme.

GHD assessed the water risks in seven countries representing varied economic and climatic conditions: the United States, China, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates and Australia. Using global insurance data and scientific studies on how extreme events can affect different sectors, the team estimated the amount of losses countries face in terms of immediate costs as well as to the overall economy.

In the United States, the world's biggest economy, losses could total $3.7 trillion by 2050, with U.S. gross domestic product shrinking by about 0.5% each year up until then. China, the world's No. 2 economy, faces cumulative losses of around $1.1 trillion by mid-century.

Of the five business sectors most vital to the global economy, manufacturing and distribution would be hit hardest by disasters costing $4.2 trillion as water scarcity disrupts production while storms and floods destroy infrastructure and inventory. read more

The agricultural sector, vulnerable to both drought and extreme rainfall, could see $332 billion in losses by 2050. Other sectors facing major challenges are retail, banking and energy.

At this year's World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, a global group of experts launched a new commission to research the economics of water that aims to advise policymakers on water management. read more

We must "transform how we govern water and the climate together," said commission co-chair Tharman Shanmugaratnam. "The costs of doing so are not trivial, but they are dwarfed by the costs of letting extreme weather wreak havoc."

Reporting by Gloria Dickie; Editing by Katy Daigle and Susan Fenton

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Gloria Dickie

Thomson Reuters

Gloria Dickie reports on climate and environmental issues for Reuters. She is based in London. Her interests include biodiversity loss, Arctic science, the cryosphere, international climate diplomacy, climate change and public health, and human-wildlife conflict. She previously worked as a freelance environmental journalist for 7 years, writing for publications such as the New York Times, the Guardian, Scientific American, and Wired magazine. Dickie was a 2022 finalist for the Livingston Awards for Young Journalists in the international reporting category for her climate reporting from Svalbard. She is also the author of Eight Bears: Mythic Past and Imperiled Future (W.W. Norton, 2023).

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Floods, other water-related disasters could cost global economy $5.6 trillion by 2050 -report

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LONDON, Aug 29 (Reuters) - Worsening droughts, storms and torrential rain in some of the world's largest economies could cause $5.6 trillion in losses to the global economy by 2050, according to a report released on Monday.

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YourCentralValley.com | KSEE24 and CBS47

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A big rig full of fish overturned in Fresno Sunday afternoon, closing busy lanes of the highway.

The rollover at Highway 99 and 180 was caused by the driver taking a turn too quickly, according to California Highway Patrol Sgt. Edward Jacobs.

The truck, carrying thousands of pounds of seafood, rolled over just after 2 p.m.

Highway 99 southbound is closed as the scene is cleaned up, and a detour is set up from 99 northbound from Highway 180.

The driver has minor injuries, Jacobs reports.

There are no injuries reported in the collision.

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Big rig carrying thousands of pounds of seafood rolls over on Highway 99

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A big rig full of fish overturned in Fresno Sunday afternoon, closing busy lanes of the highway.

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Closed quarters, vehicles faster than the speed of sound, zero gravity, and extremely volatile rockets. Do any of these things sound particularly prone to accidents? Space travel is tricky work that takes careful calculations and even more careful actions when situations get tough. Here is a list of seven accidents and disasters that have occurred during space expeditions.

STS-51-L: Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster

The space shuttle Challenger disaster that occurred on January 28, 1986, marked one of the most devastating days in the history of space exploration. Just over a minute after the space shuttle lifted off, a malfunction in the spacecraft's O-rings-rubber seals that separated its rocket boosters-caused a fire to start that destabilized the boosters and spread up the rocket itself. The shuttle was moving faster than the speed of sound and quickly began to break apart. The disaster led to the deaths of all astronauts on board, including civilian Christa McAuliffe, a participant in NASA's Teacher in Space project who was to teach classes and perform experiments while in space. The extended mission of the shuttle included deployment of satellites and the test of tools for studying astronomy and Halley's Comet. The shuttle's launch was not widely televised, but the explosion and breakup of the shuttle was visible to spectators on the ground. The launch itself, performed in 26 °F (−3 °C) weather, was predicted to encounter issues by members of the engineering team who knew of the dangers posed to O-rings by such low temperatures. Despite vocalizing these concerns, the mission continued as planned because NASA was against delaying the shuttle's launch any more, as it had already been delayed multiple times. The disaster resulted in the temporary suspension of the space shuttle program and the creation of the Rogers Commission to determine the cause and fault of the disaster.

Soyuz 1: Parachute Failure

Vladimir Komarov was one of Soviet Russia's first group of cosmonauts selected to attempt space travel. He was also the first person to enter outer space twice, though his second time would sadly be his last. During the expedition of Soyuz 1, the Soviets' first space vehicle intended to eventually reach the Moon, Komarov encountered issues with the design of his spacecraft that led to his death. The mission plan for Soyuz 1 was a difficult one: the spacecraft was to orbit Earth and then have a rendezvous with Soyuz 2. The two vehicles would have precisely matched their orbital velocities to test the first step in docking two spacecraft together. After Komarov was in orbit around Earth and it was time for Soyuz 2 to launch and meet him, problems with the spacecraft that had been largely ignored became apparent, and the Soyuz 2 mission was halted. The mission control was able to determine that one of the solar panels on Soyuz 1 had not deployed and was limiting the power to the spacecraft dramatically. Equipment that needed the power from this solar panel was malfunctioning, creating difficulties in controlling the vehicle. It was decided that the mission could not continue, and Komarov began preparing for his return to Earth. After some trouble breaching the atmosphere, the parachutes on Soyuz 1 were deployed but did not unfold correctly, making the spacecraft impossible to slow down. Soyuz 1 crashed into Earth on April 24, 1967, killing cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Komarov was the first fatality in spaceflight and, since his death, has been honored with memorials and monuments near the site of the crash and in Russia for his bravery and skill.

STS-107: Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster

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7 Accidents and Disasters in Spaceflight History

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It doesn't take rocket science to understand why space travel can be a little tricky.

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In a cruel repeat of history, Tobago is facing another oil spill-related environmental disaster 44 years after the fifth-largest oil spill on record occurred 18 kilometers east of the island. This latest spill, however, is still shrouded in mystery nearly five days after a thick, black oil-like substance began to wash up on Tobago's shores. There have been no reports of injuries or fatalities as a result of the overturned ship or subsequent spill at this time.

What we know about the ship

At 7:20 AM Wednesday, February 7th, 2024, the Tobago Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) received a report of a capsized ship approximately 150 to 200 meters south of Cove, Tobago, with a thick, oil-like substance washing up on nearby coastlines and spreading across Tobago's windward coastal waters. The North Post Radio did not receive distress calls from the vessel.

It is still unclear where the ship overturned and whether there were any souls aboard at the time of capsizing. On Wednesday, the Tobago House of Assembly (THA) engaged local certified divers to conduct a rescue/recovery effort to investigate whether any individuals were trapped under the boat and ascertain the vessel's name. By Wednesday night, divers were able to identify the 330-foot (100-meter) vessel as "Gulfstream", and there were no visible signs of human life or remains. Repeat dives to the vessel proved challenging to get the International Maritime Organization (IMO) registration number due to poor visibility and the vessel constantly moving.

In their preliminary assessment, TEMA said, "It has been determined that the vessel may have been carrying lumber and sand," but no lumber has washed up on any shore to date. However, the exact spot where the ship overturned is also still unclear.

Divers returned on Thursday and Friday to inspect the overturned vessel. Lead Diver Alvin Douglas explained that the vessel was lying in 20 to 25 feet of water, the bow (front of the ship) in 25 feet of water at the edge of the reef, and the stern (back of the ship) in approximately 40 feet of water. He added, "It has moved somewhat; it's actually in shallower waters because the prevailing currents and the wind are constantly pushing that vessel towards the shoreline."

In their dive on Friday, the team made some new discoveries. Douglas said, "We also observe that there is a debris trail on the water that suggests that the vessel was turned over even before it made contact with the reef. The superstructure of the vessel was torn off. There were cranes, arms and railings all the way, and there's a lot of destruction in that area."

He also added, "We also found a cable that is connected to the bow of the vessel. That also suggests that the vessel may have been in tow because the anchor is secured where it's at. But there is a huge tow line, approximately a third of the length of the vessel."

The dive team also noted that the vessel was being pushed into the reef and still leaking the oil-like substance.

The leaking oil-like substance

From Wednesday morning, the oil-like substance began washing up at Canoe Bay, extending to the Port of Scarborough. Moderate to strong southwesterly to southeasterly winds on February 7th pushed a 12 to 15-kilometer-length area of oil towards Scarborough and areas further north, which was captured on a very fortunate Sentinel-2 pass. This satellite data gave TEMA needed data, as the T&T Air Guard was unable to provide aerial support at the time.

Dayreon Mitchell, a TEMA GIS Specialist, has been using this data to support the response operations in Tobago. According to the data and observations, oil from this initial surge would have moved onshore in the vicinity of The Esplanade, Scarborough, towards Kilgwyn Bay, near Crown Point and the A.N.R. Robinson International Airport, spanning approximately 15 kilometers.

According to Mitchell, within this area, "We have some eco-sensitive areas along that [coast]line, including Kilgwyn Bay, the Magdalena Petit Trou, and the Lambeau Beach area. There are a lot of reefs along that site.

By Saturday, February 10th, 2024, prevailing winds are now mostly easterly, resulting in the oil-like substance, which continues to freely flow into the ocean, now moving to the west, toward Crown Point.

According to a recent report on Saturday night, lead diver Alvin Douglas told Guardian Media that the specialist divers from the Institute of Marine Affairs have found it impossible to plug the spill. He said the team will now have to re-strategize. "The spill has not been contained. What is happening is, from the professional commercial divers' point of view, the vessel is in a peculiar area. It cannot be entirely contained. The boat keeps bobbing up and down. We did our best to contain as much as we can. With regard to plugging it, that may not be possible."

Officials are still awaiting to acquire the formal details of the vessel to ascertain the type of vessel and maximum capacity of the ship, which will give an estimate of the potential worst-case discharge of the oil-like substance. On Sunday, the THA will be utilizing unmanned submarine vehicles with cameras to investigate the vessel and retrieve the necessary information.

The fallout in Tobago

Tobago's economy is highly dependent on tourism, and its fisheries play a substantial part in the overall food security - both of which are now significantly affected.

From the first day of the spill, the THA strongly advised fisherfolk and beachgoers to avoid the coast between Rockley Bay to Canoe Bay. THA Chief Secretary Farley Augustine said, "Let me warn fisherfolk, those with vessels, those with jet skis, swimmers, whomever, please avoid the area as much as possible. Don't go purposefully sightseeing and sailing into the area. It's not an opportunity to go sightseeing isn't an opportunity to go being more cautious. Please be cautious and avoid the area."

Augustine also warned fisherfolk of plying their trade in the area, going as far as saying, "I wouldn't want to raise the alarm to the extent of saying that people should not buy fish around the island because it's not safe to eat. That's not necessarily the case. Just avoid that area. And I assure you that most of our fisherfolk are responsible members of the industry, they will not go fishing in the midst of the oil spill, they will go distances much further away." Many fisherfolk expressed concern for their livelihoods, but Augustine said until the vessel and its owner can be identified, only then can the conversation occur because there is still the question of liability.

The Junior Parade of the Bands on Sunday, February 11th, 2024, was cancelled as a precaution for health and safety, while some businesses in Scarborough reportedly closed on Thursday.

The Response

In the first few hours of the report of a capsized vessel and leaking of an oil-like substance, the THA engaged private divers to investigate the vessel for its identity, as well as rescue and recovery for any people that may have still been aboard.

The THA had meetings with TEMA and the Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries, which is the custodian of the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan and leads the Incident Command Team in the event of a major spill, and Kaizen Environmental Services, a company that specialises in oil spills. Kaizen allowed the THA to use their equipment to mitigate against further environmental damage, as it was already stored in Scarborough in the event of an oil spill. TEMA also had peat moss in stock, which can be used to encapsulate the oil-like substance for safe disposal.

In the first media conference concerning the spill, the THA Chief Secretary said while the T&T Coast Guard has been involved and is involved in efforts, Augustine alluded to their slow response due to the Coast Guard's limitations in their Tobago operations. He explained that the T&T Coast Guard then was leading the marine response while the Division of Natural Resources and the Environment was leading the onshore response.

The more formal clean-up plan began on Thursday morning, with over 60 people working both on the coast and offshore to contain the oil-like substance. This included Tobago's Public Health, CEPEP, URP, and CCC. The contingent was augmented with CERT volunteers, with a call for volunteers being put out on Saturday night by TEMA.

On Thursday morning, the Tobago Emergency Operations Center was activated at Level 2, indicating that national assistance has been sought and other stakeholders were brought in, including the Environmental Management Authority and the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management. Oil spill response equipment and two vessels were also deployed. The THA indicated that they anticipate the disaster level would be raised to Level 3, meaning international assistance can be requested.

Though a typical nuisance, the mats of sargassum have proven useful, as they were absorbing or encapsulating the oil-like substance on shore and nearshore, leading to easy removal from the marine environment. The removed sargassum has been transported to a sealed containment area in Studley Park, Tobago.

By Friday, Stuart Young, Minister of Energy and Energy Industry, and Rohan Sinanan, Minister of Works and Transport, had visited Tobago. Heritage Petroleum engaged subject matter experts from Health Safety Security and Environment (HSSE), logistics and field operations, with decades of experience in safely and efficiently managing hydrocarbon spills to head to Tobago to support clean-up operations on the island. The ODPM, with assistance from the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF), provided a number of Tyvek suits, hazmat bins, reflective vests, wheelbarrows, shovels, pitchforks, goggles, steel-toe boots, collapsible barrels, and roll polythene to the TEMA.

Booms were deployed Friday night into Saturday to cordon off the Port of Scarborough to ensure the harbour and docking area remain free from the oil-like substance with additional booms deployed near the Gulfstream vessel to control the movement of pollution.

Farley Augustine said the costs have come in at nearly one million TTD so far, but he still has to review each cost, and many invoices have yet to be submitted.

On Sunday, T&T's Prime Minister, Dr Keith Rowley, is set to tour the disaster areas in Tobago impacted by the oil spill. Dr Rowley will also host a media conference at 12:30 p.m. at the Office of the Prime Minister - Central Administrative Services Tobago (CAST), Orange Hill Road, Scarborough.

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Tobago is facing an environmental disaster following the capsizing of a mystery vessel that continues to pour an oil-like substance into Tobago's waters, affecting multiple shores.

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Cristian Mercado)

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Cristian Mercado)

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When did the Deepwater Horizon oil spill happen?

Who owned the rig responsible for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill?

What caused the Deepwater Horizon oil spill?

How did the Deepwater Horizon oil spill affect birds?

Deepwater Horizon oil spill, largest marine oil spill in history, caused by an April 20, 2010, explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig-located in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 41 miles (66 km) off the coast of Louisiana-and its subsequent sinking on April 22.

The explosion

The Deepwater Horizon rig, owned and operated by offshore-oil-drilling company Transocean and leased by oil company BP, was situated in the Macondo oil prospect in the Mississippi Canyon, a valley in the continental shelf. The oil well over which it was positioned was located on the seabed 4,993 feet (1,522 metres) below the surface and extended approximately 18,000 feet (5,486 metres) into the rock. On the night of April 20 a surge of natural gas blasted through a concrete core recently installed by contractor Halliburton in order to seal the well for later use. It later emerged through documents released by Wikileaks that a similar incident had occurred on a BP-owned rig in the Caspian Sea in September 2008. Both cores were likely too weak to withstand the pressure because they were composed of a concrete mixture that used nitrogen gas to accelerate curing.

Once released by the fracture of the core, the natural gas traveled up the Deepwater rig's riser to the platform, where it ignited, killing 11 workers and injuring 17. The rig capsized and sank on the morning of April 22, rupturing the riser, through which drilling mud had been injected in order to counteract the upward pressure of oil and natural gas. Without any opposing force, oil began to discharge into the gulf. The volume of oil escaping the damaged well-originally estimated by BP to be about 1,000 barrels per day-was thought by U.S. government officials to have peaked at more than 60,000 barrels per day.

Leaking oil

Although BP attempted to activate the rig's blowout preventer (BOP), a fail-safe mechanism designed to close the channel through which oil was drawn, the device malfunctioned. Forensic analysis of the BOP completed the following year determined that a set of massive blades known as blind shear rams-designed to slice through the pipe carrying oil-had malfunctioned because the pipe had bent under the pressure of the rising gas and oil. (A 2014 report by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board claimed that the blind shear rams had activated sooner than previously thought and may have actually punctured the pipe.)

Disasters of Historic Proportion

Efforts in May to place a containment dome over the largest leak in the broken riser were thwarted by the buoyant action of gas hydrates-gas molecules in an ice matrix-formed by the reaction of natural gas and cold water. When an attempt to employ a "top kill," whereby drilling mud was pumped into the well to stanch the flow of oil, also failed, BP in early June turned to an apparatus called the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) cap. With the damaged riser shorn from the LMRP-the top segment of the BOP-the cap was lowered into place. Though fitted loosely over the BOP and allowing some oil to escape, the cap enabled BP to siphon approximately 15,000 barrels of oil per day to a tanker. The addition of an ancillary collection system comprising several devices, also tapped into the BOP, increased the collection rate to approximately 25,000 barrels of oil a day.

In early July the LMRP cap was removed for several days so that a more permanent seal could be installed; this capping stack was in place by July 12. Though the leak had slowed, it was estimated by a government-commissioned panel of scientists that 4,900,000 barrels of oil had already leaked into the gulf. Only about 800,000 barrels had been captured. On August 3 BP conducted a "static kill," a procedure in which drilling mud was pumped into the well through the BOP. Though similar to the failed top kill, mud could be injected at much lower pressures during the static kill because of the stabilizing influence of the capping stack. The defective BOP and the capping stack were removed in early September and replaced by a functioning BOP.

The success of these procedures cleared the way for a "bottom kill," considered to be the most likely means of permanently sealing the leak. This entailed pumping cement through a channel-known as a relief well-that paralleled and eventually intersected the original well. Construction of two such wells had begun in May. On September 17 the bottom kill maneuver was successfully executed through the first relief well. The second had been intended to serve as a backup and was not completed. Two days later, following a series of pressure tests, it was announced that the well was completely sealed.

Claims by several research groups that subsurface plumes of dispersed hydrocarbons had been detected in May were initially dismissed by BP and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). However, it was verified in June that the plumes were in fact from the Deepwater spill. The effect of the microscopic oil droplets on the ecosystem was unknown, though their presence, along with that of a layer of oil several inches thick discovered on portions of the seafloor in September, cast doubt on earlier predictions about the speed with which the discharged oil would dissipate. Bacteria that had adapted to consuming naturally occurring gas and oil seeping from the seabed were thought to have consumed a portion of it.

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Deepwater Horizon oil spill | Summary, Effects, Cause, Clean Up, & Facts

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Deepwater Horizon oil spill, largest marine oil spill in history, caused by an April 20, 2010, explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig-located in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 41 miles (66 km) off the coast of Louisiana-and its subsequent sinking on April 22.

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Yungas Road Bus Disaster (Jovani Pulido)

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Yungas Road Bus Disaster (Jovani Pulido)

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https://paloverdevalleybus.com/biggest-bus-accident-in-history/

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As discussed below, this bus accident occurred in 1983 in Bolivia, leaving over 100 people dead. In recent years, many bus accident lawsuits have been filed over injuries and deaths caused by negligence. As the editor of Palo Verde Valley Bus, my primary goal is to educate bus passengers and researchers on issues like safe transport, maintenance, and driver's education. In this article, I will delve into the largest and most tragic bus accident s worldwide, including those in the United States. Disasters often inflict immense devastation upon individuals and communities as they grapple with the loss of multiple lives.

Whether it's a plane plummeting from the sky, a train succumbing to disaster, or cadets being run over on the way to their barracks, these events are deeply felt by friends, family, and society. This article aims to comprehend these incidents and implement preventive measures to avert their recurrence, often due to negligence, as we explore the most catastrophic bus crash and analyze its far-reaching consequences on society as a whole. There aren't just one, two, three, four, or five deadliest bus crashes. There are far more. This is why we need to educate ourselves to make sure similar scenarios are avoided. At the outset, Kentucky seems to be a bus accident country, with two of the deadliest bus crashes in North American history occurring there.

Deadliest Bus Crash In World?

Yungas Road, Bolivia Bus Driver - 100 + Dead (1983)

This remains history's deadliest road accident involving a bus. It also remains among the most notable bus accidents on July 24, 1983, on the Yungas Road in Bolivia, known as the "Death Road." A driver of a crowded bus lost control, causing the bus to plunge off a steep cliff, leading to a significant loss of life. This devastating bus accident claimed the lives of over one hundred passengers, making it one of the worst road accidents not just in Bolivia but the world. The treacherous nature of Yungas Road has been responsible for numerous accidents, solidifying its reputation as one of the most dangerous roads globally.

Kintampo, Ghana Africanway Bus Crash - 100 Dead (2016)

On the night of February 17, 2016, a passenger bus carrying more than 80 people was traveling along its regular 242-mile route from Kumasi to Tamale in Ghana, West Africa. Tragically, an accident occurred as the bus encountered a critical issue with its brakes. The bus collided head-on with a cargo truck that was transporting tomatoes near the town of Kintampo. The bus went up in flames, and some people who suffered injuries were able to escape after it slammed head-on with the truck. But 45 passengers were not so lucky and died.
According to CNN:

"The collision was so intense, you could see the truck almost inside the bus. They were meshed together."

Yorkshire Dales, UK Bus Crash- 33 Dead (1975)

On May 27, 1975, disaster struck on road B6265 when a bus carrying 45 predominantly elderly women on a day excursion from Thornaby-on-Tees to the Yorkshire Dales encountered brake failure. The bus was navigating a steep downgrade, and due to an incorrect shift by substitute bus driver Roger Marriott, the brakes encountered a catastrophic failure. As the bus approached a sharp turn, it crashed through the parapet of Dibbles Bridge. It plummeted 17 feet, ultimately landing upside down in a garden, crushing the elderly, submerged passengers aboard. The devastating accident claimed the lives of 33 individuals, including Marriott. Remarkably, despite being trapped in the wreckage, Marriott was able to communicate the sequence of events leading up to the crash before succumbing to his injuries.

Hida River, Japan Bus Crash- 102 Dead (1968)

On August 18, 1968, an unfortunate bus accident occurred en route to the religious site of Uchangidurga. Tragically, two buses were struck by a landslide and dragged into the river. The bus was carrying approximately 100 pilgrims when the accident occurred after heavy rainfall resulting from a typhoon that caused the Hida River in Gifu, Japan, to flood. The incident's aftermath led to the recovery of over 20 bodies downstream from the accident site. The total death toll from this incident reached 102. The sources cited in the provided information are the National Safety Council, National Transportation Safety Board, and Reuters.

Deadliest Double Decker Bus Accident /Collision in World?

Shoreham Airshow in West Sussex, England - 11 Dead (2015)

On August 22, 2015, during the Shoreham Airshow in West Sussex, England, a Hawker Hunter jet aircraft crashed onto the A27 highway while attempting a loop maneuver. Tragically, the aircraft struck a vintage 1960s double-decker bus carrying a group of spectators.

The impact caused a massive explosion and fire, destroying the bus. The crash claimed the lives of all 11 occupants on board the bus, including the driver, and injured several others nearby. However, the jet pilot, Andy Hill, survived the crash but sustained severe injuries. The incident also caused significant disruption to the airshow and the surrounding area.

The Shoreham Airshow crash was a tragic event that led to investigations into aviation safety and resulted in changes to airshow regulations. It remains one of the most severe incidents involving a double-decker bus before September 21, 2021.

Most Deadly Bus Crashes In the USA?

Hurricane Rita Nursing Home Bus Crash - 23 Dead (2005)

On September 23, 2005, a devastating incident occurred when a bus carrying nursing home residents attempting to evacuate from Hurricane Rita caught fire and exploded. The tragic event occurred while the bus was stuck in traffic on a highway south of Dallas. Regrettably, 23 elderly patients who were too frail to escape died in the incident. The bus was en route from the Brighton Gardens nursing home in Houston, carrying 38 residents and six employees, to another nursing home located in Dallas. Investigators were called in to examine the circumstances surrounding the fire and explosion.

Mother's Day Bus Crash, New Orleans, Louisiana - 23 Dead (1999)

On Mother's Day, May 10, 1999, forty-eight individuals boarded a rented casino charter bus in New Orleans. Unfortunately, 23 people were killed, and 20 were seriously injured before it ended.

"We have people on top of each other, crushed between twisted metal," Officer Joe Narcisse of the New Orleans Police told The Associated Press. ( NY Times.)

The driver was under the influence of marijuana, which posed a significant safety risk similar to dulled senses from drunk driving. A subsequent police investigation uncovered that the driver had been involved in a collision, prompting the bus driver to turn frantically and veer across three lanes, narrowly avoiding three other vehicles in a potential head-on collision. Eventually, the bus crashed into a guardrail and flew off the highway, resulting in the infamous "Mother's Day Crash." Family members still maintain a memorial at the accident site.

Carrolton, Kentucky Bus Crash - 27 People Dead (1988)

Tragically, the victims lost their lives in their cars following a day spent on a church bus in Carrollton due to an intoxicated driver operating their bus. This devastating incident became the fourth deadliest bus accident and the worst drunken-driving crash ever recorded. Recollections from other survivors of the assault describe the harrowing moments, with some expressing a sense of familiarity with such incidents. One survivor vividly recalls seeing flashes of light before being abruptly struck by the wall behind them. Despite the shock and disbelief, everyone involved remained conscious and relatively unharmed, with no severe injuries reported due to the collision.

Yubu High School Bus Crash, Martinez, CA - 29 People Dead (1976)

The crash stands among the most tragic disasters in history. On April 21, 1976, a charter bus carrying 28 students from Yuba City High School to Miramonte High in Orinda was involved in the incident. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), multiple factors contributed to the accident, including the failure of a compressor drive belt responsible for supplying air to the bus brakes and the driver's lack of experience.

The negligent driver mistakenly interpreted the brake warning light as the oil pressure light became confused and poorly attempted to regain control of the bus. The 1950 Crowne vehicle then burst through a guardrail on an elevated ramp, plummeting approximately 30 feet to the ground, landing on its roof, and crushing the people inside. The accident resulted in the devastating loss of 29 lives, including one adult. The impact of the Yuba City Bus Disaster remains deeply felt.

Chualar, California School Bus Crash - 32 Dead (1963)

The Chualar train-bus collision of 1963 was one of the deadliest bus accidents in the United States before September 2021. The vehicle was a makeshift bus (a flatbed truck with a canopy) constructed for the farm workers who harvested crops at the local farms. On September 17, 1963, a school bus transporting 58 students and workers was tragically struck by a freight train at a railroad crossing in Chualar, California. This devastating collision claimed the lives of 32 students and the bus driver, leaving a profound impact on the community and making it one of the most tragic bus accidents in the history of the United States. The incident serves as a sad reminder of the importance of safety measures and caution at railway crossings.

Prestonsburg, Kentucky School Bus Crash - 27 Dead (1958)

The Prestonsburg bus crash near Prestonsburg, Kentucky, on February 28, 1958, remains among the most disastrous bus accidents in the history of the United States. On a cold and cloudy morning, a school bus carrying 48 elementary and high school students on the way back from an outing at Kings Island amusement park collided with a wrecker truck, sending it plunging down an embankment and into the flooded waters of the Levisa Fork of the Big Sandy River. The tragic bus accident resulted in a devastating fire that claimed the lives of 27 passengers (26 children and the bus driver lost their lives in the accident, while 22 children managed to escape and survive.)

The intense heat caused temperatures to rise rapidly, reaching 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit within 90 seconds. Many victims had been returning from a day at King's Island amusement park and were caught off guard while sleeping.

Other Driver Survived

The collision occurred when a pickup truck driver, driving under the influence of alcohol after consuming multiple beers and vodka earlier that night, traveled in the wrong direction. Shockingly, the driver of the pickup truck survived the crash. Kentucky State Police conducted an investigation and determined that none of the passengers sustained serious injuries from the initial collision, highlighting the devastating impact of the subsequent fire burn injuries.

The search and recovery operation, which lasted for 69 days, involved the activation of over 500 Kentucky National Guardsmen and other authorities. This heartbreaking incident remains a solemn reminder of the need for safety precautions and swift response to such tragedies. Following the accident in Kentucky, Governor Wallace Wilkinson promptly took action by mandating the inspection of buses throughout the state, including those used by church groups, and he implemented measures including the installation of multiple emergency exits on buses. He also spearheaded the adoption of flame-retardant seats and floor coverings. These reforms aimed to improve passenger evacuation capabilities and reduce the risk of fire-related injuries in the event of future accidents to make school buses safer.

Kentucky Guardsmen Shattered For Life

The Prestonsburg Bus Tragedy remains etched in the memory of the Kentucky Guardsmen who were involved as a rescue squad. They considered it the most unhappy state duty they had ever performed. The accident garnered nationwide sympathy for the grieving parents and admiration for the resilient spirit of the people of Prestonsburg.

Is it a Tie for Deadliest U.S. Bus Crash?

Remarkably, the death toll of 27 in this tragedy is tied with the Carrollton, Kentucky, bus disaster in 1988 for the highest number of fatalities in a bus accident. In both cases, the victims initially survived the collisions but could not evacuate the school buses safely. Following the 1988 accident, Kentucky implemented changes to its public school bus equipment requirements, including a higher number of emergency exits, making it one of the states with the most stringent safety regulations in the country. These measures were implemented to prevent similar incidents and ensure the safety of school bus passengers.

Tips to stay safe riding a bus
Here are some tips to help you stay safe while riding a bus:

1. Be aware of your surroundings: Stay vigilant and observe your surroundings while on the bus. Pay attention to other passengers and any suspicious activity.

2. Follow the rules and regulations: Observe and follow the rules set by the bus company or transit authority. This includes wearing seatbelts if available and adhering to any posted safety instructions.

3. Secure your belongings: Keep them close to you and ensure they are securely stored. Avoid displaying valuable items that may attract attention.

4. Hold on to handrails or seatbacks: When the bus is in motion or making turns, hold on to the handrails or seatbacks to maintain your balance and prevent falling or injuries.

5. Stay seated while the bus is in motion: It is important to remain seated while the bus moves. Standing or moving around can increase the risk of accidents or falls.

6. Use designated bus stops: Board and exit the bus at designated stops only. Avoid attempting to get on or off the bus in unsafe locations or areas with heavy traffic.

7. Communicate with the driver: If you notice any concerns or feel unsafe during the journey, politely inform the bus driver. They are there to ensure your safety and can address any issues that may arise.

8. Be mindful of traffic when exiting: When exiting the bus, wait for the bus to come to a complete stop and carefully check for oncoming traffic before crossing the road.

9. Report suspicious activity: If you observe any suspicious behavior or feel threatened, immediately report it to the bus driver or appropriate authorities.

10. Stay informed and plan your journey: Familiarize yourself with the bus route, timetable, and any potential changes or disruptions. Planning can help ensure a smoother and safer journey.

Personal safety is a priority when riding a bus as tourists, students, and local passengers head downtown. Following these tips and remaining alert can help create a safer environment for yourself and fellow passengers in your caravan or local transport.

Conclusion

These large, Herculean vehicles can quickly become rolling coffins. So I hope you got educated about the deadliest bus crashes involving children, teenagers, and adults across all social spheres and cultures. As you can see, distracted driving, lack of training, and mechanical problems are among the biggest causes of most bus accidents. People walking across the street, passengers aboard, and other vehicles can be pulled into an early grave along the interstate. However, acts of god and nature can strike any time, demonstrating the importance of hiring the right bus company and bus driver. A bad part can cause a bus to burst into flames, making it the fault of a repairer or manufacturer. Good luck affording a lawyer to go after these large corporations. The cost to families and society due to a collision of a loaded bus can hurt everyone.

Hospital bills, lost wages, and other problems can bankrupt families and even lead to divorce. If you are a concerned person reading this and want to make a change, we want to hear from you. We are seeking editors and volunteers and moving towards obtaining nonprofit status. If you have a story about a bus that plunged off a cliff or some safety issue that needs to be addressed, please get in touch with us at any of the provided methods. We always scream for good, dedicated help, including pro bono attorneys or even a law student who wants to donate time to updating our Q and A library.

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As discussed below, this bus accident occurred in 1983 in Bolivia, leaving over 100 people dead. In recent years, many bus accident lawsuits have been filed over injuries and deaths caused by negligence. As the editor of Palo Verde Valley Bus, my primary goal is to educate bus passengers and researchers on issues like safe transport, maintenance, and driver's education.

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Samsung Galaxy 7 Catches Fire on Plane (Neil)

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Samsung Galaxy 7 Catches Fire on Plane (Neil)

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WASHINGTON - The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), today announced it is issuing an emergency order to ban all Samsung Galaxy Note7 smartphone devices from air transportation in the United States. Individuals who own or possess a Samsung Galaxy Note7 device may not transport the device on their person, in carry-on baggage, or in checked baggage on flights to, from, or within the United States. This prohibition includes all Samsung Galaxy Note7 devices. The phones also cannot be shipped as air cargo. The ban will be effective on Saturday, October 15, 2016, at noon ET.

"We recognize that banning these phones from airlines will inconvenience some passengers, but the safety of all those aboard an aircraft must take priority," said Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx. "We are taking this additional step because even one fire incident inflight poses a high risk of severe personal injury and puts many lives at risk."

Device owners have experienced documented incidents of dangerous evolution of heat with both recalled and replacement Samsung Galaxy Note7 devices. Samsung and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) acknowledged this imminent safety hazard with the company's September 15, 2016 and October 13, 2016 recalls. Additionally, on October 11, 2016, Samsung suspended the manufacture and sale of the Samsung Galaxy Note7 device.

"The fire hazard with the original Note7 and with the replacement Note7 is simply too great for anyone to risk it and not respond to this official recall," said CPSC Chairman Elliot F. Kaye. "I would like to remind consumers once again to take advantage of the remedies offered, including a full refund. It's the right thing to do and the safest thing to do."

What air travelers should know

If passengers attempt to travel by air with their Samsung Galaxy Note7 devices, they will be denied boarding.

Passengers who attempt to evade the ban by packing their phone in checked luggage are increasing the risk of a catastrophic incident. Anyone violating the ban may be subject to criminal prosecution in addition to fines.

Passengers currently traveling with Samsung Galaxy Note7 phones should contact Samsung or their wireless carrier immediately to obtain information about how to return their phones and arrange for a refund or a replacement phone. Samsung has provided guidance for customers about refund and replacement options, as well as how to contact wireless carriers, at http://www.samsung.com/us/note7recall/. Samsung is also answering customers' questions at 1-844-365-6197.

If an airline representative observes that a passenger is in possession of a Samsung Note7 device prior to boarding an aircraft, the air carrier must deny boarding to the passenger unless and until the passenger divests themselves and their carry-on and checked baggage of the Samsung Galaxy Note7 device. Passengers absolutely should not pack the phones in their checked luggage.

If a flight crew member identifies that a passenger is in possession of a Samsung Galaxy Note7 device while the aircraft is in flight, the crew member must instruct the passenger to power off the device, not use or charge the device while aboard the aircraft, protect the device from accidental activation, including disabling any features that may turn on the device, such as alarm clocks, and keep the device on their person and not in the overhead compartment, seat back pocket, nor in any carry-on baggage, for the duration of the flight.

The Samsung Galaxy Note7 device is considered a forbidden hazardous material under the Federal Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-185), which forbid airline passengers or crew from traveling with lithium cells or batteries or portable electronic devices that are likely to generate a dangerous evolution of heat. PHMSA has issued a special permit to Samsung to facilitate commercial shipment of the recalled devices by ground transportation.

The Emergency Order will be on display in the Federal Register display on Friday, October 14, 2016, and the ban will be effective on Saturday, October 15, 2016, at noon ET.For additional information on the recall, visit the CPSC website at www.cpsc.gov.

For additional information on returning your recalled Galaxy Note7 device to the manufacturer, call 1-800-SAMSUNG or 1-800-726-7864 or visit the website: http://www.samsung.com/us/note7recall/

For additional information about safe travel with lithium batteries and other potentially hazardous materials, visit the DOT Safe Travel Website at http://phmsa.dot.gov/safetravel/batteries.

Additional passenger information from the FAA is available at: http://www.faa.gov/Go/PackSafe. For all other questions about the transportation of hazardous materials, contact PHMA's Hazardous Materials Information Center at 1-800-467-4922 or infocntr@dot.gov.

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DOT Bans All Samsung Galaxy Note7 Phones from Airplanes

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The earthquake

The earthquake hit at 4:53 pm some 15 miles (25 km) southwest of the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. The initial shock registered a magnitude of 7.0 and was soon followed by two aftershocks of magnitudes 5.9 and 5.5. More aftershocks occurred in the following days, including another one of magnitude 5.9 that struck on January 20 at Petit Goâve, a town some 35 miles (55 km) west of Port-au-Prince. Haiti had not been hit by an earthquake of such enormity since the 18th century, the closest in force being a 1984 shock of magnitude 6.9. A magnitude-8.0 earthquake had struck the Dominican Republic in 1946.

Geologists initially blamed the earthquake on the movement of the Caribbean tectonic plate eastward along the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden (EPG) strike-slip fault system. However, when no surface deformation was observed, the rupturing of the main strand of the fault system was ruled out as a cause. The EPG fault system makes up a transform boundary that separates the Gonâve microplate-the fragment of the North American Plate upon which Haiti is situated-from the Caribbean Plate.

The earthquake was generated by contractional deformation along the Léogâne fault, a small hidden thrust fault discovered underneath the city of Léogâne. The Léogâne fault, which cannot be observed at the surface, descends northward at an oblique angle away from the EPG fault system, and many geologists contend that the earthquake resulted from the slippage of rock upward across its plane of fracture.

Occurring at a depth of 8.1 miles (13 km), the temblor was fairly shallow, which increased the degree of shaking at the Earth's surface. The shocks were felt throughout Haiti and the Dominican Republic as well as in parts of nearby Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. The densely populated region around Port-au-Prince, located on the Gulf of Gonâve, was among those most heavily affected. Farther south the city of Jacmel also sustained significant damage, and to the west the city of Léogâne, even closer to the epicentre than Port-au-Prince, was essentially leveled.

A country in ruins

The collapsed buildings defining the landscape of the disaster area came as a consequence of Haiti's lack of building codes. Without adequate reinforcement, the buildings disintegrated under the force of the quake, killing or trapping their occupants. In Port-au-Prince the cathedral and the National Palace were both heavily damaged, as were the United Nations headquarters, national penitentiary, and parliament building. The city, already beset by a strained and inadequate infrastructure and still recovering from the two tropical storms and two hurricanes of August-September 2008, was ill-equipped to deal with such a disaster. Other affected areas of the country-faced with comparable weaknesses-were similarly unprepared.

In the aftermath of the quake, efforts by citizens and international aid organizations to provide medical assistance, food, and water to survivors were hampered by the failure of the electric power system (which already was unreliable), loss of communication lines, and roads blocked with debris. A week after the event, little aid had reached beyond Port-au-Prince; after another week, supplies were being distributed only sporadically to other urban areas. Operations to rescue those trapped under the wreckage-which had freed over 100 people-had mostly ceased two weeks into the crisis, as hope that anyone could have survived for that length of time without food or water began to fade. However, there were still occasional recoveries of people who had managed to survive such confinement for weeks by rationing the meagre supplies available to them.

A people in crisis

It was estimated that some three million people were affected by the quake-nearly one-third of the country's total population. Of these, over one million were left homeless in the immediate aftermath. In the devastated urban areas, the displaced were forced to squat in ersatz cities composed of found materials and donated tents. Looting-restrained in the early days following the quake-became more prevalent in the absence of sufficient supplies and was exacerbated in the capital by the escape of several thousand prisoners from the damaged penitentiary. In the second week of the aftermath, many urbanites began streaming into outlying areas, either of their own volition or as a result of governmental relocation programs engineered to alleviate crowded and unsanitary conditions.

Because many hospitals had been rendered unusable, survivors were forced to wait days for treatment and, with morgues quickly reaching capacity, corpses were stacked in the streets. The onset of decay forced the interment of many bodies in mass graves, and recovery of those buried under the rubble was impeded by a shortage of heavy-lifting equipment, making death tolls difficult to determine. Figures released by Haitian government officials at the end of March placed the death toll at 222,570 people, though there was significant disagreement over the exact figure, and some estimated that nearly a hundred thousand more had perished. In January 2011, Haitian officials announced the revised figure of 316,000 deaths. The draft of a report commissioned by the U.S. government and made public in May 2011 drastically revised the estimate downward to no more than 85,000. Officials from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) later acknowledged inconsistencies in data acquisition. Given the difficulty of observing documentation procedures in the rush to dispose of the dead, it was considered unlikely that a definitive total would ever be established.

Further deaths occurred as serious injuries went untreated in the absence of medical staff and supplies. The orphans created by these mass mortalities-as well as those whose parents had died prior to the quake-were left vulnerable to abuse and human trafficking. Though adoptions of Haitian children by foreign nationals-particularly in the United States-were expedited, the process was slowed by the efforts of Haitian and foreign authorities to ensure that the children did not have living relatives, as orphanages had often temporarily accommodated the children of the destitute.

Because the infrastructure of the country's computer network was largely unaffected, electronic media emerged as a useful mode for connecting those separated by the quake and for coordinating relief efforts. Survivors who were able to access the Internet-and friends and relatives abroad-took to social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook in search of information on those missing in the wake of the catastrophe. Feeds from these sites also assisted aid organizations in constructing maps of the areas affected and in determining where to channel resources. The many Haitians lacking Internet access were able to contribute updates via text messaging on mobile phones.

The general disorder created by the earthquake-combined with the destruction of the country's electoral headquarters and the death of UN officials working in concert with the Haitian electoral council-prompted Haitian Pres. René Préval to defer legislative elections that had been scheduled for the end of February. Préval's term in office was set to end the following year.

As the spring rainy season and summer hurricane season approached with reconstruction efforts having made little progress, residents of tent settlements were encouraged by aid agencies to construct more-substantial dwellings using tarpaulins and, later, donated lumber and sheet metal. Though some provisional housing was erected before the onset of inclement weather, many persons remained in tents and other shelters that provided scant protection from the elements. Compounding the problems in the increasingly disorganized encampments within Port-au-Prince was the return of many people who, months before, had initially retreated to the countryside only to find little opportunity for employment.

Two years later, though roughly half of the rubble littering Port-au-Prince had been cleared and some damaged residences had been made habitable, more than half a million people remained in tents, many of which had deteriorated significantly. That number dropped to about 360,000 by the third anniversary. The decrease was partly due to a Canadian-sponsored program that provided grants to some of the nearly 30,000 residents of the most-conspicuous camp-located near the collapsed presidential palace on the Champs de Mars-which allowed them to find rental housing or repair existing structures. Although that area was cleared by July 2012, countrywide some 500 camps still remained at the end of the year. By 2014 the number of camps had been more than halved, though some 100,000 people remained without permanent housing. While the number of camps continued to diminish, more than 62,000 people were still displaced in early 2016.

Many who left the camps merely relocated to outgrowths of the existing slums surrounding Port-au-Prince. Others crowded into undamaged homes owned by extended family members or friends or returned to damaged structures, more than 200,000 of which were either marked for demolition or required major repairs. Efforts to level the worst such buildings, some of which precariously gripped the rims of ravines, were hampered by irate residents who refused to leave. The capital remained without power for significant stretches during a given day because of stalled work on the electricity grid. In addition, less than one-third of the population was steadily employed. Conditions were further exacerbated by damage to crops and settlements by tropical weather events, notably Superstorm Sandy in October 2012.

In October 2010, cases of cholera began to surface around the Artibonite River. The river-the longest on the island and a major source of drinking water there-had been contaminated with fecal matter carrying a South Asian strain of cholera bacteria. Suspicion that Nepalese UN peacekeeping forces stationed near the river were the likely source of the outbreak was validated by the leak of a report by a French epidemiologist in December. The report cited the absence of cholera in Haiti during the previous decade and the emergence of a parallel outbreak of cholera in Kathmandu, the city from which the troops had departed Nepal. The epidemic reached the tent cities of Port-au-Prince in November 2010, and by 2016 it had sickened some 770,000 people and proved fatal to more than 9,200. A 2016 report by the organization Doctors Without Borders claimed that cases of cholera had likely been significantly underreported.

In November 2011 several organizations filed claims against the United Nations asking that it take responsibility for the outbreak, install new water and waste-management systems, and compensate those who fell ill or lost relatives to cholera. In December 2012 the UN, while not acknowledging that its troops had been vectors of the disease, announced that it would fund a program proposed by the governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic to rid Hispaniola of cholera by instituting new sanitation and vaccination measures. Critics noted, however, that the proposed financial scheme for the project hinged largely on previously promised monies not yet in hand. The UN asserted in February 2013 that it would not receive compensation claims related to the outbreak, citing its convention on privileges and immunities. In October 2013 a U.S.-based group, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, filed a lawsuit in New York City against the UN, seeking compensation on behalf of Haitians affected by the epidemic. The U.S. Department of Justice asserted that the UN was immune from prosecution in 2014. In an October 2015 letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, a group of UN human rights experts excoriated the body for using legal loopholes to avoid taking responsibility for the epidemic and thereby undermining its own credibility. The following year the UN finally admitted to playing a role in starting the epidemic, though it did not say that the organization had caused the outbreak. The announcement came after Ban received a report from a UN adviser who claimed that the epidemic "would not have broken out but for the actions of the United Nations." In addition, the adviser urged the UN to provide compensation to the victims. However, there was no indication that the organization would drop its claim of legal immunity.

The election to choose Préval's successor as president took place in November 2010 after a 10-month delay. Voter turnout was low, and allegations of electoral fraud were widespread. A runoff election was held on March 20, 2011, between the top two candidates: popular musician Michel Martelly and Mirlande Manigat, a legal scholar and the wife of a former president of Haiti. Election observers noted fewer instances of fraud in the runoff, and voter turnout was higher. On April 21 it was announced that Martelly had won the election with some two-thirds of the vote. The political instability created by the quake resulted in the postponement of municipal and senatorial elections scheduled for 2011 and 2012, respectively. Haiti's parliament was dissolved in January 2015, having lost its mandate to govern. Parliamentary elections were held in August 2015, and a second round, alongside a presidential election, was held in October 2015. However, allegations of fraud led to demands for a presidential runoff. Originally slated for December 2015, the runoff was canceled. Following the establishment of the new parliament in January 2016, Martelly agreed to leave office in February, and an interim president was sworn in that month.

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2010 Haiti earthquake | Magnitude, Damage, Map, & Facts

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2010 Haiti earthquake, magnitude 7.0 earthquake that struck some 15 miles (25 km) southwest of the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince on January 12, 2010. Haiti's government estimated that more than 300,000 were killed, but other estimates were considerably smaller. Hundreds of thousands of survivors were displaced.

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Pacific Gas and Electric will pay $45 million in penalties for its role in the Dixie Fire - the second-largest wildfire in California's history - that started after a tree fell and hit the company's equipment in 2021, state regulators said Thursday.

The massive inferno ignited on July 13, 2021, when power lines owned by PG&E came in contact with a tree, according to Cal Fire. The wildfire burned for more than 100 days, charring 963,309 acres across five counties in Northern California before it was contained on October 25, 2021, according to Cal Fire.

The fire destroyed more than 1,300 structures, including much of the small community of Greenville, about 170 miles north of Sacramento.

The settlement with PG&E allocates $40 million in shareholder funding to make hard copy records into an electronic system, which will improve "the timeliness of inspections and preventive maintenance," the California Public Utilities Commission said Thursday in a news release.

The company will also pay $2.5 million in fines to the California General Fund and $2.5 million to tribal communities impacted by the fires, the utilities commission added.

PG&E is "committed to making it right and making it safe for our customers and hometowns" and has resolved claims with the five impacted counties and "numerous individuals and families," the company said in a statement to CNN.

PG&E accepted Cal Fire's conclusion that a tree falling on its powerline caused the fire, but the company believes it "acted as a prudent operator," the company said in a statement Thursday.

"There is no evidence that PG&E consciously and willfully disregarded a known risk with regard to the ignition of the Dixie Fire," the statement said. "We followed the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) requirements when inspecting, maintain and operating our system."

PG&E noted the settlement will not impact costs for customers as it is not requesting rate recovery, adding that the agreement doesn't "preclude PG&E from receiving cost recovery for costs related to the fire, including from the state's Wildfire Fund."

The utility company has been involved in several multi-million dollar settlements related to destructive wildfires in recent years.

In 2021, PG&E was fined $125 million for its role in the 2019 Kincade Fire in Sonoma County as part of a settlement with the California Public Utilities Commission.

And in 2020, PG&E pleaded guilty to 85 counts, including involuntary manslaughter and unlawfully starting the 2018 Camp Fire. The blaze was California's deadliest, killing 85 people and destroying thousands of structures.

Last year, the company agreed to pay $50 million in a settlement connected to the deadly 2020 Zogg Fire and had criminal charges dropped against it.

Other penalties have included $1 million over the 2019 Easy Fire and fines over inspection issues, according to the utilities commission.

PG&E said Thursday that it is focused on reducing wildfire risk and cited its preventive power shutoffs during high fire risk conditions and its program to bury 10,000 miles of its power lines to reduce the risk of starting more blazes.

The-CNN-Wire
™ & © 2024 Cable News Network, Inc., a Warner Bros. Discovery Company. All rights reserved.

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Dixie Fire: PG&E agrees to $45 million settlement related to California's second-largest wildfire

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The massive inferno ignited on July 13, 2021, when power lines owned by PG&E came in contact with a tree, according to Cal Fire.

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United Airlines plane plunged into ocean (Henry ballin Jr)

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United Airlines plane plunged into ocean (Henry ballin Jr)

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Read more at:

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/united-airlines-plane-plunged-into-ocean-in-2022-us-authority-reveals-reason-behind-crash/articleshow/102656798.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

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Agencies

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has said in its report that the United Airlines plane plunged into the ocean in 2022 due to a pilot's error. The Boeing 777 took off from Hawaii's Kahului Airport amid heavy rain and turbulence and nosedived 748 feet. However, the flight with 271 passengers onboard continued its journey to San Francisco.

According to the report, the captain who was flying the plane noticed at the height of 2,100 feet that the flaps were still extended and he started descending and decelerating. The flaps are generally extended for the takeoff and they begin retracting after reaching a height.

The report based on the testimonies of the pilots, also suggests that as the aircraft descended suddenly, the Ground Proximity Warning System or the GPWS got activated and alerted the pilots- pull up, pull up.

United Airlines has said that it has changed the training module for the pilots. It also said that it has cooperated with the probe and will adapt the necessary changes as suggested.

Q1. What did happen to the United Airlines plane in 2022 when it plunged?

A1. After the United Airlines plane took off from Hawaii's Kahului Airport amid heavy rains, the captain who was flying the plane found that the flaps were still extended. So, he descended suddenly and the plane plunged 780 feet.

Q2. What has United Airlines stated?
A2. United Airlines has said that it has changed the training module for the pilots. It also said that it has cooperated with the probe and will adapt the necessary changes as suggested.

Disclaimer Statement: This content is authored by a 3rd party. The views expressed here are that of the respective authors/ entities and do not represent the views of Economic Times (ET). ET does not guarantee, vouch for or endorse any of its contents nor is responsible for them in any manner whatsoever. Please take all steps necessary to ascertain that any information and content provided is correct, updated, and verified. ET hereby disclaims any and all warranties, express or implied, relating to the report and any content therein.

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United Airlines plane plunged into ocean in 2022. US authority reveals reason behind crash

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What happened to United Airlines in 2022 when it plunged suddenly? Know what the NTSB has found in its report.

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Table of Contents

natural disaster, any calamitous occurrence generated by the effects of natural, rather than human-driven, phenomena that produces great loss of human life or destruction of the natural environment, private property, or public infrastructure. A natural disaster may be caused by weather and climate events or by earthquakes, landslides, and other occurrences that originate at Earth's surface or within the planet itself. No spot on Earth is immune from a natural disaster; however, certain types of disasters are often limited to or occur more frequently in specific geographic regions.

Types

Weather- and climate-driven natural disasters include flooding caused by heavy rains associated with hurricanes and typhoons ( tropical cyclones) and other intense storms; drought, famine, and wildfires brought on by heat waves and shifts in precipitation patterns; wind-generated devastation caused by tropical cyclones, tornadoes, derechos, and other windstorms; and damage and loss of life caused by blizzards and heavy snowfalls. Earth-driven natural disasters include large volcanic eruptions (which produce lava flows, explosions, toxic gas clouds, ash falls, and pyroclastic flows that damage populated areas) and strong earthquakes (which result from the sudden fracturing of Earth's crust) powerful enough to damage or destroy built-up areas near their origin points.

Some phenomena that produce natural disasters may be caused by a combination of several different forces. For example, landslides (the movement of large masses of rock, debris, and soil downslope) may be caused by rains that saturate the soil on an unstable slope, or they may be triggered by earthquakes. In a similar manner, the buildup of snow on mountain slopes increases the risks of localized avalanches. Tsunamis, catastrophic ocean waves that can rise as high as 30 metres (about 100 feet) above normal sea level, are produced by submarine earthquakes, underwater or coastal landslides, volcanic eruptions, or meteor or comet impacts. The largest tsunamis are fast-moving waves that can travel across oceans to wreak havoc in coastal areas separated thousands of kilometres from one another.

Frequency and disaster patterns

Certain types of natural disasters are more likely to occur in specific geographic regions, and in some places these events occur with seasonal regularity, as in the spring tornado season in the United States or the summer-and-fall hurricane season in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are most frequent near tectonic plate boundaries, and an especially active boundary exists between the Indo-Australian and Eurasian plates.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO)-a United Nations (UN) agency that monitors Earth's land, water, and atmosphere-reported in 2021 that the number of natural disasters per decade showed a fivefold increase from 1979 to 2019, and data collected in the EM-DAT, an international disaster database maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Brussels, indicate that more than 300 disasters have been tallied each year since 1998. Though many natural disasters are neither preventable nor largely predictable, the WMO report notes that global warming-an increasingly human-driven phenomenon generated by the emission of greenhouse gases, specifically those released by the combustion of fossil fuels-is increasing the frequency of weather- and climate-related natural disasters, such as droughts, heat waves, increasingly intense hurricanes, and flooding due to sea-level rise. Warmer temperatures are causing more extreme weather events by delivering more precipitation to some areas-which may be unused to receiving heavy rains and snows, increasing flooding risk-while delivering less to other areas that rely on it, increasing drought risk. In addition, reliable sources of rainfall, such as the South Asian monsoon, on which agriculture of the Indian subcontinent has long depended, are becoming less predictable, and rain events have become more violent and dangerous, damaging crops and producing more intense flooding. This change has subjected some areas under the monsoon's influence to extended drought conditions, whereas other areas receive too much rainfall, a pattern that scientists predict will worsen in the 21st century.

Damage and deaths

The costs of individual natural disasters frequently reach the tens of billions of dollars. Such costs may be associated with damage to crops, buildings, and infrastructure that occurs annually in areas prone to tropical cyclone activity or heavy seasonal rains, with some events, such as the Pakistan floods of 2022 and Hurricane Katrina (which struck the southern United States in 2005), costing more than $30 billion and $186 billion, respectively. Similarly, costs associated with earthquakes, which occur less regularly, can be high (such as China's Sichuan earthquake of 2008 and Japan's Kōbe earthquake of 1995, which incurred costs estimated at more than $86 billion and more than $100 billion, respectively).

The number of deaths from natural disasters also varies by location and the intensity of the event; however, the overall trend points to a decline from several hundreds of thousands of deaths annually during the first half of the 20th century to roughly 45,000 deaths globally each year. The number of deaths also varies widely from year to year, with smaller natural disasters (or natural disasters occurring in areas far from human settlement) killing few and shockingly large disasters producing truly massive losses of life. Some of the most notable catastrophic disasters in history include the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 (which killed more than 225,000 people), the Tangshan earthquake of 1976 (which resulted in more than 242,000 deaths), the 2010 Haiti earthquake (which by some estimates may have killed at least 300,000 people), and China's Shaanxi province earthquake of 1556 (which killed more than 800,000 people).

Although deaths from natural disasters have decreased overall, people in lower-income countries often suffer disproportionately, because these locations have fewer resources and thus greater vulnerability to the elements and to food insecurity. In contrast, highly developed countries have better infrastructure (for communications, evacuation procedures, the movement of resources, and the delivery of medical services). In addition, high-income countries can implement policies that limit construction in flood-prone areas or mandate the construction of more earthquake-resistant homes, office buildings, and other structures, thereby reducing the risk of crushing injury and death stemming from building collapses. Consequently, relatively few people die from earthquakes in California, a location well-known for its strong building codes with respect to withstanding earthquakes, compared with places such as Iran and Pakistan, where building codes are either less stringent or whose codes frequently go unenforced.

Disaster warning systems

Advances in weather forecasting and advances in land-based seismic sensors and sensors placed aboard satellites, aircraft, and stationary buoys floating in the world's oceans have led to the development of various kinds of early warning systems. In some cases, these systems are capable of predicting or accurately classifying the strength of the physical forces that generate natural disasters before they cause damage. The perhaps most widespread and best known of these systems are those used by national weather bureaus that classify, track, and predict various weather events and issue bulletins about storms and other weather and climate phenomena affecting their land areas and sea zones. National weather bureaus are often made up of a network of numerous local offices spread across a country that gauge local weather conditions several times per day. Data collected by these offices can be used to develop weather models that help to predict the strength of a storm, as well as its location, days in advance of its arrival in a local area.

In addition, specialized units within national governments-such as the China Earthquake Administration, the Japan Meteorological Agency, the United Kingdom's Met Office, India's National Center of Seismology, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. Geological Survey-monitor specific physical forces capable of causing the most damaging and deadly natural disasters (that is, earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts, flooding, and winds driven by tornadoes and tropical cyclones). Many of these organizations within specific countries cooperate with their counterparts in others or assist international organizations, such as the WMO and the International Tsunami Information Center, to issue warnings, develop international safety standards, and assess the risks associated with forces that affect several countries or the planet as a whole. Some early warning systems even look beyond Earth's atmosphere; the near-Earth objects system operated by the European Space Agency and the Scout and Sentry impact hazard systems run by NASA in the United States are a few of several systems designed to detect, track, and predict the risk associated with asteroids, comets, and other extraterrestrial objects capable of striking Earth.

Michele Metych

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Natural disaster | Causes, Types, & Facts

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Natural disaster, any calamitous occurrence generated by the effects of natural, rather than human-driven, phenomena that produces great loss of human life or destruction of the natural environment, private property, or public infrastructure. A natural disaster may be caused by weather and climate

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A total of 18 people have lost their lives either while in space or in preparation for a space mission, in four separate incidents. Given the risks involved in space flight, this number is surprisingly low.

The two worst disasters both involved NASA's space shuttle. On 28 January 1986 the Challenger space shuttle blew up 73 seconds after take-off, owing to a failure on a sealant ring that allowed hot gas from the boosters used to lift the craft in the first two minutes of flight to hit the huge main external tanks containing hydrogen-oxygen fuel. All seven crew members died, including Christa McAuliffe, a teacher from New Hampshire selected on a special NASA programme to bring civilians into space. The Challenger disaster remains perhaps the most notorious in the history of spaceflight, owing to the number of people, many of them schoolchildren, who saw it live on TV.

In 2003 a further seven astronauts died when the shuttle Columbia broke up on re-entry into Earth's atmosphere. A piece of foam insulation had broken away during launch, damaging a wing and sealing the mission's fate almost before it had started. A subsequent report sharply criticised NASA for allowing the incident to happen and failing to intervene during the mission.

The remaining four fatalities during spaceflight were all cosmonauts from the Soviet Union. The first was Vladimir Komarov on 24 April 1967, when the parachute on the landing capsule of his Soyuz 1 mission failed to open. This was the first crewed flight of the Soyuz spacecraft that is still used to send people to the International Space Station. In 1971 all three of the Soyuz 11 mission crew died when their capsule depressurised before re-entry on their way back from humanity's first ever stay on a space station, Salyut 1.

A further 13 astronauts and cosmonauts have died during training and testing for spaceflight. Perhaps the most notorious incident was a fire on the launch pad of the Apollo 1 mission in January 1967. The three victims were Roger Chaffee, Gus Grissom, who had been the second American ever in space, and Ed White, who in 1965 had become the first American to walk in space. The Apollo programme to reach the moon was almost cancelled in the wake of the disaster. As it was, crewed flights were suspended for 20 months. Richard Webb

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A total of 18 people have lost their lives either while in space or in preparation for a space mission, in four separate incidents. Given the risks involved in space flight, this number is surprisingly low. The two worst disasters both involved NASA's space shuttle.

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Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster (Cristian Mercado)

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Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster (Cristian Mercado)

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Columbia disaster, breakup of the U.S. space shuttle orbiter Columbia on February 1, 2003. The disaster claimed the lives of all seven astronauts on board just minutes before it was to land at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.

Columbia, which had made the shuttle program's first flight into space in 1981, lifted off for its 28th mission, STS-107, on January 16, 2003. STS-107 was a flight dedicated to various experiments that required a microgravity environment. The crew comprised commander Rick Husband; pilot William McCool; mission specialists Michael Anderson, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, and Laurel Clark; and payload specialist Ilan Ramon, the first Israeli astronaut. As Columbia was reentering Earth's atmosphere, it broke apart over Texas at approximately 9:00 am Eastern Standard Time at an altitude of 60 km (40 miles), showering debris across southeastern Texas and southern Louisiana. The disintegration of the craft was recorded by television cameras and U.S. Air Force radar. Its major components and the remains of the crew were recovered over the following month.

The destruction of Columbia followed by almost exactly 17 years the loss of Challenger in a launch accident on January 28, 1986. Ironically, the cause of the Columbia catastrophe soon was determined to be launch-related as well. Films showed that a piece of insulating foam broke loose from the external propellant tank and struck the leading edge of the left wing approximately 81 seconds after liftoff. Bits of foam had detached in past missions without serious mishap, and, at the time of the Columbia launch, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) engineers did not think that the foam carried enough momentum to cause significant damage. In fact, as demonstrated in postaccident tests, the foam was capable of punching a large hole in the reinforced carbon-carbon insulation tiles that protected the shuttle's nose and wing leading edges from the extreme heat of atmospheric reentry. Although some engineers had wanted ground-based cameras to take photos of the orbiting shuttle to look for damage, the request did not get to the right officials.

During Columbia 's atmospheric reentry, hot gases penetrated the damaged tile section and melted major structural elements of the wing, which eventually collapsed. Data from the vehicle showed rising temperatures within sections of the left wing as early as 8:52 am, although the crew knew of their situation for perhaps only a minute or so before vehicle breakup. Subsequent investigation by NASA and the independent Columbia Accident Investigation Board uncovered a number of managerial shortcomings, in addition to the immediate technical reason (poor manufacturing control of tank insulation and other defects), that allowed the accident to happen.

The most palpable result of the accident was a grounding of the remaining three shuttles- Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour (the last built to replace Challenger)-until NASA and its contractors could develop means to prevent similar accidents, which included kits for repairs in orbit.

Assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) in Earth orbit was suspended after the Columbia accident until shuttle flights could resume. Limited research on the ISS was conducted by rotating two-person crews launched in Russian Soyuz spacecraft. The shuttle did not return to space until the STS-114 mission, which launched on July 26, 2005.

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Columbia disaster, breakup of a U.S. space shuttle orbiter on February 1, 2003, that killed all seven astronauts on board.

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Japan Airlines Flight 123, JA8119

Gunma Prefecture, Japan

August 12, 1985

Approximately 12 minutes after departing Tokyo bound for Osaka, and just prior to reaching its planned cruising altitude of 24,000 feet, JAL 123 experienced an explosive decompression, caused by a rupture of the airplane's aft pressure bulkhead. The resultant pressure surge into the unpressurized area aft of the pressure bulkhead resulted in extensive damage to the airplane. The airplane's Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), rudder, and a large portion of the vertical stabilizer were lost. Additionally, all four of the airplane's hydraulic lines were severed, resulting in complete hydraulic pressure loss which severely degrading the airplane's controllability. Despite severe pitch (phugoid) and lateral-directional (dutch-roll) oscillations the airplane managed to stay airborne for approximately 30 minutes after the event before crashing in remote mountainous terrain in Gunma Prefecture. Out of the 524 passengers and crew aboard only four survived.

The root cause of the explosive decompression was attributed to an improperly executed repair to the airplane's aft pressure bulkhead that was completed several years prior to the accident. The improper repair led to undetected local fatigue cracking which undermined the bulkhead's strength and resulted in a catastrophic failure of the entire bulkhead.

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On August 12, 1985, Japan Airlines Flight 123 departed Haneda Airport in Tokyo, Japan, bound for Osaka. Approximately 12 minutes after takeoff, at an altitude of 24,000 feet and an airspeed of 300 knots, a bang, vibration, and cabin decompression was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The captain was in the right seat and the copilot was in the left seat for training as captain. This was the fifth flight of the day for this airplane. At 46 seconds after decompression, the captain signaled an emergency on the transponder and requested a return to Tokyo.

The cabin decompression was caused by the rapid rupture of the aft pressure bulkhead (located at the aft end of the passenger cabin), starting in an area of the pressure bulkhead that had been repaired several years earlier following a tail-strike event during landing.

The rush of cabin air into the unpressurized fuselage cavity caused an overpressure in that area, resulting in the failure of the APU firewall and the supporting structure for the vertical fin. The vertical fin separated from the airplane. Hydraulic components located in the aft body were also severed, leading to a rapid depletion of all four hydraulic systems. The loss of the vertical fin, coupled with the loss of all four hydraulic systems, left the airplane extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control in all three axes.

The aircraft descended to 22,000 feet and began phugoidal (longitudinal) and dutch-roll (lateral) oscillatory motions that continued for the rest of the flight. Damage from decompression resulted in the loss of all hydraulic fluid, leaving the flight crew unable to control heading or pitch through normal flight control inputs. Steering and adjustments to pitch attitude were accomplished with thrust changes.

The flight crew maintained 22,000 feet and 250 knots for about 20 minutes. Twenty-nine minutes after takeoff, the main landing gear was extended and the dutch roll increased in severity.

The airplane did a slow left turn while descending through 8,000 feet, while severe roll and pitch oscillations continued. At an altitude of 5,300 feet, the flight crew sighted mountains and increased thrust, climbing back to 10,000 feet.

Forty-one minutes after takeoff, the crew began to extend flaps, resulting in an increase in roll amplitude to approximately 60 degrees. An immediate flap retraction was initiated and thrust was increased. At generally the same time, the airplane assumed a nose-down attitude and began to descend at a rate of approximately 18,000 feet per minute. The crew was able to temporarily recover the airplane to a nose-high attitude at approximately 5,000 feet, but ultimately lost control. Forty-six minutes after takeoff (32 minutes after decompression), the airplane struck mountains at 5,000 feet altitude and 340 knots.

As a result of the accident, 505 passengers and 15 crew members were killed. Four survivors were found near the tail section that had broken away from the main wreckage. Ground fire destroyed the majority of the aircraft.

Much of the airplane's vertical tail and aft section were lost from the airplane following decompression. The separated pieces landed in Sugami Bay, southwest of Tokyo, and some pieces were subsequently recovered. Heavier objects, such as the APU, were not recovered. This photograph was taken by a witness prior to the crash. It shows the missing sections of the airplane.

At the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated a total flight time 25,030 hours and 18,835 landings. The airplane was used for short routes within Japan and was arranged in a high-capacity seating configuration.

Improper Repair

More than seven years prior to the accident, on June 2, 1978, the airplane experienced a severe tail strike incident during landing at Osaka, Japan. Several aft fuselage frames, skin, and the aft pressure bulkhead were substantially damaged, and 25 passengers were injured. At the time of the incident, the airplane had 16,200 hours and 12,300 cycles. The airline contracted to a Boeing Airplane-On-Ground (AOG) team to disposition the aircraft and perform the damage repair.

The prescribed repair that the AOG team accomplished involved replacing and/or repairing a major portion of the aft fuselage, replacement of the tail compartment pressure relief door, and replacement of the lower half of the aft pressure bulkhead. In the post-repair inspection, it was discovered that certain rows of rivets on the newly replaced lower half of the bulkhead had inadequate edge margins. A solution for the inadequate edge margin was engineered and involved installation of a splice plate to join the upper and lower halves of the bulkhead. This rework design called for a single splice plate to be used to provide a continuous load path between the upper and lower halves of the bulkhead. The splice plate was difficult to install, owing to the compound curvature of the splice plate and adjoining structure. The eventual solution, which was a departure from the installation instructions, involved cutting the splice plate into two pieces, and fitting the pieces in place individually. This deviation from the approved repair resulted in a single row of rivets transferring the load to the upper affected web plate instead of the two rows specified in the repair instruction drawing.

This deviation resulted in the bulkhead web being improperly loaded and susceptible to early fatigue. (See Japan Airlines Bulkhead Animation). Furthermore, because of the geometry of the repair and the use of fillet sealant to fill the gap, the splice deviation would visually appear to conform to the approved repair when viewed from either side of the aft pressure bulkhead. The accident board estimated that the strength of the repair decreased to about 70% of the strength that would have resulted from a proper repair.

Failure Mechanism

The fuselage aft bulkhead failed as a result of repeated fatigue cycling and related cracking in the areas adjacent to the improper repair. Over the time period (more than seven years) between the repair and the accident, repeated pressurization cycling of the aft pressure bulkhead allowed fatigue cracks to form and propagate along the row of fasteners that was unintentionally carrying the pressure loads in the repaired area. To initiate the accident, cracking rapidly progressed along the single row of fasteners, through the tear straps, and into the adjacent bays, resulting in a rapid fracture of the aft pressure bulkhead.

The resulting pressure release into the fuselage cavity behind the pressure bulkhead resulted in an overpressure in this area (there was a pressure relief door, but it was sized only to relieve the pressure from the failure of a single bay of the aft pressure bulkhead, not the failure of the entire bulkhead). The overpressure filled the aft body and the lower portion of the vertical stabilizer, which was not designed to withstand a large internal pressure. The internal overpressure caused structural failures in critical fin support structure, causing it to rupture and depart the airplane.

Additionally, the aft portion of the area which was filled by cabin air following the bulkhead failure was contained by the APU firewall. Similar to the structure associated with the vertical fin, the APU firewall failed due to the overpressure. The APU firewall and the vertical fin failed almost simultaneously, approximately .4 seconds after the failure of the aft pressure bulkhead. Tubing for the four hydraulic systems, supplying hydraulic pressure to the flight control components in the vertical and horizontal stabilizer, were routed through the upper portion of the aft fuselage and lower portion of the vertical fin. The simultaneous failure of the APU firewall and vertical fin was suspected to have severed the hydraulic lines to all four systems, leading to the depletion of all four systems.

The loss of inherent stability, coupled with the loss of flight control hydraulics, left the crew with essentially no effective way to control roll, pitch, or yaw of the airplane. The use of engine thrust was used by the crew to initiate limited turning maneuvers and limited altitude changes. As exhibited by the flight path leading to the crash, flight path control was extremely difficult and eventually became impossible as the demands of control in all three axes became too complex to maintain the flight path required for straight and level flight and terrain avoidance.

Hydraulic System

The 747 has four independent hydraulic systems, each pressurized by an engine-driven pump and an air-driven pump, powered by engine bleed air that normally functions as a demand pump. The number-four system also incorporates an electrically driven pump as a standby source for hydraulic power in the event of a failure of all other pumps. The hydraulic system layout was designed so that "get-home" capability is achieved with any single hydraulic source available.

This is a schematic of the 747 hydraulic system, showing the system architecture. The table shows the distribution of various flight controls relative to the four hydraulic systems.

Hydraulic Systems Functional Assignments

The four hydraulic systems are generally separated, isolated from, and independent of each other, such that loss of fluid or a failure in one system will not result in a related failure in the other three systems. Similarly, hydraulic power for the flight control system is distributed among the four systems, so that a failure of a single system will not result in a loss of flight controls.

Due to space limitations in the aft fuselage, hydraulic lines for all four systems are located in close proximity to one another in the aft body, just behind the aft pressure bulkhead. The failure of the aft pressure bulkhead resulted in a large overpressure in the compartment behind the bulkhead, with one of the consequences being the failure of all four hydraulic lines. All four systems were rapidly depleted, leaving the flight crew with no means to move any of the flight control surfaces. The four hydraulic systems were most closely situated in proximity to the horizontal stabilizer jackscrew assembly. The collapse of the local support structure led to the rupture of all four hydraulic systems and to their depletion.

The accident was investigated by the Japan Ministry of Transport's Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission. They issued their aircraft accident investigation report on June 19, 1987. The findings contained in that report are summarized below:

The commission concluded that the accident was caused by deterioration of flying qualities and loss of primary flight control functions resulting from a rupture of the airplane's aft pressure bulkhead and the subsequent rupture of part of the aft fuselage, vertical fin, and all four hydraulic lines. These failures caused a loss of all primary flight control functions. Empennage structure that departed the airplane as a result of the pressure bulkhead failure is shown below (cross hatched area).

These diagrams copied from the accident report show the details of the structural failures during the breakup sequence. The details document the damage to the aft fuselage, the vertical stabilizer, and the aft pressure bulkhead itself.

The aft pressure bulkhead ruptured because fatigue cracks propagating from the spliced section of the bulkhead's web weakened the bulkhead to the extent that it could no longer endure the in-flight cabin pressure.

The initiation and propagation of the fatigue cracks were attributable to improperly conducted repairs of the bulkhead in 1978. The fact that the fatigue cracks were not found in later maintenance inspections contributed to their propagation, leading to the rupture of the bulkhead.

The single (middle) rivet row became the origin of structural fatigue cracking. The cracks connected rivet-to-rivet and propagated through the "crack stop" straps. The modified splice error could not be found through visual inspection since the gap was filled with fillet sealant. The correct and incorrect configurations would appear identical when viewed from either side.

On June 2, 1978, during a landing incident at Osaka, the airplane experienced a tail strike. Several aft fuselage frames, skin, and aft pressure bulkhead were damaged. At the time, the airplane had 16,200 hours and 12,300 cycles. The airplane was repaired by a Boeing AOG team contracted to perform damage repair.

The AOG team replaced/repaired a major portion of the aft fuselage, replaced the lower half of the pressure bulkhead, and replaced the tail compartment pressure relief door.

The accident board estimated that the strength of the repair decreased to about 70% of the strength that would have resulted from a proper repair.

The Boeing 747SR-100 cabin pressure differential is selectable by the flight crew at 8.9 psi for high altitude/long range flights or 6.9 psi for low altitude/short range flights. The JAL structural inspection intervals were predicated on low altitude/short range flights (6.9 psi). However, JAL regularly operated at 8.9 psi. This operational inconsistency resulted in an acceleration of the fatigue related cracking, and it was estimated that the fatigue life of the bulkhead structure was reduced by approximately 6%.

The complete text of the findings from the accident report is contained at the following link: ( Findings)

The complete text of the accident report can be viewed at the following link: ( Accident Report)

Based on their participation in the accident investigation conducted by the Japanese authorities, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made the following safety recommendations to the FAA:

Recommendation A-85-133 - December 5, 1985

Require the manufacturer to modify the design of the Boeing 747 empennage so that in the event that a significant pressure buildup occurs in the normally unpressurized empennage, the structural integrity of the stabilizers and their respective control surfaces will be protected against catastrophic failure, and to incorporate associated modifications on all Boeing 747 airplanes. Airworthiness Directive (AD) 86-08-02 was issued to address this recommendation.

Recommendation A-85-134 - December 5, 1985

Require the manufacturer to modify the design of the Boeing 747 hydraulic systems so that in the event a significant pressure buildup occurs in the normally unpressurized empennage, the integrity of all four hydraulic systems will not be impaired, and to incorporate associated modifications on all Boeing 747 airplanes. AD 87-12-04 was issued to address this recommendation.

Recommendation A-85-135 - December 5, 1985

Reevaluate the design of the Boeing 747 and 767 aft pressure bulkheads by requiring Boeing to analyze and test further the bulkhead to demonstrate the validity of the fail-safe "flapping" failure mode. This recommendation was incorporated into recommendation A-85-138.

Recommendation A-85-136 - December 5, 1985

Evaluate any procedures approved to repair Boeing 747 and Boeing 767 aft pressure bulkheads to assure that the repairs do not affect the "fail-safe" concept of the bulkhead design, which is intended to limit the area of pressure relief in the event of a structural failure.

The Structural Repair Manuals for the Boeing Models 707, 737, 747, and 767 were reviewed. The FAA found they do not contain any instructions that would be in conflict with the "fail-safe" concept.

Recommendation A-85-137 - December 5, 1985

Revise the inspection program for the Boeing 747 rear pressure bulkhead to establish an inspection interval wherein inspections beyond the routine visual inspection would be performed to detect the extent of possible multiple site fatigue cracking.

As a result, Boeing issued Service Bulletin 747-53-2275 requesting a visual inspection from the aft side of the pressure bulkhead at 1,000 flight-cycle intervals (for freighters) or at 2,000 flight cycle intervals for passenger airplanes. They further recommended after 20,000 flight cycles that a detailed inspection by high-precision eddy current, ultrasonic wave, and x-rays be accomplished at 2,000 flight-cycle intervals (freighters) or at 4,000 flight-cycle intervals for passenger airplanes.

Recommendation A-85-138 - December 5, 1985

Determine which transport category airplanes have dome-shaped aft pressure bulkheads and ascertain that the "fail-safe" criteria for the pressure bulkheads of those airplanes have been satisfactorily evaluated.

Fatigue testing and damage tolerance testing were completed on the Boeing 747 in March and July 1986, respectively. A reinforced aft pressure bulkhead was installed from line number 672, delivered in February 1987. The modification added two tear straps, a cover plate to the center of the bulkhead, and doublers to both sides of the bulkhead around the APU cutout.

Recommendation A-85-139 - December 5, 1985

Evaluate any procedures approved to repair the aft pressure bulkhead of any airplanes which incorporate a dome-type of design to assure that the affected repair does not derogate the fail-safe concept of the bulkhead. AD 85-22-12 was issued to address this recommendation.

Recommendation A-85-140 - December 5, 1985

Issue a maintenance alert bulletin to persons responsible for the engineering approval of repairs to emphasize that the approval adequately considers the possibility of influence on ultimate failure modes or other fail-safe design criteria.

The FAA issued Action Notice 8110.7, Approved Data, on November 18, 1986. It provides guidance to airworthiness inspectors on approval of major repairs and major alterations.

The complete text of the recommendations from the accident report is available via the following link: ( Recommendations)

This accident was the result of an improper repair, and as such has no pertinent regulations related to the design or operations of the airplane. 14 CFR part 43, titled "Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration" addresses certain aspects of the repair performed on the airplane that eventually failed, resulting in the accident.

Although this airplane was operated by Japan Airlines, the subject repair was performed by the airplane manufacturer under contract to Japan Airlines.

Additionally relevant, if this repair had been performed on an airplane that was owned and/or operated by a U.S. carrier, the referenced regulation would have been fully applicable.

Following the tail strike event at Osaka, seven years before the accident, JAL contracted with Boeing to perform the structural repair work. Boeing, as the original equipment manufacturer, would be expected to be in the best position to understand the repair complexity, and also most knowledgeable regarding design details of the model 747. It would also be expected that Boeing would be the most qualified organization to perform the highly complex structural repair. The repair involved a complete replacement of the lower half of the pressure bulkhead, numerous frames, stringers, and fuselage skin. During the bulkhead repair, difficulty in installation of a splice plate resulted in the Boeing repair crew dividing the plate and installing it in two pieces - a deviation from the repair instructions that, when complete, with sealant applied on both fore and aft surfaces, had the same appearance as a correctly installed splice plate.

The following key safety issues existed at the time of this accident.

1. Improper repair of the aft pressure bulkhead.

2. Aft pressure bulkhead structural fatigue failure characteristics (i.e., crack propagation through tear stop straps).

3. Lack of independence of four hydraulic systems from a single failure event (zonal hazard).

4. Vulnerability of the tail compartment to catastrophic damage resulting from explosive decompression (inadequate venting).

The following design and safety assumptions proved to be flawed:

The failure mode of the pressure bulkhead would be a single section flapping failure mode. Circumferential straps intended to prevent more than one sector from failing (i.e., crack stoppers) were an integral component of the design. The assumption was that if a crack were initiated and propagated, it could be detected and repaired before propagating beyond a single bay. A bay is defined as one area of the pressure bulkhead surrounded by stiffeners and tear straps. In this case, cracks initiated and propagated simultaneously in more than one bay and were difficult to detect because they were small. The cracks propagated along rivet holes at web overlaps. Therefore, in this case, the tear stop strap did not prevent a crack from progressing into multiple sections. During the airplane design phase, the configuration of tear stop straps installed on a compound curved panel (like the pressure bulkhead) was not adequately tested. Since the accident, tear strap testing has resulted in significant improvements in tear strap design.

The independence of four hydraulic control systems was assumed. No zonal hazard analysis was performed on the torque box location.

The design of the tail compartment pressure relief vent door (the capacity of the door) was predicated on aft pressure bulkhead failure with panel failure assumed to result in flapping of the associated bay. The actual level of pressure venting into the compartment was significantly greater than predicted. Vent door capacity and function are not verified by test.

On October 2, 1971, a British European Airways Vickers 951 Vanguard airplane on a flight from London, England to Salzburg, Austria experienced a structural failure of the rear pressure bulkhead at an altitude of 16,400 feet. The aircraft spiraled down out of control and crashed in a field near Aarsele, Belgium, killing all 55 passengers and eight crew members. ( Accident Summary)

Examination of the airplane revealed corrosion in the lower part of the rear pressure bulkhead underneath plating that was bonded to the structure. The bond was completely delaminated in this area and the bulkhead material literally eaten away. Tears ran upward and outward from the corroded area. The corrosion had probably required a relatively long period of time to develop and gave way on this particular flight to the stress created by pressurization. When the bulkhead ruptured, air from the cabin rushed into the empennage, which was not designed to withstand such internal pressure. Interior damage and severe distortion of the outer skin led to the failure of the tail surfaces causing the airplane to enter a steep dive from which recovery was impossible.

The corrosion was attributed to fluid contamination. It was not detectable through the normal maintenance procedures that consisted of both visual and radiographic inspection.

Subsequent to the accident, similar corrosion was found in eight other aircraft of the same type in Vanguard's fleet. Inspection procedures were revised, and the airplane modified to improve access to the inspected area. The frequency of inspections was increased considerably.

This accident, like the JAL 123 accident, resulted from a ruptured aft pressure bulkhead, which destroyed much of the control surface of the tail section. The rupture was preceded by fatigue cracking that was never found during inspections because it was very difficult to detect.

Prior to this accident 14 CFR 25.365 had been amended at Amendment level 54 as a result of the DC-10 accident in Paris (discussed elsewhere in this library) in order to address the effects of rapid depressurization or bomb explosions. At amendment 71, as a direct result of the JAL 123 accident, 25.365 was further amended to address the affects of rapid depressurization of the pressure vessel into smaller compartments, and the effects on structure whose failure could compromise the capability for continued safe flight and landing. ( 14 CFR 25.365)

Further, as a result of this accident, several parts of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations were modified to require repair assessment programs in order to operate airplanes with pressurized fuselages beyond certain specified life cycle implementation times. Parts 91, 121, 125, and 129 were all modified to require repair assessment programs. The specific regulations are available at the following links:
14 CFR 91.410 - General Operating and Flight Rules
14 CFR 121.370 - Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations
14 CFR 125.248 - Certification and Operations: Airplanes having a Seating Capacity of 20 or More Passengers or a Maximum Payload Capacity of 6,000 Pounds or More; and Rules Governing Persons On Board such Aircraft
14 CFR 129.32 - Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S.-Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage

In Addition, Advisory Circular AC 120-73, DAMAGE TOLERANCE ASSESSMENT OF REPAIRS TO PRESSURIZED FUSELAGES, was released as guidance on incorporating FAA-approved "repair assessment guidelines" in air carrier maintenance or inspection programs subject to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121.

AD 85-22-12 required a one-time visual inspection of the aft side of the aft pressure bulkhead for evidence of repairs or damage. It further required reporting of a complete description of the findings (sketches, photos, or drawings, as necessary) of the inspections.

AD 86-08-02 was issued on April 4, 1986. This AD became effective on May 19, 1986, and was applicable to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. It requires the addition of a structural cover for the opening within the empennage, which provides access to the vertical fin. This is to prevent structural failure of the vertical fin in the event of failure of the aft pressure bulkhead.

On May 26, 1987, the FAA issued AD 87-12-04 to require installation of a hydraulic fuse in the number four hydraulic system on Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. The AD became effective on July 13, 1987.

AD 87-23-10 was effective December 10, 1987, and required inspection for damage and cracking of the aft pressure bulkhead on Boeing Model 747 airplanes. This AD was later superseded by AD 98-20-20 which added repetitive inspections. AD 98-20-20 was, in turn, superseded by AD 2000-15-08, which requires that a one-time inspection to detect cracking of the upper segment of the bulkhead web be accomplished repetitively, and adds additional repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the upper and lower segments of the aft bulkhead web.

Airplane Life Cycle:

Maintenance / Repair / Alteration

Accident Threat Categories:

Structural Failure

Lack of System Isolation / Segregation

Pressurization / Decompression Failures

Groupings:

Accident Common Themes:

Organizational Lapses

Human Error

Flawed Assumptions

Organizational Lapses

This particular airplane was operated by Japan Airlines in a high density seating configuration for use on short routes between Japanese cities. As such, the maximum enroute altitudes were generally low, well below those where maximum cabin differential pressure would be encountered. Based on the lower enroute altitudes and the lower differential pressures, Japan Airlines had adopted certain maintenance and inspection intervals based on the expected routine use of the lower pressure differentials. Operationally, flight crews tended to use higher differential pressures. The use of these higher pressures accelerated the fatigue-related damage to the aft pressure bulkhead and caused this fatigue damage to progress at a rate higher than the inspection and maintenance program anticipated. Use of the proper pressurization schedule would not have prevented the accident; however, the bulkhead failure would likely have occurred later in the airplane's life.

Human Error

Following the original repair, it was determined that certain fasteners had been installed with insufficient edge margins and required reinstallation. This reinstallation involved the incorporation of a splice plate that was difficult to fit into place. The installers cut the splice plate so that it would then fit properly, but when installed in this manner, the result was that only a single row of fasteners was bearing the entire load transmitted through that section of the pressure bulkhead. This error in installation led to the eventual failure of the fastener row and to the failure of the pressure bulkhead.

Flawed Assumptions

A basic design assumption regarding the aft pressure bulkhead was that only a single "bay" would fail at one time, resulting in a flapping of the failed section, which would be easily discovered. Tear straps, as part of the design, would prevent migration of a crack beyond the limits of a single bay. As it resulted, the eventual failure of the repaired section of the bulkhead rapidly migrated through several tear straps, and effectively separated the upper and lower halves of the bulkhead. The pressure relief features in the aft fuselage were overwhelmed, having only been designed to accommodate the pressure surge from the failure of a single bay. This cascade of failures resulted in the accident.

Unintended Effects

The design of the bulkhead repair was intended to distribute the bulkhead pressure loads among three fastener rows. The modification to the designed repair, in order to facilitate installation, inadvertently resulted in the entire load being borne by a single fastener row. This unplanned load distribution had the unintended effect of reducing the fatigue life of a primary structural element of the airplane.

China Airlines Flight CI611, B-18255, May 25, 2002

China Airlines Flight CI611, a Boeing Model 747-200 series airplane, experienced an in-flight breakup over the Taiwan Strait. The most probable cause of the accident was the structural failure of a 22-year-old tail-strike repair located on the aft lower lobe of the fuselage. The skin scratches associated with the tail-strike had not been removed prior to installation of the permanent repair doubler. Over time and airplane cycling, multi-site cracking progressed from the scratches, ultimately leading to a catastrophic failure of the airframe.

See accident module

Aloha Airlines Flight 243, Boeing 737, April 28, 1988

As the airplane leveled at flight level 240 on an inter-island flight from Hilo to Honolulu, an 18-foot-long section of the upper fuselage, a little aft of the forward passenger entrance door, suddenly departed the airplane. This accident was the result of the fatigue failure of a three-row riveted lap splice joint and widespread fatigue damage that had occurred in the joint.

See accident module

Technical Related Lessons:
Fatigue properties of complex structural elements should be well understood so that in-service maintenance programs are properly designed. (Threat Category: Structural Failure)

Fatigue characteristics of the 747 aft pressure bulkhead assumed that a crack in any area of the bulkhead would be stopped/turned by the presence of tear straps and result in pressure venting in only one "bay" of the bulkhead. Post-accident testing revealed that tear straps were ineffective at stopping and turning cracks, in that cracks could propagate completely through the bulkhead, resulting in a catastrophic decompression event.
System redundancy and isolation should include assessment of both physical and zonal hazards. (Threat Category: Lack of System Isolation/Segregation)

The four hydraulic systems on the 747 were physically isolated from one another and operated completely independently. As a design necessity, all four hydraulic systems had to be routed through the aft fuselage in order to provide hydraulic power to the elevator and rudders. The available space in the aft fuselage behind the aft pressure bulkhead was limited, and it required that hydraulic lines for all four systems be located in close proximity to one another. System isolation was retained, yet the close physical proximity allowed all four systems to be compromised when the aft pressure bulkhead failed. With the failure of the APU firewall, all four hydraulic systems were ruptured and rapidly depleted, leading to the inability to move any of the control surfaces, and eventually, to the loss of control. Following the accident, a hydraulic fuse was added to one of the four hydraulic systems such that if a system were ruptured, the fuse would prevent the loss of hydraulic fluid, and the fused system would continue to function.

Common Theme Related Lessons:
Aircraft maintenance programs should be developed consistent with actual aircraft operations. (Common Theme: Organizational Lapse)

The accident airplane was configured and operated as a short-haul airplane in a high-density seating configuration and was used to carry a large number of passengers on relatively short trips between Japanese cities. Due to the short length of many flights, the airplane was operated at relatively low altitudes. The 747-maintenance manual allows structural inspection intervals to be based, in part, on selected cabin differential pressures. Lower cabin pressures allowed for longer intervals between inspections, while higher cabin pressures would require more frequent structural inspections. JAL maintenance inspection schedules were based on operations at lower cabin differential pressures. However, investigators determined that this airplane had been regularly operated at higher cabin differential pressures.
Repairs should be accomplished in a manner that preserves the original safety features of the airplane. (Common Theme: Human Error)

Following the initial repair of the pressure bulkhead, a splice plate was required between the upper and lower halves in order to recover fastener edge margins that had been found to be inadequate. The splice plate turned out to be difficult to install and fit in place, and was cut into two pieces, allowing it to be more easily installed. The division of the splice plate resulted in the tensile loads between the upper and lower bulkhead portions being carried by only a single row of fasteners, rather than multiple rows, as had been intended by the original (one piece) design. The unintended load distribution resulted in a loss of strength in the repaired area, leading to the failure of the aft pressure bulkhead.

Last updated: Tuesday, July 18, 2023

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Nitrogen Leak

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A month before the State of Alabama plans to use nitrogen gas to execute Kenny Smith on Alabama's death row, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released its final investigation report into the deaths of six Georgia poultry plant workers who died from nitrogen asphyxiation in 2021. The report underscores the extreme risks that nitrogen poses to workers' lives, even in industries and facilities where the hazardous chemical has long been widely and regularly used.

Like many meatpacking plants, the Foundation Food Group facility in Gainesville, Georgia, used liquid nitrogen to instantly freeze its poultry products.

There is "abundant industry guidance" on the critical importance of safety measures like atmospheric monitoring and adequate emergency preparedness in plants that use liquid nitrogen, the CSB noted, because without sufficient warnings, training, and specialized protective equipment, workers cannot detect the presence of deadly nitrogen gas, which is odorless and colorless.

On January 28, 2021, investigators found that the nitrogen leak at FFG was so deadly because the plant did not adequately inform, train, equip, drill, or otherwise prepare workers for a nitrogen leak. As a result, at least 14 employees entered the contaminated area to investigate or try to rescue coworkers without any safeguards.

No state has ever used nitrogen to execute someone sentenced to death. Alabama's scheduled execution of Kenny Smith on January 25 has resulted in several legal challenges, some of which raise questions about this risk of harm and death to correctional staff and others involved in the execution. Mr. Smith's attorneys have argued that the State has not released the information necessary to ensure that nitrogen will not result in torturous death.

In the Georgia case, the CSB found that "[w]orkers were not aware of the deadly consequences of a liquid nitrogen release," Investigator-in-Charge Drew Sahli said. "[U]ltimately trying to save their colleagues led to them sacrificing their own lives."

Investigators found that a single point of failure-a "bubbler tube" used to measure liquid nitrogen levels inside the plant's freezer was bent, likely during regular maintenance-allowed liquid nitrogen to overflow from the freezer and fill the room with an unsafe level of liquid nitrogen.

The liquid nitrogen quickly vaporized into a four- to five-foot-high deadly cloud that killed six employees and seriously injured three other workers and a firefighter who responded to the incident, the CSB said.

The plant had also failed to install air monitoring and alarm devices that could have alerted workers about the dangerous vapor cloud and prevented them from entering the freezer room, the report said.

The 115-page report details the five key safety issues revealed by the FFG leak and provides a dozen safety recommendations for employers that use liquid nitrogen.

"The CSB's recommendations are important for preventing incidents involving liquid nitrogen and lessening their severity if they do occur," CSB Chairperson Steve Owens said. "The hazards of liquid nitrogen must be clearly communicated to workers, and the safety management systems for operations that use liquid nitrogen must be improved."

Despite the deadly risks of liquid nitrogen, there is not a national standard that covers the hazards arising from the storage, use, and/or handling of cryogenic asphyxiants like liquid nitrogen. The CSB is calling on OSHA to create a national standard and to specifically cover liquid nitrogen in its regional programs for poultry processing and food manufacturing.

The report raises serious questions about Alabama's plan to use nitrogen gas in the upcoming execution of Kenny Smith, specifically what steps the Alabama Department of Corrections has taken to prepare and protect correctional officers, the execution team, and other prison staff from suffering the kind of " needless and senseless tragedy " that claimed six workers' lives in Georgia.

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Workers Killed by Nitrogen Leak While Trying to Save Their Coworkers, Report Finds

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A month before the State of Alabama plans to use nitrogen gas to execute Kenny Smith on Alabama's death row, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released its final investigation report into the deaths of six Georgia poultry plant workers who died from nitrogen asphyxiation in 2021.

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85 Killed, 100 Injured In Car Race Crash - LE MANS, Sunday. - The Canberra Times (ACT : 1926 - 1995) - 13 Jun 1955

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A Mercedes racing car killed 85 spectators and injurmoremrc than 100 others when it crashed and exploded during the annual 24-hour endurance test race yesterda. American Associated Press repoted, to-day that officials fear the total ...

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The New Space Race Is Causing New Pollution Problems

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Earth’s stratosphere has never seen the amounts of emissions and waste from rockets and satellites that a booming space economy will leave behind.