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Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project

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National Defense University Washington, D.C.

The Pew Forum co-sponsored a symposium with the National Defense University's School for National Security Executive Education on "Religion, Conflict and the Global War on Terrorism in Latin America." A panel entitled "Christianity and Conflict in Latin America" featured Paul Freston, of Calvin College, and Virginia Garrard-Burnett, of University of Texas, Austin, who examined the political mobilization of Christian movements in Latin America, including recent social and political conflicts between evangelical Protestants and traditional Catholics, and the implications for U.S. security policy in the region. The panelists also discussed case studies in Brazil, Mexico and Guatemala.

Other symposium speakers focused on "Islam and the Global War on Terrorism in Latin America" and "Religion, Security and the Future of Latin America."

Speakers:
Paul Freston, Professor of Sociology and Byker Chair in Christian Perspectives on Political, Social and Economic Thought, Calvin College

Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Senior Lecturer in History and Latin American Studies, University of Texas, Austin

Moderator:
David Spencer, Assistant Professor, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
The discussion was part of a joint project on religion and security undertaken by the Pew Forum and National Defense University's School for National Security Executive Education. Although the event was off-the-record, the speakers agreed to make their remarks available online. Remarks by Paul Freston:
Thank you very much, David. Good afternoon everybody. We're starting off this first panel looking at the Christian side of the intersection between U.S.-Latin American relations and changes in Latin American religion. Obviously, the Latin American religious field is interesting to look at not just as a possible staging ground for Islamist groups, but because Latin America, in many senses, is the heartland of the Christian world today. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the BBC has just done a series on how the U.S. "lost" Latin America. So, I think it's important to understand that Latin American Christianity cannot be understood in terms of North American Christianity - that goes for both Catholicism and Protestantism.

Christianity in the 20th century, of course, has shifted markedly towards the south of the globe and has become a predominantly non-Western religion. Therefore, it's become much more distant from power and wealth, much more associated with poverty and not necessarily imitative of or dependent on the Christianity of the developed West. So, I would suggest that global Christianity is just as important as global Islam for understanding religion's impact on politics around the world.

Now if Christianity has grown impressively in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of East Asia, in Latin America it has been significantly transformed and revitalized. Latin America has been one of the main areas of expansion of evangelical Protestant Christianity and is, perhaps, the last bastion of a serious Catholic-Protestant divide with the exception, maybe, of Northern Ireland. Ironically, Latin America has become the heartland of Catholicism at the very time that Catholic hegemony there has been eroded. However, for every two people who leave Catholicism - cease regarding themselves as Catholics - only one becomes Protestant. So, I would suggest that the religious future of Latin America is much more pluralist and not, as some scholars have suggested, Protestant.

The letter of invitation to this event talks of increased Protestant-Catholic social and political conflict. I think one needs to nuance that. Despite fears of a war of religion, which might harm democracy, this war hasn't in fact happened very much. Guatemala would be the place for it. It has the largest proportion of evangelicals in Latin America. But even there you haven't really had a war of religion, if only because evangelicals conspicuously lack unity. In Brazil, there have been two types of religious conflict. One is regarding ownership of important media stations - the Globo television network against the Record television network, which one of the new neo-pentecostal churches, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, acquired. And secondly, there has been a conflict between pentecostal churches and the Afro-Brazilian religions. But that conflict has rarely been violent. It has been, if you like, a full-blooded religious dispute between social equals at the grassroots level. There has, of course, been Catholic-Protestant conflict in Chiapas in Mexico, but I'll leave that to Dr. Garrard-Burnett.

I would suggest that the changes in the religious field of Latin America have had other implications, one of which is pluralization, including the growth of people who consider themselves to have no religion. This implies a painful transition for Latin American states to understanding the new nature of the religious field and how to relate to it. At the same time, there has, in a sense, been a grassroots revitalization of Christianity in various forms - pentecostal, Catholic charismatic, liberation-theology base communities - making Christianity perhaps more rooted in the masses than it ever was when it enjoyed state protection. Catholicism is no longer integral to Latin American identity. There is this clear division there now almost throughout the entire region. The religious field is no longer similar to that of Latin Europe and has become partially more similar to that of the United States.

As far as the Catholic world is concerned, obviously Latin American Catholicism gave the world liberation theology and the base communities. But they have been in decline since the 1980s, both for internal and external reasons - internal and external to the Church. Within Catholicism, now the most vital movement is the Catholic charismatic renewal. And in any case, liberation theology never became hegemonic anywhere in Latin America. In some countries, it never got beyond isolated groups. In others it became more mainstream and retains some influence, but never on the level that it had 25 years ago.

National churches reacted very differently to dictatorships in the '70s and '80s and have behaved very variedly under the formal democratic systems which prevail now. The Christian democratic parties, almost without exception, have declined markedly in recent years in Latin America. The official Catholic project now is the New Evangelization, which aims not at a Christian social order through concordats or Christian parties, but at an evangelization of culture through a deep penetration of civil society. But recent analyses are pessimistic about the Catholic Church's capacity to do that, especially in view of its weakening vitality as a religion of personal salvation.

There are many other Catholic movements involved in politics besides those inspired by liberation theology. The major challenger to Lula in the forthcoming Brazilian presidential elections is a man who is linked to Opus Dei, the very conservative traditionalist Catholic movement, which is also very strong in Peru. The Catholic charismatic movement has also become more and more politically active.

As for Protestantism in Latin America, Latin American Protestant identity was forged strongly in opposition to the dominant Catholicism; and, therefore, the political operationalization of a specifically Protestant identity has been more marked there than in the rest of the world in recent decades. By the turn of the century, Protestantism had become the religion of perhaps 12 percent of all Latin Americans. In Brazil it's over 15 percent; in Guatemala it's over 20 percent. In countries like Uruguay, it's probably still below 5 percent. Protestantism, and especially pentecostalism, is disproportionately associated with the poor, the less educated and the darker skinned. Membership is predominantly female. And although it doesn't have the classic Protestant work ethic and operates in a very different economic context, there is significant evidence for individual economic improvement as disorganized lives become more organized and the capacity to survive increases markedly.

Political involvement by Protestants is not recent. But since the 1980s, it has increased tremendously, especially with the involvement of Pentecostal denominations. Two Protestant presidents have governed Guatemala, and in some countries, such as Brazil, there have been large Protestant congressional caucuses. Over 20 political parties of Protestant inspiration have been founded in various countries, although none has achieved much success. Much Protestant political activity has been very conservative and/or oriented toward institutional aggrandizement, leading in some countries to a significant worsening of the public image of Protestants as a whole.

I think one can definitely say that Latin American Protestant politics is a phenomenon of democratization. Whether it's also a phenomenon for democratization - deepening it - is an important query. But it has certainly played a role in incorporating grassroots sectors into the democratic process and has provided a significant route for individuals of lower social origin to achieve political visibility.

The political implications of Protestantism, especially pentecostalism, have been appraised in very varied ways by scholars. On the one side are authors who emphasize the repressive and corporatist nature of the pentecostal churches and see them as reproducing traditional authoritarian political culture and social control. Other authors stress Protestantism's democratizing potential, talking of a vibrant civil society. They contend that Protestant churches offer a free social space, an experience of solidarity and a new personal identity, as well as responsible participation in the community and, for some, the development of leadership gifts.

On the whole, I would say that evangelicals have been less useful in democratic transitions than in phases of democratic consolidation or democratic deepening. But on the whole, they have been kept within the democratic track. There are very few who have nondemocratic theocratic projects. In any case, they're so divided that they could never implement any such project. Also, the more they grow, the more they penetrate the mainstream and become more similar to the general society.

In some countries, notably in Brazil, in the last 15 years there has been a marked shift towards the left - or at least towards the center-left - on the part of the evangelicals. This, I think, has many causes. Partly it's due to a change in the perception of where the Catholic Church is located politically. It's also, in some cases, of course, due to the class aspect, especially of pentecostalism. There has been a growing evangelical social discourse with an emphasis on justice, partly resulting from an increased participation in social projects. Also, there have been many left-wing politicians who have converted to evangelical churches and have continued their left-wing militancy in their new religious identity.

And finally, of course, the new left in Latin America is usually extremely nationalist, and evangelicals are often very nationalist too, which is not surprising when you consider that they're usually very nationalist in this country also. Therefore, there is often considerable doubt about the idea of a free-trade area of the Americas. There has been considerable pentecostal support for Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Evangelicals do not seem to be very worried about Evo Morales in Bolivia, at least not so far. Another factor is evangelical penetration of the indigenous communities in the Andes and Central America, and that also has taken a strong political connotation in many areas.

Finally, I would say that at the level of civil society, very often the contribution of evangelicals has a rather different feel to it from what one might perceive looking at the parliamentary and party level. For example, it's often said that in the favelas, the shantytowns in Brazil, there are really only two things that function. The state is virtually absent. The Catholic Church is virtually absent. There are really only two things that function. One is organized crime. The other is the evangelical churches. And there's a very interesting relationship there, in the sense that evangelicals are having an impact on communities that are very crime-ridden. In as much as such ungoverned areas are, of course, vulnerable to all sorts of illicit activities, there is a very interesting evangelical presence, which is based very much on the idea of exorcising the demons of violence and what have you, and also preaching in the prisons.

So, I would say that clearly Latin American evangelical Protestantism is not tributary to U.S. evangelicalism. It's not an extension of American soft power, as some authors have portrayed it. There were no Venezuelan evangelical terrorists willing to assassinate Hugo Chavez at the behest of Pat Robertson, for example. What about violence on the other side?

Well, I would say that in Latin American evangelicalism, there is some marginal use of violence. For example, there was a lot of evangelical involvement in the peasant patrols in the highlands of Peru against the Shining Path guerillas. There have been some evangelicals, it seems, involved in the Zapatista guerilla movement in Mexico. And, of course, the Ríos Montt presidency in Guatemala in the 1980s was extremely violent. At the same time, there is considerable anti-Americanism in sectors of Latin American evangelicalism. I would say anti-Americanism of the policy type, if you like, rather than of the cultural or geopolitical type - that is, an anti-Americanism driven by disagreement with specific policies.

But I would also say that there is - so far, anyway - no conflation of violence and anti-Americanism perceptible in the Latin American evangelical world. There is, as I said, considerable policy-driven anti-Americanism, especially with regard to the war in Iraq and, to some extent, the so-called war on terror in general. In fact, there would seem to be something of a geopolitical chasm between Latin American evangelicals and U.S. evangelicals. It was interesting to observe at the time when the Iraq war was just starting how all Brazilian evangelicals, however conservative they were in many other things and however wild and woolly some of their churches were, were all to a man totally against the Iraq war. So, I would say that Brazilian evangelicals at least - and I think in most of Latin America this is true - are closer, perhaps, to U.S. mainline church positions than to U.S. evangelical positions on this.

And just a final comment. It's important to note, of course, that the vast majority of illegal immigrants in the United States are Latin American Christians, either Catholic or Protestant. About 30 percent of them either are already or become Protestants. I have done studies on Brazilian evangelicals in this country, the majority of whom are illegal. It's interesting to see how these churches develop what you might call a theology of the undocumented based on theological, historical and pragmatic arguments.
Remarks by Ms. Garrard-Burnett:
I wanted to thank you for inviting us here today. It's an exciting opportunity to be able to present before an audience like this, which is very different from my usual audience of 20-year-olds at the University of Texas. When people begin to ask questions about religion and security in Latin America, what almost certainly comes to mind is liberation theology. Liberation theology is, of course, a Catholic movement, which provided a fundamental reinterpretation of the place of the poor in the kingdom of God. It made political activism a godly virtue. Liberation theology played a clear and arguably very decisive role in the wars of liberation in Central America in the 1970s and 1980s. And it was, without doubt, an important mobilizing force for thousands of campesinos, many of whom became part of the revolutionary movements.

Liberation theology, of course, has declined significantly in its importance as a political and social movement with the defeat - at least perhaps a temporary defeat - of the left in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. It is still present in Latin America, but without much of its political content. Liberation theology today tends to be very much focused on family and social issues, concerning itself with things like alcoholism, domestic abuse, poverty alleviation and things of that nature.

Catholicism in Latin America today presents, as Dr. Freston said, a much more conservative face. Many of the cardinals who were named by Pope John Paul II are members of the Legion of Mary and of Opus Dei and other very conservative movements within the Catholic Church. Grassroots Catholics within Latin America tend to be much more likely than before to be involved in nonpolitical church movements, such as the charismatic movement. This, I think, is indicative of two long-term trends. One is the "effective" repression of the radical church by Central American governments in the '70s and '80s. The other is the hard rightward push from the Vatican, beginning with the papacy of John Paul II and continuing presumably on through the papacy of Pope Benedict XVI.

Had we had this conversation 20 years ago, we would have talked at a time when pluralism in Latin America was in its very early stages. Having said that, Latin America is still overwhelmingly Catholic. That being said, there has indeed been a very dramatic increase in religious pluralism over the past 20 years. Specifically, there has been a very rapid rise in Protestant conversions to the extent that some countries in Latin America, such as Brazil, Guatemala, Chile and Honduras, have very large Protestant minorities. Looking at the chart you can see Guatemala has about a third - well, close to a third - El Salvador, 25 percent. Belize is a British colony so it's not surprising it's 27 percent Protestant; Honduras is 22 percent. Notice - we'll talk about his later - Mexico is only 6 percent Protestant. And the figures are more symbolic than actually correct, but they give you a sense. In the case of Central America, much of this conversion took place during the 1970s and 1980s during the era of the civil wars. I don't want to put too fine a point on this or overstate it, but Protestant conversion was to some extent during this period a reaction to the violence and upheaval of the era.

There is a continuing perception, or series of perceptions and misconceptions, that certain Protestant values are very tangible things - almost tangible currencies - within Central America. That is, Protestants tend to represent in people's minds anticorruption, honesty, trustworthiness and clean living. They are thought of as being good citizens and very good with money. There are a number of studies that show that many of these attributes, particularly in the matter of affluence or relative affluence, are not quantifiably true but this perception still continues to inform people's thinking about Protestantism.

This brings us to the matter of religious conflict. As Dr. Freston has indicated, there is an obvious venue for conflict between radical Catholics and conservative Protestants or simply Catholics and Protestants within Latin America. I think what's really remarkable is how rarely that contestation has turned violent. Having said that, I'm going to talk about a case that is violent, and that is the case study in the Mexican state of Chiapas.

Mexico, as my previous chart indicated, is one of the least Protestant countries in Latin America. But there are indeed pockets of Protestantism in parts of the country, and one of those pockets is the state of Chiapas in the far south of Mexico. Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, violence did break out in highland indigenous villages between Mayan traditionalist Catholics and new Protestant converts. Violence has broken out on a fairly large scale, particularly in this cluster of towns in Chiapas.

Violence broke out largely over the Protestants' failure to pay what Sheldon Annis has called a Catholic cultural tax; that is, their failure to participate in fiestas and to contribute to community funds and to engage in communal farming, and things like that. The competition in these villages ramped up into outright armed violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s and resulted in the expulsion of large numbers of Protestants from their village, who then moved on to the slums outside of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, which is the capital of Chiapas. The Zapatista movement, which started in 1994, is one of the first and only post-Soviet, post-modern guerilla movements to emerge in Latin America. Many of the original Zapatistas were and still are disaffected Protestants.

In December of 1997, there was an extremely unfortunate event in the highland village of Acteal, where 45 men, women and children who were Catholic pacifists were murdered while saying mass. Now, who committed the murders? It's not all together clear. It has been attributed variously to the PRI, the governing party in Mexico at that time, to paramilitary groups and - I think most implausibly - to hostile indigenous Protestants. We'll say that this charge is highly uncharacteristic of Protestants in general, but it does give you a sense of the highly charged religious atmosphere in Chiapas. A couple of years ago, Chiapas elected a Protestant governor, and since he has been in power - Pedro Salazar - there has been at least a truce between Catholics and Protestants. This truce remains to this day and will probably remain at least as long as Salazar remains governor. He has about two more years.

I wanted to mention, too, something that is somewhat unique to Chiapas. There is a theory - I don't think either of us particularly subscribe to it - it's called the religious marketplace theory. The idea behind the theory is that people pick and choose their religion. They see it as a commodity and they make religious choices just like you would choose a brand of toothpaste in a grocery store. Although I think the theory itself may demand a little further scrutiny, it does seem clear that once people leave the Catholic Church, which for them is an enormous rupture culturally and socially and in every other way, they are much more likely to engage in what sociologist Henri Gooren has called "conversion careers." That is, they're much more likely to change their religions to suit changing life circumstances. In the case of Chiapas, this has also meant conversion to Islam, particularly among the expulsados, the people who have been evicted from their villages.

It's not at all clear to me what this means. This is not a large-scale movement, but it has, in fact, happened. I think it's safe to say that if they are not more doctrinaire Muslims than they were Christians, maybe, in a global sense, it really doesn't mean anything at all. There have been efforts by a group of Spanish, that is, Iberian, imams to open a madrassa in San Cristóbal De Las Casas in order to bring the Islamic converts closer into orthodox Islam and to internationalize Islam. It's not at all clear where this is going and, again, I think it's doubtful that it's a significant trend. But I think it certainly bears watching, particularly in a place where you have a very liminal character such as in Chiapas.

The second case study that I would like to discuss today is Guatemala and the Ríos Montt regime. We've had a little prelude to this. Ríos Montt was a Guatemalan general who served between 1982 and 1983 as head of state. Guatemala is arguably the most Protestant country in Latin America. Perhaps as many as a third of the people in the country are Protestants. The vast majority of that conversion has taken place since 1976 when a catastrophic earthquake hit the country and many missionaries came into the country in its wake. But it's also the point - '76 - when the guerilla war really escalated dramatically.

When Ríos Montt took power in 1982, he oversaw the scorched earth campaign in the largely indigenous highlands that virtually eliminated the URNG guerillas. It also destroyed, along with it, 450 indigenous villages and may have killed as many as 100,000 people in 18 months. Ríos Montt was also a born-again Christian. I don't know how many of you read Spanish, but the headline here says, "God put me here, says President Ríos Montt." He appeared on TV every Sunday night offering what were called Sunday sermons, in which he very freely mixed evangelical language and anti-communist rhetoric. He demanded honesty and accountability from his government.

This is actually a public service ad during the Ríos Montt era: "This government has committed to change. I don't lie." This is the pledge that every public servant was required to take: "I don't lie. I don't steal. I don't abuse." Three of Ríos Montt's singular points that he made again and again and again in his discourses - his Sunday sermons - were pledges against corruption, in favor of law and order and respect for the proper authority. Ríos Montt remained a very powerful political figure in Guatemala up until very recently. His idea of there being these evangelical values, these Protestant values, is still an idea that has strong salience in Guatemala and has a tremendous amount of political capital.

The issue of evangelicals has been brought to bear in recent times by a series of events in the community of San Lucas Toliman. I took this map off, of all things, an evangelical website. This is a Mayan village on the highland lake of Lake Atitlan. In this village, something new has emerged within the last year or so, and it is that a group of Christian leaders in the town decided to initiate a policy of what they actually called, in so many words, social cleansing.

The project of social cleansing probably began around 2004 or 2005. The village itself was damaged very badly as a result of Hurricane Stan in October 2005, which is what this picture of devastation is about. The Hurricane certainly has exacerbated the policy of social cleansing. There are a group of evangelical vigilantes who have named themselves the moral arbiters of this Mayan village. They have closed down bars and have exacted sin taxes from businesses they consider to be sinful. They send Bible verses and threats out to sinners in the community, and in a small village, you know who the sinners are, right? Beginning in July 2005, they began to go onto city buses with lists of people who they considered to be sinful and needed to be called down for it. Actually, that was a very common practice in Guatemala in the '80s when the death squads would get on buses and take people off. But they get on buses and pull people off and either rough them up or in a couple of cases kill them. In July of 2005, there was a case where a group of vigilantes got on a bus and pulled off a serial adulterer and executed him in full view of everybody on the bus. Seven of the vigilantes of this group were arrested in February of 2006, but there are many more of them.

Now, I should say that the events in San Lucas Toliman are part of a larger vigilante movement in Guatemala that has nothing particularly to do with religion. In 2005, there were 3,000 people killed in Guatemala by vigilantes. Vigilantes in Guatemala enjoy the support of the general population, who believe that they enforce order in the face of what would otherwise be a chaotic and lawless society. What I think distinguishes the San Lucas Toliman case, of course, is the religious element, which I think may actually be part of an emerging trend. This is not, in fact, the first incidence of Christian vigilantism in Guatemala. A couple years ago in the village of Almolonga, which is also a Mayan village, a group of men from a church killed two teenage boys who they accused of having brought un-Christian values into the town. I think, specifically for the Guatemala case, it raises the possibility that people may want to see a return to the Ríos Montt-era law-and-order mentality through the enforcement of evangelical values, but without the return to the politics and the excesses of Ríos Montt himself.

In terms of security, the case of San Lucas Toliman, I think, is particularly concerning for two reasons. Number one - vigilantism of any kind indicates the absence of the rule of law. The soaring incidences of lynchings in Guatemala and elsewhere in Central America, especially in El Salvador - and I will say, I've heard unsubstantiated cases of Christian vigilantism in El Salvador as well - points to the dangerous disintegration of civil society that had built up in these areas since the region's civil wars came to an end. And certainly, this sort of disintegration provides an opening for all kinds of self-appointed enforcers and power struggles in the absence of a functional rule of law.

Second, the presence of self-appointed moral enforcers suggests that the Talibanization of fundamentalist Christianity, at least in this one corner of Latin America, may be starting. While this presents a very different kind of security issue than does fundamentalist Islam, radicalized Christian fundamentalism is very much like radical Islam in the sense that it seeks to repudiate the ills of modern society that people associate with a post-modern West: excessive consumerism, rampant sexuality, disregard for authority, family disintegration and the like. Down the line, this would seem to have very serious implications for how people feel about the kinds of cultures and values that they associate very strongly with the United States, rightly or wrongly. It is too early to say whether this is a trend or not, but it most certainly bears watching. Thank you.

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Christianity and Conflict in Latin America

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National Defense University Washington, D.C. The Pew Forum co-sponsored a symposium with the National Defense University's School for National Security Executive Education on "Religion, Conflict and the Global War on Terrorism in Latin America."

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El Salvador has long suffered from cycles of extreme violence linked to powerful criminal gangs. National authorities have responded with both severe repression and secret appeasement. In public, governments may enact “mano dura” or “iron-fist” policies, which include mass arrests of suspected gang members.

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Members of a police anti-gang force in San Salvador, El Salvador. Under President Nayib Bukele, the Salvadoran government has initiated an unprecedented anti-gang crackdown. (Tomas Munita/The New York Times)

Under President Nayib Bukele, the Salvadoran government has initiated an unprecedented anti-gang crackdown in response to a weekend surge of killings in March that many suspect signaled the breakdown of a secret gang truce. Since declaring a state of exception in March 2022 that suspends certain constitutional rights, the government has arrested more than 53,000 suspected gang members, doubling the number of people held in the country's prisons. Almost two out of every 100 Salvadorans is now in jail, the highest reported incarceration rate in the world.

Despite (or perhaps because of) his iron-fisted policies, the Salvadoran president remains popular, with approval ratings that have hovered between 80 and 90 percent. But what comes next? How does the president use his popularity to develop a long-term strategy and institutions that can contain gang violence without violating human rights and without further harm to communities whose social and familial fabric has been hit hard by the crackdown?

USIP's Mary Speck spoke with José Miguel Cruz, a Central American gang expert at Florida International University, about the power of Salvadoran gangs, the impact of mass incarceration and whether negotiations with gang leaders might offer a pathway to lasting peace.

Speck: We generally think of gang members as youths from underprivileged backgrounds who are searching for social connections, excitement and, often, financial gain through crimes such as retail drug sales. Do Central American gangs fit this pattern? What make them so powerful?

Cruz: In both the United States and Central America, basically we're talking about young people who are searching for belonging and trying to respond to the questions about identity that you always have when you're young. Because of the conditions where they live - poverty, exclusion, marginality - the gang becomes their immediate group of reference. That's basically what we see in both the United States and in Central America.

What sets Central American gangs apart is their capacity to control daily life in their neighborhoods, using a lot of violence. Another important difference is that the main source of income for gangs in the United States is drug trafficking at the local level. In Central America, they rely much more on extortion, imposing taxes on the local people. They become a kind of ruler, developing this capacity to tax the population.

If you try to develop a small business or start a company in a neighborhood controlled by gangs, you have to pay " renta," or rent, in order to "get security." This is normally what the state does: ask you for taxes in return for giving you some kind of security. That's the kind of power gangs have developed in Central America especially in poor barrios or the deprived zones.

But even within Central America there are important differences. Gangs have developed the most in El Salvador, then Honduras, then Guatemala. Why is this? Well, there are many different factors, but I think one of the important factors is that in Honduras and Guatemala, you have other criminal actors - specifically drug trafficking organizations - that have prevented gangs from growing as powerful as in El Salvador.

Speck: El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have all implemented so-called mano dura policies to combat gangs. The Salvadoran crackdown since March 2022 is the most recent and extreme example. Nonetheless gangs still dominate impoverished urban neighborhoods throughout the region. Do these crackdowns weaken - or at least contain - the gangs? And if not, why not?

Cruz: We know a lot about the impact of "mano dura" policies now, because they have been implemented since the early 2000s. Basically what we found is that these policies, especially in El Salvador, motivated the gangs to become much better organized.

First, because these crackdowns generated a lot of grievances among the population. That pushed many kids into the hands of the gangs. Second, the government put those they arrested together in these massive prisons. So, you have people from different parts of the country together in a prison. And they start networking and establishing connections. The crackdowns provided these opportunities, 24/7, for kids and young men to organize.

El Salvador cracked down on gangs in 2003 and by 2004 we started seeing evidence that extortion was becoming a problem. Why? Because gang members in prison started demanding that their pals outside prison send them money. So, the gang members outside started extorting the population to send money to those inside. And the people in prison also started using cell phones to extort people outside prison.

It is clear that after mano dura, extorsions went up. Homicides also went up because there were wars between gangs to gain territorial control and also between the state and gangs.

Speck: The U.S. government and other donors have worked with the Salvadoran government on gang and violence prevention programs. And there is evidence that these programs can be effective. Why haven't they been scaled up? And why have Salvadoran governments chosen instead to negotiate with gang leaders?

Cruz: Salvadorans did realize that mano dura policies weren't working. So [President Mauricio] Funes started trying more preventive policies after taking office in 2009. But - and this is very important in terms of policy - preventive measures take time. You have this kind of momentum or inertia from the crackdowns, so gangs continue to strengthen while at the same time you're trying to implement preventive policies. People were not seeing results and the homicide rate remained high.

So Funes does a 180 and puts the Minister of Defense [David Munguía Payés] in charge of security. And the first thing the minister does is to go back a bit to mano dura. But at this point, gangs are better prepared and start responding in the same fashion. So, what you have is even more violence.

It seemed like nothing was working. Prevention seemed not to be working. The hard approaches didn't work. So, the minister says, "What we need to reduce are homicides." And the only way to do so is by talking with gangs, and that's how he came up with the truce. He negotiated the truce to reduce homicides. He didn't care about extorsions or other things, just homicides. And it worked!

The limitation of the truce was that while people liked the reduction of homicides, the truce didn't really address the gang control in the communities. And the gangs continued extorting. That's when you have the backlash. Because people are saying "Ah, now they are negotiating with gangs. But I still have to pay rent to the gang. The gangs are still here, right? The gangs haven't disappeared."

Speck: What can be done? Violence prevention efforts are unpopular because they take too long. Gang truces may offer relief from violence but allow gangs to retain local control. Mass incarceration can create a new generation of gang members. Is there any way to break out of these cycles of accommodation, repression and resurgence?

Cruz: Considering the power gangs have at the local level, I think any solution has to entail some kind of negotiation. Recognizing that the gangs are what we call in Spanish "un poder fáctico," a factual power at the local level.

The problem with the truce of 2012 or Bukele's negotiations with the gang leaders is that they don't address what I think should be the ultimate goal: the demobilization of the gangs as criminal actors and their incorporation into licit ways of living. They also did it clandestinely, so you don't know what arrangements were made.

You should negotiate with gangs as part of a strategy to demobilize them, and also to provide justice to the victims, which should also be part of the equation.

There are people who need to be held accountable: the leaders. But you also need to remember, many of these guys did terrible things when they were kids and some are still kids, so you have to take that into consideration even as you try to provide justice to victims.

Many of the gang leaders are very much aware of all the things they did, and some of them have remorse. Some of them acknowledge that they need to pay for that. Many of them want their kids to have a normal life.

So, what can we say is "you have to pay for what you did. You have to be in prison. But your family and your community will be safe. They will have the opportunities they deserve as any other member of the society."

Many gang members have even told me, "Look, I'm still in this because of my family, because otherwise I won't have anything to offer to my family. They will starve." Many never completed school; they've never received any training. And their kids also never got any education, any training. So, a bargaining chip may be to offer a future for these families, these communities, while at the same time holding the leaders accountable, keeping them in prison, basically paying their debt.

We have tried mano dura. We have tried gang truces. And we keep failing. So, why not negotiate gang demobilization? You have to invest a lot of money and political capital. President Bukele might have been in a stronger position to do so early in his tenure, but it will be harder now with the mass incarceration and vilification of gang members. Still, demobilization is the only long-term solution.

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Ending El Salvador's Cycle of Gang Violence

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El Salvador has long suffered from cycles of extreme violence linked to powerful criminal gangs. National authorities have responded with both severe repression and secret appeasement. In public, governments may enact "mano dura" or "iron-fist" policies, which include mass arrests of suspected gang members.

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violence is a key pull factor reason for immigrants to leave their countries due to the lack of no protection and feeling safe.

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[On the security risks of climate change] The classic definition [of state security] has been around conflict-threats to human life from armed aggression-which includes intrastate components such as dissident groups and civil war, and then, of course, when states go to war with each other.... [But climate change may induce conflict] to happen in places that are already living on the edge.

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Violence drives immigration from Central America

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On the security risks of climate change] The classic definition [of state security] has been around conflict-threats to human life from armed aggression-which includes intrastate components such as dissident groups and civil war, and then, of course, when states go to war with each other....

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Economic conditions play such a big role when it comes to pushing factors. According to this article, in 2021 when COVID-19 got bad it caused many individuals to live in worse conditions than ever. There were thousands of immigrants leaving their countries due to these living standards.

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The majority of Central Americans who want to migrate internationally are driven by economic factors, report says

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The majority of Central Americans who want to migrate internationally are motivated by economic factors, a new report found.

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Katie

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Migration across Central America is escalating, with more families with children seeking better opportunities outside their home countries. Migrants primarily cite poverty and economic hardships, violence, and food insecurity as reasons for leaving. Adding to the surge in migration is the exodus of Venezuelan migrants, who are leaving their homeland in significant numbers, as reported by the United Nations.

Central America migration: Facts, FAQs, and how to help

Fast facts: Central America migration

Families are migrating north due to poverty, violence, and food insecurity.

Migrants at the southern U.S. border predominantly come from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

UNICEF reports an estimated 4.1 million children will need humanitarian assistance in Mexico and Central America in 2024.

Weather-related events such as the El Niño weather pattern and other crises threaten areas already affected by food insecurity and past disasters.

At the Mexico-U.S. border, World Vision and church partners aid vulnerable families with food and basic household and school supplies.

In Central America, World Vision partners with churches, governments, local businesses, and schools to build resilience and create a safer, more nurturing environment, helping people remain hopeful at home.

BACK TO QUESTIONS
Where do most Central American immigrants come from?

Most Central American migrants come from three of the region's seven countries - El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras - referred to as the Northern Triangle. It's called the Northern Triangle because the countries are clustered in a triangle at the northern tip of Central America. Guatemala, the northernmost of the three, borders Mexico.

All three of the Northern Triangle countries rank among the poorest in the Western Hemisphere and are plagued by chronic violence.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
Why are Central American migrants coming to the U.S.?

Many factors cause people to uproot their families. The most common reasons among Central American migrants are extreme economic hardship and lack of opportunities, food insecurity, political insecurity, violence, natural disasters, and extreme weather-related events.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
How many people are migrating from Central America to the U.S.?

There is no clear count of how many people are migrating to the U.S. from Central America. But the Migration Policy Institute says of the 3.4 million Central Americans living in the U.S., about 85% of them are from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. At any given time, there could be thousands of people journeying north from their home countries. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection*:

Over 450,000 people arrived at the U.S. border in 2020, as the coronavirus pandemic slowed migration across the world.

That number nearly quadrupled in 2021 to at least 1.7 million migrants who were returned to their home country or detained in the U.S., at least temporarily, at the U.S.-Mexico border.

More than 189,000 people reached the U.S. border in June 2021 - the highest number ever seen for one month in more than 20 years. Numbers kept climbing in subsequent months that year.

*Numbers are based on the fiscal year. BACK TO QUESTIONS
What is World Vision doing to help at the Mexico-U.S. border?

Since late 2018, when one of the large migrant caravans arrived in Tijuana, Mexico, World Vision staff have been working with local faith-based organizations to help migrant families. We're working with partners along the border in Arizona, California, and Texas, where we're supporting vulnerable families who need essential supplies like food, water, hygiene items, and basic household and school supplies.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
Where in the Americas is World Vision providing humanitarian aid?

Since 2019, World Vision has been actively responding to the Central America and Venezuela crisis through our program "Hope Without Borders" in Central and South America. From 2019 to March 2024, we have supported over 2.1 million people with programs focused on child protection, education, food security, access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), and livelihoods in countries including Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

We are also facilitating economic programs through employment support and training, along with mental health services for those affected by the crises. Collaboration with faith-based organizations is vital, enabling us to offer safe spaces, skills training, and language classes. World Vision's cash transfers and food aid have become an essential lifeline for thousands of people in Central America and Venezuela.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
What is World Vision doing in migrants' home countries?

We've been working for decades throughout Latin America, including in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, where child sponsorship is helping families thrive at home.

World Vision has designed the Hope at Home: Building Resilience in Central America framework, which aims to address the root causes of forced migration by building resilience at the individual, family, community, and societal levels. We do this by helping communities through programs on violence prevention; social inclusion; sustainable livelihoods; food security; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); quality of education; health; and so much more.

One program raising hope among vulnerable youth in Central America is Youth Ready. Through this approach, we partner with local churches to support young people to discover their potential, develop specific career and life skills, establish support networks, build character and confidence, and plan for their future. This work is made possible largely through child sponsorship.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
How can I help children and families in the Central America migration crisis?

Here are effective ways you can help Central American families living in precarious situations:

Pray: Join us in praying for people in Central America, asking God to bring peace to communities, strength and integrity to leaders, and economic stability to families.

Support U.S. foreign assistance by contacting your elected officials. It only takes a minute.

Sponsor a child in Central America: Sponsoring a child is a personal way to show God's love to a child in need. It also gives a family more reasons to remain in their community.

BACK TO QUESTIONS

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Central America migration: Facts, FAQs, and how to help

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Here are basic facts and FAQs about Central America migration, how World Vision addresses root causes of poverty there, and how you can help.

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lai

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Some women mostly migrate because there is a high level of them being raped and also a very high level of human trafficking which is why women have no choice but to take their kids and leave.

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5 Things to Know About Central American Migration | Project HOPE

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Record numbers of migrants are transiting through Mexico in search of safety and security. Learn more about what they face.

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High population growth poses challenges like extreme poverty, environmental impact, and rising fundamentalism. It strains resources and leads to inequality.

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Latin America and the Caribbean to Reach Maximum Population Levels by 2058

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Accede al comunicado Latin America and the Caribbean to Reach Maximum Population Levels by 2058 . Lee el texto completo aquí.

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As drug trafficking organizations fight for territory and drug routes, thousands of People have to leave due to criminal violence. "Criminal violence, including sex trafficking and systemic, large-scale kidnapping, poses a serious threat to the lives and sustainability of those in cartel territories."

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https://dignityformigrants.com/issues/push-pull/push_factors/

"Therefore, the vast majority of people with a very genuine fear of gang recruitment who have been threatened in their home country do not have a legal remedy for remaining in the U.S"

"CIA World Factbook states the almost half of Guatemalan children under age 5 are chronically malnourished. Guatemala has one of the highest malnutrition rates."

Claudia GP

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Right now, the latest data shows that we have 9.9 million job openings in the U.S., but only 5.8 million unemployed workers. This data shows that their are a lot of people who probably don't have a job because they weren't accepted or have the skills for it.

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Unsustainable Development (Hydroelectric Dam) Keelin Lagos

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Unsustainable Development (Hydroelectric Dam) Keelin Lagos

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In connection to the research I've done on Berta Caceres (Indigenous Leader & Activist against unsustainable developments on Indigenous people's land in Honduras who was assassinated for her work against such developments), Wendy Garcia fled Honduras because a hydroelectric dam polluted the water where she lived. Water is a basic necessity and unsustainable developments in Honduras are pushing people out of their homes. Aside from Garcia's story, there are many who have gotten sick from such developments and have caused many more to flee.

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Why I’m fleeing Honduras to seek asylum in the US

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When a fellow protester against a dam that was polluting our water was killed, I left with my young son on a migrant caravan

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Violence and corruption in Central America, particularly in the Northern Triangle countries, is causing a wave of outward migration.
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/why-the-central-america-crisis-is-so-persistent/#:~:text=For%20years%2C%20Central%20America%20has,crime%20and%20the%20drug%20trade.

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For years, violence and corruption in Central America, particularly in the Northern Triangle countries, has been causing a wave of outward migration.

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Crime

Guatemala has one of the highest violent crime rates in Latin America. Although the majority of serious crime involves local gangs, incidents are usually indiscriminate and can occur in tourist areas. Despite the high levels of crime, most visits to Guatemala are trouble-free.

Car-jacking and armed hold-ups are common on the main road 'Carretera Salvador' leading from Guatemala City to the border with El Salvador. The crossroads at Fraijanes, San Jose Pinula and Las Luces are also focal points for express kidnappings.

Such attacks, including sexual assault, can take place anywhere and at any time of the day. Attacks usually involve firearms and motorcycle riders. There is a low arrest and conviction rate. Victims have been killed and injured resisting attack.

No parts of Guatemala City are free from crime, this includes Zone 10 (Zona Viva), which is popular with tourists and foreign residents. Take care in Zone 1 (the historical centre), where the cheaper hotels are located and several bus routes terminate.

For shorter trips within towns and cities the safest option is to take radio or hotel taxis. When arriving at the airport you can buy pre-paid taxi vouchers from the INGUAT Tourist Office in the arrivals terminal.

Take care around ATM machines, petrol station forecourts, the airport, bus stations and shopping centres. Check ATMs for evidence of tampering, but be aware that affected machines may not be easy to spot. It's safer to change money in hotels, at banks or at foreign exchange offices. Don't withdraw too much money at once, and avoid withdrawing money at night.

Avoid displaying valuable items like laptops, cameras and mobile phones. Don't wear a lot of jewellery and only carry minimal amounts of cash. Use a hotel safe if possible.

Avoid travelling around on your own or at night, especially at border crossings or areas where there are few other people around. When travelling to remote areas it may be safer to travel with others or take part in a tour with a reputable company.

Be wary of bogus police officers. There have been reports of visitors becoming victims of theft, extortion or sexual assault by people dressed in police uniforms.

Foreign visitors and residents can be targeted by scam artists. The scams come in many forms, and can lead to great financial loss. Be cautious if you are asked to transfer funds to family or friends in Guatemala. Try and get in contact with your family member or friend to check that they have made this request.

Local travel

If you are travelling near the affected areas you should seek advice from your travel agent or PROATUR. Always cooperate with military and police officers; carry valid ID at all times and be prepared for various checkpoints; allow extra time to reach your destination; monitor local news to stay informed on the current situation.

You can get up-to-date security information through INGUAT, the Guatemalan tourist agency. INGUAT's tourist assistance service, PROATUR, offers a service to accompany individual tourists or groups travelling in Guatemala. You can contact them on (502) 2290 2810; an English service is available. You may also dial 1500 in Guatemala.

There have been armed attacks on tourists travelling by road to/from major tourist sites like Antigua, Tikal, Petén and Lake Atitlan. Boat services between towns on the shore of Lake Atitlan may be a safer alternative.

PROATUR issues advice on which routes to take when travelling in and around Sololá, Panajachel and Lake Atitlan. Avoid the Godinez by-pass via Patzun between Guatemala City and Panajachel. Use the Pan American Highway to Sololá instead. You should also avoid the road between Cocales (Suchitepequez) and San Lucas Toliman (Atitlan) if possible.

Reports of violence have been reported in the municipalities of Ixchiguan and Tajumulco of the department of San Marcos. Please seek advice from PROATUR if you plan to travel to these areas and whether it is safe to climb the Tajumulco volcano.

Be careful when accepting lifts.

Border areas

Pay particular attention to your security in the border areas with Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador and Belize. There have been reports of disruptions and tensions at the Mexico-Guatemala border. For information on the current requirements if travelling to Mexico from Guatemala, contact the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala.

Take particular care in the Belize/Guatemala border area because of the ongoing dispute between the two countries. Only use the officially recognised border crossings.

Volcanoes

Before climbing volcanoes, you should visit the website of the Guatemalan Meteorological Office (INSIVUMEH) and the CONRED disaster agency for information on access, restrictions and recommendations. You should also check and follow the advice of local authorities beforehand. Some volcanoes are at high altitude with sub-zero temperatures at night. Six tourists died of exposure on Acatenango in January 2017. Warm clothing and waterproofs are essential. Local tour organisers tend to underestimate the risks. There is no mountain rescue service. Please also see Local travel.

Road travel

You can use your UK driving licence to drive in Guatemala for visits under 3 months, but an International Driving Permit is recommended. Driving standards are variable. You should drive carefully and expect the unexpected. Adequate car insurance is essential. If you are involved in an accident, contact the National Police by calling 120 or the fire brigade by dialling 122 or 123 and wait for them to arrive.

PROVIAL, a roadside assistance force, patrols most of the major roads in the country. However, patrols are sporadic. PROVIAL can be contacted by calling 2419-2121.

It is generally safer to travel on main roads. There is a greater risk of attack on quieter routes. Travel in convoy if possible. In more isolated locations, roads are unpaved and you may need a four-wheel drive vehicle.

Motorcyclists throughout the country must wear an orange vest and helmet with the registration number. Those violating the law face a fine of Q1000 (around £100).

Speed limits are strictly enforced and there are heavy penalties for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. These can include fines, confiscation of driving licences and imprisonment. It is against the law for drivers to operate mobile telephones whilst driving. For more information you can visit Departamento de Transito PNC and Transit Law (in Spanish).

Public buses and coach services

For security reasons you should avoid travel on public buses (repainted US school buses). There has been an increase in armed attacks by local gangs on bus drivers and conductors, often resulting in serious injury or death. Since July 2010 these attacks have included the use of explosives. There have been reports of violent muggings, including rape and assault against foreigners on these buses.

Private inter-city coach services are generally safer, but have been attacked during daylight hours on well-used, main roads.

Guatemala City Council no longer allows some inter-city buses to enter the city centre. Passengers are dropped at various points on the outskirts.

Political situation

Nationwide elections will take place in Guatemala in 2023 with the first round taking place 25th June and a potential second round on 20th August. There may be heightened tensions in the lead up to these, as well as in the immediate aftermath. Monitor local news channels and visit the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (the government entity in charge of the election process) for the latest information.

The months leading up to elections season are typically characterised by large rallies and other events associated with political campaigning. Such events could cause increased traffic and disrupt movements, complicating travel.

There is a risk of political demonstrations, and although most demonstrations are peaceful, they can turn violent. You should avoid all demonstrations. Guatemalan legislation prohibits political activities by foreigners. If you take part in protests you may be detained and/or asked to leave the country.

Incidents of political violence, strikes and large demonstrations can occur, often with little or no notice.

The use of roadblocks and blocking public facilities, including the international airport, can happen at any time.

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Safety and security - Guatemala travel advice

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Guatemala has one of the highest violent crime rates in Latin America. Although the majority of serious crime involves local gangs, incidents are usually indiscriminate and can occur in tourist areas. Despite the high levels of crime, most visits to Guatemala are trouble-free.

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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/06/29/CF-Central-America-resilient-growth
Economic problems are something that many countries have been and are dealing with. Since COVID happened many countries especially Central American ones have been feeling the economic impact that COVID had on them.

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Central America: Seeking Resilient Growth and Social Cohesion in the Aftermath of Shocks

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Central America is no stranger to large shocks. The region was once one of the most volatile in the world, the scene of civil and political upheaval. More recently, it has been hit by natural disasters, on top of the COVID-19 pandemic. After each shock, the region has managed to recover as it seeks new beginnings.

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A lack of jobs appears to be a significant driver in the migrant flow from Guatemala to the United States. Astoundingly, according to the Wall Street Journal, government estimates show that "150,000 to 170,000 people enter the workforce annually," but the economy only creates about 35,000 to 40,000 jobs per year. Plainly, such a failing in the Guatemalan economic system encourages departures.
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The Wall Street Journal reported this week on the trip that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner Kevin McAleenan made last month to the so-called "Northern Triangle" countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The commissioner went to those countries in an attempt to assess the "push" factors that attract nationals of those countries to enter the United States illegally. The "pull" factors are likely stronger, but it is often difficult to separate one from the other.

In attempting to find a simple definition for the terms "push" factors and "pull" factors, I happened across a web site called "eschooltoday.com", which appears to be a Ghana-based website geared toward school students below the college level. It is surprisingly unbiased, although the header for the article in question is captioned "your cool facts and tips on migration". I rarely think of "cool facts" as it relates to this subject, but perhaps I should reconsider.

In any event, the site defines "push factors" as follows:

Push factors are those that force the individual to move voluntarily, and in many cases, they are forced because the individual [may] risk something if they stay. Push factors may include conflict, drought, famine, or extreme religious activity.

Poor economic activity and lack of job opportunities are also strong push factors for migration. Other strong push factors include race and discriminating cultures, political intolerance and persecution of people who question the status quo.

"Pull factors" are in turn defined in the following manner:

Pull factors are those factors in the destination country that attract the individual or group to leave their home. Those factors are known as place utility, which is the desirability of a place that attracts people. Better economic opportunities, more jobs, and the promise of a better life often pull people into new locations.

Sometimes individuals have ideas and perceptions about places that are not necessarily correct, but are strong pull factors for that individual. As people grow older and retire, many look for places with warm weather, peaceful and comfortable locations to spend their retirement after a lifetime of hard work and savings. Such ideal places are pull factors too.

Very often, people consider and prefer opportunities closer to their location than similar opportunities farther away. In the same vein, people often like to move to places with better cultural, political, climatic and general terrain in closer locations than locations farther away. It is rare to find people move over very long distances to settle in places that they have little knowledge of.

In September reporting on that trip in the Washington Post, McAleenan conceded the strong role that current American law plays as a pull factor in encouraging illegal migration, and the dangers of that trip:

"Our legal framework continues to act as a powerful magnet for families and children seeking a better life," McAleenan, who invited a small group of reporters on his trip, said in an interview. "As a result, transnational criminal organizations are profiting from a billion-dollar human smuggling industry that treats people like a disposable commodity."

"We see it every day on the border and at our ports of entry," he added. "High-speed chases, people being smuggled in tractor-trailers, and bodies found in the desert and on our riverbeds are all terrible symptoms of the same complicated problem. CBP cannot fix this problem by ourselves."

A fairly revealing passage in that article explains how the smugglers themselves exploit our flawed immigration laws to lure potential migrants:

Guatemalan community leaders told McAleenan that smuggling guides who charge $10,000 for a trip to the United States capitalize on the dysfunction of the American immigration system.

"They say that if you bring a child they'll let you into the United States and give you citizenship," said Dora Alonzo Quijivix, describing the sales pitch during a meeting McAleenan attended with indigenous leaders in Quetzaltenango, the largest city in the western highlands. "Now they're saying pregnant women who go will also get citizenship."

Quijivix said she's heard smugglers say this on local radio stations.

The commissioner attempted to counter those claims, but still had to concede that they were not entirely inaccurate:

McAleenan told the group that such claims were false and that the United States needed to do a better job of countering them. "There's no ability to stay in the U.S. if you bring a child with you," he said. "There's no ability to just stay if you are pregnant. But our court system is very slow, so you might actually have a false promise of being able to stay in the U.S. for a year or two before you are repatriated."

An honest understanding of the push factors is a critical element of effective border enforcement, so credit must be given to the commissioner for at least trying. As the Journal article, which focused on Guatemala, noted:

Unrelenting violence in the region was widely accepted as having sparked the first wave of roughly 70,000 immigrant families, and nearly as many unaccompanied children, in 2014.

But as the flows have fluctuated in recent years, the causes have become more elusive.

...

Although official data show no increase in violence in Guatemala in recent years, it is still a reason some newly arrived immigrants cite for leaving.

A lack of jobs appears to be a significant driver in the migrant flow from Guatemala to the United States. Astoundingly, according to the Wall Street Journal, government estimates show that "150,000 to 170,000 people enter the workforce annually," but the economy only creates about 35,000 to 40,000 jobs per year. Plainly, such a failing in the Guatemalan economic system encourages departures.

It is not the only factor, however. Malnutrition, a lack of access to education, and a lack of protection for indigenous peoples from the predations of the gangs and drug traffickers that use Guatemala as a transit point were all listed by local officials as reasons for the departure of members of those communities to the United States. Lorena Lopez Mejia, an employee of the nongovernmental agency "Organismo Naleb" in Guatemala's indigenous communities, offered a particularly enlightening perspective: "If we can't have access to land, we can't talk about food access, let alone (food) security."

The Department of State (DOS) Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Guatemala for 2017 confirms that the Guatemalan government does a poor job of integrating its significant indigenous citizenry:

While the indigenous population constituted 44 percent of the population, according to the latest 2002 government census, indigenous representation in national government was minimal. There was one indigenous female member of the cabinet, one on the Constitutional Court, and one on the Supreme Court. There were approximately 20 indigenous members of Congress. Indigenous individuals comprised a larger share of elected local government officials, filling 113 of the 333 mayoral seats elected in 2015.

The news is not all bad, however. As DOS states:

The law provides for equal rights for indigenous persons and obliges the government to recognize, respect, and promote the lifestyles, customs, traditions, social organizations, and manner of dress of indigenous persons. The government does not recognize particular indigenous groups as having a special legal status provided by national law.

Although indigenous communities were often not consulted with respect to the exploitation of resources in their areas, DOS was careful to note:

During the year courts suspended the operating licenses of several hydroelectric and mining projects for not complying with requirements for consultations with indigenous communities prior to project implementation as required by International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169, recognizing the convention's requirement that the government must play a role in the process. Previously, businesses carried out consultations independently without government oversight.

At least part of the issue with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples in Guatemala is systemic. DOS explains: "Indigenous lands lacked effective demarcation, making the legal recognition of titles to the land problematic."

I am aware of the fact that discourses on the rights of indigenous peoples in foreign lands is the sort of topic that often makes the eyes of readers of posts like this glaze over. These are often key facts, however, in immigration court, particularly as it relates to the asylum claims that are currently clogging the court system and contributing to the massive backlog.

The good news is that the U.S. government does have the ability to influence factors in Guatemala. According to USAID, Guatemala received almost $297 million in U.S. foreign aid in 2016, the third-highest rate in the region. And, according to the CIA, the United States is far and away Guatemala's largest trading partner, accounting for 33.8 percent of the country's exports. This gives the United States government significant leverage to demand the changes necessary to address the push factors that have created the flow of migrants leaving that country to enter the United States illegally.

The Journal article concluded:

As he finished his trip, Mr. McAleenan said he hadn't received the "clarion bell" he had anticipated. Food insecurity turned out to be one element in a complex set of reasons why so many Guatemalans have been coming to the U.S. illegally, he said. He was also frustrated that so many would-be migrants know the risks of the trip to the U.S. but chose to come anyway.

"This is not an acceptable situation," Mr. McAleenan said.

No, it is not. But at least the administration is attempting to address the flow of illegal migrants from the Northern Triangle countries holistically. It is a start. Now is the time for the U.S. government to use its significant leverage to bring about the changes in those countries necessary to stem the flow.

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Looking for Push Factors in Central America

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The Wall Street Journal reported this week on the trip that CBP Commissioner Kevin McAleenan made last month to the so-called "Northern Triangle" countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The commissioner went to those countries in an attempt to assess the "push" factors that lead nationals of those countries to try to enter the United States illegally.

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Natural disasters can push individuals out of their country due to the sense of threat, loss of resources, negative impact on businesses, and long-term damages these disasters inflict.

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Today, inaccurate diagnosis, medication errors, inappropriate or unnecessary treatment, inadequate or unsafe clinical facilities or practices, or providers who lack adequate training and expertise prevail in all countries.

https://www.who.int/news/item/05-07-2018-low-quality-healthcare-is-increasing-the-burden-of-illness-and-health-costs-globally

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Poor quality health services are holding back progress on improving health in countries at all income levels, according to a new joint report by the OECD, World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank.

Today, inaccurate diagnosis, medication errors, inappropriate or unnecessary treatment, inadequate or unsafe clinical facilities or practices, or providers who lack adequate training and expertise prevail in all countries.

The situation is worst in low and middle-income countries where 10 percent of hospitalized patients can expect to acquire an infection during their stay, as compared to seven percent in high income countries. This is despite hospital acquired infections being easily avoided through better hygiene, improved infection control practices and appropriate use of antimicrobials.. At the same time, one in ten patients is harmed during medical treatment in high income countries.

These are just some of the highlights from Delivering Quality Health Services - a Global Imperative for Universal Health Coverage. The report also highlights that sickness associated with poor quality health care imposes additional expenditure on families and health systems.

There has been some progress in improving quality, for example in survival rates for cancer and cardiovascular disease. Even so, the broader economic and social costs of poor quality care, including long-term disability, impairment and lost productivity, are estimated to amount to trillions of dollars each year.

"At WHO we are committed to ensuring that people everywhere can obtain health services when and where they need them," said WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. "We are equally committed to ensuring that those services are good quality. Quite honestly, there can be no universal health coverage without quality care."

"Without quality health services, universal health coverage will remain an empty promise," said OECD Secretary-General Ángel Gurría. "The economic and social benefits are clear and we need to see a much stronger focus on investing in and improving quality to create trust in health services and give everyone access to high-quality, people-centred health services."

"Good health is the foundation of a country's human capital, and no country can afford low-quality or unsafe healthcare," World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim said. "Low-quality care disproportionately impacts the poor, which is not only morally reprehensible, it is economically unsustainable for families and entire countries."

Other key findings in the report paint a picture of quality issues in healthcare around the world:

Health care workers in seven low- and middle-income African countries were only able to make accurate diagnoses one third to three quarters of the time, and clinical guidelines for common conditions were followed less than 45 percent of the time on average.

Research in eight high-mortality countries in the Caribbean and Africa found that effective, quality maternal and child health services are far less prevalent than suggested by just looking at access to services. For example, just 28 percent of antenatal care, 26 percent of family planning services and 21 percent of sick-child care across these countries qualified as 'effective.'

Around 15 percent of hospital expenditure in high-income countries is due to mistakes in care or patients being infected while in hospitals.
The three organisations outline the steps governments, health services and their workers, together with citizens and patients, urgently need to take to improve health care quality. Governments should lead the way with strong national health care quality policies and strategies. Health systems should focus on competent care and user experience to ensure confidence in the system. Citizens should be empowered and informed to actively engage in health care decisions and in designing new models of care to meet the needs of their local communities. Health care workers should see patients as partners and commit themselves to providing and using data to demonstrate the effectiveness and safety of health care.

The full report is available at http://www.who.int/servicedeliverysafety/quality-report/en/

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Low quality healthcare is increasing the burden of illness and health costs globally

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Poor quality health services are holding back progress on improving health in countries at all income levels, according to a new joint report by the OECD, World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank. Today, inaccurate diagnosis, medication errors, inappropriate or unnecessary treatment, inadequate or unsafe clinical facilities or practices, or providers who lack adequate training and expertise prevail in all countries.

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People move to other places because the country they might be in has food that is not safe for consumption or food that is too expensive.

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The region has the highest cost for a healthy diet compared to the rest of the world, at USD 3.89 per person per day, while the world average is USD 3.54.
January 19, 2023, Santiago, Chile. The new United Nations report Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 2022 finds that 22.5% of the Latin America and the Caribbean population cannot afford a healthy diet. In the Caribbean this figure reaches 52%; in Mesoamerica, 27.8%; and in South America, 18.4%.

The publication reports that 131.3 million people in the region could not afford a healthy diet in 2020. This represents an increase of 8 million compared to 2019 and is due to the higher average daily cost of healthy diets in Latin America and the Caribbean compared to the rest of the world's regions, reaching in the Caribbean a value of USD 4.23, followed by South America and Mesoamerica with USD 3.61 and USD 3.47, respectively.

This problem is related to different socioeconomic and nutritional indicators. The report presents a clear relationship between the inability to afford a healthy diet and such variables as a country's income level, the incidence of poverty, and the level of inequality.

The report also reveals that the rise in international food prices experienced since 2020, exacerbated after the start of the conflict in Ukraine, and a regional increase in food inflation above the general level, have increased the difficulties for people to access a healthy diet.

The document also includes recommendations based on evidence and an analysis of policies already implemented to improve the availability and affordability of nutritious foods, focusing on supporting the most vulnerable people and low-income households that spend a more significant proportion of their budget on food.

"There is no individual policy that can solve this problem independently. National and regional coordination mechanisms need to be strengthened to respond to hunger and malnutrition," said Mario Lubetkin, FAO Assistant Director and Regional Representative for Latin America and the Caribbean.

"To contribute to the affordability of healthy diets, it is necessary to create incentives for the diversification of the production of nutritious foods aimed mainly at family farming and small-scale producers, take measures for the transparency of the prices of these foods in markets and trade, and actions such as cash transfers and improving school menus," Lubetkin concluded.

Trade and market policies can play a fundamental role in improving food security and nutrition. Greater transparency and efficiency improve inter-regional agri-food trade by replacing uncertainty with market predictability and stability.

"We are talking about the region of the world with the most expensive healthy diet, which particularly affects vulnerable populations - small farmers, rural women, and indigenous and Afro-descendant populations - who allocate a greater percentage of their income to the purchase of food," said IFAD Regional Director Rossana Polastri. "To reverse this situation, we must promote innovative solutions that diversify production and increase the supply of healthy food, and that improve small producers' access to markets and quality food, including digital solutions that articulate food supply and demand."

The report also describes how some nutrition-sensitive social protection programs have worked and are essential to support the diets of the most vulnerable population, particularly in periods of crisis.

"Food insecurity will continue to rise due to the food and fuel price crisis caused by the conflict in Ukraine and the aftermath of COVID-19," said Lola Castro, WFP Regional Director. "We must act now, but how can we do it? Supporting governments to expand social protection networks because the pandemic once again demonstrated that social protection is useful to improve the affordability of a healthy diet, preventing crises like this from hitting affected populations even more".

Other food policies, such as nutritional labelling, subsidizing nutritious foods, and taxing unhealthy or non-nutritious foods that do not contribute to healthy diets, if well designed, can improve the affordability of healthy diets and prevent debilitating conditions and diseases related to overweight and obesity.

"We must redouble efforts to address malnutrition in all its forms by promoting public policies to create healthy food environments, eliminate industrially produced trans fats, implement front-end warning labeling, regulate advertising of unhealthy foods, tax sugary drinks, and support healthy eating and physical activity in schools," PAHO Director Carissa F. Etienne said. "Understanding the factors that determine poor dietary practices is key to finding solutions and ensuring that everyone in the region has access to healthy foods," she said.

For example, countries with higher levels of poverty and inequality tend to have more significant difficulties accessing a healthy diet, which is directly associated with a higher prevalence of hunger, chronic malnutrition in boys and girls, and anemia in women aged 15 to 49.

"For children to grow up healthy, it is not only urgent to ensure the availability of nutritious food at affordable prices. It is also necessary to develop public policies that guarantee adequate nutrition, in addition to nutritional counseling, focusing actions on the most vulnerable populations," said Garry Conelly, UNICEF Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The socioeconomic panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean is not encouraging. The most affected population groups are children under five and women, who suffer a higher prevalence of food insecurity than men.

The Regional Panorama of Food and Nutrition Security 2022 is a joint publication of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO); the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations World Food Program (WFP).

The number of hungry people in the region continues to rise

Between 2019 and 2021, the number of hungry people in the region increased by 13.2 million, reaching 56.5 million hungry people in 2021. The highest increase was in South America, where an additional 11 million people suffered from hunger. Between 2019 and 2021, hunger reached a prevalence of 7.9% in South America, 8.4% in Mesoamerica, and 16.4% in the Caribbean.

In 2021, 40.6% of the regional population experienced moderate or severe food insecurity, compared to 29.3% worldwide. Severe food insecurity was also more frequent in the region (14.2%) than in the world (11.7%).

Other figures presented in the report indicate that the region registers an important and positive evolution regarding the prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under five years of age. In 2020, this figure was 11.3% in Latin America and the Caribbean, approximately ten percentage points below the world average. However, 3.9 million children up to five years of age are overweight.

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UN Report: 131 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean cannot access a healthy diet

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The region has the highest cost for a healthy diet compared to the rest of the world, at USD 3.89 per person per day, while the world average is USD 3.54. January 19, 2023, Santiago, Chile. The new United Nations report Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 2022 finds that 22.5% of the Latin America and the Caribbean population cannot afford a healthy diet.

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the crime and violence in latin america is high including the lack of opportunity and poverty is a push while stability opportunity and jobs in the us is a pull

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For centuries, the United States has been a popular destination for migrants from around the world. Every day, asylum seekers and other migrants are coming to the U.S. southern border. This pattern is not new. However, the demographic composition of people attempting to cross the border has changed considerably over the past decade. In 2007, the vast majority of migrants attempting to enter the U.S. through its southern border were from Mexico. In 2018, most migrants were from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala - often referred to collectively as the "Northern Triangle countries" because they are the three northernmost Central American countries. Most of the Northern Triangle migrants have been unaccompanied children and families rather than individual adults, and an increasing number of families and unaccompanied children also present themselves at one of the U.S. ports of entry to apply for asylum rather than attempt unauthorized border crossings.

Migrants from Central America leave their home countries and undergo the often dangerous journey to the U.S. for varying reasons, and comprehensive data about these reasons is unavailable. Understanding the motives that lead migrants to the U.S. is crucial to reaching well-focused immigration and foreign policy solutions to the increasing migrant flows from Central America.

Unfortunately, the debate about whether migrants come primarily because of the "pull" factors to the U.S. or because of the "push" factors motivating them to leave their countries of origin is unresolved. Past research has suggested that some come primarily for the social and economic benefits of living in the U.S., but more recent findings suggest that more decide to begin new lives in the U.S. primarily because of real fears about their futures - fears that "push" them northward despite increased border security and stricter U.S. immigration policies.

Defining 'Push' and 'Pull' Factors

Individuals around the globe migrate for a broad variety of reasons, which can be conceptualized in two general terms: "push" and "pull" factors. "Push" factors are conditions in migrants' home countries that make it difficult or even impossible to live there, while "pull" factors are circumstances in the destination country that make it a more attractive place to live than their home countries.[1] Common "push" factors include violence, gender inequality, political corruption, environmental degradation and climate change, as well as lack of access to adequate health care and education. Common "pull" factors include more economic and work opportunities, the possibility of being reunited with family members, and a better quality of life, including access to adequate education and health care.[2]

Although the general "push" and "pull" factors describe motivational trends and patterns, they do not account for the specific and personal reasons for migrating that are unique to every individual.

Central American Migrants Coming to the U.S.

The data regarding migration from Central America does not explain whether people are coming because of push or pull factors, but the recent increases suggest new motivations for migration. While the number of migrants trying to cross the southern border between ports of entry annually has remained relatively stable during the past 10 years at around 400,000 per year,[3] the demographic makeup of those migrants has changed considerably, with Northern Triangle migrants accounting for a considerable share of the total since 2014.

Source: U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by Citizenship and Sector in FY2007-FY2018. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/BP%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20Citizenship%20FY07-FY18.pdf.

Until recently, the largest number of migrants entering the country between ports of entry (POEs) were from Mexico. However, this trend began to change in 2014, and since 2016 the number of migrants from the Northern Triangle actually has exceeded the number of Mexican migrants.

Source: U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by Citizenship and Sector in FY2007-FY2018. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/BP%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20Citizenship%20FY07-FY18.pdf.

Moreover, an increasing number of Northern Triangle migrants apprehended along the southern border from FY 2015 through FY 2018 have been children and families. Between fiscal years (FY) 2015 and 2018, the proportion of family units and unaccompanied children (UACs) apprehended at the southern border increased substantially, accounting for 63 percent of all apprehensions of Northern Triangle migrants in FY 2018.

Source: U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector FY2018. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions. ; Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children Statistics FY 2016. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-alien-children-statistics-fy-2016.

Source: U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector FY2018. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions. ; Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children Statistics FY 2016. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-alien-children-statistics-fy-2016.

Since FY 2017, an increasing number of families and UACs from Northern Triangle countries have been presenting themselves at one of the ports of entry to seek asylum. In FY 2017 and FY 2018, children and families from the Northern Triangle accounted for about half of all UACs and family units that presented themselves to Border Patrol officers along the southern border.

*By-country breakdown data for 2016 is not available
Source: Southwest Border Inadmissibles by Field Office FY2018. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/ofo-sw-border-inadmissibles.; Southwest Border Inadmissibles by Field Office FY2017. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/ofo-sw-border-inadmissibles-fy2017.

In FY 2018, UACs and families from the Northern Triangle accounted for about a quarter of all inadmissible individuals who arrived at one of the POEs along the southern border.

Source: Southwest Border Inadmissibles by Field Office FY2018. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/ofo-sw-border-inadmissibles.; Southwest Border Inadmissibles by Field Office FY2017. U.S. Customs and Border Control, Retrieved July 22, 2019, from https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/ofo-sw-border-inadmissibles-fy2017.

In 2019, more families and UACs from the Northern Triangle countries have been continuing to arrive at the U.S. southern border. As of March 2019, 74 percent of all migrants apprehended at the border were from one of the Northern Triangle countries and 58 percent were families or UACs from one of the Northern Triangle countries. [4] [5] [6]

What 'Pushes' Central American Migrants?

To understand the changes in these migration patterns, we need to examine the circumstances and events in the Northern Triangle countries. These countries share political, social and economic similarities, including high crime rates, pervasive gang violence, extreme poverty and corruption,[7] which all play a crucial role in migrants' decision to leave. In the 1980s and 1990s, migration researchers concluded that economic factors were "pulling" migrants to what they perceived as a thriving U.S. economy.[8] However, current analyses of migration across the southern border attribute migration to a complex interaction between various "push" and "pull" factors motivating migrants to leave their homes.[9] Experts generally agree that the recent increase in UACs and families migrating from the Northern Triangle is attributable to immediate threats of violence, corruption and environmental degradation in these countries, which are classified as "push" factors,[10] together with contributing factors of U.S. immigration policy and practice[11] and smuggling organizations' activities and propaganda.[12]

All three Northern Triangle countries rank among the most violent countries in the world, with significantly higher murder rates than neighboring Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama.[13] In 2015, El Salvador became the most violent not-at-war country in the world,[14] as its gang-related violence pushed the country's murder rate to 103 per 100,000 people.[15] While the rate has since fallen considerably,[16] it still remains nearly 10 times higher than that of the United States.[17] In 2018, there were 3,340 murders in El Salvador and the country's homicide rate stood at 51 per 100,000, down from the 81.2 per 100,000 recorded in 2016. Honduras saw 3,310 homicides in 2018 and a murder rate of 40 per 100,000 people.[18] Guatemala's murder rate fell to 22.4 per 100,000 with 3,881 homicides in 2018.[19] In comparison, the most recent data shows that United States recorded 5.3 homicides per 100,000 people in 2017.[20]

Gang activity is one of the main factors consistently driving the homicide rates in the Northern Triangle countries.[21] Together with a lack of governmental intervention, gang activity creates a self-perpetuating cycle of lawlessness and violence. Organized crime groups target small businesses and poor neighborhoods, recruiting members to impose and collect payments for "protection," threatening and harming individuals who do not comply with their demands. The imminent and omnipresent nature of oppressive gang activity forces innocent people to live under the constant threat of violence. A study conducted by Doctors Without Borders revealed that among nearly 500 Northern Triangle migrants surveyed, almost 40 percent mentioned direct attacks or threats to themselves or their families, extortion or gang-forced recruitment as the main reason for fleeing their countries, and 43.5 percent reported they had a relative who died due to violence in the previous two years.[22] Additionally, a recent Congressional Research Services (CRS) study showed that Salvadoran and Honduran victims of crimes are 10 to 15 percent more likely to migrate than those who have not had such an experience.[23]

Moreover, large numbers of people in the Northern Triangle countries live in poverty (defined by the World Bank as living at $1.90 or less per person per day[24]), which makes them more likely to be victimized by gangs that use their socioeconomic vulnerability to manipulate them and target them for membership recruitment and extortion.[25] More than 66 percent of Hondurans lived in poverty in 2016.[26] Moreover, Guatemala has faced some of the worst poverty levels (around 60 percent) in Latin America.[27] El Salvador's poverty rate hit 31 percent in 2016.[28] Gangs profit off rising poverty levels by ramping up recruitment efforts in poor communities to increase their hegemony over the government and society. The vicious cycle is spurred even more by corrupt governments and their inability and unwillingness to help their most vulnerable citizens.

In addition to violence and corruption, climate change-induced environmental threats also "push" Northern Triangle migrants to leave their home countries. The World Risk Index, a measure of disaster risk applied to 172 countries worldwide, revealed that Guatemala and El Salvador are among the 15 countries particularly prone to natural disasters, such as earthquakes and droughts. Because about 25 percent of the countries' workforce is employed in the agriculture sector, changing climate and natural disasters have a heavy impact on the population's well-being. In 2015, a massive drought plagued the Northern Triangle, leading to financial disaster for farmers and resulting in a food shortage whose impact was most devastating on impoverished communities. Individuals who were already fearful of gang violence became even more motivated to leave their countries because the drought caused food insecurity. In the most heavily impacted areas, migrants cited "no food" as the main reason for leaving their country. Guatemala has one of the highest food insecurity and malnutrition rates in Latin America, with nearly 1 million Guatemalans suffering from moderate to severe food insecurity. In 2018, Guatemala and Honduras had the second- and third-highest hunger levels in Central America and the Caribbean in the International Food Policy Research Institute's Global Hunger Index,[33] a measure that tracks hunger at global, regional and national levels; Haiti ranked first.

Are Central American Migrants Being 'Pulled' to the U.S.?

The conditions in the Northern Triangle countries explain why people desire to migrate to the U.S., but there's no denying that the conditions in the U.S. may be a contributing factor driving their migration. A common misperception, however, is that "pull" factors, such as socially, politically and economically attractive circumstances, explain solely why migrants come to the U.S. While the U.S. has been known as a country of unlimited possibilities with a growing economy, an excellent educational system, low levels of poverty and low levels of violence,[34] these factors alone are not the only forces "pulling" migrants to undergo the long and dangerous journey to the U.S. border to face an uncertain fate.

Family reunification is another common "pull" factor, as many Northern Triangle migrants have relatives who have already settled in the U.S. About 1 in 5 Salvadorans and 1 in 15 Guatemalans and Hondurans have migrated to the U.S., making the U.S. an attractive destination for their children and other family members fleeing the region.[35]

A comprehensive study about the causes of the increased migration at the U.S.-Mexico border published by the South Texas College of Law Houston showed that in Northern Triangle countries, the "word of mouth" phenomenon is a tangentially related factor "pulling" individuals to the U.S.[36] Smugglers (sometimes referred to as "coyotes"), who profit from bringing migrants across the southern border, encourage already vulnerable individuals to leave their homes, pushing them past a "psychological tipping point" by providing them with inaccurate information about the U.S. immigration system.[37] They orchestrate a "campaign of rumors," exaggerating the system's navigability and the likelihood of being granted asylum and scaring individuals into paying exorbitant amounts of money to be smuggled into the U.S.[38] A study of more than 400 interviews of migrants from the Northern Triangle revealed that most migrants do not possess any knowledge of the U.S. immigration system,[39] suggesting this "pull" factor is based on falsehoods rather than accurate perceptions about political realities and immigration laws in the U.S.

Conclusion

It is impossible to explain with absolute precision why migrants come to the U.S. because no comprehensive data tracks all of the reasons. Given the current realities in the Northern Triangle countries and recent research, it is reasonable to conclude that push factors - social, political and economic realities forcing people to leave their home countries - outweigh the pull factors in the U.S. that make it a more attractive place to live. Although more research about migrants' reasons for leaving their home countries is needed, it seems likely that migrants from the Northern Triangle countries will continue to arrive at the U.S. border until socioeconomic and security issues in their home countries are adequately addressed.

In the past few years, the Trump administration has implemented a number of policies to discourage migrants from coming to the U.S., such as family separations; metering, in which U.S. Customs and Border Protection limits the number of people who can request asylum at a port of entry; and Migrant Protection Protocols at the border, in which some migrants are returned to Mexico for the duration of their immigration proceedings. However, a lack of knowledge about which immigration policies particularly draw immigrants to the U.S.,[40] combined with evidence that migrants are unfamiliar with the U.S. immigration system, make it unlikely that these deterrence efforts will stop individuals from migrating north.[41]

Rather than focus on U.S. domestic policies and a deterrence-based approach at the southern border, the way to address the increasing flows of migrants from the Northern Triangle must center on U.S. cooperation with Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries to address the root causes of migration.

[8] See generally Kathleen M. Johnson, Note, Coping with Illegal Immigrant Workers: Federal Employer Sanctions, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 959 (1984).

[10] Rempell, S. Note, Credible Fears, Unaccompanied Minors, and the Causes of the Southwestern Border Surge, 18 Chap. L. Rev. 337 (2015).

[36] Rempell, S. Note, Credible Fears, Unaccompanied Minors, and the Causes of the Southwestern Border Surge, 18 Chap. L. Rev. 337 (2015).

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Push or Pull Factors: What Drives Central American Migrants to the U.S.?

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For centuries, the United States has been a popular destination for migrants from around the world. Every day, asylum seekers and other migrants are coming to the U.S. southern border. This pattern is not new. However, the demographic composition of people attempting to cross the border has changed considerably over the past decade.

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"These countries share political, social and economic similarities, including high crime rates, pervasive gang violence, extreme poverty and corruption..."
"most violent countries in the world, with significantly higher murder rates than neighboring Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama.[13] In 2015, El Salvador became the most violent not-at-war country in the world,[14] as its gang-related violence pushed the country’s murder rate to 103 per 100,000 people."

daya

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War- Darian

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1. Have students discuss reasons whole groups or communities might move to another location.
Review with students some of the push factors and pull factor s that cause individuals to move from one location to another. Then have students discuss possible reasons that whole groups or communities might move to another location. Provide them with the following examples:

human-made environmental disasters that make it unsafe to stay in an area

natural disasters that make it unsafe to stay in an area

the loss of industries or employers in an area

a less extreme climate

cultural resources

job opportunities

Have students identify which are push factors and which are pull factors. Have students add their own examples of additional push and pull factors.

2. Have small groups investigate your community's history.
Divide students into small groups. Provide groups with historical documents, newspaper articles, photographs, and other documents you gathered. Write the questions below on the board, and ask students to find the answers to the questions as they explore the materials:

What push factors can you find? Why did people leave the community?

What pull factors can you find? Why did people move into the community?

3. Have groups present their findings to the class.
Have students create and share brief, simple presentations that show migration to and from your community. Have students draw pictures that show these push and pull factors and explain their drawings to the class.

Informal Assessment

Check students' comprehension. Ask:

Extending the Learning

Have students add captions for each push or pull factor in their drawings.

Credits

Media Credits

The audio, illustrations, photos, and videos are credited beneath the media asset, except for promotional images, which generally link to another page that contains the media credit. The Rights Holder for media is the person or group credited.

Writer

Nancee Hunter

Editor

Christina Riska Simmons

Expert Reviewer

Andrew C. Clarke, University of Otago, Allan Wilson Centre for Molecular Ecology and Evolution, Department of Anatomy and Structural Biology, Dunedin, New Zealand

Other

The idea for this activity was inspired by Marie Loiselle of the Maharishi School in Fairfield, Iowa, who received a teacher grant from the National Geographic Education Foundation in support of a project called Geographic Learning and City Growth.

Sources

adapted from National Geographic Xpeditions lesson "Migration: Reasons to Move"

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# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
1. Have students discuss reasons whole groups or communities might move to another location. Review with students some of the push factors and pull factor s that cause individuals to move from one location to another. Then have students discuss possible reasons that whole groups or communities might move to another location.

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"Food insecurity – often rooted in poverty – decreases the ability of countries to develop their agricultural markets and economies. Access to quality, nutritious food is fundamental to human existence. Secure access to food can produce wide ranging positive impacts, including: Economic growth and job creation."
https://www.paho.org/en/news/19-1-2023-report-131-million-people-latin-america-and-caribbean-cannot-access-healthy-diet - steph

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The region has the highest cost for a healthy diet compared to the rest of the world, at USD 3.89 per person per day, while the world average is USD 3.54.
January 19, 2023, Santiago, Chile. The new United Nations report Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 2022 finds that 22.5% of the Latin America and the Caribbean population cannot afford a healthy diet. In the Caribbean this figure reaches 52%; in Mesoamerica, 27.8%; and in South America, 18.4%.

The publication reports that 131.3 million people in the region could not afford a healthy diet in 2020. This represents an increase of 8 million compared to 2019 and is due to the higher average daily cost of healthy diets in Latin America and the Caribbean compared to the rest of the world's regions, reaching in the Caribbean a value of USD 4.23, followed by South America and Mesoamerica with USD 3.61 and USD 3.47, respectively.

This problem is related to different socioeconomic and nutritional indicators. The report presents a clear relationship between the inability to afford a healthy diet and such variables as a country's income level, the incidence of poverty, and the level of inequality.

The report also reveals that the rise in international food prices experienced since 2020, exacerbated after the start of the conflict in Ukraine, and a regional increase in food inflation above the general level, have increased the difficulties for people to access a healthy diet.

The document also includes recommendations based on evidence and an analysis of policies already implemented to improve the availability and affordability of nutritious foods, focusing on supporting the most vulnerable people and low-income households that spend a more significant proportion of their budget on food.

"There is no individual policy that can solve this problem independently. National and regional coordination mechanisms need to be strengthened to respond to hunger and malnutrition," said Mario Lubetkin, FAO Assistant Director and Regional Representative for Latin America and the Caribbean.

"To contribute to the affordability of healthy diets, it is necessary to create incentives for the diversification of the production of nutritious foods aimed mainly at family farming and small-scale producers, take measures for the transparency of the prices of these foods in markets and trade, and actions such as cash transfers and improving school menus," Lubetkin concluded.

Trade and market policies can play a fundamental role in improving food security and nutrition. Greater transparency and efficiency improve inter-regional agri-food trade by replacing uncertainty with market predictability and stability.

"We are talking about the region of the world with the most expensive healthy diet, which particularly affects vulnerable populations - small farmers, rural women, and indigenous and Afro-descendant populations - who allocate a greater percentage of their income to the purchase of food," said IFAD Regional Director Rossana Polastri. "To reverse this situation, we must promote innovative solutions that diversify production and increase the supply of healthy food, and that improve small producers' access to markets and quality food, including digital solutions that articulate food supply and demand."

The report also describes how some nutrition-sensitive social protection programs have worked and are essential to support the diets of the most vulnerable population, particularly in periods of crisis.

"Food insecurity will continue to rise due to the food and fuel price crisis caused by the conflict in Ukraine and the aftermath of COVID-19," said Lola Castro, WFP Regional Director. "We must act now, but how can we do it? Supporting governments to expand social protection networks because the pandemic once again demonstrated that social protection is useful to improve the affordability of a healthy diet, preventing crises like this from hitting affected populations even more".

Other food policies, such as nutritional labelling, subsidizing nutritious foods, and taxing unhealthy or non-nutritious foods that do not contribute to healthy diets, if well designed, can improve the affordability of healthy diets and prevent debilitating conditions and diseases related to overweight and obesity.

"We must redouble efforts to address malnutrition in all its forms by promoting public policies to create healthy food environments, eliminate industrially produced trans fats, implement front-end warning labeling, regulate advertising of unhealthy foods, tax sugary drinks, and support healthy eating and physical activity in schools," PAHO Director Carissa F. Etienne said. "Understanding the factors that determine poor dietary practices is key to finding solutions and ensuring that everyone in the region has access to healthy foods," she said.

For example, countries with higher levels of poverty and inequality tend to have more significant difficulties accessing a healthy diet, which is directly associated with a higher prevalence of hunger, chronic malnutrition in boys and girls, and anemia in women aged 15 to 49.

"For children to grow up healthy, it is not only urgent to ensure the availability of nutritious food at affordable prices. It is also necessary to develop public policies that guarantee adequate nutrition, in addition to nutritional counseling, focusing actions on the most vulnerable populations," said Garry Conelly, UNICEF Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The socioeconomic panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean is not encouraging. The most affected population groups are children under five and women, who suffer a higher prevalence of food insecurity than men.

The Regional Panorama of Food and Nutrition Security 2022 is a joint publication of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO); the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations World Food Program (WFP).

The number of hungry people in the region continues to rise

Between 2019 and 2021, the number of hungry people in the region increased by 13.2 million, reaching 56.5 million hungry people in 2021. The highest increase was in South America, where an additional 11 million people suffered from hunger. Between 2019 and 2021, hunger reached a prevalence of 7.9% in South America, 8.4% in Mesoamerica, and 16.4% in the Caribbean.

In 2021, 40.6% of the regional population experienced moderate or severe food insecurity, compared to 29.3% worldwide. Severe food insecurity was also more frequent in the region (14.2%) than in the world (11.7%).

Other figures presented in the report indicate that the region registers an important and positive evolution regarding the prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under five years of age. In 2020, this figure was 11.3% in Latin America and the Caribbean, approximately ten percentage points below the world average. However, 3.9 million children up to five years of age are overweight.

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UN Report: 131 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean cannot access a healthy diet

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The region has the highest cost for a healthy diet compared to the rest of the world, at USD 3.89 per person per day, while the world average is USD 3.54.

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The push factors are factors that compel a person, due to different reasons, to leave that place and go to some other place. The common push factors are low productivity, unemployment, and underdevelopment, poor economic conditions, and lack of opportunities for advancement. https://www.worldofstatistics.org/files/2014/03/Pull-and-Push-Factors-of-Migration-Thet.pdf

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-Lyric

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Most people in the world have had the experience of leaving the place where they grew up. Maybe they will only move as far as the next village or city. But for some people, they will need to leave their country entirely - sometimes for a short time, but sometimes forever.
Every day, all over the world, people make one of the most difficult decisions in their lives: to leave their homes in search of a safer, better life.
There are many reasons why people around the globe seek to rebuild their lives in a different country. Some people leave home to get a job or an education. Others are forced to flee persecution or human rights violations such as torture. Millions flee from armed conflicts or other crises or violence. Some no longer feel safe and might have been targeted just because of who they are or what they do or believe - for example, for their ethnicity, religion, sexuality or political opinions.

These journeys, which all start with the hope for a better future, can also be full of danger and fear. Some people risk falling prey to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation. Some are detained by the authorities as soon as they arrive in a new country. Once they're settling in and start building a new life, many face daily racism, xenophobia and discrimination.

Some people end up feeling alone and isolated because they have lost the support networks that most of us take for granted - our communities, colleagues, relatives and friends.

WHY DO PEOPLE LEAVE THEIR COUNTRIES?

There are many reasons why it might be too difficult or dangerous for people to stay in their own countries. For example, children, woman and men flee from violence, war, hunger, extreme poverty, because of their sexual or gender orientation, or from the consequences of climate change or other natural disasters. Often people will face a combination of these difficult circumstances.

People who leave their countries are not always fleeing danger. They might believe they have a better chance of finding work in another country because they have the education or capital to seek opportunities elsewhere. Others might want to join relatives or friends who are already living abroad. Or they might seek to start or finish their education in another country. There are lots of different reasons for people to start a journey to build a life in a new country.

DEFINITIONS: WHAT EXACTLY IS A REFUGEE, AN ASYLUM SEEKER AND A MIGRANT?

The terms "refugee", "asylum seeker" and "migrant" are used to describe people who are on the move, who have left their countries and have crossed borders.

The terms "migrant" and "refugee" are often used interchangeably but it is important to distinguish between them as there is a legal difference.

Who is a refugee?

A refugee is a person who has fled their own country because they are at risk of serious human rights violations and persecution there. The risks to their safety and life were so great that they felt they had no choice but to leave and seek safety outside their country because their own government cannot or will not protect them from those dangers. Refugees have a right to international protection.

Who is an asylum seeker?

An asylum seeker is a person who has left their country and is seeking protection from persecution and serious human rights violations in another country, but who hasn't yet been legally recognized as a refugee and is waiting to receive a decision on their asylum claim. Seeking asylum is a human right. This means everyone should be allowed to enter another country to seek asylum.

Who is a migrant?

There is no internationally accepted legal definition of a migrant. Like most agencies and organizations, we at Amnesty International understand migrants to be people staying outside their country of origin, who are not asylum seekers or refugees.

Some migrants leave their country because they want to work, study or join family, for example. Others feel they must leave because of poverty, political unrest, gang violence, natural disasters or other serious circumstances that exist there.

Lots of people don't fit the legal definition of a refugee but could nevertheless be in danger if they went home.

It is important to understand that, just because migrants do not flee persecution, they are still entitled to have all their human rights protected and respected, regardless of the status they have in the country they moved to. Governments must protect all migrants from racist and xenophobic violence, exploitation and forced labour. Migrants should never be detained or forced to return to their countries without a legitimate reason.

WHAT IS AMNESTY'S POSITION ON MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS?

We campaign for a world where human rights can be enjoyed by everyone, no matter what situation they are in. Amnesty has championed the human rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants for decades.

We campaign to make sure governments honour their shared responsibility to protect the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. We condemn any policies and practices that undermine the rights of people on the move.

The people are not the problem
There are about 35 million refugees globally. Many people feel overwhelmed by the numbers and see people moving across borders as a global crisis. We at Amnesty International disagree that it is a crisis of numbers. The people are not the problem. Rather, the causes that drive families and individuals to cross borders and the short-sighted and unrealistic ways that politicians respond to them are the problem.
Campaigning for people on the move
With our campaigns, we put pressure on governments to honour their responsibility to protect every single person's rights. They must make sure that refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are safe, and are not tortured, discriminated against or left living in poverty.

We campaign for governments to properly process the asylum claims of asylum seekers so that they don't leave them in limbo - sometimes even locked away in detention centres - for years. We also want to see migrants being protected from exploitation and abuse by their employers or by traffickers.
The individual beyond the label
Each human being has more than one identity. "Refugee", "migrant" and "asylum seeker" are only temporary terms; they do not reflect the whole identity of women, children and men who have left their homes behind to start a new life in a new country.

When we use these labels, we need to remember that out of the many ways in which people describe themselves, these terms only refer to one experience: that of leaving their countries. But the identities of these people are made up of so many more things.

Most people seeking to live elsewhere will feel that the experience of leaving their countries doesn't fully capture who they are. Like all of us, they are complex and unique human beings and might choose to identify themselves as being from a certain country or region, belonging to a group that speaks a certain language or shares a culture. Or they might say about themselves that they are a teacher, doctor, artist, passionate football fan, father, sister, son or mother.

A person's legal status cannot express the full identity and personality of a refugee, asylum seeker or migrant. No one can be known solely through their legal status.

WHAT CAN YOU DO?

Support our campaigns to help refugees!

You can join our movement of people who welcome refugees. Amnesty's I Welcome campaign calls on governments worldwide to welcome their fair share of the world's people who are seeking safety. With enough political will, our leaders can protect people fleeing conflict and persecution, including through a solution called resettlement.

We are also pushing for other safe ways for refugees to start new lives, such as by reuniting families who have been separated, through community groups sponsoring refugee families to move to their country, and through universities and businesses offering people study or work visas to start a new life.

Governments should never force anyone to go back to a country where they are at risk of human rights violations. Instead, refugees should be offered a safe place to live and opportunities to access work, education and health care.

Where your government has a sponsorship programme, you can get involved in community sponsorship. This is where local communities come together to raise money to resettle and welcome families and individuals who have fled their home countries.

FIND OUT MORE

Laws for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers

The rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are protected by international law, regardless of how and why they arrive in a country. They have the same rights as everyone else, plus special or specific protections including:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 14), which states that everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries

The 1951 UN Refugee Convention (and its 1967 Protocol), which protects refugees from being returned to countries where they risk being persecuted

The 1990 Migrant Workers Convention, which protects migrants and their families

Regional Refugee law instruments (including 1969 OAU Convention, 1984 Cartagena Declaration, Common European Asylum System and Dublin Regulation)

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Who is a refugee, a migrant or an asylum seeker?

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"Refugee," "migrant" and "asylum seeker" are only temporary terms, learn more about who they really are.

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Natural Disasters are a push factor because, in Central America, they get a variety of different natural disasters like Earthquakes, Tsunamis, Hurricanes, Floods, etc. This causes a large group of immigrants to come to the U.S. for a new safe place to stay.

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Immigrants are benefitting from a tight U.S. labor market

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Immigrants are benefitting from a tight U.S. labor market

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"Workers from places like Mexico, Venezuela and Central America have seen pay bumps as they’ve gotten settled here in the U.S."

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One population in particular benefiting from the current labor market appears to be immigrants, more specifically immigrants from Latin America.

Workers from places like Mexico, Venezuela and Central America have seen pay bumps as they've gotten settled here in the U.S.

Santiago Pérez is deputy editor for Latin America at the Wall Street Journal who's been on the subject. He joined the Texas Standard to talk about where immigrants are working and U.S. labor needs. Listen to the story above or read the transcript below.
This transcript has been edited lightly for clarity: The crux of your reporting is that a lot of migrants are reaping the benefits of America's tight labor market. Tell us a little bit more about what sort of jobs they are taking.
Well, essentially, we're talking about low skilled jobs, which are really hard to fill these days in the U.S. Talking about construction, landscaping, housekeeping, hospitality. If you go to restaurants in the U.S., you can actually see the problems that some small business owners have with staffing. There's just not enough people available for work.
How much more are people taking home for these jobs that you're describing - cooks, construction workers and the like?
Well, it depends on the sector. For example, construction tends to be very well-paid. Some workers are making about $200 a day. Of course, in restaurants or that type of work isn't as well compensated. We may be talking about anywhere between $14 to $15 an hour or so. So it depends on the type of work that you're doing. You also need to take into account that the U.S. has a visa system for guest workers in which employers essentially request permission to hire some workers from, say, Central America, to perform some specific duties that U.S. workers aren't willing to do or they just can't find any interested Americans to do that type of work. That process is regulated also when it comes to payments and income. And we're talking also about $15 an hour or so.
Well, now I know you talk to a lot of immigrants from Latin America. Several of these individuals crossed the southern border to get there. I'm curious, to what extent do you think these pay premiums are a motivating factor for migration to the U.S. from Latin America?
Well, when it comes to migration, you have what we call "pull-and-push factors." So essentially, we need to take into account what are the elements that essentially prompt one person to leave home and cross, for example, the Darién Gap jungle in Panama, which is pretty dangerous, or cross Mexico, which can also be quite dangerous. So you have a number of elements. So the Latin American economy was pretty bad during the pandemic, so that was an incentive for a lot of people to leave. You also have dictatorships cracking down on citizens like what we're seeing in Nicaragua and Cuba. And then you also have pull factors, meaning huge labor demand for low skilled jobs in the U.S. So you have a combination of elements that are resulting in these very significant trends.
I want to get back to the point that you were making about visas. In your reporting, you talk about H-2B visas, which allow employers to hire low wage foreign workers for seasonal jobs, but those visas have caps. And I'm curious where that cap stands now and how that factors into the labor needs we have in the U.S. and what you foresee the impact being on migration to the U.S. as a result?
Well, at present, we have 130,000 visas allowed or processed, so that's highly insufficient. And there's also another problem. So these visas are granted essentially through a lottery system. So it's random. It's not based on merit or on the needs of U.S. employers. Just take into account the fact that the U.S. at present has 11 million job openings and demand, meaning their requests that employers make to the Labor Department are well above that level.

So in a way, what the employers told me is that, you know, this visa process is highly insufficient, and overall the immigration policy in the U.S. doesn't seem to be serving the needs of the U.S. economy. It needs a lot of low skilled workers. I'm talking about dry cleaning shops, restaurants, construction, gardening, landscaping, hospitality, housekeeping. So these are essentially jobs that are in high demand and that U.S. workers are not willing to do. The problem is that the caps don't really serve the needs of the U.S. economy at present.

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Immigrants are benefitting from a tight U.S. labor market

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One population in particular benefiting from the current labor market appears to be immigrants, more specifically immigrants from Latin America. Workers from places like Mexico, Venezuela and Central America have seen pay bumps as they've gotten settled here in the U.S. Santiago Pérez is deputy editor for Latin America at the Wall Street Journal who's been on the subject.

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Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have experienced poverty and violence causing the people to immigrate to find peace and saftey.

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Push Factors from Guatemala – Dignity for Migrants

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VIolence drives families from central american countries due to the lack of protection and security.

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[On the security risks of climate change] The classic definition [of state security] has been around conflict-threats to human life from armed aggression-which includes intrastate components such as dissident groups and civil war, and then, of course, when states go to war with each other.... [But climate change may induce conflict] to happen in places that are already living on the edge.

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Violence drives immigration from Central America

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On the security risks of climate change] The classic definition [of state security] has been around conflict-threats to human life from armed aggression-which includes intrastate components such as dissident groups and civil war, and then, of course, when states go to war with each other....

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https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/06/26/violence-drives-immigration-from-central-america/
Sonia

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[On the security risks of climate change] The classic definition [of state security] has been around conflict-threats to human life from armed aggression-which includes intrastate components such as dissident groups and civil war, and then, of course, when states go to war with each other.... [But climate change may induce conflict] to happen in places that are already living on the edge.

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Violence drives immigration from Central America

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On the security risks of climate change] The classic definition [of state security] has been around conflict-threats to human life from armed aggression-which includes intrastate components such as dissident groups and civil war, and then, of course, when states go to war with each other....

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Financial Instability - Star

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Exploring the fundamental connection between the state of Mexico's economy and its high rate of migration to the United States

Mexican emigration into the United States remains a contentious topic, a source of friction, and a lasting negative influence on Mexico's economic development. The main reason why Mexicans emigrate to the United States is to improve their economic situation. Other motives exist, such as kinship relations in the destination city, but if the disparities in income opportunities were lower between the two countries, this would override kinship relations. This is what happened in the recent past in emigration from Italy and Spain. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that reducing the level of Mexican immigration into the United States requires higher economic growth in Mexico. It would not be necessary to reach full income equality for emigration to diminish-the income level in Spain did not reach that in France when Spanish emigration slowed-but a substantial narrowing of the gap is necessary. In addition, many more Mexicans are likely stay home if convinced that income improvement will continue.

Current policy debates suffer, however, from a lack of understanding of the deeper economic equation that drives emigration from Mexico, rooted in the structural weaknesses of the Mexican economy. This project will address this gap and develop recommendations for more effective and harmonious strategies by Mexico and the United States to address these economic dimensions.

The project was kicked-off by a full-day conference with panelists from Mexico and the United States. High-level policymakers will continue to comment at CSIS on the issue of economics and migration in Mexico throughout the project.

This project is made possible by the John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

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Dealing with the Causes: Mexico's Economic Policy and Migration | Archives | CSIS

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Exploring the fundamental connection between the state of Mexico's economy and its high rate of migration to the United States

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People from all over the world experience war, violence, poverty, natrual deisasters etc. causing them to find new homes somewhere with more job oppurtunitys, better conditions, and safety. - angie v

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Students consider the push and pull factors that cause groups of people or communities to move. Then they investigate their own community’s history.

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The northern tier of Central America — Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador — is the other major source of migrants seeking opportunity and safety within the United States. Like Mexicans, they have long sought employment in the United States, though over the past decade increasing numbers are traveling as families, not just working-age single men. The looming catastrophe of climate change is now exacerbating the region’s chronic struggles with poverty and insecurity.

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People are seen crossing back and forth between Mexico, left, and the U.S., in Del Rio, Texas on Sept. 16, 2021.(Verónica G. Cárdenas/The New York Times)

The northern tier of Central America - Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador - is the other major source of migrants seeking opportunity and safety within the United States. Like Mexicans, they have long sought employment in the United States, though over the past decade increasing numbers are traveling as families, not just working-age single men. The looming catastrophe of climate change is now exacerbating the region's chronic struggles with poverty and insecurity.

USIP's Mary Speck spoke with Sarah Bermeo, a professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, about how natural disasters are interacting with and intensifying the other root causes of Central American migration.

Speck: How does climate change increase the pressure to emigrate from Central America? And which communities are suffering the greatest impact?

Bermeo: Climate change affects migration from Central America in two major ways: the increased intensity of storms and changes in precipitation patterns that have negatively affected crop production. Two category 4 hurricanes, Eta and Iota - among the strongest storms ever to hit the region - made landfall in November 2020, a year when the International Red Cross estimates that disasters displaced at least 1.5 million Central Americans. Many homes and crops were destroyed and there was a sharp increase in food insecurity. Almost two years later, many families have not been able to return to normal. Climate change is leading to warming oceans, which means that high intensity storms are likely to become more frequent.

Farmers in Central America have experienced multiple droughts since 2014, resulting in crop losses of 70 percent or more during some harvests and often affecting consecutive growing seasons. There have also been occasional periods of intense rainfall that inflict strong damage on crops. When crops fail, subsistence farmers cannot grow the food they need to feed their families and those who farm for wages lose their livelihoods. Changes in precipitation patterns, including prolonged dry spells and periods of intense rainfall, will continue as the impacts of climate change intensify.

Both storms and crop failures have driven already poor families further into poverty. Droughts were likely a key driver of large increases in family migration from Honduras and Guatemala to the United States in 2018 and 2019. Many of those arriving in the United States during this time came from rural areas, including the highlands of Guatemala where Indigenous communities make up a large portion of the population. They left their farms because they could no longer feed their families if they remained.

Speck: You have written that the "negative impacts from climate and violence reinforce each other, increasing external migration." Can you explain the relationship between rural food insecurity, urban violence and external migration?

Bermeo: Globally, most climate-related migration happens within countries: people who can no longer meet their needs at home migrate to a new home in their own country. In northern Central America, that is not what we are seeing. People displaced due to climate change, often facing severe food insecurity, are relocating south to Costa Rica or north to Mexico, Canada and the United States.

This appears to result from the lack of viable internal migration options. Gangs control many urban neighborhoods, making it difficult for people to move there. Rates of homicides, gang recruitment, and extortion are high in urban areas, and criminals usually operate with impunity. When farmers are displaced by storms or can no longer produce enough to meet their basic needs, they need to find new places to live. If they can't find suitable places internally, they will migrate abroad. Climate change forces people to leave their homes and then high levels of violence force them to leave their country. These migrants then mix with other migrants - those fleeing violence or looking for better economic opportunity - to create flows of migrants leaving for a variety of reasons that are not easily disentangled.

Speck: Some studies show that households with more resources are more likely to leave, given the high cost of emigration. According to a released by scholars from MIT in 2021, Central Americans spend $2.2 billion per year attempting to migrate and hiring a smuggler to enter the United States costs about $7,500 - that's more than double the average per capita income in northern Central America. Is there a danger that foreign assistance will increase incomes and therefore spur even more emigration?

Bermeo: To understand the link between income and migration in any given situation, it is important to look at the underlying drivers of migration. When households or individuals are saving up to migrate, it is likely that increasing their income (including through foreign aid) could help them reach this outcome more quickly.

Those who migrate due to climate-related impacts are not in this situation. They are migrating because their income and assets are declining. In some cases, families affected by climate change may decide to sell their few assets to finance migration rather than selling them to buy farming inputs or to meet their immediate needs. They are at a tipping point: migrate today or perhaps lose the financial ability to afford migration at all. In many of these cases people would prefer to stay, but they have lost the ability to do so.

Foreign assistance can decrease migration if it improves Central Americans' expectations that they can sustain their livelihoods without leaving home. At any given point in time, there are people who could afford to migrate but have chosen not to. Climate-related shocks can cause them to rethink this decision and leave. The sheer magnitude of migration suggests that foreign aid is unlikely to make it worse: More than seven percent of the entire population of some departments in Honduras and Guatemala has shown up at the U.S. border traveling in family units in recent years. Total emigration numbers are even higher, as some don't arrive in the United States. These families are traveling with children through extremely harsh and dangerous conditions. Many would choose to avoid this journey if they had hope for sustainable outcomes at home.

Speck: Central America suffers not only from poverty and violence but also fragile governance. Surveys show that support for democratic institutions has declined over the past decade while perceptions of corruption run high. Given the weakness of government institutions, how and where should the United States channel assistance to increase the region's resilience to climate change?

Bermeo: El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras perform poorly on measures of corruption; in recent years this appears to be trending in the wrong direction, with governments refusing to cooperate with international bodies that had been established to help fight corruption. My strong recommendation would be for aid agencies to consider channeling significantly more of their assistance directly to local groups, bypassing both country governments and internationally based for-profit organizations.

Working directly with local groups accomplishes multiple goals. Local people understand both the needs of their communities and the challenges of implementation. Cutting out for-profit "middle" organizations allows a larger proportion of funding to be used directly for programming.

There's a further consideration that is seldom discussed by foreign assistance policymakers: working directly with local communities helps build government capacity from the ground up. In countries where corruption is high, governments are likely to look skeptically on foreign aid "governance" programs. When local people come together to make decisions and implement programs, they build community and leaders emerge even without programs that specifically target governance.

Speck: Are there any hopeful trends in the region? Or examples of local adaptations to climate change that show signs of providing the kind of hope for the future that might decrease the pressure to migrate?

Bermeo: There are promising opportunities for climate adaptation in the region, particularly in the realm of agriculture and smallholder farmers. The Water Smart Agriculture project that Catholic Relief Services has piloted in the region is showing impressive early results. Farmers are being supplied with information about soil quality and farming techniques so that they can make decisions about their own farms that make them more resilient to climate change. The project encourages farmers to participate in all stages of the program and to train other farmers.

Other promising techniques include early warning systems that allow farmers to adjust their crops or farming techniques to changing weather conditions. We have the data but communicating this broadly and in real time remains a challenge. Building resilience to storms and improving capacity for disaster response are also critical, but more difficult given the need for competent governance to perform these at scale.

Even with adaptations, climate change is likely to render some areas inviable. Displaced people will still need safer in-country destinations and legal pathways for external migration. Destination communities will need resources to handle increased demand for services such as health care and education, and to ease short-term pressures on housing and infrastructure. Research shows that migrants become productive members of their new communities, contributing to the economy and paying taxes that help support government provision of infrastructure and services. Over time these benefits are strong, but in the short-term adjustment costs are real and can be daunting for destinations receiving many migrants in a short period.

The relatively young population of Central America can make strong economic contributions at home and abroad, but they need help to overcome the devastating impacts of climate change. That will require a multi-pronged approach in both the United States and Central America: locally led adaptation, investment in resilient infrastructure, safer Central American cities to receive in-country migrants, and access to legal migration pathways abroad.

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How Climate Change Catalyzes More Migration in Central America

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Annual migrant apprehensions at the U.S. southwestern border have surpassed 2 million, breaking previous fiscal year records. The flows (which include large numbers of repeat crossers) have grown increasingly multinational in recent years, including Haitians trying to escape their country's violence and poverty, along with Cubans, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans fleeing a combination of economic misery and political repression.

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People may choose to immigrate for a variety of reasons, such as employment opportunities, to escape a violent conflict, environmental factors, educational purposes, or to reunite with family.

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Immigration is the process of moving to a new country or region with the intention of staying and living there. People may choose to immigrate for a variety of reasons, such as employment opportunities, to escape a violent conflict, environmental factors, educational purposes, or to reunite with family.

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Every year, hundreds of thousands of people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras flee extreme violence and poverty and head north through Mexico to find safety. The high levels of violence in the region, known as the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA), are comparable to that in war zones where MSF has worked for decades.

https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/focus/migration-crisis-americas

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URGENT

Sudan: MSF is responding to acute medical needs

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MEXICO 2016 © Christina Simons/MSF

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What is the Central American migration crisis?

Every year, hundreds of thousands of people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras flee extreme violence and poverty and head north through Mexico to find safety. The high levels of violence in the region, known as the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA), are comparable to that in war zones where MSF has worked for decades.

The countries of the NTCA have long been burdened by deep social inequality, political instability, and conflict-and in some cases have been further destabilized by US interventions in the region over the past 40 years. Now these countries are also contending with the rapid expansion of transnational organized crime, which has exploded over the past decade. Across this region, drug and human trafficking by criminal groups known as maras, coupled with widespread corruption and weak law enforcement, have resulted in an environment where civilians face the ever-present threat of violence.

The facts about the humanitarian crisis in Mexico and Central America

Read more

Gang-related murders, kidnappings, extortion, and sexual violence are daily facts of life. "In my country, killing is ordinary-it is as easy as killing an insect with your shoe," said one man from Honduras, who was threatened by gang members for refusing their demand for protection money, and later shot three times.

Central Americans fleeing violence often face more of the same along the migration route through Mexico. In 2020, MSF published a special report based on 480 interviews and testimonies of Central American migrants and asylum seekers, experiences of MSF staff, and medical data from more than 26,000 people helped along the migration route through Mexico during the first nine months of 2019.

Now refugees and migrants across the region are also facing the coronavirus pandemic. People on the move and in detention throughout the region are at particularly high risk of contracting the disease. The pandemic, along with other economic issues, are among the main reasons tens of thousands of people, primarily from Haiti, Cuba, and Venezuela, are risking their lives on dangerous travels routes to the north, including the Darién Gap.

of respondents were exposed to a violent situation
during the two years prior to leaving their home country

of patients surveyed were victims
of violence while in transit through Mexico

of people traveling with children reported leaving home due to violence

How MSF is helping people on the move in Central America and at the US-Mexico border?

MSF teams have been providing medical and mental health care to migrants and refugees along the migration routes through Mexico since January 2013. Many of our patients need mental health support due to the significant stresses related to conditions in their home countries as well as on the run. Treatment for women often includes medical and psychosocial care for victims of sexual violence. Teams provide primary care as well as treatment for acute and chronic diseases whenever possible.

From 2015 to late 2019, we have provided more than 42,000 medical consultations and more than 11,000 mental health consultations for migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and deportees in Mexico.

In June of 2021, when more than 11,000 migrants entered Panama from Colombia, MSF teams opened programs in Bajo Chiquito-the first village that migrants reach in Panama after crossing the dangerous Darién Gap -and at the migrant reception stations in Lajas Blancas and San Vicente. By the end of the year, MSF provided medical and mental health care to more than 14,000 people who crossed to Panama.

MSF's direct experience on the ground points to a broader humanitarian crisis in Central America. Despite the catastrophic conditions in the region, the US and Mexico generally treat people from the Northern Triangle as economic migrants, and have focused efforts on detention and deportation rather than on providing protection and support. MSF is calling on the US and Mexico to provide humane treatment to all refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants and to stop deportations of vulnerable people back to a dangerous region.

Desperate journey: Fleeing invisible wars in Central America

Read more

COVID-19 impact on the Central American migration crisis

The coronavirus pandemic has compounded the risks for people on the move in Mexico and Central America. In March, MSF issued a joint statement protesting the US government's decision to block asylum proceedings and close the US-Mexico border citing the threat of the coronavirus. Turning back men, women, and children seeking refuge is not in accordance with public health guidance and will only endanger more lives. Thousands of people seeking international protection in the US have been forced to remain in Mexico, many of them living in overcrowded shelters and settlements. MSF is also calling on the US government to suspend all deportations to Latin America and the Caribbean. We are concerned that continuing deportations move people from the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic to countries with lower rates of transmission and weaker health systems. US policies threaten to fuel a wider public health crisis in the region.

MSF has called on Mexican authorities to release all migrants held in detention centers and ensure testing and medical care for those suspected to be infected with the coronavirus. Visits conducted by MSF teams to various migrant detention centers in southern Mexico in 2019 found that detainees received no regular medical attention and lacked essential services such as access to water, making these facilities ideal breeding grounds for infectious diseases like COVID-19.

MSF is providing medical and psychological care to migrants, refugees, and homeless people in Mexico City and along the migration route through Mexico. Teams are working in shelters, hostels, hotels, and community kitchens. We're also offering practical advice to staff, volunteers, visitors, and residents in these facilities on ways to prevent transmission of the virus.

How you can help

Not everyone can treat patients in the field. But everyone can do something.

Some humanitarian crises make the headlines-others don't. Unrestricted support from our donors allows us to mobilize quickly and efficiently to provide lifesaving medical care to the people who need it most, whether those needs are in the spotlight or not. And your donation is 100 percent tax-deductible.

We need your support to continue this lifesaving work

Donate

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URGENT Sudan: MSF is responding to acute medical needs Scroll down for content MEXICO 2016 © Christina Simons/MSF Share Share in Facebook Share in Twitter Share in LinkedIn Share in Mail Every year, hundreds of thousands of people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras flee extreme violence and poverty and head north through Mexico to find safety.

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https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/central-american-migration-facts

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Migration across Central America is escalating, with more families with children seeking better opportunities outside their home countries. Migrants primarily cite poverty and economic hardships, violence, and food insecurity as reasons for leaving. Adding to the surge in migration is the exodus of Venezuelan migrants, who are leaving their homeland in significant numbers, as reported by the United Nations.

Central America migration: Facts, FAQs, and how to help

Fast facts: Central America migration

Families are migrating north due to poverty, violence, and food insecurity.

Migrants at the southern U.S. border predominantly come from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

UNICEF reports an estimated 4.1 million children will need humanitarian assistance in Mexico and Central America in 2024.

Weather-related events such as the El Niño weather pattern and other crises threaten areas already affected by food insecurity and past disasters.

At the Mexico-U.S. border, World Vision and church partners aid vulnerable families with food and basic household and school supplies.

In Central America, World Vision partners with churches, governments, local businesses, and schools to build resilience and create a safer, more nurturing environment, helping people remain hopeful at home.

BACK TO QUESTIONS
Where do most Central American immigrants come from?

Most Central American migrants come from three of the region's seven countries - El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras - referred to as the Northern Triangle. It's called the Northern Triangle because the countries are clustered in a triangle at the northern tip of Central America. Guatemala, the northernmost of the three, borders Mexico.

All three of the Northern Triangle countries rank among the poorest in the Western Hemisphere and are plagued by chronic violence.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
Why are Central American migrants coming to the U.S.?

Many factors cause people to uproot their families. The most common reasons among Central American migrants are extreme economic hardship and lack of opportunities, food insecurity, political insecurity, violence, natural disasters, and extreme weather-related events.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
How many people are migrating from Central America to the U.S.?

There is no clear count of how many people are migrating to the U.S. from Central America. But the Migration Policy Institute says of the 3.4 million Central Americans living in the U.S., about 85% of them are from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. At any given time, there could be thousands of people journeying north from their home countries. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection*:

Over 450,000 people arrived at the U.S. border in 2020, as the coronavirus pandemic slowed migration across the world.

That number nearly quadrupled in 2021 to at least 1.7 million migrants who were returned to their home country or detained in the U.S., at least temporarily, at the U.S.-Mexico border.

More than 189,000 people reached the U.S. border in June 2021 - the highest number ever seen for one month in more than 20 years. Numbers kept climbing in subsequent months that year.

*Numbers are based on the fiscal year. BACK TO QUESTIONS
What is World Vision doing to help at the Mexico-U.S. border?

Since late 2018, when one of the large migrant caravans arrived in Tijuana, Mexico, World Vision staff have been working with local faith-based organizations to help migrant families. We're working with partners along the border in Arizona, California, and Texas, where we're supporting vulnerable families who need essential supplies like food, water, hygiene items, and basic household and school supplies.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
Where in the Americas is World Vision providing humanitarian aid?

Since 2019, World Vision has been actively responding to the Central America and Venezuela crisis through our program "Hope Without Borders" in Central and South America. From 2019 to March 2024, we have supported over 2.1 million people with programs focused on child protection, education, food security, access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), and livelihoods in countries including Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

We are also facilitating economic programs through employment support and training, along with mental health services for those affected by the crises. Collaboration with faith-based organizations is vital, enabling us to offer safe spaces, skills training, and language classes. World Vision's cash transfers and food aid have become an essential lifeline for thousands of people in Central America and Venezuela.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
What is World Vision doing in migrants' home countries?

We've been working for decades throughout Latin America, including in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, where child sponsorship is helping families thrive at home.

World Vision has designed the Hope at Home: Building Resilience in Central America framework, which aims to address the root causes of forced migration by building resilience at the individual, family, community, and societal levels. We do this by helping communities through programs on violence prevention; social inclusion; sustainable livelihoods; food security; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); quality of education; health; and so much more.

One program raising hope among vulnerable youth in Central America is Youth Ready. Through this approach, we partner with local churches to support young people to discover their potential, develop specific career and life skills, establish support networks, build character and confidence, and plan for their future. This work is made possible largely through child sponsorship.
BACK TO QUESTIONS
How can I help children and families in the Central America migration crisis?

Here are effective ways you can help Central American families living in precarious situations:

Pray: Join us in praying for people in Central America, asking God to bring peace to communities, strength and integrity to leaders, and economic stability to families.

Support U.S. foreign assistance by contacting your elected officials. It only takes a minute.

Sponsor a child in Central America: Sponsoring a child is a personal way to show God's love to a child in need. It also gives a family more reasons to remain in their community.

BACK TO QUESTIONS

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Central America migration: Facts, FAQs, and how to help

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Here are basic facts and FAQs about Central America migration, how World Vision addresses root causes of poverty there, and how you can help.

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Central America: Meet people’s needs and tackle root causes of migration, says report

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Central America: Meet people’s needs and tackle root causes of migration, says report

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Poverty + food insecurity is a psuh factor in almost all of cenral america. The struggle to put and provide food for your family gives a lot of parents/ adults reasons to migrate else where (mainly to the US).

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Poverty, the struggle to put food on the table, climate shocks and the threat of violence are pushing an estimated 378,000 people in Central America to make their way to the United States every year in the past five years, according to joint report released today.

"We are seeing an exodus ... as hunger and despair force many to migrate in search of a better life," said World Food Programme (WFP) chief executive David Beasley.

The report confirms food insecurity as one of a number of interlinked propellers of migration from Central America, noting that food insecure people are three times more likely to make concrete plans to migrate than those who are better off.

Colombia: Venezuelans making a hazardous crossing across the border in 2018.
Photos: WFP/Jonathan Dumont

"Families are being separated and communities are being destroyed as poverty, climate change and now COVID-19 have left many people feeling they have no choice but to head north," said Beasley.

"We know they would much rather stay home, so WFP's programmes are supporting sustainable livelihoods and offering people hope and opportunity in their own villages. But we need fresh funds to reach the millions planning to leave if they don't get help soon."

The new report is a joint effort of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), WFP and the Civic Data Design Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with support from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Organization of American States (OAS).

Food insecurity has seen a dramatic rise in Central America as the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic and poverty continue to make it harder for families to access nutritious food.

Honduras: Marlene and her four children at home in Quimistán in Santa Barbara - she became the family's sole breadwinner after her husband was laid off due to COVID-19. Photo: WFP/Hetze Tosta

Pointing to "the repeated cyclical patterns" of rising Central American migration, Andrew Selee, President of the Washington-based Migration Policy Institute (MPI) has called for a change of tack.

"It is clearly time for a strategy that moves beyond unilateral enforcement actions to recognize not only the drivers of migration but also the nuanced contexts in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras that smart investment and community strengthening policies should address," he said.

The study, ' Charting a New Regional Course of Action - the Complex Motivations of Central American Migration', found people embarking on hazardous journeys, from the three countries, put themselves in financial as well as physical peril - 55 percent of migrants hired a smuggler at an average cost of US$7,500 per person, US$3,000 more than it would cost to travel legally.

This amounts to an estimated US$2.2 billion a year, with 89 percent of respondents intent on reaching the US.

Part of Central America includes the Dry Corridor - an area severely affected by climate change and the El Niño phenomenon.

El Salvador: Devastation caused by hurricane Amanda in San Salvador last year.
Photo: WFP/Mauricio Martinez

Against such a backdrop, social protection vehicles such as cash grants and school feeding have a critical role to play in alleviating poverty and empowering people to weather both economic and climatic shocks over the long term, the report found.

"We cannot expect different results from the same actions," said Luis Almagro, Secretary General of the OAS. "We have been implementing migration containment policies for years, which have proven to be insufficient."

He added: "The study proves that the causes of migration are poverty, inequality, unemployment, food insecurity, violence, the impact of natural disasters and climate change - these require to be addressed in a decisive and comprehensive manner."

While Central Americans' desire to migrate is on the rise, the report found, "only a fraction of the surveyed population planned and prepared to do so."

And while "violence, insecurity and natural disasters" were complex and longstanding triggers of migration, "economic factors were participants' primary motivation for desiring to emigrate."

With many families in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala dependent on remittances form relatives abroad, the report said it was important to "create incentives and opportunities for diasporas to invest in the development of local communities and to become agents of change in their countries of origin or ancestry."

El Salvador: Stephanie and her family of seven lost their home in San Salvador to the floods caused by tropical storm Amanda last year. Photos: WFP/David Fernández

It added that "legal pathways for Central Americans interested in migrating to the United States and other destination countries to redirect migration" should be expanded with "coordinated efforts to increase access to temporary employment visas, for example."

WFP estimates that, as of October 2021, the number of food insecure people in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras grew three-fold to 6.4 million, from 2.2 million people in 2019.

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Central America: Meet people's needs and tackle root causes of migration, says report | World Food Programme

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Poverty, the struggle to put food on the table, climate shocks and the threat of violence are pushing an estimated 378,000 people in Central America to make their way to the United States every year in the past five years, according to joint report released today. "We are seeing an exodus ...

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New World Bank-UNICEF report, in collaboration with UNESCO, calls for urgent action to mitigate the learning crisis in the wake of COVID-19
PANAMA CITY/WASHINGTON D.C., June 23, 2022 - Four in five sixth graders in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are expected to lack basic reading comprehension proficiency, according to a report issued today by the World Bank and UNICEF, in collaboration with UNESCO. While the region was already in a learning crisis prior to the pandemic, this represents a substantial increase. This new and staggering estimate also suggests that two years of COVID-19 school closures in the region may have set learning outcomes back by more than a decade. Emerging evidence from across LAC buttresses these estimates.

The new report 'Two Years After: Saving a Generation' underlines that these learning losses could cost today's students in the region a 12 percent decrease in lifetime earnings.

Children in Latin America and the Caribbean experienced some of the longest and uninterrupted COVID-19 school closures in the world. On average, students in the region lost, fully or partially, two thirds of all in-person school days since the start of the pandemic, with an estimated loss of 1.5 years of learning.

"Latin America and the Caribbean faces an unprecedented education crisis, which could compromise our countries' future development," said Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, World Bank Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean. "The fact that a large majority of sixth graders may not be able to understand what they read, jeopardizes the future well-being of millions of children who have not developed critical foundational skills, which increases the risks to deepen the already long-standing inequities in the region."

Younger and more vulnerable children have been disproportionally affected by the learning losses, the latest evidence from across the region shows, setting the stage for increased inequality and a generational crisis.

" Latin America and the Caribbean has already lost more than ten years of learning progress due to two years of COVID-19 school closures. The education catastrophe is still going on, day after day," said Jean Gough, UNICEF's Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean. " While most schools have reopened across the region, we are seeing that far too many children are not back in the classroom full-time, and many of those who have returned are lost. In both cases, they are not learning. Turning a blind eye to the most severe learning crisis ever faced by the region will hurt children now and all of us in the long run."

Also released today, ' The State of Global Learning Poverty: 2022 Update' report, produced by the World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF, FCDO, USAID, and BMGF, shows that in comparative terms, the education crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean places the region in the second worst place globally. Only sub-Saharan Africa shows a higher rate of learning poverty, with around 9 out of 10 students at the end of primary education unable to read and understand a simple text.

More worryingly, Latin America and the Caribbean shows the steepest increase in this index since 2019, followed by South Asia. According to the report, this was likely due to the length of the school closures in both regions.

Claudia Uribe, Director of OREALC/UNESCO Santiago highlighted the outcome of the III Regional Meeting of Ministers of Education of Latin America and the Caribbean in which the urgency of prioritizing the recovery and transformation of education systems was expressed. " The recovery cannot mean going back to business as usual, it is necessary to prioritize education in the public agenda of our nations, guaranteeing its adequate financing in order to achieve the proposed objectives".

Given the gravity of the crisis 'Two Years After: Saving a Generation'urges governments to immediately focus policies on two essential strategies: returning to schooling and recovering lost learning. The first aims to complete the reopening of all schools in a sustainable manner, re-enroll all students, and prevent dropouts. The learning recovery agenda must prioritize foundational reading and math skills, assessing learning levels, and implementing learning recovery strategies and programs at scale. Addressing psychosocial needs of students and teachers and digital gaps will also be necessary to tackle these challenges.

The report includes four key actions to help put this generation back on track:

Place the education recovery at the top of the public agenda

Reintegrate all the children that abandoned school and ensure they stay in it

Recover lost learning and ensure the socio-emotional well-being of children

Value, support, and train teachers

The report's recommendations echo the "Commitment to the Recovery and Protection of Learning in Latin America and the Caribbean" announced earlier this month jointly with the InterAmerican Dialogue, UNESCO, and UNICEF, and with the support of the Presidents of Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Honduras.
Link to the report

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Four in Five Children in Latin America and the Caribbean Will Not Be Able to Understand a Simple Text

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Estima-se que quatro em cada cinco alunos do sexto ano do ensino fundamental na América Latina e no Caribe (ALC) apresentarão dificuldades de leitura e interpretação simples de texto, segundo o relatório lançado hoje pelo Banco Mundial e o UNICEF, em colaboração com a UNESCO.

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Crime is a push factor in much of central America, immigration forum states: A study conducted by Doctors Without Borders revealed that among nearly 500 Northern Triangle migrants surveyed, almost 40 percent mentioned direct attacks or threats to themselves or their families, extortion or gang-forced recruitment as the main reason for fleeing their countries, and 43.5 percent reported they had a relative who died due to violence in the previous two years.

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Crime is a push factor in much of central America, immigration forum states: A study conducted by Doctors Without Borders revealed that among nearly 500 Northern Triangle migrants surveyed, almost 40 percent mentioned direct attacks or threats to themselves or their families, extortion or gang-forced recruitment as the main reason for fleeing their countries, and 43.5 percent reported they had a relative who died due to violence in the previous two years.

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https://www.bread.org/sites/default/files/downloads/fact-sheet-migration-push-factors-november-2018.pdf

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Lack of access to jobs forces people to move to places where they can work to support their families.

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8 April 2021 (Lima) - The Latin American and Caribbean region lost 26 million jobs as a result of the pandemic, and started 2021 with a complex employment landscape aggravated by new waves of contagion and slow vaccination processes that make the prospects for recovery in labour markets more uncertain, says a new technical note from the International Labour Organization (ILO).

"The quest for better normality will require ambitious action to recover from setbacks in the world of work", warned Vinícius Pinheiro, ILO Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, when commenting on the note, which presents the latest data on the impact of COVID-19 over the past year.

"It is now time to rebuild the jobs lost by the pandemic and create new decent work opportunities," Pinheiro said, noting that despite adversity, action must be taken and consensus reached so that "2021 is the year of vaccination and economic recovery with more and better jobs".

However, the ILO Regional Director highlighted that "in the pursuit of recovery, addressing pre-existing conditions in the region will be unavoidable and those conditions are key to understanding why the impact of the pandemic on employment was so strong. Many of the challenges we had before the pandemic remain in place, although they are now more urgent".

"High informality, small fiscal spaces, persistent inequality, low productivity and poor coverage of social protection, coupled with problems that still persist such as child labour and forced labour, are part of the ongoing challenges in the region", he added.

The ILO regional technical note, "The employment crisis in the pandemic: Towards a human-centred job recovery", emphasizes that the labour impacts were devastating in the second quarter of 2020 when the employment and participation indicators plummeted, and then partially recovered.

However, by the end of 2020 the region's average employment rate had fallen from 57.4 per cent to 51.7 per cent, a sharp drop equated to the loss of around 26 million jobs, of which 80 per cent, or more than 20 million people, left the workforce.

This significant exit from the workforce was unprecedented and has been characteristic of 2020. By comparison, the unemployment rate has only partially reflected the magnitude of the difficulties faced by labour markets in the region, increasing by just over 2 percentage points between 2019 and 2020, from 8.3 per cent to 10.6 per cent.

This situation would have begun to change, explained Roxana Maurizio, ILO Regional Labour Economics Specialist and author of the technical note, who commented that in 2021 there could be "a significant increase in the employment rate when millions of people who had ceased to participate in the labour force return to the workforce".

In addition to lost jobs, the region experienced a sharp contraction in working hours, as well as a reduction in labour incomes, which account for 80 per cent of what people in Latin America and the Caribbean earn. The region has recorded the largest losses in hours worked worldwide.

The ILO's technical note indicates that during the crisis both formal and informal employment experienced very pronounced contractions, but with greater intensity for the latter and for this reason the informality rate was reduced (temporarily), in the context of the widespread collapse in employment demand, especially in the early months of the pandemic.

But that situation has already started to change.

"There is a high risk of informalization that adds to the already high levels of labour informality that countries had before the pandemic", said Maurizio.

According to available data from seven countries, employment recovery in the second half of 2020 has been almost entirely contracted by informal employment growth. These occupations account for more than 60 per cent of the total increase in employment.

"The formal work deficit, in turn, is likely to become more apparent to certain types of workers such as young people, women and adults with lower qualifications - groups that traditionally experience greater difficulties in accessing formal employment", she added.

"The macroeconomic collapse has disproportionately impacted some segments of the population, amplifying labour and social gaps - especially gender gaps - that characterize the region", she continued.

"The outlook for economic recovery by 2021 is modest and still very uncertain, so expectations about a possible reversal of the critical labour market situation should be very cautious".

The ILO has proposed developing recovery strategies based on a Policy Framework with four main pillars: stimulating the economy and employment; support businesses, jobs and incomes; protect workers in the workplace; and resort to social dialogue to find solutions.

The technical note highlights that in a scenario as complex as the current one "social dialogue and the building of new consensuses, pacts or agreements are more relevant than ever" to advance the recovery of employment.

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26 million jobs lost in Latin America and the Caribbean during pandemic

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A new ILO analysis warns that 'ambitious actions' are needed for the regional labour market to recover in 2021 - a year that began marked by new waves of contagion. The strong labour impact of COVID-19 was aggravated by pre-existing structural problems.