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I have been a part of the Asian American community throughout my entire life, although I have lived in areas that have been lacking in community and culture. As a third generation immigrant I grew up speaking English, never learning either of my mother tongues and often feeling very disconnected from my culture. Despite this, there was still an expectation from those around me to be immersed in my culture. There was a heavy stigma from the other Asian Americans around me to not be "white-washed". Because of this I often felt disconnected from the very culture I was apart of. As a teenager I put more emphasis into learning about my culture, joining clubs and spending more time with other Asian Americans. As an adult I still struggle to fully feel apart of my culture, often hearing from my peers that I'm white-washed or "not really Asian" due to my background.

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How have historical events shaped the experience of Asian Americans?

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How have historical events shaped the experience of Asian Americans?

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Early 1849: The gold rush in California prompted a need for labor, Chinese immigrants filling it quickly. Over time, Americans began to blame Chinese people for the lowered wages and their success, leading to violence and discriminatory laws against Chinese Americans and other immigrants.

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The dark history of the Chinese Exclusion Act - Robert Chang

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How have environmental changes shaped the experiences of Asian Americans?

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How have environmental changes shaped the experiences of Asian Americans?

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This video describes the creation of Chinatowns in America and how they were created to prevent the areas from being gentrified and delegating Asian Americans to the slums in these cities.

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The surprising reason behind Chinatown's aesthetic

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Violence against Asian Americans 2020-2022: Early 2020 was the quick rise of the COVID-19 pandemic. During this time, discrimination of Asian Americans ran rampant throughout areas with high concentrations of Asian Americans due to scapegoating against Chinese Americans for the COVID-19 pandemic. It is important to note that this discrimination was not just against Chinese Americans, but different races within the Asian American Community, as well as those who were racially profiled as Asian.

This article depicts some of the hate crimes against Chinese and Asian Americans and the frequency throughout the duration of the pandemic.

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Abstract

The recent high-profile cases of hate crimes in the U.S., especially those targeting Asian Americans, have raised concerns about their risk of victimization. Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, intimations-and even accusations-that the novel coronavirus is an "Asian" or "Chinese" virus have been linked to anti-Asian American hate crime, potentially leaving members of this group not only fearful of being victimized but also at risk for victimization. According to the Stop AAPI Hate Center, nearly 1900 hate crimes against Asian Americans were reported by victims, and around 69% of cases were related to verbal harassment, including being called the "Chinese Coronavirus." Yet, most of the evidence martialed on spikes in anti-Asian American hate crime during the COVID-19 pandemic has been descriptive. Using data from four U.S. cities that have large Asian American populations (New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington D.C.), this study finds that hate crime against Asian Americans increased considerably in 2020 compared with that of 2019. Specifically, hate crime against Asian Americans temporarily surged after March 16, 2020, when the blaming labels including "Kung flu" or "Chinese Virus" were used publicly. However, the significant spike after March 16, 2020, in anti-Asian American hate crime was not sustained over the follow-up time period available for analysis.

Keywords: hate crime, COVID-19, crime prediction, ARIMA, anti-Asian American

Hate crime is a distinct form of violence and aggression targeting a certain group of individuals on the basis of their religion, race/ethnicity, or gender identity ( Chakraborti & Garland, 2012; Hall, 2013; Perry, 2001). This emotional, hostility-oriented aggression likely heightens or hardens the common expression of hate while sustaining social hurdles between individuals having different identities ( Chakraborti, 2018). Scholars have proposed multiple reasons to explain why hate crime occurs. Some argue that critical/trigger events of local, national, and global significance could increase or decrease the frequency, severity, and the demographic group targeted by hate crime ( Awan & Zempi, 2017; Chakraborti & Garland, 2015). Traditionally, terrorist attacks or domestic economic downturns, such as recessions or depressions, are believed to contribute to increases in hate crime ( Byers & Jones, 2007; Hanes & Machin, 2014). Although there are likely to be several theoretical reasons as to why this may be the case, one commonly used framework anticipates that people tend to build more prejudice towards a group of distinct individuals, for example, an "outgroup," and express prejudice as aggression or discrimination when visual and symbolic differences that distinguish between outgroups and ingroups are considered as the cause of tragic events, resulting in the amplified ingroup and outgroup social psychology ( Allport, 1979; Byers & Jones, 2007; Jacobs & Potter, 1998).

The recent high-profile cases of hate crimes in the U.S., especially those targeting Asian Americans, have raised concerns about their risk of victimization. For example, on March 14, 2020, several members of an Asian American family in Texas were stabbed by a man since he believed this Asian family was infecting people with coronavirus ( Kim, 2020). More recently, a 65-year-old woman was beaten outside of a New York City apartment with anti-Asian American racial slurs such as "you do not belong here" said to her on March 29, 2021 ( Treisman, 2021). The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic was accompanied by intimations-and even accusations-that the novel coronavirus is an "Asian" or "Chinese" virus. These sentiments and the high-profile cases of hate crime against Asian Americans may have left members of this group fearful of victimization simply because of their race/ethnicity ( Sun, 2021). In fact, a recent Pew Research Center survey found a majority of Asian Americans worried about being threatened or attacked due to their race or ethnicity, and just over one-third of those that worried about victimization have made changes to their daily routines due to that fear ( Noe-Bustamante et al., 2022). Regarding the "amplified prejudice perspective," the recent pandemic coupled with the view of Asian Americans as permanent outsiders in society could amplify the prejudicial and discriminative perceptions among the in-group population in the U.S., resulting in an increase in hate crime against Asian Americans ( Gover et al., 2020; Tessler et al., 2020).

Yet, most of the evidence martialed on spikes in anti-Asian American hate crime during the COVID-19 pandemic have been descriptive (e.g., Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, 2021; Hswen et al., 2021). This useful evidence articulates a rapid increase in hate crime against Asian Americans along with the spread of COVID-19, but it remains largely under-documented. Accordingly, this study examines whether the recent spike of hate crime was linked to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and stay-at-home orders by empirically examining the trend of hate crime in several U.S. cities, including some which have the largest Asian American populations.1

Background

Hate Crime

In recent decades, hate crime has received increasing attention from citizens, politicians, and criminologists as a newer type of discrimination and criminal behavior that may heighten a hurdle for unification and harmony in society. Due to its nature, hate crime is distinct from traditional violent or property crime. The definition of hate crime highlights the motivation of aggressive behavior against a certain group of people in the form of hate, prejudice, and hostility underlying the commission of a crime, rather than the action that is the central theme in the traditional definition of crime (see Chakraborti, 2018). The underlying bias-based motivation is likely driven by differentiating or marginalizing other religions, genders, ethnic identities, or vulnerabilities/disabilities which are the core components of hate crime ( Chakraborti & Garland, 2012; Hall, 2013; Perry, 2001).

According to the legal definition, hate crime is defined as "crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender and gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity" (Hate Crime Statistic Act (28 U.S.C. § 534)). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also defines hate crimes as a "criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity" ( Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). The US Department of Justice (DOJ) categorizes actions into hate crime and other hate incidents ( Department of Justice, n.d.). Hate incidents are acts of prejudice that are not codified as crimes and they do not accompany traditional forms of criminal behavior such as violence, threats, or property damage. Hate crime involves violent and property crime, including harassment, assault, murder, arson, or vandalism, driven by biased motivation regarding the victim's race, color, religion, nationality, disability, gender, or sexual orientation. In sum, the DOJ explains that hate crime may include all the violent or non-violent activities targeting marginalized individuals in any form of verbal harassment, assault, or bullying due to differences in religion, gender, sexual identity, or ethnicity.

COVID-19 and Hate Crime Increases

In 2020, the outbreak of COVID-19 and the ensuing global pandemic has influenced the everyday life of countless numbers of people around the world. As of May 20, 2022, more than 525 million people have been infected by COVID-19, with more than 6 million deaths attributed to COVID-19 ( Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, n.d.). In the United States alone, as of May 20, 2022, just over one million people have lost their lives due to COVID-19 ( Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, n.d.) In addition, the pause to everyday life in response to COVID-19 has resulted in unplanned negative changes, including unemployment, the disruption of education, aggravated financial polarization, and the global financial crisis ( Boman & Gallupe, 2020). As well, pervasive stay-at-home orders, mask regulations, and other social distancing guidelines have caused unprecedented changes to everyone's daily routines (i.e., working home remotely or avoiding crowded public spaces), interpersonal contact (i.e., social distancing or virtual meeting), and social interactions (i.e., avoiding neighbors).

Changes in crime as a result of the pandemic and its associated public health response has not gone unstudied either. According to major news outlets at the beginning of the pandemic, crime was decreasing across the United States ( Jackman, 2020; Jacoby et al., 2020; Waldrop, 2020), which subsequent scholarly research has tended to confirm. Several dozens of studies have explored crime trends during this pandemic period, with the most consistent set of findings indicating increases in violent crimes throughout the later part of 2020, especially homicide, aggravated assault, and domestic violence (see Rosenfeld et al., 2021; Piquero et al., 2021). A recent, comprehensive study using daily counts of crime in 27 cities from 23 different countries showed that stay-at-home policies were associated with a decline in urban crime, but there was variability in this general conclusion across crime types and cities ( Nivette et al., 2021).

Recently, the publicization of hate crime against the Asian population has triggered a debate about another negative consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic regarding crime. According to the Anti-Asian Hate Crime Report (2021), hate crimes against the Asian population increased by 145% in the 16 largest cities in the U.S. in 2020 compared with that of 2019. Also, one poll about COVID-19 revealed that more than 30% of respondents had seen someone blaming the Asian population for the spread of the COVID-19 virus ( Ipsos, 2020).

Aforementioned, it is hypothesized that significant events (i.e., terrorist attacks or great economic downturns) are likely to trigger hostile emotions among the public, and individuals express those negative feelings in the form of microaggressions, violence, or other types of crime ( Byers & Jones, 2007; Muzzatti, 2005). People in major groups tend to perceive various types of threats to their own culture and system from the outgroup which in turn lead to feelings of anger or rage, resulting in more acts of aggression and hostility ( Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Smith & Mackie, 2015). According to Othering Theory, a racially/socially dominant group tends to differentiate or even marginalize a non-dominant group by labeling this outgroup as "others" and viewing them as deviant from the dominant culture and system ( Grove & Zwi, 2006; Sundstrom & Kim, 2014). Moreover, when this type of prejudice is merged with the symbolic image of an outgroup that is considered to contribute to recent tragic events, the hostile attitudes and expressions against the outgroup are likely amplified ( Byers & Jones, 2007). For instance, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, hate crime against Arab Americans and those of the Islamic faith considerably increased (e.g., approximately 1600% increase in 2001 compared to 2000) since those individuals were described as belonging to the same group responsible for the terrorist attack ( Hanes & Machin, 2014; Swahn et al., 2003).2 The existing social perception that visually differentiated the ingroup from the outgroup along with negative attribution played a key element in increased hate crime against Islamic individuals who were considered outgroup members ( Byers & Jones, 2007).

Asian Americans have also been considered as threats to the dominant group (e.g., White race) in Western societies due to the rise in economic, cultural, and military power since the 1880s, with this threat labeled as the "yellow peril" ( Chen, 2000; Hsu, 2015; Kimura, 2021). In accordance with rapidly growing Asian immigration rates, the fear among ingroup members of being invaded by Asian populations has remained and appeared in the form of legislation (e.g., Immigration Act of 1924) or general perceptions viewing Asians as forever foreigners ( Kil, 2012; Kimura, 2021; Tuan, 1998). Indeed, Asian Americans have been consistently treated with a stereotype of the model minority in secured and peaceful eras while being othered or isolated in times of economic downfall, wars, or pandemics [such as COVID-19] ( Gover et al., 2020).

The novel coronavirus was first reported in Wuhan, China, and news sources in late January 2020 referred to it as the "Wuhan Virus," or "Chinese Virus." For example, one such article stated "a second person in the U.S. who visited China has been diagnosed with the Wuhan virus, officials from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said Friday" ( Szabo, 2020, para. 5). In addition, government officials, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in the Trump administration, used those terms during the second week of March in public appearances rather than referring to the novel coronavirus as COVID-19 ( Boyer, 2020; Rogers, 2020). Some argued that these terminologies might connote racist or xenophobic messages to the public as they can sound like the promotion of aggression towards Asian Americans or they may be suggestive of excluding them from society ( Gover et al., 2020). Regarding the spread of biased terms and blaming attitudes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned in its mid-March intelligence report that hate crime against the Asian population could increase due to the presumed association between COVID-19 and Asian Americans ( Margolin, 2020). According to the Stop AAPI Hate Center, nearly 1900 hate crime against Asian Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic were reported by victims, and around 69% of cases were related to verbal harassment, including being called the "Chinese Coronavirus" ( Jeung & Nham, 2020). Also, Lee and Waters (2021) analyzed qualitative answers from 410 Asian respondents to a survey during the COVID-19 pandemic and found that around 30% of Asian American respondents experienced at least one type of hate crime or form of discrimination, such as being treated as a suspicious person in public, hearing racist jokes, being verbally or physical threatened, or overhearing racist comments. Taken together, it is hypothesized that the recent COVID-19 pandemic and widely spread blame on Asian Americans for coronavirus may contribute to an increase in hate crime against Asian Americans due to the amplified prejudice spawned by the pandemic and othering that already existed towards this outgroup's members.

Current Study

The present work focuses on the recent purported surge in hate crime, with a special focus on hate crime against Asian Americans in the U.S. The aim of the study is twofold. First, the trends of hate crime against Asian Americans are examined to assess whether they evinced any change(s) during the pandemic, especially with the use of the blaming label for Asian Americans such as "Chinese Virus" or "Kung flu." Second, this study is designed to statistically analyze whether the trends of general hate crime show unprecedented changes. The examination of overall hate crime trends is expected to provide hints on whether overall hate crime increased during the COVID-19 pandemic or whether hate crime against Asian Americans is the only type of hate crime statistically associated with this unprecedented event. For this study, data were drawn from multiple police departments to analyze changes in anti-Asian American hate crime during the pandemic that move beyond the descriptive analyses that exist.

Method

Data

The data for this study is comprised of two sets of hate crime data drawn from multiple police departments of some of the largest metropolitan cities in the U.S. Specifically, weekly general hate crime information between 2019-2020 is drawn from four police departments (New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington D.C.), while weekly anti-Asian American hate crime data were collected from the same four cities from January 2019 to March 2021. It is, of course, ideal to include many cities or a representative sample to maximize the generalizability of the study findings, but not all cities count (and/or report) hate crime, disaggregate hate crime by race/ethnicity, or provide data in a format suitable for time-series analysis. As a result, we relied on a convenience sample consisting of four U.S. metropolitan cities with large Asian American populations. In total, we had 104 observations for the weekly hate crime dataset and 116 complete observations for the weekly dataset for hate crime against Asian Americans. Datasets were comprised of data gathered from public city data portals or provided based upon public information requests.3

Looking at the number of hate crime each year in Table 1, three out of four cities reported decreases in hate crime between 2019 and 2020. Only Seattle showed an increase in hate crime in 2020 relative to 2019, with hate crime increasing by 63% in 2020. Also, Seattle received the largest volume of calls regarding hate crime, while San Francisco, in general, had the fewest reports of hate crime during the study years. With respect to hate crime against Asian Americans, considerable increases were observed in New York, Seattle, and San Francisco. New York appeared to have the greatest increase in hate crime against Asian Americans, with an increase of 3200%, from 1 incident in 2019 to 33 in 2020. In Seattle, overall hate crime and those against Asian Americans increased, even doubling among Asian Americans. It is important to note that hate crime against Asian Americans is a relatively rare event, and as such, small denominators and numerators can greatly influence percent change calculations. Because of this, we employ multiple methodological techniques to assess the state of hate crime in our four-city sample, to which we now turn.

Table 1.

City

% of Population- AAPI

Hate Crime

Anti-Asian American Hate Crime

2019

2020

Change

2019

2020

Change

Measurement

The definition and guidelines for hate crime are heterogeneous across the nation. Each police department defines hate crime following their city and state code or regulation. For instance, Seattle has a more expansive definition because police have three categorizations: bias incidents, crimes with bias elements, and hate crimes.4 Similarly, the New York and San Francisco Police Departments include both hate crime and bias incidents as unlawful acts that need to be reported to police. Meanwhile, the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department articulates that hate crime must be a criminal act based on the offender's prejudice or bias.

The US Attorney General's Office released a memo on May 27, 2021, relaying information from the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act and Jabara-Heyer NO HATE Act and explaining the DOJ's goal to combat both hate crimes and hate incidents ( Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, 2021). While hate crimes and hate incidents may be distinct, the memo stressed how both may lead to fear within minority communities. Following the Attorney General's May 2021 memo, and due to the limitation in differentiating hate crime from hate incidents in the data available from police departments, we operationalized hate crime as hate crimes and hate incidents reported to police departments. In particular, we analyze a weekly series of hate crime that includes all types of criminal behavior targeting any demographic groups as well as a weekly series of hate crime against Asian Americans. Data were aggregated to weekly counts, with the first week starting on January 7, 2019 (Monday) and running through January 13, 2019 (Sunday).

Due to this coding scheme, week 63 of our data (week 12 of 2020) starts with March 16, 2020, the third week of March 2020, and we considered week 63 as the start of the "intervention" for our analyses, or the break point marking the beginning of anti-Asian American rhetoric and stay-at-home orders related to the spread of COVID-19. We use the term "intervention" here and throughout the text to refer to the break point marking the beginning of anti-Asian American rhetoric related to the spread of COVID-19, something we believe to act as an exogenous force that might interrupt the pre-existing trend in anti-Asian American hate crime. In particular, we selected March 16, 2020, as the break point and segmented weekly data into pre- (January 7, 2019 to March 15, 2020) and post-intervention (March 16, 2020 to March 28, 2021). While there may have been public anti-Asian American remarks made in reference to COVID-19 prior to this date, Hswen et al. (2021) have documented the first expansive spread of this sentiment occurred March 16, 2020. Furthermore, in the third week of March 2020, most cities, counties, and states in the U.S. had issued mandatory stay-at-home orders in order to curb the spread of COVID-19. Previous studies also set March as a break point to examine the increase/decrease in crime during the pandemic (e.g., March 24 th in Piquero et al., 2020).5 Additionally, some officials in the Trump administration started using terms like "Chinese virus," "China virus," or "Kung flu" after Trump made those remarks himself in mid-March ( Gover et al., 2020; Hswen et al., 2021; Rogers, 2020; Scott, 2020).6

Analytic Plan

To explore the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, stay-at-home orders, and accompanying rhetoric that may have inflamed hostile attitudes and behavior towards Asian Americans in the middle of March 2020, we employ two separate analytical techniques: an ARIMA forecasting approach and a trend analysis. First, the ARIMA forecasting approach uses data from before the intervention to train an ARIMA model to predict hate crime after the intervention and then compares observed values to prediction intervals to assess whether crime significantly increased or decreased relative to what we might have expected. Point estimates and 80 and 95% prediction intervals centered on the point estimates were generated for this study for eight periods (8 weeks) post-intervention for the weekly series. If an observed (actual) value falls above a predicted interval's upper limit, this means the data point is significantly different from what we might have expected to happen 80 or 95% of the time.

Our second approach for examining the trends of hate crime against Asian Americans is interrupted time-series analysis (ITSA), also known as trend analysis. ITSA is typically used to evaluate the impacts of an intervention by comparing outcomes of the pre- and post-intervention periods. The intervention refers to the treatment, and the pre-intervention period is utilized to compare the outcomes of an intervention. In this study, the 16 th of March 2020 where the COVID-19 pandemic became widely spread so much that it began leading to stay-at-home orders and the blaming of Asian Americans for COVID-19 appeared in media reports is considered our "intervention" point, or the beginning of the "treatment" (i.e., anti-Asian American rhetoric). The data utilized is weekly anti-Asian American hate crime between January 7, 2019, and March 28, 2021, resulting in 116 weeks of observation. Therefore, anti-Asian American hate crime from the period of the 1 st week of January 2019 through the 2 nd week of March 2020 constitutes the pre-intervention series while data from the 3 rd week of March 2020 through 2021 comprises the post-intervention series. The statistical package "itsa" in STATA is used ( Imbens & Lemieux, 2008), and the model is presented in the form of the following equation:

Y t=β 0+β 1 T t+β 2 X t+β 3 X t T t+ϵ 3

where Y t denotes the hate crime against Asian Americans, T t represents the time since the start of the study, X t is a dichotomous variable indicating the intervention, and X t T t is an interaction term ( Linden, 2015). Therefore, β 2 represents temporal effects of the COVID-19 pandemic while β 3 represents continuous effects over time.

We begin by investigating weekly counts of hate crime against Asian Americans in our four-city sample with an ARIMA forecasting approach. Dickey-Fuller tests for the presence of a unit root and the "auto.arima" function in R were used to identify the best model for our data based on the 62 observations from the 1 st week of January 2019 through the 2 nd week of March 2020 to project eight weeks post-intervention. Second, we use the trend analysis approach with a longer follow-up period to examine anti-Asian American hate crime in our four-city sample. This analysis allows researchers to examine whether the increase/decrease in hate crime against Asian Americans is a temporary or a longer-lasting change, at least within the window of the data available. Lastly, the weekly counts of overall hate crime were analyzed with a secondary analysis of four cities, projecting eight weeks post-intervention.7

Results

Anti-Asian American Hate Crime

With our forecasting approach, we used the "auto.arima" function in R to fit a model to a subset of our data (weeks 1 through 62) to then test the observed data against 80 and 95% prediction intervals. According to the "auto.arima" results, the best fitting model is an ARIMA model of order (2,0,0) based on the first 62 weeks of data to predict the 8 weeks after March 16, 2020. However, the results of a Dickey-Fuller test suggested there is a unit-root and the series is non-stationary. A subsequent Dickey-Fuller test of the first difference of the data suggests the first difference of the series is stationary. To account for this, we fit an ARIMA model of order (2,1,0) to our data. The results displayed in Figure 1 show anti-Asian American hate crime spiked above the upper bound of the 95% prediction interval in the first week after the intervention and then returned to expected levels in the weeks thereafter.

Figure 1.

Weekly Anti-Asian American Hate Crime Projection, 4 Cities.

To conduct a longer-term evaluation of the trend of anti-Asian American hate crime, we employed 116 full weeks of observed data to conduct our trend analysis, with week 1 beginning Monday January 7, 2019, and the final week ending Sunday March 28, 2021. The intervention begins in week 63 of our data, or the 12th week of 2020. Table 2 contains the results for the trend analysis, and Figure 2 visually displays the estimated trend lines before and after our intervention. Using the "itsa" command in STATA to estimate pre- and post-trend linear regression estimates, although we see visual evidence of an initial spike in anti-Asian American hate crime, we found no statistically significant change to the trend of anti-Asian American hate crime in our four study cities.

Table 2.

Variables

Total

Coef

SE

t

Time before March 16, 2020

0.013

0.023

0.56

Start of March 16, 2020

−0.651

1.45

−0.45

Time after March 16, 2020

0.075

0.056

1.32

Constant

0.559

0.583

0.96

F (3, 112)

3.86*

Figure 2.

Anti-Asian American Hate Crime Trend Analysis.

The results in Table 2 can be interpreted as follows. The coefficient for the time before March 16, 2020, is the slope estimate for weeks 1 through 62 of our data. The start of March 16, 2020 is the estimated increase associated with the start of our intervention (week 63) and the time after March 16, 2020 coefficient is the estimated change in the slope from pre-to post-intervention. The post-intervention slope estimate can be calculated by adding together the coefficients for the time before March 16, 2020 (b = 0.013) and the time after March 16, 2020 (b = 0.075) to have an estimated post-intervention slope estimate of 0.088.8 However, none of the parameter estimates are statistically significant, which means there was no identifiable trend (increasing or decreasing) before the intervention, and there was no statistically significant increase or decrease in the slope associated with the intervention.

Total Hate Crime Forecasts

After considering model fit and the presence of a unit root, a final ARIMA model order of (0,0,0) was specified for the weekly hate crime series. Data were stationary, and there was no need to difference the series. Figure 3 displays the weekly hate crime forecast for our four-city sample. As can be seen in Figure 3, actual hate crime statistics for the weeks after the intervention did not exceed what we might expect them to be based on prior values. There was not an observable spike in total hate crime like there was for anti-Asian American hate crime. This might suggest the increase in anti-Asian American hate crime was due to a factor that might influence it alone and not affect all hate crime in our sample. This is particularly important because we detected a sudden (though short-term) spike for hate crime on Asian Americans that was not observed for more general hate crime, that happened to coincide with not just stay-at-home orders, but more importantly (and we believe not coincidentally) anti-Asian American remarks made by many influential persons that may have influenced members of the public.

Figure 3.

Weekly Hate Crime Projection, 4 Cities.

Discussion

Various media outlets have reported increases in hate crime against Asian Americans amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to a concern over the risk of victimization within the Asian American community. In fact, on March 20, 2021, President Biden signed the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act, due in large part to attacks on the Asian American community, signifying that the issue was a priority among the highest levels of the U.S. government ( Cathey, 2021). Our investigation comes on the heels of the descriptive research that has highlighted increases in anti-Asian American hate crime by applying two statistical modeling approaches to gauge whether there have been significant increases since the early stages of the pandemic and especially when high profile individuals started to use derogatory terms to describe the virus in public.

Two notable findings emerge from our multi-city research. First, descriptive statistics show that hate crime against Asian Americans increased considerably in 2020 compared with that of 2019. Three out of four cities in the study sample experienced a dramatic increase in hate crime against Asian Americans while overall hate crime incidents decreased during the study period for three of our four cities between 2019 and 2020. Further empirical analysis also revealed that hate crimes against Asian Americans temporarily surged after March 16, 2020, when the blaming labels including "Kung flu" or "Chinese Virus" were stated in the media by certain political officials.9 Indeed, Asian Americans have long been considered as "foreigners," and their communities have continued to experience being excluded and "othered" by the culture of racism and xenophobia ( Grove & Zwi, 2006; Kim & Sundstrom, 2014). Also, the repetitive emergence of anti-Asian American stereotypes caused by yellow peril occurred with the myths inherently differentiating Asian Americans from the majority population ( Gover et al., 2020; McGowan & Lindgren, 2006). When prejudice towards the outgroup was coupled with accusations of spreading the coronavirus, ingroup and outgroup differences were amplified, likely leading to the short-term spike in anti-Asian American hate crime. Adding to the prevalent and chronic discriminatory culture, the blaming labels on Asian Americans for stay-at-home orders and subsequent financial restrictions and tremendous loss of life in the COVID-19 pandemic is deemed as spiking the surge of hate crime against Asian Americans.10 Although we grant that this remains speculative, we are stricken by the spikes observed and encourage subsequent efforts to gather the necessary data to better examine individual-level motivation to fully assess the theoretical notions posited above.

This finding notwithstanding, it is also important to note that the significant spike in anti-Asian American hate crime was not sustained over time-at least with the follow-up data available for our analysis. There are possible reasons explaining this eventual stabilization, if it indeed has stabilized. As Chakarborti (2018) argued, three elements may play important roles in reducing hate crime and eliminating the discriminatory culture against a specific group of individuals in society: dismantling barriers to reporting, prioritizing meaningful engagement with diverse communities, and delivering meaningful criminal justice interventions. In this regard, police actively responded to hate crime, especially against Asian Americans. For instance, NYPD deployed plainclothes officers to Asian-populated areas in order to prevent hate crime. This initiative operated with a strong message that when people discriminate or target a person of a different identity, whether it is verbal, menacing activity, or anything else, the victim could be a plainclothes New York City police officer ( Eyewitness News, 2021). In addition, there were police departments that launched new taskforces/teams to deal with hate crime or opened their website for reporting hate crime victimization along with recently opened social organizations helping to report hate crime victimization (e.g., Stop AAPI Hate). These massive efforts to combat hate crime against Asian Americans might have delivered a strong message to the public that hate crime is no longer acceptable while encouraging involvement of communities in helping address social issues together.

In spite of the findings emanating from our multi-city investigation, we are also mindful of the limitations of our work. First, our data were limited to four large U.S. cities, therefore additional work in other U.S. cities (as well as cities around the world) would be important. Second, due to the lack of a uniform definition, the definition of hate crime is not perfectly consistent across the four cities in the current study. For instance, Seattle holds a wider definition of hate crime compared with that of Washington D.C. Since the data could not be reliably disaggregated into hate crimes and hate incidents, separating the two might yield alternative findings. Thus, future studies need to examine the differential effects of policies on hate crime and hate incidents, as well as the effects each have on perceptions of safety within targeted communities. Third, this study relies on official records and has not captured hate crime that were not reported to the police. Since hate crime may not always be person- or violence-oriented, there is a need to try and capture as many of these non-traditional hate crimes as possible. Lastly, it would be important as well to interview offenders who committed these acts in order to better understand and ascertain their motivations and whether their actions were influenced by the statements made of any particular individuals. This will be important to assess not only the theoretical rationales highlighted earlier in the work but other frameworks and constructs that may also yield insight.

Hate crime has a long history, and significant events likely trigger the blaming labels on a certain group of people in society due to different identities. In order to address its adverse effects, the community of scholars and government officials should continue to track the effects of COVID-19 and provide adequate service to people in need.

Author Biographies

Sungil Han, PhD is an Assistant Professor in the Criminal Justice and Criminology Department at the University of North Carolina Charlotte. His research interest includes environmental criminology, immigration and crime, and issues related to communities and crime

Jordan R. Riddell, PhD is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Missouri State University. His research interests include the spatial-temporal analysis of crime and criminal justice education

Alex R. Piquero, PhD is a professor and chair of the Department of Sociology and Criminology, Arts and Sciences Distinguished Scholar at The University of Miami and professor of Criminology at Monash University in Melbourne Australia. He is also editor of Justice Evaluation Journal. His research interests include criminal careers, criminological theory, crime policy, evidence-based crime prevention, and quantitative research methods. He has received several research, teaching, and service awards and is fellow of both the American Society of Criminology and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. He has received several research, teaching, and mentoring awards and in 2019, he received the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Bruce Smith, Sr. Award for outstanding contributions to criminal justice. In 2020, he received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the Division of Developmental and Life Course Criminology.

Notes

1.

Due to the limitation in differentiating hate crime from hate incidents in the data available from police departments, we operationalized hate crime as hate crimes and hate incidents reported to police departments.

4.

The term "Bias Crime" is interchangeably used with "Hate Crime". Since hate crime is motivated by bias it is widely called bias crime as well.

5.

Most cities in the US implemented stay-at-home orders between the middle to the end of March.

7.

To be sure, it is challenging to determine whether the dramatic spike after March 16, 2020, stems solely from the blame targeted at Asian Americans for spreading COVID-19 or from the possible effects of stay-at-home orders (or even some combination thereof). The key here will be if the intervention had a significant effect on hate crime against Asian Americans more than regular hate crime, it may be assumed that the labeling might have influenced the spike of hate crime against Asian Americans.

8.

According to the post-intervention trend results, the post-trend slope estimate is also not statistically significant.

9.

According to Figure 1, the unique spike in hate crime against Asian Americans is observed just before the 16 th of March 2020 which is the intervention point of the study. A set of interrupted time series analyses with a new break point which is the first week of March 2020 were conducted and the results showed similar findings indicating a short and significant spike after the first week of March 2020 but insignificant increasing trends after the intervention period.

10.

Given that stay-at-home orders were implemented around the fourth week of March in three sample cities (New York: March 22, San Francisco: March 17, Seattle: March 23, Washington D.C.: March 30) the spike in the third week of March can be linked (but causality remains uncertain) to the blaming labels.

Footnotes

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding: The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Sungil Han https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5438-9520

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Articles from Journal of Interpersonal Violence are provided here courtesy of SAGE Publications

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A rising share say they have no religion, but many consider themselves close to one or more religious traditions for reasons such as family or culture

Pew Research Center conducted this analysis to understand the religious identities, experiences and practices of people of Asian origin or ancestry living in the United States. The study is part of the Center's multiyear research effort focused on the nation's Asian population. Its centerpiece is a nationally representative survey of 7,006 Asian adults. The survey sampled U.S. adults who self-identify as Asian, either alone or in combination with other races or Hispanic ethnicity. It was offered in six languages: Chinese (Simplified and Traditional), English, Hindi, Korean, Tagalog and Vietnamese. Responses were collected from July 5, 2022, to Jan. 27, 2023, by Westat on behalf of Pew Research Center.

The survey includes a large enough sample to report on the views of the six biggest origin groups among Asian Americans: Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese. Together, these six groups constitute 81% of all U.S. Asian adults, according to a Center analysis of the Census Bureau's 2021 American Community Survey (ACS). These six groups are discussed throughout the report.

Findings for Asian origin groups other than the six largest are also included in the report - in the survey findings for U.S. Asian adults overall, and in findings about the "NET East Asian," "NET South Asian" and "NET Southeast Asian" populations. Origin groups other than the six largest each comprise about 2% or less of the Asian population in the U.S., making it challenging to recruit nationally representative samples for any of them.

Survey respondents were drawn from a national sample of residential mailing addresses, which included addresses from all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Specialized surnames list frames maintained by the Marketing Systems Group were used to supplement the sample. Those eligible to complete the survey were offered the opportunity to do so online or by mail with a paper questionnaire. For more details, read the survey Methodology. For questions used in this analysis, refer to the Topline Questionnaire.

In addition to the survey results, the report draws on guided small group discussions (focus groups) and in-depth one-on-one interviews. Details on these can be found in the focus group Methodology.

Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder. The Center's Asian American portfolio was funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts, with generous support from The Asian American Foundation; Chan Zuckerberg Initiative DAF, an advised fund of the Silicon Valley Community Foundation; the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation; the Henry Luce Foundation; the Doris Duke Foundation; The Wallace H. Coulter Foundation; The Dirk and Charlene Kabcenell Foundation; The Long Family Foundation; Lu-Hebert Fund; Gee Family Foundation; Joseph Cotchett; the Julian Abdey and Sabrina Moyle Charitable Fund; and Nanci Nishimura.

We would also like to thank the Leaders Forum for its thought leadership and valuable assistance in helping make this survey possible.

The qualitative research on Asian American Muslims, and the strategic communications campaign used to promote the research portfolio, were made possible with generous support from the Doris Duke Foundation.

Asians living in the United States/U.S. Asian population/Asian Americans: Used interchangeably throughout this report to refer to U.S. adults who self-identify as Asian, either alone or in combination with other races or Hispanic identity.

Ethnicity/Ethnic origin labels: Used interchangeably in this report for findings for ethnic origin groups, such as Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Japanese, Korean or Vietnamese. For this report, ethnicity is not nationality. For example, Chinese in this report are those self-identifying as of Chinese ethnicity, rather than necessarily being a current or former citizen of the People's Republic of China. Ethnic origin groups in this report include those who self-identify as one Asian ethnicity only, either alone or in combination with a non-Asian race or ethnicity.

Less populous Asian origin groups/Other Asian origin groups: In this report, those who self-identify with ethnic origin groups other than the six largest Asian origin groups (e.g., those who identify as Burmese, Hmong or Pakistani). The term includes those who identify with only one Asian ethnicity. These ethnic origin groups each represent about 2% or less of the overall Asian American population and are unreportable on their own due to small sample sizes. They are collectively reportable under this broader category.

Asian origins/ Asian origin groups: Used interchangeably throughout this report to describe ethnic origin groups.

Immigrant: Someone who was not a U.S. citizen at birth - in other words, someone born outside the U.S., Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories to parents who are not U.S. citizens. Also referred to as "foreign born" in this report.

U.S. born: Those born in the 50 U.S. states or the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories.

Like the U.S. public as a whole, a growing percentage of Asian Americans are not affiliated with any religion, and the share who identify as Christian has declined, according to a new Pew Research Center survey exploring religion among Asian American adults.

But the survey also shows that 40% of Asian Americans say they feel close to some religious tradition for reasons aside from religion. For example, just 11% of Asian American adults say their religion is Buddhism, but 21% feel close to Buddhism for other reasons, such as family background or culture.

Religious profile of Asian Americans

Today, 32% of Asian Americans are religiously unaffiliated, up from 26% in 2012.

Christianity is still the largest faith group among Asian Americans (34%).

But Christianity has also seen the sharpest decline, down 8 percentage points since 2012.

Asian American Christians are about evenly split between Catholics and Protestants (17% and 16% of all U.S. Asian adults, respectively). Born-again or evangelical Protestants make up 10% of Asian Americans.

Buddhists and Hindus each account for about one-in-ten Asian Americans, while Muslims make up 6%.

Various other religious groups (including Daoists, Jains, Jews, Sikhs and others) together make up about 4% of all Asian American adults.

The survey also asked Asian Americans how important religion is in their lives (31% say it is very important), how often they attend religious services (29% report that they go at least monthly), and whether they have an altar, shrine or religious symbol that they use for home worship (36% say they do).

Of the major Asian American religious groups, Protestants and Muslims are the most likely to report that they attend religious services at least once a month. By contrast, Buddhists and Hindus are especially likely to say they worship at shrines or altars in their homes.

Differences in religious affiliation among Asian origin groups

There are large differences in religious affiliation among Asian Americans depending on their ethnic origin group. For example:

56% of Chinese Americans and 47% of Japanese Americans are not affiliated with any religion - the highest percentages of "nones" among the Asian origin groups that are large enough to be analyzed in the survey.

Three-quarters of Filipino Americans are Christian, mostly Catholic.

59% of Korean Americans are Christian, mostly Protestant - including 34% who identify as born-again or evangelical Protestants.

Indian Americans are far more likely than the other large Asian origin groups to be Hindu (48%), though a fair number of Indian Americans are Christian (15%), Muslim (8%) or Sikh (8%).

Vietnamese Americans are the most likely of the large origin groups to identify as Buddhist (37%).

These six Asian origin groups - Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese Americans - account for 81% of all Asian Americans.

The survey did not include enough interviews with respondents in other Asian origin groups to be able to report on them separately. However, the members of less populous Asian origin groups were included in the study, and it is possible to analyze them when they are grouped together by region. Doing this reveals some additional patterns. For example:

60% of South Asians in the United States other than Indian Americans (i.e., those who trace their origins to countries including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan) are Muslim - higher than any of the six largest Asian origin groups.

38% of U.S. adults who trace their origin to Southeast Asian countries other than the Philippines and Vietnam are Buddhist.

These are among the key findings of a nationally representative, multilingual survey of 7,006 Asian American adults conducted by Pew Research Center from July 5, 2022, to Jan. 27, 2023. The Center previously has published other findings from this survey.

Importance of religion

While nearly a third of Asian Americans say religion is very important in their lives, Asian American Muslims (60%) and Christians (54%) are much more likely than Asian American Hindus (33%) and Buddhists (31%) to feel that way.

Looking at Asian Americans by their ethnic origin group, Japanese and Chinese Americans are notably less likely than members of other Asian origin groups to say religion is very important in their lives, reflecting the large number of "nones" (those who describe their religion as atheist, agnostic or "nothing in particular") in these two groups.

As a whole, Asian Americans born in the U.S. are somewhat less likely than Asian Americans born elsewhere to say religion is very important in their lives. And Asian Americans overall are somewhat less likely than the general U.S. population to say religion is very important in their lives (31% vs. 41%).

Attending religious services

About three-in-ten Asian Americans (29%) say they attend religious services or go to a temple, shrine or other religious space at least once a month, including 21% who say they do so weekly or more often.

Asian American Christians and Muslims are more likely than Asian American Buddhists, Hindus or "nones" to say they attend religious services at least monthly.

Regular religious attendance is more common among Korean and Filipino Americans than among Vietnamese, Japanese or Chinese Americans. (As previously noted, Korean and Filipino Americans are also more likely to be Christian.)

Overall, foreign-born Asian Americans are more likely than those born in the U.S. to attend religious services at least monthly (32% vs. 21%).

On this question, Asian Americans closely resemble U.S. adults as a whole, 31% of whom say they attend religious services at least once a month, including 25% who say they do so weekly or more often, according to an August 2021 survey.

Home worship: Shrines, altars and religious symbols

In some Asian religious traditions, religious practice is centered in the home rather than in a communal setting. About one-third of Asian Americans (36%) say their home contains an altar, shrine or religious symbol that they use for worship.

Using an altar, shrine or other religious symbol for worship in the home is most common among Vietnamese and Indian Americans, in part because this is a relatively common practice among Buddhists (who make up 37% of the Vietnamese American population) and Hindus (who make up 48% of the Indian American population).

Worshipping at home is also fairly common among Filipino Americans, owing to the large share of Catholics within the Filipino American population - 66% of Filipino Catholics in the U.S. say they have an altar, shrine or religious symbol used for worship in their home, compared with just 9% of other Filipino Americans.

While 36% of Asian Americans say they use a shrine, altar or religious symbol to worship at home, and 29% say they regularly attend religious services, only 15% say they do both of these things. This pattern reflects the varying worship practices of different religious groups.

For example, about half of Asian American Protestants (53%) say they attend religious services monthly but don't worship at a home altar. About half of Buddhists (51%) and Hindus (52%) say the opposite: They do not attend religious services monthly, but they do worship at a home altar.

Sizable numbers of Asian American Catholics (29%) and Hindus (27%) engage in both practices, attending religious services monthly and worshipping at a home altar or shrine.

Feeling 'close to' a religion for reasons such as family background or culture

In the U.S., being Christian is often perceived as an exclusive religious identity with a clear set of associated beliefs (such as a creed) and normative practices (such as attending religious services). In many Asian countries, however, religion and religious identity are often understood differently.

For example, the practices and beliefs associated with Buddhism, Hinduism, Daoism (or Taoism), Shintoism and Confucianism are often so infused in daily life in Asian countries that even people who do not identify with those religious groups may accept some of their beliefs and engage in some of their rituals.

The lines between members and nonmembers, as well as between the religious groups themselves, can be fuzzy. In China and Japan, for example, many individual temples and shrines are associated with multiple traditions. (Read the sidebar about the words for "religion" in Asian languages.)

Asian Americans are at the intersection of these two ways of being religious. Many identify with a specific religion, such as Christianity or Islam. However, many who do not identify with a specific religion still say they consider themselves close to the religious or philosophical traditions that are common in their country of ancestry. In addition, some Asian Americans say they feel close to multiple faith traditions.

The survey measured these ways of being religious with two questions. The first asked: "What is your present religion, if any?" The second question asked: "Aside from religion, do you consider yourself close to any of the following traditions for other reasons (such as your family background or culture)?"

In total, 40% of Asian American adults express a connection to one or more groups that they do not claim as a religious identity.

For example, 21% of Asian American adults do not identify religiously as Buddhist but say they feel close to Buddhism "aside from religion," while 18% do not identify religiously as Christian, yet say they feel close to Christianity aside from religion. And 10% express a similar connection to Confucianism.

About two-thirds of religiously unaffiliated Asian Americans (63%) say they are close to at least one of these religious traditions. (Jump to the chapter on religiously unaffiliated Asian Americans for more on this.)

The meaning of 'religion' in East Asia

In many East Asian languages, there is no single, literal equivalent of the English word "religion." The modern Chinese, Japanese and Korean terms for religion - , and - were all created in the early 20th century by Asian scholars working with Western texts who wanted to translate "religion" from Western languages and needed to invent a word.

Their definitions of religion were influenced by Christian religious norms, rather than developing organically from Buddhist, Confucian, Shinto, Daoist or other religious traditions that are more common in those countries, as we noted in our 2023 report, "Measuring Religion in China."

To this day, the words for "religion" in many East Asian countries and some parts of Southeast Asia refer primarily to organized forms of religion, particularly those with professional clergy and institutional oversight. The Chinese term zongjiao and its Japanese and Korean equivalents do not typically refer to some traditional religious beliefs and practices that are common in these countries.

Across East Asia, there are many beliefs (such as in spirits) and practices (such as visiting shrines and making offerings to ancestors) that might be considered religious, broadly speaking. But there is little emphasis in these countries on membership in congregations or denominations, except among Christians and Muslims.

These differences might lead Americans of East Asian origin to say they do not identify with any religion or that religion is not very important in their lives, because they do not consider their traditional spiritual practices - or cultural customs that have a spiritual underpinning - to be "religious" in nature. In a series of small group conversations, some focus group participants made this point. And the survey data supports it: More Asian Americans say they are close to Buddhism for reasons such as ancestry or culture than say Buddhism is their religion.

A similar dynamic exists in Asian countries. In China, for example, the share of adults who consider Buddhism to be their formal religion (zongjiao) is 4%, according to the 2018 Chinese General Social Survey data. But the share who believe in Buddha and/or bodhisattvas is 33%, according to the 2018 China Family Panel Studies survey.

Findings from our focus groups

After conducting the survey, the Center arranged small group conversations (focus groups) and one-on-one interviews with a total of more than 100 Asian Americans to gain an understanding of what religion means to them in their own words. In the conversations, participants were asked to discuss the nature of their connections to religions they may not claim as their own.

These are some of the most common themes that emerged on this topic:

Many people we talked to, including those who are religiously unaffiliated, expressed a cultural connection to the dominant religious tradition in their country of origin. This sentiment was also apparent in the survey results, which show, for example, that Indian Americans who are religiously unaffiliated say they feel close to Hinduism aside from religion at much higher rates than do religious "nones" of other Asian origin groups.

For some non-Christians we talked to in these conversations, feeling close to Christianity is an unavoidable result of living in the United States. One Indian American focus group participant who grew up in the U.S. and is not Christian, but who said she considers herself close to Christianity, explained: "My whole life I was exposed to Christmas and all this stuff. Even though I don't believe in it, we had to give gifts ... so it was always part of our culture, even though we don't believe in it." In the survey, 34% of religiously unaffiliated U.S. Asian adults (representing 18% of Asian Americans overall) said they feel close to Christianity even though they do not identify as Christians.

Some participants in these conversations said there is a natural affinity or closeness between certain pairs of religions that have shared beliefs, values or practices. For example, a Hindu participant expressed a personal connection to Buddhism "because some of the practices of Buddhists, they are very much similar to [Hindu practices]." And a Muslim participant drew parallels between Islam and Christianity, saying "in Islam and in Christianity there's a lot common."

Finally, some people we talked to questioned whether Confucianism or Daoism should be seen as religions. In the words of one Vietnamese Buddhist, "Confucianism and Daoism is part of my culture. However, for me, it's a school of philosophy. I do not identify myself as being a Daoist or Confucian." Another participant said of Confucianism, "There's no deity there. So it's only ... a philosophy." This view aligns with the survey's findings on Asian Americans' views on Confucianism and Daoism. (Jump to the chapter on Confucianism and Daoism.)

Other key findings

In addition to the overall religious profiles of Asian American ethnic groups, other key findings from the survey include:

12% of Asian Americans neither identify with, nor feel close to, any of the religions or philosophical traditions measured in the survey.

30% of Asian Americans say all or most of their friends have the same religion they do. This share is slightly lower among Buddhists (21%) than among Asian Americans in other religious groups analyzed.

77% of Asian Americans say they would be comfortable if a family member married outside of their faith. This is slightly lower than the share saying they would be comfortable if a family member married someone who is not Asian (86%) or married someone who is Asian but has a different ethnicity (87%). Korean Americans are less likely than other Asian Americans to say they would be comfortable with a family member marrying outside of their faith.

The remainder of this report details the survey's findings about Asian American adults who identify with - or feel close to - six religions or philosophical traditions. Click the links below to jump to each chapter.

Christianity | Buddhism | Hinduism | Islam | Confucianism and Daoism | Religiously unaffiliated

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A rising share of Asian Americans say they have no religion (32%), but many consider themselves close to one or more religious traditions for reasons such as family or culture. Christianity is still the largest faith group among Asian Americans (34%).

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The Stop Asian Hate movement was founded in March 2020 following Asian hate crimes which resulted from xenophobia and blame during the COVID-19 pandemic. Stop Asian Hate impacted the Asian American community by bringing light to discrimination and harassment which was largely hidden by the model minority myth. Members of the Asian American community came together to establish the movement and work to raise awareness on hate crimes and other discriminatory practices. Community members also supported each other by donating and sharing GoFundMes for families affected by hate crimes. While the founding of the Stop Asian Hate Movement preceded the death of George Floyd, the movement gained traction after the Atlanta Spa Shooting in March 2021. The movement was inspired by the Black Lives Movement through campaigning and other methods of protest.

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Health, Safety, and State

Health, safety, and state has impacted my community through both physical as well as mental health. The model minority myth has been used to obscure and minimize the importance of mental health in Asian American communities. Obstacles to physical health of Asian Americans are deemed less important than that of other marginalized communities, again due to the model minority myth. Social change of this lapse in awareness of physical health has been incited through community-driven political action of Asian American communities. The Asian Mental Health Collective has been established to alleviate cultural barriers and stigma around mental health and raise awareness in Asian American communities.

Education

Education has impacted my community by causing barriers to higher education due to the eradication of affirmative action. Social change has been incited through protests and campaigns to reinstate affirmative action. In this way, social change for the continued diversification of higher educational institutions has been used to bring together Asian American communities as well as other marginalized communities.

Social Movements

Asian American participation in social movements have existed long before the Stop Asian Hate Movement, working to protest against racist and discriminatory laws and practices, some examples being the efforts to save the I-Hotel and protests against the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Asian Americans have also participated in social movements affecting other marginalized communities, one key activist being Yuri Kochiyama in the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power Movement. Most recently, the Stop Asian Hate Movement has worked to raise awareness on racial injustices, discrimination, and hate crimes following the COVID-19 pandemic. This movement was greatly influenced by the Black Lives Matter movement and included intersectional participation by many BIPOC communities.

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Timeline of Asian American Social Movements

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Timeline of Asian American Social Movements

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Asian American Histories of Resistance Timeline | AACRE

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AACRE Activism Timeline tracks Asian American & Pacific Islander activism in the fight for social justice & equity

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Life Story: Yuri Kochiyama Yuri Kochiyama Corky Lee, Yuri Kochiyama, 1980. National Portrait Gallery; Smithsonian Institution © Estate of Corky Lee.

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Addressing Gaps in Health Care Delivery Among Asian Americans Through Community-Driven Policy Action

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Lobbying For Policy Change Regarding Physical Health 

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Lobbying For Policy Change Regarding Physical Health 

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In 2022, Chinese American households near the top of the income ladder earned over 19 times as much as Chinese American households near the bottom of the ladder. This gap was the largest across Asian American households of different origins, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

Income inequality is a measure of the income gap between highest- and lowest-earning households. It has long been a public concern in the United States, especially after the economic upheaval brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic.

A 2018 analysis by the Center found that income inequality is greater among Asian Americans than any other U.S. racial or ethnic group. In this new analysis, we explore income inequality within the origin groups that make up the Asian American population.
Related: The State of the American Middle Class
Income inequality differs widely across Asian origin groups

One of the most common measures of income inequality is the "90/10 ratio." This metric reflects the ratio of household income of those at the 90th percentile (the top 10% of earners) to those in the 10th percentile (the bottom 10% of earners).

Among all Asian origin groups in the U.S., Chinese American households had the highest income inequality in 2022, with a 90/10 ratio of 19.2. In other words, Chinese households in the 90th percentile of the income distribution earned 19.2 times as much as their counterparts in 10th percentile.

Sri Lankan, Korean and Pakistani American households also had high levels of income inequality in 2022. Within each of these origin groups, households in the top 10% had more than 13 times the income of those in the bottom 10%. Laotian and Vietnamese households also had 90/10 ratios above 11, indicating a high degree of income inequality.

By contrast, Burmese, Filipino, Nepalese and Hmong households had the lowest income gaps among U.S. Asians in 2022, all with 90/10 ratios lower than 8. Still, even among Hmong households, those in the top 10% earned 7.3 times that of those in the lowest 10%.

Income inequality has increased among most of the largest Asian origin groups

Income inequality has risen among nearly all of the largest Asian origin groups in the U.S. since 1980.

The biggest increase occurred among Chinese American households. Their 90/10 income ratio rose from 8.3 in 1980 to 19.2 in 2022. Korean, Japanese, Filipino and Indian households also experienced increases in income inequality over this time period.

Vietnamese Americans are the exception to this pattern. Since 1980, the income inequality ratio among Vietnamese households has declined by over 17 points in the 90/10 income ratio. It's not clear what is behind this trend, but many Vietnamese Americans in 1980 were new immigrants who entered the U.S. following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975.

Among Asian Americans, Chinese households are among the lowest - and highest - earners

Indian Americans are frequently the highest-earning Asian origin group when looking at different steps on the income ladder. For example, they top the list when looking at those who belong to the lowest 10% of households and the top 10% of households by earning levels.

The story is different for Chinese Americans. At the lower end of the income distribution - the 10th percentile - Chinese Americans who belong to the lowest-earning households were among the poorest Asian origin groups in 2022, with annual earnings of $10,500. At the 50th percentile of the income distribution - the median - Chinese American households were among the Asian origin groups with the highest incomes, with earnings of $65,800. And at the 90th percentile, Chinese households earned $200,000 in 2022 - second only to Indian Americans. (Incomes are adjusted for household size and expressed in 2022 dollars.)

The lowest- and highest-earning Asian households differ demographically

Across the six largest Asian origin groups in the U.S., there are some key demographic differences between those at the lowest and highest ends of the income distribution.

Nativity

Among most of the largest Asian origin groups, those in the bottom 10% of earners are more likely than those in the top 10% to be immigrants. However, Filipino and Japanese Americans at both ends of the income ladder are about as likely to be U.S. born as foreign born.

Length of time in the U.S.

For five of the six largest Asian origin groups - all but Japanese Americans - immigrants in the highest-earning households have higher or similar shares that have lived in the U.S. for more than 10 years when compared with those in the lowest-earning households.

For example, 71% of the highest-earning Indian American immigrants have resided in the U.S. for more than 10 years. A much smaller share of Indian American immigrants in the lowest-earning households (53%) have lived in the U.S. for that long.

Educational attainment

The top 10% of Asian Americans by earnings are far more likely than those in the bottom 10% to have a bachelor's degree or more education. This trend holds true for all six major Asian American origin groups.

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Income inequality is greater among Chinese Americans than any other Asian origin group in the U.S.

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Among all Asian origin groups in the U.S., Chinese American households had the highest income inequality in 2022.