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Between March 24 and 27, 2022, 92 people were killed in El Salvador, seemingly by gangs. The killings, which amounted to the deadliest peak in lethal violence in the country's recent history, were a bleak reminder of El Salvador's failure to take sustainable and rights-respecting measures to fulfill its duty to protect the population from chronic gang violence.

In response, and at the request of President Nayib Bukele, the Legislative Assembly promptly adopted a 30-day "state of emergency," suspending a range of constitutional rights, including the rights to freedom of association and assembly, to privacy in communications, and to be informed of the reason for arrest, as well as the requirement that anyone be taken before a judge within 72 hours. The Assembly, where President Bukele's New Ideas (Nuevas Ideas) party has a two-thirds majority, also expanded counterterrorism legislation in ways that violate basic rights, including by allowing judges and prosecutors to try to jail children ages 12 and above.

Between March and November, police officers and soldiers have conducted hundreds indiscriminate raids, particularly in low-income neighborhoods, arresting over 58,000 people, including more than 1,600 children. Officers have often targeted communities where people have, for years, suffered insecurity and lack of economic and educational opportunities.

This joint report by Human Rights Watch and Cristosal documents widespread human rights violations committed during the state of emergency, which the Assembly has extended eight times and remains in place at time of writing. These human rights violations include arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture and other ill-treatment of detainees, and significant due process violations. In addition, the circumstances of many deaths in custody during the state of emergency suggest state responsibility for those deaths.

Between March and November 2022, Human Rights Watch and Cristosal interviewed more than 1,100 people from all 14 states in El Salvador, including during a Human Rights Watch visit to San Salvador in October. Interviewees included victims of abuse, their relatives and lawyers, witnesses, prosecutors, judges, journalists, human rights defenders, and government officials. Whenever possible, researchers also reviewed relevant case files, medical records, and death certificates, and in some cases consulted international forensic experts.

We found that human rights violations were not isolated incidents by rogue agents. Rather, similar violations were carried out repeatedly and across the country, throughout a period of several months, by both the military and the police.

Official policies and the rhetoric of high-level government authorities, including President Bukele, who commands the National Civil Police and the armed forces, have in some cases incentivized abuses.

Between March and late September, some police commanders appear to have established a policy of quotas, requiring officers to arrest a given number of people daily. Instead of taking measures to prevent abusive arrests, the president has publicly backed the security forces and acted in intimidating ways toward the few remaining independent judges and prosecutors in the country who could investigate violations. He has also promoted dehumanizing rhetoric against detainees and their families, and stigmatized independent journalists and civil society groups that document abuses.

Despite this record, President Bukele remains very popular, largely because some indicators of violence appear to have improved in the short term. Homicides, which have been decreasing in El Salvador since 2015, have fallen further, although government restrictions on accessing homicide and other data and changes in the ways killings are counted make it harder to estimate the true extent of the reduction and the prevalence of other crimes.

The authorities' campaign of mass, indiscriminate arrests has led to the detention of hundreds of people with no apparent connections to gangs' abusive activity. In many cases, detentions appear to be based on the appearance and social background of the detainees, or on questionable evidence, such as anonymous calls and uncorroborated allegations on social media. In these cases, police and soldiers did not show people a search or arrest warrant, and rarely informed them or their families of the reasons for their arrest. A mother who witnessed the detention of her son said that police officers told her, "We can arrest anyone we want."

In some cases of people detained by security forces, officers refused to provide information about the detainees' whereabouts, in what amount to enforced disappearances under international law. Authorities left such victims defenseless and caused their family members inhumane and abusive uncertainty and suffering.

Lack of information about detainees' whereabouts and their conditions in detention drove hundreds of people, mostly women, to sleep outside detention facilities in the hope of receiving some information about their loved ones. In many cases, the seemingly arbitrary arrest of breadwinners severely curtailed the income of families already suffering from poverty and lack of economic opportunities.

As of November 2022, judges had charged over 51,000 people arrested during the state of emergency with gang membership and sent them to pretrial detention, often appearing to apply a recent and abusive amendment to the Criminal Code that expanded mandatory pretrial detention. Two thousand people, less than 4 percent of those detained during the state of emergency, had been released from prison, often on bail.

The prison population increased from 39,000 in March 2022 to an estimated 95,000 detainees as of November. The latest public figures, from December 2020, indicate that prisons in El Salvador have capacity for 27,000, less than one-third of the number actually detained at the end of 2022. Thousands were held incommunicado for weeks or months or were only allowed to see their lawyer for a few minutes before their hearings. At time of writing, many continue in incommunicado detention.

This mass incarceration has aggravated historically poor conditions in detention, including extreme overcrowding, violence, and poor access to goods and services essential to rights, such as food, drinking water, and health care. Some of the few people who were released from detention reported inhumane conditions and, in some cases, torture and other forms of ill-treatment.

According to Salvadoran authorities, 90 people have died in custody during the state of emergency. Authorities have failed to meaningfully investigate these deaths. In some cases, detainees who died in prison did not receive access to the medication they needed, family members said.

Judges and prosecutors repeatedly and impermissibly infringed on due process protections under international law, violating detainees' human rights and making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to adequately defend themselves during criminal proceedings. Most detainees had public defenders who faced an immense workload and often failed to provide an adequate defense.

Hearings were conducted in groups that were at times massive, with up to 500 detainees participating, often virtually, in each. Such conditions make it difficult or nearly impossible for judges, prosecutors, and detainees' lawyers to fairly assess or present evidence and arguments related to each individual detainee.

These widespread human rights violations were enabled by President Bukele's swift dismantling of democratic institutions since taking office in 2019, which has left virtually no independent government bodies that can serve as a check on the executive branch or ensure redress for victims of abuse.

Since President Bukele's party obtained a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Assembly in May 2021, legislators from his party have severely undermined the separation of powers. They have summarily removed and replaced all five judges of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, as well as the Attorney General, and have passed laws that allow the Supreme Court and the Attorney General to arbitrarily transfer or dismiss independent lower-level judges and prosecutors.

In September 2022, President Bukele announced he will seek re-election in 2024, relying on a 2021 ruling by the new Constitutional Chamber that departed from longstanding jurisprudence interpreting the Constitution as forbidding immediate re-election.

The Bukele administration has also undermined transparency and accountability, including by weakening the agency in charge of ensuring access to public information. It has created a hostile environment for journalists and civil society members, who have become targets of digital and physical harassment, surveillance, seemingly spurious criminal investigations, and other attacks in response to their work on corruption and human rights violations. President Bukele and other authorities have assaulted the credibility of independent media and civil society groups, accusing them, without any evidence, of being "gang supporters."

President Bukele has tried to justify human rights violations as supposedly acceptable "errors" committed during what the government calls a "war against gangs." He also said that the government will be "watching judges who favor criminals," in what appears to be an effort to intimidate judges and prosecutors from investigating human rights violations or releasing people who are arbitrarily detained.

There are serious reasons to question the long-term effectiveness of President's Bukele security measures. Iron-fist strategies attempted by prior governments have proven to be ineffective and have at times led to more violence. Gangs have in the past benefited from policies of mass incarceration by using prisons to recruit new members. Failure to invest meaningful resources in prevention and rehabilitation policies, as well as to address illegal economies and the lack of legitimate economic opportunities that allow gangs to thrive, have contributed to the spiraling of atrocious cycles of violence.

At the same time, the dismantling of judicial independence in El Salvador means that victims of gang violence or human rights violations by security forces will have little, if any, access to meaningful remedy.

The administration of President Bukele should ensure Salvadorans' safety by taking sustainable and rights-respecting steps to protect the population and dismantle gangs, which continue to be responsible for heinous abuses. This requires developing and implementing a new security policy that promotes strategic criminal prosecutions focused on prosecuting higher-level gang leaders and investigating violent crimes, as well as addressing the illegal economies that allow these groups to thrive, including extortion, money laundering, and contraband in weapons. To do so, having a truly independent judiciary is key.

Additionally, the government should bolster efforts to reduce gang membership by taking steps to address the structural causes that push people, particularly children and youth, into gangs. These include lack of economic opportunities, social marginalization, and abusive and ineffective security policies.

The government should also expand current programs, such as the "Urban Centers of Wellbeing and Opportunity" (Centros Urbanos de Bienestar y Oportunidades, CUBO), that seek to prevent violence by increasing economic and educational opportunities for youth in vulnerable communities, and it should strengthen reintegration programs for former gang members.

International action is needed to protect the country's rapidly deteriorating rule of law and prevent further human rights violations. Despite his enormous popularity in El Salvador, President Bukele is not totally immune to international pressure.

The administration of United States President Joe Biden and the European Union should rally multilateral pressure, including from governments in Latin America, to focus attention on the situation in El Salvador, including at the United Nations Human Rights Council.

Foreign governments and international financial institutions, in particular the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), should suspend any existing loans or donations to government entities directly involved in abuses, including the Justice and Public Safety Ministry, the National Civil Police, the Ministry of Defense, the prison system, and the Attorney General's Office, and condition any further cooperation with these institutions on significant human rights progress.

The US government has adopted positive steps by redirecting some funding away from Salvadoran institutions such as the National Civil Police and toward civil society groups. The European Union has redirected its funding of the National Civil Police toward the Ministry of Education.

Meanwhile, in recent years, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration approved significant funding to the National Civil Police, the Ministry of Defense, the prison system, and the Attorney General's Office. Several funds had not been disbursed at time of writing and the Bank's authorities said that some of the loans were being "reformulated" to replace the National Civil Police, Ministry of Defense, and the prison system as the entities charged with executing the funds. Its board of directors, composed of representatives from Central American governments, as well as Mexico, Taiwan, Argentina, Colombia, Spain, Dominican Republic, and the Republic of Korea, should condition programs on the Salvadoran government taking concrete steps to prevent and investigate torture, deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions.

Foreign governments should also step up efforts to support independent journalists and civil society groups, which remain virtually the sole check on abuse of power and human rights violations in El Salvador.

The international community should redouble its efforts to support the rule of law in El Salvador and help ensure that Salvadorans are safe from heinous crimes by gangs, human rights violations, and other abuse of power.

To the Bukele administration

Work with the Attorney General's Office and security forces to develop and implement a new, rights-respecting security policy to dismantle gangs and protect the population from their abuses, including by promoting strategic criminal prosecutions, focused on prosecuting higher-level gang leaders and investigating violent crimes, as well as curbing extortion, money laundering, and contraband weapons.

Prioritize efforts to address the root causes of gang membership, such as lack of economic and educational opportunities, including by expanding violence-prevention strategies that increase opportunities for children and youth, such as the "Urban Centers of Wellbeing and Opportunity," as well as legal and safe paths for former gang members to reintegrate.

End the state of emergency absent credible evidence that its restrictions on fundamental rights are proportionate and strictly necessary to respond to situations that genuinely threaten the life of the nation.

Ensure that police officers' performance is not measured by the number of arrests or other criteria that could incentivize arbitrary arrests and other human rights violations.

Take progressive steps to eliminate the role of the armed forces in public safety tasks.

Refrain from posting on social media photos of detained people and prejudging them as criminals based on their clothing, where they live, their tattoos, or their family relationships before they have had a fair trial.

Take immediate steps to reduce prison overcrowding, including by applying alternatives to imprisonment for people with disabilities or with underlying health conditions and for older people, and by using, when appropriate, reporting requirements and other less-restrictive measures.

End incommunicado detention and ensure that detainees can communicate and receive visits from their families and lawyers.

Take meaningful steps to comply with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, including by ensuring access to adequate and timely medical care, adequate food, water, and sanitation in prisons.

Ensure that prison authorities comply with judicial decisions ordering the release of detainees.

Allow international humanitarian organizations and the Human Rights Ombudsperson's Office to have unimpeded access to prisons, including by allowing them to conduct private and confidential meetings with detainees.

Refrain from harassing and stigmatizing independent journalists and civil society members, including on social media.

Ensure that any negotiation with gangs is conducted in a transparent and inclusive manner and prioritizes human rights, including the right of equal access to justice.

Work with the Legislative Assembly to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

Comply fully with the 2011 Law on Access to Public Information, including by publishing public interest information, such as homicide rates, information on the implementation of the Territorial Control Plan, and the prison population, as well as by responding in a timely and fair manner to public information requests.

Increase funding to the Public Defender's Office to ensure it is able to provide adequate and timely defense.

To the Legislative Assembly

End the state of emergency.

Increase the age of criminal responsibility to 14 or above, consistent with international human rights standards.

Derogate the 2022 reforms to the Special Law Against Terrorist Acts, the Juvenile Criminal Law, and the Law Banning Gangs, Bands, Groups, Associations and Organizations, and bring these laws and the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure in line with international standards, including by eliminating mandatory pretrial detention and narrowing the definitions of terrorism and "unlawful association."

Repeal the 2021 reforms to the Judicial Career Law and the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office.

Reform the Penitentiary Law to ensure that it complies with international legal standards, including by ensuring that detainees have access to family visits and private meetings with their lawyers.

Refrain from adopting the 'foreign agents' bill or any other law that could be used to restrict the work of civil society groups and independent media outlets.

Increase the funding and staffing of the Public Defender's Office to ensure that it can provide adequate legal assistance to all detainees.

To the Attorney General's Office

Develop and implement a policy of strategic criminal prosecutions to address gang violence by improving prosecutors' technical capacity to gather credible evidence, prioritizing the prosecution of higher-level gang leaders, investigating violent crimes, as well as curbing extortion, money laundering, and contraband in weapons.

Promptly initiate thorough, impartial investigations into unlawful connections between gangs, government officials, and security forces.

Conduct prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into allegations of human rights violations, including instances of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and torture and other ill-treatment of detainees, as well as into circumstances such as suspicious deaths in custody.

Conduct swift, impartial, and thorough investigations into the arrest quota in the police and whether it has incentivized arbitrary detention and other human rights abuses.

Conduct prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into government officials who may have failed to comply with court decisions ordering the release of detainees.

To the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court

Reach and announce timely decisions on habeas corpus petitions from or on behalf of people detained in the context of the state of emergency.

To the Public Defender's Office

Increase staffing and ensure that the legal assistance provided to people guarantees due process rights.

To the Human Rights Ombudsperson's Office

Conduct swift investigations into allegations of human rights violations and report on the office's findings in a transparent and periodic manner.

Investigate abuses by gangs in El Salvador and provide concrete recommendations to the government on how to protect the population from these groups in a sustainable and rights-respecting manner.

Work with the National Penitentiary Office, the Attorney General's Office, and the Public Defender's Office to ensure respect for the rights of people who have been detained.

Continue monitoring prison conditions, including by seeking private and confidential meetings with detainees, and releasing comprehensive reports of the visits, including on allegations of ill-treatment, overcrowding, lack of access to adequate or timely medical care, and poor sanitary conditions.

To the Institute of Legal Medicine

Conduct autopsies for everyone who dies in custody and ensure that family members have access to such documentation.

Ensure that investigations into deaths in custody adhere to internationally accepted medical practices and international standards as outlined by the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death.

To the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and the members of its Board of Directors including Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, Mexico, Taiwan, Argentina, Colombia, Spain, Dominican Republic and the Republic of Korea

Suspend current loans benefiting El Salvador's National Civil Police, Ministry of Defense, prison system, and Attorney General's Office and develop specific and measurable human rights benchmarks to condition future financial support to these institutions, such as:

Concrete steps toward eliminating torture and other forms of ill-treatment in detention;

Reductions in reports of arbitrary detentions and due process violations reported by detainees;

Evidence of credible and timely criminal investigations of abuses committed by members of the armed forces and the National Civil Police;

Reforms of legal frameworks adopted in the context of the current state of emergency that severely undermine human rights;

Improvements in detention conditions, including reduction of overcrowding and increased access to medical care; and

Increased access of independent monitors to interview detainees in Salvadoran detention centers.

Closely monitor the situation in El Salvador, including by conducting regular meetings with civil society groups, to verify human rights conditions and ensure that the bank's funding is not enabling further abuses.

To Members of the United Nations Human Rights Council

Bring attention to the situation in El Salvador and raise human rights concerns during Council meetings and debates, including during Interactive Dialogues with relevant Special Procedures mandate-holders or in their statements under item 4.

To the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

Closely monitor the human rights situation in El Salvador and publicly condemn human rights violations in the country.

To Relevant UN Special Procedures including the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism:

Conduct visits to El Salvador, as permitted under the country's 2010 standing invitation, to document human rights violations within their mandates, and report to the Human Rights Council on the situation in the country.

To the governments of the United States, Canada, and Latin American countries, the European Union, and EU member states:

Publicly and privately oppose human rights violations committed by Salvadoran security forces and press, in a multilateral manner, Salvadoran authorities to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Refrain from providing loans or other economic support to El Salvador's police, army, prison system, and Attorney General's Office until there are meaningful human rights improvements, and condition any future aid or loans to these entities on human rights benchmarks.

Increase support for independent media outlets and civil society groups in El Salvador, including through financial assistance.

Press Salvadoran authorities to progressively restore judicial independence including by conducting, at the appropriate time, independent, fair, and transparent processes for the selection of Supreme Court justices and the attorney general, and abrogating laws that undermine judicial independence.

Impose or maintain targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, on senior government officials who bear responsibility for the human rights violations documented in this report, including:

Gustavo Villatoro, the minister of justice and public safety, who oversees the National Civil Police and the prison system.

Mauricio Arriaza Chicas, the director of the National Civil Police, which has been responsible for widespread human rights violations during the state of emergency.

René Francis Merino Monroy, the minister of defense, who oversees the work of the army, which has been involved in multiple human rights violations in the context of the state of emergency.

Osiris Luna Meza, head of the prison system and vice minister of justice and public safety. Luna Meza has adopted extraordinary measures in detention facilities that violate international standards and has openly supported and publicized ill-treatment of detainees and overcrowding.

To the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:

Closely monitor the human rights situation in El Salvador and publicly condemn human rights violations in the country.

Closely monitor the ongoing constitutional reform process to verify its consistency with international human rights standards, including on judicial independence, as well as with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' Advisory Opinion 28/2021 regarding the incompatibility of indefinite presidential re-election with the American Convention on Human Rights.

This joint report by Human Rights Watch and Cristosal is based on both organizations' research between March and November 2022 on abuses committed during the state of emergency.

Over 2,900 people completed an online form created by Cristosal and advertised on their social media to report on cases of abuses. Out of these cases, as well as others referred to Cristosal by other non-governmental organizations and others, Cristosal selected a subset of cases on the basis of the gravity of the allegations and their consistency with other reports. In total, Cristosal interviewed over 1,100 victims or their relatives.

Human Rights Watch interviewed over 140 people, including victims of abuse, their relatives and lawyers, witnesses, independent journalists, prosecutors, judges, and government officials. While most of the interviews were conducted by phone, some were carried out during a visit to San Salvador in October 2022.

Most of the interviewees feared for their security and only spoke to researchers on condition that we withhold their names and other identifying information. Details about their cases or the individuals involved, including the location of the interviews, have also been withheld when requested or when Human Rights Watch and Cristosal believed that publishing the information would put someone at risk. In footnotes, we may use the same language to refer to different interviewees to preserve their security.

Interviews with victims, their relatives, or witnesses were conducted in confidential settings or through secure means of communication. We informed all participants of the purpose of the interview, its voluntary nature, and how the information would be used. Each participant orally consented to be interviewed.

Human Rights Watch and Cristosal did not make any payments or offer other incentives to interviewees. Care was taken with victims of trauma to minimize the risk that recounting their experiences could further traumatize them. Where appropriate, the organizations provided contact information for organizations offering legal, social, or counseling services, or linked those organizations with survivors.

Whenever possible, Human Rights Watch and Cristosal also reviewed case files, medical records of victims and death certificates, and obtained expert opinion on some cases of abuse from the Independent Forensic Expert Group (IFEG) of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT), an international group of prominent forensic experts.

Human Rights Watch and Cristosal sent multiple information requests to government authorities for this report. These include:

On April 29, July 27, September 26, and November 7, 2022, Cristosal or Human Rights Watch asked the National Civil Police for information regarding people detained under the state of emergency, their gender and age, and the crimes of which they were accused, as well as whether police officers were required to arrest a number of people per day. The National Civil Police replied on May 5, August 15, October 11, and November 25, indicating that all the information requested, with the exception of the total number of people detained, was "classified."

On November 7, 2022, Human Rights Watch asked El Salvador's Armed Forces for information, including the number of people arrested and of confrontations between the soldiers and gangs. The Armed Forces had not responded at time of writing.

On April 29, July 12 and July 27, 2022, Cristosal or Human Rights Watch asked the Attorney General's Office for information regarding people detained under the state of emergency, their gender and age, and the crimes of which they were accused, as well on whether prosecutors were investigating members of the security forces for human rights violations. Authorities replied on May 17, August 12, and September 9, indicating in all cases that the information requested was either "non-existent" or "classified."

On April 29, July 12, July 27, and September 20, 2022, Cristosal or Human Rights Watch asked the Public Defender's Office for information on people detained under the state of emergency, their health conditions, age, and gender, the crimes of which they were accused, the status of the investigations against them, and the number of officials in the Public Defender's Office, and inquired about documentation requested of detainees' relatives. The Public Defender's Office replied on July 7, July 25, August 31, and October 19, providing large parts of the information requested and indicating that other information, such as on the status of investigations, was "classified."

On April 29, 2022, Cristosal asked the Human Rights Ombudsperson's Office for information on people detained under the state of emergency, their age and gender, and the crimes of which they were accused. On May 25, the Human Rights Ombudsperson's Office replied by providing information on the number of complaints received by the agency.

On July 27 and November 7, 2022, Cristosal or Human Rights Watch asked the General Directorate of Penal Centers for information on the number of detainees under the state of emergency, the total prison population, the number of people in pretrial detention, and the number of people convicted, among others. At time of writing, Cristosal and Human Rights Watch had not received a response.

On September 26, 2022, Cristosal asked the Institute of Legal Medicine for information on the number of deaths in custody during 2022. The Legal Medicine Institute replied on October 6 that the institution "lacked the authority" to respond and that a request should be made to the Attorney General's Office and the National Civil Police.

Gang Violence

US criminal and immigration laws became increasingly harsh in the 1990s and thereafter. Authorities in many US states and localities established databases of alleged gang members, which were notoriously vague and thus ripe for arbitrary and discriminatory application. In most cases, after a criminal conviction US laws mandated deportation once people completed their sentences, which often separated family members and further destabilized communities. Some Salvadorans were deported after serving their sentences for criminal offenses involving extreme violence and others were deported for minor offenses linked to poverty and the circumstances of their lives in the US. These laws were applied to all non-citizens in the US, including Salvadorans, and in many respects also violated international human rights law.

There is no single registry of missing people nationwide. Figures vary by institution, for example, between the Attorney General's Office and the National Civil Police. The Attorney General's Office registered more than 22,000 reports of missing people between 2014 and 2019. According to the Foundation for the Study and Application of Law (Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho, FESPAD), a Salvadoran nongovernmental organization, the National Civil Police registered over 12,000 reports in the same period, more than the estimated 8,000 to 10,000 disappeared during the 12-year civil war. Between January and May 2022, FESPAD counted 500 cases of disappearances registered by the National Civil Police.

Gang membership appears to have significantly increased in recent decades. According to unverified figures that Minister of Justice and Public Safety Gustavo Villatoro shared during an interview, there are 76,000 gang members in El Salvador. In 2003, a Central American University (UCA) study estimated the figure to be 20,000. Some studies suggest that, prior to the state of emergency, the gangs were present in 90 percent of the country's municipalities. Root causes of gang membership, particularly among children and young people, include poverty, social marginalization, ineffective police and justice systems, and poor security policies.

Salvadoran Security Forces

Human rights monitors have also expressed concern that extrajudicial executions of alleged gang members are being portrayed as killings during clashes between security forces and gang members. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions noted, in her report on El Salvador, that during armed confrontations, "alleged gang members were reportedly killed execution-style and the crime scene tampered with by those responsible or others, including by placing weapons and drugs alongside the dead bodies."

Past Responses to Gang Violence

Authorities in El Salvador have historically been largely heavy handed and ineffective in protecting the population from gang violence.

As a part of their anti-gang strategy, authorities have also pursued criminal groups through repressive anti-gang legislation, criminalizing gang membership, and toughening penalties.

Another Way Forward?

This analysis suggests that rather than engaging in mass arrests and prosecutions, El Salvador should prioritize strategic criminal investigations-something it has not done.

Dismantling Democratic Institutions

The Bukele administration has undermined the independence of virtually all government bodies that could serve as check to the executive branch.

Shortly after taking office, President Bukele aggressively confronted the legislature and the Supreme Court over funding for his security plan and his harsh enforcement of a Covid-19 quarantine. In particular:

In February 2020, President Bukele entered the Legislative Assembly, where his party held a minority, with armed soldiers, in an apparent effort to intimidate legislators into approving a $109 million loan from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) for security forces. After occupying the chair of the Assembly's president, he announced he would give it "a week to approve the loan." He threatened to remove lawmakers from the Assembly, if needed.

The government repeatedly defied court rulings related to its response to the Covid-19 pandemic, including on its arbitrary detention of hundreds of people in containment centers where there was an increased risk of spreading Covid-19. After the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court issued rulings in March and April 2020 that limited the government's ability to detain people under the lockdown, President Bukele called on law enforcement personnel to ignore the rulings. He used social media to lash out against judges and accused them of being "genocidal."

In the months prior to the February 2021 legislative elections, President Bukele intensified attacks against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE), the institution overseeing the elections. He repeatedly accused the TSE, without evidence, of planning "electoral fraud" to defeat his party.

On May 1, 2021, the same day that new legislators took office, they summarily removed and replaced all five judges of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court for supposedly inhibiting the government's pandemic response. The same night, legislators dismissed the attorney general, who had been investigating corruption allegations against high-level government officials and reports of a pact between President Bukele's administration and gangs. The removals violated international human rights standards that removals of judges (and by analogy, removals of prosecutors) should be determined in accordance with established standards of conduct, should be subject to independent review, and should take place "only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties."

On June 30, 2021, the Assembly appointed five new judges to the Supreme Court, in violation of the process established in the Constitution and the Assembly's own internal rules. Salvadoran law allows each newly constituted legislative body to appoint five Supreme Court judges, but the Assembly has appointed 10 of a total 15.

In September 2021, lawmakers passed laws allowing the Supreme Court and the attorney general to dismiss judges and prosecutors over 60 years of age and expanding their authority to transfer judges and prosecutors to new posts. The laws run counter to international human rights standards on judicial independence and have been used to dismiss and transfer independent judges or prosecutors.

On September 3, 2021, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, whose members have been named by the pro-Bukele legislature, ruled that the Constitution allows for immediate presidential re-election. El Salvador's Constitution forbids "any individual who served for at least six months, consecutive or not, in the previous presidential term" from running for president. The court had previously interpreted this provision to forbid immediate re-election. President Bukele himself said during a TV interview in 2013 that there was "no re-election in El Salvador" and that the constitution "does not allow the same person to be president twice in a row."

In September 2021, Vice President Félix Ulloa made public a draft proposal to revise the Constitution, proposing more than 200 changes, including to extend the presidential term from five to six years and to overhaul institutions such as the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the Court of Accounts (which audits public funds). Under Salvadoran law, the reform needs to be approved by the current Assembly and ratified by the next one, which will be elected in 2024. It has not been discussed at time of writing.

Security Policies

Yet, since he took office, his policies have oscillated between closed-door negotiations with gangs and iron fist measures that took his predecessors' policies of mass incarceration to unprecedented levels.

The digital media outlet El Faro has published extensive evidence showing that, at the beginning of his term, the Bukele government negotiated a "truce" with gangs, offering privileges to imprisoned gang members and employment opportunities to those outside in exchange for the gangs' commitment to lower homicide rates and provide political support during 2021 legislative elections. President Bukele has denied these allegations.

After waves of gang violence in 2020, the government ordered a state of emergency at maximum security prisons. President Bukele said he had received reports that homicides outside had been orchestrated by gang members inside the prisons. During a subsequent lockdown that the president ordered, authorities held prisoners in inhumane conditions that may amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment under international law.

According to the government, homicides declined from about 36 per 100,000 people in 2019 to 17 per 100,000 in 2021. There is no aggregated data on the number of homicides for 2022, and authorities have told journalists that such information is "classified." Human Rights Watch and Cristosal obtained a National Civil Police document indicating that 463 people were killed between January and the end of October 2022-a reported 50 percent decrease compared to the same months in 2021. According to press reports, since July 2019, authorities have not included deaths resulting from encounters with security forces in the homicide data. Authorities and some experts also report a decrease in extortion by gangs.

Attacks on Independent Media and Civil Society

President Bukele and his allies have assaulted the credibility of independent media, particularly digital outlets, including El Faro, Revista Factum, and Gato Encerrado, accusing them of spreading "fake news," and being "gang supporters." Government-run media outlets have repeatedly published articles that appear designed to damage the reputation of independent outlets.

In July 2020, authorities launched a tax audit of El Farothat appears selective and abusive. After El Faro reported on a truce between the government and gangs, President Bukele announced criminal investigations, accusing the outlet of "money laundering" and "tax evasion."

Pro-Bukele legislators in the Legislative Assembly have also introduced or passed legislation that severely restricts freedom of expression and association.

After several foreign governments criticized the bills and the German embassy said that it was considering ending its humanitarian programs in the country, the Bukele administration announced that it would delay voting on the law. In August 2022, the speaker of the government's party, Christian Guevara, said authorities would use the law, once passed, to punish El Faro.

Limiting Transparency and Accountability

The Bukele administration has dramatically undermined government transparency and accountability mechanisms, increasing the risk of corruption and abuse of power.

In June 2021, Rodolfo Delgado, the new pro-Bukele attorney general, ended a cooperation agreement with the International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador (Comisión Internacional Contra la Corrupción en El Salvador, CICIES), a body backed by the Organization of American States to fight corruption in the country. The commission had supported investigations into alleged corruption by high-level officials in the Bukele administration, including in connection with irregular purchases of equipment used to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. Delgado also reportedly dismantled a prosecutors' unit that was investigating alleged negotiations between the administration and gangs.

The press has reported several allegations of government corruption during the pandemic. El Faro reported that, before Attorney General Melara was ousted in May 2021, prosecutors were investigating alleged irregular purchases by the Bukele administration. In January 2022, Attorney General Delgado's office raided the offices of prosecutors who were investigating allegations of corruption and officials' negotiations with gangs. At least four prosecutors fled the country, fearing persecution.

State of Emergency

President Bukele requested the suspension of rights, portraying it as necessary to address a spike in gang violence. Ninety-two people were killed, seemingly by gangs, between March 24 and 27 in El Salvador, with March 26 having the highest daily homicide rate in several years, according to official records.Nobody had been convicted of the killings as of July.

According to El Faro, the wave of violence in March was the result of collapsed secret government negotiations with the MS-13 gang.

International law allows countries to temporarily derogate or suspend some of their human rights obligations only in very limited circumstances, which did not appear to apply to conditions in El Salvador in March 2022 or at the times of the subsequent extensions of the state of emergency.

Sweeping Criminal Amendments

Other amendments dramatically increase sentences for alleged gang members in ways that could lead to disproportionate punishment.

Sentences for people convicted of leading a "terrorist" gang were increased from 10 to 15 years to between 30 and 40 years in prison.The sentence for people who "take part" in these groups with the "intention of" carrying out "acts of terrorism" was increased to 15 to 20 years, up from 8 to 12.

Additionally, in September, the Legislative Assembly passed a law allowing prosecutors and judges to try people in absentia. On its face, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does not appear to permit in absentia trials. Even so, the UN Human Rights Committee, which provides authoritative interpretations of the ICCPR, has clarified that in absentia proceedings may be permissible in limited circumstances, such as where the accused has been informed of the charges, the date, and the place of the hearing reasonably in advance but has declined to be present. The Human Rights Committee has called on courts to verify these circumstances before starting a trial in the absence of the accused. The apparent absence of this safeguard in El Salvador's in absentia trials raises concerns about respect for due process rights, particularly in a context of widespread violations like El Salvador's.

International Funding

The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica, CABEI) has provided significant funding to Salvadoran government institutions.

· In 2019, the Bank approved loans to support the Territorial Control Plan with $200 million, including funds to the National Civil Police, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation. In November 2022, officials from the Bank told Human Rights Watch that these funds had not been disbursed and that the loans were being "reformulated" to replace the National Civil Police and the Ministry of Defense as the entities charged with executing the funds. However, El Salvador's proposed 2023 budget indicates that the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety is expected to receive $20 million from these loans to develop the police's infrastructure in 2023, roughly 67 percent of the funds allocated for this purpose in the budget. Similarly, the Defense Ministry's proposed 2023 budget includes funds from one of these loans for $17 million, roughly 7 percent of the ministry's expected total budget.

In 2014 and 2019, the Bank approved loans to build and equip new headquarters for the Attorney General's Office, for a total of over $70 million, which have yet to be disbursed. The Attorney General's Office budget indicates it expected to receive over $35 million from this loan in 2022, which represents more than 30 percent of the office's total funding for the year. The 2023 proposed budget notes that the office is expected to receive almost $44 million from these loans in 2023, roughly 35 percent of the office's expected budget for the year. In November 2022, an official from the Bank said that they expected to disburse funds from this loan in 2023.

In 2012, the Bank approved a $71 million loan to "strengthen the prison system" in El Salvador. The Bank has already disbursed roughly $57 millon. In September 2022, the bank's directory approved a resolution replacing the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety with the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation as the entity charged with executing the funds. The change was requested by Salvadoran authorities as a result of the December 2021 decision by the US Department of Treasuary to sanction Osiris Luna Meza, the head of the prison system and vice minister of justice and public safety, due to his alleged involvement in closed-door negotiations with gangs.

Cristosal and Human Rights Watch documented widespread human rights violations committed during the state of emergency in El Salvador.

Arbitrary Detention and Short-term Enforced Disappearances

Human Rights Watch and Cristosal gathered evidence of over 1,100 cases of arbitrary detention committed during the state of emergency and documented in detail 130 of them, including 12 that amount to short-term enforced disappearances.

In virtually all cases that Human Rights Watch and Cristosal documented, people were taken from their homes or work or picked up on the street without being shown a search or arrest warrant by security forces.

On August 8, the digital media outlet El Faro revealed records by the Attorney General's Office suggesting that scores of arrests had been conducted based on questionable or no evidence. Out of 690 cases examined by El Faro, 160 detentions were purportedly based on detainees' "suspicious appearance," 73 others on "nervous appearance," and 34 on "anonymous reports."

In the cases documented by Human Rights Watch and Cristosal, detainees were rarely informed of the reasons for their arrest. In some cases officers said they were "following the orders of their superiors" or "orders from the president." In some others, security forces portrayed the arrests as "informal questioning." However, many people taken for such "questioning" were later reported as being under arrest.

Witnesses said that in some cases police or soldiers hit people and family members during the arrest or threatened to arrest them as well. Cristosal reported 77 cases in which family members of those detained were beaten or threatened with being arrested.

On July 18, 2022, soldiers detained Noemí Abrego (pseudonym), 16, in the state of Sonsonate. Abrego works with her mother selling food at a market and was waiting for the bus outside of her home when four soldiers stopped her. They did not show her a warrant or explain the reason for the arrest.

Abrego's sister, who witnessed the detention through a window, saw a soldier pushed Abrego to the ground and told her mother. Her mother went outside and told soldiers that Abrego was pregnant. One soldier replied that she should stop talking or he "was going to arrest her" as well.

Abrego was taken to a police station in Sonsonate. She was held there for five days and then transferred to a juvenile detention facility in the city of San Salvador.

Fifteen days after her arrest, Abrego was taken to a judge for the first time. She was accused of "unlawful association" and sent to pretrial detention, her mother, who attended the hearing, said.

On October 6, her mother went to the juvenile detention facility to leave her clothes and sanitary supplies. She was told by a prison guard that her daughter had had a miscarriage two months after her arrest. When the mother asked why she had not been informed, an officer said they "had forgotten to let her know."

Abrego remained in detention as of November.

On April 30, police officers kicked and beat Lucas Sánchez, 18, and Ricardo Marín, 28 (pseudonyms) as they were arrested at their home in Chalatenango state, a relative said. The police said they were arresting them because of the "state of emergency." The relative, who was eight months pregnant at the time, tried to defend them, but a police officer pushed her against a police car, saying she could also be detained if she didn't stop asking questions. The relative said she bled for a week and a health care worker told her the pregnancy was at risk. Sánchez and Marín remain imprisoned at time of writing.

Human Rights Watch and Cristosal gathered information about 14 cases in which people with psychosocial disabilities or mental health conditions were detained and documented five such cases in detail. These arrests can lead to damaging long-term consequences for their physical and mental health.

Officers asked him for an identification document and, when he showed it, they said he was being detained for "collaborating with gangs." They did not show an arrest warrant, a witness said. When the family told the officers that Ramírez had a mental health condition, one agent responded that "if [Ramírez] died, [the officer] would bring him to me dead," a relative recalled.

The officers also arrested Ramírez's brother, who arrived at the house later when they were taking Ramírez to celebrate a relative's birthday party.

The brothers were sent to a nearby police station and, two days later, to the Mariona prison. They have been held incommunicado since their arrest. On May 13, a judge charged them with "unlawful association" and ordered their detention pending trial.

Security forces did not tell him or a relative who was present why he was being detained; they only said it was "due to the state of emergency." He was taken to a police station in the municipality of Santa Cruz Michapa, Cuscatlán state, and, a few hours later, moved to a police station in the municipality of Coatepeque, Santa Ana state. There, an officer told his family that he had to comply with an "arrest quota." The officer acknowledged that the detention was unjust, his relative said, but alleged he could not do anything about it.

Molina was transferred to the Mariona prison, but his family was not informed. Unaware of his whereabouts, his relatives looked for him for almost three months, until in July, a prison guard acknowledged that he was in Mariona.

Lack of information about detainees' health conditions and, at times, about their whereabouts drove hundreds of family members, mostly women, to gather outside the Mariona prison for days or weeks between April and May.

On April 30, the police detained Tomás' brother, Martín Rivera (pseudonym), a 28-year-old mechanic, and his brother-in-law, Juan González (pseudonym), an 18-year-old construction worker. Officers did not provide a reason for the detention. A relative said three officers kicked and beat the two men.

Authorities did not give the family any information about the detainees' whereabouts. A family member spent 24 days sleeping outside the Mariona prison awaiting news about the three. She was pregnant and waited with her 2-year-old son and, for some days, other family members, including children.

While establishing these centers is an important step toward fulfilling authorities' obligations to provide information on detainees' whereabouts, they do not address the fact that many victims have been held incommunicado. They also do not allow relatives to obtain other crucial information about their loved ones, including on their health. The centers were created two months into the state of emergency, when thousands had already been detained and hundreds of relatives were gathering outside of prisons to obtain information.

Police officers detained brothers Eric and Ricardo Gallegos (pseudonyms), ages 23 and 26, on April 5 and 6, respectively, in Santa Ana state. Officers said the brothers were "gang members" and detained them without showing an arrest or search warrant, a relative said.

Officers arrested Eric in a food market and, a day later, took Ricardo from his home. Officers did not tell the family where they were taking Ricardo, so the family followed the police to a station in Santa Ana. On April 7, the family saw the brothers taken out of the station and placed on a bus, apparently to move them to another detention facility. When a relative asked where they were being taken, officers said they "could not provide information about their whereabouts."

Their family was not aware of their whereabouts for two months. In June, when the government announced that relatives would be allowed to leave clothes and medicine for detainees, family members decided to visit the Izalco prison to see if the brothers were held there. Guards said that they were detained there and received the package, but relatives have not been able to see them since their arrest.

Officers asked for his phone and identification document, which he provided. They arrested him, saying he was in a different neighborhood than the one noted on his identification document, and accused him of being "a gang member hiding from justice."

Officers threatened his brother with arrest. "You can't do anything," one of them said, "and if you keep asking for his rights, I will detain you and take you to a police station."

They did not say where they were taking him. His relatives and a friend, who is a lawyer, toured detention centers to try to find him. In one of them, known as "El Penalito," they recalled seeing what they estimated to be more than one hundred women waiting outside to learn if their relatives were detained there.

After a six-hour search, officers told them that Gavidia was held in the San Marcos police station. A police officer told the lawyer that, "We did not find anything [to detain] him but we are not going to release him." "There is nothing you can do now. We are in a 'state of emergency,'" an officer told them, "We cannot release him, these are the orders from above."

Gavidia has not been able to talk with his family since. On April 25, a judge charged him with "unlawful association" and sent him to pretrial detention.

In some specific cases, officers have arrested or threatened to arrest people in apparent retaliation for previous incidents involving those detained or their families, including reporting police conduct to the Attorney General's Office or to the Human Rights Ombudsperson's Office. In some cases, police harassment and fear of being arbitrarily arrested has forced people to move or hide in different places. Cristosal has documented over 50 cases of people who have fled their homes during the state of emergency, fearing arbitrary arrests.

For over ten years, the relative said, police had repeatedly harassed Hernández, demanding that he provide information on gang members who operate in his community. The relative reported the officers to the Human Rights Ombudsperson's Office; one police officer was dismissed temporarily, and the harassment ended for some time.

But when Hernández turned 18, the same officer arrived at his home with an arrest order and accused him of murder. He was held in the Quezaltepeque prison for three years. He was acquitted and released in 2019. Soon after, officers arrested him again, this time accusing him of drug possession, but he was released on parole.

The relative said that during the state of emergency, police officers have repeatedly arrived at his home searching for him. Currently, Hernández is in hiding, fearing that officers will arrest him again.

Abusive Prison Conditions and Ill-Treatment in Custody

Prisons in El Salvador have for decades been overcrowded and marked by violence and poor access to basic services, such as food, drinking water, and health care.

Overcrowding has been rooted in part in policies of mass incarceration implemented by previous governments in response to gang violence. By 2020, the official capacity of the prison system was about 27,000 detainees, but it housed over 39,000 according to official statistics.

The excessive use of pretrial detention is another factor driving high levels of prison overcrowding. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has noted that authorities have routinely resorted to pretrial detention "based on the type of offense, with no sufficient and individualized consideration of each case to determine whether the necessary conditions for detention are met."

However, overcrowding has seriously worsened during the state of emergency. Between late March and late November 2022, over 58,000 people have been detained, according to official figures, including over 51,000 who have been sent to pretrial detention. Such mass imprisonment raised El Salvador's prison population to an estimated 95,000 detainees, 68,000 more than the country's prison capacity.

Human Rights Watch and Cristosal interviewed eight people who have been released from prison. They reported poor conditions and degrading and inhumane treatment at police stations and at Mariona, Izalco, Ilopango, Quezaltepeque, and Jucuapa prisons, as well as cases of torture in the Mariona and Izalco prisons, including beatings and waterboarding.

Such prison conditions, coupled in some cases with limited access to health services in detention, can seriously aggravate the health conditions of detainees. Human Rights Watch and Cristosal gathered evidence of over 240 cases of people detained with underlying health conditions, including diabetes, recent history of stroke, and meningitis.

Guevara was taken to the Mariona prison, prison guards said to a relative. Two months after his detention, a person who did not identify himself arrived at Guevara's house and told relatives that Guevara had been hospitalized at the National Hospital since May 3. An official in the Human Rights Ombudsperson's Office told a relative that Guevara had injured his left foot when he was taken to the Mariona prison, but he did not say how.

A relative who was able to visit Guevara briefly in the hospital learned that doctors amputated Guevara's right leg and a part of his left foot.

Guevara is diabetic. His relatives took his medication to the Mariona prison before the amputation but do not know if prison authorities gave him access to it. On July 8, Guevara was taken to the Quezaltepeque prison, where he remained as of November 24.

(As discussed earlier in this report, lawmakers repeatedly threatened to oust Tobar Serrano, a vocal critic of the government's human rights policies between 2019 and mid-2021.)

Selected Cases of Abuses in Detention

Lucrecia López (pseudonym), 48, Cuscatancingo

On March 30, police arrested Lucrecia López, a 48-year-old fruit seller, in Cuscatancingo, San Salvador state.After raiding the house without showing a search warrant, officers told her they were detaining her because "[they] needed to make numbers," she said, in an apparent reference to the police's arrest quotas. Officers took López to a police station in Cuscatancingo where they told her she was detained for "unlawful association."

Later that day, she was transferred to a police station in Sacamil. López said she was held in a small room with 45 women; many had to sleep standing. There were no beds or mattresses in the cell, she said.

On April 2, she was moved to the women's prison in Ilopango. López said that she slept on the floor for several days until her family sent her a mattress and some blankets. She said there was no running water.

On April 17, she was charged with "unlawful association" and placed in pre-trial detention. Sixty-five other people were charged in that hearing; all of them participated virtually.

Marcelo Gómez (pseudonym), 39, Cuscatancingo

Four police officers detained Marcelo Gómez, a-39-year-old taxi driver, outside his home in the municipality of Cuscatancingo, San Salvador state. After reviewing his ID card and phone, officers told Gómez's partner that they were taking him to the police station as part of a "police routine" and that they would "release him soon."

He spent three days at the police station, without knowing why he had been detained. He "cried all day." The cell had capacity to house 25 people, but when he arrived, there were over 75 prisoners, he said. He slept on the floor next to "the bathroom," a hole in the ground that smelled "terrible."

He was sent to Izalco prison on the third day. During the transfer, officers tied his hands with plastic straps so tight that his fingers swelled: "I felt they were going to explode," he said.

When they arrived, the prison's guards ordered the group to take off their clothes. They were forced to kneel on the ground naked looking downwards for four hours in front of the prison's gate, Gómez said. They were then forced to squat several times.

Guards took the group to a room with five barrels full of water with ice, he said. Fifteen guards forced him and others to go into the barrels for around two hours in total, as they questioned them about their supposed links with gangs.

He was forced into a barrel "around 30 times," and was kept there for about a minute each time. Guards forced his head under water so he could not breathe. "I felt I was drowning," he said. Guards repeatedly insulted them, calling them "dogs" and "scum" and saying they would "pay for what [they] had done."

He was then taken to a cell along with 124 other people. Gómez said that the cell had capacity for 60 detainees. He had two meals per day, which normally "arrived dirty, and smelled bad." Gómez said he lost 60 pounds in one month.

Some people were forced to sleep on the floor. Gómez said he had fever and pain in his ear. After eight days in pain, a guard took him to the infirmary where a health professional gave him two pills for an "ear infection" and sent him back to his cell. He also said he suffered from continuous coughs that were severe enough that he could not speak.

Marvin Argueta (pseudonym), 45, Ilopango

On March 27, police officers detained Marvin Argueta a 45-year-old professor and taxi owner, at his taxi shop in the state of San Salvador. He was detained with seven other taxi drivers who were also there.

Officers asked Argueta to provide documentation of the taxis, which he did. But the police officer detained him, without showing an arrest warrant; according to Argueta the officer said it was due to the "state of emergency."

He was taken to the Ilopango police station, where he was held for four days. It was the first time Argueta had been detained, he said. He received food once or twice a day. At the police station an officer told him he had been detained for "unlawful association."

On March 30, Argueta was transferred, handcuffed, to the Izalco prison. He was forced to keep his head down during the transfer, Argueta said, and police officers kicked and beat up those who disobeyed. Before entering the prison, officers forced him to kneel on the ground for about two hours, under the sun, and to squat 25 times naked, Argueta said. "Welcome to hell," prison guards said, according to Argueta.

As detainees walked to their cells, police officers stood on both sides and beat them, Argueta said. "We had to walk almost squatting, and without looking up," he said. Argueta fell and officers kicked him repeatedly.

He said he vomited when he arrived in his cell and had fever for four days. The cell had capacity for 30 people but actually held 125, according to Argueta. He slept on the floor due to the overcrowding. There was no water or toilet paper in the cell. Guards told detainees they could not talk or pray, and threw tear gas in the cell every time someone disobeyed, Argueta said.

Argueta suffers hypertension and diabetes, but he said he did not receive health care while he was detained.

On April 14, he was taken to a virtual hearing with over 50 other people. The prosecutor accused all of them of belonging to a "terrorist organization." Argueta told the judge that he was innocent. The judge charged him and sent him to pretrial detention.

On April 23, guards took him to the prison's infirmary where they treated him for a severe flu. The next day he was sent to a hospital, where he spent one night, before being transferred to the Quezaltepeque prison.

In Quezaltepeque, food was only "tortillas and beans." There were 90 people in the cell, which had capacity for 30, he said.

On September 8, he was taken to the Occidental Santa Ana prison, also known as "El Peñalón," where he said conditions were better. He was taken to a health examination and had a bed. He also was able to be outside his cell and had three meals each day.

Luis Orozco (pseudonym), 47, Ahuachapán

Officials said he was detained due to the "state of emergency." Orozco was taken to a police station in Ahuachapán, where he was held for a day, handcuffed and without food or water, he said.

He was then moved to a police station in the municipality of Atiquizaya. Orozco's wife said she went to the police station to leave food and clothes, but officials said he was not there.

Orozco was moved to the Mariona prison on April 22. When he arrived, he said, a prison guard told him and other detainees, "welcome to Mariona, a hell for gang members like you." Five prison guards beat him with batons on his leg and back for approximately 10 minutes while he was handcuffed, he said. The guards said he had to "acknowledge that he was a gang member."

He was taken to a cell with capacity for 80 people that held over 200, according to Orozco. Officers gave him one tortilla twice a day, and he had to share with another detainee. Sometimes he was also given water, he said.

There was one toilet inside the cell, but some days it did not have water. He spent one month and 10 days in that cell. Guards did not allow them to go outside, and the cell had no natural light. Orozco said he did not receive any health care and that he saw three people die in the cell.

On June 7, he was taken to what he described as a "punishment cell." He said officers moved him and others there to "make room for other detainees." The new cell was constantly dark, and detainees had to sleep standing due to overcrowding. There was no regular access to drinking water, and he could not shower.

On June 28, he was taken to participate virtually in a hearing, where he first learned he was being accused of "unlawful association." The prosecutor said he had been detained "at a market along with a gang member." Orozco denies this charge, but in the hearing, he was not allowed to intervene. He could only communicate with his lawyer through a screen that allowed him to respond "yes" or "no."

Deaths in Custody

Cristosal has received reports of 86 deaths in custody since March. Human Rights Watch and Cristosal documented 11 cases in detail, based on interviews with victims' relatives, medical records, analysis by forensic experts, and other evidence.

Medical authorities reported some of these deaths as being the result of "pulmonary edema" and "cerebral edema." But the IFEG noted that the death certificates "fail to meet internationally accepted medical practice and legal standards that require recording of not only immediate causes of death, but also all underlying causes and other significant conditions contributing to death." In the experts' view, Salvadoran authorities "failed to adhere to internationally accepted medical practices and legal standards as outlined by the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death in its investigation into the suspicious deaths."

Investigations into deaths in custody also appear to be slow. Salvadoran authorities say they are investigating these deaths, but as of mid-November, all such investigations appeared to be at an "initial phase." Human Rights Watch formally asked the Attorney General's Office for information regarding these investigations, but the office responded that information on complaints of alleged human rights violations by security forces had been "classified" for two years.

The police raided Rivas' home on April 21 without showing a search warrant. They told the family he was suspected of "unlawful association." A relative went to a police station where officials had taken Rivas and told the officer that Rivas had diabetes and required daily medication. "We are not giving any [medication] right now," the officer replied, saying that he should try again at the "El Penalito" police station, where they said Rivas would be transferred the next day.

On April 22, relatives went to "El Penalito," but officers said they were not "receiving medication" either. They asked a prison guard at the gatehouse if Rivas was there. The guard said he "was not authorized to provide information" but assured them that he would receive any medication he needed.

Authorities held Terán for three days at a police station in Atiquizaya. He was then moved to the Izalco prison, where he was held incommunicado.

On June 3, workers from a mortuary went to Terán's house and informed his family that he had died. A report by the Institute of Legal Medicine says he died due to "pulmonary edema." But photographs of his body show he had multiple bruises on his torso and arms. The injuries are not visible in the photograph published by the police during his arrest, which suggests they were caused during detention. As mentioned above, forensic experts who received the photos concluded that his body "present[ed] multiple lesions that evidence trauma that could have been caused by torture or ill-treatment that might have contributed to their deaths while in custody."

"We are following orders from the president," an officer responded when she asked in the police station why Posada had been detained. On April 8, he was transferred to Izalco prison, where he was held incommunicado.

A relative who witnessed the arrest said that police did not show an arrest warrant or explain the reasons for his arrest. When a relative asked why he was being detained, an agent threatened to detain him as well.

After two days in a police station in Usulután, López Castellón was moved to the Mariona prison. On April 21, López Castellón was taken to a hearing where he was charged with belonging to a "terrorist organization." On May 31, a relative went to Mariona to leave medicine for López Castellón, who the relative says suffered from diabetes and a heart condition. Prison guards received it.

On August 8, the relative went to the Public Defender's Office to request López Castellón's criminal records. A staff member told him she could not provide the records because López Castellón was dead.

López Castellón had been transferred to the Zacamil hospital on May 27. Four days later, his relatives left him medicine in the Mariona prison, but prison authorities did not inform the family about the transfer. The Institute of Legal Medicine told a relative he was buried in a mass grave, without the family's knowledge or consent. In mid-September, his family was able to exhumate his body and bury him in a cemetery in their municipality.

Abusive Criminal Proceedings

Authorities repeatedly infringed due process guarantees established under international law, violating detainees' human rights, and making it difficult, if not impossible, for detainees to adequately defend themselves during criminal proceedings.

These violations have been taking place in a context in which there are few protections for judicial and prosecutorial independence from the executive branch.

· Courts sent over 51,000 detainees to pretrial detention, seemingly applying a recent amendment to the criminal code that expanded mandatory pretrial detention to include all crimes committed by members of terrorist groups, gangs, and other criminal organizations. As explained above, this provision is inconsistent with international human rights standards requiring an individualized determination establishing that pretrial detention is necessary and proportionate for purposes such as preventing flight, interference with evidence, or the recurrence of crime.

Thousands were held incommunicado for weeks or months or were only allowed to see their lawyer for a few minutes before their hearings. Authorities have in many cases prohibited prison visits, including of the defendant's lawyers, allegedly because "they were conducting raids in prisons" or due to "increased Covid-19 cases." They also denied detainees the right to make phone calls.

Additionally, several relatives of detainees said that public defenders failed to provide them with sufficient information on their relative's case, or to inform them in a timely manner of the evidence required from them.

The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court has addressed only a handful of the habeas corpus requests filed by lawyers representing detainees. As of November 29, Socorro Jurídico Humanitario, a human rights organization, had filed 611 habeas corpus requests; the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court had only ruled on five.

Lack of Accountability for Human Rights Violations

The Attorney General's Office, which periodically tweets about arrests and other progress in criminal investigations, has not published any information on its social media accounts about investigations into police or army officers allegedly responsible for abuses committed during the state of emergency.

This report was researched by staff members of Cristosal and Human Rights Watch.

It was written by Juan Pappier, acting associate director of Human Rights Watch's Americas Division, and by a Human Rights Watch staff member whose name is withheld for security reasons.

The following Cristosal staff members reviewed the report: Noah Bullock, executive director; Abraham Abrego, director for strategic litigation; Rina Montti, director for human rights research; and Daniel Nieto, human rights researcher.

The report was also reviewed by the following Human Rights Watch staff members: Juanita Goebertus, Americas director; Tamara Taraciuk Broner, Americas deputy director; Kyle Knight, senior health and human rights researcher; Matt McConnell, economic justice and rights researcher; Margaret Wurth, senior children's rights researcher; Letta Tayler, associate director, Crisis and Conflict Division; Regina Tamés, deputy director, Women's Rights Division; Alison Leal Parker, managing director, US Program; Claudio Francavilla, senior EU advocate; Carlos Ríos-Espinosa, senior researcher, Disability Rights Division; Kate Waine, Washington advocacy coordinator; Floriane Borel, senior United Nations advocacy coordinator. María McFarland Sánchez-Moreno and Michael Bochenek García provided Human Rights Watch's program and legal review, respectively.

Americas Division associates Camilo Moraga-Lewy, Delphine Starr, and Johan Romero contributed to the report production. The report was prepared for publication by Travis Carr, publications officer, Fitzroy Hepkins, administrative manager, and José Martínez, senior administration coordinator. It was translated into Spanish by Gabriela Haymes.

Human Rights Watch is deeply grateful to the victims who, despite often incredibly difficult circumstances, shared their testimonies with us.

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The 89-page report, "'We Can Arrest Anyone We Want': Widespread Human Rights Violations Under El Salvador's 'State of Emergency'" documents mass arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment against detainees, enforced disappearances, deaths in custody, and abuse-ridden prosecutions. President Nayib Bukele's swift dismantling of judicial independence since he took office in mid-2019 enabled the abuses.

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This article is talking about how the cases of people detained by security forces and officers without legal justification.Doing so constitutes a civil rights violation based on the Fourth Amendment.

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Goitom, a 42-year-old ethnic Tigrayan farmer, lived in Adi Goshu, a town in Western Tigray, a large and fertile district known for growing sesame, sorghum, and cotton in Ethiopia's northern Tigray region. On January 17, 2021, he watched helplessly from his home as Amhara Special Forces and local militias beat up and detained Tigrayans in his town. Tigrayans had already faced months of intimidation by local authorities and Amhara security forces, and so Goitom ran to a nearby forest to escape the latest onslaught until the situation subsided. He waited a day and then called his relatives back in Adi Goshu, who informed him that the forces had rounded up dozens of Tigrayans and summarily executed them at the Tekeze bridge. He said:

Our numbers were decreasing by the day. After the Tekeze incident happened, Tigrayans left in big numbers. There was nothing to live for. We were not part of the town; it was taken over by other people. We were not allowed to live.

Fearful for his life if he remained, Goitom, like thousands of other Tigrayans who were forced to flee - others were simply expelled from the territory - headed east across the Tekeze River to northwestern Tigray to escape Amhara authorities and regional security forces. Far from the world's attention, Goitom was among the first wave of Tigrayans fleeing abuses in the Western Tigray Zone - waves that have recurred while the conflict, and the world's attention, has moved on.

Since the outbreak of armed conflict on November 4, 2020, - pitting forces aligned with Ethiopia's federal government against those affiliated with Tigray's regional government led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) - hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans living in Western Tigray have been displaced from their homes through threats, intimidation, and a campaign of violence and forcible removal.

In communities across the region, Amhara security forces acting under newly appointed Amhara and Walqayte officials have been responsible for extrajudicial executions, rape and other acts of sexual violence. The widespread pillage of crops and livestock, and the looting and occupation of Tigrayan homes, destroyed sources of livelihood. Tigrayans have faced mass arrest and prolonged arbitrary detention in formal and informal detention sites where detainees were killed, tortured, and ill-treated. Regional authorities have also imposed discriminatory rules that deny Tigrayans basic services and access to humanitarian aid, and measures that seem designed to suppress their rights and presence from the area. Tigrayans endured ethnic-based slurs that targeted their Tigrayan identity and were banned from speaking their language, Tigrinya. People with disabilities and older people have been especially affected.

This report is based on 427 interviews and other research conducted between December 2020 and March 2022 by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as previous research used for background and context. The organizations found that since November 2020 in Western Tigray, civilian authorities, and Amhara regional security forces, with the acquiescence and possible participation of Ethiopian federal forces, committed numerous grave abuses as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Tigrayan civilian population that amount to crimes against humanity as well as war crimes. These crimes include murder, enforced disappearances, torture, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, sexual slavery and other sexual violence, persecution, unlawful imprisonment, possible extermination, and other inhumane acts.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch found that Amhara regional officials and regional special forces and militias, with federal forces' complicity, are responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans from Western Tigray. Although not a formal legal term or a recognized crime under international law, "ethnic cleansing" was defined by the final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia as a purposeful policy by an ethnic or religious group to remove, by violent and terror-inspiring means, the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. As this report makes clear, the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray was conducted through resort to serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Simmering tensions in Western Tigray and rights abuses over many years, mainly by Tigray regional security forces against ethnic Amharas and Walqaytes (Tigrinya and Amharic-speaking people historically inhabiting the highland areas of Western Tigray) served as a backdrop for the eventual physical violence and expulsion of Tigrayan communities from the area. The takeover by Amhara regional officials of Western Tigray Zone - an administrative area bordering Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north, and neighboring Amhara region to the south - represents a violent reversal of changes to Ethiopia's contested internal boundaries enacted by the TPLF-led Ethiopian federal government in 1992.

At that time, Ethiopia's internal boundaries were redrawn following the recommendations of a government boundary commission, and the districts that make up Western Tigray, which previously fell under the administrative authority of the former Begemdir province, were incorporated into the Tigray regional state. Ever since, Amhara activists living in the Western Tigray Zone, and in the Amhara region, resisted the government decision. In response, the government suppressed, at times through violence and force, those attempting to assert their Amhara identity in the territory and raise their claims with the regional and federal government. The outbreak of conflict, in November 2020, brought these longstanding and unaddressed grievances to the fore: Amhara regional forces, along with Ethiopian federal forces, seized these territories and displaced Tigrayan civilians in a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign.

Abuses during the military offensive's initial stages, early November 2020

When the armed conflict started on November 4, 2020, fierce fighting, initially centered on the Western Tigray administrative Zone, and pitted Tigrayan forces against Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and allied forces from the Amhara region - including Amhara regional police special forces (ASF), Amhara militias, and irregular militia known as "Fanos." Federal and allied forces shelled towns and villages, including Humera town from the Eritrean border. Tigrayan forces detained and allegedly summarily executed suspected government informants in the course of fighting but were quickly pushed out of Western Tigray.

Within about 10 days, the Ethiopian federal forces and allied forces perpetrated numerous abuses amounting to war crimes against Tigrayan communities throughout the Zone. Forces destroyed villages and settlements, looted property, livestock, and harvests, and subjected Tigrayan civilians, suspected TPLF sympathizers, and local Tigrayan militia members, to extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and torture and other ill-treatment. These abuses drove tens of thousands of Tigrayans to flee to neighboring Sudan to the west, and central Tigray to the east.

Mai Kadra, a town near the border with Sudan, was the site of the first publicly reported large-scale massacre. Starting from mid-afternoon on November 9, Tigrayan militia and local residents brutally beat, stabbed, and hacked with knives, machetes, and axes, scores of Amhara civilians. Later that same evening, Amhara attackers retaliated, killing and injuring Tigrayans. The violence left approximately 229 people dead. An additional 100 people, primarily Amhara residents and laborers, who had been injured were brought to nearby hospitals and health centers. A joint investigation by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) similarly found that more than 200 people were killed.

After federal and allied forces took control of Mai Kadra on November 10, Amhara Special Forces and militias, over the following days, targeted Tigrayans in a wave of revenge killings. The Tigrayan residents who had not fled were detained in official and makeshift detention facilities. Tigrayan property was pillaged and occupied, while security forces obstructed the provision of relief to detained Tigrayan residents before organizing their eventual expulsion from West Tigray in late December 2020.

The November 9 massacre in Mai Kadra was uniquely tied to a combination of local factors, including preexisting tensions in the town among and between residents and laborers from out of town, the proximity of the town to fast-evolving fighting between the warring parties, and widespread rumors. Differing accounts of what occurred during the massacre fueled further hatred, mutual fear, and mistrust well beyond the town. Accounts of the massacre served as a tool of mobilization to support and justify war efforts by federal and Amhara regional authorities. In other places in Western Tigray, the accounts of what had transpired in Mai Kadra precipitated revenge attacks on Tigrayans. The persecution of Tigrayans in the town, in the days after November 9, including the targeted killings, the looting, the mass detentions, and the subsequent organized expulsion of the town's Tigrayan population, would repeat as a pattern and unfold across the territory in the year that followed.

Abuses in Western Tigray from November 2020 to June 2021

For the many Tigrayan men, women, and children who remained behind in Western Tigray, the abuses did not stop after federal and allied forces established control of the Zone. The Amhara regional authorities took over the administration of the area, which until now remains under their authority. Interim authorities were also drawn from the local Walqayte and Amhara community in Western Tigray, as well as from the Amhara region.

The newly appointed authorities imposed a regime of ethnically targeted restrictions on movement and access to farmland, as well as on speaking Tigrinya - the local language of Tigrayans. Tigrayan residents described how newly appointed authorities and security forces in Western Tigray restricted, and at times outright blocked, their access to the critical aid that was available. Amhara and Fano militias, in some cases alongside non-Tigrayan residents and Eritrean federal forces, pillaged crops and tens of thousands of livestock - the backbone of economic survival and livelihoods of the largely farming communities in the area - leaving Tigrayans with little to survive on, and no choice but to leave. Authorities and security forces began detaining Tigrayans by the thousands.

In several towns, including Humera, Ruwassa, Adi Goshu, Adebai, and Baeker, the plans to remove Tigrayans from the area were a matter of public discussions and displays. Local administrators openly discussed such plans during public town meetings. Signs were displayed demanding that Tigrayans depart, and pamphlets distributed issuing Tigrayans a 24-hour or 72-hour ultimatum to leave or be killed. Interim authorities and security force officials repeated slogans such as "Tigrayans belong east of the Tekeze River," and "This is Amhara land," further underscoring that Tigrayans were being pushed out.

On January 17, 2021, Fano militia and local Walqayte and Amhara residents rounded up dozens of male Tigrayan residents of Adi Goshu. Amhara Special Forces (ASF) took about 60 of them to the Tekeze River bridge that same day, and summarily executed them. This is the massacre Goitom escaped from. Residents and the few survivors believed the killings were a revenge attack after ASF forces suffered heavy losses during fighting with Tigrayan forces near the river the previous night. The persecution of Tigrayans in Adi Goshu escalated in the aftermath of the massacre, prompting a mass exodus from the town. For several weeks, Tigrayans who fled across the Tekeze bridge could see the bodies, which had remained unburied, and served as a terrifying reminder of the atrocities committed.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch found that the authorities in Western Tigray deprived Tigrayan communities of resources key to their survival, and coerced people to depart for Sudan or other parts of Tigray. In some places, local authorities provided the means to forcibly remove Tigrayans from the area, organizing the trucks or buses that took Tigrayans from their homes or places of detention to the Tekeze bridge, the crossing marking the limits of the area newly under the Amhara authorities' control. Before allowing Tigrayans to cross, Amhara security forces manning the final checkpoint on the bridge confiscated their identification cards and the property documents that linked them to land in Western Tigray, warning them not to return. They also prevented Tigrayans who were fleeing the violence in other parts of Tigray from entering Western Tigray.

The forcible displacement escalated during late February and March and led to a surge in the numbers of internally displaced Tigrayans in towns east of the Tekeze River, such as Shire, Sheraro, and Axum in central and northwestern Tigray, where, for months, many lived in overcrowded displacement sites. By June 2021, a preliminary assessment carried out by the federal interim administration of Tigray estimated that 723,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Western Tigray had been registered in other parts of Tigray, while the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) had registered 51,207 refugees in Eastern Sudan by January 2022. Meanwhile, interim authorities and Amhara regional officials called for the settlement of Amhara residents into Western Tigray, with promises of available homes and land.

Abuses In Western Tigray from June to December 2021

As Tigrayan forces recaptured many parts of Tigray in late June, Amhara authorities and forces escalated the arbitrary arrests and killings of the remaining Tigrayan residents, particularly in the border town of Humera and nearby towns and villages. By August, as Tigrayan residents were being rounded up and killed, dozens of mutilated bodies with restraints appeared in the Tekeze River, which marks the de facto border between Western Tigray and Sudan. In November, the roundups and forced displacements escalated again in Humera, Adebai, and Rawyan towns, as Amhara Special Forces, Fano militia, in some cases alongside Eritrean forces, detained men and removed many women, children, and older Tigrayans from their homes, before forcibly expelling them towards the Tekeze River. Thousands of other adult and adolescent men and women remained in detention facilities, facing life-threatening torture, starvation, and denial of medical care in overcrowded sites.

The scale of the forced displacements and flight, the way the abuses were carried out, and the number of areas where they occurred within the Zone, all indicate a degree of control, coordination, and purpose among the authorities overseeing the Amhara regional forces and militias that appear aimed at terrorizing and directly removing Tigrayans from Western Tigray.

The Ethiopian government's efforts to halt these grave abuses or punish those responsible have been grossly inadequate. Federal and regional authorities dismissed allegations of ethnic cleansing, including in response to a February 2021 statement by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that "acts of ethnic cleansing had been committed in Western Tigray." Since then, federal authorities investigated the reports of the mass killing of Amhara residents and communities in Mai Kadra but have taken little action to investigate ongoing human rights violations against Tigrayan civilians in Western Tigray. Instead, the government's continued dismissal of accounts from refugees who fled their homes to Sudan, and its characterization of credible reports of killings and detentions in Western Tigray as "fake," has only further obfuscated the lived realities that survivors and victims endure.

Although Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch contacted a range of Ethiopian federal government officials and agencies to seek their response to the findings set out in this report, only the Amhara Regional Government responded. Their response letter did not provide any contrary evidence or rebut our specific findings, but rather denounced allegations against "the people, governance, and security forces," as "unfounded" and "bothersome." It described our conclusions as "baseless," and the "accusations to expel Tigrayans," from what it characterized as the Amhara region, as "cynical."

The crimes outlined in this report, while not a full and comprehensive accounting of the abuses that occurred in Western Tigray, require meaningful accountability and redress. Ethiopian authorities should facilitate safe and unhindered access to humanitarian agencies, while granting independent human rights monitors - including the Commission of Inquiry established by the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights, and the United Nations-established International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia -access to conflict-affected areas in Ethiopia, including Western Tigray.

Ensuring accountability for these abuses needs a coordinated global response. The United Nations, the African Union, and Ethiopia's international and regional partners must take concrete steps to press for the immediate protection of all communities, including at-risk Tigrayan communities who remain in the area. They must also immediately support the work of the UN's independent International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia and ensure its operationalization to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and alleged war crimes carried out by all parties to the conflict in northern Ethiopia since November 2020. Many of the Tigrayans interviewed for this research hoped that the abuses would end, and that the world would finally know of their suffering. States should ensure that their suffering is not being ignored and press for credible justice and redress for the serious crimes that were committed.

Summary of Key Recommendations

To the Ethiopian federal government and regional authorities

Publicly orderfederal and regional security forces to end all violations of international human rights and humanitarian law against the Tigrayan population in Western Tigray and elsewhere.

Immediately demobilize and disarm all abusive irregular forces from Western Tigray, such as Fano and other militias.

Suspend civilian officials, including interim Amhara officials, and security force personnel from the Amhara Special Forces and Ethiopian federal forces implicated in serious abuses in Western Tigray pending investigations into their actions.

Discipline or prosecute as appropriate those found to be responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Western Tigray Zone since November 2020. Investigate the three individuals named in this report.

As part of any consensual agreement between the warring parties, allow the deployment of an AU-led international peacekeeping force in Western Tigray with a robust mandate and the means to protect civilians, promote human rights, and create an environment conducive to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Promptly release all those arbitrarily detained in Western Tigray. Amhara interim authorities and security forces should also immediately make public information about the fate of all Tigrayans detained since the conflict began in November 2020 in Western Tigray. Ethiopian authorities should immediately allow international humanitarian agencies access to formal and informal detention sites without prior notification, and provide detainees with immediate emergency food, water, and medical care.

Immediately restore basic services and facilitate safe, sustained, and unhindered access to humanitarian agencies to all affected populations across Tigray, remove bureaucratic and physical restrictions on United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations that unnecessarily hinder the delivery of assistance, and allow independent oversight and monitoring of assistance.

In consultation with displaced communities andwith the involvement of relevant UN agencies, establish an independent body that can organize and monitor returns that are safe, voluntary, well-informed, and dignified. Ensure that returns of displaced persons and refugees take place in accordance with international standards, on a voluntary basis, and with attention to the safety and dignity of returning populations.

Ensure that any mechanism established for addressing grievances between groups, including regarding administrative boundaries, is in consultation with a diverse range of stakeholders and independent institutions, and operated in full respect of individuals' human rights, including the right to return.

To African Union and the United Nations Member States:

Press all parties to the conflict to immediately facilitate safe, sustained, and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas. Urge the Ethiopian government to immediately restore basic services, including banking, communications, and electricity to Tigray. AU and UN member states should also press the Ethiopian federal and regional authorities to facilitate prompt access of United Nations human rights protection monitors in Western Tigray.

Security Council member states should place Ethiopia on the council's formal agenda and establish a comprehensive arms embargo on all parties to the conflict in northern Ethiopia, and a UN monitoring body to report on the implementation of the embargo.

Support, as part of any consensual agreement between the warring parties, the deployment of an AU-led international peacekeeping force in Western Tigray, with a robust mandate and the means to protect civilians, promote human rights, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.

In consultation with displaced communities, and with the involvement of relevant UN agencies, assist with the establishment of an independent body that can organize and monitor returns thatare safe, voluntary, well-informed and dignified.

Given the gravity of the crimes documented in this report, the international commission of human rights experts on Ethiopia should include events in Western Tigray, since November 2020 as part of its investigations, identify individuals responsible where possible, and make recommendations on how perpetrators can be held accountable, including through national, regional, and international justice bodies.

Support, under the principle of universal jurisdiction and in accordance with national laws, the investigation and prosecution of those credibly implicated in serious crimes under international law.

This report presents the findings of joint research by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, documenting gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, perpetrated in Western Tigray between November 2020 and December 2021. The report documents specific incidents and trends but is not a comprehensive survey of all violations that took place in the region during this period. The organizations do not take a position on the dispute between warring parties or which group, or authorities should control a territory.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch formally sought access to Tigray and the Amhara region from the Ethiopian government but received no response. Because of this lack of access, we were unable to conduct in-person interviews within Tigray or to visit the sites of alleged violations to examine physical or digital evidence. Documentation of abuses in Western Tigray was also constrained by other factors, including ongoing efforts by Ethiopian federal and allied forces to block the routes to Sudan for fleeing Tigrayans, and the restrictions and fear of movement within Tigray, which together limited the ability of witnesses to travel outside the region. Sporadic government restrictions on electricity and communications in Ethiopia and poor communications network in Sudan often hindered the ability of researchers to document abuses in real time.

In total, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch conducted 427 interviews, including 409interviews with survivors of abuses, their family members, and witnesses. Researchers separately carried out 18 interviews with representatives of international organizations, journalists, as well as other informed sources. Five separate research missions to Sudan in December 2020 and January, May and June 2021 allowed researchers to interview Tigrayan refugees. Finally, researchers conducted remote telephone interviews between March 2021 and March 2022, primarily with Tigrayans displaced from Western Tigray in the region and to Sudan, as well as with residents from the Amhara region.

To provide as broad a perspective as possible, researchers interviewed people from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds, ages, genders, and geographical areas in the Western Tigray Zone.

Researchers sought to identify safe locations to carry out interviews both remotely and in person and assessed the security concerns and risks facing interviewees before proceeding with the interviews. Interviews with victims were conducted in English, Tigrinya, and Amharic, with the help of several different and trusted interpreters where needed. Researchers informed all interviewees of the purpose of the research and the ways in which the information would be used and offered anonymity for their reporting. While all interviewees quoted or mentioned in this report agreed that their statements could be used, many expressed extreme fear and anxiety about potential reprisals should their identity be revealed.

Names and other identifying details have been withheld to protect interviewees' security, and in the footnotes to this report, all interviewees, unless otherwise noted, have been assigned pseudonyms. None of the interviewees received financial or other incentives for speaking with us, and all spoke voluntarily, giving informed consent to be interviewed and being made aware of their right to discontinue the interview at any point. In 15 cases, researchers interviewed children between the ages of 10 and 17, where we sought to obtain the consent of a parent or relative in the case of younger children and identified service providers to assist children in cases of referrals. Where appropriate and feasible, researchers identified and referred interviewees to service providers to obtain appropriate psychosocial and medical support.

The reliability and credibility of each source was carefully assessed. Researchers probed the veracity of their statements by corroborating information from several other sources and determining consistency with overall patterns that emerged during the research, including with other types of evidence. Individual cases or incidents used in the report are based on at least one credible source of direct information, which in most cases was independently corroborated by at least one other credible source of information. Reports of major incidents are based on multiple accounts from witnesses and victims, allowing for in-depth fact-finding and detailed event reconstruction. In some cases, researchers carried out follow-up interviews with the same witness for further clarification.

Researchers also reviewed medical reports, and forensic analysis, as well as satellite imagery, videos and photographs that provided direct information concerning incidents, or which corroborated accounts of military presence, destruction, looting, and executions. Due to the communication restrictions detailed above, there were few videos and photographs to analyze. Researchers conducted targeted searches on social media platforms using keywords in Amharic, Tigrinya, and English to find relevant information, as well as received videos and photographs directly from sources. Researchers verified five videos sent directly to researchers and six videos posted to Facebook or YouTube used in this report. Researchers identified exactly where they were filmed - through matching landmarks visible in the footage with landmarks visible from satellite imagery, when they were recorded - by analyzing relevant metadata, timestamps from social media platforms, witness interviews and changes in the built environment visible in satellite imagery - and what they showed, including through an evaluation of whether it captured situations in their entirety. Other relevant material included academic articles, books, media and government reports, court documents, official government decisions, and information collected by other credible experts and independent human rights investigators that could corroborate details or patterns of abuse described in the report.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch solicited responses from the federal government, the Amhara regional government, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, regarding this report's findings. On February 25, 2022, we sent letters to the Ethiopian federal government, federal agencies, including the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), and the Refugee and Returnee Services (RRS), as well as Amhara regional authorities, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front summarizing our findings and seeking a response.

At the time of publication, only the Amhara Regional Government had responded. We have included their response as an annex to this report.

The administrative boundaries of Western Tigray have been contested for decades.

Factors Contributing to Rising Tensions in Western Tigray

Redrawing of Administrative Boundaries in the 1990s

After securing control of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital city, the EPRDF sought to address longstanding issues around identity, as well as the relationship of the central state to various peoples and regions in the periphery.

Tensions and Violence Around Identity, Self-Rule, State Power, and Borders

Settlement Patterns and Government Land Policies in the Contested Areas

a. Settlement Patterns in Western Tigray in the 1990s and 2000s

From the 1990s onwards, the settlement patterns and policies adopted by the TPLF-led EPRDF in the Welkait, Kafta Humera, and Tsegede districts fueled grievances and tensions, particularly among Walqayte and Amhara communities in the districts.

b. Later Settlement Patterns

Protests and Rising Amhara Nationalism

Increased Displacement and Identity-Based Attacks in 2016-2020

The Transitional Period, 2018-2020

Following years of protests and interparty discord, the EPRDF, led by Hailemariam Desalegn, agreed to reform in early 2018. In April,Ethiopia's parliament selected Abiy Ahmed as prime minister. The government continued the reform process initiated by Abiy's predecessor, including the return of exiled political parties; the release of opposition politicians, activists, and journalists in detention; and the revision of repressive laws. But security force abuses continued, as did communal violence, at times manifesting along ethnic lines and often resulting from historical grievances and competition over resources and land. Violence resulted in millions displaced in 2018-2020.

a. Rise and Role of Informal Militias and Regional Special Forces

In 2018, the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) - a partner within the EPRDF coalition - appointed Brig. Gen. Asaminew Tsige, a proponent of Amhara nationalism, to head the Amhara region's administrative and security apparatus. This role empowered him to oversee and control the region's security organs, including the ASF, the regular police, and the militia.[78]Asaminew built up regional security forces and reportedly "formalized and empowered former bandits and rebel fighters into the Fano structure; reintegrated previously dismissed members of the national defense forces and trained and armed tens of thousands of militias."

At times, some Fanos came into conflict with the security forces, leading in some cases to armed clashes.On March 24, 2020, the Gondar City Security Council denounced Fanos' involvement in illegal activities including kidnapping, killing, confiscation of property, and extortion of businesspeople, among other crimes. The council gave Fanos until March 29, 2020, to surrender or face law enforcement actions. One Fano leader said in response that the government was trying to dismantle the Fanos organization and assimilate it to the government security structure. He vowed not to disarm until the demands of the Amhara people were answered, especially the return of "Welkait, Raya, Dera and Metekel borders" to the Amhara region.

Situation Prior to the Current Conflict

The Ethiopian military offensive in Western Tigray that began on November 4, 2020, against forces affiliated with the region's ruling party - the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) - was carried out with the direct support and close coordination of Amhara Special Forces (ASF), Amhara militias, and Fano armed groups from the Amhara region, and in some areas, Eritrean forces.

State Security Forces and Armed Groups in Western Tigray

Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF)[108]: Ethiopia's armed forces, which consist of ground and air forces, reportedly had about 140,000 active personnel at the start of the conflict. The prime minister in Ethiopia is also commander-in-chief other ENDF. On November 8, 2020, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced the appointment of Ethiopia's current chief of staff of the army, Gen. Berhanu Jula Gelalcha. In a November 30, 2020, speech before parliament, Abiy acknowledged the role of ENDF army generals, General Belay and General Meressa, in leading offensives in Western Tigray.

Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF): Eritrea's forces are comprised of three branches, including the air force, army, and navy. Eritrea's president is the commander-in-chief of the EDF.

Amhara Regional Special Forces (ASF) ("Liyu Hail" in Amharic): A regional paramilitary police force under the command of Brig. Gen. Tefera Mamo since July 2021. In February 2022, the Amhara regional government replaced Brig. Gen. Tefera as Commander of the ASF with Maj. Gen. Mesele Belete, who was serving as the head of the Amhara regional state peace and security bureau.

Fanos (loosely translated as "patriot" from Amharic): Armed groups perceived as both an Amhara nationalist movement and as an irregular militia group, with some members affiliated with the Amhara security forces.

Militias: Armed security that are not part of the regional police force, but which have historically played a role in Ethiopia's internal security at the local, community level. Local militias from both the Amhara and Tigray region were active in the initial fighting. Amhara militias came to be in control of areas and towns that were captured initially by Ethiopian federal and allied forces. Local militias in Tigray, including Tigrayan militias and militias also identifying as Walqayte have also been involved in abuses in Western Tigray following the outbreak of armed conflict.

Salugs: Salug is a term used to refer to laborers, bandits, and smugglers in Sudan and in some parts of Ethiopia, including Western Tigray.

Timeline of November Fighting in Western Tigray

November 8: ENDF and allied forces fighting against Tigrayan forces in Banat (near the border with Sudan) and Nugarad.

November 9: Massacre in Mai Kadra. Indiscriminate shelling of Humera from Eritrean border. ENDF in control of Adi Remets.

Indiscriminate Attacks

The settlement of Division, near the Amhara regional border, and which was established to host retired and demobilized TPLF fighters and those with disabilities, many of them in their 60s-and 70s, came under a barrage of artillery.On November 6, Desta, a 50-year-old farmer, witnessed heavy shelling damaging homes and killing residents. "Shelling hit houses, sorghum storages, and shops in the town center," he said. Berhanea local accountant, saw his neighbor's two sons killed, and their house, located behind the commercial bank, damaged. "They were dead, hit by the shelling [at the entrance] of their compound, killing the people and the sheep," he said. Hailemariam,a doctor working in nearby Meareg hospital said he had to treat "around 12 . unarmed civilians, two were children . with bullet injuries."

Ethiopian forces, accompanied by Amhara Special Forces and militia, continued to capture towns and villages surrounding Division and near the Sudanese border, before making their way north, toward the Eritrean border. On November 9 and 10, heavy artillery fire from Eritrea hit the town of Humera, in the tri-border area with Sudan and Eritrea. The shelling struck homes and businesses, killed and wounded residents, and forced scores to flee to Sudan, to neighboring towns in Tigray, and to rural areas surrounding Humera. Abadi, a 26-year-old driver, was in kebele 02 and sought shelter amid storm drains and bridges when the shelling began. When he returned to his neighborhood, he saw the bodies of his neighbors, Ato Teklu and his son Goitom, who had been killed by shells that struck their home, as well as the body of a 3- or 4-year-old girl from another family, he said. "Their bodies were scattered so we wrapped them with tarpaulin and buried them in one hole."

Doctors working at Humera's Kahsay Aberra hospital began receiving a stream of patients throughout the day on November 9. Seyoum, a doctor working at the hospital, explained:

"[We]started to get lots of injuries, blast injuries, burns, lost limbs, in groups of five, ten. We did triage. We saw 23 dead. Around 80 injured. A mortar shell fell right outside the emergency entrance."

Extrajudicial Executions

a. Unlawful Killings on Entering Towns

In 11 towns in Western Tigray, Ethiopian soldiers, Amhara Special Forces, and militias, entering towns with little resistance, fired weapons, and shot at civilians. As Ethiopian government forces and allied Amhara forces entered Adebai via the main road on November 11, 2020, "People were panicked and began to run," recalledHailay, a 30-year-old animal trader from the town. Residents - including women and children - were frequently fired on without warning and killed. "A young woman tried to run when the Ethiopian military shot at her from a distance," Zemariamsaid. "There was also a mentally ill person [person with a mental health condition]. They shot him. It seemed random. I did not hear any commands." Ethiopian soldiers shot at Tsegay, a 42-year-old bajaj (motor rickshaw) driver as he fled on his vehicle with his 11-year-old son, fatally wounding the boy. Tsegay said:

In Division, five residents described how at least 17 men, ranging in age from their 20s to their 70s, were killed in the neighborhood of Dedebit on November 6, after it was captured by Ethiopian and allied Amhara forces. Tesfay Teklu, a 60-year-old man, was among those killed."His wife was sick so he couldn't leave home," explained Desta. "[Tesfay] was on the doorstep and immediately put his hands up. One Fano struck him with a machete on the side of his neck and he fell. Then they hit him with stones, and he died." Teame, from Division, reported that he found the bodies of Berhe, and a man known as "Jamaica," both of whom worked as security guards at a storage house, shortly after he fled the shooting. Other residents recalled seeing their bodies and burying them.

b. Extrajudicial Executions of TPLF Officials and Suspected Tigrayan Fighters

Once they took control of at least seven towns, Ethiopian federal forces and Amhara forces worked together to interrogate, detain, and sometimes summarily execute men suspected of being TPLF fighters or sympathizers. A farmer, 50, in Division, recalled that he saw two Fano fighters and an Ethiopian soldier kill Haile, a nurse at the Meareg hospital, after accusing him of taking medicines to the TPLF: "They . tied his hands at the back with a rope and led him out of the compound. . I heard gunshots. After some minutes, I went with three others and found Haile's body on the road, about 100-150 meters away from the hospital. He had been shot in the back."

Ethiopian soldiers "shot at people running, those wearing military boots, those wearing khaki," said Hailay, a farmer in Adebai." He said the federal forces, working together with Fanos, killed his neighbor Gerezighar Araye and his son Goitom:

c. Deliberate Targeting of Prominent Figures and Business Owners

Ethiopian and allied forces extrajudicially executed prominent community leaders and local business owners. At times, non-Tigrayan local residents helped identify prominent individuals in the community. For example, on November 10, a wealthy farmer named Isaias was driving his tractor on the bridge on the main road out of Rawyan towards Baeker and Mai Kadra when Ethiopian troops and Fano militia stopped him. According to three witnesses, one town resident identified Isaias. Tesfatsion recalled that the resident reported Isaias as "exploitative" and "hating the Amharas." "A Fano hit [Isaias] on the head with a machete and he fell to the ground. Other Fanos hit him too," said Merhawi, who watched the killing from his home. "There were about 15 Fanos around him but not all hit him. Then they left, and he stayed lying on the ground."

Fano and other militias killed Tesfaye, a shoe seller in Dansha known for his charity work, outside his workplace, near Saint Mikael church, saidBerhane, who witnessed the attack."First, they struck his head with a machete. His brain was coming out," he said. "There were a lot of them, and they surrounded him. They dragged him by his legs, holding onto his feet. After they dragged him some distance, they left him there. His brain was completely out of his head."

Burning and Destruction of Neighborhoods

The Mai Kadra Massacre and its Aftermath

Tensions between neighbors and residents in Mai Kadra, which had steadily grown for several years, surged in the initial days of the war. News of the imminent advance of Ethiopian federal forces and allied forces, and of attacks by Amhara and Fano militia on neighboring towns south of Mai Kadra, created an atmosphere of intense fear among Tigrayans. On the morning of November 9, tensions rose sharply following news that the Ethiopian military and allied forces were several kilometers from the town after having routed Tigrayan forces. Tigrayan youth began carrying out neighborhood searches, monitoring newcomers in the town. By the afternoon, Amhara daily workers opportunistically looted Tigrayan businesses. The rising tensions caused many Tigrayans and Amhara to hide in their homes or flee to the countryside. Beginning at 3 p.m. and continuing into the evening, Tigrayan men and youth with knives, machetes, and axes, beat, stabbed, and hacked Amhara residents, killing scores and injuring about 100. By evening, armed Amharas also attacked Tigrayan residents in town.

After Ethiopian military forces and allied Amhara security forces and militias captured the town by 10 a.m. on November 10, these forces targeted the remaining Tigrayan residents in a brutal wave of revenge killings, arbitrary detentions, pillage, and eventual mass expulsion - a pattern that would repeat against Tigrayan communities across the Western Tigray Zone in the year that followed.

a. Background

b. Rising Tensions

Tigrayan, Walqayte, and Amhara residents complained that administrators did little to curb acts of violence and grievances over the unequal distribution of land and took measures that contributed to local tensions. Abrehet, a 70-year-old Tigrayan woman explained that the unequal treatment began as early as the 1990s: "The [federal government] gave Tigrayan families and households two or three hectares of farmland. But Walqayte and Amhara farmers had much more, like 20-30 hectares, sometimes over 50 hectares." Tensions began to grow, however, in 2015. A 43-year-old Walqayte farmer said he joined the Welkait Identity Committee after his land was taken away by administrators. "They took 20 hectares from me and 20 hectares from Eyerus. We were farming the land until (2016)." Haben, a Tigrayan farmer, criticized corrupt land practices after 2018, but blamed administrators he said were linked to the federal government for granting Walqayte people more land: "A Tigrayan would get two hectares, while a Walqayte person would get five hectares of land," he said.[206]

In June 2019,Hiruy, a Walqayte resident, said that clashes between Tigrayan and Walqayte residents mainly involved the use of "stones and sticks," but at times also weapons, and that property was occasionally destroyed. On June 19, 2019, Tigrayan youth and residents looted homes in the Bole neighborhood, where Walqayte predominately lived. "It was the youth that did this, but they were accompanied and protected by the militia, special force, and police," added Zelalem.

A 21-year-old Tigrayan resident, explained that such disputes were a "normal" occurrence at the time. He recalled how"Amhara and Tigrayan salugs [laborers] did not like each other.

c. Mai Kadra at the Onset of the War

d. November 9

On the morning of November 9, residents began their daily routine - heading to work in the fields or in town. Yehansu, a teacher, awoke at 7 a.m. and was eating breakfast at a restaurant in the neighborhood of Gijet when he saw "injured Tigrayan and ENDF soldiers loaded on tractors . also tired Tigrayan fighters coming to Mai Kadra" from the front. A 15-year-old grade 8 student, who was excited to be back in class that week after several months of school closures due to the Covid-19 pandemic, said: "Around fourth period, I could hear boom, boom [at a distance]. Our teacher told us to just go back home." Araya, whoworked as a daily laborer, was heading to the nearby farmland that morning when he saw other laborers return with their tractors towards the town. "I was afraid because I could hear gunshots in every direction," he said.

Around noon, a58-year-old Tigrayan priestwho lived near Abune Aregawi, a church that lies north of Hawelty square and close to Gimb Sefer,encountered a Tigrayan laborer fleeing from Abderafi. The priest recounted that the laborer warned him it was time to "escape for [their] lives," after he witnessed Fano and Walqyate militia kill his friend in farmland near Mai Kadra and said that "others coming after them would steal and loot." By then residents, particularly those living on the edges of Mai Kadra, noticed people fleeing from the center of town, warning others to do the same.

By then, the climate of intense distrust between communities and perceptions of imminent threat had turned Mai Kadra into a tinderbox.

Biniyam, an Amhara resident, was also near the square and witnessed a large crowd give chase. He said:

They were chasing the Amharas saying "Thieves! Thieves!" They [the Tigrayans] were carrying different implements like gejera [machetes]. When they were chasing, the Amharas were trying to protect themselves using stones. They [Tigrayans] were beating and attacking. The situation was not good. The Amhara residents then understood they were attacking each and every Amhara. Rather than be killed, the Amharas gathered together. In each house, they said let us come together and defend ourselves. Tigrayans came from different areas and were insulting us, calling us "Amhara donkeys." The Amhara daily laborers were captured at the roundabout. We do not know where they took them.... Then the [Tigrayan militias] fired bullets ... and ordered us to enter our homes. The Amharas that had gathered dispersed.

e. The First Killings

Several witnesses and survivors interviewed, as well as media reports, described how Tigrayan seasonal workers, local militias, and armed youth killed Amhara and Walqayte residents and laborers on the street and during house-to-house searches in Gimb Sefer.

Satellite imagery of Mai Kadra recorded between November 9 and 10 (11:17 a.m. to 11:11 a.m.) and analyzed by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, shows visible damage and burning to a cluster of homes in the Gimb Sefer neighborhood, about 200 meters southeast of the main intersection at Hawelty square. Satellite imagery recorded on November 11 shows additional damaged houses in the Gimb Sefer neighborhood.

Biniyam, an ethnic Amhara,was hiding alongside his brother and around 35 other laborers in the corrugated iron sheets of their roof. His brother's wife and three children, including an infant, were in the home. Biniyam said that a group of what he estimated to be 40 people repeatedly came looking for his brother, eventually killing him as he watched:

We saw the [attackers] moving around, killing along the street. In our area, human beings were chopped like trees with traditional implements like gejera [machetes].. They approached our house. The children inside were crying.. My sister-in-law begged them not to kill her or her children, and they left.

When the group of attackers returned, her husband was unable to tolerate the shouts and cries of the children and came down from the roof. Biniyam recalled:

A 29-year-old Amhara seasonal worker was sitting outside at a cafe in Gimb Sefer, around 4:30 p.m., when he witnessed Tigrayan laborers and residents gather and attack a young man. He said:

We were sitting outside at a tea shop ... when I saw them hitting the young man with an axe. I begged them to shoot him rather than kill him with the axe. When they came for us, we closed the door, but they broke it. We jumped to another house, but they kept following us. We could hear people screaming for help.

The day laborer added: "Militias were assisting them. They weren't protecting us."

Violence appeared to subside around Hawelty square and the center of town and residents returning to town around 5 p.m. recalled seeing a large number of bodies in the area. Amanuelentered Mai Kadra and saw several bodies near thesquare, in Bole, Gimb Sefer, and near the beer shops in Ketena 4. A 30-year-old health worker returning to Mai Kadra that afternoon saw"the road to the health center from the Kela [checkpoint] was strewn with dead bodies."

Tewolde, a 65-year-old farmer from Rawyan, remembered entering Mai Kadra at sunset, and was unaware of the massacre occurring in the town:

f. November 10

g. Immediate Aftermath

Bodies lay outside for several days.Tadesse, a Tigrayan farmer, 60, corroborated Tilahun's account that the arriving federal and Amhara forces told them not to bury the dead. A burial committee was established, he said, but Tigrayans killed in his neighborhood were dumped elsewhere: "After three days the forces loaded the bodies on a tractor and took them outside of town. I saw them in a pile west of the town. These were [Tigrayan] neighbors I saw being killed."[289]

Several witnesses provided similar accounts of bodies being carried away on tractors. Senait, a Tigrayan woman in Kebele 02 said: "When I went out, I saw around 20 to 40 dead bodies. They had been hit with axes and knives. I saw Agew residents [an ethnic group inhabiting Ethiopia and Eritrea] gathering the bodies and putting them in a tractor," She added, "This was around the big shop. The dead bodies were mainly of young men, ages 17 to 20. I couldn't recognize them. Their faces were covered with blood."[291]

Residents seeking shelter at the church or initially with Ethiopian military forces also witnessed a collection process whereby bodies were taken away using tractors.[292]

Terhasfound shelter in Abune Aregawi church for a few days. She said the funerals of those killed on November 9 took place days later, between November 13 and 16, when bodies were buried in mass graves in the church graveyard or covered with soil in a dry riverbed near a petrol station on the way to Humera. By then the stench of decomposing bodies lingered in the air of the town. She said:

h. Revenge Attacks and Extrajudicial Executions

The Ethiopian federal forces, Amhara Special Forces, and militias responded to the violence carried out against Amhara and the Walqayte residents and laborers in Mai Kadra by targeting the broader Tigrayan population in a wave of killings, arbitrary detentions, and looting.

As in other towns in Western Tigray, local residents assisted in the killings, helping security forces by identifying Tigrayan residents. "There were informants pointing people out: people who ran banks, people who had large farms," saidTesfatsion, a 45-year-old woman farmer.[299]

Terhas, while seeking shelter at the Abune Aregawi church, noticed Ethiopian solders working with non-Tigrayan residents and daily laborers to identify three Tigrayan residents they knew. She said she saw the soldiers lead the three men away and subsequently heard gunfire and screams. She explains how she later witnessed killings by a mix of Amhara Special Forces and Ethiopian federal forces:

Tadesse, a 60-year-old Tigrayan farmer living in Kebele 02 witnessed what he described as Fano militia and forces wearing beige uniforms - apparent Amhara Special Forces - bring two groups of people to an open area, meters away from his home, and shoot them. He said:

They shot them with continuous automatic fire. I didn't know them. They weren't from Mai Kadra [town]. They were 20 agricultural laborers.... They ordered residents not to bury them and not to go to the bodies. They were eventually buried near the house in two common graves.

As a religious figure,Berhethought he would be safe when government forces took over the town. Hearing gunshots in his neighborhood, he recalls seeing Fanomilitiamen kill people at a distance:

They were walking in a group. Whoever they saw in the street, they would kill. They called over one guy standing near a building and shot him in the neck.... I took my motorcycle and started riding towards Hamdayet [20 kilometers away]. They were shooting at me as I fled, with a weapon called a "Bren" [light machine gun]. I put my head down and bullets were flying over my head."

Security forces stopped Tigrayans who were fleeing. After seeing people killed on the street, a 23-year-old trader tried to escape. He described a patrol of Amhara Special Forces stopping him near Rawyan, attacking him with a knife, and bringing him back to town. He said:

i. Ensuing Abuses

On the same day, around 9 a.m., a48-year-old housewifedescribed returning to townafter havingfled the initial violence when she was stopped by a group of around eight people, armed with machetes, who shouted at her. Hoping to protect herself, she claimed she was from the Amhara region. The attackers believed her and let her go. When she entered her home, she saw that her property and livestock had been taken. She recalled finding the bodies of two brothers she knew from another family, and the dismembered body of her husband, a former militiaman and member of the local administration, lying near the gate of their home in Ketena 02. "I had left town on November 9.. [B]y then my husband was out of Mai Kadra at the farm.... I think he was killed when he came back to check on us. His body had marks of cuts by sharp objects. He was dismembered at his hip and neck . I was not allowed to pick or bury his dead body. And there were many other dead bodies like him. The Salug were watching the dead bodies."

j. Roundups and Detentions

A Tigrayan farmer, recalled being arrested by three armed men in civilian clothes, two of whom were farmworkers he knew, who accused him of taking part in the killing of Amharas. He said:

Alongside other people,Kindihaftisaid she was held for a day in a bar used as a makeshift detention site at first; Ethiopian forces subsequently took her to the Abadi building where she was detained for over a month. Similarly,Mekonnenrecounted staying with a Walqayte neighbor who refused to hand him over to Amhara militiamen and instead took him to a hotel in the center of town that was under Ethiopian military control, thinking he would be protected. The Ethiopian military forces, however, in turn marched him and 40 others to the Abadi storage, where he was detained for nearly a month. He described the conditions there:

The number of people arrested increased from day to day. There was one Tigrayan they forced to register all the people. And I asked him how many we were, and he said 9,000 people. So, we were almost 9,000 people.

At one point, Terhas continued, the guards began to separate detainees who were mixed or had Amhara spouses:

The detainees of the Abadi warehouse were eventually deported to central Tigray ( see Forced Displacement, Transfers and "Ethnic Cleansing" section).

Response of the Amhara Regional Government

The letters that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch sent to a range of federal, regional authorities and to TPLF officials included our findings regarding the events in Mai Kadra and requested information regarding the status of any investigations into the killings in the town. None of the federal agencies and the TPLF officials whom we contacted responded, but we did receive a response from the Amhara Regional Government, which described the events of Mai Kadra as "dreadful crimes committed by the . TPLF."196 The Amhara authorities claimed that "members of Samri (youth groups assigned for the massacre), with the help of the Tigrayan police and militia . slaughtered more than 1,600 innocents" at Mai Kadra. Their figure, however, does not tally with victim counts found in the Joint EHRC - OHCHR Investigation Report and in the reporting of the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission. The Amhara Regional Government also declined to respond to our specific questions concerning the events of Mai Kadra and was silent regarding reprisal attacks targeting Tigrayan residents of Mai Kadra.

Within a few weeks of the capture of towns in Western Tigray, Amhara security forces and newly appointed authorities began to take various measures to drive Tigrayans from their homes.

Establishment of New Authorities

After the Ethiopian military passed through tabia (administrative neighborhood) Irob, a village near Ruwassa, leaving Fano militias in control, a Bahir Dar official arrived and declared to residents that the village belonged to Amhara, and was placed under the administration of the Amhara regional government, according to Andom, a 36-year-old teacher in town:

The new authorities collected weapons from local militiamen and, in some places, redistributed them to local allies. Andomsaid that in tabia Irob, the "Bahir Dar official" at a meeting gave an ultimatum to local Tigrayan militias to lay down their arms. The administration then "started giving the guns to most of the Walqayte people." In Adebai, the organizers "said any militia found to have weapons should turn them in," during the first town-hall meeting after the town changed hands, recalled Zeray. Amhara Special Forces in Sheglil also collected weapons from around 20 militias at a meeting. "When the Fano first came into the city, they didn't have firearms," said Aregawi, a 60-year-old farmer. After one week, he said, ASF "handed the weapons to the Fano who started going door-to-door looting."

The agenda [of the meeting] was very dangerous because it was about Tigray and how we can move Tigray people out of the zone beyond the
Tekeze bridge.

Aklile, a 30-year-old Tigrayan farmer

The new kebele 1 administrator, he said, made a speech announcing the administration's decision to deport Tigrayans:

Discriminatory Restrictions

Language Restrictions

Gebremariam, a 14-year-old boy, described how he was stopped at a checkpoint on a road exiting Rawyan. He said:

Identification Cards

Dawit said, "The old ID said: 'Tigray region,' but the new ones said the town was [in the] Amhara region..The new ID brought problems for Tigrayans":

Confiscation of Personal Documents

Other Restrictions

Blocking Freedom of Movement

Beginning in late November 2020, the Ethiopian federal forces, Amhara Special Forces and militias including Fanos frequently stopped civilians from crossing the border to Sudan by detaining, robbing, beating, and killing them. Ethiopian soldiers often told people to return home, in an apparent attempt to present a veneer of normalcy. Witnesses said that Amhara forces and militias told Tigrayans to go beyond the Tekeze River towards eastern Tigray.

By January 2021, Ethiopian federal soldiers were no longer visible in Dima, the last stretch of the journey for Tigrayans fleeing to Sudan. But refugees in Sudan describe groups of Amhara Special Forces and Fanos waiting in ambush to intercept people on the move. Some of the people fleeing were detained on the way or turned back repeatedly by forces in the Dima area.

A 24-year-old from Shire said two of his friends were killed when his group came under attack by Amhara forces near Saint Michael church, on the outskirts of Humera and roughly five kilometers east of Dima:

The patrols posed a threat to any Tigrayan in the area, even those who were not seeking to cross the border. Hagos, 20, was one of a small group of cattle keepers, living with their animals out in the fields of Banat, an agricultural area near the border. On January 16, 2021, he and other cattle keepers came across a patrol of Amhara and Walqayte men in a sand-colored camouflage uniform:

We were about to cross the river.... They shot and our cattle got scared and started running. And then they shot again and then we were scared.... The soldiers came, arrested us. Some of them said: "Those are juntas, supporters of TPLF!" ... And some of them said: "Kill them!" We were with our cattle and then my friend fled, went down to the river... We were together in the river; the water was up to our waist. First, they shot him, he fell in the water... and the water took him... I ran immediately out of the water and lay on the ground ... I thought they were gone, but when I got up, he shot at me, hit my arm.... I kept running across the river to the Sudanese border. He shot at me twice but couldn't hit me.

Harassment, Threats, and Intimidation

Many Tigrayans said they faced harassment in their daily lives from forces loyal to the Amhara region, which they believed was aimed at terrorizing Tigrayans to leave the areas. They described how Amhara Special Forces and Fano and Walqayte militias harassed them through a variety of what interviewees called "techniques": throwing stones at houses, shooting rifles in the air, and taunting Tigrayans with loudspeakers. These forces also used the opportunity of daily encounters with Tigrayans to beat and threaten them.

a. Daily Harassment

Tesfa, the 60-year-old farmer from Baeker, said the gunshots at night were just one of many "techniques to make you feel uncomfortable living there." He mentioned other such tactics:

Every night. stones were thrown on houses. Most of the walls are made of steel, so when they throw stones against the wall, it's loud and scary. That means they are around. Every night. Every single night. And that's terrifying, it makes you feel uncomfortable and hate living there, so you deport yourself.

Tigrayans trying to go about their daily lives faced threats and the risk of a violent encounter.

The impunity militias enjoyed from local authorities created an environment in which even ordinary residents felt empowered to threaten their Tigrayan neighbors. A 37-year-old sewa (beer) seller in May Humer village near May Gaba received threats from Walqyate residents while at work. She explained: "Walqayte would come to my house and would say, 'Why are you in our land? We expect you to leave."

Tsega, a 24-year-old woman from tabia Irob, recalled: "People were beaten every day, every time." She recalled being assaulted by the operator of the mill where she went to mill her sorghum:

Akbret, a 38-year-old woman from Humera, said that her landlord's son threatened her with death. "I didn't have any issues" with her landlord, she said:

"They were calling my little girl, who is 4, a junta," recalled a 33-year-old from Baeker, adding:

b. Ultimatums

Between November and March, in at least 11 towns and villages, Tigrayan households received written ultimatums with deadlines to leave from Amhara security forces and militias, often alongside death threats.

Depriving Tigrayans of Means of Survival

It seemed they were trying to kill us slowly. What did we have to wait for? There was nothing to live for and survive. So why would we stay?

-Mehari, a 70-year-old farmer from Division, June 2021

Looting of Property

Security forces looted four of Division's churches, including Abune Aregawi, St. Gabriel, St. Mary, and St. Michael's church, according to Berihu, who said:

The pattern of pillage and looting of Tigrayan property continued after towns and villages came firmly under the control of new authorities and security forces. In Adebai, "the Fanos started looting" after the Ethiopian federal forces left, said Hailay, a 30-year-old animal trader from Adebai. "They were looking for gold, they were even picking out the clothes they liked and didn't like."In Humera, ASF and Fanos plundered homes and businesses. "They were even taking curtains from houses," said a 33-year-old civil servant in the town. Residents from Adi Goshu, Ruwassa, May Deli, Bereket, and Korarit described comparable mass looting in these locations.

On December 16, 2020, one witness recorded the damage of property as he drove south between Dansha and May Deli towns. At one point in the video, a man can be seen bent over picking up debris left from the foundations of a house with a cart nearby. Shortly after, a man has parked his donkey cart while he is walking through the destroyed remnants of houses. The entire video films approximately 1.7 kilometers of the road and approximately 16 destroyed houses are seen on one side of the road. High resolution satellite imagery from November 18, 2020, shows the roofs visible at the start of the video still intact. By December 14, high resolution satellite imagery shows the roofs are no longer there.

Looting of Crops, Livestock, and Restrictions on Access to Farmland

The pillage of harvests and livestock often marked the first of a series of actions by security forces in Western Tigray that left Tigrayan communities without access to and the means to secure food, medicine, or other sources of livelihood. The timing of the attacks - during harvest season (November-December) - and its duration - continuing long after the takeover of towns - exacerbated food insecurity for Tigrayan residents.

Four Tigrayans in other villages separately provided similar accounts of militias and security forces waiting for farmers to collect or harvest the sorghum before stealing their crops. "They completely looted the land," explained Hadgu, a farmer from Division. "We cut the sorghum together with other residents. Then, after we cut the sorghum, Fano [militiamen] came up to us and forced us to leave and took the cut sorghum and processed it themselves." In farmland surrounding Mai Kadra, Rawyan, and Adi Goshu, militias were free to harvest the land themselves.In early December,asAsmeret, 70, hid with her family, she could see Amhara militia and laborers come to a farmland near Mai Kadra and loot the harvest:

Amhara forces also prevented Tigrayans from harvesting their land or grazing their livestock using threats and, in some cases, violence, according to numerous Tigrayan residents from eight different villages and towns. "I was in my farmland with a young herder when the Fano and ASF came. They pointed a gun at me, and they beat me, too," said Abel,from Dansha. "They gave me an option: 'Do you want your life or your animals?' I chose my life, and they took my animals.... I was left with one camel and donkey and cart." Fano militia also looted all 20 cattle belonging to the family of a 38-year-oldfarmer from Sheglil in the first week after the capture of the village. "They were taken in front of my eyes. The cattle lived with us, in our compound.... The armed Fano threatened us.. We don't have any other possessions, as we are poor ... they just took our cattle ... They accused us of being Woyane thieves."

In late December 2020, over a dozen Amhara militia, and in this instance Eritrean soldiers, threatened a group of 13 Tigrayans harvesting their crop in fields near Adebai, before shooting them and killing 12, said two witnesses. Hayelom, a 54-year-old farmer, described what happened:

We sent a man from our group to bring water from the river when the forces [approached]. [They] asked what we were doing. [We] said: "Harvesting sorghum." [One] said: "This is Amhara land, and you have no right to be here and to harvest the sorghum."

I had 23 cows in Division, I had 20 taken, I sold three of them to use money to pay for transport for Shire....We had an animal market in Division and sold them there. The cows usually sold for 20,000 Ethiopian Birr. I sold them for 5,000 Ethiopian Birr for each .... We didn't have a choice. If we kept the animals, they would come one night and take them for free.

New Authorities' Response to Looting and Pillage

According to Neguse, an Adi Goshu administrator issued permission papers for the transport of pillaged goods out of the town:

Denial of Services and Discriminatory Distribution of Aid

a. Lack of International Humanitarian Presence, Oversight in Western Tigray

b. Government Assistance in Western Tigray

Though there was also limited public information available on food distributions and on who had access to food assistance in Western Tigray between January and March 2021-at the height of Tigrayans' forcible displacement from the area (see Forced Displacements, Transfers, and "Ethnic Cleansing" Section). The little information that was available, however, highlighted a dire humanitarian and human rights situation.

The lack of independent monitoring meant aid agencies and donors had no real understanding of how much aid was in fact distributed. As one donor country official put it:

Timeline of Publicly Reported Food Distributions in Tigray in 2020 and 2021

December 2020: NDRMC distributed 5,600 metric tons of food relief benefiting 332,000 conflict-affected people in Tigray (Western, Northwestern, Southern, Southeastern Zones) and Amhara (North Gondar Zone) Regions.

January 2021: In mid-January NDRMC reportedly delivered food to beneficiaries in Western Tigray.

April: One round of food was distributed by the Amhara Regional Government.

June: Local authorities report to UN assessment mission that no food aid had been distributed since February 2021.

July: Amhara regional authorities organize a round of food distribution in the town of Baeker, southeast of Humera.

August: NDRMC reported distribution of 927 metric tons of food to 61,771 people in Mai Kadra, Humera, and Dansha woredas.

c. Denial of Services and Humanitarian Aid

Tsige mentioned a one-time distribution in Dansha town between January and February 2021, but the aid was refused to Tigrayan residents in nearby settlements of Division, including in Ambagala village where she was from:

The Kunama [an ethnic minority in Tigray] were given 15 kilograms for each person, but Tigrayans didn't get anything. The farmers in Adebai, the Tigrayans, went to the authorities and said: "Everything we had was taken, so why are we not getting any aid?" And the authorities said: "Don't come back asking these same questions." The people in power said Tigrayans had a good summer, so they didn't need any aid, but the Kunamas got some. I was one of the people registered to get aid, but I didn't get anything... There was an announcement that every resident from Adebai should register for aid, people from Division asked too, those who were living [displaced] there... but they still got nothing.

A farmer in Adi Goshurecalled that a distribution occurred in late May but was denied to Tigrayan residents. "It was a government distribution; they didn't stay long." He added:

They gave all the food to the [local] administration and they left. The administrators then told us: "This doesn't belong to Tigrayans. It belongs to us."So,they didn't distribute anything to us; they kept it for themselves.

In Division, Ethiopian military and Amhara Special Forces and militia also took part in the occupation and looting of the Meareg hospital, affecting the ability of residents to receive care. "Officials from the new zonal administration locked the medicine store of the hospital," said Takele, a staff member who fled from the hospital. "So, patients weren't able to get medicine."[515]

Impact

Cut off from their sources of livelihood, essential services, health care, and food, many Tigrayans felt they had no option but to flee Western Tigray.

For Andom, from Division, the lack of food assistance for Tigrayans in January drove Tigrayans like himself to leave. He said:

Robel, a 40-year-old construction worker, hid in Rawyan, in fear of being targeted for abuse. He arrived in Sudan in late December. "I was extremely hungry, starving, almost dying," he said. "There was one guy with me who kept supporting me. And after we crossed the river [into Sudan], I came to the hospital, and they gave me glucose." Gebreselassie, a67-year-old pensioner in Division, also relied on support from neighbors at first, but that amount was insufficient - as mostly everyone was in a similar state. The lack of food and support forced him to leave. "We were really starving," he said. "We had no stable life, we were [previously] supported by government programs, but after the war broke out, no government [was] supporting us, no international organization. It was hard for us."

There was little work Tigrayans could do to earn a living. Semira, a 21-year-old woman who remained in Rawyan for around five months, said everything had changed: "There are no. facilities for taking classes, getting jobs to make money and help your family, follow your daily life in different ways - financially, economically." "There was no banking, no telephones, our cattle were looted. There was no work," said Andomin the village tabiaIrob, providing a list of the limited options Tigrayans had to survive. "The biggest thing was the lack of food; we didn't have any food to eat." Tesfafrom Baeker said: "If they looted everything you have, you can't survive. If your cattle, your property, your bed, your food [were stolen], it's difficult to live, and they know what they're doing."

Arbitrary Arrests, Mass Detentions, and Torture, November - June 2021

Detention Facilities in Western Tigray

Facilities in which people were detained were controlled by different security forces, including:
Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF):Amhara Special Forces and Militias, including Fano militias:

Prisons

Humera "Bet Hintset" prison

Humera Old prison

Korarit

Police Station

Setit police station, Humera

Kafta Humera/Geter police station, Humera

Adi Remets

Adi Goshu

May Gaba

Fano and Amhara Militias:
Makeshift Sites

Warehouses, and Food Storage

Abadi warehouse, Mai Kadra

Enda Yitbarek warehouse, Humera

Guna warehouse, Humera

Flour mill, Rawyan

Farmers Association Building, Adebai

Schools

Kebele offices

Humera Kebele 02

Rawyan, Kebele 02

Arbitrary Arrests

Some Tigrayans thought they would not face threats, restrictions, and violence from Ethiopian federal forces. Instead, these forces also arrested and abused Tigrayans in their custody. "While taking me to jail in an ENDF vehicle, they asked me why I came back to Humera," said Tsegazeb, a civil servant who recounted his arrest by a group of Ethiopian federal forces and Amhara and Fano militiamen from his home in Humera in early January 2021: "I thought civil servants wouldn't be targeted and that the situation in Humera had improved. [But] they said: 'This is Amhara land; you have no right to be here.'" At least two Tigrayans, who had sought protection at Ethiopian military camps, were transferred over to the new administrators or to Amhara security forces and militia, and later detained in official and unofficial detention sites. One woman said she sought protection at an ENDF camp in mid-November with her baby and father and 98 other Tigrayans. But on November 28, she recalled, "interim administration officials came and said they want to arrest all of us." Alongside the rest of the group and her baby child, she was taken to a police station in Humera: "The ENDF did not protect us ... They just handed us over," she said.

Torture, Ill-Treatment, and Deaths in Custody

According to Aregawi, a 60-year-old beekeeper from Sheglil, on November 17, a week after federal and allied forces took control of the village of Sheglil, around six Amhara Special Forces militiamen entered his home, shouting that the land belonged to Amhara. They took his money and looted his property, he said, before detaining him with his family and a 48-year-old man at a school in the village. The ASF held him there for over a week, repeatedly torturing him.

Aregawi said:

At night, they took us out and beat us. I was beaten every night. The Amhara Special Forces tried to pierce through my finger with a nail. They cut me on my right arm and [on my] back with a scythe - the one you use to cut grass and millet. They said they will destroy Tigray and its men.

A 74-year-old man who was interrogated for a week by Ethiopian federal forces in the Baeker military camp recalled similar abuse:

A 37-year-old shopkeeper described a brutal, almost daily schedule of beatings during his three-month detention at the police station in Humera:

Even if I shout, no one can help. The three could not stop raping me. Though I told them to stop, they call me "junta," and they beat me with a huge stick called "the thieves stick" - it is a plastic tool the police use.

"They kept shooting guns to terrorize us," said Kindihafti,a female detainee held in a makeshift detention site in Mai Kadra for over a month. "I think bullets are cheap for them." Two former detainees said they saw individuals taken away by guards and not returning. "They took people one by one or a few at a time and we never heard what became of them," said Measho, who was held in Humera prison. Haftu, whowas captured by federal soldiers along with friends and held in a military camp near Rawyan in early March 2021, said: "They took one of my friends, Berihu Wereda. They accused him of being a militia. He wasn't different from the rest of us. They wanted to scare us. I have no idea where he is until now."

Mass detentions, killings, and enforced disappearances of detainees in Humera, Adebai, and Rawyan towns increased in July 2021, coinciding with the appearance of dozens of bodies floating downstream into Sudan on the Tekeze River, and escalating again in November 2021. ( See Renewed Roundups and Extrajudicial Executions July -December 2021 section.)

A 45-year-old farmer who said he was detained first in a jail, and then a prison in Humera town over a three-month period, recalled that guards forced detainees and their visiting family members to converse in Amharic, a language that older Tigrayans, and those from rural areas, did not speak or understand well, if at all:

Our families would come to see us, but no visitor was allowed to speak in Tigrinya. Even if you don't speak in Amharic, you were forced to try to speak in Amharic....

The releases were sporadic and, in several cases, made conditional on extortionate payments to security forces. Yirgalem said his group of detainees was freed after [they paid a total of paid] 15,000 ETB ($375): "There was a guy from the diaspora who was in jail with us. He paid half of the price and we paid the rest by selling clothes and cellphones." Detainees from poor backgrounds or who were out of touch with their families risked longer detention. "Sometimes the police would negotiate, saying, 'If you have this money, we can release you,'" recalled a 45-year-old farmer held in Humera prison. "But we had no money," he said. "I know some people who paid 20,000ETB ($500) to be released, others 105,000 ETB ($2625)."

Finally, some detainees were held for longer periods, at times spanning several months before their arranged expulsion from detention sites in Western Tigray to the Tekeze bridge [ see Organized Forced Expulsions section]. For the Tigrayan communities who remained, the pattern of arbitrary detentions and expulsion solidified an atmosphere of oppression that prompted many to leave out of fear of being ethnically targeted for arrest and forcibly transferred. [ see Coerced Departures section.]

Extrajudicial Executions and Mass Killings

Meaza, a 45-year-old woman farmer from Baeker, said that on February 24, 2021, Amharic-speaking gunmen in uniform detained her brother-in-law Beyene while the family was taking refuge in Adebai, and subsequently killed him. She believed that Beyene, a retired soldier and the father of two Tigrayan fighters, was killed as a result of a denunciation:

Elsewhere, Amhara forces appeared to have deliberately shot Tigrayans at random. Berihu, a 17-year-old boy from Division, said that on December 28, 2020, he saw Amhara Special Forces kill a man on the street:

Berihu said that the brother was taken to the Maereg Hospital, but it is not known whether he survived.

Amhara Security Forces and militias in Humera prevented Tigrayans from burying their dead. "They were killing Tigrayans every day. They would kill one or two or three people day," recalled a 67-year-old woman from the town:

Bodies were found on the side of the road at a place called Mazoria, a rural area 10 to 15 kilometers away from Mai Kadra around December 2020, according to Nigisti. She found them as she was walking from Baeker towards Dansha: "I saw dead people around there, maybe 20 to 25." Horrified by the scene, she added: "There were a lot of bodies.... All of them were burned."

Tekeze River Bridge Massacre, January 17, 2021

The situation dramatically changed the following morning. Amhara Special Forces suffered heavy losses in the area after clashing with Tigrayan fighters near the Tekeze River. News of the Amhara battle losses soon reached Adi Goshu. Amhara Special Forces, Walqayte and Amhara residents, as well as werkegnas(artisanal gold miners),thenwent around town, attacking Tigrayans, beating them on the streets and in their houses as they rounded them up, robbed them, and brought them to various detention sites. A 32-year-old farmer, a member of the Kunama ethnic minority in Tigray, said the forces and goldminers specifically targeted Tigrayans in town. "After the battle they came back saying 'Let the Tigrayans leave,' as they beat and arrested people," he said. "I was hiding at home, they didn't target Kunamas." One 19-year-old who ran to Saint Michael church for protection said that he witnessed Amhara Special Forces kill five people near the church.

One of the survivors said the Amhara Special Forces told them to disembark:

Mihretab said that he survived by falling over as the bullets started flying: "I fell immediately because I was in the front." He added:

Mihretabsaid he began praying. He believed that the killers left him alone because they thought he was dead. Kinfe, the 74-year-old man, said he faced another round of shooting:

The forces left rapidly, said the victims who survived the massacre. The survivors found help among sympathetic local residents. Mesfin recalled:

Two months later, the remains could still be seen at the location. A 57-year-old man from Mai Lemin who crossed the Tekeze bridge on March 11, 2021, said:

Researchers were not able to confirm if subsequent killings took place at the same site, or if dead bodies from the January 17 massacre were buried or had been moved at the time of writing.

A 26-year-old man who lost his father in the massacre said:

Gang Rape and Other Sexual Violence

I was with other women; four men raped me. . They insulted me and they urinated on my head. They said you and your race are a foul, toilet-smelling race and should not be on our land. Then was left on my own and stranded for four days.

- Samhal, 30-year-old survivor, May 2021

Blen, a 48-year-old woman from Dansha town, said that on February 7, 2021, Fano gunmen wearing old Ethiopian army uniforms robbed her of her money and took her from her house to rape her:

Jamila, a 27-year-old owner in Dansha, said that in early November, a half-dozen Fano militiamen carrying out neighborhood searches targeting Tigrayans entered her shop while she was working, and raped her in front of her children. She said:

Samhal, 30, tried to flee Baeker toward central Tigray in early November, when Amhara militias apprehended her:

Sexual slavery

Some survivors interviewed were raped while they were held in captivity, in one case for more than a month.

Fasika, a 28-year-old mother of two from Humera, recalls that she was attempting to cross the border to Sudan in mid-December with her two daughters, ages 3 and 5, when ten Amhara militia members apprehended her and forcibly took her to a house nearby. She said:

A farmer in Adi Goshu tried to assist at least three women who had been taken by Amhara militias while trying to cross the Tekeze River to central Tigray. The militiamen raped the women and held them in captivity. The farmer said:

Etsegenet, a 16-year-old from Dansha, said that Fano militia members gang raped her for three days in Adebai town, where she and her family had fled, seeking safety. "My mother sent me to buy injera on the street," she recalled, when three men armed with sticks, machetes, and rifles approached. Two wore uniforms, while one was in civilian clothes. She said:

Forced Displacement, Transfers and "Ethnic Cleansing"

The outbreak of conflict in the Tigray region on November 4, 2020, triggered widespread displacement from Tigray, with more than 65,000 people fleeing to neighboring Sudan and more than two million displaced within Tigray. The number of Tigrayans who sought refuge in Sudan slowed by December. However, bylate February and the first two weeks of March 2021, tens of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans began arriving in Central Tigray's larger towns. Local authorities and relief organizations reported large population influxes from Tigray's Western Zone,with about 1,500 reaching Shire every day. By late February, 45,000 new arrivals had been registered in Shire.

On March 10, 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Biden administration had seen credible reports of "acts of ethnic cleansing" in Western Tigray. Tigray's interim regional authorities, appointed by the Abiy government, acknowledged the forcible displacement of civilians from Western Tigray and called for them to end. However, both Amhara regional authorities and the federal government denied that ethnic cleansing had taken place ( See Government Response Section).

Organized Forced Expulsions

The authorities used various administrative methods to forcibly expel Tigrayans from Western Tigray.

At times the new interim authorities also provided the means of departure, arranging transport for Tigrayan residents to leave town, several witnesses said. The new mayor of Adi Remets organized the transportation of Tigrayan residents to the Tekeze, recalled a 60-year-old resident: "He . made the decision. They called everyone, all Tigrayans who wanted to leave town, to the police station. An Isuzu FSR truck came, and we were sent [across the] Tekeze River to the Dedebit side." Sindayoin Adebai said interim authorities similarly arranged transport and made Tigrayans finance their own expulsion: "On the day I came, about seven big buses of Tigrayans left to the Tekeze. We took the buses, paying 1,000 ETB ($25) per person." Mihretin Humera had a similar experience: "There were 10 minibuses.... The forces kept telling us to leave the Zone to go to the middle of Tigray. There was transport available, owned by Amhara drivers and arranged by the region."[678]

A 55-year-old farmer from Adebai described how he tried to hide when the roundups began. He said his daughters, niece, and other Tigrayans were taken by Fano militia on November 23:

a. Expulsions from places of detention

Amhara interim authorities began expulsions from places of detention in Western Tigray in December 2020, efforts that would escalate in February 2021. The coordination and timing of bus movements, as well as the striking similarity of the witness accounts across several locations, all indicate a centrally planned operation that contributed to the ethnic cleansing campaign in Western Tigray. Security forces first gathered Tigrayan detainees and placed them on FSR Isuzu trucks or convoys of buses, which were then often escorted by Amhara Special Forces or militias, and at times Ethiopian federal forces or police, during the trip to the Tekeze bridge.

In May Gaba, a former traffic police officer had become an administrator in the town, according to two former residents.Tesfalem, 43, who was held in custody, said the administrator arranged for the Welkait sugar factory car to transport detainees, including himself, to the Tekeze, escorted by security forces. He said:

b. Forcible Transfers from Humera in February 2021

"I was arrested on February 16," said Gebrekristos, who was swept up in the roundup:

They said we were farmers and weren't involved in the war. We were sent by Isuzu FSR [trucks] to Tekeze. When we arrived in Tekeze, the Amhara Special Forces at the bridge asked who we were, and the [guards taking us] said we were arrested for three to four months. [They] said they found nothing and had to release us. But the Amhara Special Forces at the bridge said: "No, they are Tigrayans. Why are you releasing them? They would join the junta, they need to be killed right here, right now!" But the people guarding the prison said: "They were found innocent of crime. We are not going to kill them. They need to cross the bridge. They don't belong here, but they are not criminals." The policemen were from Agew and were guarding [us] the last month and half of prison stay. They were kind to us. They would give [us] cellphones to call [our] families. They saved us from being killed by the Amhara Special Forces. The [forces] had a bad argument, [but] the policemen won, and they made us cross the bridge.

Coerced Departures

Those whom the militias or police did not forcibly remove, but instead fled Western Tigray in the months that followed the capture of towns in November 2020, gave varying accounts of the reasons that ultimately led them to leave. But all referred to the dramatic deterioration of their living conditions as a result of the persecution Tigrayans faced, citing frequent killings, beatings, rapes, looting, destruction of their homes and property, forced transfers, and arbitrary arrests and detention. They also pointed to profiling, threats, harassment, and restrictions on the Tigrinya language. These abuses and the lack of support from the administration made Tigrayans experience overwhelming fear for their lives.

Specific incidents that convinced Tigrayans that things would not improve or that a threat to them was imminent triggered departures. A 46-year-old farmer in Ruwassa said he left after Fano militia twice attempted to kill him:

In places such as Adi Goshuor Mai Kadra, where massacres took place, the mass killings caused Tigrayans to flee in large numbers. In Adi Remets, accounts of the mass killings of Amharas in Mai Kadra escalated the threats on Tigrayans in the town. Alula, a 60-year-old resident, heard an announcement on November 12, 2020, that "Tigrayans would be killed." He recalled:

Impact of Tekeze River Bridge Massacre

Other Departures

Elsewhere in Western Tigray, people left under pressure after they had exhausted all coping mechanisms. The military and regional forces that controlled Western Tigray had committed mass killings and other grave abuses against Tigrayans with impunity, creating a situation in which the mere rumor of a government crackdown was enough to trigger flight.

Tesfakiros, a 30-year-old shopkeeper from Humera, recalled: "Every single minute you feel fear - are they gonna kill me? Am I going to die today? Am I going to go to jail?" When asked how her life changed after her village, tabia Irob, changed hands, Tsega, 24, said: "If you want to buy groceries, you're scared a lot, and you can't [sense] whether you will be going be back home or be killed. Your brain is running about these things. It makes you feel [like you're] losing control."Living in Adebai, where "there is killing, hunger, detentions, releases," said Gezae, a 45-year-old male farmer who was displaced to the village, "makes you feel hopeless." Being banned from speaking Tigrinya, Hadgu, a 24-year-old farmer from Division, said he "felt deep anger inside, because that's my language and identity, I can't change it."

Tesfakiros, the 30-year-old shopkeeper from Humera, said:

Recounting an experience common among the people interviewed, a 70-year-old farmer from Division said: "We had hoped that things would get better, but ... It seemed they were trying to kill us slowly. What did we have to wait for? There was nothing to live for and survive. So why did we stay? We decided to live and that was what made us leave." In Ruwassa, said Andom, "They were pushing us to leave that area." "They really worked on it," explained his wife, Tsega. Speaking of the diverse intimidation methods deployed against Tigrayans, Tesfa, a 60-year-old farmer from Baeker, said: "They were pushing us to leave that area.. You got deported in different ways."

Renewed Roundups and Extrajudicial Executions, July - December 2021

Mass Detentions of Tigrayans

Zemede recalled his arrest on July 17 by a mixed group of Amhara forces, including ASF, Fano, and local militias, even though he had attended the demonstration:

Zemede said he was among those swept up in Humera. He recalled:

a. Torture and Ill-Treatment in Detention

They would just take you out of your room and beat you up however they wanted in the open in the compound, but sometimes they would take you in an underground place downstairs, it's dark, and they torture you..

They used to do it simultaneously. They would take 10 or 15 people out at the same time. They would tie us down and we would lie on the floor with our face down. And they would start beating us....

b. Bodies in the Tekeze River, Eastern Sudan

It was not possible to conclusively identify the victims found in Sudan. The recovery and handling of human remains require special attention and care, including respect for the dignity of the deceased and compliance with forensic best practices to ensure that such evidence is preserved for future identification by trained experts and for accountability.

Deaths in Detention from Torture and Inadequate Medical Care

Another former detainee recounting his arrest on July 19, and detention in Bet Hintset prison, described guards forcing him and other detainees load onto tractors the corpses of fellow detainees who had died in the prison around mid-November. He recalled:

Extrajudicial Executions, Enforced Disappearances

In many cases the bodies were found on the outskirts of the town. In September, one man recalled finding the body of an acquaintance, a teacher from Humera named Asmelash, in a valley on the western edge of town close to the Enda Michael church and Enda Yetbarek warehouse. "We found him with [gash wounds] on his face and neck," he said. Helater helped bury Asmelash.

Eightformerdetainees mentioned the killings and enforced disappearances of Tigrayans in custody since July 2021. A 20-year-old student described being arrested in mid-October and held in the kebele 2 office when Fano militia called for a detainee held in the same room and summarily shot him outside: "I don't know who told on him, but they came in and said he was a former soldier. They took him out and I heard gunshots, and I heard him drop. Afterwards, I could see from the door in our room that his body was lying at the gate."

At the Yetbarek warehouse, a former detainee, who was held there for two months until June or July, said he saw guards shoot two youths who tried to escape, killing a 16-year-old.

In Adebai, Amhara forces that rounded up residents in early November 2021 took those apprehended to detention sites: some to the town's police station, others to an Adebai farmers' association compound located on the town's eastern outskirts, near the Enda Roto petrol station compound whose warehouse was used as a makeshift detention site.

In the ensuing days, Tigrayans who had escaped survived by hiding on farmland, but the attacks continued. One man described hearing gunshots on November 7 and later saw bodies near a reservoir three kilometers northeast of Adebai:

b. Enforced Disappearances

Barring Tigrayans from Entry into Western Tigray

A 17-year-old from Axum hid his Tigrayan identity by pretending to be Amhara. The Amhara forces on the bridge welcomed him with open arms:

Occupation of Homes

A 38-year-old woman said she noticed Fano militia making similar markings in Humera:

Between the time his house burned down during the shelling of Division and the moment he left in April 2021;Hadgu described seeing the arrival of new Amhara residents while he was forced to live under a tree with other displaced residents. "Most of the town became empty," he said.

Security forces and militias took part in the occupation of homes, according toa 53-year-old businessman who remained in Humera. He saw militias and their families occupy homes, and explained that Tigrayans did not have any option but to leave:

Repopulation

The conflict in Tigray that began on November 4, 2020, between the Ethiopian military and its allied forces from the neighboring Amhara region and Eritrea on one side, and fighters affiliated with the Tigray People's Liberation Front on the other, is considered a non-international armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions. The conflict is governed by international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, which provides protection to civilians and other noncombatants from the hazards of armed conflict by all sides to a conflict. International human rights law, such as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, remains in effect.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch found that since November 2020, Amhara regional government forces and militias and local authorities, with the participation of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, committed numerous serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing targeting the Tigrayan population of Western Tigray. These violations include war crimes and crimes against humanity. Amhara Special Forces and Fano and other militias have committed unlawful killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, forcible displacement, and other inhumane acts, including starvation, as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the Tigrayan civilian population of Western Tigray. Ethiopian federal forces in Western Tigray have committed murder, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture against the Tigrayan population, which are war crimes and may also amount to crimes against humanity.

Ethnic Cleansing

The definition rests on three crucial components. "Purposeful policy" designates coordinated actions by individuals and groups (whether formal or informal), acting in the pursuit of a common goal; qualifying acts as "purposeful policy" may rely on demonstrating the implication of government bodies, but does not require it. The second component, the "remov[al] . by one ethnic or religious group . the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from a geographic area," indicates that the policy aims at widespread displacement of a given group by another. Finally, ethnic cleansing relies on "violent and terror-inspiring means."

Officials from the Amhara regional government, newly appointed interim officials, Amhara Special Forces, Fano, and ethnic Amhara and Walqayte militias, took concerted action to remove Tigrayans from Western Tigray. Those who directed or took direct part in abuses, made clear orally and in written statements their intention to remove Tigrayans "from this land" and beyond the Tekeze River. In addition to their role in coordinating the forcible removal and transfer of Tigrayans, Amhara regional authorities organized the repopulation of Western Tigray, providing legal cover for the pillage and looting of Tigrayan property and the distribution of land that Tigrayans had farmed. Taken together, these acts indicate a concerted policy carried out by the Amhara regional administration, with the acquiescence and possible participation of the federal government.

War Crimes

Serious violations of international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, committed with criminal intent-that is, deliberately or recklessly-are war crimes. War crimes, listed in the "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and as customary law as reflected in the International Criminal Court statute and other sources, include a wide array of offenses for which individuals may be held criminally liable -deliberate, indiscriminate, and disproportionate attacks harming civilians; murder; torture; rape and other sexual violence; arbitrary detention; enforced disappearance; pillage and looting; using starvation as a method of war; and collective punishment, among others. Individuals also may be held criminally liable for attempting to commit a war crime, as well as assisting in, facilitating, aiding, or abetting a war crime.

Responsibility also may fall on people planning or instigating a war crime. Commanders and civilian leaders may be prosecuted for war crimes as a matter of command or superior responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission of war crimes and took insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those responsible.

Ensuring justice for serious violations is, in the first instance, the responsibility of the country whose nationals are implicated in the violations. Governments have an obligation to investigate serious violations that implicate their nationals or other people under their jurisdiction. The government must ensure that military or domestic courts or other institutions impartially investigate whether serious violations occurred, identifying and prosecuting the individuals responsible for those violations in accordance with international fair-trial standards, and imposing punishments on individuals found guilty that are commensurate with their deeds. While non-state armed groups do not have the same legal obligation to prosecute violators of the laws of war within their ranks, they are nonetheless responsible for ensuring compliance with the laws of war and have a responsibility when they do conduct trials to do so in accordance with international fair trial standards.

Crimes Against Humanity

The commission of crimes against humanity can serve as the basis for individual criminal liability not only in the domestic courts of the country where the crimes took place, but also in international courts and tribunals, as well as in other country's courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Individual criminal liability extends beyond those who carry out the acts to those who order, assist, facilitate, aid, and abet the offense. Under the principle of command or superior responsibility, military, and civilian officials up to the top of the chain of command can be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by their subordinates when they knew or should have known that such crimes were being committed but failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the crimes or punish those responsible.

The following alleged crimes against humanity should be independently and impartially investigated and appropriately prosecuted:

Imprisonment and Other Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty

Amhara civilian authorities in conjunction with the security forces and federal authorities carried out thousands of arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention of Tigrayans in various formal and informal detention sites.

Torture

Tigrayans in custody have been subjected to torture, defined by the Rome Statute as "the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering" that can be either physical or mental. The Rome Statute definition of torture as a crime against humanity does not require that it be inflicted with a specific prohibited purpose, such as to obtain a confession, meaning that certain acts of severe physical or mental pain or suffering would fall within the crimes against humanity definition of torture regardless of the purpose for which it is committed.

Many of the acts committed against Tigrayans amount to torture under the Rome Statute as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Acts of torture include beatings, verbal insults, deprivation of food, water, and medical care against Tigrayans held in custody in formal and informal detention centers.

Murder, Enforced Disappearance, and Crime of Extermination

Amhara and federal forces were implicated in the massacres of Tigrayans in their custody as well as the killings and forced disappearances of Tigrayans in their homes and at other locations throughout West Tigray. An unknown number of Tigrayans died as a result of the conditions of detention, particularly at sites in Humera town, where security forces subjected them to beatings, torture, and summary executions. The deliberate deprivation of food and medical treatment to hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of Tigrayans in custody could amount to the crime against humanity of extermination.

Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Other Forms of Sexual Violence

Rape and other acts of sexual violence committed as part of an attack on civilian population may be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Survivors of rape described being assaulated by Ethiopian military forces, as well as Amhara Special Forces, and Fano militias. Survivors described being subjected to gang rape in their homes, in some cases in custody or held in captivity for prolonged periods. Tigrayan rape survivors repeatedly described being verbally abused and denigrated for their ethnicity during the attacks and were specifically told to leave Western Tigray.

Forced Displacement

Since November 2020, Amhara and Ethiopian security force have forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans from their homes, villages, and towns in Western Tigray, and acted to prevent their return. These actions appear aimed at permanently removing the Tigrayan population and thus change the demographic nature of Western Tigray Zone altogether.

A similar pattern of forced displacement across towns and villages in Western Tigray over several months indicates a governmental policy. Amhara interim authorities and other officials, and Amhara regional forces, at times with the support of federal forces and police, forcibly transferred Tigrayan communities, arranging the buses and trucks that removed Tigrayans from Western Tigray.

The term "forced" is not limited to physical force or violence, but may also include fear of violence, psychological oppression, or abuse of power against the person. Restrictions on movement, violence inflicted, denial of services and food, and a prevailing environment of harassment, threats, and intimidation by officials who called for Tigrayans to leave and security forces, made Tigrayans feel that had no choice but to flee. Such "involuntary departures" would still constitute forcible transfer.

Persecution and Other Inhumane Acts

Security force actions in Western Tigray deprived Tigrayan communities of medical care and humanitarian services, pillaged Tigrayans' food and other livestock necessary for their survival and denied food and medical treatment to detainees in detention sites. Together these acts, perpetrated on ground of ethnicity, may amount to the crime against humanity of persecution.

Right to Return

Since the adoption of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 (the Refugee Convention), three "durable solutions" have emerged under international law and refugee policy to enable refugees to put an end to their refugee status and re-establish an effective link in a country. These are voluntary repatriation to the refugee's country of origin, local integration in the country of asylum, and resettlement in a third country.

International law entitles people who are victims of the crime against humanity of deportation and forcible transfer the remedy of return to their home areas and property. The UN Security Council and other UN bodies have also repeatedly asserted the right of internally displaced persons to return to their former homes. The Security Council, in its Resolution 820 (1993) dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that, "all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former homes and should be assisted to do so." The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which are drawn from accepted principles of international law, set out provisions relating to return, resettlement and reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons. Principle 28 states:

Right to Redress

Victims are also entitled to reparation for other rights violations committed as part of crimes against humanity and war crimes, for instance if they were detained arbitrarily, tortured, raped, their family member killed, or if their property or crops were looted. The Ethiopian government again bears primary responsibility to provide victims with, or assist them in obtaining, compensation.

Under the TPLF-led EPRDF coalition government that was in power from 1991 to 2018, Ethiopian institutions with the mandate to investigate human rights violations, including the judiciary, the national Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and the ombudsperson were not sufficiently independent to meet that responsibility. In their responses to allegations of abuse, officials typically denied any wrongdoing and suggested that the claims were "politically motivated." The government also strongly opposed international investigations, asserting that it could carry out such investigations on its own.

Domestic Investigations into the Tigray Conflict

For the first few months of the conflict, preliminary investigations were carried out by the national Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), a federal body charged with investigating human rights abuses in the country. Ethiopian authorities argued that investigations by the Attorney General's Office and the EHRC were sufficient and that an international inquiry was not needed.

Following the joint investigation report by the EHRC and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in November 2021 ( see International Investigations section below), the Ministry of Justice announced the establishment of an inter-ministerial taskforce to "oversee redress and accountability measures in response to human rights violations committed in the context of the conflict in northern Ethiopia," and set up four committees on investigation and prosecution, refugees and IDP affairs, sexual and gender-based violence, and resource mobilization. It is unclear whether the committees will investigate the situation in Western Tigray.

International Investigations

The report identifies waves of displacement, which includes both Amhara and Tigrayan populations. It speaks to fear as a driver of displacement, but also of violence. While describing the detention and transport of Tigrayans from Mai Kadra to the Tekeze, the report does not reflect the organized and coerced nature of these expulsions, nor does it establish a timeline of displacement affecting Tigrayan residents across the Western Tigray Zone or spell out who may be responsible.

The Ethiopian federal authorities' statements concerning the alleged abuses committed against Tigrayan civilians in Western Tigray described in the report - some of which were previously reported in the media or by other organizations - have repeatedly denied or sought to downplay the role of federal and allied forces.

To All Parties to The Armed Conflict:

Issue clear, public orders to all security forces, including the military, military intelligence, police, and allied militias to prevent and end all abuses, including unlawful killings, arbitrary detentions, torture, and other ill-treatment, enforced disappearances, crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, forcible displacement, and theft and looting of property.

Investigate and appropriately hold accountable those responsible for serious abuses, including commanders for abuses committed by forces under their control.

Facilitate safe, sustained, and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to all populations in need and ensure all humanitarian staff, facilities, and supplies are protected from attack.

As part of any consensual agreement between the warring parties, allow the deployment of an AU-led international peacekeeping force in Western Tigray with a robust mandate and the means to protect civilians, promote respect for human rights, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Exclude from any peace agreement the provision of amnesty or immunity for serious violations of international law.

Ensure that returns of displaced persons and refugees take place in accordance with international standards, on a voluntary basis with attention to the safety and dignity of the returning population.

To the Ethiopian Federal Government

Protection

Publicly order federal and regional civilian officials and security forces to end all violations of international human rights and humanitarian law against the Tigrayan population in Western Tigray and elsewhere.

Immediately demobilize and disarm all abusive irregular forces present in Western Tigray since November 2020 such as Fano and other militias.

Suspend civilian officials, including interim Amhara officials and security force personnel from the Amhara Special Forces and Ethiopian federal forces, implicated in serious abuses in Western Tigray pending investigations into their actions. Discipline or prosecute as appropriate those found to be responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Western Tigray Zone since November 2020. Investigate the three individuals named in this report.

Immediately restore basic services, including banking and electricity, the disruption of which is causing disproportionate harm to Tigray's civilian population. Urgently facilitate the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to populations at risk throughout Tigray. Specifically, remove bureaucratic and physical restrictions on United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations that unnecessarily hinder the delivery of food, fuel, and medical assistance to all populations in need throughout Tigray, including Western Tigray. Support independent evaluation and monitoring of the humanitarian response, including the distribution of food and medical assistance.

Promptly release everyone arbitrarily detained in Western Tigray. Press Amhara authorities and security forces in Western Tigray to immediately make public information about the fate of all Tigrayans detained since the conflict began in November 2020 in Western Tigray.

Immediately provide all detainees adequate food, water, and medical care. Urgently allow independent international humanitarian agencies access to formal and informal detention sites without prior notification.

Investigate and prosecute serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law as appropriate, including the three individuals named in this report who should be investigated for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Investigators and prosecutors should focus on the impact of the conflict on survivors of sexual violence, on children, older people, and on persons with disabilities. Civilian and military officials implicated, including as a matter of superior or command responsibility, should be prosecuted regardless of position or rank.

Internally Displaced Persons

Treat all internally displaced persons (IDPs) in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.

Ensure that internally displaced persons and refugees wishing to return to their homes or places of habitual residence have the right to do so, that returns take place in accordance with international standards, and that returns are safe, voluntary, well-informed, and dignified.

Provide clear, accurate, and accessible information to refugee and IDP populations about the situation in their areas of habitual residence to ensure that decisions to move are fully informed.

In consultation with displaced communities and with the involvement of relevant UN agencies, establish an independent body to organize and monitor the safe and voluntary return of communities, and report on conditions faced by returnees, including the specific conditions for people with disabilities, older people, and other at-risk groups. Publicly report on any inability to monitor conditions faced by returnees.

Set up a fair, accessible, and independent mechanism to provide compensation or redress for losses or damage to housing, property, and land because of government violations.

Prevention

Cease all coercive policies associated with the forced expulsion or transfer of ethnic minorities, including restrictions on movement, and the seizure of property, businesses, and land.

Ensure that any mechanism established for addressing grievances between groups is in consultation with a diverse range of stakeholders, and conducted with full respect for their human rights, including the right to return.

Set up a forum in consultation with nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and government institutions with relevant expertise, to develop alongside victims and affected communities a comprehensive, impartial, transparent, accessible, and efficient mechanism that would provide restitution and reparation for victims of serious abuses and their families. The mechanism should also promptly provide for resolution of claims over land, property, and livestock losses in accordance with international standards.

Accountability and Security Sector Reform

The Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Accountability and Redress of Violations should ensure its investigations into abuses in conflict-affected areas including Tigray. The Task Force should provide timely and transparent updates to the public and international community on the progress of its investigations and ongoing trials and make its findings public. Any military, police, and other investigations already underway should be promptly completed and the findings made public.

Serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law should be investigated and prosecuted as appropriate in accordance with international fair trial standards. Civilian officials and military commanders implicated in abuses, including as a matter of superior or command responsibility, should be prosecuted regardless of position or rank.

Cooperate with and facilitate access to conflict-affected areas in northern Ethiopia for the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, established by the UN Human Rights Council, including in relation to events in Western Tigray since November 3, 2020.

Establish a vetting mechanism in consultation with victims and stakeholders to remove members of the Ethiopian federal forces and regional police who are responsible for serious abuses human rights abuses, notwithstanding any criminal charges that may be brought against them. The vetting mechanism should take into accounts reports from the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Commission of Inquiry on the Situation in Tigray, the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia established by the UN Human Rights Council, national and international human rights organizations, and testimony of victims.

Establish an independent and accessible oversight mechanism to ensure individuals and affected communities can make complaints about human rights violations, including discrimination and other misconduct by members of the security forces. Such disciplinary measures should complement rather than replace criminal investigations by the relevant civilian bodies.

To the Amhara Regional Authorities

Direct the Amhara Special Forces and regional militias to immediately cease all abuses against civilians and captured combatants, including specifically against the Tigrayan population.

Immediately disarm and demobilize all abusive militia forces, including Fano, present in Western Tigray since November 2020.

Suspend civilian officials, including interim Amhara officials, and security force personnel from the Amhara Special Forces implicated in serious abuses pending criminal investigations into their actions in Western Tigray.

Facilitate criminal investigation of members of Amhara Special Forces and Fano and other militias who have been deployed in Western Tigray.

Cooperate with investigations by the UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Commission of Inquiry into abuses carried out in Western Tigray Zone.

To the Tigray Regional Authorities

Direct Tigrayan forces to immediately cease all abuses against civilians and captured combatants and adopt measures to deter and appropriately punish commanders and fighters who have committed serious human rights abuses.

Cooperate with investigations by the UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Commission of Inquiry into abuses committed by all sides in Tigray and neighboring regions.

Cooperate with independent efforts to investigate abuses committed in Mai Kadra on November 9, 2020, and the causes of ethnic violence.

To the United Nations Security Council

Formally add the situation in Ethiopia to the Security Council's agenda and request monthly briefings from relevant UN agencies and other bodies on the situation in Tigray and other affected regions.

Press the Ethiopian government to permit independent international humanitarian agencies access to all detention facilities, official and unofficial, without prior notification.

Impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea that covers the direct and indirect supply, sale, and transfer, including transit and trans-shipment, of all weapons, munitions, and other military and security equipment, as well as the provision of training and other military and security assistance.

As part any consensual agreement between warring parties, press for and support the deployment of an AU-led international peacekeeping force in Western Tigray, with a robust mandate and the means to protect civilians, promote human rights, and create an environment conducive to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Any future peacekeeping force deployed to Western Tigray should have sufficient resources - financial, personnel, and technical - to prevent and remedy human rights abuses by its members.

Officers and soldiers belonging to any future peacekeeping force should receive appropriate training in international human rights, children's rights, and humanitarian law, and a unit of advisors with particular expertise in international humanitarian law should be included within it.

An independent human rights' monitoring and accountability mechanism should be incorporated within any future peacekeeping force, with special emphasis on prevention and protection of sexual violence in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018).

Peacekeepers who commit war crimes or other abuses or misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse of women and children, should be investigated, disciplined, or appropriately prosecuted.

Call for the UN special advisor on the prevention of genocide to conduct a fact-finding mission in Western Tigray and provide a formal briefing to the UN Security Council.

To the United Nations Department of Peace Operations

Place a moratorium on the use and deployment of Ethiopian forces, including federal forces, federal and regional police officers, in peacekeeping operations until an effective vetting mechanism can ensure that no one reasonably suspected of human rights violations committed anywhere in Ethiopia is being deployed.

Ensure that any peacekeepers provided by the Ethiopian government for UN peacekeeping operations are fully vetted to ensure that they have not been involved in human rights violations. This should cover all Ethiopian federal forces, federal and regional police officers and forces from Ethiopia, not just officers and senior officials.

To the African Union and AU Member States

Urgently call for an African Union extraordinary session on the conflict in northern Ethiopia.

The AU Peace and Security Council should press Ethiopia, as one of its 15 member states, to ensure safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance in Tigray and other conflict-affected areas.

Ensure that the AU Peace and Security Council holds regular private and public discussions on the situation in Tigray.

The AU Peace and Security Council should request the three African member states of the UN Security Council, the so-called A3, in collaboration with other Security Council members, to add Ethiopia to the Security Council's regular agenda and consider calling for a global arms embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea.

As part of any consensual agreement between the warring parties, consider the deployment of an AU-led international peacekeeping force in Western Tigray with a robust mandate and the means to protect civilians, promote human rights, and create an environment conducive to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Any future peacekeeping force deployed to Western Tigray should have sufficient resources - financial, personnel, and technical - to prevent and remedy human rights abuses by its members.

Officers and soldiers belonging to any future peacekeeping force should receive appropriate training in international human rights, children's rights, and humanitarian law, and a unit of advisors with particular expertise in international humanitarian law should be included within it.

An independent human rights monitoring and accountability mechanism should be incorporated within any future peacekeeping force, with special emphasis on prevention and protection of sexual violence in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018).

Peacekeepers who commit war crimes or other abuses or misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse of women and children, should be investigated, disciplined, or appropriately prosecuted.

The AU Peace and Security Council should provide technical and political support to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Commission of Inquiry and the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia to promote timely and comprehensive investigations.

Call for the UN special advisor on the prevention of genocide to conduct a fact-finding mission in Western Tigray and provide a formal briefing to the AU Peace and Security Council.

To UN Member States

Support the UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia and its mandate, as set out in Human Rights Council Resolution S-33/1 (2021), including its continued investigations and annual reporting to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly.

To Ethiopia's Partners including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union and its Member States, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and China

Press the UN Security Council member states should step-up efforts to put the human rights situation in Ethiopia on the Security Council's formal agenda.

Press all warring parties to immediately facilitate safe, sustained, and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas. Urge the Ethiopian government to immediately restore basic services, including banking, communications, and electricity to Tigray. Also press Ethiopian federal and regional authorities to facilitate prompt access to UN human rights protection monitors in Western Tigray. Ensure access of independent humanitarian organizations to detention facilities in Western Tigray.

As part of any consensual agreement between the warring parties, press them to support the deployment of an AU-led international peacekeeping force with a robust mandate and the means to protect civilians, promote human rights, and create an environment conducive to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Donor countries should provide financial and other assistance to any AU-led international peacekeeping force.

Officers and soldiers belonging to any future peacekeeping force should receive appropriate training in international human rights, children's rights, and humanitarian law, and a unit of advisors with particular expertise in international humanitarian law should be included within it.

An independent human rights monitoring and accountability mechanism should be incorporated within any future peacekeeping force, with special emphasis on prevention and protection of sexual violence in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018).

Peacekeepers who commit war crimes other abuses or misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse of women and children, should be investigated, disciplined, or appropriately prosecuted.

Immediately suspend the direct and indirect supply, sale, and transfer, including transit and trans-shipment, of all weapons, munitions, and other military and security dual-use equipment, as well as the provision of training and other military and security assistance pending thorough investigations into allegations of human rights violations.

Closely monitor justice and accountability initiatives in Ethiopia, including when providing technical support and resources to initiatives and institutions by demanding greater public transparency and updates on the progress of their investigations and steps taken towards accountability to ensure their credibility and effectiveness.

Given the gravity of the crimes documented in this report, the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, should include events in Western Tigray Zone since November 2020 into their investigations, identify individuals responsible, and make recommendations on holding perpetrators of violations identified accountable, including through national, regional, and international justice bodies.

Support under the principle of universal jurisdiction and in accordance with national laws, the investigation and prosecution of those credibly implicated in serious crimes under international law.

Continue to provide political support and resources to the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia.

Donorcountries and international financial institutions should press for the establishment of robust independent monitoring processes and systems in agreements with the government to monitor assistance to ensure that it is not being diverted or withheld.

Support the creation of vetting mechanisms to ensure that members of the Ethiopian federal forces and regional forces responsible for serious human rights and humanitarian law abuses are not reintegrated into the national army or given other official positions within the government. Call on the government to disarm and demobilize abusive militia forces.

Assist and support the establishment of an independent mechanism that can organize and monitor returns, with the involvement of relevant UN agencies, so that displaced persons and refugees can return in accordance with international standards, on a voluntary basis with attention to the safety and dignity of the returning population, as well as the particular circumstances for people with disabilities, older people, and other at-risk groups.

To the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia

In accordance with its mandate set out in Human Rights Council Resolution S-33/1 (2021), investigate and report on allegations of violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law and international refugee law by all parties in Western Tigray since November 3, 2020.

Make recommendations on holding perpetrators of violations identified accountable, including through national, regional, and international justice bodies.

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The 221-page report, "'We Will Erase You From This Land': Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia's Western Tigray Zone," documents how newly-appointed officials in Western Tigray and security forces from the neighbouring Amhara region, with the acquiescence and possible participation of Ethiopian federal forces, systematically expelled several hundred thousand Tigrayan civilians from their homes using threats, unlawful killings, sexual violence, mass arbitrary detention, pillage, forcible transfer, and the denial of humanitarian assistance.

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Amhara regional security forces, with the acquiescence and possible participation of Ethiopian federal forces, committed abuses as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Tigrayan civilians.These crimes include murder, enforced disappearances, torture, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, sexual slavery and other sexual violence, persecution, unlawful imprisonment, possible extermination, and other inhumane acts.

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Although the law of discrimination provides the same legal status and rights for women as for men, including equal pay for equal work, the government did not enforce the law effectively, and women encounter discrimination in their workplace. Women often earned less than men while performing the same work. Women were restricted from working in some factory jobs. Domestic workers were particularly vulnerable to workplace discrimination and sexual harassment.