# data[].attributes.body
El desarrollo económico se refiere al proceso de mejora del bienestar económico y la calidad de vida de una nación, región, comunidad local o individuo, de acuerdo con metas específicas. Este proceso implica la transformación estructural del sistema económico a largo plazo, con el objetivo de mejorar la eficiencia en los procesos productivos, atender las necesidades de las personas y considerar los efectos en el medio ambiente

no solo se centra en el crecimiento económico, sino que también se basa en indicadores como la esperanza de vida, el acceso a la educación y otros factores que contribuyen al desarrollo humano y social de los individuos

. En resumen, el desarrollo económico busca crear riqueza para mantener la prosperidad y mejorar la calidad de vida de las personas, considerando aspectos cuantitativos y cualitativos, así como la sostenibilidad y la igualdad

# data[].attributes.body
El crecimiento económico se refiere al aumento de la producción de bienes y servicios en una economía durante un período de tiempo. Este incremento se mide generalmente como el aumento del Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) o la renta nacional. El crecimiento económico inclusivo y sostenible puede impulsar el progreso, crear empleos decentes para todos y mejorar los estándares de vida

. El análisis del crecimiento económico busca comprender las razones detrás de las tasas dispares de crecimiento en diferentes regiones del mundo

. Algunos factores que contribuyen al crecimiento económico incluyen el progreso técnico, la inversión y la acumulación de capital

. Es importante destacar que el crecimiento económico por sí solo no garantiza mejoras en el bienestar de toda la población, a menos que sea sostenido y redistributivo

En resumen, el crecimiento económico es fundamental para el desarrollo de una sociedad, ya que puede generar empleo, mejorar los estándares de vida y promover el progreso. Sin embargo, es importante que este crecimiento sea inclusivo, sostenible y beneficie a toda la población.

# data[].attributes.body
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_development

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Economic growth can be defined as the increase or improvement in the inflation-adjusted market value of the goods and services produced by an economy in a financial year.[1] Statisticians conventionally measure such growth as the percent rate of increase in the real and nominal gross domestic product (GDP).[2]

Growth is usually calculated in real terms - i.e., inflation-adjusted terms - to eliminate the distorting effect of inflation on the prices of goods produced. Measurement of economic growth uses national income accounting. Since economic growth is measured as the annual percent change of gross domestic product (GDP), it has all the advantages and drawbacks of that measure. The economic growth-rates of countries are commonly compared using the ratio of the GDP to population ( per-capita income).

The "rate of economic growth" refers to the geometric annual rate of growth in GDP between the first and the last year over a period of time. This growth rate represents the trend in the average level of GDP over the period, and ignores any fluctuations in the GDP around this trend.

Economists refer to economic growth caused by more efficient use of inputs (increased productivity of labor, of physical capital, of energy or of materials) as intensive growth. In contrast, GDP growth caused only by increases in the amount of inputs available for use (increased population, for example, or new territory) counts as extensive growth.

Development of new goods and services also generates economic growth. As it so happens, in the U.S. about 60% of consumer spending in 2013 went on goods and services that did not exist in 1869.[6]

Critics such as the Club of Rome argue that a narrow view of economic growth, combined with globalization, is creating a scenario where we could see a systemic collapse of our planet's natural resources.[143][144]

The marginal costs of a growing economy may gradually exceed the marginal benefits, however measured.

Concerns about negative environmental effects of growth have prompted some people to advocate lower levels of growth, or the abandoning of growth altogether. In academia, concepts like uneconomic growth, steady-state economy, eco-taxes, green investments, basic income guarantees, along with more radical approaches associated with degrowth, eco-socialism and eco-anarchism have been developed in order to achieve this and to overcome possible growth imperatives.[145][146] In politics, green parties embrace the Global Greens Charter, recognising that "... the dogma of economic growth at any cost and the excessive and wasteful use of natural resources without considering Earth's carrying capacity, are causing extreme deterioration in the environment and a massive extinction of species."[147]: 2

The 2019 Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services published by the United Nations' Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services warned that given the substantial loss of biodiversity, society should not focus solely on economic growth.[148][149] Anthropologist Eduardo S. Brondizio, one of the co-chairs of the report, said "We need to change our narratives. Both our individual narratives that associate wasteful consumption with quality of life and with status, and the narratives of the economic systems that still consider that environmental degradation and social inequality are inevitable outcomes of economic growth. Economic growth is a means and not an end. We need to look for the quality of life of the planet."[150]

Those more optimistic about the environmental impacts of growth believe that, though localized environmental effects may occur, large-scale ecological effects are minor. The argument, as posited by commentator Julian Lincoln Simon, stated in 1981 that if these global-scale ecological effects exist, human ingenuity will find ways to adapt to them.[151] Conversely Partha Dasgupta, in a 2021 report on the economics of biodiversity commissioned by the British Treasury, argued that biodiversity is collapsing faster than at any time in human history as a result of the demands of contemporary human civilization, which "far exceed nature's capacity to supply us with the goods and services we all rely on. We would require 1.6 Earths to maintain the world's current living standards." He says that major transformative changes will be needed "akin to, or even greater than, those of the Marshall Plan," including abandoning GDP as a measure of economic success and societal progress.[152] Philip Cafaro, professor of philosophy at the School of Global Environmental Sustainability at Colorado State University, wrote in 2022 that a scientific consensus has emerged which demonstrates that humanity is on the precipice of unleashing a major extinction event, and that "the cause of global biodiversity loss is clear: other species are being displaced by a rapidly growing human economy."[153]

In 2019, a warning on climate change signed by 11,000 scientists from over 150 nations said economic growth is the driving force behind the "excessive extraction of materials and overexploitation of ecosystems" and that this "must be quickly curtailed to maintain long-term sustainability of the biosphere." They add that "our goals need to shift from GDP growth and the pursuit of affluence toward sustaining ecosystems and improving human well-being by prioritizing basic needs and reducing inequality."[154][155] A 2021 paper authored by top scientists in Frontiers in Conservation Science posited that given the environmental crises including biodiversity loss and climate change, and possible "ghastly future" facing humanity, there must be "fundamental changes to global capitalism," including the "abolition of perpetual economic growth."[156][157][158]

Up to the present, there is a close correlation between economic growth and the rate of carbon dioxide emissions across nations, although there is also a considerable divergence in carbon intensity (carbon emissions per GDP).[159] Up to the present, there is also a direct relation between global economic wealth and the rate of global emissions.[160] The Stern Review notes that the prediction that, "Under business as usual, global emissions will be sufficient to propel greenhouse gas concentrations to over 550 ppm CO ₂ by 2050 and over 650-700 ppm by the end of this century is robust to a wide range of changes in model assumptions." The scientific consensus is that planetary ecosystem functioning without incurring dangerous risks requires stabilization at 450-550 ppm.[161]

As a consequence, growth-oriented environmental economists propose government intervention into switching sources of energy production, favouring wind, solar, hydroelectric, and nuclear. This would largely confine use of fossil fuels to either domestic cooking needs (such as for kerosene burners) or where carbon capture and storage technology can be cost-effective and reliable.[162] The Stern Review, published by the United Kingdom Government in 2006, concluded that an investment of 1% of GDP (later changed to 2%) would be sufficient to avoid the worst effects of climate change, and that failure to do so could risk climate-related costs equal to 20% of GDP. Because carbon capture and storage are as yet widely unproven, and its long term effectiveness (such as in containing carbon dioxide 'leaks') unknown, and because of current costs of alternative fuels, these policy responses largely rest on faith of technological change.

British conservative politician and journalist Nigel Lawson has deemed carbon emission trading an 'inefficient system of rationing'. Instead, he favours carbon taxes to make full use of the efficiency of the market. However, in order to avoid the migration of energy-intensive industries, the whole world should impose such a tax, not just Britain, Lawson pointed out. There is no point in taking the lead if nobody follows suit.[163]

Many earlier predictions of resource depletion, such as Thomas Malthus' 1798 predictions about approaching famines in Europe, The Population Bomb,[164][165] and the Simon-Ehrlich wager (1980)[166] have not materialized. Diminished production of most resources has not occurred so far, one reason being that advancements in technology and science have allowed some previously unavailable resources to be produced.[166] In some cases, substitution of more abundant materials, such as plastics for cast metals, lowered growth of usage for some metals. In the case of the limited resource of land, famine was relieved firstly by the revolution in transportation caused by railroads and steam ships, and later by the Green Revolution and chemical fertilizers, especially the Haber process for ammonia synthesis.[167][168]

Resource quality is composed of a variety of factors including ore grades, location, altitude above or below sea level, proximity to railroads, highways, water supply and climate. These factors affect the capital and operating cost of extracting resources. In the case of minerals, lower grades of mineral resources are being extracted, requiring higher inputs of capital and energy for both extraction and processing. Copper ore grades have declined significantly over the last century.[169][170] Another example is natural gas from shale and other low permeability rock, whose extraction requires much higher inputs of energy, capital, and materials than conventional gas in previous decades. Offshore oil and gas have exponentially increased cost as water depth increases.

Some physical scientists like Sanyam Mittal regard continuous economic growth as unsustainable.[171][172] Several factors may constrain economic growth - for example: finite, peaked, or depleted resources.

In 1972, The Limits to Growth study modeled limitations to infinite growth; originally ridiculed,[164][165][173] some of the predicted trends have materialized, raising concerns of an impending collapse or decline due to resource constraints.[174][175][176]

Malthusians such as William R. Catton, Jr. are skeptical of technological advances that improve resource availability. Such advances and increases in efficiency, they suggest, merely accelerate the drawing down of finite resources. Catton claims that increasing rates of resource extraction are "...stealing ravenously from the future".[177]

Energy economic theories hold that rates of energy consumption and energy efficiency are linked causally to economic growth. The Garrett Relation holds that there has been a fixed relationship between current rates of global energy consumption and the historical accumulation of world GDP, independent of the year considered. It follows that economic growth, as represented by GDP growth, requires higher rates of energy consumption growth. Seemingly paradoxically, these are sustained through increases in energy efficiency.[178] Increases in energy efficiency were a portion of the increase in Total factor productivity.[15] Some of the most technologically important innovations in history involved increases in energy efficiency. These include the great improvements in efficiency of conversion of heat to work, the reuse of heat, the reduction in friction and the transmission of power, especially through electrification.[179][180] There is a strong correlation between per capita electricity consumption and economic development.[181][182]

The economic system as a subsystem of the environment: natural resources flow through the economy and end up as waste and pollution.

Ecological economics criticizes the possibility of infinite economic growth on a finite planet. Current economic models ignore physical constraints and thus suggest the economy can grow continuously as a perpetual motion machine. However, according to the laws of thermodynamics, perpetual motion machines do not exist.[183] Thus, no system can continue without inputs of new energy that exit as high entropy waste. Just as no animal can live on its own waste, no economy can recycle the waste it produces without the input of new energy to reproduce itself.[183]

Matter and energy enter the economy in the form of low entropy natural capital, such as solar energy, oil wells, fisheries, and mines. These materials and energy are used by households and firms alike to create products and wealth. After the materials are used up, the energy and matter leaves the economy in the form of high entropy waste that is no longer valuable to the economy. The natural materials that power the motion of the economic system from the environment, and the waste must be absorbed by the larger ecosystem in which the economy exists.[184]

It cannot be ignored that the economy intrinsically requires natural resources and the creation of waste that must be absorbed in some manner. The economy can only continue churning if it has matter and energy to power it and the ability to absorb the waste it creates. This matter and low entropy energy and the ability to absorb waste exists in a finite amount, and thus there is a finite amount of inputs to the flow and outputs of the flow that the environment can handle, implying there is a sustainable limit to motion, and therefore growth, of the economy.[183] The Limits to Growth states that, due to those limits caused by thermodynamical laws, the availability of resources will decrease in a context of everlasting growth, leading to the increase of the prices of those resources, therefore to a decrease of the investment in industry. This decrease of industry will eventually lead to scarcity of goods and services that could eventually lead to a decrease of the living conditions and an increase of death rates all over the world. [185]

1. ^ Roser, Max (2021). "What is economic growth? And why is it so important?". Our World in Data.

2. ^ Barro, Robert; Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (2004). Economic Growth (2nd ed.). p. 6. ASIN B003Q7WARA.

3. ^ Das, Tuhin K. (2019). "Cross-Sectional Views of GDP Growth in the Light of Innovations". Economic Growth eJournal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3503386. S2CID 219383124. SSRN 3503386.

4. ^

5. ^ Wang, Ping (2014). "Growth Accounting" (PDF). p. 2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-07-15.

6. ^ Corry, Dan; Valero, Anna; Van Reenen, John (November 2011). "UK Economic Performance Since 1997" (PDF). The UK‟s high GDP per capita growth was driven by strong growth in productivity (GDP per hour), which was second only to the US.

7. ^

8. ^

9. ^ Ayres, Robert U.; Warr, Benjamin (June 2005). "Accounting for Growth: The Role of Physical Work". Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. 16 (2): 181-209. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.1085.9040. doi:10.1016/j.strueco.2003.10.003.

10. ^ Grubler, Arnulf (1990). The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-03-01.

11. ^ Beaudreau, Bernard C. (1996). Mass Production, the Stock Market Crash and the Great Depression. New York, Lincoln, Shanghi: Authors Choice Press.

12. ^ Moore, Stephen; Simon, Julian (15 December 1999). "The Greatest Century That Ever Was: 25 Miraculous Trends of the last 100 Years" (PDF). Policy Analysis. The Cato Institute (364).Diffusion curves for various innovations start at Fig. 14

13. Data refer to the year 2008. $26,341 GDP for Korea, $1513 for Ghana. ^ World Economic Outlook Database - October 2008. International Monetary Fund.

14. ^ Field, Alexander (2004). "Technological Change and Economic Growth the Interwar Years and the 1990s". The Journal of Economic History. 66 (1): 203-236. doi:10.1017/S0022050706000088. S2CID 154757050. SSRN 1105634.

15. ^ Gordon, Robert J. (June 2000). "Interpreting the 'One Big Wave' in U.S. Long Term Productivity Growth". NBER Working Paper No. 7752. doi:10.3386/w7752.

16. ^ Abramovitz, Moses; David, Paul A. (2000). Two Centuries of American Macroeconomic Growth From Exploitation of Resource Abundance to Knowledge-Driven Development (PDF). Stanford University. pp. 24-5 (pdf pp. 28-9).

17. Dale W. Jorgenson; Mun S. Ho; Jon D. Samuels (12 May 2014). "Long-term Estimates of U.S. Productivity and Growth" (PDF). World KLEMS Conference. Wikidata Q111455533.

18. ^ Dale W. Jorgenson; Mun S. Ho; Kevin J. Stiroh (2008). "A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 22 (1): 3-24. doi:10.1257/jep.22.1.3.

19. ^ Bruce T. Grimm; Brent R. Moulton; David B. Wasshausen (2002). "Information Processing Equipment and Software in the National Accounts" (PDF). U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis.

20. ^ "Hours of Work in U.S. History". 2010. Archived from the original on 2011-10-26.

21. ^ Mankiw, N. Gregory; Romer, David; Weil, David (1992). "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth". Quarterly Journal of Economics. 107 (2): 407-37. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.335.6159. doi:10.2307/2118477. JSTOR 2118477. S2CID 1369978.

22. ^ Romer, Paul (1990). "Human Capital and Growth: Theory and Evidence" (PDF). Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 32: 251-86. doi:10.1016/0167-2231(90)90028-J. S2CID 15491089.

23. ^ Baten, Joerg; van Zanden, Jan Luiten (2008). "Book Production and the Onset of Modern Economic Growth". Journal of Economic Growth. 13 (3): 217-235. doi:10.1007/s10887-008-9031-9. hdl:10230/757. S2CID 195314801.

24. Bloom, David; Kuhn, Michael; Prettner, Klaus (2018). "Health and Economic Growth". SSRN 3301688.

25. Acemoglu & Robinson 2012, p. 43.

26. ^

27. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James A. (2005). "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth". In Aghion, Philippe; Durlauf, Steven (eds.). Handbook of Economic Growth. Vol. 1, Part A. Elsevier. pp. 385-472. doi:10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01006-3. ISBN 9780444520418.

28. ^

29. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Naidu, Suresh; Restrepo, Pascual; Robinson, James A. (March 2014). "Democracy Does Cause Growth". NBER Working Paper No. 20004. doi:10.3386/w20004.

30. ^ Lee, Yong Suk (28 July 2016). "Entrepreneurship, small businesses and economic growth in cities" (PDF). Journal of Economic Geography. 17 (2): 311-343. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbw021.

31. ^ Ayres, Robert (1989). Technological Transformations and Long Waves (PDF). Vienna, Austria: Novographic. p. 9. ISBN 3-7045-0092-5. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-07-16. Attributed to Mensch who described new products as "demand creating".

32. ^ "All Employees: Manufacturing". January 1939.

33. ^ Kuprianov, Alexey (30 April 2018). "Decomposition of GDP. The Role of Quality of Goods and Services in Measuring Economic Growth". SSRN 3170839.

34. Adam Smith, ^ The Wealth of Nations (1776). Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations: A Translation into Modern English, ISR Publications, 2015.

35. ^ Malthus, Thomas R. (1798). Gilbert, Geoffrey (ed.). An Essay on the Principle of Population. Oxford: Oxford University Press (published 1999).

36. ^

37. ^ Murphy, Kevin M.; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. (1989). "Industrialization and the Big Push". Journal of Political Economy. 97 (5): 1003-1026. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.538.3040. doi:10.1086/261641. S2CID 222424224.

38. ^

39. ^ Swan, Trevor W. (1956). "Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation'". Economic Record. 32 (2): 334-61. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4932.1956.tb00434.x.

40. ^ Romer, Paul (1986). "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth". Journal of Political Economy. 94 (5): 1002-1037. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.589.3348. doi:10.1086/261420. S2CID 6818002.

41. ^ Dean Baker (2016), Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Wikidata Q100216001.

42. ^ Landreth, Harry (1976). History of Economic Theory : Scope, Method, and Content. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. pp. 478-480. ISBN 978-0-395-19234-4.

43. Galor, Oded (2011). Unified Growth Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

44. Galor O., 2005, "From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory". Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier doi:10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01004-X

45. Galor, Oded (2011). "Inequality, Human Capital Formation, and the Process of Development". ^ Handbook of the Economics of Education. Elsevier.

46. ^ Berg, Andrew G.; Ostry, Jonathan D. (2011). "Equality and Efficiency". Finance and Development. International Monetary Fund. 48 (3).

47. Galor, Oded; Zeira, Joseph (1988). "Income Distribution and Investment in Human Capital: Macroeconomics Implications". Working Paper No. 197. Department of Economics, Hebrew University.

48. ^ The World Bank Group (1999). "The Effect of Distribution on Growth" (PDF).

49. ^

50. ^

51. ^ Manfred Max-Neef (November 1995). "Economic growth and quality of life: a threshold hypothesis". Ecological Economics. 15 (2): 115-118. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.321.4576. doi:10.1016/0921-8009(95)00064-X. ISSN 0921-8009. Wikidata Q56032205.

52. ^ "In Pursuit of Happiness Research. Is It Reliable? What Does It Imply for Policy?" Archived 2011-02-19 at the Wayback Machine The Cato Institute. April 11, 2007

53. Claire Melamed, Kate Higgins and Andy Sumner (2010) Economic growth and the MDGs Archived 2011-07-17 at the Wayback Machine Overseas Development Institute

54. ^ Anand, Rahul; et al. (May 2013). "Inclusive Growth: Measurement and Determinants" (PDF). IMF Working Paper. Asia Pacific Department: International Monetary Fund.

55. ^ Ranieri, Rafael; Ramos, Raquel Almeida (March 2013). "Inclusive Growth: Building up a Concept" (PDF). Working Paper. Brazil: International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. ISSN 1812-108X.

56. ^ Bourguignon, Francois (February 2002). "Growth Elasticity of Poverty Reduction: Explaining Heterogeneity across Countries and Time Periods". Forthcoming in T. Eichler and S. Turnovsky (eds), Growth and Inequality, MIT Press (PDF). S2CID 1574390. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2004-03-30.

57. Donella H. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, Dennis L. Meadows. ^ Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update. White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green, 2004.

58. ^ Allan Schnaiberg (1980), The environment, from surplus to scarcity, Oxford University Press, Wikidata Q111450348

59. ^ Wiedmann, Thomas; Lenzen, Manfred; Keyßer, Lorenz T.; Steinberger, Julia K. (2020). "Scientists' warning on affluence". Nature Communications. 11 (3107): 3107. Bibcode:2020NatCo..11.3107W. doi:10.1038/s41467-020-16941-y. PMC 7305220. PMID 32561753.

60. ^ Hickel, Jason; Kallis, Giorgos; Jackson, Tim; O'Neill, Daniel W.; Schor, Juliet B.; et al. (12 December 2022). "Degrowth can work - here's how science can help". Nature. 612 (7940): 400-403. Bibcode:2022Natur.612..400H. doi:10.1038/d41586-022-04412-x. PMID 36510013. S2CID 254614532.

61. ^ "Charter of the Global Greens" (PDF contains full charter). Global Greens. Dakar. 2012.

62. ^ The Ultimate Resource, Julian Simon, 1981

63. ^ Ripple, William J; Wolf, Christopher; Newsome, Thomas M; Barnard, Phoebe; Moomaw, William R (5 November 2019). "World Scientists' Warning of a Climate Emergency". BioScience. 70: 8-12. doi:10.1093/biosci/biz088. hdl:1808/30278.

64. ^ Carrington, Damian (5 November 2019). "Climate crisis: 11,000 scientists warn of 'untold suffering'". The Guardian.

65. ^ Bradshaw, Corey J. A.; Ehrlich, Paul R.; Beattie, Andrew; Ceballos, Gerardo; Crist, Eileen; Diamond, Joan; Dirzo, Rodolfo; Ehrlich, Anne H.; Harte, John; Harte, Mary Ellen; Pyke, Graham; Raven, Peter H.; Ripple, William J.; Saltré, Frédérik; Turnbull, Christine; Wackernagel, Mathis; Blumstein, Daniel T. (2021). "Underestimating the Challenges of Avoiding a Ghastly Future". Frontiers in Conservation Science. 1. doi:10.3389/fcosc.2020.615419.

66. ^ Garrett, T. J. (2009). "Are there basic physical constraints on future anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide?". Climatic Change. 104 (3-4): 437. arXiv:0811.1855. doi:10.1007/s10584-009-9717-9. S2CID 5287353.

67. ^ Jaccard, M. (2005). Sustainable Fossil Fuels. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-67979-4.

68. ^ "Examination of Witnesses (Questions 32-39)". 16 May 2007.

69. "Chapter 17: Growth and Productivity-The Long-Run Possibilities". Oswego.edu. 10 June 1999. Archived from the original on 2010-12-18.

70. Bailey, Ronald (4 February 2004). "Science and Public Policy". Reason.com.

71. ^ Hall, Charles A.S.; Cleveland, Cutler J.; Kaufmann, Robert (1992). Energy and Resource Quality: The ecology of the Economic Process. Niwot, Colorado: University Press of Colorado.

72. ^ Lyon, Christioher (3 July 2015). "Declining South America copper ore grades require ingenuity". Mining Weekly.

73. ^ Bartlett, Albert Allen (2013). "Arithmetic, Population and Energy". albartlett.org. You cannot sustain population growth and / or growth in the rates of consumption of resources.

74. ^ Murphy, Tom (12 July 2011). "Galactic-Scale Energy". Do the Math. continued growth in energy use becomes physically impossible within conceivable timeframes ... all economic growth must similarly end.

75. ^ Hayward, Steven F. "That Old Time Religion". AEI. Archived from the original on 2009-04-18.

76. ^ Turner, Graham (June 2008). "A Comparison of the Limits of Growth with Thirty Years of Reality" (PDF). Socio-Economics and the Environment in Discussion. CSIRO Working Paper Series. ISSN 1834-5638. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2010-11-28.

77. ^ Garrett, T. J. (2014). "Long-run evolution of the global economy: 1. Physical basis". Earth's Future. 2 (3): 127. arXiv:1306.3554. Bibcode:2014EaFut...2..127G. doi:10.1002/2013EF000171. S2CID 204937958.

Sources

Barro, Robert J. (1996). "Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study". Social Science Research Network. SSRN 3422.

Business and Economic Growth: Key Features and Determinants, Industrial Systems Research Publications, Kindle edition, 2023. ISBN 9780906321829

Argyrous, G., Forstater, M and Mongiovi, G. (eds.) (2004) Growth, Distribution, And Effective Demand: Essays in Honor of Edward J. Nell. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Barro, Robert J. (1997) Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

Galor, O. (2005) From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory. Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier.

Halevi, Joseph; Laibman, David and Nell, Edward J. (eds.) (1992) Beyond the Steady State: Essays in the Revival of Growth Theory, edited with, London, UK:

Hickel, Jason (2020). Less is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World. Penguin Random House. ISBN 9781785152498.

Jones, Charles I. (2002) Introduction to Economic Growth 2nd ed. W. W. Norton & Company: New York, N.Y.

Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (2003) The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Annual Report online edition

Pokrovskii, Vladimir (2018). Econodynamics. The Theory of Social Production. Springer, Dordrecht-Heidelberg-London-New York.

Schumpeter, Jospeph A. (1912) The Theory of Economic Development 1982 reprint, Transaction Publishers

Weil, David N. (2008) Economic Growth 2nd ed. Addison Wesley.

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Roland, Gerard (2011). "Individualism, innovation, and long-run growth". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 108 (supplement_4): 21316-21319. Bibcode:2011PNAS..10821316G. doi:10.1073/pnas.1101933108. PMC 3271573. PMID 22198759.

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Roland, Gerard (2017). "Culture, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations". The Review of Economics and Statistics. 99 (3): 402-416. doi:10.1162/REST_a_00599. S2CID 2562715.

Spolaore, Enrico; Wacziarg, Romain (2013). "How Deep Are the Roots of Economic Development?". Journal of Economic Literature. 51 (2): 325-369. doi:10.1257/jel.51.2.325.

Wiedmann, Thomas; Lenzen, Manfred; Keyßer, Lorenz T.; Steinberger, Julia K. (2020). "Scientists' warning on affluence". Nature Communications. 11 (1): 3107. Bibcode:2020NatCo..11.3107W. doi:10.1038/s41467-020-16941-y. ISSN 2041-1723. PMC 7305220. PMID 32561753.

Ruck, Damian J.; Bentley, R. Alexander; Lawson, Daniel J. (2020). "Cultural prerequisites of socioeconomic development". Royal Society Open Science. 7 (2): 190725. Bibcode:2020RSOS....790725R. doi:10.1098/rsos.190725. PMC 7062048. PMID 32257300.

Burgess, Matthew G.; Carrico, Amanda R.; Gaines, Steven D.; Peri, Alessandro; Vanderheiden, Steve (2021). "Prepare developed democracies for long-run economic slowdowns". Nature Human Behaviour. 5 (12): 1608-1621. doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01229-y. PMC 9026903. PMID 34795424.

The economic growth rate is calculated from data on GDP estimated by countries' statistical agencies. The rate of growth of GDP per capita is calculated from data on GDP and people for the initial and final periods included in the analysis of the analyst.

Living standards vary widely from country to country, and furthermore, the change in living standards over time varies widely from country to country. Below is a table which shows GDP per person and annualized per person GDP growth for a selection of countries over a period of about 100 years. The GDP per person data are adjusted for inflation, hence they are " real". GDP per person (more commonly called "per capita" GDP) is the GDP of the entire country divided by the number of people in the country; GDP per person is conceptually analogous to " average income".

Country

Period

Real GDP per person at beginning of period

Real GDP per person at end of period

Annualized growth rate

Seemingly small differences in yearly GDP growth lead to large changes in GDP when compounded over time. For instance, in the above table, GDP per person in the United Kingdom in the year 1870 was $4,808. At the same time in the United States, GDP per person was $4,007, lower than the UK by about 20%. However, in 2008 the positions were reversed: GDP per person was $36,130 in the United Kingdom and $46,970 in the United States, i.e. GDP per person in the US was 30% more than it was in the UK. As the above table shows, this means that GDP per person grew, on average, by 1.80% per year in the US and by 1.47% in the UK. Thus, a difference in GDP growth by only a few tenths of a percent per year results in large differences in outcomes when the growth is persistent over a generation. This and other observations have led some economists to view GDP growth as the most important part of the field of macroeconomics:

...if we can learn about government policy options that have even small effects on long-term growth rates, we can contribute much more to improvements in standards of living than has been provided by the entire history of macroeconomic analysis of countercyclical policy and fine-tuning. Economic growth [is] the part of macroeconomics that really matters.[8]

The system of economic growth in developed regions

It has been observed that GDP growth is influenced by the size of the economy. The relation between GDP growth and GDP across the countries at a particular point of time is convex. Growth increases as GDP reaches its maximum and then begins to decline. There exists some extremum value. This is not exactly middle-income trap. It is observed for both developed and developing economies. Actually, countries having this property belong to conventional growth domain. However, the extremum could be extended by technological and policy innovations and some countries move into innovative growth domain with higher limiting values.[9]

Historic world GDP per capita

In national income accounting, per capita output can be calculated using the following factors: output per unit of labor input (labor productivity), hours worked (intensity), the percentage of the working-age population actually working (participation rate) and the proportion of the working-age population to the total population (demographics). "The rate of change of GDP/population is the sum of the rates of change of these four variables plus their cross products."

Economists distinguish between long-run economic growth and short-run economic changes in production. Short-run variation in economic growth is termed the business cycle. Generally, according to economists, the ups and downs in the business cycle can be attributed to fluctuations in aggregate demand. In contrast, economic growth is concerned with the long-run trend in production due to structural causes such as technological growth and factor accumulation.

Increases in labor productivity (the ratio of the value of output to labor input) have historically been the most important source of real per capita economic growth.[11][12][13][14][15] In a famous estimate, MIT Professor Robert Solow concluded that technological progress has accounted for 80 percent of the long-term rise in U.S. per capita income, with increased investment in capital explaining only the remaining 20 percent.[16]

Increases in productivity lower the real cost of goods. Over the 20th century, the real price of many goods fell by over 90%.[17]

Economic growth has traditionally been attributed to the accumulation of human and physical capital and the increase in productivity and creation of new goods arising from technological innovation.[18] Further division of labour (specialization) is also fundamental to rising productivity.[19]

Before industrialization technological progress resulted in an increase in the population, which was kept in check by food supply and other resources, which acted to limit per capita income, a condition known as the Malthusian trap.[20][21] The rapid economic growth that occurred during the Industrial Revolution was remarkable because it was in excess of population growth, providing an escape from the Malthusian trap.[22] Countries that industrialized eventually saw their population growth slow down, a phenomenon known as the demographic transition.

Increases in productivity are the major factor responsible for per capita economic growth-this has been especially evident since the mid-19th century. Most of the economic growth in the 20th century was due to increased output per unit of labor, materials, energy, and land (less input per widget). The balance of the growth in output has come from using more inputs. Both of these changes increase output. The increased output included more of the same goods produced previously and new goods and services.[23]

During the Industrial Revolution, mechanization began to replace hand methods in manufacturing, and new processes streamlined production of chemicals, iron, steel, and other products.[24] Machine tools made the economical production of metal parts possible, so that parts could be interchangeable.[25] (See: Interchangeable parts.)

During the Second Industrial Revolution, a major factor of productivity growth was the substitution of inanimate power for human and animal labor. Also there was a great increase in power as steam-powered electricity generation and internal combustion supplanted limited wind and water power.[24] Since that replacement, the great expansion of total power was driven by continuous improvements in energy conversion efficiency.[26] Other major historical sources of productivity were automation, transportation infrastructures (canals, railroads, and highways),[27][28] new materials (steel) and power, which includes steam and internal combustion engines and electricity. Other productivity improvements included mechanized agriculture and scientific agriculture including chemical fertilizers and livestock and poultry management, and the Green Revolution. Interchangeable parts made with machine tools powered by electric motors evolved into mass production, which is universally used today.[25]

Productivity lowered the cost of most items in terms of work time required to purchase. Real food prices fell due to improvements in transportation and trade, mechanized agriculture, fertilizers, scientific farming and the Green Revolution.

Great sources of productivity improvement in the late 19th century were railroads, steam ships, horse-pulled reapers and combine harvesters, and steam-powered factories.[29][30] The invention of processes for making cheap steel were important for many forms of mechanization and transportation. By the late 19th century both prices and weekly work hours fell because less labor, materials, and energy were required to produce and transport goods. However, real wages rose, allowing workers to improve their diet, buy consumer goods and afford better housing.[29]

Mass production of the 1920s created overproduction, which was arguably one of several causes of the Great Depression of the 1930s.[31] Following the Great Depression, economic growth resumed, aided in part by increased demand for existing goods and services, such as automobiles, telephones, radios, electricity and household appliances. New goods and services included television, air conditioning and commercial aviation (after 1950), creating enough new demand to stabilize the work week.[32] The building of highway infrastructures also contributed to post-World War II growth, as did capital investments in manufacturing and chemical industries.[33] The post-World War II economy also benefited from the discovery of vast amounts of oil around the world, particularly in the Middle East. By John W. Kendrick's estimate, three-quarters of increase in U.S. per capita GDP from 1889 to 1957 was due to increased productivity.[15]

Economic growth in the United States slowed down after 1973.[34] In contrast, growth in Asia has been strong since then, starting with Japan and spreading to Four Asian Tigers, China, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and Asia Pacific.[35] In 1957 South Korea had a lower per capita GDP than Ghana,[36] and by 2008 it was 17 times as high as Ghana's.[37] The Japanese economic growth has slackened considerably since the late 1980s.

Productivity in the United States grew at an increasing rate throughout the 19th century and was most rapid in the early to middle decades of the 20th century.[38][39][40][41][42] U.S. productivity growth spiked towards the end of the century in 1996-2004, due to an acceleration in the rate of technological innovation known as Moore's law.[43][44][45][46] After 2004 U.S. productivity growth returned to the low levels of 1972-96.[43]

Capital in economics ordinarily refers to physical capital, which consists of structures (largest component of physical capital) and equipment used in business (machinery, factory equipment, computers and office equipment, construction equipment, business vehicles, medical equipment, etc.). Up to a point increases in the amount of capital per worker are an important cause of economic output growth. Capital is subject to diminishing returns because of the amount that can be effectively invested and because of the growing burden of depreciation. In the development of economic theory, the distribution of income was considered to be between labor and the owners of land and capital.[47] In recent decades there have been several Asian countries with high rates of economic growth driven by capital investment.[48]

The work week declined considerably over the 19th century.[49][50] By the 1920s the average work week in the U.S. was 49 hours, but the work week was reduced to 40 hours (after which overtime premium was applied) as part of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.

Demographic factors may influence growth by changing the employment to population ratio and the labor force participation rate.[11] Industrialization creates a demographic transition in which birth rates decline and the average age of the population increases.

See: Spending wave

Many theoretical and empirical analyses of economic growth attribute a major role to a country's level of human capital, defined as the skills of the population or the work force. Human capital has been included in both neoclassical and endogenous growth models.[51][52][53]

Economic growth rates (percent, vertical) v. standardized tests of student achievement in different regions, both adjusted for GDP per capita in 1960

Eric Hanushek and Dennis Kimko introduced measures of students' mathematics and science skills from international assessments into growth analysis.[56] They found that this measure of human capital was very significantly related to economic growth. Eric Hanushek and Ludger Wößmann have extended this analysis.[57][58] Theodore Breton shows that the correlation between economic growth and students' average test scores in Hanushek and Wößmann's analyses is actually due to the relationship in countries with less than eight years of schooling. He shows that economic growth is not correlated with average scores in more educated countries.[55] Hanushek and Wößmann further investigate whether the relationship of knowledge capital to economic growth is causal. They show that the level of students' cognitive skills can explain the slow growth in Latin America and the rapid growth in East Asia.[59]

Joerg Baten and Jan Luiten van Zanden employ book production per capita as a proxy for sophisticated literacy capabilities and find that "Countries with high levels of human capital formation in the 18th century initiated or participated in the industrialization process of the 19th century, whereas countries with low levels of human capital formation were unable to do so, among them many of today's Less Developed Countries such as India, Indonesia, and China."[60]

Here, health is approached as a functioning from Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum's capability approach that an individual has to realise the achievements like economic success. Thus health in a broader sense is not the absence of illness, but the opportunity for people to biologically develop to their full potential their entire lives [61] It is established that human capital is an important asset for economic growth, however, it can only be so if that population is healthy and well-nourished. One of the most important aspects of health is the mortality rate and how the rise or decline can affect the labour supply predominant in a developing economy.[62] Mortality decline triggers greater investments in individual human capital and an increase in economic growth. Matteo Cervellati and Uwe Sunde[63] and Rodrigo.R Soares[64] consider frameworks in which mortality decline has an influence on parents to have fewer children and to provide quality education for those children, as a result instituting an economic-demographic transition.

The relationship between health and economic growth is further nuanced by distinguishing the influence of specific diseases on GDP per capita from that of aggregate measures of health, such as life expectancy[65] Thus, investing in health is warranted both from the growth and equity perspectives, given the important role played by health in the economy. Protecting health assets from the impact of systemic transitional costs on economic reforms, pandemics, economic crises and natural disasters is also crucial. Protection from the shocks produced by illness and death, are usually taken care of within a country's social insurance system. In areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where the prevalence of HIV and AIDS, has a comparative negative impact on economical development. It will be interesting to see how research in the areas of health in near future uncover how the world will be performing living with the SARS-CoV-2, especially looking at the economic impacts it already has in a space of two years. Ultimately, when people live longer on average, human capital expenditures are more likely to pay off, and all of these mechanisms center around the complementarity of longevity, health, and education, for which there is ample empirical evidence.[65][61][63][64][62]

"As institutions influence behavior and incentives in real life, they forge the success or failure of nations."[66]

In economics and economic history, the transition to capitalism from earlier economic systems was enabled by the adoption of government policies that facilitated commerce and gave individuals more personal and economic freedom. These included new laws favorable to the establishment of business, including contract law and laws providing for the protection of private property, and the abolishment of anti-usury laws.[67][68]

Much of this literature was built on the success story of the British state after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, in which high fiscal capacity combined with constraints on the power of the king generated some respect for the rule of law.[69][70][71][66] However, others have questioned that this institutional formula is not so easily replicable elsewhere as a change in the Constitution-and the type of institutions created by that change-does not necessarily create a change in political power if the economic powers of that society are not aligned with the new set of rule of law institutions.[72] In England, a dramatic increase in the state's fiscal capacity followed the creation of constraints on the crown, but elsewhere in Europe increases in state capacity happened before major rule of law reforms.[73]

There are many different ways through which states achieved state (fiscal) capacity and this different capacity accelerated or hindered their economic development. Thanks to the underlying homogeneity of its land and people, England was able to achieve a unified legal and fiscal system since the Middle Ages that enabled it to substantially increase the taxes it raised after 1689.[73] On the other hand, the French experience of state building faced much stronger resistance from local feudal powers keeping it legally and fiscally fragmented until the French Revolution despite significant increases in state capacity during the seventeenth century.[74][75] Furthermore, Prussia and the Habsburg empire-much more heterogeneous states than England-were able to increase state capacity during the eighteenth century without constraining the powers of the executive.[73] Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a country will generate institutions that respect property rights and the rule of law without having had first intermediate fiscal and political institutions that create incentives for elites to support them. Many of these intermediate level institutions relied on informal private-order arrangements that combined with public-order institutions associated with states, to lay the foundations of modern rule of law states.[73]

In many poor and developing countries much land and housing are held outside the formal or legal property ownership registration system. In many urban areas the poor "invade" private or government land to build their houses, so they do not hold title to these properties. Much unregistered property is held in informal form through various property associations and other arrangements. Reasons for extra-legal ownership include excessive bureaucratic red tape in buying property and building. In some countries, it can take over 200 steps and up to 14 years to build on government land. Other causes of extra-legal property are failures to notarize transaction documents or having documents notarized but failing to have them recorded with the official agency.[76]

Not having clear legal title to property limits its potential to be used as collateral to secure loans, depriving many poor countries of one of their most important potential sources of capital. Unregistered businesses and lack of accepted accounting methods are other factors that limit potential capital.[76]

Businesses and individuals participating in unreported business activity and owners of unregistered property face costs such as bribes and pay-offs that offset much of any taxes avoided.[76]

"Democracy Does Cause Growth", according to Acemoglu et al. Specifically, "democracy increases future GDP by encouraging investment, increasing schooling, inducing economic reforms, improving public goods provision, and reducing social unrest."[77] UNESCO and the United Nations also consider that cultural property protection, high-quality education, cultural diversity and social cohesion in armed conflicts are particularly necessary for qualitative growth.[78]

According to Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, the positive correlation between high income and cold climate is a by-product of history. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where these colonizers faced high mortality rates (e.g., due to the presence of tropical diseases), they could not settle permanently, and they were thus more likely to establish extractive institutions, which persisted after independence; in places where they could settle permanently (e.g. those with temperate climates), they established institutions with this objective in mind and modeled them after those in their European homelands. In these 'neo-Europes' better institutions in turn produced better development outcomes. Thus, although other economists focus on the identity or type of legal system of the colonizers to explain institutions, these authors look at the environmental conditions in the colonies to explain institutions. For instance, former colonies have inherited corrupt governments and geopolitical boundaries (set by the colonizers) that are not properly placed regarding the geographical locations of different ethnic groups, creating internal disputes and conflicts that hinder development. In another example, societies that emerged in colonies without solid native populations established better property rights and incentives for long-term investment than those where native populations were large.[79]

In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson said that the English in North America started by trying to repeat the success of the Spanish Conquistadors in extracting wealth (especially gold and silver) from the countries they had conquered. This system repeatedly failed for the English. Their successes rested on giving land and a voice in the government to every male settler to incentivize productive labor. In Virginia it took twelve years and many deaths from starvation before the governor decided to try democracy.

Policymakers and scholars frequently emphasize the importance of entrepreneurship for economic growth. However, surprisingly few research empirically examine and quantify entrepreneurship's impact on growth. This is due to endogeneity-forces that drive economic growth also drive entrepreneurship. In other words, the empirical analysis of the impact of entrepreneurship on growth is difficult because of the joint determination of entrepreneurship and economic growth. A few papers use quasi-experimental designs, and have found that entrepreneurship and the density of small businesses indeed have a causal impact on regional growth.[81][82]

The structural change could also be viewed from another angle. It is possible to divide real economic growth into two components: an indicator of extensive economic growth-the 'quantitative' GDP-and an indicator of the improvement of the quality of goods and services-the 'qualitative' GDP.[87]

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Economic growth can be defined as the increase or improvement in the inflation-adjusted market value of the goods and services produced by an economy in a financial year.[1] Statisticians conventionally measure such growth as the percent rate of increase in the real and nominal gross domestic product (GDP).[2] Growth is usually calculated in real terms - i.e., inflation-adjusted terms - to eliminate the distorting effect of inflation on the prices of goods produced.

# data[].attributes.headline
Como avanzar en el desarrollo economico 

# data[].attributes.subject
Como avanzar en el desarrollo economico 

# data[].attributes.body
Podríamos exportar cobre a demás países porque si china no quiere más, podríamos quedar sin ingresos económicos, ya que la mayoría de cobre va a china y podríamos empezar a enviar a demás países.