# data[].attributes.body
During the 1960s, the United States was intimately involved in equipping and training Guatemalan security forces that murdered thousands of civilians in the nation's civil war, according to newly declassified U.S. intelligence documents.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Papers Show U.S. Role in Guatemalan Abuses

By Douglas Farah
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, March 11, 1999; Page A26

During the 1960s, the United States was intimately involved in equipping and training Guatemalan security forces that murdered thousands of civilians in the nation's civil war, according to newly declassified U.S. intelligence documents.

The documents show, moreover, that the CIA retained close ties to the Guatemalan army in the 1980s, when the army and its paramilitary allies were massacring Indian villagers, and that U.S. officials were aware of the killings at the time. The documents were obtained by the National Security Archive, a private nonprofit group in Washington.

Some of the documents were made available to an independent commission formed to investigate human rights abuses during Guatemala's 36-year civil war, which killed an estimated 200,000 people. The report by the Historical Clarification Commission, which grew out of the U.N.-brokered peace agreement that ended the conflict in 1996, was released last month in Guatemala and blamed government forces for the overwhelming majority of human rights violations during the conflict.

But some of the documents were not released until yesterday. One was a Jan. 4, 1966 memo from a U.S. State Department security official describing how he set up a "safe house" in the presidential palace for use by Guatemalan security agents and their U.S. contacts. The safe house became the headquarters for Guatemala's "dirty war" against leftist insurgents and suspected allies.

"I have never seen anything like it," said Kate Doyle, Guatemala project director at the archives, expressing amazement at "the description of our intimacy with the Guatemalan security forces."

Three months after the cable about the safe house, on March 6, 1966, security forces arrested 32 people suspected of aiding Marxist guerrillas; those arrested subsequently disappeared. While the Guatemalan government denied any involvement in the case, a CIA cable sent later that year identifies three of those missing, saying, "The following Guatemalan Communists and terrorists were executed secretly by Guatemalan authorities on the night of March 6."

The CIA has a long history of involvement in Guatemala, having helped to orchestrate the army's overthrow of a democratically elected government in 1954. Nevertheless, largely because of human rights concerns, the United States never provided Guatemalan security forces with the same level of support it gave anti-communist forces in neighboring Nicaragua and El Salvador during fighting in the 1980s.

In 1977 the Guatemalan government rejected $2.1 million in U.S. military aid because it was conditioned on improved performance on human rights. But in the early 1980s, under the Reagan administration, the relationship warmed up again despite occasional clashes over the military's brutal tactics.

As the Cold War raged in the 1960s and '70s, the United States gave the Guatemalan military $33 million in aid even though U.S. officials were aware of the army's dismal track record on human rights, the documents show.

On Oct. 23, 1967, for example, a secret State Department cable reported that covert Guatemalan security operations included "kidnapping, torture and summary executions." The cable said that "in the past year . . . approximately 500-600 persons have been killed; with the addition of the 'missing' persons this figure might double to 1,000-2,000." It also described the government's Special Commando Unit, which used civilians as well as military personnel and carried out "abductions, bombings, street assassinations and executions of real or alleged communists."

A 1992 CIA cable confirmed that indigenous villages were targeted for destruction because of the army's belief that the Indians supported the guerrillas.

In describing one episode, which occurred shortly before it was written, the cable reported that "several villages have been burned to the ground." It continued, "The well-documented belief by the army that the entire Ixil Indian population is [pro-guerrilla] has created a situation in which the army can be expected to give no quarter to combatants and noncombatants alike."

An April 1994 Defense Intelligence Agency report outlined how, in the 1980s, as U.S. aid grew, Guatemalan military intelligence agents dumped suspected guerrillas dead and alive out of airplanes into the ocean.

"In this way they have been able to remove the majority of the evidence showing that the prisoners were tortured and killed," the memo said.

But as grim a picture as the documents portray, said Doyle, the project director, the Clinton administration was to be commended for making them public.

"The commission asked for documents from Argentina, Israel and Taiwan," Doyle said. "Only the United States responded.

© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company

Back to the top

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Washingtonpost.com: Papers Show U.S. Role in Guatemalan Abuses

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Papers Show U.S. Role in Guatemalan Abuses By Douglas Farah Washington Post Foreign Service Thursday, March 11, 1999; Page A26 During the 1960s, the United States was intimately involved in equipping and training Guatemalan security forces that murdered thousands of civilians in the nation's civil war, according to newly declassified U.S.

# data[].attributes.body
President Clinton quotes, ''For the United States,'' Mr. Clinton said, ''it is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake.''

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Clinton Offers His Apologies To Guatemala (Published 1999)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Pres Clinton, in Guatemala on third day of his Central America trip, apologizes for US support of right-wing governments in Guatemala that killed tens of thousands of rebels and Mayan Indians in 36-year civil war; promises US support for reconciliation in Guatemala as well as throughout Central Amer…

# data[].attributes.headline
President Clinton Apologizing- expressing regret

# data[].attributes.subject
President Clinton Apologizing- expressing regret

# data[].attributes.body
Guatemala City, March 10- President Clinton showed regret for the US’s role in the 36 year civil war. He said that Washington “was wrong” to support the Guatemalan security forces that resulted in killing thousands of civilians.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Clinton: Support for Guatemala Was Wrong

President Clinton, left, and Guatemalan President Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen review a military honor guard at the presidential palace in Guatemala City on Wednesday. (AP)

By Charles Babington
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, March 11, 1999; Page A1
GUATEMALA CITY, March 10 President Clinton expressed regret today for the U.S. role in Guatemala's 36-year civil war, saying that Washington "was wrong" to have supported Guatemalan security forces in a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that slaughtered thousands of civilians.

Clinton's statements marked the first substantive comment from the administration since an independent commission concluded last month that U.S.-backed security forces committed the vast majority of human rights abuses during the war, including torture, kidnapping and the murder of thousands of rural Mayans.

"It is important that I state clearly that support for military forces or intelligence units which engaged in violent and widespread repression of the kind described in the report was wrong," Clinton said, reading carefully from handwritten notes. "And the United States must not repeat that mistake. We must, and we will, instead continue to support the peace and reconciliation process in Guatemala."

Guatemalan President Alvaro Arzu sat next to Clinton when he made the remarks at a "peace round table" in the ornate National Palace of Culture, but had no immediate response. His press aides said they were unsure whether he would comment.

Clinton's aides said the president had thought for some time about how to word his near-apology. The Guatemalan military received training and other help from the U.S. military in an era when the United States supported several Latin American rightist governments fighting leftist insurgents.

The record of the Guatemalan security forces was laid bare in a report released Feb. 25 by the Historical Clarification Commission, which grew out of the U.N.-sponsored peace process that ended the war in 1996. The commission said the Guatemalan military had committed "acts of genocide" during the conflict, in which 200,000 people died.

Clinton's comments capped a busy, nation-hopping day that began in San Salvador, El Salvador's capital. There, he told Central American leaders that their recently democratized region deserves to be a more equal partner with the United States, and he pledged to make several trade and immigration changes they have sought.

In what aides billed in advance as the major address of his four-day Central American visit, Clinton praised the nations for ending their devastating civil wars and shifting to democratic systems of government. All Central American countries, he noted in a speech in San Salvador before the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly, now have freely elected leaders.

Winning applause from the legislature's 83 attending members, the president vowed to reduce tariffs on some Central American exports, press for nearly $1 billion in new aid for victims of Hurricane Mitch and give $8 million to the region's schools. Tiptoeing around the sensitive issue of past U.S. support for rightist governments in the region, Clinton also acknowledged that the United States had undergone "bitter divisions about our role in your region," which included a "dark and painful period."

But he did not grant one key request from this region's leaders, who want the United States to cease or slow deportation of undocumented Central Americans, many of whom send money to relatives in their impoverished homelands.

"We must continue to discourage illegal immigration," he said. "We must enforce our laws."

Clinton did, however, say he will fight to put illegal immigrants from Guatemala and El Salvador on an equal footing with Nicaraguans, who enjoy easier rules in proving "hardship," a condition that can allow them to remain in the United States although they crossed the border illegally.

The Nicaraguan rules are a holdover from U.S. animosity toward the former Sandinista regime, the leftist government of the 1980s that some Nicaraguans had sought to escape by moving illegally to the United States.

"I will do everything I possibly can to overcome that different treatment," Clinton said, drawing a roar of approval from the Salvadoran lawmakers. Administration officials already are drafting plans to change the guidelines, which do not require congressional approval, presidential aides said. In Guatemala, Clinton said he would seek to change the guidelines by law and executive action.

In his speech in San Salvador, Clinton alluded to the brutal civil wars and insurrections that killed thousands of people in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and, to a lesser degree, Honduras, in recent decades. He did not, however, apologize for U.S. support for the Salvadoran military in the 1980s, which totaled billions of dollars during a war that cost 70,000 lives.

"Just a few years ago, the people of Central America were suffering from a legion of man-made disasters far more cruel than anything nature can bestow on us," he said. Over the past several years, he said, "a battlefield of ideology has been transformed into a marketplace of ideas."

When Clinton traveled later in the day to Guatemala City, he ran into one of the few signs of protest during his trip. Several demonstrators held signs decrying U.S. support for the military during its counterinsurgency campaign. A few yelled, "Viva Monica," a reference to former White House intern Monica S. Lewinsky.

© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company

Back to the top

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Washingtonpost.com: Clinton: Support for Guatemala Was Wrong

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Clinton: Support for Guatemala Was Wrong President Clinton, left, and Guatemalan President Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen review a military honor guard at the presidential palace in Guatemala City on Wednesday. (AP) By Charles Babington Washington Post Staff Writer Thursday, March 11, 1999; Page A1 GUATEMALA CITY, March 10 President Clinton expressed regret today for the U.S.

# data[].attributes.body
The United Fruit company sells and distributes produce, processes and distributes meat, fats, oils, and drinks. It's current name is Chiquita Brands International. Originally, it capitalized more than $11 million. After a lot of absorbing more than 20 rival Companies, it expanded to having around $215 million by 1930.

# data[].attributes.body
On December 17, 1953, President Guzman and Maria Arbenz entertained John E. Peurifoy and his wife for a dinner. Their conversations lasted for 6 hours, containing plenty of direct quotes from Guzman that prove communist influence.
The following are quotes from John Peurifoy to the US in a telegram:

“President then answered that there were some Communists in his Government and that [they] had certain amount of influence, but they were “local.” He described his friendship with Victor Manuel Gutierrez, Communist secretary general of country’s only national labor federation, and Jose Manuel Fortuny, head of Guatemala Communist Party… They went to Moscow (Fortuny is on trip there now) merely to study Marxism, not necessarily to get instructions.”

“Also asked about Guatemalan Congressional memorial observances for Stalin’s death and Mrs. Arbenz explanation was Guatemalan people regarded Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin as saviors of world.”

“President took up agrarian reform, saying there had been much opposition from American circles and others in the country. I told him we had worked and were working with countries who had introduced land reform, citing my experience in Greece4 and present situation in Bolivia. I said the difference seemed to lie in the administration, not in principle of assisting poor people to obtain land. I pointed out the explanation was perhaps in fact that National Agrarian Department was dominated by Communists.”
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d427

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
611.14/12-1754: Telegram

154. President and Mrs. Arbenz entertained my wife and me privately at dinner last night and we had a frank six hour discussion of the Communist problem here lasting until two this morning. President showed depth of his feeling against United Fruit Company and his admiration for Guatemala's Communist leaders, leaving no doubt he intended to continue to collaborate with them.

I opened conversation by telling President I was interested in seeing what I could do to improve relations and asked if he had any suggestions. He began by saying problem here is one between United Fruit Company and his government. He spoke at length and bitterly on Fruit Company's history since 1904, complaining especially that now his Government has a $70 million budget to meet and collects only $150,000 in taxes.

I interrupted here to say I thought we should put first things first, that as long as Communists exerted their present influence in Guatemalan Government I did not see real hope of better relations.

President then answered that there were some Communists in his Government and that [they] had certain amount of influence, but they were "local." He described his friendship with Victor Manuel Gutierrez, Communist secretary general of country's only national labor federation, and Jose Manuel Fortuny, head of Guatemala Communist Party. [Page 1092] They were both "honest" and followed Guatemalan not Soviet interests. They went to Moscow (Fortuny is on trip there now) merely to study Marxism, not necessarily to get instructions.

I asked by name about several Communists and Communist suspects in National Agrarian Department, directorate general of Radio Broadcasting and Guatemala Institute of Social Security. Before translating, Mrs. Arbenz started in each case to deny twenty were Communists, but three times President contradicted her saying he was sure they were. I asked whether Government adverting [advertising?] helped support Communist Tribuna Popular and after Mrs. Arbenz again started to deny, President admitted that it did. Also asked about Guatemalan Congressional memorial observances for Stalin's death and Mrs. Arbenz explanation was Guatemalan people regarded Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin as saviors of world. Communists presented no threat and his government was in full control.

Touching on the Caracas conference, I told President that since he has said Communists were of no consequence in Guatemala, I found it strange Guatemala had cast its vote against inclusion of the item on Communist infiltration on agenda. He said that this was interference in internal affairs, that they did not want outsiders coming in to investigate their country. I told him this was not a question of investigating, but discussing means and methods of combatting a godless ideology, but he reiterated views that Communism was not a threat. President took up agrarian reform, saying there had been much opposition from American circles and others in the country. I told him we had worked and were working with countries who had introduced land reform, citing my experience in Greece and present situation in Bolivia. I said the difference seemed to lie in the administration, not in principle of assisting poor people to obtain land. I pointed out the explanation was perhaps in fact that National Agrarian Department was dominated by Communists. I said I was sorry he had had no concrete proposals to make to improve our relations. He then reverted to Fruit Company and said this was the stumbling block: It was a large American organization which dominated press in US. I explained Fruit Company was relatively small by US standards and no corporation as far as I knew dominated any of US press whose Guatemalan reports were based by on-the-spot investigation. At one point President stated if there were a choice, it would be for Guatemala to live under Communist domination than live for fifty years with Fruit Company.

Foregoing took place in atmosphere of frank and polite exchange of views, and on leaving I told President I was disappointed because we had not accomplished anything. He said after I had become familiar with country, I would probably come around to his way of thinking. I told him I did not believe anything would make me convert to Communism and feared situation would get worse because Americans had given blood and paid high taxes and would continue to do so as long as Communism threatened free nations. President ended by giving me private phone numbers, saying I should get in touch with him whenever I wanted without going through Foreign Office.

I came away definitely convinced that if President is not a Communist he will certainly do until one comes along, and that normal approaches will not work in Guatemala. I am now assessing situation in this light and expect to submit recommendations in a few days.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Guatemala City, December 17, 1953—7 p.m.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV - Office of the Historian

# data[].attributes.body
Who you spend your time with impacts the way you think and behave.

# data[].attributes.body
The Agarian reform bill was to confiscate land from large land owning companies and redistribute it to farmers and peasants of Guatemala.

The draft of Arbenz’s proposal was similar to the draft made by the leader of Central General Trabajadores de Guatemala.

Page 8 paragraph 1

# data[].attributes.body
Arbenz believed that since Guatemala had low economic development, it needed a lot of rehabilitation to prepare to enforce communism.  Arbenz had a land reform plan to help modernize Guatemala and set certain conditions to make it a Marxist state. The land reform did not follow through and served the opposite. This involved taking away large tracts from the United Fruit Company, and gave them to peasants that did not own land and made up a big part of the population.

https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/foreign-affairs
https://www.wbur.org/npr/234752747/meet-the-brothers-who-shaped-u-s-policy-inside-and-out

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In 1953, for the first and only time in history, two brothers were appointed to head the overt and covert sides of American foreign policy. President Dwight Eisenhower appointed John Foster Dulles secretary of state, and Allen Dulles director of the CIA.

Journalist Stephen Kinzer says the Dulles brothers shaped America's standoff with the Soviet Union, led the U.S. into war in Vietnam, and helped topple governments they thought unfriendly to American interests in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo and Indonesia. In his new book, The Brothers, Kinzer says the Dulles' actions "helped set off some of the world's most profound long-term crises."

John Dulles died in 1959. President Kennedy replaced Allen Dulles after the covert operation he recommended to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba ended disastrously in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

Kinzer tells Fresh Air's Terry Gross that the Dulles' shared background and ideology played out in their policy decisions: "They had this view of the world that was implanted in them from a very young age," Kinzer says. "That there's good and evil, and it's the obligation of the good people to go out into the world and destroy the evil ones."

When they were making a decision about carrying out some earth-shattering operation; they never had to consult anyone else. ... They served as a reverberating echo chamber for their own shared certainties.
Stephen Kinzer
On the way the brothers worked together

They both became close to Eisenhower during his presidential campaign, and he named them both, one right before he took office and the other right after he took office. It was an arrangement that was fraught with danger from the beginning, not just because of who the brothers were, but for the fact that they were brothers. They'd grown up together, of course, and had come to develop a very intimate relationship.

They also saw the world in precisely the same way. What this meant is that when they were making a decision about carrying out some earth-shattering operation, they never had to consult anyone else. Under other circumstances you might've had the half dozen Latin America experts of the CIA and the half dozen guys from the State Department, and they would sit around a table and try to figure out if this was a good idea or not. But having the two brothers meant that you never had to consult anyone else. They served as a reverberating echo chamber for their own shared certainties.
On the brothers' professional relationship
We have very little written record of the relationship between the two of them, and the reason is they would speak on the phone several times a day. They would meet after work sometimes or on weekends, and it just took a wink or a nod, sometimes literally, for these huge operations to be carried out. They had the full blessing of President Eisenhower and they didn't do anything behind his back, but he gave them more or less free reign, and they functioned as kind of two jaws of a serpent that are kind of not connected but working towards the same goal. Foster Dulles would provide the diplomatic backdrop and the political motivation that American citizens would hear, and then Allen would carry out the operation secretly.
On how their religious upbringing affected their politics
The Dulles brothers came from a long line of missionary Calvinists. They grew up in a parsonage; their father was a clergyman; they had missionaries for dinner very often; and they had to go to services every day - three on Sundays - and take notes about the services so that they could discuss the sermons with their father. They sang hymns at home and spent a lot of time in prayer. The particular religious tradition they came out of - Presbyterian Calvinism - was one that did see the world in these two ways: that there were good Christians and then there were heathens and savages. Christians, under this doctrine, did not have the luxury of sitting at home and hoping for the triumph of good; they had to go out into the world and make sure that good triumphed.

When you have that view about your religion, it's a very small step to applying the same schema to politics. You think there are good and evil leaders in the world, good and evil regimes in the world, and this is a very different concept than the concepts that many cultures and many other peoples have. It's a widespread belief in many parts of the world that every person and every government is made up of good and evil impulses, and they come out in different proportions depending on circumstances. But the Dulles brothers didn't believe that. They had grown up in a religious tradition that saw a division between good and evil, and when they came to political power, they saw the world that way.
On being horrified by communism
They saw, quite correctly, that Marxism, Bolshevism, communism had emerged as the principle threat to the power of multinational corporations in the world. They were very worried about radical change. They felt that the world could go crazy if it didn't allow business to function freely. As far as they were concerned, conditioned by their decades defending the biggest American multinational corporations [when they were corporate lawyers], the world economy, the security and happiness of all the world's people depended on the ability of American corporations to function freely in the world.

That communism would not only seek to restrict American corporations, but that it actually doubted the efficacy, the entire concept of private enterprise and multinational corporate activity, was something horrifying to them.
On their misinterpretation of nationalism and neutrality

The Dulles brothers not only saw a danger coming from the Soviet Union, which of course was a nuclear-armed state at the height of the Cold War and for many years afterward, they also saw an equal danger coming from countries all over the world that were embracing what we now see as simple nationalism. Countries that emerged and decided that they didn't want to side with the United States in the Cold War and didn't want to be involved in the Cold War, seemed to the Dulles brothers to be tools of the Kremlin. ...

They completely failed to understand the nature of third-world nationalism. You had hundreds of millions of people in Africa, Asia and even in Latin America emerging from colonialism. They were looking for a place in this tumultuous world. The Dulles brothers couldn't see that; they assumed that all these neutralist and nationalist movements were part of the Kremlin strategy.
On the Dulles' ability to overthrow regimes in Iran and Guatemala but not in Cuba or Vietnam
They were able to succeed [at regime change] in Iran and Guatemala because those were democratic societies, they were open societies. They had free press; there were all kinds of independent organizations; there were professional groups; there were labor unions; there were student groups; there were religious organizations. When you have an open society, it's very easy for covert operatives to penetrate that society and corrupt it.

Actually, one of the people who happened to be in Guatemala at the time of the coup there was the young Argentine physician Che Guevara. Later on, Che Guevara made his way to Mexico and met Fidel Castro. Castro asked him, "What happened in Guatemala?" He was fascinated; they spent long hours talking about it, and Che Guevara reported to him ... "The CIA was able to succeed because this was an open society." It was at that moment that they decided, "If we take over in Cuba, we can't allow democracy. We have to have a dictatorship. No free press, no independent organizations, because otherwise the CIA will come in and overthrow us." In fact, Castro made a speech after taking power with [Guatemalan President Jacobo] Árbenz sitting right next to him and said, "Cuba will not be like Guatemala."

Now, [Vietnamese Communist leader] Ho Chi Minh was not establishing an open society ... the fact is, he had a dictatorship, he had a closed, tyrannical society, and that made it much more difficult for the CIA to operate. So we find this irony that if [Prime Minister of Iran Mohammad] Mossadegh and Árbenz had been the tyrants that the Dulles brothers portrayed them as being, the Dulles brothers wouldn't have been able to overthrow them. But the fact that they were democrats committed to open society made their countries vulnerable to intervention in ways that Vietnam and particular North Vietnam then were not.
On how things might have been different had the Dulles brothers not intervened
It's quite possible, even likely, had the Dulles brothers not been [in Vietnam] or had acted differently, there never would've been an American involvement in Vietnam at the cost of a million lives and more than 50,000 Americans. Guatemala wouldn't have suffered 200,000 dead over a period of 35 years in the civil war that broke out after they intervened in Guatemala and destroyed democracy there. Iran fell under royal dictatorship and then more than 30 years of fundamentalist religious rule as a result of the Dulles brothers' operations. Had they not intervened in Iran we might've had a thriving democracy in the heart of the Muslim Middle East. ...

So you look around the world and you see these horrific situations that still continue to shake the world, and you can trace so many of them back to the Dulles brothers.

Correction: October 18, 2013 12:00 am - In the audio of this story, the title of Stephen Kinzer's previous book is misstated as Regime Change. The correct title is Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq.
Copyright NPR 2022.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Meet 'The Brothers' Who Shaped U.S. Policy, Inside And Out

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower appointed John Foster Dulles as secretary of state, and Allen Dulles as director of the CIA. In his new book, The Brothers, journalist Stephen Kinzer says the Dulles' actions "helped set off some of the world's most profound long-term crises."

# data[].attributes.body
Roberto Fanjul, Minister of Economy and a close friend of Arbenz, told the CIA that “he was certain that the President’s sources of information were always “filtered through a Communist screen””.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d27

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
27. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report

No. 00-B-57327

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

Personal Political Orientation of President Arbenz/Possibility of a Left-Wing Coup
[Page 39]

PLACE ACQUIRED (BY SOURCE)

DATE ACQUIRED (BY SOURCE)

DATE (OF INFO.)

SOURCE

[1 paragraph (11-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Although President Arbenz appears to collaborate with the Communists and extremists to the detriment of Guatemala's relations with the US, I am quite certain that he personally does not agree with the economic and political ideas of the Guatemalan or Soviet Communists, and I am equally certain that he is not now in a position where they can force him to make decisions in their favor. The reasons for my opinion are as follows:

The President's social reform ideas stem from the US New Deal rather than from Soviet Communism.

President Arbenz is still convinced that he is "using" Communists and Communism to further his own ends.

He is fully aware of Guatemala's economic dependence on the US.

Arbenz has no fear of a conservative coup and has taken no active steps to guard against one.

The "opposition" of business groups and conservatives (with the exception of a few landowners) has been greatly exaggerated. This is evidenced by the "surprising" lack of serious concern in most business circles about the effects of the new land reform bill.

It is my personal fear that the chief threat to the Arbenz regime is a coup by rank opportunists within the "palace clique" who have sold out to Communist penetration. Such a coup would first assassinate the popular Arbenz, blame the reactionaries for his death, and then proceed to violently wipe out all conservative opposition.

Rather than setting up a Communist state, Arbenz desires to establish a "modern democracy" which would improve the lot of its people through paternalistic social reforms. Arbenz' personal idol is FDR and his reforms are patterned after New Deal reforms and adjusted to the backward economy and social structure of Guatemala. None of the reforms is substantially extreme as compared to many of those in the US, Europe, and even in other Latin American countries. The [Page 40] extremities are relative and seem radical in Guatemala only because of the backward feudal situation they are meant to remedy. Also they seem extreme compared to the ineffective piecemeal measures of his predecessor, Arevalo. During Arevalo's term, Arbenz often became angry at his weakness as a chief-of-state and realized that no effective social measures could be implemented while Arevalo was president. Satisfying his ambition to become president himself, and also with a sincere desire to fulfill his promises to his people, Arbenz went to work immediately and impatiently to implement his reforms and, as he put it, "to jar Guatemala out of the Middle Ages".

President Arbenz is still convinced that he is "using" Communism to further his own ends and in no sense is he dictated to by Communist elements although he often plays into their hands in his attempts to use them and the Party line of world Communism.

When Arbenz came to power he feared a popular revolt more than anything else. He pictured himself as FDR in 1932 and followed what he thought was a similar course, that is, he achieved popular support by relieving some of the immediate economic and social pressure on the very poor at the expense of the very rich. The reactionary group, in which Arbenz had many personal friends, fully expected him to reverse his field once his presidency was assured and forget his reform promises. When it became evident that he was serious about reform, the landowners became quite bitter and opposed him at every turn. The reactionaries immediately turned the Communist spotlight on all reform measures regardless of merit.

Sincere about reform and unable to get support for his program from any other source, he found the Party line of international Communism a ready-made tool with which he could organize the proletariat and control the country. Harping on US financial imperialism and on Guatemala's oppressive land system, Arbenz became a popular hero at the calculated price of arousing US indignation. His best emotional appeal to the people was a platform that was anti-US and defiant of US corporate imperialism. Meanwhile the Communist organization which lined up and manifested popular support for Arbenz succeeded in penetrating his government. I am not aware of the extent of this penetration and I doubt that Arbenz is aware of it.

The President deals with his subordinates as individuals rather than thinking of them as organized groups. Roberto Fanjul, Minister of Economy and a close friend of Arbenz, told me several weeks ago that he was certain that the President's sources of information were always "filtered through a Communist screen". (Fanjul is loyal to Arbenz, I am convinced, but under pressure could not be expected to act effectively in his behalf.) Fanjul feels that Arbenz does not believe the Communists [Page 41] have penetrated far enough to harm him and that he does not realize the extent that the Communists claim his reforms as their own. Arbenz still feels he can carry out his objective of using the Communists without being controlled by them. Meanwhile I would say that eight out of ten of the government officials would swear they are not in favor of Communism but that they are using it for their own purposes.

Incidentally the President's wife, Maria Cristina Vilanova Arbenz, daughter of a wealthy family of El Salvador, has far more radically leftist ideas than her husband and expresses these ideas at will. This lady was educated in the US and was raised and spoiled in the luxurious style of wealthy inbred aristocrats. Her socialistic, left-wing ideas are, in my opinion, a definite reaction to this background. So far the President has not appeared to have been influenced by his wife's ideas. One exception to this is the case of relations with El Salvador. These have been and will remain quite cordial on the top governmental level as long as Arbenz is president.

Arbenz realizes that Guatemala is economically dependent on the US but intends to bluff through his defiance of US corporations to any length short of national suicide. An integral part of his program is the removal of Guatemala from the category of a "subsidiary of United Fruit". He is a stubborn idealist who is willing to risk his own wealth and who is able to enlist the support of others to risk their wealth on the gamble of getting national control of Guatemala's fruit, coffee and chicle industries and its mineral and petroleum potential. Sacrifices are to be expected under this program and Arbenz is willing to make them. He feels that any hardships on his people resulting from defiance of US imperialism would be politically offset by its nationalistic appeal so as not to effect the perpetuity of the regime.

His goal is to assert the rights of the Guatemalan Government to dictate the terms under which foreign firms shall operate in the country, especially where the exploitation of natural resources is concerned. Knowing that his country will never be a large industrial nation and yet needing a sound economy to carry out his reform programs, Arbenz sees the only answer is expanding production and keeping a larger share of what is produced. Yet he realizes this is not possible without US markets and US capital. He realizes that if prices fell in the US or if US import restrictions barred Guatemala's goods, his country would go bankrupt. Arbenz is determined this will not happen. He can only bluff because he has no place to turn. The one possibility would be the Soviet bloc, which might conceivably finance the country in order to maintain a western hemisphere subversion base. This is the one thing Arbenz does not want. He definitely would prefer US domination to Soviet domination. The best example of this is the fact that throughout his [Page 42] bluffing of US interests he has never used the potential weapon of proposed trade treaties with Soviet bloc countries, although it seems logical to assume that such commercial overtures have been made to him. It is my belief that Arbenz will not go that far in bluffing the US. He may, however, bluff too long for the good of his regime.

Right now the entire economy is propped up by the price of coffee. A close friend of mine who has been a resident buyer for a US coffee firm for several years told me that if the price of coffee dropped five cents he would get out of Guatemala immediately. The price of coffee is high but the government depends on it to offset some of the losses of the other branches of the economy. Aviateca is bankrupt, several public works projects are in the red, there is trouble in the mining industry and Wrigley stopped buying chicle in the Peten. Despite these reverses, if the price of coffee holds up the regime will stand financially and still carry out most of its social reforms. Yet most of the growers feel that it will take five more years of today's high prices to reach a point where they can withstand a substantial drop in coffee prices. Once the price goes down, only the large growers will be able to hold their land. These will also be able to buy up other lands merely to keep them idle in an attempt to cut down the supply until the prices rise. These tactics would centralize the wealth and starve the workers. These deserted fincas would become overgrown immediately in this climate and if a finca is idle just one year it takes at least five years to put one back into production. In such a situation it would be impossible for the present regime to stay in power.

In case of a drop in prices Arbenz still has his oil lands to fall back on, although his use of them as a last resort might come too late politically. He has held up their exploitation so far on nationalistic grounds, holding out for his right to dictate terms for oil exploitation. The government owns most of the oil lands outright and also owns the rights to all underground minerals as only surface rights are included in private titles.

Arbenz does not fear overthrow from reactionary groups. When I left Guatemala two weeks ago the President's wife and three children had flown to Washington and from there to Switzerland where the children will be put in school. Someone asked the President if this household evacuation indicated that he anticipated any trouble. He denied it emphatically, stating the family had planned the move some time ago (Arbenz' father was a Swiss immigrant). There is little real worry around Arbenz about an anti-Communist or reactionary coup. Arbenz and Fanjul both feel that there are just not enough large landholders who are interested in or capable of accomplishing a coup and that they could not line up the other dissident elements. The President has several very close friends in the reactionary ranks, all of whom are wealthy and would have less personal gain from Arbenz' overthrow than some [Page 43] of the left-wing government officials. I believe the President is better informed on activities in the rightist opposition camp than within his leftist support groups.

The President has not taken the obvious precautions to guard against reactionary revolt. No arms have been distributed to Communist cells or labor groups (at least with his knowledge).

Many conservatives have come to view Arbenz as a "moderate" man. Paz Tejada, a staunch reactionary who had once threatened to kill Arbenz, is now on very friendly terms with him. The Communist-inspired agrarian reform bill which was to have met with fierce opposition from all conservative elements has actually been received with surprising calm by business interests and a great part of the landowners. One reason for the relaxing of their fears is the retention of the "last word" power by the President and by the appointment of his private secretary as administrator.

President Arbenz, who is constantly aware of the danger of administrative corruption in all reform legislation, has reserved the final authority on reform measures to rest with himself. This relieved the business interests and landholders as it was an indication of a "realistic" approach to land reform. There is confidence that the President himself would veto any attempt to expropriate land which is in active cultivation.

This reservation of authority in the case of new land reform law is viewed as unconstitutional by several elements. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] opinion is that the President's act definitely was unconstitutional. When I advised him of this fact he passed it off to expediency. No one else seemed to take it too seriously.

As most landowners are not too worried about having their cultivated land taken away they have also calmed their fears that the opening of new land would diminish their coffee labor force. It is pretty well agreed among the landowners that the Indians will not take on the extra labor and risk involved in leaving their communities and a steady source of food to take the chances involved in clearing and planting uncultivated, inaccessible land.

There may be a slight temporary shortage of auxiliary part-time help, but those that work and live on the fincas will probably not leave. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] there are 35 families living there permanently. During coffee harvest about 80 more workers are recruited in the hills. These hill people are more or less independent but all envy the life of the workers on our finca, for whom we provide shelter and a year-round source of food. The finca dwellers feel they would be fools to leave and try working a strange plot of land. They would lose their place on the finca and risk crop failure on the government land, which [Page 44] would mean they would have to give it up. There is no entrepreneurial spirit among the native workers.

Possibility of a Left-Wing Coup Against Arbenz

I believe that the regime is in no danger from a conservative coup but may possibly be in danger of a plot to send Guatemala violently to the left. This will not be possible while Arbenz is President, but there are many opportunists around Arbenz whose personal ambitions outweigh any political convictions. I personally am afraid of a "palace coup" which would accomplish the assassination of the popular Arbenz by the plotters who would blame the killing on reactionary elements. They would use this "outrage" as an excuse to violently "suppress a rightist's revolution" and inaugurate a "peoples' democracy" in Guatemala with themselves at the head.

These opportunists of whom I speak are such that they could be, and may already have been, approached by the Communist organization in Guatemala. The man I feel would be most capable of this is Alfonso Martinez, recently appointed by Arbenz to head the government department charged with administering the new land reform law. He is a fat, jovial, extrovert who has succeeded in gaining the complete confidence of Arbenz and who has acted as the President's personal secretary. It was the President's desire for direct personal supervision that prompted him to appoint Martinez to head this important department rather than a tendency to repudiate the known left-wing advocates of the bill, such as Charnaud MacDonald. This appointment was viewed with relief by the business and coffee growing interests. This view is correct as long as Arbenz is President, but the reform machinery has now been set up and with someone else as president who is of more leftist orientation or under actual Communist control, the situation would be radically different. Martinez' recent, though nominal, promotion, his position close to Arbenz, and his greed for power make him an ideal target for Communist penetration. Another opportunist is Charnaud MacDonald, of whose political activities I know very little. It is my opinion that he does not enjoy the President's complete trust.

Incidentally, the health of the President is excellent, although he has lost about 20 lbs in the past few years. He is quite robust and active. He enjoys recreational sports, especially swimming and horseback. His morale is also excellent.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala - Office of the Historian

# data[].attributes.body
Maria Cristina Villanova converted Guzman to socialism after they got married.

# data[].attributes.body
“Her [Maria, his wife] influence on Arbenz's political consciousness was great.” During their marriage, she was able to convert Guzman to becoming a socialist, proving she has a monumental influence on him and his views. She was an open socialist and surrounded herself with communists. For example, she had a strong friendship with Virginia Bravo, who was a Chilean communist leader. And she was also a great friend of Salvadoran Communist exile Matilde Elena Lopez. These three women organized regular political discussions at the Arbenz family home.
https://biography.yourdictionary.com/jacobo-arbenz-guzman
https://www2.umbc.edu/che/historylabs/lessondisplay.php?lesson=101

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Guatemalan Coup of 1954: How Did the Cold War Influence American Foreign Policy Decisions?

[ Download a printer-friendly version]

Introduction

Author: Courtney Fleming, Parkville High School, Baltimore County Public Schools

Grade Level: High

Duration: Two 80-minute block periods
Overview:
As the Cold War heated up in the 1950s, the United States made decisions on foreign policy with the goal of containing communism. To maintain its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. intervened in Guatemala in 1954 and removed its elected president, Jacobo Arbenz, on the premise that he was soft on communism. In 1997, the CIA released files pertaining to the Guatemalan coup that reignited questions about the motivations for U.S. actions in Guatemala. Was the United States concerned with the containment of communism, or was it acting on behalf of the business interests of the United Fruit Company? In this History Lab, students will examine documents, films, photographs, and other primary source materials to analyze U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.

Related National History Standards

National History Standards

Era 9: Postwar United States (1945 to early 1970s)

Standard 2: How the Cold War and conflicts in Korea and Vietnam influenced domestic and international politics

Standard 2B: The student understands United States foreign policy in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Evaluate changing foreign policy toward Latin America [Identify issues and problems in the past]

Historical Thinking Standards

Standard 5: Historical Issues-Analysis and Decision Making

Identify issues and problems in the past and analyze the interests, values, perspectives, and points of view of those involved in the situation

Evaluate alternative courses of action, keeping in mind the information available at the time, in terms of ethical considerations, the interests of those affected by the decision, and the long- and short-term consequences of each

Evaluate the implementation of a decision by analyzing the interest it served; estimating the position, power, and priority of each player involved; assessing the ethical dimensions of the decision; and evaluating its costs and benefits from a variety of perspectives

Common Core State Standards: Standards for Literacy in History/Social Studies,
Grades 6-12
Reading Standards for Literacy in History/Social Studies, Grades 11-12

Key Ideas and Details
Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole

Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source; provide an accurate summary that makes clear the relationships among the key details and ideas

Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain

Craft and Structure
Determine the meaning of words and phrases as they are used in a text, including analyzing how an author uses and refines the meaning of a key term over the course of a text (e.g., how Madison defines faction in Federalist No. 10)

Analyze in detail how a complex primary source is structured, including how key sentences, paragraphs, and larger portions of the text contribute to the whole

Evaluate authors' differing points of view on the same historical event or issue by assessing the authors' claims, reasoning, and evidence

Integration of Knowledge and Ideas
Integrate and evaluate multiple sources of information presented in diverse formats and media (e.g., visually, quantitatively, as well as in words) in order to address a question or solve a problem

Evaluate an author's premises, claims, and evidence by corroborating or challenging them with other information

Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources

Text Type and Purposes
Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content

Production and Distribution of Writing
Produce clear and coherent writing in which the development, organization, and style are appropriate to task, purpose, and audience

Maryland State Curriculum Standards for United States History

Expectation: Students will demonstrate understanding of the cultural, economic, political, social and technological developments from 1946-1968.

Topic: Challenges of the Post War World (1946-1968)

Indicator
1. Analyze the causes, events, and policies of the Cold War between 1946-1968 (5.4.1)

Objectives

In this History Lab, students will examine how the Cold War impacted U.S. foreign policy in Latin America during the 1950s. Through an analysis of primary sources, they will construct and provide support for a historical interpretation on the role of the United States in the Guatemalan coup of 1954. By analyzing the actions and motivations of key individuals and organizations that participated in the coup, students will decide if the United States acted to contain communism or to protect the business interests of the United Fruit Company.

Students will analyze American foreign policy decisions during the Cold War in order to evaluate the role of the CIA and the American government in the Guatemalan coup of 1954.

Students will use inquiry skills to interpret primary source materials in order to determine the motivations behind the Eisenhower administration's intervention in Guatemala.

Topic Background

Topic Background

Following the Second World War, the containment of communism was a primary concern for the United States. The United States feared that communist forces would gain a foothold in post-colonial, developing nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. To avoid a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union, and to protect its image, the U.S. government increasingly used the newly-formed Central Intelligence Agency in covert operations to respond to perceived threats. In 1954, the focus of the Cold War turned to the Western Hemisphere and the nation of Guatemala.

In the late nineteenth century bananas had become a regular part of the American diet. By 1901, the profitable, American-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO) was working extensively out of Guatemala to supply produce to the American market. With the support of dictatorial, right-wing Guatemalan leaders, the UFCO had built an empire in the country, securing vast tracts of land for commercial farming and economic privileges.

Jorge Ubico came to power in Guatemala in 1931. While credited with improving roads and public works, Ubico harshly suppressed political dissidents. The UFCO continued to flourish, though, gaining control of more than 40% of the country's land and an exemption from taxes and import duties. The company also controlled International Railways of Central America and Empress Electrica, monopolizing Guatemala's transportation and power industries; making the United States Guatemala's major trade partner.

Growing unrest among the middle class led to the overthrow of Ubico in the October Revolution of 1944, ending his thirteen-year rule. In 1944, Juan José Arévalo, a philosophy professor, was elected by a majority of the popular vote. Arévalo faced significant challenges, with a poor, illiterate population and land ownership concentrated among the nation's elite. After the passage of a new constitution, based on that of the United States, Arévalo began to implement education and land reforms and establish workers' rights, modeling his programs on the New Deal agenda of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

President Jacobo Arbenz succeeded Arévalo in 1951. Political freedom was of particular concern to Arbenz, who allowed communists in the Guatemalan Labor Party to hold key government seats. While their numbers were small, the inclusion of Labor Party members in the Guatemalan government was troubling to the United States, despite evidence that demonstrated very little, if any, communist activity or influence in the Arbenz administration.

Arbenz legalized labor unions and passed further land reform legislation to expropriate idle land for redistribution to the poor. Small farms and those between 223 and 670 acres were not affected. Farms of any size that were fully utilized were exempt as well. Decree 900, approved in 1952, however, empowered the government to seize control of idle portions of plantations. The UFCO held about 500,000 acres of uncultivated land, in part to keep it out of the hands of competitors. The company, which had devalued the land for tax purposes, rejected the compensation then offered based on assessed and paid taxes on the land, as offered by the Guatemalan government, stating it was insufficient. When the dispute could not be settled, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, intervened, taking the matter before the Tenth Inter-American Conference on the grounds that Guatemala was in violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

A majority of Guatemalans resented the United Fruit Company, believing the corporation had prevented the country from gaining economic independence. For years, UFCO had freely operated with the support of a series of Guatemalan dictators. The success of the UFCO, claimed official Alfonso Bauer Paiz, Minister of Labor and the Economy under President Arbenz, had come at the expense of the people. In his mind, the UFCO was a corrupt enemy of Guatemala.

When challenged by Arbenz and the land reform movement, UFCO designed a propaganda campaign to link the Guatemalan president to a growing communist threat in the region. The campaign consisted of carefully-planned press junkets for influential and sympathetic American reporters from the New York Times, Time, U.S. News and World Report, and The Christian Science Monitor. During the arranged tours, the members of the press were presented with information, provided by the UFCO, which indicated that communists had infiltrated the government of Guatemala. Guillermo Toriello, Guatemala's Ambassador to the United States, formally protested the depiction of his country by these news organizations.

In this climate of elevated public fear of communism, and with mounting pressure from the UFCO, President Eisenhower decided to take action in Guatemala. Eisenhower had previously vowed to reduce the federal budget and cut Cold War spending. He believed that new tactics were needed to fight the Cold War and turned to the CIA to conduct clandestine operations that would prove less costly than large-scale military operations. This was Eisenhower's "New Look" program.

Aware that direct military engagement in Guatemala would damage the image of the U.S. and could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower authorized the CIA in August 1953 to begin planning for the overthrow President Arbenz. Complicating the matter, CIA director, Allen Dulles, and his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, both had financial ties to the United Fruit Matter.

The CIA handpicked Castillo Armas to lead rebel forces in an invasion of Guatemala, promising to support him as provisional president after Arbenz was removed. Armas, an exiled ex-Guatemalan military officer, had long opposed Arbenz. He had a few hundred rebel forces supporting him in Honduras. Alone they were no match for the Guatemalan military, however, with the assistance of the CIA, the plotters believed they could weaken Arbenz's popularity.

On 26 May 1954, Armas' forces flew over the Palacio Nacional (National Palace), dropping anti-communist leaflets that urged Guatemalans to join the resistance. Then, on June 18th, Armas and his few hundred American-trained rebel forces, armed with American weapons, launched an invasion. They were initially unsuccessful, but rumors that American troops might join the invasion were enough to turn many officials and the military against Arbenz, who resigned a few days later.

Castillo Armas became the leader of Guatemala and quickly reversed land reform and labor union laws. He also created a National Committee of Defense Against Communism, making it a priority to crush communist activity in Guatemala. In doing so, he put an end to the relative political freedom that Guatemalans had known for ten years. Armas was assassinated three years into his presidency. Over the next thirty years, a series of military dictators ruled Guatemala using terror tactics to secure their power, with the tacit support of the United States.

In 1997, the CIA released the secret files of the covert Operation PBSUCCESS. These files have led many historians to re-visit the motivations of the American players in Guatemala. Was Eisenhower protecting the United States from a national security threat in Guatemala, or using communism as an excuse to protect powerful business interests with direct ties to his administration? Regardless of the motives, the United States' actions in Guatemala left the Guatemalan people without a democratic government and facing decades of oppression, civil war and violence.

Vocabulary

Banana Republic - Term for a small nation, especially in Central America, dependent on the cultivation of a single crop or the influx of foreign capital

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - A federal bureau of the United States, created in 1947, to coordinate and conduct espionage and intelligence activities

Kremlin - The historic fortified complex in Moscow that is the seat of power of the Russian government and of the former Soviet Union

Clandestine - Kept or done in secret, often in order to conceal an illicit or improper purpose

Despotism - Absolute power or authority

Mercenary - A professional soldier hired to serve in a foreign army.

Expropriate - To take property from someone, either legally for the public good, or illegally by means of theft or fraud

Intransigent - Refusing to change or consider changing a decision or attitude

Teaching Procedures
Overarching Question: How did the Cold War influence American foreign policy decisions?
To answer the overarching question, students will need to understand how, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the extraordinary tensions of the Cold War era and anxiety about communism influenced American domestic and foreign policy decisions.

History Lab Focus Question: Were the actions taken by the United States in Guatemala in 1954 motivated primarily by a fear of communism (containment) or to protect American business interests (bananas)?

To assess the actions of the United States in the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, students will examine documents, film clips, and visual images. They will determine the motivations of the key individuals and organizations that participated in the coup, and decide if the United States acted primarily to contain communism or to protect the business interests of the United Fruit Company.
Materials:
RS#01: The Guatemalan Coup Reading - Topic Background
Journey to Banana Land - A propaganda film produced by the United Fruit Company in 1950. (Can be viewed on YouTube or downloaded at
(https://archive.org/details/2094_Journey_To_Bananaland)
RS#02: Making Connections Warm-Up
RS#03: Guatemalan Coup Document Analysis Sheet
RS#04: Source 1 - Official CIA Document, October 1952
RS#05: Source 2 - Peurifoy Telegram to Dept. of State, 18 December 1953
RS#06: Source 3 - President Arbenz's Resignation Speech
RS#07: Source 4 - Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Radio Address, 1954
RS#08: Source 5 - "Arbenz Pits Reds Against U.S.?" The Christian Science Monitor,1954
RS#09: Source 6 - Eisenhower Memoirs, 1963
RS#10: Source 7 - Phillip C. Roettinger, "The Company, Then and Now," 1986
RS#11: Assessment Option 1 - Interpreting Gloriosa Victoria
RS#12: Assessment Option 2 - How Would the Soviets Have Portrayed the American Intervention in Guatemala?
RS#13: Composition Scoring Tool
RS#14: Power Point - The power point is used to guide students through the History Lab. Slides provide additional context and allow visual learners to view classroom discussion questions.
Sticky Notes
Continuum (for the board)
Step 1: Initiate the Lab
Present students with the overarching question: How did the Cold War influence American foreign policy decisions?

To understand and answer this large question, tell students that they will focus on a specific foreign policy topic: The intervention of the United States in the overthrow of the president of Guatemala, Central America, in 1954.

To prepare for the History Lab, students will read background information on U.S.-Guatemalan relations during the first half of the twentieth century (RS#01). Afterwards, they will complete a chart, highlighting the motivations of key players in the 1954 Guatemalan coup. This will be assigned as homework before starting the History Lab.
Step 2: Frame the Lab Step 3: Model the Historical Process

Distribute the Guatemalan Coup Document Analysis Sheet (RS#03)

Distribute and have students read the sample source (RS#04 Source 1 - Official CIA Document, October 1952, and complete the section for Source 1 on the analysis sheet.

As a class, identify and discuss the text, context, and subtext for the source. Review definitions, if necessary:

Text - What information is provided by the source?

Context - The conditions under which the source was created. Why was the source produced? What was going on during the time period?

Subtext - What information can be determined by reading between the lines? Was the document meant to be read by the public? For whom was the source intended and why was it produced?

Ask the students how the source affects their view of the focus question: Were the actions taken by the United States in Guatemala in 1954 motivated primarily by a fear of communism (containment) or to protect American business interests (bananas)?

Reread the text. Underline examples indicating whether the author believed communism was a threat in Guatemala.

Does the source offer any information to support the idea that Guatemala was a communist threat?

Is there any evidence that the coup was planned by the United States to protect the interests of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala?

Is this author believable? Why or why not? Is this source biased?

Step 4: Facilitate the Lab
Students will work collaboratively in assigned groups. Divide students into groups of four, based on their personalities and strengths. Distribute the remaining six (RS#05 - RS#10) sources to each group. Each student is responsible for two sources within their group. Student "A" is responsible for the two sources labeled "A," etc.

Students will work independently on their subtext chart for the assigned sources. Give students 25 to 30 minutes to complete this assignment. The subtext chart requires that students determine if their sources supports the idea that the coup was planned by the United States because Guatemala represented a national security threat, or because business interests were at stake. Students should also analyze the subtext of the source by answering the questions:

Who created the source and how does the authorship impact the message?

Who was the source intended for? Does that affect its meaning?

What is important about when the source was produced?

As a group, students will share their interpretations of the sources, while completing their chart for all seven sources.
Step 5: Present Information and Interpretations

Place a large continuum on the front board, with "Bananas" on one end, and "Containment" on the other end.

Have students write their name on sticky notes. If they believe the United States supported the coup in order to protect bananas, they should place their note near the "Banana" sign. If they believe the United States supported the coup in order to contain communism, they should post their note near the word "Containment."

To prepare for a class debate and discussion, project the following questions for students to answer:

Which of the materials affected your historical interpretation the most? Why?

Which two sources contradicted each other the most? Why?

Which readings, images, or clips did you find complemented each other the most? Why?

Which evidence did you find the most difficult or inconclusive? Why?

Have the students who placed their sticky notes on "Bananas" move to one side of the room, and those who placed their sticky notes on ""Containment" move to the other side.

Facilitate a debate with students about their historical interpretation of the History Lab's focus question.
Ask: What motivated the United States to sponsor the Guatemalan coup? Manage the opposing interpretations. Students should support their answers with evidence obtained from the sources.

Guide the debate:

Was President Eisenhower's memoir a reliable source? Why or why not?

Why do you believe that CIA members who participated in PBSUCCESS had such different interpretations about the motivations behind the coup?

According to the sources, how was the United Fruit Company partially responsible for the coup?

Did the actions of the United States in Guatemala violate the democratic principles on which the U.S.was founded?

Allow students to move their sticky notes if their opinion changes during the class debate. Have students justify their new positions.

Step 6: Connect to the Overarching Question
Ask students the following questions to connect the lab to the overarching question: How did the Cold War influence American foreign policy decisions?

How did the CIA- sponsored coup in Guatemala reflect the concerns of the Eisenhower Administration and its foreign policy in Latin America during the Cold War?

Could the United States have pursued alternative actions in Guatemala?

Prediction: How would U.S. action in Guatemala affect the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union? Explain.

Prediction: Would the Cold War intensify or improve as a result of U.S. actions in Guatemala? Justify your response.

Step 7:Assess Student Understanding
Option 1: RS#11 Diego Rivera Painting
Students will use their acquired knowledge from the History Lab to answer the following questions about Diego Rivera' s painting, Gloriosa Victoria.

Option 2: RS#12 How Would the Soviets Have Portrayed the American Intervention in Guatemala?
Students will write a three-paragraph news briefing on the American involvement in the Guatemalan coup from the perspective of a Soviet state-run newspaper in July of 1954. Students will analyze how the Soviets would have depicted the actions of the United States in Guatemala and how they may have used the events for propaganda. They will determine how these actions could have affected U.S.-Soviet relations. Remind students to cite specific information from the sources provided to support their central argument. Use RS#13 Composition Scoring Tool to assess their work.

Student Resources

Teacher Resources

NOTE:For some Resource Sheets, an associated teacher resource is provided with additional information. These are numbered RS#XX.1.

Primary Source Annotaions

Official CIA Document, October 1952 - RS# 04 (Source 1) http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d27

Text: This official CIA document assessed President Arbenz's political orientation and determined that he both recognized and worked with known members of the Communist Party, but they did not influence his decision-making. The document provided evidence to prove that Arbenz was not motivated by communism, but, in fact, by FDR's New Deal. While Arbenz was of little concern to the United States, the possibility of a communist coup in Guatemala deserved its consideration.

Context: The CIA started its investigation of Arbenz in 1950, following his election. This document was written in October of 1952, after Arbenz had passed land reform acts, expropriating idle land. He had already recognized the Guatemalan Communist Party because of his belief in political freedom.

Subtext: This official document was intended only for members of the CIA and high-ranking government officials. The author was likely a CIA agent working in Guatemala. The document was produced during the investigation into President Arbenz's alliances and questioned his possible affiliation to the Communist Party in Guatemala. The author clearly believed there was a communist threat in Guatemala, but did not think that Arbenz constituted a threat to the United States.

John E. Peurifoy Telegram to Dept. of State, 18 December 1953 - RS# 05 (Source 2)

Source: American Ambassador to Guatemala, John E. Peurifoy's telegram to Department of State, Dispatch No.522, December 18th, 1953, in Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, by Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 136-139.

Text: This document summarized Ambassador John Peurifoy's dinner meeting with President Jacobo Arbenz. The meeting lasted six hours and was the only time the two men met in person. During the conversation, they had several disagreements. Arbenz insisted there were only a few communists in Guatemala, with no real power. Peurifoy spoke of a significant communist threat in the country. The two men also disagreed about the role of the United Fruit Company. Arbenz insisted the problem that existed between the two nations was not due to communism, but in fact, to issues with the United Fruit Company and land reform. Peurifoy insisted that American business interests had no impact on American foreign policy.

Context: This was written by John Peurifoy, the new American Ambassador to Guatemala, in December, before the coup. Peurifoy was a well-known anti-communist. It was said that after this telegram, Eisenhower gave final approval for Operation PBSUCCESS.

Subtext: Peurifoy wrote this telegram believing that only high ranking members of the State Department would read it; which certainly influenced the way he composed the telegram. It was clear in the telegram, that Peurifoy was unwilling to reason with Arbenz or listen to him justify his decisions in Guatemala. Peurifoy believed that if Arbenz was going to allow a "Commie influence from so few" he should be removed from office.

President Arbenz's Resignation Speech - RS# 06 (Source 3)

Source: http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000920952.pdf

Text: President Jacobo Arbenz resigned his office on Sunday, 27 June 1954. He read his resignation speech over Guatemalan radio. It is hard to know how many Guatemalans heard the speech, because the CIA had partially jammed its transmission over the airwaves. In the speech, Arbenz directly blamed the financial interests of the United States and the United Fruit Company for his downfall. He stated that there was no communist threat in Guatemala and defended his democratic principles.

Context: The speech was written by President Arbenz, after he realized that he could not overcome the forces attempting to overthrow his government. His last public radio address to the Guatemalan people took place on 27 June 1954, when he resigned the presidency.

Subtext: Knowing this was his last presidential address, Arbenz wrote a defensive speech that bitterly laid blame for the coup on the United States. Arbenz emphatically stated that communism was only an excuse for the American government, which sought to protect its business interests in his country. His audience was the citizens of Guatemala and the world. After resigning, Arbenz never wrote again about the events of the coup. The speech was clearly emotional, since it was the only opportunity Arbenz had had to defend himself before being exiled.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Radio Address - RS# 07 (Source 4)

Source: Jonathan L. Fried and others, eds., Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History (New York: Grove Press, 1983), 77-79.

Text: In this media address, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, alerted the American public to the communist forces that had attempted to seize Guatemala. He referred to Guatemala as an example of the "intrusion of Soviet despotism." He stated that Russian-trained, communist agitators had infiltrated public and private sectors in Guatemala. Dulles informed the American people that the President Jacobo Arbenz has resigned, because it was what the Guatemalan people wanted. He made no mention of American involvement in the event, but considered it an American victory against communism in the Western Hemisphere.

Context: One week after Arbenz's resignation, Dulles spoke publically to the American people to discuss the events in Guatemala. Citing a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, Dulles explained how the Soviets had threatened the Western Hemisphere. Dulles was known as an aggressive anti-communist supporter during the early Cold War. His law firm had represented the United Fruit Company, and his brother, Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA in the Eisenhower Administration, owned shares in the company.

Subtext: Dulles' speech was intended for the American public. Dulles made no mention of his personal and family connections to the United Fruit Company, but the company's well-being in Guatemala was certainly important. In the address, Dulles did not mention the role of the U.S. and CIA in the coup. He was deceptive in trying to dispel rumors that United Fruit was involved in the coup, explaining that the company only had the best of intentions in Guatemala. He exaggerated the communist presence in the country, and led the American public to believe Guatemala was a communist stronghold, because it was in his best interest politically. In addition, Dulles used the speech to reinforce the idea that communism could spread anywhere, heightening the already existing fear among the American people. With an aggressive anti-communist stance, the overthrow of the Arbenz regime bolstered the Eisenhower administration in the eyes of the American public.
Arbenz Pits Reds Against U.S.? - RS# 08 (Source 5)
Source: "Arbenz Pits Reds Against U.S.?" The Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 1954, 11.

Text: In this newspaper article, the author, who was identified as a Latin American affairs staff writer, discussed communist infiltration in Guatemala. The article said that while some were skeptical, a threat existed because of President Arbenz's policies towards the communists in his country. This source indicated that the United States was not exaggerating the threat of communism that was developing in Guatemala. An unidentified Latin American source was quoted as saying that the threat did not lie with the Guatemalan people, but, rather, with Arbenz himself. The observer believed that Arbenz allowed the communists to operate in order to provoke the United States into taking action, thus providing ammunition and propaganda for the Soviet Union to use against the Americans.

Context: The article was published in January of 1954. During this period, the United Fruit Company held press junkets in Guatemala for prominent newspapers. These junkets promoted favorable coverage of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala. The information was crafted carefully to reflect well on the company, while condemning the Arbenz administration. The Christian Science Monitor was among the publications that regularly participated in these junkets.

Subtext: This article was written by an unidentified Latin American affairs staff member and was intended for the readers of the Christian Science Monitor. The article stated that the communist threat in Guatemala was real and that Arbenz allowed communists to operate because he was trying to bait the U.S. into action. This was significant because journalists from the Christian Science Monitor attended several United Fruit Company press junkets in Guatemala. These press junkets were carefully orchestrated, biased, and damaging to objective journalism within the United States. The article was strongly influenced by the United Fruit Company and its anti-communist Guatemalan press campaign.

Eisenhower Memoirs - RS# 09 (Source 6)

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1963) 421-426.

Text: This excerpt from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's autobiography, The White House Years: A Mandate For Change 1953-1956, was written in 1963, nearly a decade after he had authorized Operation PBSUCCESS. In the excerpt, Eisenhower justified the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, because of the communist threat the country had posed to the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. However, Eisenhower did not disclose the CIA's full involvement in the coup, stating that the CIA intervened to provide air support when the anti-communist forces of Castillo Armas were struggling. Eisenhower attributed the coup to overall distrust and disapproval of the Arbenz regime.

Context: A Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years was Dwight D. Eisenhower's personal account of his entry into politics and his first administration as President of the United States. Eisenhower wrote the book in 1963, at the height of the Cold War, three years after his presidency had ended and nine years after the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. At the time the autobiography was released, the American public was still unaware of exactly what role the CIA played in the coup.

Subtext: Dwight Eisenhower wrote his autobiography to chronicle his presidency and to defend his legacy. He wrote for the general public. By writing a memoir, Eisenhower attempted to justify his actions and decisions as president. In the excerpt, Eisenhower raised questions as to the credibility and veracity of his account.
Philip C. Roettinger, "The Company, Then and Now," - RS# 10 (Source 7)
Source: Philip C. Roettinger, "The Company Then and Now," The Progressive, July 1986, 50.

Text: Phillip Roettinger, a former CIA agent who helped train the Guatemalan rebels, revealed his disgust with the operation. In his opinion, Arbenz was not motivated by communism, but that communism had provided a convenient excuse for the United States to interfere in Guatemala on behalf of the United Fruit Company. The coup, he believed, ultimately set Guatemala on course for thirty years of oppressive military rule.

Context: Philip Roettinger wrote his essay thirty-two years after the coup, after three decades of reflection. Living in Central America for several years, Roettinger was in a unique position to witness the impact of the coup. His essay appeared in The Progressive, a magazine that promoted itself as dedicated to social justice.

Subtext: This account, written years after the coup, was intended for the general public. In it, Roettinger stated his beliefs about the overthrow of President Arbenz. Roettinger, who had trained the rebels in Honduras, had come to believe the coup was a mistake. This was evident when Roettinger stated that the rebels he trained were "uninterested in social reforms and untouched by ideological convictions..." They just wanted to overthrow a government." Roettinger had come to understand that the rebels weren't concerned with communism; they were concerned with power. He blamed U.S. business interests in the United Fruit Company and discontent over Guatemalan land reforms for the overthrow of President Arbenz.

Other References:

Books

Chapman, Peter. Bananas: How the United Fruit Company Shaped the World. Edinburgh, Scotland: Canongate, 2007.

Cullather, Nick. Secret History: The CIA's Classified Accounts of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-54. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1963.

Fried, Jonathan L. and others, eds., Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History. New York: Grove Press, 1983.

Kinzer, Stephen, and Stephen Schlesinger. Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999.

La Feber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996. 8th ed. America in Crisis. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997

La Feber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions - The United States in Central America. New York, New York: W & W Norton and Company, Inc., 1993.

Phillips, David Atlee. The Night Watch. New York, New York: New York Athenaeum, 1977.
Films
Journey to Banana Land - A propaganda film produced by the United Fruit Company in 1950. (Can be viewed on YouTube or downloaded at https://archive.org/details/2094_Journey_To_Bananaland
Magazines
"Arbenz Pits Reds Against U.S.?" Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 1954, 11.

Roettinger, Philip C. "The Company Then and Now," The Progressive, July 1986, 50.
Online Sources
Arbenz's Resignation Speech. Central Intelligence Agency. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. Available from http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000920952.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2013.

Banana Republic: The United Fruit Company. Available from http://www.mayaparaiso.com/united_fruit_company.php. Accessed 8 August 2011.

Doyle, Kate and Peter Kornbluh. CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents. The National Security Archives. Available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/ . Accessed 8 August 2011.

"Miss Chiquita: Getting to Know our First Lady of Fruit." Chiquita. Available from http://chiquita.com/Our-Company/The-Chiquita-Story/Miss-Chiquita.aspx . Accessed 4 May 2013.

"Personal Political Orientation of President Arbenz." Official CIA Document. 10 October 1952 Available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d27 . Accessed 4 May 2013.

Photograph Jacobo Arbenz. Available from http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/guatemala/arbenz-leaving.jpg . Accessed 4 May 2013.

"Timeline: Guatemala's History of Violence." Frontline World: Stories From a Small Planet. http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/guatemala704/history/timeline.html . Accessed 4 May 2013.

Zinn, Howard. Excerpt. A People's History of the U.S. New York, New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Available from http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/zinn-chap16.html#guatamala . Accessed 30 March 2013.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Center for History Education Online Lessons

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Download a printer-friendly version] Author: Courtney Fleming, Parkville High School, Baltimore County Public Schools Grade Level: High Duration: Two 80-minute block periods Overview: As the Cold War heated up in the 1950s, the United States made decisions on foreign policy with the goal of containing communism.

# data[].attributes.body
"During Guzman’s presidency, Fortuny played a key role in the administration of President Jacobo Arbenz (1951–1954) as the president's friend, personal adviser, and member of the so-called "kitchen cabinet," writing many of his speeches."

https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/fortuny-jose-manuel-1916

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
José Manuel Fortuny ( b. 22 March 1916), Guatemalan Communist leader. Fortuny was born in Cuilapa in the department of Santa Rosa to a middle-class family. He studied law at the University of San Carlos but never graduated. Beginning in 1938 he worked as a journalist, and the following year he began to write poetry and theatrical works for radio. In 1940 he won a national poetry prize. Until 1942 he was a journalist with the radio news program Diario del Aire, directed by the novelist Miguel Angel Asturias.

Fortuny began his political career in the student struggle against the dictator Jorge Ubico (1931-1944) and participated in the revolution of October 1944. From 1945 to 1949 he was a representative to the National Constituent Assembly and to the Guatemalan Congress. He founded the leftist Popular Liberation Front (FPL) in 1944 and served as secretary-general to both the FPL and the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR) in 1947. In that same year he formed a faction within the PAR called the Democratic Vanguard, which gave rise in 1949 to the Guatemalan Communist Party (PCG), renamed the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) in 1952. He was the secretary-general of this group until 1954.

Fortuny played a key role in the administration of President Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954) as the president's friend, personal adviser, and member of the so-called "kitchen cabinet," writing many of his speeches. After the American intervention and subsequent fall of Arbenz, Fortuny went into exile. He continued as leader of his party, and between 1971 and 1974 lived clandestinely within Guatemala. He later moved to Mexico City and went to work for the newspaper Uno Más Uno. In the 1990s he remained a Marxist and followed the moderate evolution of the former Italian Communist Party.
See also Guatemala, Political Parties: Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT); Guatemala, Political Parties: Revolutionary Action Party (PAR).
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Flores, Marco Antonio. Fortuny: Un comunista guatemalteco. Guatemala: Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 1994.

Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

James, Daniel. Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude. New York: John Day Co., Inc., 1954.

Schlesinger, Stephen and Stephen Kinzer. Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala. Garden City: Doubleday, 1982.

Schneider, Ronald M. Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954. New York: Praeger, 1958.

VÍctor AcuÑa

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.keywords[]
josé manuel (1916–)josé manuel fortuny (b. 22 march 1916)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.keywords[]
guatemalan communist leader. fortuny was born in cuilapa in the department of santa rosa to a middle-class family. he studied law at the university of san carlos but never graduated. beginning in 1938 he worked as a journalist

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.keywords[]
and the following year he began to write poetry and theatrical works for radio. in 1940 he won a national poetry prize.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Fortuny, José Manuel (1916–) | Encyclopedia.com

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Fortuny, José Manuel (1916–)José Manuel Fortuny (b. 22 March 1916), Guatemalan Communist leader. Fortuny was born in Cuilapa in the department of Santa Rosa to a middle-class family. He studied law at the University of San Carlos but never graduated. Beginning in 1938 he worked as a journalist, and…

# data[].attributes.body
Jacobo’s social circle included many communists who influenced his decisions (Ex. José Manuel Fortuny, communist leader of Latin America, one of the main advisors for the Guatemalan government)

# data[].attributes.headline
Arbenz's Social Circle (Communist Friends)

# data[].attributes.subject
Arbenz's Social Circle (Communist Friends)