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Kaitlyn mentions Miller’s claim which says; psychological egoism and virtue cannot coexist because some virtuous actions requires individuals to be altruistic. I think it’s possible to say that egoism and virtue coexist. If a virtuous person is not under any pressure to act in a certain way, then it’s possible to claim that he is virtuous because he likes to be a person who has his virtues. For example, a generous person likes to be generous because he feels responsible for suffering other people. Therefore, he feels good if he helps others because he thinks that he isn’t selfish, instead he is generous. Similarly, I think that a courageous person doesn’t only like good consequences of his courage. He also likes to know that he is courageous. In other words, being virtuous and acting altruistically can increase our feeling self inner worth, which makes being virtuous egoistic. Also, Lingbin mentions an important point in Merritt’s situationist critique of virtue ethics which claims that people always act in a certain way in a certain condition and it’s possible to understand human behavior scientifically. Whereas, virtue ethics insists that people who has a virtue act in a certain under in every condition. Of course, we should follow the scientific information and accept that this critique is very plausible. Lingbin also mentions that accepting this critique and using this scientific data is not a good way to defend virtue ethics, as well. The main problem between virtue ethics and situationist critique is about free will. Situationist critique relies on science, which is deterministic, to understand human nature. Under scientific determinism, which describes every natural phenomena, there is no place for free will. On the other hand, if we accept that we have free will, we can say that the data used on situationist critique can be used to be more virtuous.
-Oguz Suner

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In response to Sarah’s discussion of the three descriptions of virtue, I concur that virtues stem from virtuous motives. However, I only agree with Miller’s third description for understanding what virtue is. In my opinion, option three makes the most sense because intrinsically virtuous motives yield virtuous actions, yet virtuous actions are not necessarily always virtuous. The example provided by Miller of the Unlucky Farmer perfectly illustrates the idea that, although an individual may believe they are virtuous, they are causing more harm than good. It all comes down to each individual’s unique set of moral beliefs, and only that individuals can gauge if they are actually virtuous or not because they might believe they are when they might not be. Similarly, Moneer’s card identifies the different ideologies behind actions committed under the guise of virtue. Miller argues that “the virtue of compassion requires altruistic motivation,” while “the virtue of honestly requires either altruistic or dutiful motivation” (24). Using the descriptions provided by Miller, I believe that honesty and compassion motivate individuals to act altruistically regardless of the situation. However, everyone interprets compassion and honestly differently. -Isela Zarate

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It seems intuitive that moral character has to do with psychology or motivations of persons not with the effects of their actions. Sarah discussed three different conceptions of virtues described by Miller. The third conception is different from the first two in that it involves the psychology of moral actors, but not the consequences of the actor’s actions.

This is illustrated when people with their heart in the right place cause bad things to happen (MP, p 23). When someone accidentally causes bad things to happen, this does not necessarily mean they have a character flaw.

Hao’s argument card highlights that not just virtues, but vices too, describe something about the psychology of moral actors. It seems to me to be intuitive to think about vices as involving the psychology of actors, as opposed to the consequences of their actions. Just as good people can unwittingly cause bad things, vicious people do not necessarily always cause bad things to happen (MP, p 26); People with vicious motives sometimes fail to cause the intended consequences in the world. A person who after careful deliberation decides to carry out their vicious motive but fails still has a character flaw. Miller’s example of the doctor who injects people with a deadly disease, but fails at murdering them because his patient happen to be vaccinated is an illustration of this (MP, p26). Because the psychology of the moral actor involves a vicious motive, he probably does have a character flaw or vice. - Ezequiel Contreras

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Areen finds interesting Miller’s empirical argument that virtues don’t seem to be inherited with most humans (p.33). I was also intrigued by Miller’s findings about human behavior and how participants responded to different scenarios given specific factors that tested their virtuous character. I would have expected that people’s virtues would be robust as described by Miller, and that most of participants would act according to what is considered morally right, across all experimental scenarios. His findings seem to agree with the situationist position, and while there may be exceptions to it, it generally seems to illustrate how people behave regarding their virtues when these are put to practice. In response to another student, Nabil questions whether it is possible to act in compassion without psychological egoism coming into play, considering that Miller supports that one can be compassionate even if their motives to act are self-regarding (p. 22). I think that as Miller discusses later on, it is possible to be compassionate if the motivation to perform such action is purely altruistic. Another way to describe this is to relate to Batson’s empathy-altruism hypothesis discussed in previous weeks. That is, considering that because we feel empathy for someone when he/she undergoes a difficult situation, we act upon ending this person’s struggle, without ever coming with the thought of doing to benefit me or myself. And instead of focusing whether the action was selfish or selfless motivated, I think it is also as important to consider whether this action brings about positive outcomes for others, yourself, or both.
- Bryan Archuleta

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Responding to both Ezequiel and Yingliang, who discussed an argument in the MP textbook for the understanding the meaning of human virtue. Miller offers three potential arguments, each of which take a slightly different stance on the importance of virtuous motive and virtuous outcome in determining the virtuosity of a person. As Ezequiel mentions, the third argument also seems most convincing to me-- Miller states that “Something is a virtue for a human being only if it gives rise to virtuous actions which are produced by intrinsically virtuous motives” (p. 23). Here, Miller is arguing that virtuous motives are significantly more important than virtuous outcomes, when he states that “reliably bringing about good effects in the world is not necessary” (p. 23). I agree that motive is definitely more important than the actual outcome of the action, for any type of good deed. As such, someone who tries their best to help others out of the kindness of their heart but fails to do so would be a more compassionate person than someone who helps others to preserve their self-image. That being said, as Yingliang brings up, this definition is not of course as rigid-- if compassionate people are only those who always volunteer to help for solely selfless reasons, it would seem that none of us are compassionate people. So this makes me rethink the idea that good outcome plays no part in a virtuous action; If I were to help out a stranger just to make a good first impression, I’m being virtuous just to gain a friend for myself. But I did help out the stranger, and if he were to choose not to be my friend, it’s not like I’d regret helping him out. So perhaps a good outcome also plays a part in defining a good person.

- Aditi Shrivastava

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In response to Ezequiel’s post: I agree that causing something bad to happen does not necessarily make one a bad person. I think Miller gives a very sound explanation of why having intrinsically altruistic motivations is what matters most to having virtues whereas good results do not matter that much. And I think Miller’s argument can help people have a more accurate sense of themselves, especially when they think they have done somebody wrong or, for that matter, did not do much to help. I sometimes would feel guilty about not offering actual help to the person I set out to help. But Miller’s point made me realize that my failure to help that person does not mean that I am not kind. It is very likely that a person whose heart was in the right place but ended up making matters worse. Therefore I agree that intrinsically altruistic motivations are the most important part of having virtues. I would also like to respond to Alex’s post. Alex said in the post that she/he found Miller’s using the examples of compassion and honesty to demonstrate what virtues are problematic as these two virtues are not representative enough. I agree that more diverse examples could have been employed here to prove his point, but I think Miller chose compassion and honesty because they are the most common virtues and the easiest for readers to relate to. I still found Miller’s argumentation convincing because the examples of compassion and honesty helped me better understand what counts as virtues.
- Yingliang Shi

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Leo mentioned in his/her post that righteous motivations are critical to virtues while positive results do not necessarily need to occur after virtuous acts, and I would like to comment on it. I too also found Miller’s argument quite intriguing. Before reading about his argument, I just assumed that for virtues to count as virtues, there must be good outcomes. But the examples Miller gives of the unlucky farmer who unwittingly donated poisonous food and the cruel doctor who failed to kill his patients help me realize the importance of kind, altruistic motivations. Just because we didn’t succeed in helping the person in need out doesn’t mean that we are not kind or altruistic because it doesn’t change the fact that we are urged to help the needy person by our altruistic motivations. Moneer also talked about the relationship between virtue and altruistic motivations. He/She mentioned a point of view that it is the good results that decide whether the act is altruistic or not, and I found this view problematic. I think it is inadvisable to judge whether a person is virtuous based solely on the results of his or her actions. Bad, hypocritical people can also deliver good results, intentionally or unintentionally. There are a lot of examples of corrupt officers donating to charities to make them look good or to obtain other personal gains. In this case, the good results can not prove that they are virtuous at all. -Hao Li

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In this lectures readings I’m most intrigued by Millers idea that virtues require motivations to achieve, as well as the idea that virtue doesn’t have to be achieved by doing something good; if the motivation of that action is positive yet ends up with a bad result, it may still be a virtue as long as the motivation is righteous. Leo

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Miller discusses compassion-driven motivation as a virtue, mainly the idea of dutiful motivation as the reasoning behind compassion-driven actions. Specifically, Miller argues that if the ultimate goal is to achieve an objective or complete a moral duty, then compassion is not being explicitly exhibited towards individuals in need (MP, pg. 24). - Isela Zarate

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Unwittingly causing bad things to happen does not necessarily make you a bad person

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Unwittingly causing bad things to happen does not necessarily make you a bad person

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Miller explains that it is not necessary that something have good effects in the world for it to be a virtue. This is because of his intuition that if someone’s heart is in the right place, but unwittingly causes bad effects, those effects do not reflect a character flaw. (MP, pg 23) - Ezequiel Contreras

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One of the objection listed by Merritt. Our behavior is depends on some irrelivent enviriment factor when we make disitions. however, if we can understand these factors, we can avoid be influenced by them and develop a robust virtue characterastic. Merritt
object it by saying that it only pushed the problem one step back without solving it.
(Merritt,372)
Lingbin Wu

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I think it is interesting that Miller argued that we need  motivation to have virtue.  He argues that we need to be driven to make the outcome good or bad. On the other hand if the action was driven to reach self-fulfillment that will mean that the action was taken with egoistic motives.
Anna Miskarova

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Millers statements about psychological egoism and the nature of virtues are interesting because they imply that egoism and virtues are incompatible. If one acts out of self motivation such as personal gain or following of social contract, so says Miller, then they are not using the altruistic symbols we know as virtues. Perhaps Miller referred to this fact in saying that there “are no universal values” (p.33), which in effect states people act from their individual egos rather than shared principals.
-Henry Koepcke

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I was interested in this week's readings (MP) on virtue. One school of though is that virtue is a pre-requisite for altruistic acts. On the other hand, some believe that virtue is not a necessity. Rather, the good outcomes of an act are what deem it altruistic. This means a person can act altruistically, despite being self-motivated (p. 22-23) -- Moneer Mujaddidi

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I find the discussion of moral virtues vs. vices in the MP textbook very interesting. On page 22, the author begins discussing the difference between compassionate acts and compassionate people, upon which he speculates whether “motivation [matters] to being a compassionate person, or more generally to being a virtuous person” (p. 22). This led me to conclude two things. That acting compassionately does not make one a compassionate person, but also that one who only acts compassionate is not necessarily a bad person. A person helping another solely out of fear of social shame is of course not a perfect altruist, but they are considerably better than someone who has no fear of social shame.
- Aditi Shrivastava

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Even though someone can exhibit a form of compassion, it can still be considered self-fulfilling if there are any "egoistic motives" (p. 22). If a self-fulfilling motive can be construed, does that mean there can be no compassion without psychological egoism? -Nabil Miftah

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In opening the discussion on what virtues are, Miller uses the examples of compassion and honesty. He does this because "there is likely to be little controversy about these counting as virtues" (28) This is poorly reasoned, as just because many agree (I don't) does not mean it is true. -Alex Hukill

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Miller points out that motivation is necessary for people to have a virtue whether it "contributes to good outcomes or not" (p.22). He also argues that good outcomes are produced by behaviors  which might be self-benefit and compassionate at the same time. -Boyan Wang

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Miller states that there are three ways to describe virtues. For something to be a virtue it either has to cause good effects,  it causes a person to "reliably bring about good effects," (22) as well as well as "give rise to virtuous actions," (23), or bring cause virtuous actions that stem from virtuous motives but do not have to cause good effects (23).
Sarah Langmaid

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In the Merritt paper I found their revised explanation for behavioral consistency was quite interesting. Rather than simply assigning individuals personality traits, they argue that identifying situation specific factors that lead to consistent actions is a better fit for identifying their behavior (Merritt, 373). - Noah Choufa

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Miller argues that if psychological egoism is true then no one can possess virtues (p. 25). This is because, depending on the virtue, being virtuous requires individuals to do things with altruistic and or dutiful motivation (p. 25). Since people acting altruistically or dutifully contradicts with psychological egoism, the two concepts cannot coexist.
- Kaitlyn Wu

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Miller argues that most people have a mixed helping trait in comparison to compassion, which might result in helping actions in some situations. This trait has the tendency to empathize but can also be associated with egoistic motives, making it neither a virtue nor a vice (p. 39).
- Yingliang Shi

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I found the argument made by Miller that "there is not a widespread possession of traditional values" to be interesting (Miller, p.33). This is largely due to the fact that there have been observations and studies which show that traditional values aren't followed anymore.
- Areen Kazarian

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Miller argues that there is a difference between knowing of traditional virtues and implementing them into one's character. He also argues that if there was a widespread existence of traditional values, then relevant experiments would reveal that (pg. 33) – but this is not the case. - Annsana Biju

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Miller argues that either altruistic, dutiful or both motivations may be present when acting upon different virtues (p. 24). Therefore, a possible but not irrefutable conclusion one may arrive to according to Miller is that, "No virtue reliably gives rise to egoistic motivation to act" (p. 25).
-Bryan Archuleta

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Merritt offers a third alternative to virtue ethics that appeals to Humean ethics instead of traditional Aristolian ethics. In doing so, Merritt avoids committing to a strong MSC while acknowledging both situationist premises and virtue ethics. However, I am still confused as to how Merritt’s argument on virtue ethics is superior to Kantianism and consequentialism (cf. p.369).
- Josephine Wang

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In the MP textbook, Miller argues that intrinsically virtuous motivations are necessary to virtues while good results are not necessary (p. 23). And the same is true of vices: vicious motives are necessary for vices but these motives do not necessarily result in bad results (p. 26). - Hao Li

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The author claims that in order to have “moral vices”, there needs to be “vicious motivation” and that bad outcomes don’t count because that person has “altruistic motivation”. What about cases with people being dishonest to protect someone’s well-being or life? In situations like this, is it still considered moral vice? (MP p.26)
Yao Lei