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Google slides (unit 2 part 1 and 2), Oyez, government archives (constitution, bill of rights)

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In Judicial Activism, the constitution is interpreted loosely depending on what is needed presently, so change can be made.
In Judicial Restraint, the constitution is interpreted strictly, and new changes are held back.

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Impact on Policy Making -- Judicial Review

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Impact on Policy Making -- Judicial Review

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When new policies are mad, the judicial branch must interpret its meaning, determine its relevance, and rule on how it should be applied. The supreme court must make sure that laws and policies are constitutional in the US.

It is the Supreme Court's responsibility to make sure that the government is not corrupt, and is following the constitution. They must constantly review what is going on.

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Key Judicial Players & Traditional Backgrounds

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Key Judicial Players & Traditional Backgrounds

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John Roberts - Chief Justice
Studied at Harvard Law, then worked as a lawyer until he was appointed as a judge in 2003. After some time, John Roberts became the youngest supreme court chief justice in 100 years.
Clarence Thomas - Associate Justice
After humble beginnings, studied at Yale school of Law. After various jobs, a drinking addiction, and sexual harassments accusations, he was appointed associate justice by Bush.
Sonia Sotomayor - Associate Justice
After being born in the Bronx, she studied at Princeton University, and then Yale Law. She worked famous cases as a lawyer, then was appointed to the US circuit court, and finally appointed to the Supreme Court by Obama.

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When Marbury was appointed as Justice of the Piece in the District of Columbia, he did not get his commission delivered. When he asked the supreme court to make Madison deliver his commission, they were able to rule that Madison's refusal to deliver the commission was unconstitutional, but they also found they did not have the power to order Madison to deliver the commission.

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In Federalist 78, Hamilton argues that the Supreme Court should be responsible for making sure that Congress is abiding by the constitution using judicial review. The Supreme Court has to protect citizen's rights, and state that policies are unconstitutional. However, they have no power to enforce their rulings.

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Founders Online: The Federalist No. 78, [28 May 1788]

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At the top of the judicial branch is SCOTUS.

In the middle are the 12 circuit courts of appeals, these are concerned with regional cases. These cases deal with civil and criminal suits, but focus on constitutionality.

At the bottom of the judicial system are 94 district courts, which deal with small cases. 6 to 12 jurors make a unanimous decision to settle criminal and civil cases.

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Congress has oversight/power over the bureaucracy with the "power of the purse." This power is that congress controls the funding for bureaucratic agencies, which means they can defund them. They also can conduct committee hearings.

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Some key bureaucratic agencies include:
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Commerce
- Department of the Treasury
- Department of the Interior
- Department of Transportation

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In the law making system, the bureaucracy has to interact with congress and focus groups. These interacts form an iron triangle of legislation.

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If you're seeing this message, it means we're having trouble loading external resources on our website.

If you're behind a web filter, please make sure that the domains *.kastatic.org and *.kasandbox.org are unblocked.

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The bureaucracy: functions and responsibilities

Video transcript

now a related idea to just what a bureaucracy is in our federal government another question is how do they get influenced now one idea that you might see in many American government courses is the idea of an Iron Triangle so an Iron Triangle describes how various parties might influence each other and what they might do for each other so let's say that there is a group that is very interested in building more roads maybe there's a group that represents all the road contractors in the United States and they would love more highways to be built because there'd be more business for them and so then that interest group who wants more highways to be built they might say hey Congress people we want more highways built and the way that they try to get favored with Congress is through electoral support now what kind of electoral support could they give well they could donate money to the congressman directly they could donate money to political parties they could try to activate the electorate to vote for a Congress person who favors their agenda more than someone else in exchange Congress people could do a few things they could provide more funding to the bureaucracy that is going to build roads and we just talked about that bureaucracy in the executive branch and those that bureaucracy not only might they build more roads but if they like those interest groups they might lower the regulations on them maybe they might give them more contracts as they build those roads another thing that Congress could do for the interest group is pass friendly legislation so maybe pass a law that makes it easier to build roads in a certain part of the country or in a certain way but the reason why it's called an Iron Triangle it's it's not just about what do interest groups want it's also one of what does Congress want what does the bureaucracy want and what do they get from the other two parties so we already talked about how Congress can get electoral support from interest groups but what can it get from a bureaucracy Congress passes laws in a budget but a pure ah cracy for the most part decides how to execute on that and so if there are if they are aligned with Congress they might execute on those laws with a little bit more end if the bureaucracy for one reason or another is not as gung-ho about those laws they might drag their feet a little bit and from the bureaucracy point of view well we already talked how they could get funding and political support from Congress you see that on that part of the triangle there what do they get from the interest groups well we already talked about the congressional support which they can do by supporting Congress people who might support favorable policies for the bureaucracy the interest groups might be able to directly lobby Congress which means hey we're gonna meet with Congress we might even draft some things some things for the policy agenda now a related idea to an Iron Triangle and interest groups that you might also hear in an American government course is the notion of issue and that works one way to think about issue networks is they are essentially more informal than interest groups interest groups can be part of an issue network but an issue network can be let's say you and I start to get really activated about something we get on TV and then we start mailing our Congress people and we start blogging about it and we start getting a following and then that starts to influence an interest group or interest group joins with us and then we start to send messages to Congress we start to provide more scrutiny on the bureaucracy then we would be an issue network and as I mentioned issue networks might not be formal they might not be a formal that's a lobbying group or interest group but they can also have influence in the same way that an interest group does

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Iron triangles and issue networks (video) | Khan Academy

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The Bureaucracy is a part of the executive branch consisting of agencies, departments, and bureaus. Types of bureaucratic agencies include:

- Regulatory agencies that make sure companies, the police, and the government are following rules.

- Independent agencies are all of the other government agencies. This includes NASA and the General Services Administration.

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The 70th federalist paper argues that for a country to be successful, they must have a power executive leader, that can make good and strong government action. It argues that allowing the president to possess the entire executive branch is a good thing for the US.

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THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property against those irregular and high handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community, whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need however to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution: And a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive; it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy-how far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterise the plan, which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients, which constitute energy in the executive, are first unity, secondly duration, thirdly an adequate provision for its support, fourthly competent powers. 2

The circumstances 3 which constitute safety in the republican sense are, Ist. a due dependence on the people, secondly 4 a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen, who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles, and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand; while they have with equal propriety considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and 5 dispatch will generally characterise the proceedings 6 of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways; either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the controul and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first the two consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the states. New-York and New-Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only states, which have entrusted the executive authority wholly to single men.* Both these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections; and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far however as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be inamoured of plurality in the executive. We have seen that the Achæans on an experiment of two Præetors, were induced to abolish one. 7 The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissentions between the consuls, and between the military tribunes, who were at times substituted to the consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state, from the circumstance of the 8 plurality of those magistrates. That the dissentions between them were not more frequent, or more fatal, is matter of astonishment; until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The Patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Plebeians for the preservation of their antient authorities and dignities; the consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defence of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot; one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs; the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must no doubt have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships, which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of 9 the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, and attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprize or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office in which they are cloathed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissentions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most 10 violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes in their estimation an indispensable duty of self love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon, contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may in its consequences afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniencies from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary and therefore unwise to introduce them into the constitution of the executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberations and circumspection; and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favourable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissention in the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure, to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the executive, which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigour and expedition, and this without any counterballancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first 11 case supposed, that is to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority; a scheme the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect: But they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight, to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and delatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds, to censure and to punishment. The first is the most important of the two; especially in an elective office. Man, 12 in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him 13 unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him 14 obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated, that where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions, that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be a collusion between the parties concerned, how easy is it to cloath the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this state is coupled with a council, that is in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. 15 Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases indeed have been so flagrant, that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When enquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council; who on their part have charged it upon his nomination: While the people remain altogether at a loss to determine by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified, and 16 so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power; first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office, or to their actual punishment, in cases which admit of it.

In England the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim, which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing therefore can be wiser in that kingdom than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department; an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct, in the exercise of his office; and may observe or disregard the council given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behaviour in office, the reason which in the British constitution dictates the propriety of a council not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great-Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate; which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behaviour. In the American republic it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the chief magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the executive, which has so generally obtained in the state constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy, which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterballance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion in this particular with a writer whom the celebrated Junius 17 pronounces to be "deep, solid and ingenious," that, "the executive power is more easily confined when it is one:"*18 That it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and 20 in a word that all multiplication of the executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the executive is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult; or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power therefore is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who from the very circumstance of his being alone will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, † were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an executive much more numerous than that body, from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions; are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad, and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expence; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end, aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures, too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility.

I will only add, that prior to the appearance of the constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the states, who did not admit as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the Executive of this state was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

PUBLIUS.

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Founders Online: The Federalist No. 70, [15 March 1788]

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THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles.

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The 22nd amendment states that the president cannot serve more than two terms, and that a person who becomes president for at least 2 years cannot be president more than once again.

The 25th amendment states that if there is a vacancy for vice president, the president can appoint a new vice president, with confirmation from congress.

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The president is supported by their political party, and can appoint a cabinet to support them.

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- Party leader, helping their political party out and raising money, while awarding faithful members.
- Economic leader, helping the economy prosper (working with congress.)
- Model citizen, inspire the American people
- Managing crisis in the US

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These powers granted to the president by the constitution include:
- Chief Executive, carrying out laws passed by Congress
- Administrate cabinet departments
- Appoint cabinet members
- Nominate judges and supreme court justices
- Grant pardons
- Head of State, representing the US and visiting foreign nations -- promoting national spirit
- Chief Diplomat, including leading foreign policy, appointing ambassadors, and proposing treaties
- Commander of the military, can order troops into battle, assign generals
- Chief Legislator, recommend and persuade congress members to pass laws, ability to veto laws

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The president of the United States is one of the most famous people in the world. Their powers can be broken down into two categories:

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The US Government is divided into branches, political parties, and leadership positions. These clashing forces and powers make the government less likely to be corrupt, but they also make decisions harder to make.

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Gerrymandering is creating election districts that favor one group or party.

In Baker v Carr, a case was filed against the state of Tennessee, stating that they needed to redistrict. The Supreme Court needed to decide whether they have jurisdiction over this subject. In the end, they decided that they could order the state of Tennessee to redistrict.

In Shaw v Reno, a case about racial gerrymandering, a district drawn in North Carolina was brought before courts. The supreme court ruled that the district's bizarre shape suggested that it was intentionally trying to separate voters by race. Although it was made with good intentions, it went beyond what was neccesary.

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Gerrymandering -- explained | CNN Politics

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Here's what you need to know about gerrymandering, the word you're hearing so much about today.

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In congress, representatives will often only agree to bills if projects they want to happen are included in them as well. This wins them votes.

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Pork barrel, or simply pork, is a metaphor for the appropriation of government spending for localized projects secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.

The usage originated in American English, and it indicates a negotiated way of political particularism.

Scholars use it as a technical term regarding legislative control of local appropriations. In election campaigns, the term is used in derogatory fashion to attack opponents.

Typically, "pork" involves national funding for government programs whose economic or service benefits are concentrated in a particular area but whose costs are spread among all taxpayers. Public works projects, certain national defense spending projects, and agricultural subsidies are the most commonly cited examples.

Citizens Against Government Waste outlines seven criteria by which spending in the United States can be classified as "pork":

1. Requested by only one chamber of Congress

2. Not specifically authorized

3. Not competitively awarded

4. Not requested by the President

5. Greatly exceeds the President's budget request or the previous year's funding

6. Not the subject of Congressional hearings

7. Serves only a local or special interest.

The term pork barrel politics usually refers to spending which is intended to benefit constituents of a politician in return for their political support, either in the form of campaign contributions or votes.

In the popular 1863 story "The Children of the Public", Edward Everett Hale used the term pork barrel as a homely metaphor for any form of public spending to the citizenry. However, after the American Civil War, the term came to be used in a derogatory sense. The Oxford English Dictionary dates the modern sense of the term from 1873.

Pork barrel originally came from storing meat. By the 1870s, references to "pork" were common in Congress, and the term was further popularized by a 1919 article by Chester Collins Maxey in the National Municipal Review, which reported on certain legislative acts known to members of Congress as "pork barrel bills". He claimed that the phrase originated in a pre-Civil War practice of giving slaves a barrel of salt pork as a reward and requiring them to compete among themselves to get their share of the handout. More generally, a barrel of salt pork was a common larder item in 19th-century households, and could be used as a measure of the family's financial well-being. For example, in his 1845 novel The Chainbearer, James Fenimore Cooper wrote: "I hold a family to be in a desperate way, when the mother can see the bottom of the pork barrel."

An early example of pork barrel politics in the United States was the Bonus Bill of 1817, which was introduced by Democrat John C. Calhoun to construct highways linking the Eastern and Southern United States to its Western frontier using the earnings bonus from the Second Bank of the United States. Calhoun argued for it using general welfare and post roads clauses of the United States Constitution. Although he approved of the economic development goal, President James Madison vetoed the bill as unconstitutional.

One of the most famous alleged pork-barrel projects was the Big Dig in Boston, Massachusetts. The Big Dig was a project to relocate an existing 3.5-mile (5.6 km) section of the Interstate Highway System underground. The official planning phase started in 1982; the construction work was done between 1991 and 2006; and the project concluded on December 31, 2007. It ended up costing US$14.6 billion, or over US$4 billion per mile. Tip O'Neill (D-Mass), after whom one of the Big Dig tunnels was named, pushed to have the Big Dig funded by the federal government while he was the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives.

During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, the Gravina Island Bridge (also known as the "Bridge to Nowhere") in Alaska was cited as an example of pork barrel spending. The bridge, pushed for by Republican Senator Ted Stevens, was projected to cost $398 million and would connect the island's 50 residents and the Ketchikan International Airport to Revillagigedo Island and Ketchikan.

Pork-barrel projects, which differ from , are added to the federal budget by members of the appropriation committees of United States Congress. This allows delivery of federal funds to the local district or state of the appropriation committee member, often accommodating major campaign contributors. To a certain extent, a member of Congress is judged by their ability to deliver funds to their constituents. The Chairman and the ranking member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations are in a position to deliver significant benefits to their states. Researchers Anthony Fowler and Andrew B. Hall claim that this still does not account for the high reelection rates of incumbent representatives in American legislatures. Former Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye described himself as "the No. 1 earmarks guy in the U.S. Congress." Inouye regularly passed earmarks for funding in the state of Hawaii including military and transportation spending.

1. ^ Drudge, Michael W. Special Correspondent (1 August 2008). ""Pork Barrel" Spending Emerging as Presidential Campaign Issue". America.gov. United States Department of State. Archived from the original on 8 September 2008.

2. ^ Shepsle, Kenneth A.; Weingast, Barry R. (1981). "Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization". American Journal of Political Science. 25 (1): 96-111. doi:10.2307/2110914. JSTOR 2110914.

3. ^ "Citizens Against Government Waste". Cagw.org. 2006. Archived from the original on July 14, 2008.

4. ^ Sharma, Chanchal Kumar (2017-01-02). "A situational theory of pork-barrel politics: The shifting logic of discretionary allocations in India" (PDF). India Review. 16 (1): 14-41. doi:10.1080/14736489.2017.1279922. hdl:10419/156103. ISSN 1473-6489. S2CID 55173537.

5. The story first appeared in ^ Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, Jan. 24 and Jan. 31, 1863. Hale, Edward Everett (1910). "The Children of the Public". The Man without a Country and Other Tales. Macmillan: 97-175.

6. Quoted in: ^ Volo, James M.; Volo, Dorothy Denneen (2004). The Antebellum Period. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 170. ISBN 978-0-313-32518-2.

7. ^ Klein, Rick (August 6, 2006). "Big Dig failures threaten federal funding". The Boston Globe.

8. ^ Rimer, Sara (30 December 2009). "In Boston, Where Change Is in the Winter Air". New York Times.

9. ^ $315 million bridge to nowhere (PDF). Taxpayers for Common Sense. February 9, 2005. Archived from the original (PDF) on October 25, 2008.

10. ^ Fowler, Anthony; Hall, Andrew B. (December 2015). "Congressional seniority and pork: a pig fat myth?". European Journal of Political Economy. 40 (A): 42-56. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.07.006.

11. ^ Brown, Emma; Post, The Washington (18 December 2012). "Daniel Inouye was war hero, Senate deal maker, 'No. 1 earmarks guy'". The Bangor Daily News.

12. ^ "Daniel K. Inouye: Campaign Finance/Money - Other Data - Earmarks 2010". www.opensecrets.org.

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Pork barrel , or simply pork , is a metaphor for the appropriation of government spending for localized projects secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. The usage originated in American English, and it indicates a negotiated way of political particularism.

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The senate has the power of confirmation for treaties. The president has the power to ratify treaties.

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A bill can be held in committee if it doesn't get enough votes to leave it. A bill can be filibustered in the Senate if a senator disagrees with a bill extremely, and wants to block it. This measure is being used more and more often, making it harder for congress to pass laws.

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Party Leaders and Whips in the House and in the Senate coordinate their parties and speak for where they stand on different issues.

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The House or Senate can draft and propose a bill, vote on it, and then send it to the other. Then, it is sent to the president, where it can get signed or a vetoed. A veto can be overridden by a 2/3 majority in congress. Some dangers to a bill include: Being tabled by the committee, filibustered in senate, missing the vote in house or senate, and being vetoed.

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The chambers of the House and the Senate have different rules and structures. Generally, the House is more formal than the Senate due to the number of representatives. Debate in the House is very limited, in contrast to the almost unlimited debate in the Senate.

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Some powers of congress are enumerated in the constitution, but some powers are implied that congress has. For instance, the Necessary and Proper clause gives congress a lot of flexibility in legislation.

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In the Senate and House, coalitions are formed to get legislation done for a subject. They are formal in the House, and informal in the Senate.

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It is harder to get into the senate because there are fewer seats available, so it generally more formal.

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The US Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the senate, each state has two representatives. In the house, the representatives that a state is given depends on the population of the state. The House and Senate have different powers and shared powers, some of these being lawmaking, impeachment, and appointing judges.