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risha
xiang han
hui lin
kaithlyn
james
melody
ethel

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Ajay+Claris+Arjun+Ryan Lim +Elijah+Ryan Loo + Roopa

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Ajay+Claris+Arjun+Ryan Lim +Elijah+Ryan Loo + Roopa

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Liberal Party election propaganda poster, 26 November 1966 

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Zhou Ruizhuang. Renmin meishu chubanshe (People’s Fine Arts Publishing House). Published July, 1965

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“Vietnam's army and people valiantly wage war with a deep hatred of the enemy - The more American robbers arrive, the more will be vanquished”

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"It is clear that the restoration and further development of national economy of European countries would be facilitated if the United States of America, whose productive capacities have not only not diminished during the war but have considerably increased, could give that economic help which these countries require. At the same time it is known that the U.S.A herself is also interested in utilising her credit possibilities in connexon with the coming crisis"

An article in the Soviet newspaper Pravda commenting on the Marshall Plan, June 29th 1947.

https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/coldwar/G3/cs3/s6.htm

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The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Speech by US President Harry Truman on June 27, 1950

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“The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no skeptic now dares to express doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non- Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system. “

Speech Delivered by Stalin at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow on February 9 1946

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116179.pdf?v=a831b5c6a9ff133d9da25b37c013d691

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A Cold War-era political cartoon depicting U.S. containment strategies.

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Gorbachev was convinced that there was not only the fear of mutual destruction, although this did exist, but a realistic evaluation showed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could cooperate, and they had done so in the past, without changing their political systems, culture or ideologies. They had cooperated in the area of economics, trade and culture while respecting the choices made by the U.S. people, and, obviously, the Soviet people as well.

Gorbachev said that there had sometimes been squalls in the bilateral relationship which had been severe, perhaps extremely so, but he could definitely state that in the USSR there was no enmity toward the United States or its people. The Soviet Union respected the U.S. and its people. The Soviet people and the leadership of the Soviet Union recognized the role of the U.S. in the world, and wished it no harm. They realized that international relations could not be built on a desire to harm American interests.

Memorandum of Conversation “Reagan-Gorbachev meetings in Geneva”, 19 November 1985

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Gorbachev suggested in conclusion that the two sides seek a solution which allowed the U.S. to develop SDI, but would do so in a way which did not make SDI an obstacle to progress in the reduction of strategic arms. Gorbachev had outlined the Soviet proposal for guaranteeing peace. For the U.S, the answer was different : nuclear disarmament; maintenance of the ABM regime; and no extension of the arms race to space.

Memorandum of a conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan,

9 December 1987

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President von Weizsacker has said, "The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed." Today I say: As long as the gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament. For I find in Berlin a message of hope, even in the shadow of this wall, a message of triumph.

In this season of spring in 1945, the people of Berlin emerged from their air-raid shelters to find devastation. Thousands of miles away, the people of the United States reached out to help. And in 1947 Secretary of State--as you've been told--George Marshall announced the creation of what would become known as the Marshall Plan. Speaking precisely 40 years ago this month, he said: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."

Ronald Reagan’s speech to advise Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down this wall!", 12 June 1987

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By American cartoonist Glenn McCoy – Published in an American newspaper, The Belleville News-Democrat in, 2009.

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The necessity of the principle of freedom of choice is also clear to us. The failure to recognize this, to recognize it, is fraught with very dire consequences, consequences for world peace… Freedom of choice is a universal principle and there should be no exceptions…

The Soviet Union has made a decision on reducing its armed forces. In the next two years, their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 persons, and the volume of conventional arms will also be cut considerably.

UN General Assembly Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, 8 December 1988

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Gorbachev went on to say that because neither side could have done it alone, the Soviet leadership could not have done it alone. The two sides had to do it together, and had. There was an important symbolism in that. The President's personal contribution had counted for a lot. Gorbachev emphasised that he was not just saying nice words.   The President said that both sides had come a long way since he first wrote to Gorbachev in 1985. History would record the period positively, and that was true not just for our relations. As with the INF Accord, they had made the world a little bit safer with some of the things they had done. Gorbachev said he agreed. The President continued that they still had much to do.

Memorandum of conversation “ The President’s first One-on-One Meeting With General Secretary Gorbachev”. Reagan and Gorbachev’s first conversation during Reagan’s 1988 visit to Moscow. 29 May 1988

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. For one, China’s influence in Cold War Southeast Asia was also considerable, despite it not possessing the economic or military clout it wields today. The Chinese communist revolution was a profound inspiration for most Southeast Asian communist parties, and many of these parties looked to Beijing for guidance and support throughout the Cold War. China’s leaders, for their part, wooed the millions-strong Chinese diaspora of Southeast Asia, flooding most of the region’s Chinese-language schools and Chinese cultural organizations with communist propaganda. In Indonesia, Beijing’s efforts to this end even saw large numbers of ethnic Chinese join China’s civil service, many of them becoming diplomats and cadre members of the Chinese Communist Party.5 In addition, Beijing cultivated the indigenous communists of Southeast Asia, in particular the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), the largest communist party outside the USSR and China. As such, Beijing held significant sway in the sub-region from the mid 1950s into the early 1960s, when Sukarno’s left-leaning regime in Indonesia courted the PKI and decidedly tilted what was then the world’s fifth largest country toward China. US leaders so feared this particular development that in the late 1950s, together with Britain, regional allies in Malaya, and West-friendly factions in Indonesia, they launched a vain attempt to topple Sukarno. Years later, in 1965, when Major General Suharto’s right-wing coup marginalized Sukarno and, with US assistance, saw to the purge of the PKI, Beijing and Washington alike understood that the United States had gained the upper hand in the Sino-US rivalry. On the surface, therefore, it does appear that Cold War Southeast Asia was, like the sub-region today, driven primarily by the twists and turns of Sino-US competition. For even the insignia of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), created in 1962 by American leaders to supervise US military aid to South Vietnam, seems to convey just that: it depicts the sword of the US military splitting apart a wall, symbolizing that the war against Vietnamese communism was at base an assault on (the Great Wall of) China

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4465&context=soss_research

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Extracts from a Foreign Office report on reactions to the Truman Doctrine expressed in the newspapers in Belgium, March 1947

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"The approval of the Catholic Conservative newspapers made the war between United States and Soviet Union has been brought one step nearer." shows that CW was caused by USA