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Pavlik McIntosh - 2017 - What is social about

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Geht in die Breakoutrooms. Jedem Breakoutroom teile ich eine Theorie zu. Bitte schaut euch das das Video/die Videos zu eurer Theorie an (Link in den Kommentaren). Besprecht die Theorie gemeinsam, so dass ihr alle das gleiche Verständnis habt.
Nutzt die Kommentarfunktion oder erstellt eine neue Padlet-Kachel, um die Theorie stichwortartig zu beschreiben.
Sucht dann gemeinsam nach einem Anwendungsbeispiel aus dem Kulturkontext, an dem man die Theorie verdeutlichen kann.
Nach der Breakoutsession stellt ihr bitte das Modell anhand des gewählten Beispiels kurz für alle vor.

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Sensemaking in Organizations (Karl E. Weick): Entstehung von Bedeutung in Organisationen
- Ständiges Wechselspiel von Sensegiving und Sensemaking

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Tim O'Reilly: What is Web 2.0?

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Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software

by Tim O'Reilly
09/30/2005
Oct. 2009: Tim O'Reilly and John Battelle answer the question of "What's next for Web 2.0?" in Web Squared: Web 2.0 Five Years On.
The bursting of the dot-com bubble in the fall of 2001 marked a turning point for the web. Many people concluded that the web was overhyped, when in fact bubbles and consequent shakeouts appear to be a common feature of all technological revolutions. Shakeouts typically mark the point at which an ascendant technology is ready to take its place at center stage. The pretenders are given the bum's rush, the real success stories show their strength, and there begins to be an understanding of what separates one from the other.

The concept of "Web 2.0" began with a conference brainstorming session between O'Reilly and MediaLive International. Dale Dougherty, web pioneer and O'Reilly VP, noted that far from having "crashed", the web was more important than ever, with exciting new applications and sites popping up with surprising regularity. What's more, the companies that had survived the collapse seemed to have some things in common. Could it be that the dot-com collapse marked some kind of turning point for the web, such that a call to action such as "Web 2.0" might make sense? We agreed that it did, and so the Web 2.0 Conference was born.

In the year and a half since, the term "Web 2.0" has clearly taken hold, with more than 9.5 million citations in Google. But there's still a huge amount of disagreement about just what Web 2.0 means, with some people decrying it as a meaningless marketing buzzword, and others accepting it as the new conventional wisdom.

This article is an attempt to clarify just what we mean by Web 2.0.

In our initial brainstorming, we formulated our sense of Web 2.0 by example:

The list went on and on. But what was it that made us identify one application or approach as "Web 1.0" and another as "Web 2.0"? (The question is particularly urgent because the Web 2.0 meme has become so widespread that companies are now pasting it on as a marketing buzzword, with no real understanding of just what it means. The question is particularly difficult because many of those buzzword-addicted startups are definitely not Web 2.0, while some of the applications we identified as Web 2.0, like Napster and BitTorrent, are not even properly web applications!) We began trying to tease out the principles that are demonstrated in one way or another by the success stories of web 1.0 and by the most interesting of the new applications.

1. The Web As Platform

Like many important concepts, Web 2.0 doesn't have a hard boundary, but rather, a gravitational core. You can visualize Web 2.0 as a set of principles and practices that tie together a veritable solar system of sites that demonstrate some or all of those principles, at a varying distance from that core.

Figure 1 shows a "meme map" of Web 2.0 that was developed at a brainstorming session during FOO Camp, a conference at O'Reilly Media. It's very much a work in progress, but shows the many ideas that radiate out from the Web 2.0 core.

For example, at the first Web 2.0 conference, in October 2004, John Battelle and I listed a preliminary set of principles in our opening talk. The first of those principles was "The web as platform." Yet that was also a rallying cry of Web 1.0 darling Netscape, which went down in flames after a heated battle with Microsoft. What's more, two of our initial Web 1.0 exemplars, DoubleClick and Akamai, were both pioneers in treating the web as a platform. People don't often think of it as "web services", but in fact, ad serving was the first widely deployed web service, and the first widely deployed "mashup" (to use another term that has gained currency of late). Every banner ad is served as a seamless cooperation between two websites, delivering an integrated page to a reader on yet another computer. Akamai also treats the network as the platform, and at a deeper level of the stack, building a transparent caching and content delivery network that eases bandwidth congestion.

Nonetheless, these pioneers provided useful contrasts because later entrants have taken their solution to the same problem even further, understanding something deeper about the nature of the new platform. Both DoubleClick and Akamai were Web 2.0 pioneers, yet we can also see how it's possible to realize more of the possibilities by embracing additional Web 2.0 design patterns.

Let's drill down for a moment into each of these three cases, teasing out some of the essential elements of difference.

Netscape vs. Google

If Netscape was the standard bearer for Web 1.0, Google is most certainly the standard bearer for Web 2.0, if only because their respective IPOs were defining events for each era. So let's start with a comparison of these two companies and their positioning.

Netscape framed "the web as platform" in terms of the old software paradigm: their flagship product was the web browser, a desktop application, and their strategy was to use their dominance in the browser market to establish a market for high-priced server products. Control over standards for displaying content and applications in the browser would, in theory, give Netscape the kind of market power enjoyed by Microsoft in the PC market. Much like the "horseless carriage" framed the automobile as an extension of the familiar, Netscape promoted a "webtop" to replace the desktop, and planned to populate that webtop with information updates and applets pushed to the webtop by information providers who would purchase Netscape servers.

In the end, both web browsers and web servers turned out to be commodities, and value moved "up the stack" to services delivered over the web platform.

Google, by contrast, began its life as a native web application, never sold or packaged, but delivered as a service, with customers paying, directly or indirectly, for the use of that service. None of the trappings of the old software industry are present. No scheduled software releases, just continuous improvement. No licensing or sale, just usage. No porting to different platforms so that customers can run the software on their own equipment, just a massively scalable collection of commodity PCs running open source operating systems plus homegrown applications and utilities that no one outside the company ever gets to see.

At bottom, Google requires a competency that Netscape never needed: database management. Google isn't just a collection of software tools, it's a specialized database. Without the data, the tools are useless; without the software, the data is unmanageable. Software licensing and control over APIs--the lever of power in the previous era--is irrelevant because the software never need be distributed but only performed, and also because without the ability to collect and manage the data, the software is of little use. In fact, the value of the software is proportional to the scale and dynamism of the data it helps to manage.

Google's service is not a server--though it is delivered by a massive collection of internet servers--nor a browser--though it is experienced by the user within the browser. Nor does its flagship search service even host the content that it enables users to find. Much like a phone call, which happens not just on the phones at either end of the call, but on the network in between, Google happens in the space between browser and search engine and destination content server, as an enabler or middleman between the user and his or her online experience.

While both Netscape and Google could be described as software companies, it's clear that Netscape belonged to the same software world as Lotus, Microsoft, Oracle, SAP, and other companies that got their start in the 1980's software revolution, while Google's fellows are other internet applications like eBay, Amazon, Napster, and yes, DoubleClick and Akamai.

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by Tim O'Reilly 09/30/2005 Oct. 2009: Tim O'Reilly and John Battelle answer the question of "What's next for Web 2.0?" in Web Squared: Web 2.0 Five Years On. The bursting of the dot-com bubble in the fall of 2001 marked a turning point for the web.

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Felix Stalder: The Digital Condition (2018) - deutsch: Kultur der Digitalität

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The show had already been going on for more than three hours, but nobody was bothered by this. Quite the contrary. The tension in the venue was approaching its peak, and the ratings were through the roof. Throughout all of Europe, 195 million people were watching the spectacle on television, and the social mass media were gaining steam. On Twitter, more than 47,000 messages were being sent every minute with the hashtag #Eurovision. The outcome was decided shortly after midnight: Conchita Wurst, the bearded diva, was announced the winner of the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest. Cheers erupted as the public celebrated the victor - but also itself. At long last, there was more to the event than just another round of tacky television programming ("This is Ljubljana calling!"). Rather, a statement was made - a statement in favor of tolerance and against homophobia, for diversity and for the right to define oneself however one pleases. And Europe sent this message in the midst of a crisis and despite ongoing hostilities, not to mention all of the toxic rumblings that could be heard about decadence, cultural decay, and Gayropa. Visibly moved, the Austrian singer let out an exclamation - "We are unity, and we are unstoppable!" - as she returned to the stage with wobbly knees to accept the trophy.

With her aesthetically convincing performance, Conchita succeeded in unleashing a strong desire for personal self-discovery, for community, and for overcoming stale conventions. And she did this through a character that mainstream society would have considered paradoxical and deviant not long ago but has since come to understand: attractive beyond the dichotomy of man and woman, explicitly artificial and yet entirely authentic. This peculiar conflation of artificiality and naturalness is equally present in Berndnaut Smilde's photographic work of a real indoor cloud ( Nimbus, 2010) on the cover of this book. Conchita's performance was also on a formal level seemingly paradoxical: extremely focused and completely open. Unlike most of the other acts, she took the stage alone, and though she hardly moved at all, she nevertheless incited the audience to participate in numerous ways and genuinely to act out the motto of the contest ("Join us!"). Throughout the early rounds of the competition, the beard, which was at first so provocative, transformed into a free-floating symbol that the public began to appropriate in various ways. Men and women painted Conchita-like beards on their faces, newspapers printed beards to be cut out, and fans crocheted beards. Not only did someone Photoshop a beard on to a painting of Empress Sissi of Austria, but King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands even tweeted a deceptively realistic portrait of his wife, Queen Máxima, wearing a beard. From one of the biggest stages of all, the evening of Wurst's victory conveyed an impression of how much the culture of Europe had changed in recent years, both in terms of its content and its forms. That which had long been restricted to subcultural niches - the fluidity of gender identities, appropriation as a cultural technique, or the conflation of reception and production, for instance - was now part of the mainstream. Even while sitting in front of the television, this mainstream was no longer just a private audience but rather a multitude of singular producers whose networked activity - on location or on social mass media - lent particular significance to the occasion as a moment of collective self-perception.

It is more than half a century since Marshall McLuhan announced the end of the Modern era, a cultural epoch that he called the Gutenberg Galaxy in honor of the print medium by which it was so influenced. What was once just an abstract speculation of media theory, however, now describes the concrete reality of our everyday life. What's more, we have moved well past McLuhan's diagnosis: the erosion of old cultural forms, institutions, and certainties is not just something we affirm, but new ones have already formed whose contours are easy to identify not only in niche sectors but in the mainstream. Shortly before Conchita's triumph, Facebook thus expanded the gender-identity options for its billion-plus users from 2 to 60. In addition to "male" and "female," users of the English version of the site can now choose from among the following categories:

Agender, Androgyne, Androgynes, Androgynous, Asexual, Bigender, Cis, Cis Female, Cis Male, Cis Man, Cis Woman, Cisgender, Cisgender Female, Cisgender Male, Cisgender Man, Cisgender Woman, Female to Male (FTM), Female to Male Trans Man, Female to Male Transgender Man, Female to Male Transsexual Man, Gender Fluid, Gender Neutral, Gender Nonconforming, Gender Questioning, Gender Variant, Genderqueer, Hermaphrodite, Intersex, Intersex Man, Intersex Person, Intersex Woman, Male to Female (MTF), Male to Female Trans Woman, Male to Female Transgender Woman, Male to Female Transsexual Woman, Neither, Neutrois, Non-Binary, Other, Pangender, Polygender, T*Man, Trans, Trans Female, Trans Male, Trans Man, Trans Person, Trans*Female, Trans*Male, Trans*Man, Trans*Person, Trans*Woman, Transexual, Transexual Female, Transexual Male, Transexual Man, Transexual Person, Transexual Woman, Transgender Female, Transgender Person, Transmasculine, T*Woman, Two*Person, Two-Spirit, Two-Spirit Person.

This enormous proliferation of cultural possibilities is an expression of what I will refer to below as the digital condition. Far from being universally welcomed, its growing presence has also instigated waves of nostalgia, diffuse resentments, and intellectual panic. Conservative and reactionary movements, which oppose such developments and desire to preserve or even re-create previous conditions, have been on the rise. Likewise in 2014, for instance, a cultural dispute broke out in normally subdued Baden-Würtemberg over which forms of sexual partnership should be mentioned positively in the sexual education curriculum. Its impetus was a working paper released at the end of 2013 by the state's Ministry of Culture. Among other things, it proposed that adolescents "should confront their own sexual identity and orientation [...] from a position of acceptance with respect to sexual diversity." In a short period of time, a campaign organized mainly through social mass media collected more than 200,000 signatures in opposition to the proposal and submitted them to the petitions committee at the state parliament. At that point, the government responded by putting the initiative on ice. However, according to the analysis presented in this book, leaving it on ice creates a precarious situation.

The rise and spread of the digital condition is the result of a wide-ranging and irreversible cultural transformation, the beginnings of which can in part be traced back to the nineteenth century. Since the 1960s, however, this shift has accelerated enormously and has encompassed increasingly broader spheres of social life. More and more people have been participating in cultural processes; larger and larger dimensions of existence have become battlegrounds for cultural disputes; and social activity has been intertwined with increasingly complex technologies, without which it would hardly be possible to conceive of these processes, let alone achieve them. The number of competing cultural projects, works, reference points, and reference systems has been growing rapidly. This, in turn, has caused an escalating crisis for the established forms and institutions of culture, which are poorly equipped to deal with such an inundation of new claims to meaning. Since roughly the year 2000, many previously independent developments have been consolidating, gaining strength and modifying themselves to form a new cultural constellation that encompasses broad segments of society - a new galaxy, as McLuhan might have said. These days it is relatively easy to recognize the specific forms that characterize it as a whole and how these forms have contributed to new, contradictory and conflict-laden political dynamics.

My argument, which is restricted to cultural developments in the (transatlantic) West, is divided into three chapters. In the first, I will outline the historical developments that have given rise to this quantitative and qualitative change and have led to the crisis faced by the institutions of the late phase of the Gutenberg Galaxy, which defined the last third of the twentieth century. The expansion of the social basis of cultural processes will be traced back to changes in the labor market, to the self-empowerment of marginalized groups, and to the dissolution of centralized cultural geography. The broadening of cultural fields will be discussed in terms of the rise of design as a general creative discipline, and the growing significance of complex technologies - as fundamental components of everyday life - will be tracked from the beginnings of independent media up to the development of the internet as a mass medium. These processes, which at first unfolded on their own and may have been reversible on an individual basis, are integrated today and represent a socially dominant component of the coherent digital condition. From the perspective of cultural studies and media theory, the second chapter will delineate the already recognizable features of this new culture. Concerned above all with the analysis of forms, its focus is thus on the question of "how" cultural practices operate. It is only because specific forms of culture, exchange, and expression are prevalent across diverse varieties of content, social spheres, and locations that it is even possible to speak of the digital condition in the singular. Three examples of such forms stand out in particular. Referentiality - that is, the use of existing cultural materials for one's own production - is an essential feature of many methods for inscribing oneself into cultural processes. In the context of unmanageable masses of shifting and semantically open reference points, the act of selecting things and combining them has become fundamental to the production of meaning and the constitution of the self. The second feature that characterizes these processes is communality. It is only through a collectively shared frame of reference that meanings can be stabilized, possible courses of action can be determined, and resources can be made available. This has given rise to communal formations that generate self-referential worlds, which in turn modulate various dimensions of existence - from aesthetic preferences to the methods of biological reproduction and the rhythms of space and time. In these worlds, the dynamics of network power have reconfigured notions of voluntary and involuntary behavior, autonomy, and coercion. The third feature of the new cultural landscape is its algorithmicity. It is characterized, in other words, by automated decision-making processes that reduce and give shape to the glut of information, by extracting information from the volume of data produced by machines. This extracted information is then accessible to human perception and can serve as the basis of singular and communal activity. Faced with the enormous amount of data generated by people and machines, we would be blind were it not for algorithms.

The third chapter will focus on political dimensions. These are the factors that enable the formal dimensions described in the preceding chapter to manifest themselves in the form of social, political, and economic projects. Whereas the first chapter is concerned with long-term and irreversible historical processes, and the second outlines the general cultural forms that emerged from these changes with a certain degree of inevitability, my concentration here will be on open-ended dynamics that can still be influenced. A contrast will be made between two political tendencies of the digital condition that are already quite advanced: post-democracy and commons. Both take full advantage of the possibilities that have arisen on account of structural changes and have advanced them even further, though in entirely different directions. "Post-democracy" refers to strategies that counteract the enormously expanded capacity for social communication by disconnecting the possibility to participate in things from the ability to make decisions about them. Everyone is allowed to voice his or her opinion, but decisions are ultimately made by a select few. Even though growing numbers of people can and must take responsibility for their own activity, they are unable to influence the social conditions - the social texture - under which this activity has to take place. Social mass media such as Facebook and Google will receive particular attention as the most conspicuous manifestations of this tendency. Here, under new structural provisions, a new combination of behavior and thought has been implemented that promotes the normalization of post-democracy and contributes to its otherwise inexplicable acceptance in many areas of society. "Commons," on the contrary, denotes approaches for developing new and comprehensive institutions that not only directly combine participation and decision-making but also integrate economic, social, and ethical spheres - spheres that Modernity has tended to keep apart.

Post-democracy and commons can be understood as two lines of development that point beyond the current crisis of liberal democracy and represent new political projects. One can be characterized as an essentially authoritarian system, the other as a radical expansion and renewal of democracy, from the notion of representation to that of participation.

Even though I have brought together a number of broad perspectives, I have refrained from discussing certain topics that a book entitled The Digital Condition might be expected to address, notably the matter of copyright, for one example. This is easy to explain. As regards the new forms at the heart of this book, none of these developments requires or justifies copyright law in its present form. In any case, my thoughts on the matter were published not long ago in another book, so there is no need to repeat them here. The theme of privacy will also receive little attention. This is not because I share the view, held by proponents of "post-privacy," that it would be better for all personal information to be made available to everyone. On the contrary, this position strikes me as superficial and naïve. That said, the political function of privacy - to safeguard a degree of personal autonomy from powerful institutions - is based on fundamental concepts that, in light of the developments to be described below, urgently need to be updated. This is a task, however, that would take me far beyond the scope of the present book.

Before moving on to the first chapter, I should first briefly explain my somewhat unorthodox understanding of the central concepts in the title of the book - "condition" and "digital." In what follows, the term "condition" will be used to designate a cultural condition whereby the processes of social meaning - that is, the normative dimension of existence - are explicitly or implicitly negotiated and realized by means of singular and collective activity. Meaning, however, does not manifest itself in signs and symbols alone; rather, the practices that engender it and are inspired by it are consolidated into artifacts, institutions, and lifeworlds. In other words, far from being a symbolic accessory or mere overlay, culture in fact directs our actions and gives shape to society. By means of materialization and repetition, meaning - both as claim and as reality - is made visible, productive, and negotiable. People are free to accept it, reject it, or ignore it altogether. Social meaning - that is, meaning shared by multiple people - can only come about through processes of exchange within larger or smaller formations. Production and reception (to the extent that it makes any sense to distinguish between the two) do not proceed linearly here, but rather loop back and reciprocally influence one another. In such processes, the participants themselves determine, in a more or less binding manner, how they stand in relation to themselves, to each other, and to the world, and they determine the frame of reference in which their activity is oriented. Accordingly, culture is not something static or something that is possessed by a person or a group, but rather a field of dispute that is subject to the activities of multiple ongoing changes, each happening at its own pace. It is characterized by processes of dissolution and constitution that may be collaborative, oppositional, or simply operating side by side. The field of culture is pervaded by competing claims to power and mechanisms for exerting it. This leads to conflicts about which frames of reference should be adopted for different fields and within different social groups. In such conflicts, self-determination and external determination interact until a point is reached at which both sides are mutually constituted. This, in turn, changes the conditions that give rise to shared meaning and personal identity.

In what follows, this broadly post-structuralist perspective will inform my discussion of the causes and formational conditions of cultural orders and their practices. Culture will be conceived throughout as something heterogeneous and hybrid. It draws from many sources; it is motivated by the widest possible variety of desires, intentions, and compulsions; and it mobilizes whatever resources might be necessary for the constitution of meaning. This emphasis on the materiality of culture is also reflected in the concept of the digital. Media are relational technologies, which means that they facilitate certain types of connection between humans and objects. "Digital" thus denotes the set of relations that, on the infrastructural basis of digital networks, is realized today in the production, use, and transformation of material and immaterial goods, and in the constitution and coordination of personal and collective activity. In this regard, the focus is less on the dominance of a certain class of technological artifacts - the computer, for instance - and even less on distinguishing between "digital" and "analog," "material" and "immaterial." Even in the digital condition, the analog has not gone away. Rather, it has been re-evaluated and even partially upgraded. The immaterial, moreover, is never entirely without materiality. On the contrary, the fleeting impulses of digital communication depend on global and unmistakably material infrastructures that extend from mines beneath the surface of the earth, from which rare earth metals are extracted, all the way into outer space, where satellites are circling around above us. Such things may be ignored because they are outside the experience of everyday life, but that does not mean that they have disappeared or that they are of any less significance. "Digital" thus refers to historically new possibilities for constituting and connecting various human and non-human actors, which is not limited to digital media but rather appears everywhere as a relational paradigm that alters the realm of possibility for numerous materials and actors. My understanding of the digital thus approximates the concept of the "post-digital," which has been gaining currency over the past few years within critical media cultures. Here, too, the distinction between "new" and "old" media and all of the ideological baggage associated with it - for instance, that the new represents the future while the old represents the past - have been rejected. The aesthetic projects that continue to define the image of the "digital" - immateriality, perfection, and virtuality - have likewise been discarded. Above all, the "post-digital" is a critical response to this techno-utopian aesthetic and its attendant economic and political perspectives. According to the cultural theorist Florian Cramer, the concept accommodates the fact that "new ethical and cultural conventions which became mainstream with internet communities and open-source culture are being retroactively applied to the making of non-digital and post-digital media products." He thus cites the trend that process-based practices oriented toward open interaction, which first developed within digital media, have since begun to appear in more and more contexts and in an increasing number of materials.

For the historical, cultural-theoretical, and political perspectives developed in this book, however, the concept of the post-digital is somewhat problematic, for it requires the narrow context of media art and its fixation on technology in order to become a viable counter-position. Without this context, certain misunderstandings are impossible to avoid. The prefix "post-," for instance, is often interpreted in the sense that something is over or that we have at least grasped the matters at hand and can thus turn to something new. The opposite is true. The most enduringly relevant developments are only now beginning to adopt a specific form, long after digital infrastructures and the practices made popular by them have become part of our everyday lives. Or, as the communication theorist and consultant Clay Shirky puts it, "Communication tools don't get socially interesting until they get technologically boring." For it is only today, now that our fascination for this technology has waned and its promises sound hollow, that culture and society are being defined by the digital condition in a comprehensive sense. Before, this was the case in just a few limited spheres. It is this hybridization and solidification of the digital - the presence of the digital beyond digital media - that lends the digital condition its dominance. As to the concrete realities in which these things will materialize, this is currently being decided in an open and ongoing process. The aim of this book is to contribute to our understanding of this process.

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The show had already been going on for more than three hours, but nobody was bothered by this. Quite the contrary. The tension in the venue was approaching its peak, and the ratings were through the roof. Throughout all of Europe, 195 million people were watching the spectacle on television, and the social mass media were gaining steam.

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Jasper Visser / Jim Richardson: Digital Engagement in Culture, Heritage and the Arts

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Jasper Visser / Jim Richardson: Digital Engagement in Culture, Heritage and the Arts

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Digital Engagement Framework zur Entwicklung von Kommunikationskonzepten für die Praxis

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Long-term customer engagement only happens when the value creation is mutually beneficial and - ideally - creates a little something extra. We call this the mathematics of digital engagement, where one and one should add up to more than two.

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Was waren die drei wichtigsten Erkenntnisse oder Aha-Erlebnisse aus dem Seminar?

Schreibe sie in die Kommentare zu diesem Post oder einfach für dich privat auf.

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- Sie haben einen Überblick über wichtige Kommunikationstheorien und kennen deren jeweilige Kernaussagen
- Sie kennen die Unterschiede zwischen digitaler Kommunikation und analoger Kommunikation
- Sie können die theoretischen Ansätze, die Sie kennen gelernt haben, auf konkrete Fallbeispiele beziehen.

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Überlegt erneut in Zweiergruppen, was ein mögliches Thema für eine Hausarbeit sein könnte. Leitfragen könnten dabei z.B. sein:
- Welche neuen Sichtweisen eröffnen die theoretischen Ansätze auf Probleme aus der Praxis?
- Inwiefern können sie helfen, Lösungen zu finden?
- Siehst du Widersprüche zwischen dem, was die Theorien vorschlagen und was du in der Praxis erlebst?
- Wenn ja, wie kommt es zu diesen Widersprüchen?
- Inwiefern können die Theorien grundlegend sein für neue (z.B. digitale) Handlungskonzepte in den Kultureinrichtungen?

Notiert eure Gedanken und stellt eure Ideen in der Runde kurz zur Diskussion (optional).

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- Vorstellungsrunde
- Einführung ins Thema
- Evergreens der Kommunikationstheorie (Referate)
- Digitale Kommunikation vs. analoge Kommunikation - Die 5 Cs
- Lektüremosaik: Digitale Kommunikationstheorien
- Praxistransfer

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Geht wieder in die Breakout-Räume. Lest den jeweiligen Text (Zuordnung in den Kommentaren). Diskutiert, was die Kernaussagen des Textabschnittes sind. Einigt euch darauf, was die drei wichtigsten Aussagen des Textes sind, schreibt diese kurz und knapp in die Kommentare des jeweiligen Pins.

Stellt die Kernaussagen kurz in der großen Runde vor (keine Textzusammenfassung).
Gebt ein Beispiel, was diese Aussagen für die (kulturmanageriale) Praxis bedeuten. Verwendet dafür gern das bereits verwendete Beispiel.

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Kultur der Digitalität

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Groundswell

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Here Comes Everybody II

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Here Comes Everybody I

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The Long Tail

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Curb Your Enthusiasm: Mel's Offer - Italian Restaurant

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Vier Ohren-Modell nach Friedemann Schulz von Thun

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Vier Ohren-Modell nach Friedemann Schulz von Thun

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Konzept von George H. Meads und Herbert Blumer
Bedeutung entsteht durch soziale Interaktion

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Rollen fallen nicht vom Himmel, sondern entstehen in Gesellschaften und für Gesellschaften - umso mehr, je dynamischer sich Gesellschaften verändern. Aber wie entstehen Rollen? Woher kommen sie? Wie verändern sie sich? Welche Chancen hat der Handelnde, bei der Gestaltung von Rollen (in Familie, Schule, Freizeit, Sport etc.) seine Vorstellungen einzubringen und durchzusetzen?

Diesen dynamischen Aspekten des Werdens von Gesellschaft versuchte der US-amerikanische Sozialwissenschaftler und Sozialphilosoph George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) in seinem Hauptwerk "Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft" gegenüber dem Behaviorismus schon früh zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Rollen werden daher nicht mehr nur als Verhalten durch Drill and Practice antrainiert, sondern sinnhaft vermittelt. Dies geschieht nach Mead in der Weise, das der Akteur sich selbst aus der Sicht des anderen betrachtet und reflektiert, welche Reaktion sein Verhalten in seinem Gegenüber auslösen wird. Er selbst sieht sich als Objekt aus der Sicht des anderen an.

Schon das Kind lernt nach Mead in Spiel- und Wettkampfsituationen, das konkrete Verhalten der anderen zu antizipieren und mit dem regelgerechten Verhalten - dem "verallgemeinerten Anderen" in Beziehung zu setzen, was er am Beispiel des Baseballspiels zeigt. Ein Spieler könne nur dann handeln, wenn er die Regeln, Aufgaben und Handlungen aller Mitspieler und auch seine eigene Rolle kenne. Auch alle anderen Spieler müssen dies mit seinem Verhalten tun können, damit das Baseballspiel überhaupt möglich ist. Dieser "Generalisierte Andere" stellt nicht nur das dynamische Regelsystem innerhalb eines Wettkampfes dar, sondern ist nach Mead typische für die Funktionsweise von Normen in der Gesellschaft. Durch die wechselseitige Orientierung an eben diesem Generalisierten Anderen kommt es zu einer sozialen Strukturierung des Selbst, das nach Mead aus drei Teilen besteht: ME, I und SELF. Die objektivierten Haltungen der anderen bilden das organisierte ME, es enthält die Normen und Ansprüche der Gesellschaft an den Akteur. Die Instanz des I dient der Selbstbehauptung, in ihm werden eigene Ansprüche und Gefühle artikuliert. Das Selbst (SELF) versucht, die Ansprüche von ME und I in ein gewisses Gleichgewicht zu bringen. So wird die These von Mead verständlich, dass das Individuum seine Identität durch die Interaktion mit anderen Individuen entwickelt, dabei selbst eine wichtige Aufgabe einnimmt und gesellschaftliche Restriktionen verändern kann.

Die zentralen Gedanken von G. H. Mead hat sein Schüler, der US-Soziologe Herbert Blumer (1900 bis 1987) systematisiert und den Begriff des Symbolischen Interaktionismus geprägt. Entsprechend heißt sein erste Grundsatz: Beziehungen haben Bedeutung. (vgl. Blumer 1973) Das Bild vom handelnden Menschen als einer Marionette, wie das die Rollentheorie nahelegt, täuscht darüber hinweg, dass die Fäden, an denen der Mensch hängt, nicht in allen Bereichen so klar definiert sind, wie es scheint. Soziale Wirklichkeit gleicht nur in bestimmten Bereichen der Mechanik eines Räderwerkes, in dem ein Rad ins andere greift. Vielmehr sind die Erwartungen der anderen (z.B. von wichtigen Bezugspersonen) wie Symbole zu verstehen, haben daher immer eine Bedeutung, werden von Ego und Alter immer interpretiert und so ins interne Handlungsprogramm übersetzt. Wenn Eltern von ihren Kindern erwarten, dass sie pünktlich nach Hause kommen, dann muss die Botschaft (Erwartung) von Ego und Alter halbwegs einheitlich verstanden (wann genau?) und von Alter auch beachtet werden und was zu tun ist, wenn es mit der Zeit knapp wird oder Unvorhergesehenes dazwischenkommt (Rückruf per Handy). Die Akteure lernen, da die Bedeutungen unterschiedliche Interpretationsspielräume lassen, mit den Unterschärfen von Erwartungen und Normen situationsbezogen und sozial sinnvoll umzugehen (Ambiguitätstoleranz).

Eltern sehen, dass sie mit ihren Kindern im Gespräch bleiben müssen, denn sie stehen in Konkurrenz zu den Wirklichkeitsdeutungen all der anderen Akteure (Freunde, Klassenkameraden, Schule, Unterricht, Medien etc.). Das Besondere an sozialen Situationen ist, dass sie nicht wie physikalische Tatsachen unabhängig von den Akteuren feststehen, sondern gerade über und durch die Akteure erst geschaffen werden. Dies kommt in dem nach ihrem "Erfinder" genannten Thomas-Theorem zum Ausdruck: "Wenn Menschen Situationen als real definieren, sind sie in ihren Konsequenzen real." Dies kann als ein Grundsatz der Soziologie angesehen werden und ist auf viele Vorgänge und Regeln übertragbar, die unseren Alltag gestalten und regulieren. Auch im Bereich der Ökonomie funktioniert soziale Wirklichkeit auf diese Weise: Wenn über eine Bank, die in sich gut aufgestellt ist, das Gerücht verbreitet wird, sie drohe, zahlungsunfähig zu werden, holen die Kunden ihre Guthaben von ihren Konten und die Bank wird tatsächlich zahlungsunfähig (self-fulfilling prophecy). Von hier aus wird auch deutlich: Wenn der Gesprächsfaden zwischen den Eltern und Kindern mehr und mehr einschläft oder gar abbricht, weil die Kinder mehr und mehr in ihre Welt eintauchen und z.B. Neue Medien für ihre Kommunikation nutzen, entstehen unterschiedliche soziale Welten. Verständigung wird schwierig, ohne dass dies am bösen Willen der Akteure liegt. Eine Pflege der Beziehungen macht dauerhafte Verständigung erforderlich.

Der zweite Satz von Blumer lautet: Beziehungen zwischen Ego und Alter werden dann und in dem Maße zu sozialen Beziehungen, wenn Ego und Alter bereit sind, wechselseitig die Erwartungen (Perspektiven) der anderen zu übernehmen und anzubieten. Vom Fußballspiel ist dieser Gedanke der Interaktion geläufig im Bild des Doppelpass-Spiels: Spieler 1 gibt den Ball an Spieler 2 in der Erwartung, dass Spieler 2 ihn zur Umgehung des Gegners wieder in den Lauf von Spieler 1 zurückspielt und Spieler 1 dann freies Schussfeld aufs Tor hat. Ein eingespieltes Team kann diese Form von Interaktion perfektionieren und auch dritte Spieler noch mit einbinden und daraus dann einen "Kreisel" machen. Im sozialen Alltag entsteht durch wechselseitige Verhaltensangebote soziale Wirklichkeit - auch role-Taking und role-making genannt. Vor diesem Hintergrund lässt sich der für die Gestaltung sozialer Beziehung wichtige Grundsatz der Reversibilität gut verdeutlichen: Wenn ich von dir erwarte, dass du fair mit mir umgehst, kannst du das auch von mir erwarten.

Die dritte zentrale Einsicht, die der Symbolische Interaktionismus über die soziale Wirklichkeit vermittelt, ist die von der Gestaltbarkeit sozialer Beziehungen, von der Plastizität der sozialen Realität. Rollen, Normen, Verhaltensweisen, Interaktionen sind gestaltbar und verändern sich. Dieser Aspekt ist besonders wichtig für das Verständnis von abweichendem Verhalten, wie dies entsteht und wie man damit umgehen kann. Das Beispiel, wie die Sozialisation ("Produktion") von guten und schlechten Schülern in der Schule vor sich geht und häufig als Ergebnis sozialer Beziehungen (Etikettierungen) angesehen werden kann, verdeutlicht den plastischen Charakter von sozialer Wirklichkeit und den Gegensatz zum Behaviorismus.

Dem Thomas-Theorem folgend gewinnt der Sozialwissenschaftler eine hohe Sensibilität dafür zu untersuchen, was die Akteure jeweils aus ihrer subjektiven Sicht als soziale Wirklichkeit ansehen und was nicht. Aber innerhalb dieses Konzeptes gibt es dann keine Möglichkeit mehr, zwischen Lüge und Wahrheit, Propaganda und Information, Richtig und Falsch zu unterscheiden. Alles, was für wahr gehalten wird, wird im Rahmen dieses Konzeptes als "wahre" Aussage angesehen. Denn es ist von vorrangigem Interesse zu analysieren, wie es gelingt, soziale Wirklichkeit zu inszenieren und zu konstruieren. "Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion von Wirklichkeit" - so der zutreffende Titel des Klassikers von Berger/Luckmann - ist das zentrale Thema. Der soziologische Betrachter versucht zu analysieren, dass und wie sich die Definition der Situation z.B. des Mächtigeren (Ohnmächtigeren?) durchsetzt, ohne jeweils auf ihren Realitätsgehalt hin überprüft worden zu sein. Eine Basis für eine Kritik der sozialen Situation, welche Krisenlösungen z.B. akzeptabel bzw. inakzeptabel (inhuman) sind, ergibt sich innerhalb dieses Konzeptes nicht.

Außerhalb der empirischen Wissenschaften und innerhalb der Alltagswelt der Akteure gibt es durchaus Möglichkeiten, diese Orientierungslücke zu schließen. Die meisten Menschen wissen, was moralisch ist und was nicht, was gut und was verwerflich ist, auch wenn sie nicht genau sagen können, warum. So ist in fast allen Kulturen der Welt die Goldene Regel bekannt und wird als Grundlage für humanes Denken und faires Handeln auch schon von Kindern anerkannt: "Was du nicht willst, das man dir tut, das füg auch keinem anderen zu!" Diese Regel nutzt die Fähigkeit des Menschen zur Perspektivenübernahme und fordert ihn auf, sein Handeln auf Fairness hin zu überprüfen. Systematisch hat der Philosoph I. Kant sich mit der Grundlegung der Moral beschäftigt, die Fähigkeit des Menschen zur Perspektivenübernahme, die in der Goldenen Regel schon verlangt wird, verallgemeinert und in die Form eines Kategorischen Imperativs gebracht, der so heißt, weil er unabhängig von empirischen Bedingungen und Erkenntnissen Allgemeingültigkeit beansprucht, also kategorisch gilt.

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forschen mit grafstat - sozialisation und krise

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Rollen fallen nicht vom Himmel, sondern entstehen in Gesellschaften und für Gesellschaften - umso mehr, je dynamischer sich Gesellschaften verändern. Aber wie entstehen Rollen? Woher kommen sie? Wie verändern sie sich? Welche Chancen hat der Handelnde, bei der Gestaltung von Rollen (in Familie, Schule, Freizeit, Sport etc.) seine Vorstellungen einzubringen und durchzusetzen?

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Warum überhaupt mit Kommunikationstheorien beschäftigen?

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Welche wissenschaftlichen Zugänge zu Kommunikation gibt es?

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Einfaches Sender-Empfänger-Modell