# data[].attributes.headline
(My Wall) - It happens when you least expect it!

# data[].attributes.subject
(My Wall) - It happens when you least expect it!

# data[].attributes.body
This wall outlines major debit/credit card frauds that have occurred in history, defined as stolen card information used for  payments without ones authorization.
This wall covers major  articles and videos that give insight to real life credit/debit card fraud scenarios. To fraudulently obtain money or property. Credit and Debit card numbers can be stolen from websites following identity theft schemes.

# data[].attributes.body
1. What did you learn about your topic that surprised you the most?

I knew quite a bit on this topic before doing research. However the main lesson learned is not to use a debit card for transactions and that they are not as safe as credit cards are. Also, I did not consider how unsafe ATMS could be. I considered them secure and safe but reading the articles Brough insight of how hackers use the feeling of security to strike.

2. Relevancy of Topic or what did you find Interesting?
I share relevance to this topic because I have a friend who know somebody who has had a data breach, forcing him to freeze his accounts to prevent any further losses done to his account, the bank immediately locked all his cards to protect his account and notified him immediately he was then called into the bank to talk over his account policy and reinforce his account. In his opinion he believes that the situation was handled appropriately and he still banks with the same bank to this day since they helped him trace the problem back to its roots. The bank agency assured him that the same mistake wouldn't occur, and that more precautions would be taken towards his account. He decided to stay with the bank because they attempted to solve the problem and simply the complexity taken place.
3. If you could pass on your knowledge to a family member or friend, what do you think is the most important factor to pass on?

3. I think the most important factor to pass on is to be very cautious in who you trust. Often people are there for you, for the wrong reasons, money being the main one. Never share personal banking data with anyone even if you think they can be trusted because everyone holds betrayal.

# data[].attributes.body
These videos share stories of fraud victims and how they slowly fell into fraud schemes. They explain the feeling of having no choice and being overwhelmed. In the first video an elderly lady explains how the hackers claimed to be a Canadian Revenue Agency and that if she had not follower their orders they won't come to her home and seize her belongings immediately. Sadly, she fell into the trap and started to transfer her money using Bitcoins. These scenarios are all very unfortunate as no one should have to worry about money security.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
For Fraud Prevention Month, the Edmonton Police Service focuses on local victims of fraud. We chose this path so that we could humanize these crimes and prove that frauds do not have stereotypes. Fraud affects everyone, regardless of age, sex, or ethnicity. These brave citizens came forward to share their stories and provide others with the knowledge and warnings with the hope that future frauds could be avoided.
CRA Bitcoin Scam
Mass Market Fraud
Business/Service Scam

Shannon Baxter (early 20s) was attending business classes at NAIT part-time and working at the family business, Yellowhead Storage, full-time during the week.

She started helping out her mother, Heidi, with invoices and sales. One day, she came across an invoice from a company that she did not recognize. She phoned the company asking for verification because she thought it was a scam. Her instinct was right - it was a phishing scam.

In 2014, Shannon found another invoice for the purchase of shipping containers that didn't seem right. She shared it with the accountant and then tried to track down the buyer, only to discover that the phone number was out of service.

Shannon informed her parents that the buyer didn't exist. Heidi admitted to her husband Joe that she took and sold the shipping containers. She had established a shell company called West Yellowhead Transport and had been selling the containers between April 2013 and February 2014. A company driver, Travis, was assisting her.

"You always think of family as people you can trust. But people can change," said Shannon. "One memory I have of my mother is at a grocery store. She found 20 dollars on the ground and handed it to the cashier because it didn't belong to her."

Heidi was let go from the company and a new general manager was hired. Shannon soon discovered that the new manager was making unauthorized credit card purchases with the corporate card and accumulating late charges on invoices. His employment was also terminated.

In October 2016, Shannon became the new general manager of the company. Since then, she has implemented basic business processes/procedures, checks and balances, security cameras, digital systems and file back-up processes to ensure the safety of all employees and the business. There is also a new system in place that ensures the shipping containers in the yard are physically counted once a month.

"My grandma, she started the family business. She was semi-retired and still came in once a week to check on things. She had rules. Like, don't let the phone ring more than twice or that everyone should know at least two people's roles," said Shannon. "When I took over, I re-implemented some of her practices. She was a watcher. Now, I'm one."

On January 8, 2018, Heidi was convicted and sentenced to 15 months in jail. She admitted to profiting just over $153,000. The family company, Stankay Holdings, lost an estimated $360,000 throughout Heidi's scam.

This type of scam is an example of a financial crime. Typically referred to as white collar crimes, these scams are nonviolent crimes committed in commercial situations by individuals, groups or corporations for financial gain.

If something sounds too good to be true, it probably is. We've all heard this message before. Yet, online fraudcontinues to grow.

A local couple (who do not wish to be identified) had been searching online for an RV for an extended period. Finally, they found the one that met all of their needs. They reached out to the seller and set up a meeting to view the vehicle.

The lady who was selling the RV was accompanied by a man to the meeting. The man answered all of the questions that the couple had. He even let them go for a test drive.

"We were so enamoured by his knowledge and helpfulness," said the wife. "I'm a naturally skeptical person but I didn't want to seem rude by asking too many questions."

The couple ended up purchasing the RV later that evening. When they realized that the vehicle had been stolen, they felt robbed of the whole situation.

"Any suspicion you have, don't worry about feeling rude. Address it," said the wife. "Dig deep, hold off, pause and listen to your hunches."

This couple was one of 32 victims in 2017 that purchased a stolen vehicle. All 32 cases combined resulted in a total loss of $129,042.00 to this mass marketing scam.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
For Fraud Prevention Month, the Edmonton Police Service focuses on local victims of fraud. We chose this path so that we could humanize these crimes and prove that frauds do not have stereotypes. Fraud affects everyone, regardless of age, sex, or ethnicity.

# data[].attributes.body
These graphics express credit/debit card fraud scenarios one should be cautious of at the ATM. You’d never imagine a scam to take place at a trusted ATM, unfortunately, some hackers don’t stop at only online hacking sites. The ATM is a place people can draw their money after card and information insertion. Here are a few tips to make sure you are not getting scammed!

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Victims of credit card skimming are completely blindsided by the theft. They notice fraudulent charges or money withdrawn from their accounts, but their credit and debit cards never left their possession. How did the theft happen?

Credit Card Skimming

Credit card skimming is a type of credit card theft where crooks use a small device to steal credit card information in an otherwise legitimate credit or debit card transaction. When a credit or debit card is swiped through a skimmer, the device captures and stores all the details stored in the card's magnetic stripe.

The stripe contains the credit card number, expiration date, and the credit card holder's full name. Thieves use the stolen data to make fraudulent charges either online or with a counterfeit credit card.

Skimming at ATMs and Gas Stations

Credit card skimmers are often placed over the card swipe mechanism on ATMs and gas stations, but the skimmers can be placed over almost any type of credit card reader. With ATMs, criminals may also place a small, undetectable camera nearby to record your PIN. This gives the thief all the information needed to make fake cards and withdraw cash from the cardholder's checking account.﻿﻿

Skimming at Restaurants or Retail

Occasionally, some retail and restaurant workers who handle credit cards are recruited to be part of a skimming ring. These workers use a handheld device to skim your credit card during a normal transaction. For example, we routinely hand our cards over to waiters to cover the check for a restaurant. The waiter walks away with our credit cards and, for a dishonest waiter, it becomes the perfect opportunity to swipe the credit card through a skimmer without being detected.

How Thieves Use the Information

Once the victim's credit card information is stolen, thieves will either create cloned credit cards to make purchases in-store, use the account to make online purchases, or sell the information on the internet. Victims of credit card skimming are often unaware of the theft until they notice unauthorized charges on their account, have their card unexpectedly declined, or receive an overdraft notification in the mail.

How to Spot a Credit Card Skimmer

Credit card skimming devices are crafted to blend in seamlessly with the machine it's placed on. Unless you're specifically looking for a skimming device, you may not notice anything out of the ordinary.

Becoming familiar with the look and feel of regular credit card readers can help you detect when there's something out of place. There are some tell-tale signs that a credit-card skimmer is installed. A credit card reader that sticks out far past the panel is an indicator because skimmers are designed to fit over the existing credit card reader. This is most recognizable when an additional part seems to be affixed to the rest of the credit card reader.

At a gas station, you can compare a suspicious credit card reader to the readers at nearby pumps. If something looks out of the ordinary, avoid paying at the pump. Pay inside or go to another gas station.

If a skimmer is installed, the credit card reader will appear loose or move when jiggled. The credit card reader should be securely in place. Moving parts are a sign the reader has been tampered with or that a skimming device has been affixed to the existing reader.

Gas stations often place a security label across the gas pump that lets you know if the cabinet panel on the fuel dispenser has been tampered with. When intact, the label has a flat red, blue, or black background. However, once the seal has been broken, the words "Void Open" appears in white. If the seal missing, displays the message or is loose, it's a sign that someone without authorization has accessed the cabinet. Let the gas station attendant know and do not use the credit card machine at that pump.

In addition to a card skimming device, thieves may place a fake keypad on top of the real one to capture your keystrokes. This way they can capture your pin or billing zip code in addition to your credit or debit card details. If the keys seem hard to push, eject your card and use another ATM. Use a bank-operated ATM, which is less likely to have a skimmer, rather than an ATM at a store or gas station.

How to Prevent and Detect Credit Card Skimming

Thankfully, many banks and credit card issuers are becoming better at detecting fraudulent transactions and may not process suspicious charges until you verify that you initiated the transaction.

Simply using your credit card puts you at risk of becoming a credit card skimming victim. Catching fraudulent charges related to a skimming incident requires you to watch your accounts frequently. Monitor your checking and credit card accounts online at least weekly and immediately report any suspicious activity to your bank or credit card issuer.

Here are a few more tips for avoiding credit card skimming.

Watch where you shop. Restaurants, bars, and gas stations seem to be the places where credit card incidents happen most frequently. Retail store self-checkouts and ATMs, especially standalone ATMs (those that aren't at the bank) are also places that skimmers can be found.

Check ATMs before using them.At ATMs, skimmers often place a camera within view of the keypad to steal your PIN. These cameras are often tiny and difficult to detect. When you're using an ATM, cover your hand as you type your PIN to keep a camera from catching a view of what you're typing.

Don't hand your card to someone for cleaning. Thieves will claim to clean the magnetic strip on your credit card to help it work better. These thieves simply swipe your credit card through a credit card skimmer and take your credit card information.

How to Report a Credit Card Skimming Loss

If you think you've been a victim of credit card skimming, contact your bank or credit card issuer even if you haven't spotted any fraudulent charges. The sooner you report your suspicions, the more you shield yourself from the liability of unauthorized charges. Providing as much detail as possible about the location of the skimmer (e.g., the gas station you visited with pump number, or the ATM location) can help the bank prevent future losses.

Alert the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These government agencies often work to break up large credit card skimming rings.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
What Every Consumer Needs to Know About Credit Card Skimming

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Victims of credit card skimming are completely blindsided by the theft. They notice fraudulent charges or money withdrawn from their accounts, but their credit and debit cards never left their possession. How did the theft happen?

# data[].attributes.body
These graphics express credit/debit card fraud techniques which take place on a daily basis. It demonstrates which signs one should be suspicious for and to proceed with caution. This image highlights phone calls scams about interest, peculiar unsafe Wifi settings and even emails. All these are practiced and perfected schematics hackers perform.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Interest Rate Reduction Scam

Interest-rate reduction scams take advantage of frustrated credit card users who want to cut their credit card rates and pay off their balances faster.

How the Scam Works

You receive a pre-recorded call from someone who says you qualify for a program that will help you lower your interest rate and pay off your credit card balance sooner. All you have to do is pay a fee, enroll in a program, and the company will work to lower your credit card interest rate.

The call may sound like it comes from your credit card issuer, and the company may even have your credit card account information.

The scammer charges your credit card for the services but doesn't help you lower your interest rate as promised. You might be charged even if you decline the services.

How to Avoid Being Scammed

Add your number to the National Do Not Call Registry to lower the likelihood that you'll receive one of these calls. You can add your number by visiting DoNotCall.gov or calling 1-888-382-1222.﻿﻿

If you receive an automated call from a company asking to lower your interest rate, hang up the phone without speaking to anyone for any reason. Talking to a human may lead to more calls.

Don't give out or confirm your personal or financial information on any phone call that you didn't initiate. Scammers may have obtained some credit card information and need to confirm the accuracy or get just one more piece of information from you, like a PIN or security code.

If you qualify for a lower interest rate, you can get one for free by simply asking your credit card issuer for a lower rate.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Interest-rate reduction scams take advantage of frustrated credit card users who want to cut their credit card rates and pay off their balances faster. You receive a pre-recorded call from someone who says you qualify for a program that will help you lower your interest rate and pay off your credit card balance sooner.

# data[].attributes.body
There are numerous ways thieves can access our account information wether it be by the means of passwords, usernames, emails, downloaded Apps even online banking systems. This Short clip explains the latest and most popular ways thieves are targeting credit/debit card owners and how to counteract them. Thus study was based on 2019 surveys and high statistics. For example, in 2019 there have been a drastic uprising in robocalls and robotexts, used to scam people everywhere

# data[].attributes.body
This video demonstrates the implications that arise from using a debit card. It sheds light on the dangers of using a debit card for day to day purchases and warns us not to have unnecessary amount of money saved in your checking account. The news reporter explains a credit card can help build credit and that credit cards doesn’t put all your money out there as debit card do. He explains his perspective on fraudulent activity and his journey in the FBI academy and solving consumer crimes.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Every year, millions of American consumers - nearly 7% of the population - are victims of scams and fraud. In 2017, the number of fraud victims in the US reached 16.7 million, with $16.8 billion lost.

For more than 45 years, I've worked with, advised and consulted with the FBI and hundreds of financial institutions, corporations and government agencies around the world to help them in their fight against fraud.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
'Never, ever use a debit card,' warns fraud expert and ex-con artist-here's what to do instead

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Every year, millions of American consumers - nearly 7% of the population - are victims of scams and fraud. In 2017, the number of fraud victims in the US reached 16.7 million, with $16.8 billion lost.

# data[].attributes.body
This website highlights and ranks the best secure banks to avoid frauds and scams. These banks are the top best protective banks. It is important to have trust in banks. A good relationship with your banker can aid in financial forthcomings and in this case a good history with your bank of choice, can result in aid on unfortunate circumstances like fraud and scams. A system set up to report such circumstances is the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, it operates through a partnership of the RCMP, the Ontario Provincial Police and the Competition Bureau. This System is designed for victims of credit/debit card frauds.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
After the massive security breaches and Nieman Marcus recently, we could all stand to be more aware of the security features on our credit cards and debit cards and how banks protect our money. Some banks offer more security features than others. Let's take a look.

Your Liability for Unauthorized Charges

First, let's talk about what happens in the case your card is hit with a fraudulent charge (something that's happened in the last five years to 42 percent of Americans, according to ). By law, everyone who uses credit cards and debit cards have some protections against fraudulent transactions. Though credit cards are generally safer than debit cards, MasterCard and Visa debit card holders are protected from fraud with a few exceptions.

Credit cards: You're not responsible for any charges you didn't make if a thief uses your card over the phone or online. If your card is used physically to make a purchase, however, legal website points out that you may be liable for up to $50 of the purchase (though most card issuers waive that $50 liability).

ATM and debit cards: According to the regulations, with these cards, your liability depends on how quick you are to report unauthorized charges. If you report the card lost or stolen before any use of the card, you're not responsible for any charges. If you notify the bank about an unauthorized charge within two business days of receiving your statement, you're only liable for up to $50. If you don't notify the bank within those two days, though, you could lose up to $500- and if for some reason you don't notify the bank within 60 days, you risk losing an unlimited amount of money.

However, most debit cards in the US are either MasterCard or Visa, and these offer a "zero liability" policy-under a couple of conditions:

MasterCard: If you have a debit or credit card with the MasterCard logo, you're not responsible for any unauthorized transactions, as long as your account is in good standing, you have exercised "reasonable care" (whatever that means) in safeguarding your card from loss or theft, and you haven't reported two or more unauthorized transactions in the last 12 months. Also, zero liability doesn't apply to business cards, prepaid cards, or if a PIN was used for the transaction-so you should probably pick a more secure PIN and follow other debit card security basics.

Visa: Visa's Zero Liability program, applicable in the US only, removes the $50 liability and the 48-hour reporting requirement for both debit and credit cards. Like MasterCard, the protection doesn't apply to business cards or PIN-based transactions not processed by Visa, as well as ATM transactions.

Creditcards.com reports that the 25 largest banks and credit unions offer zero liability for both credit and debit cards and next day replacement of debit cards. Even with that assurance, however, you might want to look at this report from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau about the credit card issuers with the most complaints (including issues with fraud, credit card protection, and billing disputes).

Beyond Liability: Smart Security Features

Some banks go beyond the basics to offer more protections for your hard-earned money. Here are a few features you should consider beyond the typical options.

Note: This obviously isn't an all-inclusive list. If you're with a smaller bank or credit union, it's possible your account could have these security features. Check your bank's security page to find out.

Two-Factor Authentication

You know how important two-factor authentication is for protecting your online accounts. It's especially important when we're talking about access to your finances. Several banks already offer this, but not all do, unfortunately. Here are a few that do have this extra layer of security when you login: , Bank of America, , , , (formerly ING Direct), , (which is offering a free physical device to generate the security codes), and Charles Schwab.

Don't bank anywhere that doesn't have this minimal protection. Also, know that while some of these banks require two-factor authentication be turned on, for others it might be optional.

Guarantee Against Unauthorized Access

After I my banks readily gave my password to me over the phone with little verification, I looked for banks that guarantee your money in case your online account is hacked: Charles Schwab, , First Tennessee Bank, , and .

Next-Day Cash Reimbursement

While debit card users wait an average of two to three months before they get their money back, some banks are quick to reimburse customers' money while the dispute is being settled. This means you're not missing the stolen money in you account for however long the dispute takes. Two big banks that guarantee this are Bank of America and .

In addition, in case your card is lost or stolen while traveling, both and will send you emergency money so you can get by.

Debit Card Blocking

This feature is like hitting the pause button on your debit card. In case your card is ever lost or stolen-or even if you just want to temporarily hault your spending on it- you can sign into the mobile app or website to deactivate the debit card or reactivate it. You'll find this feature at and Capital One.

Single Use Card Numbers

These one-time virtual account numbers protect you when you're shopping online, because your actual card number isn't shared with the site. This comes in handy especially when signing up for free trials, in addition to the general online shopping protection. and Bank of America offer these single use card numbers, and MasterCard has its own program as well.

Photo Credit Cards

In the event your credit card gets into the wrong hands, you can lessen the chances of the thief using your card if you have a photo of your face on it. Bank of America, , Capital One, and Wells Fargo all offer custom photo credit cards.

SmartCards

" SmartCards," also known as chip-and-pin or chip-and-signature cards, are widely used around the world-except in the US. These cards are much more secure than the magnetic swipe cards used in the US, because they're tougher to clone and also encrypts the account info and makes it different with each transaction. Retailers in the US still have to install point-of-sale terminals to accommodate these cards-which could take years-but several banks do offer these SmartCards already (handy if you travel outside the US):

American Express: by request

Bank of America: Merrill Lynch-issued cards

Capital One: Canada only

Chase: many travel credit cards

Citibank: travel cards

USAA: by request

US Bank: by request

Wells Fargo: Visa cards, by phone request

Credit Card Forum has a breakdown of the best of these kinds of cards.

Other Essentials

Finally, the majority of banks already offer these features, but they're worth mentioning: Text, email, and mobile alerts so you'll know when suspicious activity happens, SSL secured website, automatic session timeouts, paperless statements to prevent identity theft via snail mail, and fraud monitoring.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The Best Banks That Protect Your Money from Hackers and Thieves

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
After the massive security breaches at Target and Nieman Marcus recently, we could all stand to be more aware of the security features on our credit cards and debit cards and how banks protect our money. Some banks offer more security features than others. Let's take a look.

# data[].attributes.body
This website revealed a credit fraud experience Charlie Osborne faced; she explains the occurrence as gut-wrenching. In fact, before she had noticed she continued on with her day as she normally would. She stumbled on the scam by chance and the only reason why the bank didn't catch on before she did was because the fraud had not reached a level which triggered algorithms and detectors. At first, the only transactions being made were minimalistic $10-20 transactions, banks often alert the card owner when big transactions are being made for assurance to not seize the card. Her story can happen to anyone, which signifies its importance.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
It was bound to happen eventually. I became the latest in a long list of people who have had their bank account compromised and cash stolen.

Just as any other typical morning. I sat with a cup of tea in one hand, cat on lap, and gazed at the daunting prospect of going through my emails. By curiosity, I decided to check out my online banking to see if a deposit I was expecting had landed.

That's when the fun began.

Not only was the deposit still missing, but in black and white was evidence that my debit card was being used without my knowledge or consent -- as well as a reason why the bank hadn't caught on and told me.

Work on hold, gut-wrenching panic, copious swearing, and an abandoned cup of tea later, I grabbed my phone. The moment I mentioned "fraud" to the operator I was whisked away to a team where, as a small mercy, I was not subjected to crackling, horrendous classical music tracks which are meant to soothe but actually enrage you -- and instead I was only on hold for seconds.

Before going any further than listing my banking details and the answers to security questions, the advisor barked the same standard legal advice that I, myself, have ironically spouted in how-to guides in staying safe online. (Just in case you'd forgotten, the advice is rather standard: you shouldn't make any purchases from suspicious websites, you should keep your PCs free from malware, you shouldn't be daft enough to post pictures of your credit cards online and, of course, phishing emails are always a bad, bad thing.)

That part of the checklist over, the operator transformed from a machine into a sympathetic human ear.

But one question remained unanswered. Why was it chance, rather than a fraud alert, which led me to this stage?

There are countless ways these days that someone can take your hard-earned cash or damage your credit. The use of malware and keyloggers designed to steal your credentials, skimmers which pinch the information on your card at an otherwise trustworthy retailer's point-of-sale (PoS) system or the old-fashioned but still noteworthy ATM card cloner are just a few of the tools currently used in fraud today.

I've listened to the cases of my nearest and dearest, friends and colleagues who have gone through this nightmare experience. Some know the perpetrators as vengeful ex-wives and husbands, rogue friends with sticky fingers and addictions to online shopping, and some simply don't know how it happened or who was helping themselves to their cash.

I can point a finger to how, in my case, although it isn't too steady at this time. I have a few "connections" who would revel in delight at causing me such trouble but I don't believe any of them have the skill set or knowledge to do so -- and so when my bank card details suddenly were being used without my consent and money began to flow away from the safe confines of my bank account, I had to place it at the blame at a petrol station ATM I used a few weeks ago.

However, in truth, I don't know.

The other options, which may also be valid, don't bear thinking about; at least until I have evidence pointing beyond stolen cash and towards the possibility of a far more damaging prospect: identity theft.

I was always under the impression everything was in hand. I have a subscription to a credit monitoring service which keeps an eye on my credit score for me and alerts me if anything changes -- which is one of the first indicators that you have someone who admires your identity so much they decided to wear it for the purposes of credit card and loan applications.

Aside from that, my bank, Lloyds, has a fraud team which monitors accounts for any dodgy dealings which may suggest fraud (as I learned at 2am one dark morning when paying for a New York hotel stay).

I'm in the middle of renovating my property and so there are more transactions than usual -- and many for small, daft things like sink sponges and wallpaper paste. Hidden among these transactions was one, labelled as from a telecoms service which I have no connection to.

However, the amount was so small I simply thought: "It's me being stupid. The name is probably from some other company and I've just forgotten what it was that I bought."

I ignored this sign, but the devil is in the details.

This "authorized" payment became one of many suddenly flooding my account. A few pounds here, twenty pounds there -- all of which are small enough amounts that not everyone would notice immediately, but together, can cause utter chaos.

The operator who looked into my account found it peculiar, as did I, that the transactions which had already been authorized all came from telecommunications operators that I have nothing to do with, including EE and Three.

Upon examining the account further, it seemed like these were not the only strange things taking place. Over the course of just a few days, a high number of "test transactions" had been made to the account.

These "tests" do not appear on your statement, and instead, are used by companies to make sure money is in your account before pushing through transactions of higher amounts.

We don't usually see them or know they are there, but banks do.

According to the operator, over 40 had been recorded -- which was unusual in itself -- and indicated that unless the card was frozen and destroyed now, my account could very well be hit with a fresh barrage of money requests which would beggar the account entirely.

In other words, this was the fraud before the storm.

Lloyds, and many other banks, rely on automated systems to detect fraud. While the bank refused to go into any details concerning my case or fraud detection as a whole, the bank did say it "takes fraud prevention seriously" and "invests heavily in detection systems to ensure robust controls are in place to safeguard our customers."

So why wasn't this fraud stopped?

How this one innocuous tweet could hack a bank account

One inane tweet from mid-2012 was enough to start a chain reaction of information-gathering that could have rivaled the work of a government intelligence agency. And with that dossier of data, a hacker could have ended up ruining one man's life.

To me, although I have little proof, it was simply too soon in the process for anything but the customer's own eyes to detect. The preliminary amounts of £10 to £20 appear to be top-ups which can be used by cloned cards -- and are also within the payment limit of contactless payment systems which do not require a PIN number for use.

I spoke to one of the telecoms firms, Three, who after a debate among themselves came to the general consensus someone in Glasgow is currently enjoying a phone topped up thanks to my paycheck, and it was likely either a contactless payment through a manufactured card or internet transaction.

A perfect test-bed, certainly, to see if an account could support larger fraudulent payments without a problem.

This was the lesson. Small transactions can herald bigger problems. The reason why the bank didn't catch on before I did is that the fraud had not reached a level which triggered algorithms and detectors.

When it comes to the test payments, I cannot say why problems were not picked up. It may have been that there is no backend monitoring system for these particular processes, or that the volume of my recent transactions because of the house turned Lloyds away from the scent.

In my case, there not only is an unknown amount of transactions which were, no doubt, just about to batter my account -- but ones that have already reached the "pending" stage will have to clear before I can be refunded. So, despite catching it early, having a card cancelled and money flitting in and out has still caused a host of problems.

I learned a lesson thanks to this experience. If there is even one small, strange transaction on your account, ring your bank. For the sake of a phone call, whether you think it may just be you being stupid or forgetful, you could stop fraud snowballing into empty accounts, missed mortgage payments and bounced direct debits which can cause you more stress and anguish down the line.

We can no longer ignore even the tiniest indicator that something is wrong as I've learned -- but a quick check is all it took to stop matters becoming much, much worse.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Here's the one surprising lesson I learned as a victim of debit card fraud | ZDNet

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
It was bound to happen eventually. I became the latest in a long list of people who have had their bank account compromised and cash stolen. Just as any other typical morning. I sat with a cup of tea in one hand, cat on lap, and gazed at the daunting prospect of going through my emails.

# data[].attributes.body
This website defines credit/debit frauds and how to prevent being a victim of fraudulent activity. It outlines major causes people end up getting scammed and how to proceed after you have discovered you are involved in such a scheme. The moment you realize you are a victim of fraudulent activity it is imperative to call the bank immediately and demand for your card to be seized. This way the bank freezes your account until you think it is safe to re-activate the card. In addition, the scammer won’t be able to use the card and will most probably give up.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
How debit card fraud happens

Debit card fraud happens when someone steals or uses without your permission your debit card or debit card information. Your information or your card is used to:

make a purchase in a store

make a purchase or transaction online

withdraw cash from an automated teller machine (ATM)

withdraw money with an in-store purchase

A person might steal your debit card information by:

swiping your debit card through a device that copies the information stored on the magnetic stripe on the back of your card

looking at your personal identification number (PIN) over your shoulder when you're using your debit card

sending you a fraudulent email asking for your banking information (also called phishing)

using a device that jams your card in an ATM. A helpful stranger then suggests that you try to put in your PIN a few times. When the card remains jammed, this person later removes your card and has your PIN

Protect yourself from debit card fraud

Debit cards issued by financial institutions have a computer chip that makes transactions more secure. The computer chip works with your PIN to make sure you give permission for each transaction. This helps protect you against fraud if someone steals your card.

There are also certain actions you may take to protect yourself from debit card fraud. Follow these tips to protect your debit card and your personal information.

Keep your PIN secret

Choose a PIN that is hard to guess. For example, avoid using your birthday, Social Insurance Number, address or telephone number as your PIN.

Be sure to keep your PIN secret:

never share your PIN with another person. Do not even share it with a family member or partner

memorize your PIN rather than writing it down. If you write it down, keep it in a safe place, away from your card or wallet

change your PIN often

Contact your financial institution and change your PIN immediately if you suspect someone knows it.

If you share your PIN with someone, you may be responsible for transactions you haven't made or approved.

Reduce your daily limit

A daily limit is the amount of money you may spend or withdraw from your account each day. It applies to both ATMs and in-store transactions.

Contact your financial institution if you think your limit is too high.

Protect your debit card and your debit card information

To better protect yourself from debit card fraud, you may also:

keep your debit card in a safe place

never lend your debit card

insert your card rather than swiping it during a purchase

hide the terminal or ATM keypad when you enter your PIN

keep your debit card in sight at all times when making a purchase

take your debit card and transaction receipt with you once you've finished a transaction

retrieve your card quickly after a transaction. Complete your transactions before answering anyone trying to get your attention

check your account statements often to make sure all transactions are correct

keep paper and electronic copies of your account statements and put them in a safe place

contact your financial institution right away if your card is lost, stolen or stuck in an ATM

If you're a victim of debit card fraud

If you're a victim of debit card fraud, take the following steps:

1. write down what happened and how you first noticed the fraud

2. contact your financial institution right away to tell them about the fraud

3. take note of whom you talked to and when you spoke to them

4. keep all documents that you think might be helpful when the police investigate the fraud

5. contact your local police service to file a complaint

6. if you believe a company (for example, your telephone company) has been hacked, contact it

Report the fraud to the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre

The Canadian Anti-fraud Centre includes partners from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police and the Competition Bureau of Canada. It is the central repository for information about fraud.

Contact the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre.

Related links

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.keywords[]
debit card; fraud; personal finances; banking;

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Debit card fraud is when someone steals both your PIN and debit card or debit card information and uses it without your permission. Learn more:

# data[].attributes.body
We know that frauds and scams can be inevitable. There are so many systematic software’s set up and hackers all over the globe trying to steal the easy way out. If the bank deals with credit/debit frauds and scams, it is important to belong to a decent bank…but how do you differentiate a good bank from a bad one? This website illuminates factors that determine a decent bank from a corrupt one. It enlightens the importance of being involved in a good bank, after all to put money in a bank ultimately results in trusting that bank to keep your money safe!

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Good Bank vs Bad Bank: Don't touch the unsecured creditors! Clobber the tax payer instead. Not.

The Good Bank solution differs significantly from the Bad Bank solution in its distributional implications, medium- and long-term incentive effects, and immediate impact on financial stability.
The Bad Bank solution
Under the Bad Bank approach, the authorities either purchase toxic assets from the banks that made the toxic investments/loans, or they guarantee (insure) these toxic assets.

assets are assets whose fair value cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy.

Clean assets are assets whose fair value can easily be determined.

Clean assets can be good assets (assets whose fair value equal their notional or face value) or bad assets (assets whose fair value is below their notional or face value). When the authorities acquire the toxic assets outright, they establish a legal entity to manage these assets - the Bad Bank. The publicly-owned Bad Bank either sells these toxic assets as and when they cease to be toxic and a liquid market for them re-emerges, or holds them to maturity.

Under the Bad Bank approach, the legacy banks, either sans the toxic assets or with the toxic assets guaranteed by the state, live to fight another day. The presumption is that the state overpays for the toxic assets. The price it pays is certainly greater than the immediate liquidation value of the assets by their owners. It also likely exceeds the present discounted value of the future cash flows of the assets, or their hold-to-maturity value. Similarly, the cost of any guarantees, provided by the state in the case where the toxic assets continue to be held by the banks, is likely to be less than the fair value of these guarantees.
The original TARP rationale for Bad Banks is no longer credible
The rationalisation for the creation of Bad Banks and for toxic asset purchases by the state that was part of the original TARP proposal - that it would serve as a price discovery mechanism for potentially socially useful financial instruments that had temporarily become illiquid - is no longer credible. Most of the toxic assets ought never to have been created and, with a bit of luck, will never be seen again. So the fundamental rationale for the creation of Bad Banks and for toxic asset purchases by the state is the provision of a subsidy to the banks that made the toxic loans and investments. These beneficiaries include the top management and board of these banks, the shareholders, and the unsecured and non-guaranteed creditors.

The subsidies for the legacy banks inherent in the purchase by the state of the toxic assets and/or in the guarantees provided by the state for these toxic assets are further boosted by the myriad modalities of further official financial support for these banks. These can be additional capital injections, guarantees for new borrowing, or guarantees for new loans and investments by the banks.
The Good Bank approach
Under the Good Bank approach, the state creates a new bank, the Good Bank, which gets the deposits and the clean assets of the old banks. The old bank gets compensation equal to the difference between the (known) value of the clean assets it loses and the value of the deposits it gives up. The state may also inject additional public capital into the Good Bank, or it may invite in additional private capital. Government financial support is given only to new lending, new investment, and new funding by the Good Bank. The legacy (ex-)bank has its banking license taken away and simply manages the existing stock of toxic assets. The legacy (ex-)bank does not get any further government support.
The Hall-Woodward-Bulow good bank solution applied to zombie-bank RBS
A particularly neat example of the Good Bank solution has been proposed by Robert E. Hall of Stanford University and Susan Woodward of Sand Hill Econometrics. It can be found here on the Vox website. They attribute the key idea to Jeremy Bulow. In what follows I merely adapt their numerical Citicorp example to the RBS Group.

The data for the Table below come from the Annual Report & Accounts 2008 of RBS. I am doing the exercise for the whole RBS Group. As it is unlikely that home country governments would be willing (or even able) to support the foreign subsidiaries of their banks, it might have been more appropriate just to consider the UK high-street banking units of the RBS Group. I leave that as an exercise for the reader.

Total equity of the RBS Group at the end of 2008 is reported on the balance sheet as just over £80 billion. Market capitalisation is around £8 billion. I therefore subtract £72 billion from the £2,402 total assets reported for the end of 2008, which leaves adjusted total assets at £2,330 billion. The tax payer has already put £45 billion into RBS. In addition, RBS has placed £325 billion of toxic assets in the government's Asset Protection Scheme.

This means that RBS is a dead bank walking - a zombie bank - with its market capitalisation much less than past and present government financial support, let alone past present and anticipated future government financial support, which would also be reflected in today's market capitalisation. I could have done the same type of exercise for Lloyds Banking Group, for Citicorp, for Bank of America or for UBS and many other zombie border-crossing banks.

On the asset side of RBS group are clean assets (good and bad, but with known fair values) and toxic assets (assets with unknown fair values and derivatives). On the liability side, I distinguish deposits, debt securities and other non-deposit liabilities, and derivatives. In the US, the derivatives on both the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet would have been netted, which would have reduced the size of the balance sheet by almost one trillion pounds.

I assume that the £325 billion worth of toxic asset insurance offered by the authorities to RBS equals the stock of toxic assets on its balance sheet. This leaves RBS with just over £1 trillion worth of clean assets (and the derivatives, just under £1 trillion). "Deposits" is shorthand for guaranteed or secured creditors. The £899 billion worth of deposits on the RBS balance sheet is, however, larger than what is formally covered by UK deposit insurance (or by the applicable deposit insurance schemes of the foreign subsidiaries). Debt securities and other non-deposit liabilities are claims on RBS by unsecured and non-guaranteed creditors. They include all unsecured debt, including subordinated debt, other junior debt and senior debt. RBS had £452 billion of this unsecured and non-guaranteed debt (plus of course some non-guaranteed and unsecured liabilities included in 'deposits'). Then there is just under £1 trillion worth of derivatives on the liability side of the balance sheet.

Equity - market capitalisation - is a mere £8 billion, giving a capital ratio (equity as a percentage of assets) of 0.34%. Even with all the government support it has received, RBS group is effectively worth nothing.

The Hall-Woodward-Bulow good-bank-vs-bad-bank deconstruction of the RBS balance sheet requires one key condition to hold - the value of the clean assets of RBS has to exceed that of its deposit liabilities. This will be more likely the larger the amount of non-deposit funding RBS engages in.

We split RBS into a Good Bank and a Bad Bank by giving the deposits and the clean assets of RBS to the Good Bank, leaving everything else with the Bad Bank, and giving the Bad Bank all the equity in the Good Bank. (The derivatives on both sides of the balance sheet could be given to the Good Bank instead of to the Bad Bank, assuming they are clean). Since the value of the clean assets (£1,012 billion) exceeds that of the deposits (£899 billion), the good bank has equity of £114 billion (mind the rounding errors!). Its capital ratio is a healthy 11.25%. Had I used a more restrictive definition of 'deposits', the capital ratio could easily have been over 20% or even 30%.
The Hall-Woodward-Bulow Good Bank solution requires temporary administration
The Bad Bank keeps the toxic assets and derivatives of RBS. It also has the equity in the Good Bank as an asset on its balance sheet. On the liability side it has just the unsecured and non-guaranteed debt securities and other non-deposit liabilities. Its equity is, of course, the same as that of RBS, £8 billion. Its capital ratio will therefore be higher than that of RBS, because the balance sheet of the Bad Bank is smaller. Neither the equity owners of the Bad Bank nor the unsecured and non-guaranteed creditors of the Bad Bank are worse off than, respectively, the equity owners of RBS and the unsecured and non-guaranteed creditors of RBS.

To achieve the deconstruction/decomposition of RBS into a Good Bank and a Bad Bank according to the Hall-Woodward-Bulow principles would require that RBS be put into temporary administration. The new Special Resolution Regime (SRR) introduced for the UK in February 2009 provides the ideal legal setting for this. It should not take long, a weekend at most. Basically, the Bad Bank just becomes a financial portfolio of toxic assets and derivatives, plus its stake in the Good Bank. It would not be allowed to invest in any new assets or to engage in any banking activities. It would manage the existing asset portfolio down and would cease to exist once the last asset has been sold or has matured. Among the clean assets the Good Bank buys would be the buildings, equipment etc. necessary for conducting the banking operations of the Good Bank.

If the UK government had not been daft enough to guarantee the £325billion worth of toxic assets on the balance sheet of the Bad Bank, there can be little doubt that the Bad Bank I have just constructed would have failed soon after coming out of the SRR. The Bad Bank, which is just a fund restricted not to invest in new assets, would be put into administration. The shareholders would be wiped out (more than 70% of RBS is now government-owned), and the unsecured and non-guaranteed creditors would determine what to do with the Bad Bank and its assets. Most likely there would be a significant debt-to-equity conversion and/or a large write-down of the debt.
Distributional differences between the good bank and the bad bank solution
The government would focus its financial support on the Good Bank, either by providing it with additional capital or by guaranteeing new lending and/or new borrowing by the Good Bank. Private capital could be attracted into the Good Bank too.

The Good Bank solution favours the tax payer. The Bad Bank solution favours the unsecured and non-guaranteed creditors of the zombie banks. 'Tax payer' includes those beneficiaries of public spending programmes that may have to be cut to meet the fiscal cost of purchasing or guaranteeing the toxic assets under the Bad Bank solution. It also includes those who lose as a result of future inflation or sovereign default, should either of these two solutions to dealing with the public debt created as a result of the Bad Bank solution eventually be adopted.

The Bad Bank solution also favours the shareholders of the zombie banks, but in the case of RBS, this is mainly the government and therefore the taxpayers. The amount of shareholder equity involved in the zombie banks is, in any case, negligible compared to the exposure of the unsecured and non-guaranteed creditors. The Bad Bank solution also saves the jobs and perks of the top management and the boards of the zombie banks - often the very people responsible for turning a once-healthy bank into a zombie bank.
Incentive effects of the good bank and the bad bank solution
There can be no doubt that, from a distributional fairness perspective, the Good Bank solution beats the Bad Bank solution hands down.

The Bad Bank solution creates moral hazard, because it rewards past reckless investment and lending. It also represents an inefficient use of public funds in stimulating new lending by the banks. To stimulate new lending, a subsidy to or guarantee of new lending is more cost efficient than the ex-post insurance of losses that have already been made on old lending, even though their true magnitude is not yet known. The Good Bank solution leaves the toxic waste with those who invested in it and with those who funded these activities, freeing government funds for reducing the marginal cost of new lending or increasing the expected return to new lending.
Financial stability implications of the good bank and bad bank solutions: Saving banking, without saving bankers or the existing banks
In terms of both moral hazard (incentives for excessive future risk taking) and the efficient use of government funds ('new lending bang per buck'), the Good Bank solution beats the Bad Bank solution hands down.

The holders of bank debt, with the possible exception of perpetual subordinated debt (which counts as tier one capital in some countries), have become the sacred cows of this financial crisis. Regulators, central bankers, and Treasury ministers are quite willing to see shareholders wiped out. After the demise of WAMU and Lehman Brothers, however, the unsecured creditors have become inviolable. Somehow, those in charge of macro-prudential stability, notably the Fed, have bought into the notion that if there is either a further default on bank debt, or a restructuring involving a significant debt-to-equity conversion, or a significant write-down of the claims of bank bond holders, this will be the end of the world.
The unsecured creditors creed and the Swedish bank rescue
I just don't buy it. Fortunately, I am not the only one. Luigi Zingales, the Robert C. McCormack Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the Chicago Business School, has been advocating the case for mandatory debt-into-equity conversions, debt forgiveness and other up-tempo Chapter 11-style financial restructuring of banks and other defunct behemoths like GM, since the first days of the crisis (see e.g. see this Vox column and his book Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, co-authored with Raghuram Rajan). Robert Hall and Susan Woodward also feel no need to pay any special attention to or lavish any public funds on the toxic assets, their owners and those who funded them (the unsecured and non-guaranteed creditors) once the Good Bank has been established and sent on its way.

Part of the reason there appears to be this widespread belief that you have to guarantee all bank liabilities is that this is what the Swedish authorities did during their 1991-1993 banking crisis (see e.g. Lars Jonung's Vox column and paper on which it is based "The Swedish model for resolving the banking crisis of 1991-93. Seven reasons why it was successful" . First, Jonung lists seven criteria for 'successful' resolution of a banking crisis. The paper does not demonstrate that this septet constitutes a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for success - if indeed the Swedish approach is deemed to have been a success. Second, success is in the eyes of the beholder. The Swedish banking system has been hard hit again in the current crisis by its overexposure (30% of annual GDP) to risky investments in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltics and Ukraine.

Every financial boom/bubble has been characterised by rising and ultimately excessive banking sector leverage, that is, by excessive lending to banks. If all the unsecured creditors of the banking system were made whole in the previous systemic crisis, it is not really surprising that the banks, and their creditors, are back for more.

In a more systematic study of the use of blanket guarantees of bank liabilities, Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia find the following:
Special interest pressure to bailout unsecured bank creditors
Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.

The proposition that the consequences of inflicting losses on holders of bank debt are awful beyond our wildest imagining is voiced incessantly and loudly by bankers and by those long bank debt, especially insurance companies and pension funds. And a vigorous campaign is underway to extend the no-default presumption to the debt of pseudo-banks like AIG.

The most over-the-top, ludicrous piece of attempted scare mongering about the systemic risk implications of default by any institution I have ever read is the internal memorandum "AIG: Is the Risk Systemic?", of 26 February 2009, which is now all over the internet. Just one small sample: "The failure of AIG would cause turmoil in the U.S. economy and global markets, and have multiple and potentially catastrophic unforeseen consequences".

I would have thought that, on the contrary, markets have discounted the likelihood of default by many of the major border-crossing banks, and by AIG, pretty comprehensively by now. After the US authorities bailed out Bear Stearns in March 2008, letting Lehman go belly-up in September 2008 was a bad surprise. Even then, I don't accept the interpretation that it was Lehman's filing for bankruptcy protection that triggered the cardiac arrest in global financial markets in the second half of September 2008. Instead the financial sector convulsions of the last quarter of 2008 were caused by the realisation that (1) most of the US and European border-crossing banks were insolvent without government financial support, that (2) the rot extended to the shadow banking sector (AIG), and that (3) the US authorities (Treasury, Fed, SEC) were not on top of the issue and that Congress was bound to act irresponsibly.

But even if it had been Lehman that triggered the financial upheaval, that was then. This is now. Banks, counterparties, investors and policy makers have had 6 months to adjust to the new reality and prepare for the eventuality of default on zombie bank debt and even on AIG debt. The bonds of large zombie banks trade at spreads over government yields comparable to those of automobile manufacturers (600 - 650 basis points). Their CDS spreads put many of these banks well into the default danger zone. Their stock market valuations are consistent with those of institutions not a mile away from insolvency and default.

The fact that zombie banks or AIG are self-serving when they plead systemic risk as an argument for further government hand-outs does not mean that they are wrong. It does lead one to verify more carefully the logic of their arguments and the quality of the empirical evidence offered in support. Let me just consider the argument that the main investors in bank debt (and AIG debt) - pension funds and insurance companies - are too vulnerable and too systemically important to permit the banks (or AIG) to fail.

Pension funds don't go broke with adverse effects on systemic stability. If they are funded, defined-contribution funds, a reduction in their asset value means that pensioners will get lower pensions. If they are defined-benefit schemes (including 'final salary schemes'), the risk of investment surprises is shared by the sponsors and the beneficiaries. When the Dutch pension fund ABP took a big hit last year, my parents did not get any indexation of their pension benefit. In past years, pension benefits had tracked earnings inflation, and occasionally price inflation. Should coverage ratios decline enough, even nominal cuts in pension benefits can be implemented. This may cause hardship, but not financial instability. No reason to favour the pensioners over the tax payers.

As regards insurance companies, I doubt whether "Insurance is the oxygen of the free enterprise system", as AIG would like us to believe. Certainly insurance companies like AIG are not the only suppliers of oxygen. Insurance is a regulated industry. Orderly restructuring following administration and insolvency need not interfere with the provision of any of the essential infrastructure services required for the proper functioning of a market economy.

Regulators, especially but not just in the US, have bought the 'don't touch the unsecured creditors' argument. The Fed especially appears to have swallowed it hook, line and sinker. This cognitive regulatory capture has turned the Fed, with the enthusiastic support of the FDIC and the US Treasury, into the most powerful moral hazard propagation machine ever.
Editors' Note: This first appeared on Willem Buiter's blog Maverecon. Copyedited and reposted with permission.
If a bank or an insurance company like AIG is at risk of failing but is truly too big or too interconnected to fail (rather than merely too politically connected to fail), and if a Good Bank solution is not feasible, then the institution in question should immediately be taken into public ownership or put into a special resolution regime, if one is available. From public ownership it can be put into administration. Once in administration or under a Special Resolution Regime, it can be restructured decisively through a mandatory debt-to-equity conversion or debt write-down. There is no case for sparing the unsecured creditors.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Zombie solutions: The Good Bank vs Bad Bank approaches

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Zombie banks need fixing. Good Bank and Bad Bank solutions are the leading contenders. This column reviews the implications for distributional, incentive, and financial stability effects. It argues that too-big-too-fail bank should immediately be taken into public ownership and restructured decisively through a mandatory debt-to-equity conversion or debt write-down.

# data[].attributes.body
This video is very interesting it is related to identity theft but is linked to Credit/Debit card theft as well. Both factors play the same game and require the same amount of practice and techniques to perfect. This video proves how even the most closest people to you, that you trust completely can scam you fro your money. In recent studies, it shows that the majority of scams that take place are from ex lovers, which sadly are people that were very close to you at one point.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
A spate of high-profile data breaches have brought worries about identity theft to a fever pitch. But consumers may be overlooking a risk that's much closer to home.

Concerns that your information could be compromised are justified. Through mid-July, there have been 424 data breaches compromising more than 129.6 million records, according to the Identity Theft Resource Center, affecting targets as varied as the Internal Revenue Service, the insurance company Anthem and, most recently, the adultery site Ashley Madison.

Last year, the center reports, the number of data breaches hit a record high of 783, up 27.5 percent from 2013. Javelin Strategy & Research estimated that fraud and identity theft damages that year (including but not limited to such breaches) totaled $16 billion and affected 12.7 million people.

Read More Ashley Madison hacked; should users worry about blackmail?

Tracy, a health-care worker in Kentucky, is among those victims. The thief who stole her Social Security number opened several new cards in her name last year, racking up $1,500 in purchases and pushing one account past its credit limit. Another debt, owed to an online retailer, was sent to collections.

The catch? Tracy, who asked that her last name be withheld for privacy concerns, wasn't victimized by some nameless, faceless hacker.

Her husband was the culprit.

"He knew my birthday. He had my Social Security number. He even had a copy of my driver's license stored on his computer," said Tracy, who spotted the first fraudulent account after receiving a message from the bank about a missed payment. Her husband confessed to the fraud, and the couple has since divorced.

Though data breaches are by far the more common risk, so-called "familiar fraud" isn't that unusual: Last year, 550,000 fraud and identity theft victims reported that they had their information compromised by someone they knew, according to Javelin Strategy & Research data pulled for CNBC.com. (Tweet this)

And that number may be on the low side, factoring in consumers who aren't aware of the thief's identity as well as the often long lead time to discover familiar fraud and reluctance of victims to pursue charges.

"Most of the time when we think of identity theft, we think of a bad person behind a computer in a foreign country," said Robert P. Chappell Jr., author of "Child Identity Theft: What Every Parent Needs to Know." "That's not always the case." Familiar fraud cases trace back to family members as offenders, as well as friends, neighbors, coworkers and in-home employees.

Read More More reasons to be careful about what you leave on your desk at work

Cases ebb and swell, with more taking place during tough economic times, said Al Pascual, director of fraud and security at Javelin. In 2011, familiar fraud affected 0.64 percent of the population, versus 0.35 percent last year. "We think that this ties very closely to the economy," he said. "That's when scruples tend to be a little more malleable."

"The vast majority of these are opportunistic," said Paul Stephens, director of policy and advocacy for the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. The perpetrator already knows the victim's personal information or has easy access to it.

Unlike other kinds of fraud or identity theft, with familiar fraud there isn't always intent to harm. One family member, for example, may justify the fraudulent use of another family member's identity as a temporary necessity to fill a need that their own bad credit can't-say, getting vital medical care or setting up a new utility account to keep the heat on. "But then the heat turns into the cable, and then some other, more luxury item," said Chappell. "It becomes more and more of a stretch."

Children are common targets

Children and young adults are common victims of familiar fraud. Students are four times as likely as the general public to encounter such fraud, according to Javelin's 2015 report. Another study by the firm in 2012 that focused on child identity theft estimated that in 27 percent of cases, the perpetrator was a family member or close friend of the family.

Read More Anthem victims' first hack symptom: Phishing scams

Family members may reason that their children benefit from the theft, if it means the lights stay on or groceries get purchased, said Eva Casey Velasquez, president and CEO of the Identity Theft Resource Center. "In some ways, they don't even really realize what they're doing is a crime," she said.

Thieves further out in the victim's social network find children appealing targets because the theft is likely to go unnoticed for years. (Foster kids are targets for similar reasons.) "Kids will sometimes find out about it when they're applying for college," said Velasquez-red flags might only appear when a family fills out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid, for example, or the young adult applies for a first credit card or student loan.

Axton Betz-Hamilton found out her identity had been compromised in 2001, when she was a college sophomore moving off campus. "I got a letter from the electric company saying, 'We need a $100 deposit for your service because of your credit score,'" she said. "I thought at 19 it was because I didn't have much of a credit score."

But when her requested credit report arrived, it listed 10 pages of credit card accounts and debts sent to collection, none of which were hers. They dated back to 1993.

It took Betz-Hamilton, now a child identity theft researcher and an assistant professor of consumer studies at Eastern Illinois University, until 2009 to clean up her report through a combination of good behavior, fraud disputes and simply waiting for negative items to fall off the report. In the meantime, she suffered the financial consequences of a 380 credit score. (For perspective, the prevalent FICO score ranges from 300 to 850, the higher the better, and the median U.S. FICO score was 713 as of October 2014.)

Read More Deciphering the fine print on your credit report

"There were people who had declared bankruptcy who had better credit scores than I did," she said. "My first credit card had a $300 limit, a $69 annual fee and a 29.9 percent interest rate. My first car loan had an 18.23 percent rate."

Only in 2013, shortly after her mother passed away, did Betz-Hamilton learn the source of her identity theft. Her father discovered statements and applications for the fraudulent accounts hidden among her mother's possessions. It became clear that not only had she stolen Betz-Hamilton's identity, but also that of Betz-Hamilton's father and grandfather.

"Once we figured this out, the grieving process stopped," she said. "I think we're going through some kind of trauma reaction."

An uphill battle

Familiar fraud can cut deeper than other kinds of fraud or identity theft, both financially and emotionally. The average familiar fraud victim has out-of-pocket costs of $561 to fight the problem, compared with $79 for broader fraud cases in which a victim's existing credit card number is stolen, according to Javelin.

"The repercussions are substantially greater," said Pascual. "They can keep these kinds of frauds going longer." For example, a close culprit might know enough about you to sidestep lenders' security questions to open new accounts, and have access to intercept mailed account statements.

Read More This can help prevent financial abuse of the elderly

Fighting familiar fraud is also rife with emotional and legal pitfalls. Filing a police report means a police investigation, and victims are often reluctant to get that loved one in trouble, Velasquez said. "They don't want to create drama in the family," she said. Or for themselves. Betz-Hamilton said that in her studies, she's found victims often don't get family support because the idea of a relative as identity thief seems unfathomable.

But failing to file a police report or cooperate with investigations limits victims' recourse. "The credit bureaus will say, 'We need a police report,' " said Chappell. "Where are you left at that point? You're left with damaged credit that you can't get clean." No report also means lenders are less likely to classify the debts as fraudulent-especially in the light of details common with familiar fraud such as statements being sent to the victim's correct mailing address, or a record of someone even occasionally paying the bill.

'Til debt do us part

When a spouse is the culprit, proving your innocence is more difficult-even if you're ready and willing to file that police report. Jim, a California resident who works in information security, has been fighting since 2009 to clear more than $35,000 in credit card debts his then-wife racked up in his name on four credit cards.

"Their stance is, what's to say I'm not just claiming it's my spouse to avoid paying?" said Jim, who asked that his last name be withheld for privacy concerns. "You can argue until you're blue in the face. The credit companies don't want to hear it. Now it's in collections, and the collections companies don't really care, either."

The police were unwilling to pursue criminal charges, Jim said, because there's little beyond his word as evidence. "There's no way to prove it short of her admitting it, which she won't do," he said, and a civil suit is "money I don't have, and again, how am I going to prove it?"

Read More How to avoid crowdfunding fraud

Tracy faced a similar uphill battle, even though her husband admitted to the theft. "I tried to go to the authorities, but they said they couldn't do anything because we were married at the time [of the theft]," she said. "They said it didn't matter that I hadn't known anything about my husband opening new accounts in my name."

Limited protections

To some extent, familiar fraud is more difficult to prevent than the myriad causes of data breaches. "You can't not have people who are close to you know certain personal details," said Pascual. Spouses and parents, at least, will certainly know your Social Security number, for example. Criminal and medical identity theft can also be perpetuated by a friend or family member who knows less sensitive details like your home address and birthdate, said Stephens of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse.

Still, it's important to take steps to limit others' access-especially in living situations where a wider number of people have potential access, like in college dorms or assisted living facilities. "A lot of protection can come from just removing pertinent information from view," said Chappell.

Read More Investor lessons from an alleged $1.5B Ponzi scheme

Even measures as simple as a locked drawer or safe can keep casual visitors from accessing sensitive documents unnoticed. Password protect computers and other devices or, better yet, use touch ID or facial recognition if available. Shred any documents you throw out.

"Paper breaches still happen," said Velasquez. "People still steal mail. They still go through your garbage."

When it comes to close relationships, like a spouse, trust but verify. "If you're in a relationship and you share finances, even if you don't like handling the finances, you need to look at those documents and understand what's going on," said Betz-Hamilton. Take regular fraud precautions such as monitoring your accounts and pulling your credit reports to review.

Jim agrees: "Had I been watching my credit report, I would have seen it all."

Red flags for kids

A more controversial question: Do you monitor a child's credit report? The experts are divided.

"Theoretically, there should be no credit report," said Velasquez. "It should not exist." Unwarranted parental checking could muddy the waters because it essentially creates a report, she said. (Although, 22 states allow parents to freeze credit reports for minors, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, including Illinois, Maryland, New York, Oregon and Texas.)

Read More How much do you really need in emergency savings?

But Chappell and Stephens say parents should be checking, especially if there have been warning signs like a minor child receiving credit card applications in the mail. "That's a red flag that a parent should immediately be going to the three credit reporting agencies," said Stephens.

Regardless, it's not an easy process, with the three credit bureaus requiring mailed forms and other documentation such as copies of the child's birth certificate and a parent's driver's license. If you decide to go that route, said Chappell, request a manual search of the child's Social Security number. Thieves stealing a child's identity will often cobble together a SSN with a different name or birthdate, and those so-called synthetic IDs don't always show up in general searches.

Awareness of the potential for familiar fraud can go a long way. "The reality is, you don't know other people's situations," said Velasquez. "Maybe you don't know them as well as you think."

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Identity theft victims: You might know the culprit

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
A spate of high-profile data breaches have brought worries about identity theft to a fever pitch. But consumers may be overlooking a risk that's much closer to home. Concerns that your information could be compromised are justified.

# data[].attributes.body
These videos share stories of fraud victims and how they slowly fell into fraud schemes. They explain the feeling of having no choice and being overwhelmed. In the first video an elderly lady explains how the hackers claimed to be a Canadian Revenue Agency and that if she had not follower their orders they won't come to her home and seize her belongings immediately. Sadly, she fell into the trap and started to transfer her money using Bitcoins. These scenarios are all very unfortunate as no one should have to worry about money security.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
For Fraud Prevention Month, the Edmonton Police Service focuses on local victims of fraud. We chose this path so that we could humanize these crimes and prove that frauds do not have stereotypes. Fraud affects everyone, regardless of age, sex, or ethnicity. These brave citizens came forward to share their stories and provide others with the knowledge and warnings with the hope that future frauds could be avoided.
CRA Bitcoin Scam
Mass Market Fraud
Business/Service Scam

Shannon Baxter (early 20s) was attending business classes at NAIT part-time and working at the family business, Yellowhead Storage, full-time during the week.

She started helping out her mother, Heidi, with invoices and sales. One day, she came across an invoice from a company that she did not recognize. She phoned the company asking for verification because she thought it was a scam. Her instinct was right - it was a phishing scam.

In 2014, Shannon found another invoice for the purchase of shipping containers that didn't seem right. She shared it with the accountant and then tried to track down the buyer, only to discover that the phone number was out of service.

Shannon informed her parents that the buyer didn't exist. Heidi admitted to her husband Joe that she took and sold the shipping containers. She had established a shell company called West Yellowhead Transport and had been selling the containers between April 2013 and February 2014. A company driver, Travis, was assisting her.

"You always think of family as people you can trust. But people can change," said Shannon. "One memory I have of my mother is at a grocery store. She found 20 dollars on the ground and handed it to the cashier because it didn't belong to her."

Heidi was let go from the company and a new general manager was hired. Shannon soon discovered that the new manager was making unauthorized credit card purchases with the corporate card and accumulating late charges on invoices. His employment was also terminated.

In October 2016, Shannon became the new general manager of the company. Since then, she has implemented basic business processes/procedures, checks and balances, security cameras, digital systems and file back-up processes to ensure the safety of all employees and the business. There is also a new system in place that ensures the shipping containers in the yard are physically counted once a month.

"My grandma, she started the family business. She was semi-retired and still came in once a week to check on things. She had rules. Like, don't let the phone ring more than twice or that everyone should know at least two people's roles," said Shannon. "When I took over, I re-implemented some of her practices. She was a watcher. Now, I'm one."

On January 8, 2018, Heidi was convicted and sentenced to 15 months in jail. She admitted to profiting just over $153,000. The family company, Stankay Holdings, lost an estimated $360,000 throughout Heidi's scam.

This type of scam is an example of a financial crime. Typically referred to as white collar crimes, these scams are nonviolent crimes committed in commercial situations by individuals, groups or corporations for financial gain.

If something sounds too good to be true, it probably is. We've all heard this message before. Yet, online fraudcontinues to grow.

A local couple (who do not wish to be identified) had been searching online for an RV for an extended period. Finally, they found the one that met all of their needs. They reached out to the seller and set up a meeting to view the vehicle.

The lady who was selling the RV was accompanied by a man to the meeting. The man answered all of the questions that the couple had. He even let them go for a test drive.

"We were so enamoured by his knowledge and helpfulness," said the wife. "I'm a naturally skeptical person but I didn't want to seem rude by asking too many questions."

The couple ended up purchasing the RV later that evening. When they realized that the vehicle had been stolen, they felt robbed of the whole situation.

"Any suspicion you have, don't worry about feeling rude. Address it," said the wife. "Dig deep, hold off, pause and listen to your hunches."

This couple was one of 32 victims in 2017 that purchased a stolen vehicle. All 32 cases combined resulted in a total loss of $129,042.00 to this mass marketing scam.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
For Fraud Prevention Month, the Edmonton Police Service focuses on local victims of fraud. We chose this path so that we could humanize these crimes and prove that frauds do not have stereotypes. Fraud affects everyone, regardless of age, sex, or ethnicity.