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Global Financial Integrity (GFI) trade-misinvoicing estimate: US$3.79 trillion in cumulative illicit financial flows from China (2000–2011).

Banking / underground money-laundering (CMLNs / U.S. bank channels)

Reported: ~US$312 billion routed through U.S. banks by Chinese-linked networks (2020–2024) per press summaries of FinCEN/Treasury analysis (based on >100k SARs).

Example sub-figure: ~US$13.8 billion of suspicious activity in samples referencing Chinese students (from FinCEN dataset excerpts).

No single global total for China-related crypto laundering is robustly published; trends show growing ransomware, scam, and mixer use.

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China plays a dual role in global drug economies:

As a source and exporter of chemical precursors used to manufacture narcotics (especially fentanyl and methamphetamine).

As a destination and transit point for money laundering tied to global drug trafficking networks.

The economic flows linked to these activities are valued in the tens of billions of USD annually, though precise measurement is extremely difficult due to covert transactions and laundering layers.

Fentanyl precursors (e.g., NPP, ANPP, 4-ANPP) are often produced legally in China but diverted illegally to Mexico or directly to the U.S. and Canada.

U.S. DEA reports that a majority of fentanyl seized in the U.S. can be traced to precursor chemicals originating from China.

The U.S. fentanyl black market is estimated at US$50–60 billion annually

sanctioned 17 Chinese companies and 8 individuals for involvement in precursor trafficking networks linked to the Sinaloa and CJNG cartels.

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In 2023, China’s goods exports were about US$3.38 trillion, with services exports around US$381.1 billion.

Imports of goods were around US$2.55 trillion, and services imports about US$552 billion in 2023.

Despite its strict policies, the country is fairly open to foreign trade, which represented 37% of its GDP in 2023 (World Bank).

China's main exports comprised telephone sets, including cellular (7.6%), automatic data-processing machines and units (4.4%), electronic integrated circuits and parts (4.0%), motor vehicles (2.3%), electric accumulators and separators (2.1%), diodes, transistors, and semiconductors (1.8%). On the other hand, the country mainly imported electronic integrated circuits and parts (13.7%), petroleum oils (13.2%), iron ores and concentrates (5.3%), gold, including plated with platinum, unwrought (3.6%), petroleum gas and other gaseous hydrocarbons (3.3% - data Comtrade).

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In 2023, exports were directed mostly towards the United States (14.8%), Hong Kong (8.1%), Japan (4.7%), South Korea (4.4%), Vietnam (4.1%), India (3.5%), and Germany (3.0%); whereas imports came chiefly from the U.S. (6.5%), South Korea (6.3%), Japan (6.3%), Australia (6.1%), and Brazil (4.8% - data Comtrade). China's trade partners diversified in 2023, with Belt and Road Initiative countries' share rising to 46.6% of total trade, up 1.2 percentage points. Trade with BRI nations grew 2.8% to CNY 19.47 trillion. Imports and exports with Latin America and Africa reached CNY 3.44 trillion (+6.8%) and CNY 1.98 trillion (+7.1%)

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Export decline to the U.S.: Tariffs make Chinese goods more expensive in the U.S. market, reducing demand and shifting trade toward ASEAN, the EU, and Latin America.

Supply chain shifts: Many firms adopt “China + 1” strategies, relocating some manufacturing to countries like Vietnam or Mexico to bypass tariffs.

Profit margin pressure: Chinese exporters often absorb some tariff costs, lowering profits and squeezing smaller manufacturers.

Industrial upgrading: Tariffs accelerate China’s push toward high-tech, higher-value industries (EVs, semiconductors, robotics).

Geopolitical tension: Tariffs deepen U.S.–China rivalry, prompting China to strengthen trade ties with Belt & Road and Global South partners.

Moderate macroeconomic drag: The overall GDP impact is modest (~0.5–1% lower growth), but regional and sectoral effects are uneven.

Countermeasures: China responds with export controls (e.g. on rare earths), domestic stimulus, and policies boosting self-sufficiency in key inputs.

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China’s foreign aid is coordinated through agencies such as the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) since 2017, and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Their AID comes in multiple forms like: grants, interest-free loans, and low interest loans. Many of China’s overseas engagements are not only grants but development finance or semi-commercial loans. China often uses Chinese firms, contractors, and suppliers in its aid projects, so a significant share of the value returns to China’s economy. Their AID is regionally focused on Africa, Asia, and Latin America are major recipients. Over the years, Africa has received a large share of Chinese aid. A 2024 report from China’s Ministry of Commerce says that between 2013 and 2022, China’s average annual aid (foreign assistance) was about 20.5 billion RMB, which is roughly USD 3.13 billion (using the average exchange rates over that period). For example during COVID, AidData finds that China provided over $4.6 billion in COVID-19 aid, surpassing Western donors like the U.S. and Germany. China emerged as the largest donor of COVID-19-related aid to developing countries. According to the official data, in 2020, China's foreign aid is approximately $3.12bn, almost five-fold that of 1999. This amount, slightly over 8.7% of that of the US and outnumbered by twelve members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), is not as impressive as in the 1970s. According to World Bank / OECD data, China’s net official development assistance (ODA) and official aid received is negative in recent years, meaning China gives more in aid than it receives. For example, in 2022, China’s “net ODA and official aid received” value (in current dollars) is listed as = US$282.32 million, meaning its negative leaving China as a net donor rather than a net recipient. An example for this is: During the initial outbreak of COVID-19 (especially early 2020), many countries, NGOs, and diaspora groups donated medical supplies, PPE, ventilators, test kits, etc., to China. These were in-kind and material donations rather than large-scale financial grants. However, these donations were relatively small compared to what China itself later provided to others.

Sources: https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/news/chinas-global-aid-exports-development-assistance-according-to-geopolitical-interest/

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-china-fill-the-void-in-foreign-aid/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.aiddata.org/blog/mapping-chinas-covid-19-aid-footprint

https://www.emerald.com/itpd/article/6/2/73/176994/The-Dragon-s-gift-an-empirical-analysis-of-China-s

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In China’s case, outflows (money sent out of China) are often larger than inflows, since China has become a labor-importing and investment-sending country.

China is still one of the top remittance countries globally, but its role has shifted from recipient to sender over the past two decades.

Peak years: Between 2008–2013, inflows were among the top 10 globally.

Recent years (2023–2024): Inflows have declined due to:

Fewer Chinese migrants working abroad.

Economic development within China (less reliance on remittances).

Tighter international money-transfer regulations.

Year Outflows (USD billions) Notes 2010 ≈ $13 billion Small but rising 2015 ≈ $30 billion Rising foreign workforce 2020 ≈ $45 billion Capital flight pressures 2024 ≈ $55–60 billion (est.) One of world’s top 5 outflows

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China’s inward FDI has slowed in recent years. Inbound FDI from January to May 2025 fell about 13.2% year-on-year to approximately US$50 billion. However, “utilized FDI” (actual use of foreign funds) remains stronger, with a 2024 figure of US$116.2 billion. The number of new foreign-invested enterprises is rising, with 12,603 new firms in Q1 2025. Key sectors attracting foreign investment include high-tech industries, advanced manufacturing, medical devices, aerospace/equipment manufacturing, and chemical/pharmaceuticals. Major source countries include Japan, Switzerland, and the UK.

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China’s outward FDI (ODI) in 2024 was US$192.2 billion, up about 8.4% year-on-year. The total ODI stock by the end of 2024 was around US$3.14 trillion. China is one of the top three global sources of ODI, accounting for roughly 11.9% of the global total. Major destinations include ASEAN countries, where investment grew about 36.8% in 2024, and Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) countries, with over 19,000 Chinese overseas enterprises. Key sectors for outward investment include wholesale and retail, leasing and business services, manufacturing, finance, mining, advanced manufacturing, IT/software, and construction.

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A combination of trade, aid, remittances, FDI, and illegal flows shapes China’s economic influence. Its dominant role in global trade and strategic foreign aid, especially through initiatives like the Belt and Road, extends both economic and political influence. FDI drives outward expansion, while remittances play a smaller, supporting role. At the same time, illegal financial flows including money laundering and illicit trade pose risks to financial stability. Together, these factors show China’s growth as a global power that operates through both formal and informal economic channels.