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After the Census Bureau released detailed population and demographic data from the 2020 census, states and local governments began the once-a-decade process of drawing new voting district boundaries known as redistricting. And gerrymandering - when those boundaries are drawn with the intention of influencing who gets elected - followed.

The latest redistricting cycle was the first since the Supreme Court's 2019 ruling that gerrymandering for party advantage cannot be challenged in federal court. Here are six things to know about partisan gerrymandering and how it impacts our democracy.

Gerrymandering is deeply undemocratic.

Every 10 years, states redraw their legislative and congressional district lines following the census. Because communities change, redistricting is critical to our democracy: maps must be redrawn to ensure that districts are equally populated, comply with laws such as the Voting Rights Act, and are otherwise representative of a state's population. Done right, redistricting is a chance to create maps that, in the words of John Adams, are an "exact portrait, a miniature" of the people as a whole.

But sometimes the process is used to draw maps that put a thumb on the scale to manufacture election outcomes that are detached from the preferences of voters. Rather than voters choosing their representatives, gerrymandering empowers politicians to choose their voters. This tends to occur especially when line drawing is left to legislatures and one political party controls the process, as has become increasingly common. When that happens, partisan concerns almost invariably take precedence over all else. That produces maps where electoral results are virtually guaranteed even in years where the party drawing maps has a bad year.

There are multiple ways to gerrymander.

While legislative and congressional district shapes may look wildly different from state to state, most attempts to gerrymander can best be understood through the lens of two basic techniques: cracking and packing.

Cracking splits groups of people with similar characteristics, such as voters of the same party affiliation, across multiple districts. With their voting strength divided, these groups struggle to elect their preferred candidates in any of the districts.

Packing is the opposite of cracking: map drawers cram certain groups of voters into as few districts as possible. In these few districts, the "packed" groups are likely to elect their preferred candidates, but the groups' voting strength is weakened everywhere else.

Some or all of these techniques may be deployed by map drawers in order to build a partisan advantage into the boundaries of districts. A key note, however: while sometimes gerrymandering results in oddly shaped districts, that isn't always the case. Cracking and packing can often result in regularly shaped districts that look appealing to the eye but nonetheless skew heavily in favor of one party.

Gerrymandering has a real impact on the balance of power in Congress and many state legislatures.

In 2010, Republicans - in an effort to control the drawing of congressional maps - forged a campaign to win majorities in as many state legislatures as possible. It was wildly successful, giving them control over the drawing of 213 congressional districts. The redrawing of maps that followed produced some of the most extreme gerrymanders in history. In battleground Pennsylvania, for example, the congressional map gave Republicans a virtual lock on 13 of the state's 18 congressional districts, even in elections where Democrats won the majority of the statewide congressional vote.

Nationally, extreme partisan bias in congressional maps gave Republicans a net 16 to 17 seat advantage for most of last decade. Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania alone - the three states with the worst gerrymanders in the last redistricting cycle - accounted for 7 to 10 extra Republican seats in the House.

On the state level, gerrymandering has also led to significant partisan bias in maps. For example, in 2018, Democrats in Wisconsin won every statewide office and a majority of the statewide vote, but thanks to gerrymandering, won only 36 of the 99 seats in the state assembly.

Though Republicans were the primary beneficiaries of gerrymandering last decade, Democrats have also used redistricting for partisan ends: in Maryland, for instance, Democrats used control over map-drawing to eliminate one of the state's Republican congressional districts.

Regardless of which party is responsible for gerrymandering, it is ultimately the public who loses out. Rigged maps make elections less competitive, in turn making even more Americans feel like their votes don't matter.

Gerrymandering affects all Americans, but its most significant costs are borne by communities of color.

Residential segregation and racially polarized voting patterns, especially in southern states, mean that targeting communities of color can be an effective tool for creating advantages for the party that controls redistricting. This is true regardless of whether it is Democrats or Republicans drawing the maps.

The Supreme Court's 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause greenlighting partisan gerrymandering has made things worse. The Voting Rights Act and the Constitution prohibit racial discrimination in redistricting. But because there often is correlation between party preference and race, Rucho opens the door for Republican-controlled states to defend racially discriminatory maps on grounds that they were permissibly discriminating against Democrats rather than impermissibly discriminating against Black, Latino, or Asian voters.

Targeting the political power of communities of color is also often a key element of partisan gerrymandering. This is especially the case in the South, where white Democrats are a comparatively small part of the electorate and often live, problematically from the standpoint of a gerrymanderer, very close to white Republicans. Even with slicing and dicing, discriminating against white Democrats only moves the political dial so much. Because of residential segregation, it is much easier for map drawers to pack or crack communities of color to achieve maximum political advantage.

Gerrymandering is getting worse.

Gerrymandering is a political tactic nearly as old as the United States. In designing Virginia's very first congressional map, Patrick Henry attempted to draw district boundaries that would block his rival, James Madison, from winning a seat. But gerrymandering has also changed dramatically since the founding: today, intricate computer algorithms and sophisticated data about voters allow map drawers to game redistricting on a massive scale with surgical precision. Where gerrymanderers once had to pick from a few maps drawn by hand, they now can create and pick from thousands of computer-generated maps.

Gerrymandering also looks likely to get worse because the legal framework governing redistricting has not kept up with demographic changes. Before, most people of color in the country's metro areas lived in highly segregated cities. Today, however, a majority of Black, Latino, and Asian Americans live in diverse suburbs. This change has given rise to powerful new multiracial voting coalitions outside cities such as Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston that have won or come close to winning power. Yet the Supreme Court has not granted these multiracial coalition districts the same legal protections as majority-minority districts, making them a key target for dismantling by partisan map drawers.

Federal reform can help counter gerrymandering - so Congress needs to act.

The Freedom to Vote Act, a landmark piece of federal democracy reform legislation that has already passed the House, represents a major step toward curbing political gamesmanship in map drawing. The bill would enhance transparency, strengthen protections for communities of color, and ban partisan gerrymandering in congressional redistricting. It would also improve voters' ability to challenge gerrymandered maps in court.

With redistricting now beginning in many states, the need for Congress to pass reform legislation is more urgent than ever. Fair representation depends on it.

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The practice has been a thorn in the side of democracy for centuries, and with the new round of redistricting it's a bigger threat than ever.

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Everything You Need To Know About Redistricting

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Everything You Need To Know About Redistricting: An explainer from @changeil

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PR Library: How Proportional Representation Would Finally Solve Our Redistricting and Gerrymandering Problems - FairVote

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By Douglas J. AmyDepartment of PoliticsMount Holyoke College This piece is part of the Proportional Representation Library. (This piece is […]

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White men, age 21 and older, who owned property were given the right to vote in 1776.

The 15th Amendment to the Constitution removed racial barriers to voting in 1870, but states continued to practice voter discrimination and continued to deny Black voters a chance to participate in elections.

The right to vote was extended to white women in 1920.

It wasn't until 1965, after years of intimidation, murders, and advocacy that the path to the voting booth was cleared for Black people with the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The right to vote, regardless of race

Just eight days after Martin Luther King, Jr. led a peaceful civil rights march in Selma, Alabama, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced his intention to pass a federal Voting Rights Act to ensure that no federal, state, or local government could in any way impede people from voting because of their race or ethnicity. He signed the Voting Rights Act into law later that year, banning racial discriminatory practices in voting, including literacy tests.

Provisions of the Voting Rights Act

Originally, legislators hoped that within five years of its passage, the issues surrounding the 1965 Voting Rights Act would be resolved and there would be no further need for its enforcement-related provisions. They were wrong. Congress had to extend these provisions in 1970, 1975, 1982 and most recently in 2007, this time for 25 years.

Enforcement measures included:

Requirements for certain jurisdictions with a history of disenfranchising voters to obtain approval or "preclearance" from the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S/ District Court in D.C. before they can make any changes to voting practices or procedures. They must prove that the proposed change does not denying or infringe on the right to vote on account of race or color.

Requirements for certain jurisdictions to provide language assistance to voters in communities where there is a concentration of citizens who do aren't proficient in English to actively participate in the electoral process. This provision was added to the Voting Rights Act in 1975.

Federal election examiners and observers for certain jurisdictions where there is evidence of attempts to intimidate minority voters at the polls.

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One of the most important pieces of civil rights legislation in U.S. history, the Voting Rights Act was signed into law in 1965 by President Lyndon B. Johnson.

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Gerrymandering occurs when district lines are redrawn, often in distorted, complex shapes, in an attempt to manipulate election results and disenfranchise voters. Gerrymandering gets its name from Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, who, in 1812, signed a bill creating a district that looked like a salamander, which was then mocked as a "Gerry-mander."

The Census, Community Districting, and Gerrymandering

Every 10 years the United States does a population count, called the Census. The Census is used to determine political representation and allocate federal funding. Each state also uses Census data to determine how to divide its population into equal Congressional and local election districts, through a process called community districting or redistricting. This is intended to make sure that everyone's vote has equal weight in electing representatives - but when districts are gerrymandered, that's no longer the case.

Racial Gerrymandering

Gerrymandering comes in many different forms, the most notable of which are racial and partisan gerrymandering. In racial gerrymandering, districts are drawn to dilute - or, in some cases, amplify - the representation of certain racial groups.

For the most part, the Supreme Court has taken a hard stance against racial gerrymandering. A key enforcement provision of The Voting Rights Act prohibited states from dividing communities of color, and courts have time and time again struck racial gerrymandering down as unconstitutional. But, with the Voting Rights Act's enforcement provision no longer in place, states are free to draw district lines without first making sure that those districts are not discriminatory. Racial gerrymandering is once again becoming a common tool to disenfranchise and suppress people of color.
Partisan Gerrymandering
Partisan gerrymandering, on the other hand, is used by both Democrats and Republicans to dilute the amount of representation the opposing party can gain or amplify their own representation. So far, the Supreme Court has ruled that partisan gerrymandering is legally permissible, despite its negative impacts.

The U.S. Department of Justice used to review how districts were drawn, and sometimes they required states to redo unfair districts. However, the Supreme Court ruled in 2019 that the Justice Department doesn't have to review districts anymore, and if districts are drawn based on politics, Congress or the states themselves have to fix that. But the states created the problem, and some members of Congress were elected from gerrymandered districts, so we can't rely on those groups to make the process more fair.
Packing and Cracking
There are two main methods to gerrymandering - "packing" and "cracking." When a gerrymandered district is "packed" in a partisan way, people of Party A are drawn into one district, while Party B supporters are spread across many districts. Even though Party A will likely win their district, they'll only win one district, while Party B will likely win the rest and have a majority. "Cracking," on the other hand, refers to splitting people up so that their candidate is unlikely to get a majority in any district.

Effects of Gerrymandering

The effects of gerrymandering are widespread. Underrepresentation is obviously one impact of cracked and packed districts. Poor communities and communities of color are disproportionately impacted by gerrymandering, and as a result, their political power is diluted.

Gerrymandering also leads to political monopolies and increased partisanship. Gerrymandered districts can be used to protect politicians already in power by making their districts less competitive, and once redistricting happens, it can take up to ten years before lines can be drawn again. When districts are gerrymandered to be less competitive between multiple viewpoints, representatives do not have to compromise on hard-line stances in order to win seats. Fair representation requires a healthy push-and-pull that isn't present in gerrymandered districts.

What can we do to fight gerrymandering?

- Hold your state legislators accountable when new district lines are drawn, and let them know you want fair representation for everyone. Attend town halls, participate in local politics, and contact your representatives by phone or email to share your feelings about gerrymandering.

- Advocate for federal protections against gerrymandering, like the For the People Act.

- Register and vote in local and state elections for candidates that not only represent diversity and justice, but actually champion it. Never miss an election: sign up for Rock the Vote's election reminders.

Published March 14, 2022

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Gerrymandering occurs when district lines are redrawn to manipulate election results and disenfranchise voters.

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Manipulated election maps undermine the basic tenets of healthy democracy, including fair representation and government accountability. Redistricting procedures should be reformed to ensure a system of representative politics.

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Every decade, states undertake the process of redrawing their district lines for federal and state representatives. The process varies by state, but there are certain requirements and factors that are considered when lines are drawn.

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The Wisconsin voting rights case before the Supreme Court has been cast as the definitive test of whether partisan gerrymandering is permitted by the Constitution. But a closer look at the case and others like it shows that race remains an integral element of redistricting disputes, even when the intent of those involved was to give one party an advantage.

Consider Gill v. Whitford, the Wisconsin case that was argued last week before the nation's highest court.

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During its journey through the legal system, the case has turned on whether Republicans secured an impermissible advantage over Democrats in the way Wisconsin's Republican-controlled legislature redrew district lines after the 2010 census.

But because of the deep racial divides that pervade American politics, the story is not that simple.

Wisconsin's Democratic Party includes a substantial number of African-American and Latino voters, particularly in cities like Milwaukee. When you look more closely at redistricting plans drawn in Wisconsin and elsewhere, you see that both parties have improved their statewide prospects by diminishing the political power of minority voters.

As they fight in court over lines drawn after the 2010 census, Democrats and Republicans alike are anxiously waiting to see what the decision in the Wisconsin case will let them do after the 2020 census.

Michael Li, senior counsel at the Democracy Program at New York's Brennan Center, said the ruling carries extra weight because we can expect the most sophisticated chicanery yet.

"I'm worried about a record level of gamesmanship in 2021," said Li. "There could be an unprecedented redistricting war, and both sides are going into it fully armed."

Paul Smith, the attorney presenting oral arguments on behalf of the voters challenging the Wisconsin map, echoed this sentiment.

"What the court needs to know is it's - this is a cusp of a really serious, more serious problem," Smith told the justices. As computing power and data for redistricting continue to improve, he said, "you're going to have a festival of copycat gerrymandering the likes of which this country has never seen."

While many voters would be affected by such a festival, not all voters would be affected equally.

The record shows that the reliably Democratic voters in communities of color are crucial chess pieces in the partisan game that is redistricting. Republicans often benefit from packing such voters into districts, making other districts safer for Republican candidates. Conversely, a state's Democratic Party can benefit if it divides communities of color among many districts, giving each a reliable majority of voters who will support the party's candidates. This technique, known as "cracking" in map drawers' argot, often harms minorities, voters who might have greater clout if they were kept in a single district. In some cases it has proved politically expedient for the party drawing the lines to both crack and pack minority voters.

The Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder largely ended prior review of district lines by the Justice Department. That, along with rapidly improving technology that makes it ever easier to hide manipulation of communities of color for partisan gain, and the influx of massive amounts of dark money into redistricting, have put some of the voting power of minorities in jeopardy.

If the Supreme Court upholds the lower court decision in Gill, it will allow judges to evaluate, and possibly reject, redistricting maps based on a mathematical formula intended to identify partisan gerrymandering. It could offer those suing on behalf of minority voters a tool for fighting racial discrimination that wouldn't require the high standard of proof and commitment of resources a typical Voting Rights Act case would, said Leah Aden, senior counsel at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.

Upholding the lower court ruling in Gill would also reduce the incentive for political parties to use perverse (some would say cynical) interpretations of the Voting Rights Act and Constitution as a way to defend or attack partisan maps, Aden said. In Wisconsin, and also in Texas and North Carolina, gerrymandered maps have been defended by parties with an argument Aden called "The VRA Made Me Do It."

Gill v. Whitford features a novel variation of this tactic. A brief filed by the Republican Party contends that using the suggested mathematical formula to flag districts drawn for partisan reasons would violate the Voting Rights Act because districts with a majority of minority voters - Democratic districts - could get flagged as unfairly drawn.

At times, Democrats have also invoked the Voting Rights Act for partisan reasons, according to Smith, the attorney who argued the Democrats' side in Gill v. Whitford. The formula endorsed by the lower courts would allow Democrats to challenge redistricting lines without classifying their objections as a defense of minority voting rights, Smith said during oral arguments. This would reserve the important tools for protecting minority voting rights for cases in which they are legitimately needed.

Let's start with Wisconsin. It may indeed be a partisan gerrymander, but it still illustrates the complex intersection of race and politics.

Manipulating a map to move around Wisconsin Democrats also means manipulating a map to move around Wisconsin voters who are not white, said Malia Jones, an applied demographer at The University of Wisconsin-Madison.

"Wisconsin is one of the most segregated states in the nation," Jones said. "When we are talking about geography we are also talking about race."

One example can be seen in an assembly district on the western edge of Milwaukee, a city infamous for its near-perfect division between downtown African-American neighborhoods and white affluent suburbs. In an unprecedented move, Republican map drawers crossed the Milwaukee County line to loop 60 percent minority city neighborhoods into a sprawling suburban district that is, after the redistricting, 87 percent white, according to a ProPublica analysis.

In Highly Segregated Areas Like Milwaukee, Race Always Plays a Factor in Redistricting

Proportion of white, black, and Hispanic residents in Milwaukee County

This is, in fact, a dilution of Democratic voting power. But it also places thousands of African-American and Latino citizens in a heavily white district where they have little hope of electing a candidate who will represent their interests.

"Clearly there is an impact on minority populations," Jones said.

As in many gerrymandering cases, the attorneys defending the state's redistricting have argued that the map reflects, among other considerations, an effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act and protect minority voters.

The first test of the Wisconsin map was a successful challenge arguing racial discrimination. In Baldus v. Brennan, federal judges ruled that two state assembly districts in the Latino area of Milwaukee were an example of cracking.

Depositions given by the Republican map drawers as part of the case show that this was hardly an accident. They sought input from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, but then disregarded it in order to limit consideration of Latino voters to two assembly districts and keep the rest of the map intact.

Emails surfaced showing the map drawers had worked with a political science professor in Oklahoma to manipulate the difference between the number of voting-age Latino residents in a district and the number who are citizens and eligible to vote.

While the court found that Latino voters' rights had been violated, they only changed the two assembly districts.

The outcome of Gill comes at a time when minority voters are facing obstacles they haven't faced in decades.

Before 2013, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required states and municipalities with a history of discrimination against minority voters to submit redistricting plans to the Department of Justice for review by attorneys, investigators, data analysts and sometimes political scientists.

The Department of Justice could reject the plan, preventing the proposed districts from ever being used in an election. The state or municipality could challenge the decision in federal court, but would be up against the formidable resources of the department.

Though it was imperfect, "there's no doubt preclearance had a significant deterrent effect," said John Powers, a former Section 5 analyst at the agency who now works for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.

It also forced jurisdictions to report changes to districts, Powers said. While a change to a congressional district is unlikely to go unnoticed, a change at the local level might - even though those lines can have a huge impact on citizens' lives. "Now, they can make changes and it's possible no one will even know."

In 2013, however, the Supreme Court ended many protections of the law. Though Section 5 is still in place, nearly all jurisdictions once subject to preclearance are no longer.

States and other jurisdictions did not even wait for the next census to get to work on re-engineering their political maps. The state of Georgia and municipalities in Louisiana, North Carolina and Texas drew new lines, prompting immediate lawsuits. All would have required pre-approval before the Shelby ruling.

For example, Georgia currently faces a lawsuit from the NAACP over two changes in their mid-decade redistricting. Ahead of the 2016 election, legislators shifted over a thousand African-American and Hispanic voters out of Georgia House District 105, one of the most contested seats in the state, to a majority-white neighboring district with an uncontested seat. The Republican incumbent in District 105 won by fewer than 250 votes.

Republicans were "trying to shore up districts that were too close for comfort by moving around African-Americans," said Li.

Georgia's Mid-Decade Redistricting Plan Moved Around Minority Voters to Secure a Republican Seat

Georgia Assembly Districts, 2014 vs. 2016

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AK ME V T NH MA W A MT ND SD MN WI MI NY C T RI OR ID W Y NE IA IL IN OH P A NJ C A NV UT CO K S MO KY WV DC MD DE AZ NM OK AR TN VA NC TX LA MS AL G A SC HI FL P ending R edistricting C as e s

The effective end of preclearance shifted the burden of policing the system from the government to privately funded lawsuits, and it allowed contested maps to come into effect while those costly lawsuits wended their way through the courts - often, for years.

Anita Earls, an attorney who has handled many redistricting lawsuits - including the ongoing suit in North Carolina - said even simple cases that do not go to trial can cost tens of thousands of dollars. A recent lawsuit over city council redistricting in Pasadena, Texas, cost plaintiffs over a million dollars. Larger cases, like North Carolina House and Senate redistricting, can run up legal bills of millions of dollars and take many years. In some cases, the defendants can eventually be compelled by the court to pay the plaintiffs' legal bills, but plaintiffs are required to front the money. Reimbursements are by no means guaranteed.

Earls said her group, the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, has had to turn down requests for help.

"There are a lot of different cases where we have to tell them we don't have money and staff," she said. "There are places where people end up just kind of living with the unfair plan."

Redistricting lawsuits also take time - often years - a phenomenon that supporters of the Whitford plaintiffs hope will be ameliorated by removing the complication of challenging districts one at a time.

While the court challenges drag on, interim lines often remain in effect as votes are cast. North Carolina has gone through three election cycles using state legislative lines later found to be discriminatory.

In 2017, 19 North Carolina House Districts Were Overturned for Packing Black Voters

Black population by North Carolina House Districts and overturned districts

When party operatives and legislators draw maps, they are aware that it could take years to overturn a redistricting plan, and intentionally use delaying tactics to make sure elections take place under the most favorable circumstances, Earls said.

In North Carolina, she said, state officials "at every step of the way tried to delay litigation, did everything they could to stretch this out."

As ProPublica has previously reported, donors who supported the racially gerrymandered plan even used a front group to manipulate state judicial elections, so as to ensure redistricting cases would be heard by a Republican panel of judges.

Pressure on state judges further delayed the legal process, forcing the litigants contesting North Carolina's redistricting plan to turn to the federal courts, Earls said.

Such delays can pay political dividends. During the years North Carolina's maps were being challenged in court, the legislature under the disputed map passed laws that substantially affected African Americans. Lawmakers imposed stricter rules for voter ID and eliminated the state's earned income tax credit, a provision that lowers the taxes paid by the poorest residents.

"North Carolina has had a crazy few years in terms of legislation," said Li of the Brennan Center. "You can't turn back the clock, what's happened has happened."

While citizen groups struggle to find resources to mount redistricting battles, state legislators use money from the state treasury to defend their redistricting maps. Regardless of the outcome, the taxpayers, not the political parties or campaign committees, end up on the hook for legal costs.

North Carolina's redistricting saga also illustrates the false distinction between race and politics that permeates redistricting.

In their secret map-drawing process, Republican operatives were explicit about their plan to achieve their desired political outcome: a "10-3" map that had 10 safe Republican congressional districts with only three for Democrats, a big change for a state that at the time had a delegation with seven Democrats and six Republicans.

And they were also pretty explicit - at least to each other - about how they planned to achieve their desired party breakdown.

In an email circulating two proposed maps, Tom Hofeller, a Republican redistricting expert sent in by the national Republican Party wrote that both "incorporate all the significant concentrations of minority voters in the northeast into the first district."

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court affirmed lower court decisions that found North Carolina's congressional and state legislative maps discriminated against minority voters, specifically by packing minorities into a small number of districts to achieve the maximum number of Republican-friendly seats.

Required to draw new maps, Republican state party leadership announced they would achieve the same 10-3 congressional delegation breakdown, and the same healthy majority in the state legislature, without looking at race at all.

"Race was not among the criteria we considered when we drew these maps," David Lewis, the Republican member of the state assembly who served as the redistricting point person, told the Associated Press.

Hofeller, the same consultant who drew the original maps, would redraw the maps only looking at political data, with an eye to protecting incumbents elected under previous maps, Lewis said.

In other words, a strictly partisan gerrymander.

But the groups who originally sued against the racially gerrymandered maps said the new maps had simply become discriminatory against African-American voters elsewhere in the state. Once again, they asked the courts to strike those maps down. The case is pending.

"You can't comply with Voting Rights Act and avoid racial bias by simply ignoring race altogether," said Bob Hope, Executive Director of Democracy NC.

Some states have been found to violate the civil rights of minority voters during multiple redistricting cycles. Texas' district lines - drawn by both Republican and Democrat-controlled legislatures - have been thrown out on racial-discrimination grounds for nearly 30 years - during the redistricting of the 1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s.

Texas Is No Stranger to Overturned Gerrymanders

Three decades of struck-down congressional district maps

Emails between those who drew the maps in 2010 show intentional exploitation of Hispanic voters to achieve partisan goals.

In a series of emails between map drawers, they discuss a phenomenon called "OHRVS," an acronym which stands for Optimal Hispanic Republican Voting Strength. That acronym was defined by Eric Opiela, a Republican party operative, as "a measure of how Hispanic, and Republican at the same time we can make a particular census block."

By substituting groups of Hispanic voters with low voter turnout for those with high turnout, Republicans were able to draw hypothetical maps that would create seemingly impossible political districts. One example is a 67 percent Hispanic congressional district that the map drawers projected would nonetheless likely have been won by John McCain or former Republican Gov. Rick Perry.

Texas, which in the 1990s was run by Democrats, also contradicts the notion that Democratic party interests necessarily align with those of minority voters, Aden said.

"In current politics Republicans dominate state legislatures, so more recently it's Republicans that have been accused of undermining the redistricting process," she said, but before this recent turn, districts in Texas, Arkansas and Mississippi drawn by Democrat-controlled legislatures were found to be discriminatory.

Though scrutiny of statewide partisan redistricting (one of Gill 's possible outcomes) could be a useful tool to keep state parties from going overboard - and also to fight racial gerrymandering - it cannot detect the subtleties of racial gerrymandering like those that took place in Georgia and Wisconsin.

Those gerrymanders will still have to be challenged the old-fashioned way, and in order to do that, challengers will need access to information about how decisions were made in drawing maps.

But transparency in redistricting is the exception, not the rule.

One thing the states we reviewed have in common is that the public map-drawing process was largely a charade. Emails and documents that subsequently emerged showed the real drawing was done behind closed doors by party operatives and consultants.

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In Wisconsin, for instance, the maps were drawn at a law firm associated with the Republican Party, and vetted by the Republican National Committee before anyone in the general public was even allowed to see them.

In North Carolina, the maps were also drawn at a non-government site and a wealthy donor was allowed to see drafts and offer input.

In Texas, Republicans in the state legislature turned to consultants operating in secret.

As more donor money flows into the process and mapmaking tools get more sophisticated, the importance of map drawing in the public eye will only become more important, said the Brennan Center's Li.

Regardless of the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, experts say it will be important for the public to have a detailed picture of the redistricting process. That goal, they say, can only be achieved when the map drawing process is truly public.

"If communities aren't being heard, or shut out, if a redistricting plan is rammed through or rushed," Aden said, "That is a step that needs to be exposed."

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'Partisan' Gerrymandering Is Still About Race

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The Wisconsin case before the Supreme Court claims to be about partisanship. But race is a factor in this case and many others nationwide.

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Frequently asked questions regarding the supplemental application are available, click here.

Below are some of the most frequently asked questions about the Citizens Redistricting Commission (Commission).

Q. What is the Commission?

A. Every 10 years, after the federal census, California must redraw the boundaries of its Congressional, State Senate, State Assembly, and State Board of Equalization districts, to reflect the new population data. Now those lines will be drawn by the Commission. California voters authorized the creation of the Commission when they passed the Voters First Act, which appeared as Proposition 11 on the November 2008 general election ballot. Under the Act, the Commission is charged with drawing the boundaries of California's Congressional, Senate, Assembly and Board of Equalization electoral districts.

Q. How many Commission members are there?

A. The commission has 14 members from varied ethnic backgrounds and geographic locations in the state and includes five Democrats, five Republicans, and four Decline to State.

Q. What was the process of becoming a member of the Commission?

A. When the applications became available, interested parties submitted their applications online. Applicants who affirmed in their applications that they met all of the qualifications in the Act for serving on the Commission, and did not have a "conflict of interest" were invited to submit a supplemental application containing additional information about their qualifications.

Q. How were the members of the Commission selected after the application period closed?

Interested parties submitted their application online. Applicants who met the qualifications in the Act and did not have a "conflict of interest" were invited to submit a supplemental application in which they answered essay questions providing insight into their professional experience, awareness of California's diversity, and their reasons for wanting to serve on the Commission.

Three independent auditors from the Bureau of State Audits reviewed the applications and selected 120 of the most qualified applicants to be interviewed in Sacramento. The 120 applicants were divided into 3 sub-pools: 40 Democrats, 40 Republicans, and 40 who were neither Democrats nor Republicans.

Following the interviews, the total pool was reduced to 60, again with equal sub-pools. Those 60 names were sent to the leadership of both houses of the Legislature, where the leaders exercised their right under the Act to remove up to 24 applicants from the pool.

On November 18, 2010, the State Auditor randomly drew the names of 3 Democrats, 3 Republicans and 2 Decline to State applicants and they became the first 8 members of the Commission. Subsequently, on December 15, 2010, the first 8 selected the final 6 commissioners, choosing 2 Democrats, 2 Republicans and 2 Decline to State.

Q. Will Commission members be paid?

The Act specifies that members of the Commission will be compensated at the rate of $300 for each day a commissioner is engaged in Commission business. The Act also allows for reimbursement for personal expenses incurred in connection with the duties required of commissioners.

Q How long will Commission members serve?

The Act states that the Commission will serve for 10 years, however, most of the work that the commissioners will perform should be completed by the time they approve the maps of the new districts, which is required by August 15, 2011.

Q. How can we find out more about the Commissioners' backgrounds?

A. Brief bios of the Commissioners are posted at wedrawthelines.com. The Commissioners' very exhaustive supplemental applications are also posted as well as their financial disclosure statements.

Q. What is the difference between reapportionment and redistricting?

A. Reapportionment is the permanent process by which seats in the US House of Representatives are redistributed among the 50 states according to each census. Redistricting is the process of drawing district lines which means changing the boundaries every ten years following the census.

Q. Why should Californians have confidence that 14 Commissioners who are unelected and therefore unaccountable to the voters be able to produce district boundaries that are in the voters' best interests?

A. It was the voters themselves that took the job of redistricting out of the elected legislators hands because of their frustration with a process which served to protect incumbents. The voters supported a new process which would choose 14 citizens with a myriad of backgrounds, skills and from varied geographic locations to draw district boundaries based on criteria designed to preserve communities of interest.

Q. Why should I care about redistricting?

A. One of the greatest powers that the people have is the right to elect their own representatives to conduct the business of their government. How the district boundaries are configured can make the difference between empowering and maximizing the voters' voices or minimizing and muting those voices. The independent Citizens Redistricting Commission is committed to drawing fair districts that reflect the best interests of the people not the incumbent political parties.

Q. Won't legislators be working behind the scenes to influence Commissioners and take control of the redistricting process?

A. The Voters First Act is very clear that no communication between legislators and Commissioners regarding redistricting issues can occur. Any comment from legislators must take place in a public Commission meeting-just like any other citizen.

Q. What criteria will the Commission consider in deciding the districts?

A. The criteria for the Commission to follow is laid out in the Act:

Districts must be of equal population to comply with the US Constitution.

Districts must comply with the Voting Rights Act to ensure that minorities have an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.

Districts must be contiguous so that all parts of the district are connected to each other.

Districts must respect the boundaries of cities, counties, neighborhoods and communities of Interest, and minimize their division, to the extent possible.

Districts should be geographically compact, that is, have a fairly regular shape.

Where practicable each Senate District should be comprised of two complete and adjacent Assembly Districts and Board of Equalization districts shall be composed of 10 complete and adjacent State Senate Districts.

Districts shall not be drawn to favor or discriminate against an incumbent, candidate, or political party.

Q. What is the Voting Rights Act and why is it important?

A. Before the Voting Rights Act was passed, the practice of many states was to require qualified African Americans to pass literacy tests in order to register to vote. Other states only allowed a person to register to vote if his or her grandfather was allowed to vote. The Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965 to outlaw these practices.

In the 1970s, Congress heard extensive testimony about how state and local governments drew district lines and manipulated elections rules to prevent newly-registered African American voters from being able to elect candidates. Today, the Voting Rights Act protects all racial and language minorities, including African Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos, Native Americans and Pacific Islanders.

The Commission will consider public input and legal and expert advice to meet the Voting Rights Act requirements.

For a more detailed description of how the Voting Rights Act works, visit the U.S. Department of Justice at: http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/redistricting.php.

Q. What is a community of interest?

A. The California Constitution defines a community of interest as:

A community of interest is a contiguous population which shares common social and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation. Examples of such shared interests are those common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election process. Communities of interest shall not include relationships with political parties, I ncumbents, or political candidates.
-Section 2(d)(4) of Article XXI of the California Constitution
Q. Does the Act require that districts be more competitive, rather than dominated by one political party?

A: No. Historically, districts were drawn to favor incumbents and this naturally led to dominance by one political party. Under the Act, districts must be drawn to maximize voters' opportunity to elect representatives of their own choosing, and this may lead to more competitive races

Q. Can't this whole process be done by a computer program?

A: The Commission is relying on the active participation of citizens across California to weigh in on how the districts should be drawn, since information about "communities of interest" is not collected in the Census. This is an open conversation that will assist the Commission in evaluating citizen input and exercising responsible judgment about what districts should look like - a computer could never do that

Q: What is the difference between the Commission's work and what was done in the past?

A: Historically, legislators drew the district boundaries in closed meetings, often favoring incumbents or their own party. This Commission is independent and committed to including the voices of all Californians in the process. In addition to holding public hearings throughout the State, the Commission is soliciting citizen participation through its website crc.ca.gov as well as new media such as Twitter and Facebook. You will also see Commissioners participating in speaking engagements and educational forums in your local community.

Q. What if the Commission cannot agree on the final redistricting maps?

A. Each of the 14 Commissioners is committed to delivering fair district boundaries. To accomplish that goal the Commission is undertaking a deliberative and open process engaging citizens from every corner of the state. Through that process, and working with all the critical data available, the Commission will have a clear understanding to enable them to draw the lines and agree to final maps.

In the unlikely scenario that the Commission does not come to agreement on final district boundaries the matter goes directly to the California Supreme Court which will appoint three masters to draw the lines.

Q. What happens if there is a legal challenge to the district maps adopted by the Commission?

A. The Act provides that any legal challenge is sent straight to the California Supreme Court for review. This provision was written to expedite any legal challenge straight to the state's highest court so a decision could be made on the maps in time for the June 2012 elections.

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The Colorado Independent Congressional and Legislative Redistricting Commissions were established by Amendments Y and Z in 2018 to draw Colorado's congressional and state legislative districts.

With court approval of all the commissions' maps, Colorado's 2021 state redistricting process has concluded. Final approved plans are available on this website for U.S. Congress, Colorado State Senate, and Colorado House of Representatives.

NEW on the map pages, find individual district maps and data sheets!

Also on this site you can find information about the commissions, as well as historical information, meeting schedules, and frequently asked questions.

Thank you for your participation and interest in Colorado's first independent redistricting commissions!

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The Colorado Independent Congressional and Legislative Redistricting Commissions were established by Amendments Y and Z in 2018 to draw Colorado's congressional and state legislative districts. With court approval of all the commissions' maps, Colorado's 2021 state redistricting process has concluded. Final approved plans are available on this website for U.S.

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Michigan Proposal 2, the Independent Redistricting Commission Initiative, was on the ballot in Michigan as an initiated constitutional amendment on November 6, 2018. The measure was approved.

Election results

Michigan Proposal 2

Yes
2,519,975
61.27%

Before Proposal 2, what was the congressional redistricting system in Michigan?

Redistricting is the process by which new congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn. As of 2018, the Michigan State Legislature was responsible for drawing congressional and state legislative district boundaries. These boundaries were subject to the governor's veto power. Adopting congressional or state legislative redistricting plans required a simple majority vote in both chambers of the state legislature. Prior to 2018, the last time that the legislature adopted congressional maps was in 2011, which followed the 2010 U.S. Census. Republicans controlled the state Senate, state House, and governor's office, thus holding a trifecta in state government.

What did Proposal 2 change about congressional redistricting?

Proposal 2 transferred the power to draw the state's congressional and legislative districts from the state legislature to a 13-member independent redistricting commission. The ballot initiative required four of the commissioners to be Democrats, four to be Republicans, and five to be independents or members of third parties. The affirmative votes of at least seven members, including a minimum of two Democrats, two Republicans, and two members not affiliated with the major parties, were to be needed to pass a redistricting plan. Proposal 2 required commissioners to prioritize specific criteria, including compliance with federal laws; equal population sizes; geographic contiguousness; demographics and communities of similar historical, cultural, or economic interests; no advantages to political parties; no advantages to incumbents; municipal boundaries; and compactness.

Who was behind the campaigns surrounding the ballot initiative?

The committee Voters Not Politicians led the campaign in support of Proposal 2. Voters Not Politicians raised $16.60 million, including $6.02 million from the Sixteen Thirty Fund and $5.11 million from the Action Now Initiative.

Opponents organized the Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution and the Committee to Protect Voters Rights. The opposition committees had raised $393,180, including $136,260 from a Michigan Chamber of Commerce PAC.

What states voted on redistricting measures in 2018?

In 2018, voters decided six ballot measures in five states designed to change how congressional districts, state legislative districts, or both types are drawn following the decennial U.S. Census. As of 2018, six was the highest number of redistricting-related ballot measures in a single year since 1982, when nine measures were on the ballot. Joshua Silver, CEO of the organization Represent.Us, described the measures as "the best reform map we've seen in decades." The ballot measures followed the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous dismissal of the case Gill v. Whitford, which addressed the claim of partisan gerrymandering in Wisconsin. In June 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate standing. Therefore, the justices did not address the broader question of whether partisan gerrymandering claims can be brought to trial under the U.S. Constitution. The following measures were on the ballot in 2018:

Measure

Description

Status

Missouri Amendment 1
Create the position of state demographer to draw state legislative districts

Approved

Ohio Issue 1
Change state legislative requirements to approve maps of congressional districts

Approved

Initiative design

Click on the arrows (▼) below for summaries of the different provisions of Proposal 2.

Commission Membership Application: application process to be considered for a position as commission member

Proposal 2 allowed registered and eligible voters in Michigan to submit applications to be considered for positions on the 13-member redistricting commission. The initiative banned individuals who, during the six years prior, were partisan candidates, partisan elected officials, officers of political parties, paid consultants or employees of candidates, officials, campaigns, or political action committees, state legislative employees, lobbyists, other specified state employees, and their parents and children from serving on the commission. Applicants were to be required to attest under oath that they meet the qualifications to serve on the commission and identify their party affiliation.

The secretary of state's office was required to make applications available to the public not later than January 1 of the census year. The office was also instructed to mail applications for commissioner to 10,000 random registered voters in Michigan by January 1 of the census year and to continue to mail applications at random until at least 30 qualifying Democrats, 30 qualifying Republicans, and 40 qualifying individuals not affiliated with the two major parties submit applications. The secretary of state was required to accept applications for commissioner until June 1 of the census year.

Commission Membership Selection: selection of individuals to serve on redistricting commission

Proposal 2 was designed to require the secretary of state, on July 1 of the census year, to eliminate non-qualifying applicants and randomly select 60 applicants from the pool of Democrats, 60 applicants from the pool of Republicans, and 80 applicants from the pool of voters not affiliated with either party. The measure required the office to use statistical weighting methods to make the pools reflect the geographic and demographic makeup of Michigan.

The secretary of state was to submit the selected applicants to the state Senate majority leader, state Senate minority leader, speaker of the House, and state House minority leader. Proposal 2 permitted each legislative leader to strike up to five applicants from any pool, adding up to 20 strikes between the four leaders.

By August 1 of the census year, the secretary of state was to randomly select four of the remaining applicants from the Democratic pool, four of the remaining applicants from the Republican pool, and five of the remaining applicants from the pool of voters not affiliated with either party-for a total of 13 commissioners.

If a commissioner's seat becomes vacant, the secretary of state was to randomly select a new commissioner from the same pool as the vacating commissioner.

For five years following the date of appointment, commissioners were made ineligible to serve in elective partisan offices in state or local government.

Commissioners were to be compensated in an amount equal to 25 percent of the governor's salary. As of 2016, the governor's salary was $159,300, meaning that 25 percent was $39,825.

Commencement, Public Hearings, and Meetings: requirements for public hearings before and meetings

Proposal 2 said the redistricting commission was to commence by October 15 of the census year. The Michigan State Legislature was required to appropriate revenue for the commission's activities before the commission begins.

Before drafting any redistricting plans, Proposal 2 required the commission to hold a minimum of 10 public hearings throughout the state to inform the public about the commission, its purpose, and its responsibilities and to solicit information from the public.

After drafting at least one redistricting plan for state legislative districts and one redistricting plan for congressional districts, the commission was to publish the plans, along with the data behind the plans, for the public to view. Proposal 2 allowed each commissioner to file one proposal for each type of district. The commission was to hold five meetings throughout the state to receive feedback from the public on the proposals.

Proposal 2 required that all meetings of the commission be open to the public. The secretary of state was to serve as the commission's non-voting secretary and was to provide technical services for the commission.

Redistricting Criteria: criteria to be considered when drawing district maps

Proposal 2 required commissioners to prioritize the following criteria, in the order as listed, for proposing and adopting redistricting plans:

(a) districts shall be of equal population and comply with federal laws;

(b) districts shall be geographically contiguous;

(c) districts shall reflect the state's demographic population and communities of similar historical, cultural, or economic interests;

(d) districts shall not provide an advantage to any political party;

(e) districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent official;

(f) districts shall reflect consideration for county, township, and municipal boundaries; and

(g) districts shall be reasonably compact.

Adopting Redistricting Plans: rules and requirements for adopting redistricting plans

By November 1 of the year following the census year, the commission was required to adopt a redistricting plan.

The commission was required to provide at least 45 days prior to a scheduled vote on redistricting plans for public comments.

The redistricting commission was to adopt congressional and state legislative plans through a majority vote, provided that at least two members of each political party and two members who do not affiliate with either party approve it.

If the commission fails to adopt a plan through majority vote, commissioners were to rank the plans in order of preference using a point system, and the plan receiving the most points would be adopted, provided that at least two members of each political party ranked the winning plan in their top half and the two members who do not affiliate with either party ranked the winning plan in their top half.

Within 30 days after adopting the plans, the commission was required to publish the plans, along with the data and materials behind the plans, for public viewership.

Redistricting plans were to become law 60 days after being adopted by the commission.

The Michigan Supreme Court was given jurisdiction over challenges to the plans and would call the commission back to take actions to comply with the court's judgment.

Daunt v. Benson

On July 30, 2019, Michigan Freedom Fund Executive Director Tony Daunt and several state Republican officials filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Western Michigan seeking to block implementation of the redistricting commission. Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson (D) was named as the defendant. Daunt said, "This is a fundamental question of Michigan citizens' ability to participate in the political process without being punished for that participation. This commission flips that on its head and says if you're already engaged, if you're already active, you're not allowed to serve on this and neither are your family members. Of everything, I think that's the most egregious and ridiculous part of that. Simply by virtue of being married to someone who is (politically active) you're prohibited, even if you have 180-degree-opposed political beliefs."

Jamie Lyons-Eddy of Voters Not Politicians, which sponsored the ballot initiative, responded, "It's no surprise that politicians who directly benefit from drawing their own election maps and choosing their own voters want to undermine the voice of voters again. Now that citizens are in charge of a fair, impartial, and transparent redistricting process, we know that some politicians who will lose power to draw maps in secret for their own benefit will make a last-ditch effort to hold on to it."

Michigan Republican Party v. Benson

On August 22, 2019, the Michigan Republican Party filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Western Michigan seeking to block Proposal 2. Laura Cox, chairperson of the state Republican Party, said Proposal 2 violated the party's freedom of association as the amendment prevented parties from picking their own members to serve on the redistricting commission.

Proposal 2 requires candidates for the redistricting commission to attest under oath regarding their partisan affiliation. However, Proposal 2 does not require the state department to confirm individuals' partisan affiliation. As of 2019, voters in Michigan do not have an option to declare their partisan affiliation on voter registrations.

Proposal 2 was designed to allow the legislative leaders from the two major parties to strike up to five applicants each (between the leaders, 20 strikeouts total) from the pool of 60 Republicans, 60 Democrats, and 80 non-affiliated applicants. Thereafter, a random selection from each partisan pool takes place, with four Republicans, four Democrats, and five non-affiliated applicants being selected.

The Michigan GOP's legal complaint said applicants could self-affiliate with the Republican Party "without any involvement or consent of the applicable political party and without any specific consideration of the applicants' past or current political activity, expression, or involvement." The process, according to attorneys Gary Gordon and Charlie Spies, could allow Democrats to self-affiliate as Republicans "in an effort to alter the party's selection process and weaken its representation on the commission by individuals who genuinely affiliate with MRP." Stu Sandler, general counsel for the Michigan GOP, said, "In every other system that's been created like this, political parties or legislative leaders have had the ability to select, or there's been a strong history of voter registration so that you can tell who's been a part of the party and who hasn't."

Former Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker (R), finance chairperson for the National Republican Redistricting Trust, commented on the litigation, saying, "Proposition 2 punishes people for exercising their constitutionally protected rights - among them the right to associate with a political party."

Consolidation of Daunt and MI Republican Party

On September 11, 2019, Daunt v. Benson and Michigan Republican Party v. Benson were consolidated into a single case before the court. On November 25, 2019, the U.S. District Court denied an injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied requests for the court to hear an appeal regarding the injunction. The Sixth Circuit said that plaintiffs complaints were "relatively insignificant," given "(1) their ability to serve on the Commission after their six-year period of ineligibility expires, (2) the lack of any direct prohibition or regulation of pure speech, and (3) the absence of any fundamental right to be a member of the Commission."

The Michigan Republican Party appealed the ruling to the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 15, 2020, the appellate court upheld the lower court ruling. On May 27, 2021, the 6th Circuit dismissed the case.

Text of measure

Ballot title

The ballot title was as follows:

"

Proposal 18-2. A proposed constitutional amendment to establish a commission of citizens with exclusive authority to adopt district boundaries for the Michigan Senate, Michigan House of Representatives and U.S. Congress, every 10 years.

"

Ballot summary

The ballot summary was as follows:

"

This proposed constitutional amendment would:

Create a commission of 13 registered voters randomly selected by the Secretary of State:

4 each who self-identify as affiliated with the 2 major political parties; and

5 who self-identify as unaffiliated with major political parties.

Prohibit partisan officeholders and candidates, their employees, certain relatives, and lobbyists from serving as commissioners.

Establish new redistricting criteria including geographically compact and contiguous districts of equal population, reflecting Michigan's diverse population and communities of interest. Districts shall not provide disproportionate advantage to political parties or candidates.

Require an appropriation of funds for commission operations and commissioner compensation. Should this proposal be adopted?

Should this proposal be adopted?

[ ] YES

"

Constitutional changes

The measure amended Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Article IV, Sections 1, 2, and 4 of Article V, and Sections 1 and 4 of Article VI. The following underlined text was added and struck-through text was deleted:

Note: Use your mouse to scroll over the below text to see the full text.

Article IV - Legislative Branch, Section 1

Except to the extent limited or abrogated by Article IV, Section 6 or Article V, Section 2, the legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives.

Article IV - Legislative Branch, Section 2

Senators, Number, Term

The senate shall consist of 38 members to be elected from single member districts at the same election as the governor for four-year terms concurrent with the term of office of the governor.

Senatorial districts, apportionment factors

In districting the state for the purpose of electing senators after the official publication of the total population count of each federal decennial census, each county shall be assigned apportionment factors equal to the sum of its percentage of the state's population as shown by the last regular federal decennial census computed to the nearest one-one hundredth of one percent multiplied by four and its percentage of the state's land area computed to the nearest one-one hundredth of one percent.

In arranging the state into senatorial districts, the apportionment commission shall be governed by the following rules:

(1) Counties with 13 or more apportionment factors shall be entitled as a class to senators in the proportion that the total apportionment factors of such counties bear to the total apportionment factors of the state computed to the nearest whole number. After each such county has been allocated one senator, the remaining senators to which this class of counties is entitled shall be distributed among such counties by the method of equal proportions applied to the apportionment factors.

(2) Counties having less than 13 apportionment factors shall be entitled as a class to senators in the proportion that the total apportionment factors of such counties bear to the total apportionment factors of the state computed to the nearest whole number. Such counties shall thereafter be arranged into senatorial districts that are compact, convenient, and contiguous by land, as rectangular in shape as possible, and having as nearly as possible 13 apportionment factors, but in no event less than 10 or more than 16. Insofar as possible, existing senatorial districts at the time of reapportionment shall not be altered unless there is a failure to comply with the above standards.

(3) Counties entitled to two or more senators shall be divided into single member districts. The population of such districts shall be as nearly equal as possible but shall not be less than 75 percent nor more than 125 percent of a number determined by dividing the population of the county by the number of senators to which it is entitled. Each such district shall follow incorporated city or township boundary lines to the extent possible and shall be compact, contiguous, and as nearly uniform in shape as possible.

Article IV - Legislative Branch, Section 3

Representatives, Number, Term; Contiguity of Districts

The house of representatives shall consist of 110 members elected for two-year terms from single member districts apportioned on a basis of population as provided in this article. The districts shall consist of compact and convenient territory contiguous by land.

Representative areas, single and multiple county

Each county which has a population of not less than seven-tenths of one percent of the population of the state shall constitute a separate representative area. Each county having less than seven-tenths of one percent of the population of the state shall be combined with another county or counties to form a representative area of not less than seven-tenths of one percent of the population of the state. Any county which is isolated under the initial allocation as provided in this section shall be joined with that contiguous representative area having the smallest percentage of the state's population. Each such representative area shall be entitled initially to one representative.

Apportionment of representatives to areas

After the assignment of one representative to each of the representative areas, the remaining house seats shall be apportioned among the representative areas on the basis of population by the method of equal proportions.

Districting of single county area entitled to 2 or more representatives

Any county comprising a representative area entitled to two or more representatives shall be divided into single member representative districts as follows:

(1) The population of such districts shall be as nearly equal as possible but shall not be less than 75 percent nor more than 125 percent of a number determined by dividing the population of the representative area by the number of representatives to which it is entitled.

(2) Such single member districts shall follow city and township boundaries where applicable and shall be composed of compact and contiguous territory as nearly square in shape as possible.

Districting of multiple county representative areas

Any representative area consisting of more than one county, entitled to more than one representative, shall be divided into single member districts as equal as possible in population, adhering to county lines.

Article IV - Legislative Branch, Section 4

Annexation or Merger with a City

In counties having more than one representative or senatorial district, the territory in the same county annexed to or merged with a city between apportionments shall become a part of a contiguous representative or senatorial district in the city with which it is combined, if provided by ordinance of the city. The district or districts with which the territory shall be combined shall be determined by such ordinance certified to the secretary of state. No such change in the boundaries of a representative or senatorial district shall have the effect of removing a legislator from office during his term.

Article IV - Legislative Branch, Section 5

Island areas are considered to be contiguous by land to the county of which they are a part.

Article IV - Legislative Branch, Section 6

Commission on Legislative Apportionment Independent citizens redistricting commission for state legislative and congressional districts

A commission on legislative apportionment is hereby established consisting of eight electors, four of whom shall be selected by the state organizations of each of the two political parties whose candidates for governor received the highest vote at the last general election at which a governor was elected preceding each apportionment. If a candidate for governor of a third political party has received at such election more than 25 percent of such gubernatorial vote, the commission shall consist of 12 members, four of whom shall be selected by the state organization of the third political party. One resident of each of the following four regions shall be selected by each political party organization: (1) the upper peninsula; (2) the northern part of the lower peninsula, north of a line drawn along the northern boundaries of the counties of Bay, Midland, Isabella, Mecosta, Newaygo and Oceana; (3) southwestern Michigan, those counties south of region (2) and west of a line drawn along the western boundaries of the counties of Bay, Saginaw, Shiawassee, Ingham, Jackson and Hillsdale; (4) southeastern Michigan, the remaining counties of the state.

Eligibility to membership

No officers or employees of the federal, state or local governments, excepting notaries public and members of the armed forces reserve, shall be eligible for membership on the commission. Members of the commission shall not be eligible for election to the legislature until two years after the apportionment in which they participated becomes effective.

Appointment, term, vacancies

The commission shall be appointed immediately after the adoption of this constitution and whenever apportionment or districting of the legislature is required by the provisions of this constitution. Members of the commission shall hold office until each apportionment or districting plan becomes effective. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as for original appointment. Officers, rules of procedure, compensation, appropriation. The secretary of state shall be secretary of the commission without vote, and in that capacity shall furnish, under the direction of the commission, all necessary technical services. The commission shall elect its own chairman, shall make its own rules of procedure, and shall receive compensation provided by law. The legislature shall appropriate funds to enable the commission to carry out its activities.

Call to convene; apportionment; public hearings

Within 30 days after the adoption of this constitution, and after the official total population count of each federal decennial census of the state and its political subdivisions is available, the secretary of state shall issue a call convening the commission not less than 30 nor more than 45 days thereafter. The commission shall complete its work within 180 days after all necessary census information is available. The commission shall proceed to district and apportion the senate and house of representatives according to the provisions of this constitution. All final decisions shall require the concurrence of a majority of the members of the commission. The commission shall hold public hearings as may be provided by law.

Apportionment plan, publication; record of proceedings

Each final apportionment and districting plan shall be published as provided by law within 30 days from the date of its adoption and shall become law 60 days after publication. The secretary of state shall keep a public record of all the proceedings of the commission and shall be responsible for the publication and distribution of each plan.

Disagreement of commission; submission of plans to supreme court

If a majority of the commission cannot agree on a plan, each member of the commission, individually or jointly with other members, may submit a proposed plan to the supreme court. The supreme court shall determine which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements and shall direct that it be adopted by the commission and published as provided in this section.

Jurisdiction of supreme court on elector's application

Upon the application of any elector filed not later than 60 days after final publication of the plan, the supreme court, in the exercise of original jurisdiction, shall direct the secretary of state or the commission to perform their duties, may review any final plan adopted by the commission, and shall remand such plan to the commission for further action if it fails to comply with the requirements of this constitution.

(1) An independent citizens redistricting commission for state legislative and congressional districts (hereinafter, the "commission") is hereby established as a permanent commission in the legislative branch.

The commission shall consist of 13 commissioners. The commission shall adopt a redistricting plan for each of the following types of districts: state senate districts, state house of representative districts and congressional districts. Each commissioner shall:

(a) be registered and eligible to vote in the State of Michigan;

(b) not currently be or in the past 6 years have been any of the following:

(c) not be a parent, stepparent, child, stepchild, or spouse of any individual disqualified under part (1)(b) of this Section; or

(d) not be otherwise disqualified for appointed or elected office by this constitution.

(e) for five years after the date of appointment, a commissioner is ineligible to hold a partisan elective office at the state, county, city, village, or township level in Michigan.

(2) Commissioners shall be selected through the following process:

(a) The secretary of state shall do all of the following:

(b) Subject to part (2)(c) of this Section, the secretary of state shall mail additional applications for commissioner to Michigan registered voters selected at random until 30 qualifying applicants that affiliate with one of the two major parties have submitted applications, 30 qualifying applicants that identify that they affiliate with the other of the two major parties have submitted applications, and 40 qualifying applicants that identify that they do not affiliate with either of the two major parties have submitted applications, each in response to the mailings.

(c) The secretary of state shall accept applications for commissioner until June 1 of the year of the federal decennial census.

(d) By July 1 of the year of the federal decennial census, from all of the applications submitted, the secretary of state shall:

(e) By August 1 of the year of the federal decennial census, the majority leader of the senate, the minority leader of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, and the minority leader of the house of representatives may each strike five applicants from any pool or pools, up to a maximum of 20 total strikes by the four legislative leaders.

(f) By September 1 of the year of the federal decennial census, the secretary of state shall randomly draw the names of four commissioners from each of the two pools of remaining applicants affiliating with a major party, and five commissioners from the pool of remaining non-affiliating applicants.

(3) Except as provided below, commissioners shall hold office for the term set forth in part (18) of this Section. If a commissioner's seat becomes vacant for any reason, the secretary of state shall fill the vacancy by randomly drawing a name from the remaining qualifying applicants in the selection pool from which the original commissioner was selected. A commissioner's office shall become vacant upon the occurrence of any of the following:

(a) death or mental incapacity of the commissioner;

(b) the secretary of state's receipt of the commissioner's written resignation;

(c) the commissioner's disqualification for election or appointment or employment pursuant to Article XI, Section 8;

(d) the commissioner ceases to be qualified to serve as a commissioner under part (1) of this Section; or

(e) after written notice and an opportunity for the commissioner to respond, a vote of 10 of the commissioners finding substantial neglect of duty, gross misconduct in office, or inability to discharge the duties of office.

(4) The secretary of state shall be secretary of the commission without vote, and in that capacity shall furnish, under the direction of the commission, all technical services that the commission deems necessary. The commission shall elect its own chairperson. The commission has the sole power to make its own rules of procedure. The commission shall have procurement and contracting authority and may hire staff and consultants for the purposes of this Section, including legal representation.

(5) Beginning no later than December 1 of the year preceding the federal decennial census, and continuing each year in which the commission operates, the legislature shall appropriate funds sufficient to compensate the commissioners and to enable the commission to carry out its functions, operations and activities, which activities include retaining independent, nonpartisan subject-matter experts and legal counsel, conducting hearings, publishing notices and maintaining a record of the commission's proceedings, and any other activity necessary for the commission to conduct its business, at an amount equal to not less than 25 percent of the general fund/general purpose budget for the secretary of state for that fiscal year. Within six months after the conclusion of each fiscal year, the commission shall return to the state treasury all moneys unexpended for that fiscal year. The commission shall furnish reports of expenditures, at least annually, to the governor and the legislature and shall be subject to annual audit as provided by law. Each commissioner shall receive compensation at least equal to 25 percent of the governor's salary. The state of Michigan shall indemnify commissioners for costs incurred if the legislature does not appropriate sufficient funds to cover such costs.

(6) The commission shall have legal standing to prosecute an action regarding the adequacy of resources provided for the operation of the commission, and to defend any action regarding an adopted plan. The commission shall inform the legislature if the commission determines that funds or other resources provided for operation of the commission are not adequate. The legislature shall provide adequate funding to allow the commission to defend any action regarding an adopted plan.

(7) The secretary of state shall issue a call convening the commission by October 15 in the year of the federal decennial census. Not later than November 1 in the year immediately following the federal decennial census, the commission shall adopt a redistricting plan under this Section for each of the following types of districts: state senate districts, state house of representative districts, and congressional districts.

(8) before commissioners draft any plan, the commission shall hold at least ten public hearings throughout the state for the purpose of informing the public about the redistricting process and the purpose and responsibilities of the commission and soliciting information from the public about potential plans. The commission shall receive for consideration written submissions of proposed redistricting plans and any supporting materials, including underlying data, from any member of the public. These written submissions are public records.

(9) After developing at least one proposed redistricting plan for each type of district, the commission shall publish the proposed redistricting plans and any data and supporting materials used to develop the plans. Each commissioner may only propose one redistricting plan for each type of district. The commission shall hold at least five public hearings throughout the state for the purpose of soliciting comment from the public about the proposed plans. Each of the proposed plans shall include such census data as is necessary to accurately describe the plan and verify the population of each district, and a map and legal description that include the political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, and townships; man-made features, such as streets, roads, highways, and railroads; and natural features, such as waterways, which form the boundaries of the districts.

(10) Each commissioner shall perform his or her duties in a manner that is impartial and reinforces public confidence in the integrity of the redistricting process. The commission shall conduct all of its business at open meetings. Nine commissioners, including at least one commissioner from each selection pool shall constitute a quorum, and all meetings shall require a quorum. The commission shall provide advance public notice of its meetings and hearings. The commission shall conduct its hearings in a manner that invites wide public participation throughout the state. The commission shall use technology to provide contemporaneous public observation and meaningful public participation in the redistricting process during all meetings and hearings.

(11) The commission, its members, staff, attorneys, and consultants shall not discuss redistricting matters with members of the public outside of an open meeting of the commission, except that a commissioner may communicate about redistricting matters with members of the public to gain information relevant to the performance of his or her duties if such communication occurs (a) in writing or (b) at a previously publicly noticed forum or town hall open to the general public.

The commission, its members, staff, attorneys, experts, and consultants may not directly or indirectly solicit or accept any gift or loan of money, goods, services, or other thing of value greater than $20 for the benefit of any person or organization, which may influence the manner in which the commissioner, staff, attorney, expert, or consultant performs his or her duties.

(12) Except as provided in part (14) of this Section, a final decision of the commission requires the concurrence of a majority of the commissioners. A decision on the dismissal or retention of paid staff or consultants requires the vote of at least one commissioner affiliating with each of the major parties and one non-affiliating commissioner. All decisions of the commission shall be recorded, and the record of its decisions shall be readily available to any member of the public without charge.

(13) The commission shall abide by the following criteria in proposing and adopting each plan, in order of priority:

(a) districts shall be of equal population as mandated by the united states constitution, and shall comply with the voting rights act and other federal laws.

(b) districts shall be geographically contiguous. Island areas are considered to be contiguous by land to the county of which they are a part.

(c) districts shall reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.

(d) districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.

(e) districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official ora candidate.

(f) districts shall reflect consideration of county, city, and township boundaries.

(g) districts shall be reasonably compact.

(14) The commission shall follow the following procedure in adopting a plan:

(a) Before voting to adopt a plan, the commission shall ensure that the plan is tested, using appropriate technology, for compliance with the criteria described above.

(b) Before voting to adopt a plan, the commission shall provide public notice of each plan that will be voted on and provide at least 45 days for public comment on the proposed plan or plans. Each plan that will be voted on shall include such census data as is necessary to accurately describe the plan and verify the population of each district, and shall include the map and legal description required in part (9) of this Section.

(c) A final decision of the commission to adopt a redistricting plan requires a majority vote of the commission, including at least two commissioners who affiliate with each major party, and at least two commissioners who do not affiliate with either major party. If no plan satisfies this requirement for a type of district, the commission shall use the following procedure to adopt a plan for that type of district:

(15) Within 30 days after adopting a plan, the commission shall publish the plan and the material reports, reference materials, and data used in drawing it, including any programming information used to produce and test the plan. The published materials shall be such that an independent person is able to replicate the conclusion without any modification of any of the published materials.

(16) For each adopted plan, the commission shall issue a report that explains the basis on which the commission made its decisions in achieving compliance with plan requirements and shall include the map and legal description required in part (9) of this Section. A commissioner who votes against a redistricting plan may submit a dissenting report which shall be issued with the commission's report.

(17) An adopted redistricting plan shall become law 60 days after its publication. The secretary of state shall keep a public record of all proceedings of the commission and shall publish and distribute each plan and required documentation.

(18) The terms of the commissioners shall expire once the commission has completed its obligations for a census cycle but not before any judicial review of the redistricting plan is complete.

(19) The supreme court, in the exercise of original jurisdiction, shall direct the secretary of state or the commission to perform their respective duties, may review a challenge to any plan adopted by the commission, and shall remand a plan to the commission for further action if the plan fails to comply with the requirements of this constitution, the constitution of the united states or superseding federal law. In no event shall any body, except the independent citizens redistricting commission acting pursuant to this Section, promulgate and adopt a redistricting plan or plans for this state.

(20) This Section is self-executing. If a final court decision holds any part or parts of this Section to be in conflict with the united states constitution or federal law, the Section shall be implemented to the maximum extent that the united states constitution and federal law permit. Any provision held invalid is severable from the remaining portions of this Section.

(21) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, coerce, or retaliate against any employee because of the employee's membership on the commission or attendance or scheduled attendance at any meeting of the commission.

(22) Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, or any prior judicial decision, as of the effective date of the constitutional amendment adding this provision, which amends Article IV, Sections 1 through 6, Article V, Sections 1, 2 and 4, and Article VI, Sections 1 and 4, including this provision, for purposes of interpreting this constitutional amendment the people declare that the powers granted to the commission are legislative functions not subject to the control or approval of the legislature, and are exclusively reserved to the commission. The commission, and all of its responsibilities, operations, functions, contractors, consultants and employees are not subject to change, transfer, reorganization, or reassignment, and shall not be altered or abrogated in any manner whatsoever, by the legislature. No other body shall be established by law to perform functions that are the same or similar to those granted to the commission in this Section.

Article V - Executive Branch, Section 1

Executive Power

Except to the extent limited or abrogated by Article V, Section 2, or Article IV, Section 6, the executive power is vested in the governor.

Article V - Executive Branch, Section 2

Principal Departments

All executive and administrative offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of state government and their respective functions, powers and duties, except for the office of governor and lieutenant governor and the governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in this constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within not more than 20 principal departments. They shall be grouped as far as practicable according to major purposes.

Organization of executive branch; assignment of functions; submission to legislature

Subsequent to the initial allocation, the governor may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which he considers necessary for efficient administration. Where these changes require the force of law, they shall be set forth in executive orders and submitted to the legislature. Thereafter the legislature shall have 60 calendar days of a regular session, or a full regular session if of shorter duration, to disapprove each executive order. Unless disapproved in both houses by a resolution concurred in by a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house, each order shall become effective at a date thereafter to be designated by the governor.

Exemption for independent citizens redistricting commission for state legislative and congressional districts

Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution or any prior judicial decision, as of the effective date of the constitutional amendment adding this provision, which amends Article IV, Sections 1 through 6, Article V, Sections 1, 2 and 4, and Article VI, Sections 1 and 4, including this provision, for purposes of interpreting this constitutional amendment the people declare that the powers granted to independent citizens redistricting commission for state and congressional districts (hereinafter, "commission") are legislative functions not subject to the control or approval of the governor, and are exclusively reserved to the commission. The commission, and all of its responsibilities, operations, functions, contractors, consultants and employees are not subject to change, transfer, reorganization, or reassignment, and shall not be altered or abrogated in any manner whatsoever, by the governor. No other body shall be established by law to perform functions that are the same or similar to those granted to the commission in Article IV, Section 6.

Article V - Executive Branch, Section 4

Commissions or Agencies for Less Than 2 Years

Except to the extent limited or abrogated by Article V, Section 2 or Article IV, Section 6, temporary commissions or agencies for special purposes with a life of no more than two years may be established by law and need not be allocated within a principal department.

Article VI - Judicial Branch, Section 1

Judicial Power in Court of Justice; Divisions

Except to the extent limited or abrogated by Article IV, Section 6 or Article V, Section 2, the judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house.

Article VI - Judicial Branch, Section 4

Except to the extent limited or abrogated by Article IV, Section 6 or Article V, Section 2, the supreme court shall have general superintending control over all courts; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; and appellate jurisdiction as provided by rules of the supreme court. The supreme court shall not have the power to remove a judge.

Readability score

Using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (FKGL and Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) formulas, Ballotpedia scored the readability of the ballot title and summary for this measure. Readability scores are designed to indicate the reading difficulty of text. The Flesch-Kincaid formulas account for the number of words, syllables, and sentences in a text; they do not account for the difficulty of the ideas in the text. The state board wrote the ballot language for this measure.

The FKGL for the ballot title is grade level 21, and the FRE is -2.0. The word count for the ballot title is 31, and the estimated reading time is 8 seconds.

In 2018, for the 167 statewide measures on the ballot, the average ballot title or question was written at a level appropriate for those with between 19 and 20 years of U.S. formal education (graduate school-level of education), according to the FKGL formula. Read Ballotpedia's entire 2018 ballot language readability report here.

Voters Not Politicians, also known as Yes on 2, led the campaign in support of Proposal 2. Katie Fahey, founder of Count MI Vote, was the executive director of Voters Not Politicians.

Supporters

Former officials

Municipalities

Organizations

Labor organizations

A. Philip Randolph Institute

Michigan State Utilities Worker Council

State Employees Retirees Association

United Steelworkers

Individuals

Voters Not Politicians stated the following about the initiative campaign:

"

On election day, we, the voters of Michigan, deserve to have our say. We expect our elections to be fair and transparent so that our votes matter and our voices are heard.

Politicians don't agree. They manipulate our voting maps to keep themselves in power. They draw voting maps that directly benefit themselves, instead of putting community interests and voter needs first. This allows politicians the power to choose their voters, instead of giving the voters the power to choose their politicians. This process gives us inattentive, ineffective, and unpopular representatives who keep getting re-elected over and over.

"

Rep. Rick Johnson (R), former Speaker of the Michigan House of Representatives and convention delegate for Donald Trump in 2016, said:

"

We need change. This might not be the only change, but I hope it's something. This country and this state can't continue down the road we're on right now because we'll all be broke. There won't be a legitimate unit of government that can stand this stuff that's going on.

"

Opposition

The Committee to Protect Voters Rights led the campaign in opposition to Proposal 2.

Organizations

Robert LaBrant, a Republican political strategist, said that under the initiative commissioners would be "absolute neophytes... not having a clue about redistricting." He also said:

"

I don't think there's anything wrong with having an independent redistricting commission. My concerns probably focus on two areas: One, the very convoluted way that an independent redistricting commission gets created, and then the criteria for drawing those districts.

It's so limited to people who have really no experience either in government or with political parties, and some would see that to be a virtue. Well, I think all we have to do is take a look at term limits in Michigan to see that inexperience is not necessarily a virtue.

"

Sarah Anderson, a Michigan Republican Party spokesperson, stated:

"

VNP [Proposal 2] places the power of redistricting out of the hands of elected officials who are held accountable to voters and into the hands of a randomly selected group who will be unelected and unaccountable with no qualifications, eliminating checks and balances.

"

Media editorials

Detroit Free Press: "But the major parties have utterly failed to collaborate on a redistricting process that serves the interests of voters, especially independents who don't consistently gravitate to one party's candidates. VNP's ballot initiative offers voters a practical way to assure fairer representation and encourage more robust political competition in a state that needs both. That's why the Free Press recommends a YES vote on Proposal 2."

Lansing State Journal: "Because of this structured approach that puts a premium on balance and fairness, the LSJ Editorial Board supports Proposal 2. It's time for all voices to be heard, and that's a tall order in districts that are so red or so blue that a dissenting opinion barely registers. It disenfranchises voters and puts in office legislators who are safe to cater to their base rather than represent the interests of all of their constituents."

Traverse City Record Eagle: "Michigan's current system of legislative redistricting looks a bit like the old-school game of Tetris. Spin the shape to make it fit; amass lines of fit-together shapes for points. ... We're ready for more fair play, one that might add more democracy, and subtract lobbyists, donors and self-interested parties from making the rules."

Opposition

The Detroit News: "If Prop 2 fails to deliver on its promise of eliminating gerrymandering, the fix would require another ballot measure. A better solution would be for Democrats and Republicans to embrace the use of technology to draw balanced districts made up of voters with similar concerns without absurdly distorting the geographic map. In addition, the language defining how communities of interest should be grouped is vague and opens the door to endless litigation. Voters should say no to Prop 2."

Campaign finance

There was one ballot measure committee, Voters Not Politicians Ballot Committee, registered in support of the measure. The committee raised $16.60 million and expended $16.31 million.

There were two committees, Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution and Committee to Protect Voters Rights, registered in opposition to the measure. Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution raised $393,180 and spent $393,501 (expenditures exceeded contributions), while the second committee had not reported contributions or expenditures.

The top contributor to the opposition campaign was the Michigan Chamber PAC II, which donated $136,260.

The following were the contribution and expenditure totals for the committee in support of the initiative.

The following were the top five donors to the support committee:

Opposition

The following were the contribution and expenditure totals for the committees in opposition to the initiative.

The following were the top five donors to the opposition committees:

Michigan ballot question committees filed a total of six campaign finance reports in 2018. The filing dates for reports were as follows:

Methodology

To read Ballotpedia's methodology for covering ballot measure campaign finance information, click here.

Michigan Proposal 2, Independent Redistricting Commission Initiative (2018)

Note: The polls above may not reflect all polls that have been conducted in this race. Those displayed are a random sampling chosen by Ballotpedia staff. If you would like to nominate another poll for inclusion in the table, send an email to editor@ballotpedia.org.

Background

Redistricting in Michigan

Before 2018, the Michigan State Legislature was responsible for drawing congressional and state legislative district boundaries. These lines were subject to the governor's veto power. Statute provided the Michigan Supreme Court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear challenges to congressional and state legislative district boundaries.

Redistricting after the 2010 census

In 2011, Republicans controlled both chambers of the Michigan State Legislature. Republicans also controlled six of the nine seats on the House Redistricting Commission and six of nine seats on the Senate Redistricting Commission. Maps for congressional and state legislature districts were passed along partisan lines, and Republican Gov. Rick Snyder signed off on bills for the maps.

Methods of redistricting in U.S.

In general, states vest one of the following three entities with redistricting authority:

1. State legislatures: In 37 of the 43 states required to conduct congressional redistricting, state legislatures have the final authority to draft and implement congressional district maps. Likewise, in 37 of the 50 states, state legislatures are primarily responsible for state legislative redistricting. In these states, legislatures typically adopt district lines by a simple majority vote in each chamber. A state's governor may usually veto the legislature's redistricting plan.

2. Independent commissions: The composition of independent redistricting commissions varies from state to state. However, in all cases, the direct participation of elected officials is limited. Independent redistricting commissions exist in six states (in four of these states, independent commissions draw congressional and state legislative boundaries; in two, independent commissions draw only state legislative district boundaries).

3. Politician commissions: The composition of politician redistricting commissions varies from state to state. For example, in some states, specific officials (e.g., governors, secretaries of state, etc.) are de facto commission members; in others, legislative leaders appoint other legislators to serve as commissioners. In all cases, elected officials may participate directly by sitting on the commissions. In two of the 43 states required to conduct congressional redistricting, politician commissions are responsible for drawing the maps. In seven states, politician commissions are responsible for state legislative redistricting.

Procedures for congressional redistricting in U.S.

Most states are required to draw new congressional district lines every 10 years following completion of United States Census (those states comprising one congressional district are not required to redistrict). In 33 of these states, state legislatures play the dominant role in congressional redistricting. In eight states, commissions draw congressional district lines. In two states, hybrid systems are used, in which the legislatures share redistricting authority with commissions. The remaining states comprise one congressional district each, rendering redistricting unnecessary. See the map and table below for further details.

Procedures for state legislative redistricting in U.S.

In 33 of the 50 states, state legislatures play the dominant role in state legislative redistricting. Commissions draw state legislative district lines in 14 states. In three states, hybrid systems are used, in which state legislature share redistricting authority with commissions. See the map and table below for further details.

Michigan League of Women Voters v. Johnson

On December 22, 2017, the Michigan League of Women Voters (LMV), along with 11 registered Democratic voters, filed litigation to overturn the district maps for state legislative and congressional races in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Secretary of State Ruth Johnson (R) was named as the defendant.

LMV argued that the district maps enacted following the 2010 decennial census violated the constitutional rights to free speech and equal protection. The lawsuit said, "Michigan Democrats based on their political affiliation, and intentionally places them in voting districts that reduce or eliminate the power of their votes."

On April 25, 2019, a three-judge federal panel ruled in favor of plaintiffs, ruling that 34 congressional and state legislative districts were gerrymandered to benefit Republicans. The court ordered the state to redraw district maps in agreement with Governor Gretchen Whitmer (D). However, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

On October 21, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the lower court's decision.

Election policy on the ballot in 2018

Voters considered ballot measures addressing election policy in 15 states in 2018.

Redistricting:

Voting requirements and ballot access:

Arkansas Issue 3, a legislative term limits initiative, was certified for the ballot but was blocked by an Arkansas Supreme Court ruling. The measure would have imposed term limits of six years for members of the Arkansas House of Representatives and eight years for members of the Arkansas Senate. The ruling came too late to remove the measure from the ballot, but the supreme court ordered election officials to not count or certify votes for Issue 3.

Campaign finance, political spending, and ethics:

Path to the ballot

Process in Michigan

In Michigan, the number of signatures required to qualify an initiated constitutional amendment for the ballot is equal to 10 percent of votes cast for governor in the last gubernatorial election. Signatures older than 180 days are invalid, which means all signatures must be collected within a 180-day window. Amendment petitions must be filed 120 days prior to the election.

The requirements to get an initiated constitutional amendment certified for the 2018 ballot:

Signature petitions are filed with the secretary of state and verified by the board of state canvassers using a random sample method of verification.

Details on the initiative

On August 17, 2017, the Michigan Board of Canvassers voted 4-0 to approve the initiative for signature gathering. On December 18, 2017, proponents of the initiative reported submitting more than 425,000 signatures.

The Michigan Bureau of Elections announced that an estimated 394,092 signatures were valid. On May 24, 2018, the Board of State Canvassers was planning to decide whether the initiative would be certified but canceled citing ongoing litigation. On June 20, 2018, the Board of State Canvassers voted 3-0 to confirm that enough valid signatures had been collected, allowing the initiative to appear on the ballot for the election on November 6, 2018.

Cost of signature collection:
Ballotpedia found no petition companies that received payment from the sponsors of this measure, which means signatures were likely gathered largely by volunteers. A total of $0.00 was spent to collect the 315,654 valid signatures required to put this measure before voters, resulting in a total cost per required signature (CPRS) of $0.00. Sponsors hired Practical Political Consulting to check the validity of signatures, spending $151,591.66 or $0.48 per signature.

Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution v. Secretary of State

Issue: Would the ballot measure violate the state's prohibition on initiatives that change the fundamental operation of state government?

Court: Michigan Supreme Court (appealed from the Michigan Court of Appeals)

Ruling: Ruled in favor of the defendants, keeping the measure on the ballot for the election on November 6, 2018

Plaintiff(s): Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution

Defendant(s): Michigan Secretary of State and Michigan Board of Canvassers

Plaintiff argument:
The initiative would change "the fundamental operation of state government," which state law prohibited.

Defendant argument:
The initiative does not violate the subject restriction on initiated constitutional amendments.

Source: Michigan Supreme Court

On April 25, 2018, a ballot measure committee, Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution (CPMC), that opposed the ballot initiative filed a lawsuit in the Michigan Court of Appeals to keep the proposal off the ballot in Michigan. CPMC argued that the initiative would change "the fundamental operation of state government," which state law prohibited. The ballot measure committee Voters Not Politicians, which sponsored the signature drive for the initiative, motioned to intervene in the case, which was granted.

On June 7, 2018, the state Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, decided that the initiative "is not a general revision of the constitution, where it is narrowly tailored to address a single subject." The court ordered the "Board [of Canvassers]... to take the necessary steps to place the proposal on the ballot for the general election."

Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution appealed the ruling to the Michigan Supreme Court. On July 6, 2018, the state Supreme Cout agreed to take up the case. The justices heard arguments on July 18, 2018.

On July 31, 2018, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, ruled in favor of the defendants, keeping the measure on the general election ballot.

Justice David Viviano, writing for the court's four-justice majority, said that the initiative would not "significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of our government" nor "propose changes creating the equivalent of a new constitution." Therefore, according to Justice Viviano, the ballot initiative did not violate state law. Justices Elizabeth Clement, Bridget McCormack, and Richard Bernstein concurred with Viviano's opinion.

Chief Justice Stephen Markman wrote the three-justice dissenting opinion. He stated that the initiative "would affect the 'foundation' power of government by removing altogether from the legislative branch authority over redistricting and consolidating that power instead in an 'independent' commission made up of 13 randomly selected individuals who are not in any way chosen by the people, representative of the people, or accountable to the people." Justices Brian Zahra and Kurtis Wilder concurred with the dissenting opinion.

Katie Fahey, executive director of Voters Not Politicians: "Our state Constitution begins with, 'All political power is inherent in the people.' The court's decision upholds our right as citizens to petition our government for positive change."

Rich Studley, CEO of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce: "The Michigan Chamber is very disappointed with the State Supreme Court decision that the redistricting ballot proposal met the legal requirements to appear on the November General Election ballot. Unfortunately, Michiganders are now left to wonder what the rules are for future petition drives and ballot proposals."

How to cast a vote

Registration requirements

To vote in Michigan, you must be a United States citizen and a resident of your city or township for at least 30 days. Voters must be at least 18 years old by Election Day.

Voters may register to vote online, by mail, or in person at clerk's offices in their county, city, or township or at a state department branch office at least 15 days before an election.

Same-day registration is available on Election Day and during the 14 days prior. "Individuals who register to vote within the 14-day period immediately preceding an election must appear in person at their city or township clerk's office and provide proof of residency." Acceptable documents for proving residency include:

Michigan driver's license or State ID card

Current utility bill

Bank statement

Paycheck or government check

Other government document

Automatic registration

Michigan automatically registers eligible individuals to vote when they apply for or update a driver's license or personal identification card.

Online registration

Michigan has implemented an online voter registration system. Residents can register to vote by visiting this website.

Same-day registration

Michigan allows same-day voter registration.

Residency requirements

Michigan law requires 30 days of residency in the state before a person may vote.

Verification of citizenship

Michigan does not require proof of citizenship for voter registration.

Verifying your registration

This page, administered by the Michigan Department of State, allows residents to check their voter registration status online.

Voter ID requirements

Michigan requires voters to present photo identification while voting.

Michigan driver's license

Michigan personal identification card

Current driver's license or personal ID card issued by another state

Current operator's or chauffeur's license

Current federal, state, or local government-issued photo ID

Current U.S. passport

Current military identification card with photo

Current student identification with photo from an educational institution

Current tribal identification card with photo.

A voter who does not have an acceptable form of identification can cast a ballot by signing an affidavit.

External links

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Michigan Proposal 2, Independent Redistricting Commission Initiative (2018)

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Ballotpedia: The Encyclopedia of American Politics

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The responsibility of drawing maps for congressional and state legislative districts passed from the Virginia Redistricting Commission (VRC) to the Supreme Court of Virginia (SCV) in November 2021. The Supreme Court (SCV) completed redistricting in December 2021.

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Click a topic, or press the enter key on a topic, to reveal its answer. Why are we using Ranked Choice Voting? New Yorkers elected to use Ranked Choice Voting in a 2019 ballot measure. It passed with 73.5% support. Which elections will use Ranked Choice Voting?

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Gerrymandering is defined as setting boundaries in electoral districts in order to give a political party an advantage. Redistricting is something that occurs in all states about every decade. While this is seen as a political exercise, in some instances, state legislators and governors control the redistricting and can give their political party an advantage over their opponents.

Gerrymandering first occurred when minorities were given the right to vote. Legislative bodies used gerrymandering to ensure that the political power of these voters was diminished. Today, gerrymandering may occur for various reasons, although there have been proposals for ways to prevent this from occurring. These proposals include hiring commissions for redistricting or putting alternative voting systems into place.

In some states, this practice is more common than in others. The most gerrymandered states in the U.S. include:

North Carolina: Has used Districts 1 and 12 for minority voters.

Maryland: Uses broken districts to give an advantage to Democrats.

Pennsylvania: Divides its major urban areas among other districts.

Kentucky: Places urban populations in rural districts.

Louisiana: Combined Baton Rouge and New Orleans into one district to minimize Democratic votes.

Utah: Divides Salt Lake City into surrounding rural districts.

Texas: Has tried to propose districts that would unfairly affect minority voters.

Arkansas: Has drawn district boundaries to balance out city voters with rural voters.

Ohio: Unfairly distributed districts in a partisan way.

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Most Gerrymandered States [Updated August 2023]

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Gerrymandering is defined as setting boundaries in electoral districts in order to give a political party an advantage. Redistricting is something that occurs in all states about every decade. While this is seen as a political exercise, in some instances, state legislators and governors control the redistricting and can give their political party an advantage over their opponents.

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As of July 7, 2023, a total of 74 cases have been filed challenging congressional and legislative maps in 27 states as racially discriminatory and/or partisan gerrymanders, of which 45 remain pending at either the trial or appellate levels.

To date, litigation has resulted in redrawn legislative and/or congressional maps in Alaska, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina, though the North Carolina Supreme Court has since vacated its anti-partisan gerrymandering rulings and both congressional and legislative maps there are expected to be redrawn by this fall to recreate gerrymanders.

In addition, congressional maps are expected to be redrawn in time for the 2024 election in Alabama and Louisiana after federal courts found that the maps adopted by the states' legislatures violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (though an appeal is ongoing with respect to the Louisiana map). A federal court has also ordered South Carolina to redraw its congressional map after finding that the configuration of one district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. However, the deadline for adopting a new map is not until 30 days after the Supreme Court adjudicates an ongoing appeal of the case. Because a decision in the South Carolina appeal may not come until the summer of 2024, it is unclear whether it will be possible to implement a new map for the 2024 election cycle.

As of July 7, 2023, litigation over congressional maps is ongoing in 11 states while 16 states have ongoing litigation over legislative maps.

Alabama

Racial discrimination

Congressional: Three cases have been filed in federal court by Black voters and civil rights organizations, contending that the new congressional map enacted by the Republican-controlled Alabama legislature is racially discriminatory in violation of the U.S. Constitution and/or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

The suits allege that the map intentionally perpetuates a long history of discrimination against Black voters by packing a large segment of Black voters into a single heavily Black congressional district and cracking the remaining voters among multiple districts, thereby diluting Black political power. Under the map, Black voters have the opportunity to elect a candidate of choice in only one of seven districts (14 percent of districts) despite making up around 27 percent of the state's voting age population. All three cases ask the court to require that Alabama create a second Black opportunity congressional district.

On January 24, 2022, a three-judge panel in Milligan and Singleton preliminarily enjoined Alabama's new congressional map, finding that the map is substantially likely to violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Although the panel provided the Alabama legislature an opportunity to redraw the map, it observed that, given the evidence in the record of "intensely racially polarized voting[,]" the legislature will need to redraw the map with a second Black opportunity district. Caster, which is presided over by a single judge who is also a member of the Milligan/Singleton panel, received a similar ruling.

On February 7, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the lower-court judgments pending appeal. On June 8, 2023, the Court affirmed the panel's ruling preliminarily blocking Alabama's new congressional map, reasoning that the lower court "faithfully applied [Supreme Court] precedents and correctly determined that, under existing law," the map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. It also rejected Alabama's attempt to revise the legal test that the Court uses to adjudicate Section 2 claims.

In response to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling, the lower courts have given the Alabama legislature until July 21, 2023 to adopt a revised congressional map.

Alaska

Racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering

Legislative: Five state-court lawsuits filed by Alaska voters, various boroughs, a municipality, and a regional corporation contend that Alaska's new legislative maps are racially discriminatory and a partisan gerrymander in violation of the U.S. Constitution, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and/or the Alaska Constitution. The suits allege that the maps intentionally dilute the voting power of those who live within Alaska's lowest-income and most racially diverse parts of the state by pairing groups of voters in Anchorage, Valdez, Skagway, Calista, Matanuska-Susitna, and the surrounding areas that have little in common. According to the plaintiffs, to split communities of interest, the Alaska Redistricting Board, which consists entirely of Republicans, drew district lines that are irrational and arbitrary. As an example, a Valdez citizen must drive over 120 miles after leaving the boundary of his or her house district, which is about ten miles from Valdez's municipal boundary, in order to re-enter the citizen's own district.

The cases are Skagway Borough v. The Alaska Redistricting Board, No. 1JU-21-00944CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2021), City of Valdez v. Alaska Redistricting Board, No. 3VA-21-00080CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2021), Calista Corporation v. Alaska Redistricting Board, No. 4BE-21-00372CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2021), Wilson v. Alaska Redistricting Board, No. 3AN-21-08869CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2021), and Matanuska-Susitna Borough v. Alaska Redistricting Board, No. 3PA-21-02397CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2021).

On February 15, 2022, a trial court held that the board violated the Alaska Constitution when drawing the new legislative maps, finding that the board failed to take public testimony into account when drafting House Districts 3 and 4 and state Senate District K, failed to follow proper procedures when adopting the senate map, and intentionally discriminated against East Anchorage residents who do not always favor Republicans when drawing Senate District K.

On March 25, 2022, the Alaska Supreme Court partly affirmed the decision of the trial court, concluding that Senate District K is in fact a partisan gerrymander. It reversed the trial court's determination that the board did not adequately take public testimony into account when creating House Districts 3 and 4. It also reversed the trial court's holding that House District 36 passes constitutional muster since there is no adequate justification for the district's noncompact shape.

The board enacted a revised legislative plan on April 13, 2022. Several plaintiffs from the original lawsuits as well as plaintiffs who intervened after the Alaska Supreme Court rendered its ruling objected before the trial court, arguing that the revised state senate plan is also a partisan gerrymander because it unconstitutionally increases Republican representation within the senate by splitting a suburb of Anchorage into two districts.

On May 16, 2022, a trial court agreed with the objectors and held that the revised state senate map also is a partisan gerrymander in violation of the Alaska Constitution, finding that the board intentionally discriminated against Anchorage residents by creating two safe Republican senate seats within the region. The court implemented an interim map for the 2022 election cycle but remanded the matter back to the board to adopt a remedial map for the rest of the decade.

On May 24, 2022, the Alaska Supreme Court denied the board's appeal as to whether it once again gerrymandered the senate map, upholding the trial court's order implementing an interim senate plan for the 2022 election cycle. The Court, however, stayed the lower court's order that the board enact a revised plan for the balance of the decade. On April 21, 2023, the Court issued an opinion further explaining its reasoning, declaring that "we expressly recognize that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional under the Alaska Constitution." The Court then held that splitting the Anchorage area into two senate districts violated Alaska equal protection doctrine as an "unconstitutional partisan gerrymander." The Court gave the board 90 days to demonstrate why a trial court should not implement the interim plan for the remainder of the decade.

Arkansas

Racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering

Congressional: Two cases filed by Black voters (one in state court and one in federal court) contend that the new congressional map enacted by the Arkansas legislature is racially discriminatory and a partisan gerrymander in violation of the U.S. Constitution, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and/or the Arkansas Constitution.

The suits allege that the new map intentionally dilutes the voting power of Arkansas's Black citizens through the cracking of Black voters residing in AR-2 among multiple districts. AR-2, which includes Little Rock, is the only competitive district in the state for Black voters. In the 2020 election, a Black Democrat running to represent AR-2 received 44.6 percent of the votes to the GOP incumbent's 55.3 percent.

On April 22, 2022, the Suttlar defendants removed the case to federal court: Suttlar v. Thurston, No. 4:22-CV-368 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 22, 2022).

On July 13, 2022, a federal judge concluded she lacked jurisdiction over the case and sent it back to state court.

On May 11, 2023, a state trial court dismissed the Suttlar case, reasoning that the Arkansas constitution requires the plaintiffs to have filed their complaint in the Arkansas Supreme Court.

On May 25, 2023, a three-judge panel dismissed the Simpson case because the plaintiffs had failed to plausibly allege that race was the "predominant factor" underlying the legislature's adoption of the new congressional map. The plaintiffs have filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court.

A third case, Christian Ministerial Alliance v. Thurston, No. 4:23-CV-471 (E.D. Ark. May 23, 2023), filed on behalf of a religious organization and Black voters contends that the Arkansas legislature's new congressional map is racially discriminatory in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

The suit alleges that the new map intentionally dilutes the voting power of Arkansas's Black citizens through the cracking of Black voters residing in Pulaski County-which includes Little Rock and is located within AR-2-among three separate districts. Although according to the complaint Black voters make up more than half of the voting-age population ("VAP") in the areas of Pulaski County that were excised from AR-2, they now make up no more than approximately one-fifth of the VAP in any one of the three new districts.

The suit alleges that the map intentionally perpetuates a long history of discrimination against Black voters by packing and cracking them, which in turn dilutes their political power. Although the Black community constitutes 16.5 percent of Arkansas's population, only 11 percent of house districts contain a Black majority.

On February 17, 2022, a federal judge declined to preliminarily enjoin Arkansas's new legislative maps, finding that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a longtime bulwark against racial discrimination during the redistricting process, does not provide a private right of action. After the Justice Department declined to intervene in the Arkansas NAACP's lawsuit, the judge dismissed the case. An appeal is pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Florida

Racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering

The suit alleges that the map intentionally dilutes the voting power of Black voters by cracking such voters throughout the state. As an example, the plan "obliterates" FL-5-the only district in North Florida where Black voters could elect their candidate of choice-by splitting the district's Black population among four congressional districts. Regarding partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiffs contend that the map eliminates three Democratic seats and transforms two previously competitive districts into Republican-leaning seats.

On May 12, 2022, a trial court temporarily enjoined Florida's new congressional map, finding that the map violated the Florida Constitution because it diminished the ability of Black voters' residing in FL-5 to elect their candidate of choice. The court ordered the implementation of the plaintiffs' proposed alternative plan for the 2022 election cycle, but an intermediate appeals court ruled that the trial court did not have discretion to implement that plan. Meanwhile, the Florida Supreme Court has declined to assume expedited jurisdiction over the case.

A separate lawsuit filed in federal court, Common Cause v. Byrd, No. 4:22-CV-109 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2022), contends that Florida's new congressional map intentionally discriminates against Black voters in violation of the U.S. Constitution by cracking and packing such voters throughout the state. According to the plaintiffs, the map reduces the number of Black opportunity districts within the state from four to two even though over 90 percent of Florida's population growth last decade occurred within communities of color.

Georgia

Racial discrimination

Congressional: Three cases have been filed in federal court by Black voters and civil rights organizations, contending that the new congressional map enacted by the Republican-controlled Georgia legislature is racially discriminatory in violation of the U.S. Constitution and/or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Black voters allege that the map intentionally perpetuates a long history of discrimination against them by packing some Black voters in the Atlanta metropolitan area and cracking other such voters among rural-reaching and predominantly white districts, thereby diluting Black political power. They contend that the Georgia legislature was required to create an additional Black opportunity district in the western Atlanta metropolitan area.

The Black- and Latino-led organizations allege that Republican legislators "operated with surgical precision to crack and pack districts with higher percentages of Black, Latinx, and [Asian American Pacific Islander] voters, while moving the lines to increase the number of [w]hite voters in many districts." Although communities of color account for nearly all of Georgia's population growth over the past decade, the new congressional map does not create additional minority opportunity districts.

Voting rights organizations and additional Black voters allege that Georgia lawmakers racially gerrymandered three districts-GA-6, GA-13, and GA-14-to reduce minority voting power. According to the plaintiffs, the Georgia legislature cracked GA-6 so that minority voters could no longer elect the district's first Black female congresswoman, Lucy McBath. It also packed minority voters from six counties into one sprawling district: GA-13. Finally, the legislature cracked GA-14 by lumping Black citizens living in Cobb County with voters from a predominately white, rural district whom they share little in common.

Legislative: The Georgia NAACP lawsuit also contends that Georgia's legislative maps are racially discriminatory.

Two additional cases have been filed in federal court by a Black fraternity, a religious organization, and Black voters, contending that Georgia's legislative maps violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by impermissibly packing and cracking Black voters. The plaintiffs allege that the legislative maps fail to include more than six additional Black opportunity districts.

On February 28, 2022, a federal judge declined to preliminarily enjoin Georgia's new congressional and legislative maps, finding that doing so would "not [be] in the public's interest because changes to the redistricting maps at this point in the 2022 election schedule are likely to substantially disrupt the election process." Despite this determination, the court concluded that "the plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to ultimately prove that certain aspects of the State's redistricting plans are unlawful" since it is possible to create one additional Black congressional opportunity district and five such legislative districts.

Illinois

Racial discrimination

Legislative: Black and Latino voters have sued in federal court, contending that the maps passed by Democratic legislators are racially discriminatory in violation of the U.S. Constitution and/or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Black-led organizations allege that the state house map cracks the Black community of the East St. Louis area into two state house districts to dilute its voting strength and shore up white Democratic incumbents.

Suits by Latino voters allege that the maps drawn by Democrats intentionally perpetuate a long history of discrimination against Latino voters by packing and cracking them, which in turn dilutes their political power. Under the maps, only 4 of 118 state house districts (three percent of districts) would have a Latino citizen voting age population ("CVAP") 50 percent or greater even though the Latino community now compromises more than 11 percent of the state's CVAP. Not only did the Illinois legislature fail to create more Latino districts, but it also reduced the number of Latino districts from the 2011 redistricting plan (even though Illinois's Latino population grew more than any other racial or ethnic group within the state last decade).

Illinois Republican legislative leaders also have filed suit in federal court contending that the way the new state legislative maps were drawn has a racially discriminatory effect.

On December 30, 2021, a three-judge panel rejected all of the plaintiffs' claims that the most-recently drafted legislative maps are racially gerrymandered, finding that partisanship-rather than race-predominated in the configuration of the challenged districts and that plaintiffs did not otherwise establish a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The deadline to appeal has expired.

Kansas

Racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering

Congressional: Three cases have been filed in state court by Black, Latino, and Democratic voters and a civil rights organization, contending that the new congressional map enacted by the Republican-controlled Kansas legislature is racially discriminatory and/or a partisan gerrymander in violation of the Kansas Constitution.

The suits allege that the map, which was enacted via an override of the governor's veto, intentionally dilutes the voting power of Black, Latino, and Democratic voters by cracking such voters throughout the state. Despite the fact that all of Kansas's population growth over the past decade occurred within communities of color and 40 percent of Kansans have voted in favor of Democratic candidates on average in recent statewide elections, each of Kansas's congressional districts now favor Republicans. Currently, only one district-KS-3-is represented by a Democratic, Sharice Davids. In 2020, Davids, who is an openly LGBTQ Native American, won re-election by ten percentage points. Yet under the new map, KS-3 slightly leans Republican.

The cases are Frick v. Schwab, No. 2022-CV-71 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Mar. 1, 2022), Alonzo v. Schwab, No. 2022-CV-90 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Feb. 14, 2022) and Rivera v. Schwab, No. 2022-CV-89 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Feb. 14, 2022).

On April 25, 2022, a trial court struck down the legislature's new congressional map, finding that the map was an extreme partisan gerrymander and racially discriminatory in violation of the Kansas Constitution. After concluding that Kansas courts may resolve partisan gerrymandering claims, the court determined that the new plan "displays clear signs" of a Republican gerrymander, which include "cracking communities of Democratic voters, drawing unnaturally shaped districts that run roughshod over communities of interest, and pairing far-flung communities throughout the state." The court also held that five non-exhaustive factors "compel[] the conclusion that" the map intentionally dilutes minority voting power: 1) the plan "treats minority votes significantly less favorably than white vote[s][,]" 2) the map "was enacted under an abnormal legislative process[,]" 3) the process relied upon to produce the map "excluded minority voters in particular[,]" 4) "the plan is an unprecedented departure from prior plans in its treatment of minority voters[,]" and 5) the state's justification for the map's vote dilution-namely that I-70 splits white and minority communities-was pretextual. The court ordered the legislature to adopt a revised congressional map, subject to the court's review.

On May 18, 2022, a majority of the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court, concluding that the new congressional map does not violate the Kansas Constitution. It determined that Kansas courts lack the power to hear claims of partisan gerrymandering since there is no "judicially discoverable and manageable standard in Kansas law that will guide a court in resolving" such claims. It also held that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to establish the legislature discriminated on the basis of race when drawing the map.

On August 26, 2022, the Kansas Supreme Court summarily denied the plaintiffs' motion to rehear their claims that the new congressional map is racially discriminatory. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently declined to hear the plaintiffs' appeal of the case.

Kentucky

Partisan gerrymandering

The suit alleges that the maps, which were enacted via an override of the governor's veto, intentionally dilute the voting power of Kentucky's Democratic voters by packing and cracking such voters throughout the state. The plaintiffs contend that, to achieve the gerrymanders, the legislature drew districts that are irregularly shaped. As an example, "someone driving from Lexington to Louisville would cross five of the state's [six] congressional districts, but it would take over four hours to get from one side of the First District to the other."

On November 10, 2022, a trial court rejected the plaintiffs' claims, concluding that the Kentucky Constitution does not expressly prohibit partisan gerrymandering even though the new congressional and state house maps are in fact partisan gerrymanders. An appeal is pending before an intermediate appellate court. The plaintiffs have also asked the Kentucky Supreme Court to assume expedited jurisdiction over the case.

Louisiana

Racial discrimination

Congressional: Two cases have been filed in federal court by Black voters, a voting rights organization, and a civil rights organization, contending that the new congressional map enacted by the Louisiana legislature over the governor's veto is racially discriminatory in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

The suits allege that the map intentionally perpetuates a long history of discrimination against Black voters by packing and cracking them throughout the state, which in turn dilutes their political power given racially polarized voting. Under the new map, Black voters have the opportunity to elect a candidate of choice in only 1 of 6 districts (17 percent of districts) despite making up over 30 percent of the state's voting age population. The plaintiffs allege that Black voters are sufficiently numerous and geographically compact that the congressional map should include a second Black opportunity district.

On June 6, 2022, a federal judge granted a preliminary injunction blocking Louisiana from using its newly enacted congressional map for the 2022 elections, finding that the plan is substantially likely to violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it did not include a second Black majority congressional district. The court rejected the defendants' request to stay its order, which gave the Louisiana legislature until June 20, 2022 to adopt a replacement map. Because the legislature failed to produce a revised plan by that date, the trial court will implement a map.

On June 28, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the lower-court judgment pending appeal. In the wake of the Court's decision in a separate appeal regarding Alabama's congressional map, the Court dismissed the appeal and vacated its stay of the lower-court judgment on June 26, 2023. An appeal will now proceed before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit declined the stay the lower-court judgment pending appeal, which means that the process for drawing a revised congressional map for the 2024 election cycle will continue as appeals proceed through the courts.

The suit alleges that the map intentionally perpetuates a long history of discrimination against Black voters by packing and cracking them, which in turn dilutes their political power. Under the new maps, white voters will be able to elect their candidates of choice in over 70 percent of the legislative seats despite comprising only 58 percent of the voting-age population. The plaintiffs allege that the house map should include between six and nine additional Black opportunity districts, while the senate map should include three such additional districts.

On August 30, 2022, a federal judge stayed the case pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in an appeal regarding Alabama's congressional map.

Maryland

Partisan gerrymandering

Congressional: Two cases filed in state court by registered Republicans contend that the new congressional map enacted by the Maryland legislature is an extreme partisan gerrymander in violation of the Maryland Constitution.

The suits allege that the map, which was enacted via an override of the governor's veto, intentionally dilutes the voting power of Republican voters by cracking such voters throughout the state. The plaintiffs contend that, to split communities of interest, the legislature drew district lines that are distorted and noncompact. As an example, a roughly 20-mile drive north along the Baltimore-Washington Parkway from Cheverly, Maryland to Jessup, Maryland would lead a traveler through five different congressional districts.

On March 25, 2022, the trial court struck down Maryland's new congressional map, finding that the map "is an 'outlier,' an extreme gerrymander that subordinates constitutional criteria to political considerations." Underlying that finding, according to the court, is the map's "substantial deviation from 'compactness' as well as [its] failure to give 'due regard' to 'the boundaries of political subdivisions' as required by [the Maryland Constitution][.]" The court ordered the legislature to adopt a revised map, which the legislature did on March 30, 2022. The governor then signed the plan into law, and the state's attorney general subsequently announced that the state was ending its appeal.

A third case challenging the state's new congressional map-Alban v. Lamone, Misc. No. 30 (Md. Feb. 25, 2022)-also contended that the map is an extreme partisan gerrymander in violation of the Maryland Constitution. Republican voters filed the suit in Maryland's highest court, the Maryland Court of Appeals.

The suit alleged that the Maryland legislature gerrymandered the map so that Democrats could sweep all eight of the state's congressional seats (even though the state's lone GOP district-MD-1-currently leans safely Republican). According to the petitioners, state legislators made MD-1 competitive by "egregiously" changing the boundaries of the district so that it "reach[es] across the Chesapeake Bay and far inland to grab suburban voters in Anne Arundel County."

On March 1, 2022, the Maryland Court of Appeals summarily declined to hear the petitioners' claims.

The suits, which were filed in the Maryland Court of Appeals, allege that the plan intentionally dilutes the voting power of the state's Republican voters. As an example, the plan packs Republican voters into District 31, which unnecessarily "includes a barbell-shaped part of Anne Arundel County[,]" to protect a Democratic incumbent serving another district.

On April 13, 2022, the Maryland Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' claims. The Court concluded that the new legislative plan did not violate state constitutional provisions requiring that districts be compact, contiguous, and have due regard for natural boundaries. It also determined that the plan's use of both single- and multi-member districts did not violate the Maryland or federal constitutions. Finally, it held that neither the Maryland nor federal constitutions "require that the plan include three one-member delegate subdistricts in District 2 simply because the district crossed a county line."

Michigan

Racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering

On February 3, 2022, a 4-3 majority of the Michigan Supreme Court dismissed the Detroit Caucus lawsuit, noting that the plaintiffs had failed to submit any analysis of racial bloc voting to the Court. Additionally, the commission's racial bloc-voting analysis indicated that, even in the absence of districts that were 50 percent or more minority, a sufficient number of white voters have supported Black-preferred candidates such that Black voters have an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.

A separate lawsuit, League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, No. 164022 (Mich. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2022), which was filed in the Michigan Supreme Court on behalf of nonprofit organizations and Michigan voters, contends that the new state house map enacted by the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission is a partisan gerrymander in violation of the Michigan Constitution.

On March 25, 2022, the Michigan Supreme Court summarily dismissed the League of Women Voters lawsuit, stating that the Court was "not persuaded that it should grant the requested relief."

A third lawsuit, which was filed on behalf of Black voters in federal court, Agee v. Benson, No. 1:22-CV-272 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2022), contends that the new legislative maps enacted by the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission are racially discriminatory in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the U.S. Constitution.

Mississippi

Racial discrimination

The plaintiffs allege that the maps intentionally perpetuate a long history of discrimination against Black voters by packing them into certain areas and cracking others among multiple districts, thereby diluting Black political power. According to the plaintiffs, the maps dilute Black voting strength even though Mississippi has the largest Black population of any state and all of the state's population growth last decade occurred within communities of color. The plaintiffs contend that the legislative maps fail to include at least four additional Black opportunity state senate districts and at least three additional Black opportunity state house districts.

Missouri

Racial Discrimination

The suit alleges that the map discriminates against Black voters by packing them into MO-1, thereby diluting their voting power.

On July 8, 2022, a three-judge panel dismissed the plaintiff's claim, concluding that enjoining the new congressional map plan at this stage would significantly disrupt the impending 2022 election cycle. The court expressed no opinion on whether the map violated the U.S. Constitution.

Nevada

Partisan gerrymandering

The suit alleges that the maps intentionally dilute the voting power of Nevada's Republican and independent voters by packing and cracking such voters throughout the state. As an example, the complaint points to the Assembly map's splitting of the rural town of Pahrump into two districts, causing some of the town's rural voters to be lumped together with urban voters (even though the suit says the two groups share almost nothing in common).

New Hampshire

Partisan gerrymandering

The suit alleges that the map intentionally dilutes the voting power of New Hampshire's Democratic voters by packing and cracking them throughout the state. To pack and crack such voters, the legislature drew districts that are irregularly shaped. As an example, the new Senate District 5 resembles the letter "C" so that legislators could "make [the district] as heavily Democratic as possible, thereby significantly bolstering the prospect of Republican candidates in neighboring districts." The plaintiffs also claim that Republicans could still attain a veto-proof supermajority in the state senate under the new map even if they were to lose the statewide popular vote. Yet, according to the plaintiffs, Democrats would not even win a majority of seats with the same vote share.

On October 5, 2022, a trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, concluding that the court only had the power to enforce the explicit redistricting requirements of the New Hampshire constitution, none of which forbid partisan gerrymandering.

The plaintiffs have appealed the trial court's decision to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

New Jersey

Partisan gerrymandering

The New Jersey commission consists of 13 members: six appointees from each of New Jersey's two largest political parties and one independent member. The suit alleges that the commission's independent member cast the tiebreaking vote in favor of the Democratic members' map because a Republican map had been adopted during the previous redistricting cycle. According to the plaintiffs, the new map is invalid because its ratification was contingent upon the independent member's flawed reasoning in approving the map.

On February 3, 2022, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the plaintiffs' lawsuit, concluding that the scope of its review for an apportionment challenge under the New Jersey Constitution is limited to allegations of unlawfulness and invidious discrimination (neither of which the plaintiffs had contended). It also determined that the independent member did not have a conflict of interest that prevented him for serving on the commission.

New Mexico

Partisan gerrymandering

The suit alleges that the map intentionally dilutes the voting power of New Mexico's Republican voters by packing and cracking such voters in the southeastern part of the state. Under the old map, Republican voters residing in southeastern New Mexico were grouped within a single congressional district. By contrast, the plaintiffs contend that, under the new map, those voters are now split among all three of the state's congressional districts. The plaintiffs note that the legislature did not adopt any of the three congressional maps proposed by New Mexico's Citizen Redistricting Committee.

After a trial court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, the defendants requested that the New Mexico Supreme Court assume jurisdiction over the case, which the Court granted on October 14, 2022.

On July 5, 2023, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that New Mexico Courts have the power to decide claims for partisan gerrymandering under the state constitution and set out a standard for adjudicating such claims. It also ordered the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims and, if they do, to hold a trial to determine whether the state legislature's new congressional map violates the New Mexico Constitution.

New York

Partisan gerrymandering

The suit alleges that the maps dilute the voting power of New York's Republican voters by packing and cracking such voters throughout the state. Under the new congressional map, Democrats could gain as many as three seats. According to the petitioners, both maps are more biased in favor of Democrats than any of 5,000 computer-generated maps. The legislature gerrymandered the maps even though New Yorkers passed a constitutional amendment in 2014 ending New York's history of partisan gerrymandering.

On March 31, 2022, the trial court struck down New York's new congressional and legislative maps, finding that the state legislature violated the New York constitution by adopting those maps before the state's Independent Redistricting Commission issued a second set of proposed plans. Although the petitioners had solely challenged the constitutionality of the new congressional and state senate maps, the court struck down the state assembly plan as well since "[t]he same faulty process was used [to enact] all three maps." The court also invalidated the congressional map on the ground that it "was unconstitutionally drawn with political bias in violation of [Article III, Section 4(c)(5) of the New York Constitution][,]" which states that "[d]istricts shall not be drawn to discourage competition or for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring incumbents or other particular candidates or political parties." The court ordered the legislature to adopt a new set of "bipartisanly supported maps[,]" subject to the court's review.

On April 21, 2022, a 3-2 majority of an intermediate appellate division partly affirmed the decision of the trial court, concluding that the new congressional map is in fact a partisan gerrymander. A separate 4-1 majority of the court reversed the trial court's determination that the new congressional and legislative maps were void because the legislature did not follow the correct procedures when adopting those plans. The court therefore reinstated the state senate and state assembly plans. The court ordered the legislature to adopt a revised congressional map, subject to the trial court's review.

On April 27, 2022, a 4-3 majority of New York's highest court, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the intermediate appellate division, determining that the legislatively enacted congressional map is a partisan gerrymander. In addition, the Court ruled that the process used to enact both the congressional and legislative maps violated the New York constitution, reversing the appellate division. The Court ordered the trial court to adopt revised congressional and state senate maps with "all due haste" and the assistance of a special master.

On May 20, 2022, a trial court ordered the implementation of revised congressional and state senate maps drawn by the special master appointed by the court.

Separately, on May 15, 2022, another group of New York voters challenged the new state assembly map on the ground that that plan was enacted under the same unconstitutional procedure as the congressional and state senate maps. The petitioners ask the trial court to retain a special master to draw a revised state assembly plan. The case is Nichols v. Hochul, No. 154213/2022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 15, 2022).

On May 25, 2022, a trial court declined to preliminarily enjoin the new state assembly map, finding that the petitioners filed their action too close to the impending 2022 election cycle when they could have brought it months earlier.

On June 10, 2022, an intermediate appellate division upheld the ruling of the trial court, agreeing that it was too late for New York State to implement a revised state assembly map for the 2022 election cycle. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine "the proper means for" adopting a remedial plan for the remainder of the decade.

On September 29, 2022, a trial court determined that the appropriate remedy is for New York's Independent Redistricting Commission to reconvene and submit a revised state assembly map to the state legislature. According to the court, the legislature would be able to produce its own assembly map only after it rejects-or the governor vetoes-the revised plan and the commission then submits a second amended plan.

On January 24, 2023, an intermediate appellate division upheld the trial court's ruling issued on remand, concluding that the trial court's procedures for adopting a remedial state assembly map complied with the New York Constitution. The deadline to appeal has expired.

North Carolina

Racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering

Congressional and legislative: Two cases filed in state court by Black voters, Democratic voters, and an environmental organization contend that the new congressional and legislative maps enacted by the North Carolina legislature are racially discriminatory and partisan gerrymanders in violation of the North Carolina Constitution.

The suits allege that the congressional map intentionally dilutes the voting power of North Carolina's Black citizens through packing and cracking of Black voters. Under the congressional map, Black voters have the opportunity to elect a candidate of choice in only 2 of 14 districts (14 percent of districts) despite making up around 30 percent of the state's voting age population. The suits also assert that the congressional map entrenches the Republican Party's power through the packing and cracking of Democratic voters. Models demonstrate that, under the map, if Republican candidates earned 50 percent of the statewide vote, they would win 71 percent of North Carolina's congressional seats. Democratic candidates, however, could not win 50 percent of those seats unless they earned 57 percent of the statewide vote.

On January 11, 2022, a three-judge panel rejected all of the plaintiffs' claims that the new congressional and legislative maps are partisan gerrymanders, finding that, given there were no "satisfactory and manageable criteria" for the court to adjudicate those claims, the legislature serves as the appropriate forum for the plaintiffs' grievances. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs did not establish that race predominated during the map-drawing process or that the legislature intended to discriminate against Black voters.

On February 4, 2022, a 4-3 majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court and invalidated the legislature's new congressional and legislative maps, finding that the maps were a partisan gerrymander in violation of the North Carolina Constitution's free elections clause, the equal protection clause, the free speech clause, and the freedom of assembly clause. After concluding that North Carolina courts may resolve partisan gerrymandering claims, the Court determined the constitutionality of the new maps. Because Republicans sought to achieve an amount of partisan advantage when drawing the maps that did not accord with their level of statewide support among voters, the Court held that the maps were unconstitutional. The Court ordered the legislature to adopt a new set of maps, subject to the trial court's review.

On February 23, 2022, the trial court ordered the implementation of the legislature's revised maps for the state house and senate. The court, however, rejected the legislature's revised congressional map in favor of one recommended by court-appointed special masters. The court ordered implementation of the new congressional plan only for the 2022 election cycle. In a summary order, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' appeals pending a decision on the merits.

On March 7, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to stay the trial court's adoption of the new congressional map. However, on June 30, 2022, the Court granted the defendants' request to review the case.

Meanwhile, a 4-3 majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court on December 16, 2022, upheld the trial court's rejection of the legislature's revised state house and congressional maps. The court, however, blocked further implementation of the legislature's revised state senate map, reasoning that the plan is a partisan gerrymander in violation of the North Carolina Constitution. The court ordered the trial court to oversee the development and adoption of a new state senate plan that modifies the revised plan "only to the extent necessary to achieve constitutional compliance." After the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its ruling, the composition of the court changed giving conservative-leaning justices a majority. Given this change in composition, the defendants have requested that the Court overturn its earlier decisions rejecting the legislature's congressional and legislative maps. The Court reheard the case on March 14, 2023.

On April 28, 2023, the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled its February 2022 opinion invalidating the legislature's new congressional and legislative maps and withdrew its December 2022 decision regarding the legislature's remedial plans. This means that partisan gerrymandering is now legal in North Carolina. The Court gave the legislature another opportunity to produce congressional and legislative maps for the remainder of the decade.

On June 27, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the defendants' appeal premised on the so-called "independent state legislature theory," which relied upon an implausible reading of the federal Constitution's Elections Clause to claim that state legislatures are the only state body that can regulate congressional elections - not governors, state judges, or even state constitutions. According to the Court, "the Elections Clause does not insulate state legislatures from the ordinary exercise of state judicial review." It added that the Court will only review state court decisions regarding congressional elections when the state court "exceed[s] the bounds of ordinary judicial review[.]"

North Dakota

Racial discrimination

The suit alleges that the plan intentionally perpetuates a long history of discrimination against Native American voters by packing and cracking them, which in turn dilutes their political power. According to the plaintiffs, Native American voters only have a meaningful opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in two districts. They contend that instead of packing some Native American voters in one district and cracking others among two additional districts, the legislature should have combined some of the voters within these three districts to create a third Native American opportunity district.

A second lawsuit, Walen v. Burgum, No. 1:22-CV-31 (D.N.D. Feb. 16, 2022), which was filed on behalf of two North Dakota voters, contends that the new state legislative plan enacted by the North Dakota legislature is a racial gerrymander in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

The suit alleges that the legislature predominantly relied on race when drawing two Native American opportunity districts without adequate justification.

On May 26, 2022, a three-judge panel declined to preliminarily enjoin North Dakota's new legislative plan, finding that the plaintiffs had not shown that race predominated during the map-drawing process and that temporarily enjoining the plan would significantly disrupt the impending 2022 election cycle.

Ohio

Racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering

Congressional: Two lawsuits by Ohio voters in state court contend that Ohio's congressional map is a partisan gerrymander that violates the Ohio Constitution. According to the suits, the map passed by the Republican-controlled legislature gives Republicans a lopsided number of seats by splitting counties and Black communities to minimize the efficacy of Democratic votes. Under the plan, Republicans are projected to win 12 of 15 seats (80 percent) despite on average winning only 53 to 55 percent of the statewide vote.

A separate lawsuit filed in federal court, Simon v. DeWine, No. 4:21-CV-2267 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2021), alleges that Ohio's new congressional map is racially discriminatory because legislative leadership, when drawing the map, intentionally disregarded whether the proposed districts diluted the power of Black voters.

On January 14, 2022, a 4-3 majority of the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated the legislature's new congressional map, finding that the map was a partisan gerrymander in violation of Article XIX, Sections 1(C)(3)(a) and (b) of the Ohio Constitution. Section 1(C)(3)(a) prevents a simple majority of the legislature from adopting a congressional map that "unduly favors or disfavors a political party or its incumbents," while Section 1(C)(3)(b) prohibits the legislature from "unduly split[ting] governmental units." The Court concluded that the map unduly favored Republicans and unduly split Hamilton, Cuyahoga, and Summit Counties. The Court ordered the legislature to pass a new map within 30 days of the Court's ruling that complies with the Ohio Constitution and "is not dictated by partisan considerations." Should the legislature fail to timely enact a plan within 30 days of the Court's ruling, the Ohio Redistricting Commission would then have 30 days to produce a new map.

On March 2, 2022, the commission adopted an amended congressional plan after the legislature failed to enact a revised plan within 30 days of the Court's January 14th order. The petitioners in Adams and League of Women Voters objected to the new map as violative of the Ohio Constitution, but the Court ruled that the petitioners would have to file new cases if they wanted to challenge the map.

In response to that ruling, the petitioners brought two lawsuits contending that the revised congressional map is a partisan gerrymander that violates the Ohio Constitution. According to the petitioners, the revised map "bears a striking resemblance to" the original map struck down by the Court. Despite the fact that approximately 47 percent of Ohio's voters favor Democrats, the revised map merely allows Democrats to win up to four of the state's 15 congressional seats (27 percent of seats).

On July 19, 2022, the same four-justice majority that rejected the first congressional map also rejected the revised plan, finding that the map is another partisan gerrymander in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a). According to the Court, the revised plan "allocates voters in ways that unnecessarily favor the Republican Party by packing Democratic voters into a few dense Democratic-leaning districts, thereby increasing the Republican vote share of the remaining districts."

Republican members of the commission sought review of the decision at the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that decision exceeded the powers of the Ohio Supreme Court under the federal constitution's Elections Clause. On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Ohio Supreme Court's decision striking down the Ohio Redistricting Commission's revised congressional map and sent the case back to the state supreme court for further consideration in light of the Court's recent decision in Moore v. Harper, a separate appeal regarding North Carolina's congressional map.

Legislative: Three cases filed in state court by Ohio voters, civil rights organizations, and an environmental organization contend that the new state legislative maps enacted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission unfairly advantage Republican voters in violation of the Ohio Constitution.

The suits allege that the maps intentionally dilute the voting power of Ohio Democrats and minority voters through packing and cracking. Under the state house map, if Republican candidates earned 54 percent of the statewide vote, they would win a veto-proof supermajority in Ohio's House of Representatives. Yet with the same vote share, Democrats would not even win a majority of seats. The commission gerrymandered the state legislative maps even though Ohioans overwhelmingly passed a constitutional amendment in 2015 ending Ohio's history of partisan gerrymandering.

The Simon lawsuit's allegations of racial gerrymandering also apply to the commission's enactment of the Ohio senate map.

On January 12, 2022, a 4-3 majority of the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated the commission's new legislative maps, finding that the maps were a partisan gerrymander in violation of Article XI, Sections 6(A) and (B) of the Ohio Constitution. Sections 6(A) and (B) require the commission to "attempt" drawing maps that do not "primarily . . . favor or disfavor a political party" and in which the statewide proportion of districts "corresponds closely" to the statewide preferences of Ohio voters expressed over the previous decade, respectively. The Court concluded that the commission failed to comply with Section 6(A) because it drew maps heavily favoring Republicans. It also determined that the commission failed to adhere to Section 6(B) because it misunderstood the requirements of that provision. According to the Court, Section 6(B) obliges the commission to attempt producing a plan that closely corresponds to 54 percent Republican-leaning districts and 46 percent Democratic-leaning districts. The Court ordered the commission to adopt a new set of maps.

The commission enacted a revised General Assembly plan on January 22, 2022. The petitioners in all three cases then objected to the plan, arguing that it violates Sections 6(A) and (B). According to the petitioners, the revised plan disadvantages Democrats by creating 14 toss-up districts in the state house, all of which lean Democratic. They also contend that the state senate map still allows Republicans to maintain a veto-proof supermajority.

On February 7, 2022, the same four justices who rejected the commission's original plan rejected its revised maps, finding that the maps were another partisan gerrymander in violation of Sections 6(A) and 6(B). The Court determined that the commission failed to comply with Section 6(A) because it merely tweaked the original, invalid plan to secure Republicans an unfair advantage. It also ruled that the commission failed to abide by Section 6(B) because the statewide proportion of districts cannot closely correspond to the statewide preferences of Ohio voters "[w]hen 12 of the 42 'Democratic-leaning' House districts (i.e., more than 25 percent) are very close 'toss-up' districts yet there are 0 'Republican-leaning' districts that are similarly close[.]" The Court ordered the commission to adopt a new set of maps by February 17, 2022.

The commission enacted a third General Assembly plan on February 24, 2022. The petitioners in all three cases once again objected, arguing that the second revised plan violates Sections 6(A) and (B). According to the petitioners, the maps disadvantage Democrats by creating 26 toss-up districts in the General Assembly, all of which lean Democratic. The second revised plan incorporates nearly twice the number of toss-up districts that were included in the last plan invalidated by the Court. Several of the petitioners asked the Court to declare the constitutional validity of legislative maps produced by Dr. Jonathan Rodden, an expert on redistricting.

On March 16, 2022, the same four justices who rejected the commission's original and first revised plans rejected its second revised maps, finding that the maps were yet another partisan gerrymander in violation of Sections 6(A) and 6(B). The Court determined that the commission failed to comply with Section 6(A) because it once again allowed Republicans to exclusively control the map-drawing process and Republican commissioners "exercised that control with the overriding intent to maintain as much of an advantage as possible for members of their political party." It also ruled that the commission failed to abide by Section 6(B) because when 26 toss-up districts in the legislative plan-all of which leaned Democratic-are excluded, nearly 68 percent of the non-excluded districts favor Republicans, while just 32 percent favor Democrats.

On March 23, 2022, the Simon plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit.

The commission enacted a fourth General Assembly plan on March 28, 2022. The petitioners in all three cases once again objected, arguing that the third revised plan violates Sections 6(A) and (B). According to the petitioners, the maps disadvantage Democrats by creating 23 toss-up districts in the General Assembly, all of which lean Democratic. The third revised plan is nearly identical to the invalidated second revised plan. Several of the petitioners asked the Court to implement its own map or declare the constitutional validity of legislative maps produced by two independent map drawers hired by the commission.

On April 14, 2022, the same four justices who rejected the commission's original, first revised, and second revised plans rejected its third revised maps, finding that the maps were yet another partisan gerrymander in violation of Sections 6(A) and 6(B). The Court determined that the commission failed to comply with Section 6(A) because "rather than helping the independent map drawers finish their work on a plan, the commission instead chose to modify a previously invalidated plan." It also ruled that the commission failed to abide by Section 6(B) because when 23 toss-up districts in the legislative plan-all of which leaned Democratic-are excluded, 66 percent of the non-excluded districts favor Republicans, while just 34 percent favor Democrats. The Court rejected requests to adopt its own map or declare the constitutional validity of an alternative plan, determining that the Ohio Constitution did not permit the Court to implement such remedies. It gave the commission until May 6, 2022 to adopt another General Assembly plan, subject to the Court's review.

On March 28, 2022, a federal court implemented the commission's second revised plan for the 2022 election cycle because the commission and state lawmakers failed to produce a lawful General Assembly plan by that date. The Ohio Supreme Court had previously rejected that plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.

Pennsylvania

Racial discrimination and partisan gerrymandering

Legislative: Two cases filed in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by the state house majority leader and a Pennsylvania voter contend that the new state legislative maps enacted by Pennsylvania's Legislative Reapportionment Commission are racially discriminatory and partisan gerrymanders in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution and/or the U.S. Constitution.

The suits allege that the commission predominantly relied on race when drawing districts without adequate justification. As for partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiffs contend that the maps are more biased in favor of Democrats than 99.998 percent of simulated maps.

In a separate lawsuit, Covert v. Pennsylvania 2021 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, No. 4 WM 2022 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2022), Pennsylvania voters contend that the new state house map is a partisan gerrymander in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The petitioners allege that Butler County residents are "victims of excessive partisan or political classifications" since the commission excessively split the County in the new map.

On March 16, 2022, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a summary order rejecting the petitions, finding that the new legislative maps comply with state and federal laws.

On October 31, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Benninghoff.

South Carolina

Racial discrimination

The suit alleges that the map intentionally perpetuates a long history of discrimination against Black voters by packing and cracking them, which in turn dilutes their political power. As an example, the legislature "unnecessarily" split the City of Anderson "into four districts like a shattered mirror" to prevent Black voters from influencing the elections within any of those districts.

On May 5, 2022 and pursuant to a settlement agreement, the South Carolina legislature agreed to adopt a reviewed state house map. The amended map, however, will not take effect until the 2024 election cycle. The settlement agreement does not resolve the plaintiffs' claims with respect to the new congressional map.

On January 6, 2023, a three-judge panel permanently blocked South Carolina's new congressional map as to SC-1, concluding that the legislature racially gerrymandered the district since race, and not traditional redistricting principles, was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's design of the district. The panel, however, declined to strike down the map with respect to SC-2 and SC-5. The defendants have filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court. They also requested the three-judge panel stay its ruling pending that appeal, which was denied. Though the panel denied that request, it ordered the legislature to submit a revised map within 30 days of the Supreme Court's ruling.

Tennessee

Partisan gerrymandering

The suit alleges that, to achieve unfair partisan advantage, the Republican-controlled Tennessee legislature split more counties than necessary to maintain equipopulous districts. It also contends that the state senate map fails to include consecutively numbered districts for those districts that lie within Davidson County.

On April 6, 2022, a three-judge panel temporarily enjoined Tennessee's new state senate map, finding that the map violated the Tennessee Constitution. The panel declined to temporarily block the state house map. The panel ordered the legislature to adopt a new senate plan within fifteen days. Should the legislature fail to timely produce a new plan within the allotted time period, the panel will implement its own map just for the 2022 election cycle.

On April 13, 2022, a 4-1 majority of the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the trial court, concluding that the lower court had invalidated the legislature's new state senate map too close to the upcoming 2022 election cycle. The Court expressed no opinion on whether the trial court properly ruled that the senate map violated the Tennessee Constitution.

On March 27, 2023, the three-judge panel ruled that the plaintiffs' claims may proceed to trial.

Texas

Racial discrimination

Congressional: Nine cases filed in federal court by Latino, Black, and Asian voters, civil rights organizations, the nation's oldest and largest Latino legislative caucus, and the Justice Department contend that the new congressional map enacted by the Texas legislature is racially discriminatory in violation of the U.S. Constitution and/or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

The suits allege that the map intentionally perpetuates a long history of discrimination against minority voters by packing and cracking them, which in turn dilutes their political power. As a result of the 2020 Census, Texas received two additional congressional seats. Yet under the new map, those seats each have white voting majorities even though 95 percent of Texas's population growth last decade occurred within communities of color. Overall, white Texans form a majority of eligible voters in more than 22 of 38 districts (60 percent of districts) despite making up less than 40 percent of Texas's population. And although 49.5 percent of Texas's population growth over the last decade occurred within the Latino population, the new congressional map does not create any new Latino opportunity districts.

The cases are Escobar v. Abbott, No. 3:22-CV-22 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2022) (Latina voter), Fischer v. Abbott, No. 3:21-CV-306 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2021) (Latino voter), United States v. Texas, No. 3:21-CV-299 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2021), Fair Maps Texas Action Committee v. Abbott, No. 1:21-CV-1038 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2021) (Latino, Black, and Asian voters and organizations), Texas State Conference of the NAACP v. Abbott, No. 1:21-CV-1006 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2021) (organization), Brooks v. Abbott, No. 1:21-CV-991 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2021) (Latino and Black voters), MALC v. Texas, No. 1:21-CV-988 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2021) (organization), , No. 1:21-CV-965 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2021) (Latino and Black voters and one Latino voter organization), and LULAC v. Abbott, No. 3:21-CV-259 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2021) (Latino voters and organizations).

On June 23, 2022, the Escobar suit was voluntarily dismissed.

Legislative: In addition, the Justice Department, Fair Maps coalition, Texas NAACP, MALC, Brooks, Abuabara, and LULAC lawsuits also contend that Texas's legislative maps are racially discriminatory.

Latino plaintiffs contend that the maps overpopulate Latino majority districts and under-populate majority-white districts in order to avoid drawing additional Latino districts. They also allege that the maps actually reduce the total number of Latino majority districts from the previous redistricting cycle, despite massive growth in the Latino population last decade. Other plaintiffs contend that the map badly fractures Black, Latino, and Asian communities, especially in the state's rapidly diversifying suburbs.

On May 4, 2022, a three-judge panel declined to preliminary enjoin Texas's new state senate map, finding that the legislature did not intend to discriminate against minorities when producing the plan even though "the new senate map may disproportionately affect minority voters in Tarrant County, and though the legislature may at times have given pretextual reasons for its redistricting decisions[.]"

Utah

Partisan gerrymandering

The suit alleges that the map intentionally dilutes the voting power of non-Republican voters by splitting Salt Lake County among each of the state's four congressional districts.

On October 24, 2022, a trial court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claims. An appeal of that ruling is pending before the Utah Supreme Court.

Washington

Racial discrimination

The suit alleges that the plan creates a "façade of a Latino opportunity district" within the Yakima Valley region. According to the plaintiffs, the commission cracked the region's Latino population among multiple districts, which resulted in a Latino opportunity district-District 15-that barely includes a Latino voting-age population over 50 percent. The plaintiffs request the creation of a Latino opportunity district within the Yakima Valley that would provide Latino voters "with an effective opportunity to elect the candidate of their choice to the Washington State Legislature."

On April 13, 2022, a federal judge declined to preliminarily enjoin Washington's new legislative plan, finding that the state was "too close to the 2022 election to enjoin the use of the [] plan for this election cycle" and "that any delay in the establishment of precinct boundaries will likely lead to confusion for both candidates and voters in [District 15]." The court also dismissed the speaker of the state house and the majority leader of the state senate from the lawsuit because they were not proper defendants for the Palmer plaintiffs' Section 2 claim. The court, however, did not rule on the underlying merits of that claim.

A Washington voter also filed a separate lawsuit, Garcia v. Hobbs, No. 3:22-CV-5152 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2022), contending that District 15 in the new legislative plan is racially gerrymandered in violation of the U.S. Constitution. According to the plaintiff, the district's "odd shape" can only be explained by the fact that the commission improperly relied upon race as the predominant factor when drawing the district.

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A look at legal cases around the country challenging newly adopted redistricting plans.

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Gerrymandering, explained | The Washington Post

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Redistricting Report Card Click on a map title to see its score!
Filter/sort with the map or buttons below

Redistricting Season is Open

Every 10 years, U.S. states redraw their congressional and state legislative maps to account for changes in population. In many states, the politicians who control this process draw district lines in a way that maximizes their party's partisan advantage and makes it effectively impossible for their opponents to win power.

This practice is called gerrymandering.

Visual tool with powerful analytics

In response to the 2021 redistricting cycle, the Gerrymandering Project developed this report card as a tool to help the public identify gerrymandered maps. The Redistricting Report Card uses a powerful and unique set of analytics to grade each state's newly-drawn maps during the redistricting process.

Select a map from the dropdown above to view its report card, or select a state to view report cards for maps as they become available.

Holistic and Interpretable Scoring System

In addition to scoring maps on competitiveness and geographic features, the Redistricting Report Card uses a cutting-edge algorithm to provide unprecedented analysis of a map's partisan fairness. Along with grading maps in these categories, the tool takes a holistic look at the partisan and minority composition of proposed districting plans.

Powered by A Million Maps

Our algorithm generates around one million potential districting plans for each state, providing us with a baseline of what's possible to draw in a state given its political landscape and redistricting rules. We have also enlisted a collection of 75 advanced mappers with intricate knowledge of specific states and communities to incorporate local geographic expertise in our final grades.

As politicians increasingly turn to powerful computer software to make gerrymandering harder to detect, we believe it's vital that the public has access to tools that can keep up.

Want us to score a map you don't see here? Email us with a link to the digital map files and we'll see what we can do!

Data sources: U.S. Census Bureau, state legistlatures, OpenPrecincts, MGGG, VEST, Princeton MapCorps, and All About Redistricting

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Demonstrators at a rally at the Supreme Court as it hears the gerrymandering cases Lamone v. Benisek and Rucho v. Common Cause, March 26, 2019. (Evelyn Hockstein/For The Washington Post, file)

As state lawmakers start drawing state legislative and congressional districts, Americans can be confident about this: Many districts will be drawn in bizarre shapes that give one party the advantage. While new technologies have made gerrymandering much easier, citizens have helped by clustering in neighborhoods with others who are politically like-minded, making it easier to see how any region is likely to vote.

But some local and state elections employ "multi-member districts." These districts have a larger population than single-member districts and elect more than one representative. That represents more views and promotes competition. Here's how they work.
Americans have sorted themselves in ways that make it harder to draw "fair" maps
Over the past few decades, Americans have increasingly sorted themselves into neighborhoods of the politically like-minded, scholars find. This "partisan sorting," as it's called, reinforces longstanding patterns of housing segregation by race and income. With fewer and fewer politically diverse communities, state legislators find it easier to pack their opponents' voters into a single district - called "packing" - or to dilute their votes by dispersing such communities into many different districts - called "cracking." Either way, those voters are marginalized. Political scientists say many of their ballots are "wasted" - delivered in ways that don't affect the outcome, whether poured into huge margins in packed districts or ineffectual votes in cracked districts. Meanwhile, incumbents are so secure that they only fear competition in low-turnout primaries.

Many reformers advocate for nonpartisan, independent redistricting commissions that will draw "fair" maps. But even when district boundaries are drawn in reasonable ways, Democrats are concentrated in large, urban areas, while Republicans are spread across suburbs and rural areas. As a result, GOP candidates win with smaller margins -- wasting fewer votes -- and claim more seats than their share of the state vote would suggest.

Some election experts recommend multi-member districts, which counteract partisan sorting in a variety of ways. Increasing each district's size makes both packing and cracking harder, since each district is larger than even the most populous partisan cluster. Fewer districts mean fewer boundaries to manipulate. Larger districts offer more coalition possibilities to attract strong, well-funded candidates from both parties. Together, these changes encourage both incumbents and challengers to attend to a wider range of voters.

Here's how to fix partisan gerrymandering, now that Congress has kicked it back to the states.
The mechanics of multi-member districts
Multi-member districts are as old as the Republic and are still used in municipal and state elections. In the 10 states that use multi-member districts for the lower house, procedures for determining the winner depend on how primaries are structured, votes are tallied, and how many candidates are nominated. In a hypothetical three-member district, each voter typically casts three ballots; rules vary on whether a voter can abstain from some or allocate all three votes to the same candidate.

In our forthcoming research on possible multi-member districts in Pennsylvania, we used a computer algorithm to repeatedly and randomly divide Pennsylvania into six congressional districts containing approximately 2.1 million people each, three times the size of the eighteen districts the state has now. In the tens of thousands of valid maps that resulted, each of these larger districts closely matched the state on key demographic categories, such as age, education, income levels, race, urban or rural. Most important, they also contained fewer lopsided partisan blocs, increasing the chance of competitive elections and reducing the number of wasted votes.

A key provision for making multi-member districts work most effectively is Ranked Choice Voting (RCV), in which voters order candidates by how much they prefer them - first choice, second choice and so on - as has just happened in New York City's mayoral primary. The technical details can be complex and hotly debated by experts. In the simplest method for a hypothetical three-member district, the candidate with the most first-choice votes gets the first seat. If this candidate gets any more votes beyond the 33.3 percent needed to be elected in a three-member district, the computer tabulating those ballots would examine the share of second-choice votes among people who voted for the top candidate, and would allocate those "additional" votes to those other candidates. The votes would be tallied again, and the candidate with the most votes would win the second seat. Once again, additional ballots would be reallocated, and the remaining votes would determine the winner of the third seat.

Redistricting might gain Republicans a few seats in Congress. Their real gains will be in state legislatures.
The challenge of Black majority-minority districts and multi-member constituencies
Since the Voting Rights Act of 1965, state legislators have been drawing majority-minority districts, thus increasing the number of Black lawmakers in both Congress and state legislatures. But the price has been steep: Black voters have less influence over policy. Packed into majority-minority districts, Black voters are easily ignored by elected officials who never face a significant bloc of them.

As Black turnout increases, however, majority-minority districts may no longer be necessary to elect Black candidates. In our forthcoming study, we found that of the districts in which at least 37 percent of the eligible voters were Black, all but two elected a House member who affiliated with the Congressional Black Caucus in the 115th Congress (2017-18). Recent scholarship on Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) and minority representation suggests that multi-member districts with some form of ranking built into the ballot could help Black and Latino communities elect their top choices.

To make this possible, Congress would have to repeal a ban on multi-member districts enacted in 1967, when Southern legislatures were using at-large elections without ordered preferences to swamp minority candidates. With RCV, however, candidates who are the top choice of a significant minority of voters would prevail over the majority's less preferred candidates.

Multi-member districts with ranked-choice voting do not guarantee that each party will hold the proportion of seats that matches the proportion it wins of the vote. But the system would lessen the likelihood of wasted votes. Large majorities would secure their first choice, and perhaps their second; large minorities would see at least one of their candidates elected as ballots were reallocated. Seats would be more likely to be competitive, and if voters' second and third choices matter, candidates would have more reason to reach out to voters now largely ignored in winner-take-all elections. We think citizens in both parties would be better off.
Don't miss any of TMC's smart analysis! Sign up for our newsletter. Christopher S. Fowler Linda L. Fowler is professor of government and Frank J. Reagan Chair in Policy Studies, Emerita, at Dartmouth College, and has written widely on congressional elections and the recruitment of candidates. (@csfowler13) is associate professor of geography at Pennsylvania State University and has published extensively on the consequences of population clustering in a wide range of communities with particular emphasis on racially segregated and immigrant communities.

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Analysis | Here's a different way to fix gerrymandering

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Even independent redistricting commissions are limited by the fact that Democrats cluster in cities while Republicans are widely dispersed. But there's a solution.

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How Math Has Changed the Shape of Gerrymandering | Quanta Magazine

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New tools make it possible to detect hidden manipulation of maps.

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This Font Is Made of Ridiculously Gerrymandered Congressional Districts

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The font is called Ugly Gerry and serves as a fun reminder that our political system is fundamentally dysfunctional.

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Our database includes congressional districts and election results from 1962-2022 with vote totals from 1976-2020.

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This interactive tool enables users to view more than 10 decades of apportionment and population data. #census #CensusDataViz #census

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This interactive tool enables users to view more than 10 decades of apportionment and population data. #census #CensusDataViz #census

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Includes interactive maps by State.

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Ballotpedia: The Encyclopedia of American Politics

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State redistricting criteria

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Alabama

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest

Allowed: Avoid Pairing Incumbents

Ala. Const. Art. IX, §§ 198-200

Reapportionment Comm. Guidelines, May 2011

Connecticut

Legislative

Required: Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Conn. Const. Art. III, § 3, as amended by Article II, §1, and Article XV, §1, of the Amends. to the Const. of Conn.;

Conn. Const. Art. III, § 4, as amended by Article II, §2, and Article XV, §2, of the Amends. to the Const. of Conn.;

Conn. Const. Art. III, § 5, as amended by Article XVI, §1, of the Amends. to the Const. of Conn.

Florida

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Prohibited: Intentionally Favor or Disfavor a Party or Incumbent

Fla. Const. Art. III, §§ 20, 21

Georgia

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest

Allowed: Avoid Pairing Incumbents

Hawaii

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Communities of Interest

Prohibited: Unduly Favor a Person or Party

Hawaii Const. Art. IV, § 6
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 25-2(b) (1)-(6)

Kansas

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest, Avoid Pairing Incumbents

Kansas

Congressional

Required: Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest, Preserve Cores of Prior Districts

Kentucky

Legislative

Required: Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Ky. Const. § 33

Criteria & Standards for Cong. Redistricting, Interim Joint Comm. on State

Government, Subcomm. on Redist., July 11, 1991

Louisiana

Legislative

Required: Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Cores of Prior Districts

La. Const. Art. III, § 6

Committee Rules for Redistricting, La. House Comm. on House and Gov'tal Affairs, Jan. 19, 2011

Committee Rules for Redistricting, La. Senate Comm. on Senate and Gov'tal Affairs, Feb. 16, 2011

Maine

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Congressional

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Massachusetts

Legislative

Required: Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Mass. Const. Art. CI, as amended by Art. CIX

Massachusetts

Congressional

Required: No Requirements

Minnesota

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest

Allowed: Avoid Pairing Incumbents

Prohibited: Intentionally Favor or Disfavor Incumbent

Minn. Const. Art. IV, §§ 2-3 Minn. Stat. § 2.91

Order Stating Redistricting Principles & Requirements for Plan Submissions, Hippert v. Ritchie, No. A11-152 (Minn. Spec. Redist. Panel Nov. 4, 2011)

Mississippi

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Miss. Code §5-3-101

Criteria for Leg. and Cong. Redist., Standing Joint Leg. Comm. on Reapport. & Standing Joint Cong. Redist. Comm., Apr. 5, 2012

Analysis of Factors Considered, Smith v. Hoseman, No. 3:01-cv-855 (S.D. Miss., Dec. 19, 2011)

Montana

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Prohibited: Intentionally Favor Party or Incumbent, Use Partisan Data (except as required by a court in drawing a remedy)

Mont. Const. Art. V, § 14 Mont. Code Ann. § 5-1-115 Congressional and Legislative Redistricting Criteria

Districting & Apport. Commis., May 28, 2010

Nevada

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest, Avoid Pairing Incumbents

Nev. Const. Art. 4, § 5 N.R.S. Ch. 304, App.

Order Re: Redistricting, Guy v. Miller,No. 11-OC-42-1B (1st Jud. Dist., Carson City Sept. 21, 2011)

New Mexico

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest
Allowed: Preserve Cores of Prior Districts, Avoid Pairing Incumbents

N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 2-7C-3,

Guidelines for the Development of State & Cong. Redistricting Plans, Legislative Council, Jan. 17, 2011

New York

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest, Preserve Cores of Prior Districts, Competitive

Prohibited: Intentionally Favor or Disfavor Incumbent, Candidate or Party

North Carolina

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest,

Allowed: Avoid Pairing Incumbents, Use Partisan Data
Prohibited: Use Racial Data
N.C. Const. Art. II, §§ 3 & 5

N.C. House and Senate Plans Criteria,

Sen. Comm. on Redist. & House Select Comm. on Redist., Aug. 10, 2017

N.C. Congressional Plan Criteria, Joint Select Comm. on Congressional Redist., Feb. 16, 2016

North Carolina

Congressional

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Allowed: Avoid Pairing Incumbents, Use Partisan Data

Prohibited: Use Racial Data

Ohio

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Cores of Prior Districts (until Jan.1, 2021), Proportional
Prohibited: Favor an Incumbent or Party

Ohio Const. Art. XI, §§ 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11; Art. XIX, §§1, 2

Rhode Island

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions

Vermont

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest

Allowed: Avoid Pairing Incumbents

Virginia

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Communities of Interest

Va. Const. Art. II, § 6 Va. Code § 24.2-305

House Criteria, House Comm. on Privileges & Elections,

Comm. Res. 1, Mar. 25, 2011

Senate Criteria, Senate Comm. on Privileges & Elections,

Comm. Res. 1, Mar. 25, 2011

Congressional Criteria, Joint Reapport. Comm., Aug. 17, 2015

Wyoming

Legislative

Required: Compact, Contiguous, Preserve Political Subdivisions, Preserve Communities of Interest

Redistricting Principles - 2011, Joint Corps., Elections & Political Subdivisions Interim Comm., Apr. 4,2011

Related Resources

A pair of blockbuster redistricting cases from the Supreme Court were scrutinized during a session at NCSL's Legislative Summit. At least for the moment, the cases settle the status of two prominent legal theories that play key roles in redistricting.

On this episode, Ben Williams from NCSL talks about the latest legal developments around redistricting and the efforts in 13 states to reallocate inmate data from rural prisons to the communities where the inmates came from.

There are several methods of measuring the extent to which populations of all the districts in a plan vary, or differ collectively from the "ideal." The method expressed in this document is "Overall Range."

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When redistricting, state legislatures or redistricting commissions are provided certain criteria with which to draw the lines. These criteria are intended to make the districts easy to identify and understand, and to ensure fairness and consistency.

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Maps and visualizations of House elections for nearly two centuries.

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After the census every 10 years, states redraw legislative and congressional district boundaries. This is often a fraught process, with massive potential for abuse. Most states currently draw districts through their ordinary legislative process, though there are a number of variations. Typically, each chamber of the state legislature passes maps by a simple majority vote, and the governor can veto the result.

Problems arise when state government is controlled by a single party. Even if the advantage is slim, the redistricting process can then be subverted for partisan gain or to discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities, with maps drawn behind closed doors and with little or no public input.

Independent redistricting commissions are an effective solution against such abuses. But some work better than others. The success of a commission depends largely on its structure and its internal system of checks and balances. Carefully designing a commission to promote core values like independence, inclusivity, good-faith negotiation, and transparency is critical to fair redistricting that protects community interests and guards against partisan and racial gerrymandering.

This annotated guide and accompanying model bill lay out the internal design and logic of a redistricting commission that promotes these values. This sample language can, with minimal adjustment, be adapted to account for state-specific needs and political realities.

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Our model legislation lays out a design for redistricting commissions that promotes independence, inclusivity, and transparency.

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One curious thing about those four competitive‐​in‐​November seats: They're all open seats where an incumbent is retiring. That's because none of the incumbents who planned to run again volunteered their districts to be made into the competitive ones. In fact, when you look more closely, many incumbents got their districts snipped here and expanded there so as to make them safer, not just in the general election but also-this will be less obvious, except to the well-informed-in the primaries. Sometimes the voters in a town never really warm up to you, in which case the best course is to pass that town on to the next lawmaker over.

Once you look more closely, you see that many of the districts have shapes that are a little more stretchy and boundary lines that are a little more jiggly than they would strictly need to be. Also, they crisscross county and city borders more than they have to. In two or three instances, you notice a thin peninsula of land that juts out from the main body of a district to capture a remote neighborhood. You ask an insider, who explains that those fingers are meant to connect the home residence of some lawmaker with the district he or she wishes to represent. In fact, the starting point for most of the districts had simply been to ask incumbent members of both parties how they wanted their districts to look. To paraphrase a famous line: Officials had succeeded in picking their voters, rather than letting voters pick their officials.

In one case (and only one), the new map throws two incumbents from the same party into a single district. Your insider friend explains that that was to get rid of a member of the majority party who just caused trouble all the time-making noise about supposed scandals, never cooperating with more senior colleagues. No one likes him, really. Or at least no one in the leadership does. Without this disruptive personality, the next legislature will be more collegial and less polarized. And that's to the good, right? Also, seeing what happened to this troublemaker, none of the members are going to think about crossing the leadership next term.
Everyone Wants Reform-But What Kind?
I call this kind of arrangement a "buddymander." Many people who hate partisan gerrymandering hate it too, but others are willing to let it slide or even are fine with it. The animating logic is: We'll protect our guys and you can protect yours. It's outwardly different from extreme partisan gerrymandering, since the main goal is not to take away seats from the opposition. But the two spring from the same underlying temptation: When the system gives insiders wide discretion over line drawing, they are apt to use it to advance their own interests.

The main task of redistricting reform is to confine that discretion. To appreciate the difficulty of that task, let's switch for the moment to a seemingly remote question: Why allow any discretion in drawing legislative maps at all?

When you serve on a redistricting commission, as I have now done in Maryland twice, that's one of the most common questions you get: Why can't we turn the whole thing over to a computer algorithm? At its simplest, this can take the form of proposing that the state simply be divided into districts of equal population (as the courts require) by some brute method. Thus a state might be divided among the proper number of congressional districts by drawing vertical lines dividing it into strips of varying widths.

To spend a few minutes with such a map is to grasp its flaws. Even in a conveniently rectangular state like Colorado, districts would end up comprising unrelated communities separated from each other by mountains and long distances. Coherent communities would be split, perhaps multiple ways, to no good purpose. Before long, you will have rediscovered some of the basic keys to good districting, namely: compactness, with districts looking more like turtles than snakes or octopuses; practical contiguity, meaning that all sections of a district are accessible by road connections without having to leave the district; and congruence with the boundaries of other political subdivisions, such as counties and cities.

Happily, each of these three desirable features can be translated into formulas in algorithm‐​friendly ways. While experts have devised many mathematical formulas to score compactness, picking any one of them will help curtail the worst gerrymanders. Likewise, a formula can keep track of the number of county splits (lower is better). Further prescriptions can install a decision mechanism such as splitting more populous counties before those that are less populous.

Unfortunately, algorithms are far less adept at incorporating formulas for a fourth aspect of good districting, one that has been called intelligibility. People want at least a fighting chance to describe their district in words, and to guess correctly whether someone lives in it based on knowing where his or her residence is. Curved and diagonal lines usually don't register as intelligible, while "east of the River" or "south of I‑70" may work fine. And while some neighborhoods may need to be split to make the numbers come out evenly, intelligibility is lost if a district line heedlessly splits every neighborhood it hits rather than finding the boundaries between them.

Because few of us are willing to jettison intelligibility entirely, fully algorithmic districting is unlikely to arrive anytime soon. But the impulse at least deserves respect, since it stands for the right goal: to confine the role of discretion. And it points the way to what is probably the most promising use of mathematics in districting, which is to pair quantifiable formulas with a band of discretion within which mapmakers are asked to pursue intelligibility. For example, it might be proposed that a lawful map must attain a compactness score no more than 20 percent worse than the most compact map taken under consideration, or that it must inflict no more than two more than the minimum attainable number of county splits.

It's unsurprising and true: States that have enacted clear, objective rules to guide mapmakers on topics like compactness and congruence tend to have far less of a gerrymandering problem than those that have not. The same kinds of rules also provide a firm basis for judicial review. While it is troublesome to give judges themselves massive discretion in line drawing-for one thing, it risks magnifying the role of politics in judicial selection, already a problem in many states-it is much less dangerous to assign them the quintessentially judicial task of holding others to clear and specific marching orders.

For an example of a redistricting criterion that is anything but clear and objective, consider the notion that district lines should follow so‐​called communities of interest. No one can pin down what this means to general satisfaction. Should a town that is suburban, industrial, and coastal be grouped with other areas that are suburban? Industrial? Coastal? It's a recipe for arbitrariness, disagreement, and manipulability. The same is true if a court is instructed to apply that same vague standard later on.

The toughest question-on which it is hard to offer more than speculation-is that of who, if not political insiders, should draw the lines. The currently popular plan, adopted in such places as Arizona and California, is that of the independent citizen volunteer commission. Experience with this innovation has been mixed so far, with much depending on the details of how a given law is drawn. Over time, interest groups will probably attempt to influence, or even infiltrate, the citizen commission. At the same time, the new blueprints for citizen redistricting include powerful measures to shake up the old way of doing things, such as rules forbidding commissions to take into account the residence of any incumbent or the voter registration or voting history of any community.

Public submission of maps, enabled by open databases and the availability of free or cheap software, holds great promise as well. For one thing, courts are more likely to provide effective judicial review if multiple maps are made available for comparison.

Yet another reform blueprint is to turn over the task to a legislative services bureau bound by strong impartiality norms. The results have been applauded in Iowa, a state known for relatively clean politics in which the two main political parties are approximately equally matched. But legislative service bureaus in other states might prove less robust in resisting political influence.

In the background are widening differences over what the goal of good districting should be in the first place. Those of us on the classical liberal side are likely to be inspired by the ideals of neutrality, impartiality, and objectivity. But some of the academics and commentators drawn to the controversy want a rough match between seat strength and voter strength-implicitly, a criterion of proportional representation, so that if a state is 40 percent Republican, say, somewhere around 40 percent of its seats will go to Republicans. A second group of thinkers takes the view that the chief evils to be fought are those of polarization and the alienation that arises from feeling one's vote doesn't matter; they thus advocate conscious efforts to create more competitive districts, especially ones that are competitive in general elections. (As Charles Blahous of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and others have shown, the trend has been for more districts to become competitive in party primaries, even as fewer remain competitive in the general.)

These two latter schools of thought-proportional representation and a preference for the creation of more competitive districts-are in practical terms at odds with each other. When many districts are drawn to be competitive, relatively modest swings in voter sentiment can lead to large swings in seat control.

The polarization issue is also more complicated than it may look. It is true that party positions in the U.S. House and many state legislatures have grown more polarized in recent decades, with a winnowing out of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans. But the same dynamic can be seen in the U.S. Senate, and no one now alive plays any role in drawing that body's boundaries. The best guess is that several forces are contributing to polarization, with gerrymandering one part of the mix.

Proponents of proportional outcomes sometimes seem to be fighting a losing war against the inherent nature of America's "first‐​past‐​the‐​post" electoral system, which has always tended to generate major gaps between voter strength and seat strength. (This faction might be better advised to throw its support behind a ranked‐​choice, Australian‐​ballot, or European‐​style system, each of which is meant to avoid this outcome.) At any rate, the result‐​minded thinkers in both schools have something important in common, which is that both are obliged to resort to line drawing that is intensely conscious of voters' political leanings. It's hard for either to get on board with the California idea of blinding mapmakers to political data about registration, voting history, and politicians' residences.

Indeed, once you accept a goal of corralling voters into patterns judged to yield good electoral outcomes, you may even grow cool (as some contemporary academics are) toward traditional neutral‐​impartial‐​objective criteria such as compactness and avoiding county splits. They just get in the way of reaching the right results.
Redistricting Reform Returns From the Dead
After many years of back‐​burner status, interest in partisan gerrymandering began mounting rapidly around 2015 for two reasons. First, constitutional litigators had a case they hoped to win. Second, the issue got pulled into the ceaseless noise machine of Red Team/​Blue Team warfare, because (as had not been the case over long historical stretches) one party was now doing significantly better from gerrymandering than the other.

For years, the only hope of getting the Supreme Court to recognize a constitutional remedy for gerrymandering turned on the cooperation of Justice Anthony Kennedy. With Kennedy's tenure on the bench nearing what was to prove to be its end in 2018, a search went out for a case that might tempt him. That search failed. The "efficiency gap" test proffered in a case out of Wisconsin failed to persuade him. Kennedy then retired, after which the necessary votes weren't there. In 2019, the Court used two cases- Rucho v. Common Cause and Lamone v. Benisek -to rule, 5-4, that there was no constitutional remedy to be had in federal court over partisan gerrymandering. But in the meantime, the usual publicity apparatus deployed for big Supreme Court cases had done its thing, and the issue had risen in public awareness.

A brighter‐​than‐​usual spotlight on this issue also followed the 2010 wave election, in which Republicans ousted Democrats from 680 state legislative seats in the biggest such partisan pickup in history, flipping no fewer than 20 state legislative chambers. In what became an oft‐​told tale, the GOP carefully deployed its new power using a program called REDMAP, which helped in devising exquisitely detailed gerrymanders that enabled the party to push its advantage further against Democrats in state after state. It helped that database and geographic information system technologies were improving constantly so as to allow super‐​fine‐​grained assemblage of districts on the fly. Legislators were able to sort local voters by political preference down to individual blocks, buildings, and households-a far cry from the old days, when pulling off a gerrymander might require weeks amid maps and awkward printouts of voter data.

Republicans enjoyed one other systemic advantage as well: Their objectives often meshed nicely with those of the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA). That law sanctions and even encourages-though the courts have had trouble sorting out exactly to what extent-the creation and maintenance of race‐​conscious districts in which minority voters hold a majority big enough to elect a candidate of their choice. It's an open secret that maps that result in significant black representation are often also maps where Republicans do well, since VRA districts funnel one of the most loyal Democratic voting groups off from the rest of the map. A Republican strategist could simply approach black legislators and ask them to draw their "perfect district." Wildly noncompact districting was accepted as legitimate in many VRA situations; indeed, it's not uncommon for districts that show up on lists of the worst partisan gerrymanders to have been created by legislators (or even suggested by judges) under a VRA rationale.

Notwithstanding what happened in 2010, there has been little over the longer term to mark out gerrymandering as a distinctively Republican practice. In 1986, for example, officials of both major parties took positions more or less the opposite of their 2019 ones. In Davis v. Bandemer, a high‐​profile Supreme Court case from that year, the Republican National Committee filed an amicus brief in favor of strong Court intervention to correct partisan gerrymanders (a stance requiring it to argue against its own Indiana state party, which had engaged in the practice in the case at hand). As one of the brief's co‐​authors explained the following year, Democrats had just pulled off a massive and successful gerrymander in the state of California, and Republican leaders foresaw the same thing happening in many other states, "since Democrats control considerably more state legislative houses than do Republicans."

Meanwhile, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee disparaged the idea that the federal courts should be in any hurry to jump in, saying that Republicans, having failed "to win control of more legislatures," were now seeking "a quick fix" to make up their losses.

In the longer run, unease at California gerrymanders did help touch off what became the most notable development in redistricting reform: the rise of independent citizen commissions, typically propelled by the ballot initiative process. Arizona went first with Proposition 106 in 2000, followed by California with Proposition 11 in 2008 and Proposition 20 in 2010. (Prominent California Democrats, including once‐​and‐​future Speaker Nancy Pelosi, quietly worked to sabotage the latter effort and keep the electeds in control.)

Map‐​related misconduct was indeed a bipartisan affair. A 2006 report from Azavea, a geographical software applications firm, listed the 10 most gerrymandered states. At the time the maps were drawn, four were controlled by Democratic legislatures, five were controlled by Republican legislatures, and one was split. Of the 10 most gerrymandered districts, four were in states that had Democratic legislatures at the time of drawing, three were in states controlled by Republicans, and three were split. Illinois Democrats in 2016 managed to kill a referendum backed by 500,000 petition signers, just as Michigan Republicans have lately fought a pitched legal battle to foil a voter‐​backed plan for an independent commission. Maryland Democrats behave much like Texas Republicans, and so on.
What Comes Next?
Some of today's momentum will continue, come what may. While the federal courts may have bolted their doors against gerrymander challenges, their state counterparts are still capable of surprises, especially when they draw on the language of state constitutions, as Pennsylvania's high court did in striking down that state's congressional map in 2018.

A deeper problem for reformers is that they are beginning to run out of states with strong ballot‐​initiative and referendum provisions. Only 18 states allow voters to initiate laws or constitutional amendments directly, and the practical number is a few less than that, since several of the states make the process quite hard to use. Most districting reform successes in recent years have come in states where advocates either ran a ballot initiative or credibly threatened to do so, starting with Western states and more recently extending to Ohio, Michigan, and Missouri.

With Democratic fortunes beginning to revive in the 2018 midterms, the party will soon face decisions about whether to pursue gerrymanders in Virginia and other newly consolidated states at the cost of giving up some of the moral high ground the party has briefly occupied on the issue. Meanwhile, Republicans, who have ceded so much of that same ground in the scramble for the imagined cartographic Ring of Power, will have to decide whether it's worth trying to reclaim any. Barack Obama, who since his presidency ended has sometimes spoken out against gerrymandering, has now thrown in with the National Democratic Redistricting Committee (NDRC), an official Democratic activist organization, which may limit his maneuvering room to act in ways the party perceives as adverse to its interests.

Wouldn't it be neat, though, if there were a neutral reform that would do a powerful lot of good on a national basis, was plainly consistent with the U.S. Constitution, promised to work as intended with few or no unintended effects, and was easy to explain to boot? One that could slay buddymanders as well as gerrymanders of the extremely partisan kind?

Good news: There is! What's more, it's been hiding in plain sight all the while. Charles Blahous describes it in a valuable 2019 paper for the Mercatus Center.

It begins with the Elections Clause-Article I, Section 4-in which the Constitution grants Congress an express role in overseeing the elections states hold for the House of Representatives. The wording makes clear that it is allocating power so as to give state legislatures the lead but not the final word: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations."

Congress has used its enumerated powers in this area for well over 150 years. For example, it has at various points (including the present) required that states elect House members from single‐ rather than multi‐​member districts. It also began requiring states to divide population equally among House districts long before the Supreme Court began interpreting the Constitution to require as much.

Less well known is that for about 30 years a century ago, Congress extended its oversight to include other good districting practices. The Apportionment Act of 1901, whose relevant terms remained in effect until 1929, stated that districts must be made up of "contiguous and compact territory and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants." There is no reason why such rules could not be re‐​enacted today, updated (as Blahous persuasively argues) to specify a quantitative test of the sort that political scientists regularly employ. In measuring compactness across states, it makes sense to disregard elements of noncompactness that derive from the irregularity of states' external outlines, since Florida cannot help being more elongated than South Carolina, for example. A fairer comparison can be obtained by focusing on the length of district lines that are interior to the silhouette.

Depending on how much pressure it wishes to apply against gerrymandering, Congress would be free to make an overall compactness standard easier or tougher. For example, of the 18 states that already have a legal compactness requirement for House districts on their books, none currently has any districts with a "G score" (a metric that adjusts for exterior state boundaries) above 150. If Congress set the threshold at that level, it would render just 5 percent of current districts illegal, but those would include most if not all of what are known as the most egregious gerrymanders. If it proceeded to a somewhat tougher standard of 125, it would make 8 percent of current districts illegal.

Either way, we'd finally be rid of those oddly shaped, colorfully nicknamed monsters whose habitat is our electoral maps-districts like the Duck, the Snake by the Lake, the Broken‐​Winged Pterodactyl. And we wouldn't miss them.

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Why Redistricting Reform Goes off the Rails

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"Buddymandering" is the widespread map‐​related misconduct that's wrecking our elections.

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California Common Cause is bringing an honest and open redistricting process to California, one city at a time.

As the City of Los Angeles moves to place the creation of an Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) on the ballot for Angelenos to consider in 2024, it is imperative that new amendments to the City Charter create a Commission that is truly independent and worthy of the public's trust.

As one of the architects of California's statewide Citizens Redistricting Commission and one of the leading advocates for independent redistricting in local communities, California Common Cause will continue to support the core precepts necessary for a truly independent and meaningful redistricting process. This is informed by our monitoring of over 60 local jurisdictions during the most recent redistricting process , as well as two decades of experience monitoring and working with the state's Citizens Redistricting Commission.

After carefully analyzing and reviewing the report produced by the Los Angeles City Council's Chief Legislative Analyst's Office, California Common Cause proposes key redistricting recommendations that seek to:

ensure a fully Independent Redistricting Commission,

ensure that the City Council reflects the growth of the City,

preserve a community-centered approach in map drawing,

emphasize transparency and inclusivity in the redistricting process,

and allow an independent Commission to undergo responsive evolution.

Read our recommendations:

California's 2020 Local Redistricting Cycle: Lessons Learned and Future Reforms

With the 2020 local redistricting cycle concluded, our report takes a step back to evaluate the effectiveness of the FAIR MAPS Act and related independent redistricting commission reforms in encouraging meaningful public participation and promoting the adoption of maps that better reflect and empower a jurisdiction's diverse communities.

The report explores five key areas of the redistricting process - timing, transparency of the process, public participation in the process, line-drawing criteria, and the use of independent and advisory redistricting commissions - that significantly changed this cycle compared with prior cycles.

Serving as the report of record for the 2020 redistricting cycle, The Promise of Fair Maps proposes solutions to the biggest issues identified for creating an inclusive and participatory democracy through redistricting.

Sponsored by California Common Cause, AB 1248 prioritizes people and communities over sitting incumbents by requiring a politically independent redistricting process for local jurisdictions throughout the state.

Join the movement over 1 million strong for democracy

Join us: Americans deserve open, honest, accountable government.

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California Common Cause is bringing an honest and open redistricting process to California, one city at a time. As the City of Los Angeles moves to place the creation of an Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) on the ballot for Angelenos to consider in 2024, it is imperative that new amendments to the City Charter create a Commission that is truly independent and worthy of the public's trust.

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Ending Gerrymandering

Politicians shouldn't be allowed to draw voting maps that benefit themselves. We need to change the rules and create a fair system so that voters are choosing the politicians, instead of politicians choosing their voters.

Where has redistricting reform passed?

Common Cause has led the fight to implement reforms across the country that give Americans a voice in their own representation. Democracy activists have successfully pushed for reforms that make redistricting more fair and transparent. Click on a state to learn more about these important victories.

Map Key

7 states with Independent Citizen Commissions (Partisan Balance) | Red
1 state with an Independent Citizen Commission (Partisan Imbalance) | Dark Purple
5 states with Advisory Commissions (No Elected Officials) | Dark Blue
1 state with strict Constitutional Standards | Orange
7 states with Politician Commissions | Light Blue
1 state with Nonpartisan Legislative Staff | Light Purple

Redistricting Litigation

Common Cause is actively involved in litigation across the county to challenge gerrymanders and defend redistricting reforms in court. Learn more about our efforts.

In Academia

In January of 2019, Common Cause collaborated with Duke University's POLIS and the Sanford School of Public Policy on the Reason, Reform, and Redistricting Conference. This event brought together some of the top activists, litigators, and academics working to end gerrymandering across the country. Watch video from almost every panel discussion here.

Common Cause's Partisan Gerrymandering Writing Competition is generating important scholarship and making a difference in court. Common Cause sponsors a writing competition to generate academic papers useful to litigators to make the case that partisan gerrymandering violates the U.S. Constitution. One winner served as an expert witness in Common Cause v. Rucho. After a federal court ruled that Virginia's congressional map was an illegal racial gerrymander, we collaborated with another set of winners to submit a brief to the court. This brief, the only one of its kind, guided the court expert chosen to redraw districts by assessing the partisan fairness of proposed replacement maps the public submitted.

"Using this map, the result is preordained...What becomes of the precious right to vote?"

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Join the movement over 1.5 million strong for democracy

Demand a democracy that works for us. Sign up for breaking news and updates.

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We are fighting for a better way to draw districts to prevent partisan politicians from manipulating voting maps. Help us end gerrymandering.

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Neither party currently enjoys a significant aggregate advantage from gerrymandered districts.

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North Carolina Republicans Just Took Gerrymandering to a Whole New Level

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The conservative state Supreme Court majority has thrown the door open to virtually unchecked GOP rule.

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"There was this real movement into state courts after 2018," said Marina Jenkins, executive director of the National Democratic Redistricting Committee, referring to Democrats' success in challenging Pennsylvania's GOP-drawn map before a state court. "If anything, this is just ensuring that those fights can continue, and that a broader landscape of litigation can continue to be pursued."

Wisconsin Democrats are perhaps the most immediate winners of the decision. Liberals won a majority on their state Supreme Court for the first time in over a decade earlier this year. They are already plotting to use it to unravel what is perhaps the strongest GOP gerrymandering in the country. The independent state legislature theory threatened to upend those plans, so Democrats now have a clearer path to litigate those maps thanks to Tuesday's ruling.

It also has a major effect on a long-running fight in Ohio, where the state Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down GOP maps there as illegal gerrymanders. Ohio Republicans have asked the nation's top court to intervene on similar grounds, but the court has not yet acted on their plea. Tuesday's ruling means the fight will likely remain between the legislature and the state Supreme Court, which became more favorable to Republicans last year.

Meanwhile, Democrats are pushing to have court-drawn lines thrown out in New York, where a particularly aggressive Democratic gerrymander could cost Republicans several seats. While that fight in state court is ongoing, there is no immediate ruling that would give Democrats the green light to immediately ignore their state judiciary.

It will, however, have little effect in North Carolina, the state where Moore v. Harper originated. Republicans there, spearheaded by state House Speaker Tim Moore, asked the Supreme Court to restrain their state's then-Democratic controlled high court from wading into a fight on partisan gerrymandering. But while awaiting a final ruling, Republicans won control of North Carolina's Supreme Court, which overturned the previous court's ruling. Republican lawmakers are expected to redraw the lines this summer, and are expected to heavily favor their party.

"I don't have confidence in North Carolina," said former Rep. G. K. Butterfield (D-N.C.), who was once a state Supreme Court justice, pointing out that the changed partisan makeup of the state high court affects the ultimate outcome there. "I have no confidence that that court will overturn the maps."

Republicans agree. "This decision has no practical effect on the already-underway redistricting effort in North Carolina. We look forward to the North Carolina General Assembly drawing fair lines that best represent North Carolina," Jack Pandol, a spokesperson for the House GOP campaign arm, said in a statement.

The court's decision on Tuesday also seemingly blessed the authority of independent redistricting commissions, which were the subject of a 5-4 divided Supreme Court ruling less than a decade ago. Both parties have benefitted from independent mapmakers in different states - but a world where California Democrats, for example, could gerrymander unabashedly would have been disastrous for GOP representation on the West Coast.

GOP operatives say the current judicial arms race began in the run-up to the 2018 midterms when Democrats secured a majority on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and then successfully sued to have the Republican-drawn map overturned.

The result: The Pennsylvania congressional delegation went from five Democrats and 13 Republicans to an even 9-9 split. Democrats took back the House majority for the first time in eight years.

The Supreme Court reinforced Democrats' strategy in 2019 when it ruled that federal courts had no role in policing partisan gerrymandering - but left the door open for states to do so.

For Republicans, that was a wake-up call. They started pouring millions into judicial races in key states like North Carolina. In states where justices are appointed, they leaned on GOP governors to tip the scales.

A handful of states have partisan gerrymandering litigation pending in the state courts. Earlier this year, New Mexico Republicans argued that the state's congressional maps were gerrymandered to benefit Democrats. A Democratic-controlled legislature crafted a map that helped now-Rep. Gabe Vasquez (D-N.M.) oust then-incumbent Republican Rep. Yvette Herrell from her district. Herrell has already mounted a comeback bid.

But one of the judges said in January the state Supreme Court is going to be "deliberative" and won't rush to a decision.

State Supreme Court hearings are also upcoming in Utah on July 11 and in Kentucky on Sept. 19. Both of those cases deal with GOP-controlled maps, with Republicans sweeping all four congressional districts in Utah and all but one in Kentucky.

In the immediate aftermath of Tuesday's decision, Republicans were quick to point out that the Supreme Court does not give state courts unchecked authority in redistricting and other redistricting litigation.

"The questions presented in this area are complex and context specific," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in his opinion. "We hold only that state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections."

That, some court watchers argue, is a clear shot across the bow to state judiciaries to not get carried away.

"This is a first, positive step toward reining in recent overreaches of state courts," said Adam Kincaid, the president of the National Republican Redistricting Trust.
Nicholas Wu contributed to this report.

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Supreme Court crushes plan to scramble partisan map-making

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Previously under the radar judicial contests will see millions of dollars pour in.

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Redistricting Across States

The Constitutional mandate to redraw electoral district lines follows the decennial Census, as we learn where we, the people, live.

Click on the map to the right to to view redistricting information for federal and state legislative districts in each of the 50 states.

Visit the National Overview page to compare control of the redistricting process across states and across time.

View In-Depth National Overview

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All About Redistricting: all the information about the law and process of redistricting Congress and state legislatures, tracking the history and progress of the maps, reform proposals, and redistricting-related litigation around the country.

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On October 4, the Supreme Court will hear an Alabama redistricting case, Merrill v. Milligan, that could sharply limit the ability of communities of color to use the Voting Rights Act to fight discriminatory electoral maps.

For four decades, minority voters have been able to challenge discriminatory maps under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act using a legal framework first laid out by the Supreme Court in 1986. The result has been increased representation of minority communities at every level of government.

But Alabama has asked the Supreme Court to radically rewrite the rules for Section 2 claims. A decision from the Supreme Court agreeing to Alabama's far-reaching relief could make it harder for minority voters to challenge maps that dilute their political strength and deprive long disadvantaged minority communities of strong advocates on critical public investments and issues like healthcare, education, and criminal justice.

What is at issue in the Alabama case?

Federal lawsuits filed by Black voters contend that the state violated the Voting Rights Act because its new congressional map failed to create a second Black majority or plurality district in the state's "Black Belt," an 18-county, mostly rural region characterized by stark socioeconomic disparities and some of the nation's highest rates of poverty.

Instead, Alabama lawmakers drew a map that continues a policy of dividing the Black Belt among four congressional districts, ignoring the request of Black constituents to be kept together in two districts for better representation as well as significant demographic changes in the region over the last couple of decades.

Because of the division of the Black Belt, the region's Black voters have an ability to elect their preferred candidates only in the 7th District, a sprawling district with a tenacle stretching to Birmingham that the plaintiffs say is packed with far more Black voters than needed to elect a Black-preferred candidate.

Source: Declaration of Moon Duchin filed by plaintiffs in Milligan v. Merrill.

Meanwhile, in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Districts, the Black share of the population in each district is held to 30 percent or less thanks to surgical line-drawing choices like placing Montgomery and next-door Tuskegee (both heavily Black cities) in separate districts.

The small Black population of these three districts, combined with exceedingly high racially polarized voting, mean white voters will always be able to use their numerical superiority to block attempts by Black voters and their preferred candidates to put together a politically effective coalition.

Indeed, all three districts have consistently elected white representatives whose votes and priorities in the House are not well aligned with the needs and interests of the region's Black voters. For example, the white representatives representing the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Districts all recently voted against legislation that would have capped the cost of insulin at $35 a month, despite the fact that the region has a high rate of diabetes and a high number of people without health insurance.

What is the legal basis for the lawsuits?

The lawsuits seek relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires that states' electoral processes provide minority voters with an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."

In redistricting cases, application of Section 2 takes place using a highly fact-intensive, multi-part test first laid out by the Supreme Court in 1986 in Thornburg v. Gingles.

To prevail under this well-established test, the plaintiffs in a case must show that the interaction between a state's decisions about where to draw district boundaries and high levels of racially polarized voting and other adverse conditions on the ground combine to ensure that minority voters are perpetually shut out of power. Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that there are reasonable alternative configurations of districts that map drawers ignored or purposely avoided that would produce different outcomes for voters of color.

What did the trial court rule?

In January, a panel of three federal judges, including two Trump appointees, unanimously ruled that the state's congressional map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and ordered lawmakers to redraw it in time for the 2022 midterms to include a second Black majority or plurality district in the Black Belt.

The court's opinion found that the evidence of racially polarized voting in the Black Belt was stark - on average, only around 15 percent of white voters in the region are willing to support the same candidates as the Black community. This low level of crossover support from white voters means that in the three Black Belt districts where the Black population is 30 percent or less, white voters are guaranteed to control who wins elections for the entire 10-year lifespan of the map, no matter how politically cohesive Black voters are or how hard they work to put together a winning cross-racial coalition.

The opinion also found there was "substantial and undeniable" evidence of lingering socioeconomic disparities in the region that "hinder Black Alabamians' opportunity to participate in the political process," including poverty levels rarely seen in developed countries.

Critically, the court also found that all of the disadvantages Alabama imposes on Black voters could have been easily avoided. The opinion noted that the plaintiffs' experts had presented multiple non-discriminatory maps with districts, like the ones below, that are "at least as geographically compact as those in the [state's] Plan, respect traditional boundaries at least as much as the Plan, protect important communities of interest, [and] protect incumbents where possible."

Source: Declaration of Moon Duchin filed by plaintiffs in Milligan v. Merrill.

However, before the map could be redrawn, Alabama filed an emergency request for a stay at the Supreme Court, which was granted.

What is Alabama saying the trial court got wrong?

Alabama makes two main arguments in its effort to overturn the lower court's judgment, both of which would significantly restrict the reach of the Voting Rights Act.

The state's principal argument is that Section 2 imposes no liability because it is impossible to draw a second Black opportunity district on a "race blind" basis. According to Alabama, since the plaintiffs' experts had to consider race and deviate slightly from the state "race neutral" districting rules in order to create demonstration plans with a second Black majority district, race "predominated" in the design of the maps, making them unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.

This is a radical argument that rewrites not only Section 2 precedent but also the Supreme Court's racial gerrymandering jurisprudence to effectively prohibit any consideration of race in map drawing.

Under current Supreme Court precedent, race is one factor among many that map drawers may take into account. The only prohibition in the Supreme Court's racial gerrymandering line of cases is that race cannot predominate over non-racial considerations in a way that results in racial essentializing, for example, by joining far-flung minority voters on opposite sides of a state who have nothing in common besides their race. But while map drawers cannot adopt arbitrary racial quotas or put voters in a district solely because of their race, there is no ban on keeping a politically cohesive racial or ethnic community together if there are also good non-racial reasons for doing so.

That mix of racial and non-racial justifications for a second Black Belt district is exactly what the trial court found in Alabama, describing the Black Belt as a well-defined and universally accepted community of interest of "substantial significance" with a long "shared history and common economy" dating back to the region's days as the heart of Alabama's 19th century cotton economy. While the population of the Black Belt is overwhelmingly Black, the court also found that region had multiple commonalities across "many, many more dimensions than skin color." As the court pointed out, Alabama itself has a policy of keeping the Black Belt intact in its state board of education map.

@2021 Caliper

Accepting Alabama's argument that state districting rules must be strictly followed would resolve any conflicts between state and federal law in favor of state policy preferences, essentially rendering the Constitution's Supremacy Clause meaningless. Worse, it would be an open invitation to state and local governments to design "race neutral" criteria that deliberately frustrate the fair representation for minority communities protected by the Voting Rights Act. A state, for example, could adopt hard and fast rules that districts must be maximally compact or avoiding ever pairing incumbents, having the effect of making it impossible to create a minority opportunity district.

Alabama's second major argument is an even more sweeping invitation for the court to rule that Section 2 does not apply to the drawing of single-member districts but only to multimember districts and challenges of at-large election systems. Under this argument, Section 2 could be used to strike down discriminatory use of at-large elections or multimember districts, but would offer no safeguards against similar discrimination in the resulting single-member district scheme. This is an extreme misreading of the Voting Rights Act that would require the Supreme Court to ignore the legislative history of Section 2 and overrule longstanding precedent allowing Section 2 challenges to redistricting plans.

One far-reaching argument, however, that Alabama is not advancing on appeal is its argument at the trial-court level that Section 2 claims can only be brought by the U.S. Department of Justice and not by individual voters. Although it raised the issue below, it did not include the argument in its briefing before the Supreme Court, and most observers think the high court is unlikely to take up the question of a private right of action on its own.

What would be the impact if the Supreme Court agrees with Alabama?

Even a modest reworking of the Section 2 framework could have significant ramifications for the ability of minority voters to use the Voting Rights Act to fight discriminatory redistricting. Depending on how the court decides, Section 2 could become harder to use or even completely inapplicable in redistricting cases.

The most immediate impact would be on cases in Georgia and Louisiana, where courts have already found that Section 2 requires redrawing of congressional maps to create additional Black districts. Cases in Texas, North Dakota, Washington, and other states where voters have filed lawsuits seeking the creation of additional minority opportunity districts for legislative or congressional offices would also be adversely impacted.

But the consequences are likely to be even graver at the local level, where Section 2 has been a powerful tool to ensure that bodies such as school boards, city councils, and county commissions are fair. In fact, since the Supreme Court laid out the Gingles test nearly four decades ago, Section 2 has played a far more transformative role in ensuring that voters of color have equal opportunities to participate in the political process and elect their candidates of choice at the local level than it has at the congressional or legislative levels. Just this past decade, for example, Section 2 litigation opened the door for the first time to Black representation on the city council and school board in sharply racially divided Ferguson, Missouri.

The ripple effects also could be significant. By ensuring that minority communities are not shut out of the political process, Section 2 plays an important role in guaranteeing that minority communities receive their fair share of public resources. Indeed, research on the transformative power of the Voting Rights Act shows that in jurisdictions where minority voters have successfully challenged discriminatory electoral districts, gaps in economic opportunity have narrowed and that investment in basic infrastructure like roads and schools has improved.

The Voting Rights Act has helped transform American democracy, helping minority voters pry open doors that had long been sealed shut. If the Supreme Court goes where Alabama wants it to, the onus will be on Congress and the states to find new ways to protect the country's emerging multiracial democracy.

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Allen v. Milligan: Gerrymandering at the Supreme Court (Formerly Merrill v. Milligan)

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A redistricting case challenging Alabama's congressional map could make it harder to ensure fair representation for communities of color.

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Related Resources

A pair of blockbuster redistricting cases from the Supreme Court were scrutinized during a session at NCSL's Legislative Summit. At least for the moment, the cases settle the status of two prominent legal theories that play key roles in redistricting.

On this episode, Ben Williams from NCSL talks about the latest legal developments around redistricting and the efforts in 13 states to reallocate inmate data from rural prisons to the communities where the inmates came from.

There are several methods of measuring the extent to which populations of all the districts in a plan vary, or differ collectively from the "ideal." The method expressed in this document is "Overall Range."

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Redistricting and the Supreme Court: The Most Significant Cases

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An overview of significant Supreme Court decisions on redistricting from the last five decades. The cases are grouped into four categories: population, a case relating to using a redistricting commission, cases relating to race and cases relating to partisanship.

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Nine Redistricting Cases That Shaped History

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WASHINGTON, Oct 11 (Reuters) - The U.S. Supreme Court was set on Wednesday to hear a bid by South Carolina officials to revive a Republican-drawn electoral map faulted by a lower court for moving 30,000 Black residents out of a congressional district - a case that could help decide control of the House of Representatives in the 2024 elections.

At issue is a map adopted last year by the Republican-led state legislature delineating the boundaries of one of South Carolina's seven U.S. House districts.

A panel of three federal judges blocked the map for South Carolina's coastal 1st congressional district, which includes parts of Charleston. The panel in January ruled that the map diminished the clout of Black voters in violation of the U.S. Constitution's 14th and 15th Amendments, which guarantee equal protection under the law and prohibit race-based voting discrimination, the judges found.

A practice called gerrymandering involves the manipulation of electoral district boundaries to marginalize a certain set of voters and increase the influence of others. In this case, the state legislature was accused of racial gerrymandering to reduce the influence of Black voters.

The Republican legislators and other state officials who have appealed to the Supreme Court have argued that the map was designed to secure partisan advantages, a practice that the Supreme Court in 2019 decided was not reviewable by federal courts - unlike racial gerrymandering, which remains illegal.

The new map increased the district's share of white voters while reducing its share of Black voters, which the lower court referred to as "bleaching." The Republicans faulted the judges for finding that the district's composition was motivated primarily by race rather than Republican interests. Black voters tend to favor Democratic candidates.

The eventual ruling by the Supreme Court, which has a 6-3 conservative majority, may determine whether Democrats have a realistic shot to win the district, which is currently represented by Republican Nancy Mace.

The map shifted 30,000 of the 1st district's Black residents into the neighboring 6th congressional district that stretches 125 miles (200 km) inland from Charleston. The 6th district has been held for three decades by Democrat Jim Clyburn, one of the most prominent Black members of Congress. Clyburn's is the only one of South Carolina's House districts held by a Democrat.

Legislative districts across the United States are redrawn to reflect population changes documented in the nationwide census conducted every decade.

With the district's previous boundaries in place, Mace only narrowly defeated an incumbent Democrat in 2020 - by just over 1 percentage point, or 5,400 votes. With the redistricting, Mace won re-election in 2022 by 14 percentage points.

Mace signed a brief urging the justices to preserve the Republican-drawn map.

The parties in the case - the state officials defending the map and Black voters challenging it - have asked the justices to issue a decision by the end of the year, in time for the map to be finalized ahead of the Nov. 5, 2024, congressional elections.

Similar legal cases over electoral maps in Louisiana, Georgia, New York and other states could help determine which party next year emerges with control of the House. The Supreme Court in June ruled against Alabama Republicans in one such case, ordering that state to devise a second majority-Black U.S. House district in a ruling that gave a boost to Democrats. Republicans hold a slim 221-212 House margin.

Reporting by John Kruzel; Editing by Will Dunham

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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US Supreme Court scrutinizes South Carolina voting map deemed racially biased

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The U.S. Supreme Court was set on Wednesday to hear a bid by South Carolina officials to revive a Republican-drawn electoral map faulted by a lower court for moving 30,000 Black residents out of a congressional district - a case that could help decide control of the House of Representatives in the 2024 elections.

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A Game about Representation and Redistricting.

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A free app to create, analyze and share redistricting maps for any state.

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Elbridge Thomas Gerry was an American statesman and diplomat. As a Democratic-Republican he was selected as the fifth Vice President of the United States. Gerry later became the ninth Governor of Massachusetts. He is known best for being the namesake of gerrymandering, a process by which electoral districts are drawn with the aim of aiding the party in power. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elbridge_Gerry
Gerryminder, developed by Jeremy M. Teigen and Jeffrey A. Gilbertson, is a redistricting simulation designed for learning about congressional elections, representation, and gerrymandering. By being in a position to manipulate district lines with a measure of "fairness," Gerryminder provides an engaging, experiential way to see redistricting. http://phobos.ramapo.edu/~jteigen/gerry.html
Gerrymandering is a 2010 documentary feature film written and directed by Jeff Reichert. The film explores the historical, ethical, moral and racial problems raised by redistricting, i.e., the drawing of boundaries of electoral districts in the United States. Gerrymandering covers the history of the redistricting practice, how it is used and abused, how it benefits the two major major political parties, Democrats and Republicans. The documentary draws on the perspectives from different individuals, reporters, pundits, and politicians, including Arnold Schwarzenegger, Howard Dean, Bob Graham, Lani Guiner, Ed Rollins, John Fund and Susan Lerner, and an array of lesser-known personalities. http://www.gerrymanderingmovie.com/
Voting is a method for a group such as a meeting or an electorate to make a decision or express an opinion-often following discussions, debates, or election campaigns. The Smithsonian Institute curated an exhibit that showcased the history of voting. See it here: http://americanhistory.si.edu/vote/
Most states have a website that shows their district maps. Here is the one for Florida. Here is the one for New York.

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Gerrymandering: How drawing jagged lines can impact an election - Christina Greer

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District lines, and the groups of voters within them, may seem arbitrary, but a lot of thought (and political bickering) is put into these carefully drawn lines. From "packing" a district to "cracking" a district--learn how the shape of districts impacts political parties during election season.