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Week9 Question 1

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Week 9 Question 2

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Shahana week 6

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thank you very much!!
are we done for this class?

to be honest i havent started yet
Because we have other before

Okay dont worry ! when you have any question. I am always happy to help

Yes i know thank a lot!!!!
We will talk at 3 :)
Yes:)

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Do you have any questions about the assessment ?

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Do you have any questions about the assessment ?

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This is wronge he burned his boats in order his men  to die

Yes it is False
But can you explain more?

he ordered that his ships be burned so that the
thought of retreat to Normandy was not an option and that the willpower of
his troops would be steeled to think only of victory.

we can say that it is a game because he played with their minEcelent

yes because he wanted to give to his opponent a message that he burned to show the Saxons that the Normans could not retreat.

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i would say it is true
However i do know that Π can not be greater than 1
Are you Sure?
no but i think the statmennt is correct
it is false, It is not dominant
would you be able to tell me why?

if the other player were not to shoot next turn, you
would do better to wait and get a better shot at your next turn

Did you get?

so the probabiity sould be less than 1 in order to be the dominant strategy?
0 ?
1 sorry
yes
oh i see yes
thanks a lot

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LOVELY
so i said if x=0
then the nash equilibrium will be (3,1) Hire a clown but C not go to the party
And not hire is the dominated stategy for R
Excellent
what about x=5

Nash equilibria will be (4,4)
Not hire a clown and C to go to party

And hire is dominated strategy
very good

I am  wondering when x=2
None of the four pure-strategy property  has the property that each is strategy a best response to the other . what do you think?

I agry! we can not find the nash equilibrium in pure-strategies
Excellent, So?

We will use probabilities?
yes Exactly
Dont worry about calculating the mixed strategies  here, i will check it for you next week.

ok lovely
but can i ask one question?yes plz go ahead

can we say that both in x=0 and x=5 the dominated strategies are strictly notimated or weakly?
Personaly i would say striclty

no matter what x is, neither of Caleb's strategies are  dominated

u
Yeah i notice this as well

Shall we move to the nest question? Yes Please

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Question:Roger has invited Caleb to his party. Roger must choose whether or not to hire a clown. Simultaneously, Caleb must decide whether or not to go the party. Caleb likes Roger but he hates clowns { he even hates other people seeing clowns! Caleb's payoff from going to the party is 4 if there is no clown, but 0 if there is a clown there. Caleb's payoff from not going to the party is 3 if there is no clown at the party, but 1 if there is a clown at the party. Roger likes clowns { he especially likes Caleb's reaction to them| but does not like paying for them. Roger's payoff if Caleb comes to the party is 4 if there is no clown, but 8 - x if there is a clown (x is the cost of a clown). Roger's payoff if Caleb doesnot come to the party is 2 if there is no clown, but 3 - x if there is a clown there.

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Question:Roger has invited Caleb to his party. Roger must choose whether or not to hire a clown. Simultaneously, Caleb must decide whether or not to go the party. Caleb likes Roger but he hates clowns { he even hates other people seeing clowns! Caleb's payoff from going to the party is 4 if there is no clown, but 0 if there is a clown there. Caleb's payoff from not going to the party is 3 if there is no clown at the party, but 1 if there is a clown at the party. Roger likes clowns { he especially likes Caleb's reaction to them| but does not like paying for them. Roger's payoff if Caleb comes to the party is 4 if there is no clown, but 8 - x if there is a clown (x is the cost of a clown). Roger's payoff if Caleb doesnot come to the party is 2 if there is no clown, but 3 - x if there is a clown there.

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1) Write down the payoff matrix of this game
2)] Suppose x = 0. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium. What are the equilibrium payoff
3)Suppose x = 5. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium. What are the equilibrium payoff.

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True or false : In duel (the game with the sponges) if your probability of hitting if you shoot now plus the probability of your opponent hitting if she were to shoot next turn is greater than one, then it is a dominant strategy for you to shoot now

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True or false : In duel (the game with the sponges) if your probability of hitting if you shoot now plus the probability of your opponent hitting if she were to shoot next turn is greater than one, then it is a dominant strategy for you to shoot now

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William the Conqueror burned his boats because his soldiers were afraid of the dark."
did you work on this?