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"Human Rights Violations" remind the global population how each of us can be better and make our world better place for all.

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It is often thought that, if a disabled child is studying in an ordinary school, this qualifies as inclusive education. It is also generally thought that such students require a differentiated education, unlike that of the rest of classmates, which must be given in different spaces, with different professionals and curricula.

We assume that a person lying within the spectrum of autism or cerebral palsy, for example, has educational needs unlike those of the rest of students, requiring an individual adaptation that limits or impedes their participation in class, the attention of their teachers, work on the topics of other classmates, a grade with the same validity, etc.

All this is based on a fallacy: that the rest of us all learn the same way and that this is why we hold the right to attend a classroom and an ordinary school, to education, participation and achievement at school. This reveals that what we call disability is a power-related issue -and therefore, a social one - although in schools it continues to be addressed as a biological and individual reality.

The perspective of disability as a social phenomenon has been solidly argued in the scientific literature of social sciences for decades. The same goes for other issues, such as the notion that building an identity within that social category involves an irreversible devaluation, as it implies a process of social exclusion that affects identity and intelligence; or that being educated together is positive for all students and not only for those students identified as disabled. This is obvious because we only - only! - learn from differences, which means that environments in which one cohabitates with them are educationally richer than those that aim to be homogeneous.

Challenging privileges

Therefore, that all children of school age should be together does not depend on science, which has already proven the value of differences in the educational process. It depends on political will, which implies challenging power and privileges, as has already happened with other social groups throughout history. What we are dealing with here is Human Rights, the right of education for all people, proclaimed in article 26 of the Declaration of Human Rights and violated in Spain almost 70 years later. It is as if a restrictive reading of the Human Rights card had been made into which certain children do not fit. Or what amounts to the same thing: a whole social group has been denied its inclusion within the human category.

In response to this reality, the Spanish State ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN, 2006), which was born as an instrument with which to make Human Rights effective for those persons who had been excluded: in article 24, it establishes that the right to education is the right to an inclusive education.

The member states pledged to "respect, protect and ensure an inclusive and quality education for all persons without distinction". From all this we can conclude that, although science has proven the effectiveness of inclusive schools, this is the least of issues.

As this is a human rights issue we have a moral obligation and the legal imperative to ensure that our schools are designed for all students. When talking about inclusive education, we are dealing with a great social and educational project: that of being educated together.

The categorical report of the UN

This is what underlies the categorical report that the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of the UN has just published after conducting a research of the Educational System of the Spanish State, motivated by complaints from the SOLCOM Association. What informs these complaints is the view that an important group among schoolchildren continues to be subjected to unfair and discriminatory treatment.

This is well-known to those of us who, either on a professional or a family basis, are in close contact with people who live under the bane of "Special Educational Needs" (SEN) or " "Special needs education or aided education" (Special Ed), but the complaint has been an unprecedented initiative until the present moment. The report is exhaustive:

"The Committee considers that the information available reveals violations of the right to inclusive and quality education. These violations are primarily related to certain features of the education system that have been maintained despite reforms and that continue to exclude persons with disabilities - particularly those with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities or multiple disabilities - from mainstream education on the basis of assessments conducted according to the medical model of disability. This, in turn, results in educational segregation and denial of the reasonable accommodation needed to ensure the non-discriminatory inclusion of those with disabilities in the mainstream education system."

The Committee adds that "in most cases, the future of a student with disabilities depends on the will" of family members and professionals, which is unacceptable. The future of children should not depend on chance; respect for their human rights cannot be optional or arbitrary.

But it does happen. That is what is said in the report, a very strange one for the majority of the population as it questions beliefs and prejudices made obsolete by knowledge that has been available for all too long a time.

It is surprising that we should find it reasonable, logical and desirable that certain children be excluded from being with other children, from interacting with them and from mutual development in school. And this, which is addressed in the UN research, is not something anecdotal or exceptional, but part of the school system's DNA: "A structural pattern of discriminatory exclusion and educational segregation on grounds of disability has been perpetuated, by means of a medical model."

It is not a personal problem

In schools, disability is understood in individual and biological terms - a personal problem - so the solutions that the system poses deeply entrench the problem by confining it to the private realm. But the problem is a public one and the solutions must be of the social kind. This should no longer be a question of what happens to this or that boy or girl. We must raise the issue of what problem lies behind our having decided that these children cannot learn along with the others.

Every day many families are being 'invited' to leave common schools because they will not offer them what their family members need. Some of these families find themselves forced to change; others assume it is the best option, since it was professionals who recommended it, and 'choose' segregated education. It is obvious that in either of these cases it was less a matter of choice than of stringent conditioning.

Many families suffer great pain in the schooling process of their sons and daughters, instead of finding a fundamental support at school. All too many boys and girls are sent to exclusionary schooling modalities, either in specific classrooms within the ordinary centres or in special education centres, and this is unacceptable.

Psycho-pedagogical evaluations continue to be clinical, which does not make sense from an educational but from a classificatory point of view. Schooling decisions, which are based on these common as well as useless practices, perpetuate the discrimination of the entire group. Individual curricular adaptation measures prevent the transformation of the system. And it is precisely this, the transformation of the system, what is entailed in that social project that was born with the name of inclusive education. Nothing to do with cosmetic arrangements, but a deep revision of the school system so that it may harbour a space for the democratic recreation of society and culture.

The right to exercise their citizenship since childhood

This undoubtedly touches on a few sensitive points that the report does not eschew: special education centres and specific classrooms in ordinary centres run counter to human rights, so they have to disappear. The State is under the obligation to lead this transition, in which the resources and valuable personnel they are composed of will serve as a tool for the transformation of school practices and culture.

It is these transformations that can accommodate those people who have been excluded from the institution to such an extent that it is difficult to think that they have had the same right to exercise their citizenship since childhood, learning, participating and being recognized along with the rest of their classmates. Therefore, we have the challenge of guaranteeing their presence, learning, participation and recognition, but for this to happen we need not think in terms of the ordinary school or the special school, but of a new school that overcomes so violent and painful a division.

One final thought. This report marks a turning point in our awareness of where we are. A few weeks ago it was a group of mothers who complained about the systematic discrimination and segregation that occurs in schools throughout our geography. Many of those mothers have been dismissed as mad for talking nonsense. In reality they found a new meaning, from which we, professionals, have to learn. Now it is the United Nations Organization that is saying this, and to the Spanish State.

It is necessary to face this reality, and turn it into the challenge of making the education system the main oasis of society in which human rights are respected and promoted. We know that it is desirable, that it is the best thing for all children, and that it is possible. This is a duty of the first order for the State. But this also holds for all citizens, especially school professionals: it is no longer possible to look away.

Educational laws must change, but civil society also has a moral obligation to position itself as regards everyday school practices, the relationships and culture of the centres. It is an inescapable dilemma: respect human rights or follow a tradition and regulations that breach them. The former is praiseworthy; the latter, deplorable. In this regard, the task of educating admits of no ambiguities.

Ignacio Calderón Almendros is a Doctor in Pedagogy and Professor of Theory of Education at the University of Málaga. He does research work on diversity and the processes of educational exclusion and inclusion to help the school serve all people.

His latest books include "Education, disability and inclusion" (Sense Publishers, 2017) and "Education and hope in the borders of disability"(Cinca, 2014), which received the Human Rights and Disability Award (CERMI) and an Honourable Mention from the International Association of Qualitative Inquiry (USA).

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Segregating children for their disabilities is a violation of human rights

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The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has published a forceful report on the Spanish educational system, reporting on the unfair and discriminatory treatment of thousands of children. The group of experts claims that the right to an inclusive education is being violated in Spain.

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Rage Against The Machine - Killing In the Name (Official HD Video)

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What it Means to Violate Human Rights

"The 'disappearances' of detainees in the custody of Russian federal forces in Chechnya is a major human rights crisis that the Russian government and the international community must address."

"While combat between federal forces and Chechen rebels has for the most part ceased, the 'disappearance,' torture, and summary execution of detainees continues, marking the transition from a classical internal conflict into a 'dirty war,' where human rights violations and not the conquest or defense of territory are the hallmarks." -- Human Rights Watch, click here for web page.

There is now near-universal consensus that all individuals are entitled to certain basic rights under any circumstances. These include certain civil liberties and political rights, the most fundamental of which is the right to life and physical safety. Human rights are the articulation of the need for justice, tolerance, mutual respect, and human dignity in all of our activity.[1] Speaking of rights allows us to express the idea that all individuals are part of the scope of morality and justice.

To protect human rights is to ensure that people receive some degree of decent, humane treatment. To violate the most basic human rights, on the other hand, is to deny individuals their fundamental moral entitlements. It is, in a sense, to treat them as if they are less than human and undeserving of respect and dignity. Examples are acts typically deemed "crimes against humanity," including genocide, torture, slavery, rape, enforced sterilization or medical experimentation, and deliberate starvation. Because these policies are sometimes implemented by governments, limiting the unrestrained power of the state is an important part of international law. Underlying laws that prohibit the various "crimes against humanity" is the principle of nondiscrimination and the notion that certain basic rights apply universally.[2]

The Various Types of Violations

The number of deaths related to combat and the collateral damage caused by warfare are only a small part of the tremendous amount of suffering and devastation caused by conflicts. Over the course of protracted conflict, assaults on political rights and the fundamental right to life are typically widespread. Some of the gravest violations of the right to life are massacres, the starvation of entire populations, and genocide. Genocide is commonly understood as the intentional extermination of a single ethnic, racial, or religious group. Killing group members, causing them serious bodily or mental harm, imposing measures to prevent birth, or forcibly transferring children are all ways to bring about the destruction of a group. Genocide is often regarded as the most offensive crime against humanity.

The term "war crime" refers to a violation of the rules of jus in bello (justice in war) by any individual, whether military or civilian.[3] The laws of armed conflict prohibit attacks on civilians and the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or long-term environmental damage.[4] Other war crimes include taking hostages, firing on localities that are undefended and without military significance, such as hospitals or schools, inhuman treatment of prisoners, including biological experiments, and the pillage or purposeless destruction of property.[5] Although clearly outlawed by international law, such war crimes are common. According to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, it is increasingly true that "the main aim...[of conflicts]... is the destruction not of armies but of civilians and entire ethnic groups."[6]

Women and girls are often raped by soldiers or forced into prostitution. For a long time, the international community has failed to address the problem of sexual violence during armed conflict.[7] However, sexual assaults, which often involve sexual mutilation, sexual humiliation, and forced pregnancy, are quite common. Such crimes are motivated in part by the long-held view that women are the "spoils" of war to which soldiers are entitled. Trafficking in women is a form of sexual slavery in which women are transported across national borders and marketed for prostitution. These so-called "comfort women" are another example of institutionalized sexual violence against women during wartime. Sexual violence is sometimes viewed as a way to destroy male and community pride or humiliate men who cannot "protect" their women. It is also used to silence women who are politically active, or simply inflict terror upon the population at large.[8] Mass rapes may also form part of a genocidal strategy, designed to impose conditions that lead to the destruction of an entire group of people. For example, during the 1990s, the media reported that "rape and other sexual atrocities were a deliberate and systematic part of the Bosnian Serb campaign for victory in the war" in the former Yugoslavia.[9]

Rather than simply killing off whole populations, government forces may carry out programs of torture. Torture can be either physical or psychological, and aims at the "humiliation or annihilation of the dignity of the person."[10] Physical torture might include mutilation, beatings, and electric shocks to lips, gums, and genitals.[11] In psychological torture, detainees are sometimes deprived of food and water for long periods, kept standing upright for hours, deprived of sleep, or tormented by high-level noise.

Torture is used in some cases as a way to carry out interrogations and extract confessions or information. Today, it is increasingly used as a means of suppressing political and ideological dissent, or for punishing political opponents who do not share the ideology of the ruling group.[12]

In addition to torture, tens of thousands of people detained in connection with conflicts "disappear" each year, and are usually killed and buried in secret.[13] Government forces "take people into custody, hold them in secret, and then refuse to acknowledge responsibility for their whereabouts or fate."[14] This abduction of persons is typically intended to secure information and spread terror. In most cases, interrogations involve threats and torture, and those who are arrested are subsequently killed.[15] Corpses are buried in unmarked graves or left at dumpsites in an attempt to conceal acts of torture and summary execution of those in custody.[16] Because people disappear without any trace, families do not know whether their loved ones are alive or dead.

Various lesser forms of political oppression are often enacted as well. Individuals who pose a threat to those in power or do not share their political views may be arbitrarily imprisoned, and either never brought to trial or subject to grossly unfair trial procedures. Mass groups of people may be denied the right to vote or excluded from all forms of political participation. Or, measures restricting people's freedom of movement may be enforced. These include forcible relocations, mass expulsions, and denials of the right to seek asylum or return to one's home.[17]

Political oppression may also take the form of discrimination. When this occurs, basic rights may be denied on the basis of religion, ethnicity, race, or gender. Apartheid, which denies political rights on the basis of race, is perhaps one of the most severe forms of discrimination. The system of apartheid in South Africa institutionalized extreme racial segregation that involved laws against interracial marriage or sexual relations and requirements for the races to live in different territorial areas. Certain individuals were held to be inferior by definition, and not regarded as full human beings under the law.[18] The laws established under this system aimed at social control, and brought about a society divided along racial lines and characterized by a systematic disregard for human rights.

In addition, women are uniquely vulnerable to certain types of human rights abuses -- in addition to the sexual abuse mentioned above, entrenched discrimination against women is prevalent in many parts of the world and leads to various forms of political and social oppression. This includes strict dress codes and harsh punishments for sexual "transgressions," which impose severe limitations on women's basic liberties. In addition, women in some regions (Africa , for example) suffer greater poverty than men and are denied political influence, education, and job training.[19]

Human Rights Violations and Intractable Conflict

Helen Chauncey likens their work in acheiving coexistence to the early human-rights era.

Many have noted the strong interdependence between human rights violations and intractable conflict. Abuse of human rights often leads to conflict, and conflict typically results in human rights violations. It is not surprising, then, that human rights abuses are often at the center of wars and that protection of human rights is central to conflict resolution.[20]

Violations of political and economic rights are the root causes of many crises. When rights to adequate food, housing, employment, and cultural life are denied, and large groups of people are excluded from the society's decision-making processes, there is likely to be great social unrest. Such conditions often give rise to justice conflicts, in which parties demand that their basic needs be met.

Indeed, many conflicts are sparked or spread by violations of human rights. For example, massacres or torture may inflame hatred and strengthen an adversary's determination to continue fighting. Violations may also lead to further violence from the other side and can contribute to a conflict's spiraling out of control.

On the flip side, armed conflict often leads to the breakdown of infrastructure and civic institutions, which in turn undermines a broad range of rights. When hospitals and schools are closed, rights to adequate health and education are threatened. The collapse of economic infrastructure often results in pollution, food shortages, and overall poverty.[21] These various forms of economic breakdown and oppression violate rights to self-determination and often contribute to further human tragedy in the form of sickness, starvation, and lack of basic shelter. The breakdown of government institutions results in denials of civil rights, including the rights to privacy, fair trial, and freedom of movement. In many cases, the government is increasingly militarized, and police and judicial systems are corrupted. Abductions, arbitrary arrests, detentions without trial, political executions, assassinations, and torture often follow.

In cases where extreme violations of human rights have occurred, reconciliation and peacebuilding become much more difficult. Unresolved human rights issues can serve as obstacles to peace negotiations.[22] This is because it is difficult for parties to move toward conflict transformation and forgiveness when memories of severe violence and atrocity are still primary in their minds.

What Can Be Done?

Helen Chauncey explains why the human rights movement is very inspirational for their work on coexistence.

International humanitarian law has been enacted to preserve humanity in all circumstances, even during conflicts. Such law "creates areas of peace in the midst of conflict, imposes the principle of a common humanity, and calls for dialogue."[23] It rules out unlimited force or total war and seeks to limit the use of violence in the hopes of maintaining the necessary conditions for a return to peace. Various international committees are in place to monitor compliance with human rights standards and report any violations. When breaches do occur, they are brought to the attention of international tribunals or tried in an international court or war crimes tribunal.

But conflicts sometimes progress beyond the state at which international law can help. As the number of victims grows and more individuals are taken prisoner, tortured, or executed, it becomes more difficult to resort to the legal path.[24]

In addition, it is often difficult to "reconcile the safeguarding of human rights with conflict resolution."[25] Many peacekeeping and conflict-prevention initiatives have failed both to protect human rights and help the parties towards conflict resolution. In part this is due to the fact that while wars between states have diminished, wars within states have escalated. Many internal conflicts involve a surge in organized violence. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and aggression against civilians have become a central part of warfare in these "internal" conflicts. Such violence often arises out of identity issues -- in-group/out-group dynamics -- and attempts of one ethnic or religious group to gain and maintain political control and to exclude other groups.[26] Such conflicts are often not fought over principles or ideas, but rather focus on differences. The "outsiders" are dehumanized, making human rights violations such as severe discrimination or ethnic cleansing all the more psychologically feasible. Thus, attacks on human rights are often at the very heart of these internal conflicts.[27]

In response, public authorities must regain control of organized violence. This means a re-establishment of the rule of law and a rebuilding of trust in public authorities. In addition, more inclusive, democratic values are needed to defuse exclusivist ideals.[28] In the face of such violations, leaders must champion international legal norms and human rights. These human rights norms are central to the maintenance of civil society, and necessary for grounding attitudes of tolerance and mutual respect within communities.

Serious difficulties arise, however, when those in power are responsible for human rights violations. In this case, outside intervention is necessary to stop the abuse.

The Question of Humanitarian Intervention

There is much disagreement about when and to what extent outside countries can engage in humanitarian intervention. More specifically, there is debate about the efficacy of using military force to protect the human rights of individuals in other nations. This sort of debate stems largely from a tension between state sovereignty and the rights of individuals.

Some defend the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention, and argue that other states must be permitted to determine their own course. It is thought that states have diverse conceptions of justice, and international coexistence depends on a pluralist ethic whereby each state can uphold its own conception of the good. Among many, there is "a profound skepticism about the possibilities of realizing notions of universal justice."[29] States that presume to judge what counts as a violation of human rights in another nation interfere with that nation's right to self-determination. In addition, requiring some country to respect human rights is liable to cause friction and can lead to far-reaching disagreements.[30] Thus, acts of intervention may disrupt interstate order and lead to further conflict.[31]

Others think, "Only the vigilant eye of the international community can ensure the proper observance of international standards, in the interest not of one state or another but of the individuals themselves."[32] They maintain that massive violations of human rights, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, warrant intervention, even if it causes some tension or disagreement. Certain rights are inalienable and universal, and "taking basic rights seriously means taking responsibility for their protection everywhere."[33] If, through its atrocious actions, a state destroys the lives and rights of its citizens, it temporarily forfeits its claims to legitimacy and sovereignty.[34] Outside governments then have a positive duty to take steps to protect human rights and preserve life. In addition, it is thought that political systems that protect human rights reduce the threat of world conflict.[35] Thus, intervention might also be justified on the ground of preserving international security.

Nevertheless, governments are often reluctant to commit military forces and resources to defend human rights in other states.[36] In addition, the use of violence to end human rights violations poses a moral dilemma insofar as such interventions may lead to further loss of innocent lives.[37] It is imperative that the least amount of force necessary to achieve humanitarian objectives be used, and that intervention not do more harm than good. Lastly, there is a need to ensure that intervention is legitimate, and motivated by genuine humanitarian concerns. The purposes of intervention must be apolitical and disinterested. However, if risks and costs of intervention are high, it is unlikely that states will intervene unless their direct interests are involved.[38]

Many note that in order to truly address human rights violations, we must strive to understand the underlying causes of these breaches. These causes have to do with underdevelopment, economic pressures, various social problems, and international conditions.[39] Indeed, the roots of repression, discrimination, and other denials of human rights stem from deeper and more complex political, social, and economic problems. It is only by understanding and ameliorating these root causes and strengthening civil society that we can truly protect human rights.

[1] Helena Kennedy. "Conflict Resolution and Human Rights: Contradictory or Complementary?" INCORE, 1.

[2] Don Hubert and Thomas G. Weiss et al. The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 144.

[3] Jordan J.Paust et al. Human Rights Module: On Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, Other Crimes Against Human Rights, and War Crimes, (Carolina Academic Press.2001), 130.

[4] Hubert and Weiss, et al., 144.

[5] Paust, et al., 131.

[6] United Nations Press Release SG/SM/6524 SC/6503 "Secretary-General Says Proposals in his Report on Africa Require New Ways of Thinking, of Acting" (16 April 1998, accessed 30 January 2003). Available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/pressrel.htm; Internet.

[7] "Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response." United Nations. Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/cover.htm; Internet.

[8] "Sexual Violence." Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/cover.htm; Internet.

[9] "Sexual Violence." Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/cover.htm; Internet.

[10] Antonio Cassese, Human Rights in a Changing World. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 90.

[11] Cassese, 123.

[12] Cassese, 90.

[13] "Human Rights Today: A United Nations Priority," The United Nations, (2000), available at: http://www.un.org/rights/HRToday/; Internet.

[14] " 'Dirty War' in Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture, and Summary Executions." Human Rights Watch, March 2001. Vol. 13, no. 1, 4. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/chechnya/RSCH0301.PDF; Internet.

[15] Cassese, 122.

[16] " 'Dirty War' in Chechnya," 31.

[17] "Human Rights Today: A United Nations Priority"

[18] Cassese, 108.

[19] Matthews, "Women's Rights are Human Rights"

[20] Kennedy, 1.

[21] "Human Rights Today"

[22] Michel Veuthey, "International Humanitarian Law and the Restoration and Maintenance of Peace." African Security Review, Vol. 7, No. 5, Institute for Security Studies, 1998. Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No5/InternationalHumanitarian.html; Internet.

[23] Veuthey, "International Humanitarian Law and the Restoration and Maintenance of Peace."

[24] Veuthey, "International Humanitarian Law and the Restoration and Maintenance of Peace."

[25] Kennedy, 6.

[26] Kennedy, 8.

[27] Kennedy, 9.

[28] Kennedy, 9.

[29] Hubert and Weiss, et al., 133.

[30] Cassese, 58.

[31] Hubert and Weiss, et al., 133.

[32] Cassese, 55-6.

[33] Hubert and Weiss, et al., 135.

[34] Hubert and Weiss, et al., 136.

[35] Cassese, 58.

[36] Hubert and Weiss, et al., 136.

[37] Hubert and Weiss, et al., 137.

[38] Hubert and Weiss, et al., 141.

[39] Cassese, 59.

Use the following to cite this article:
Maiese, Michelle. "Human Rights Violations." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2003 < http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human-rights-violations>.

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By Michelle Maiese July 2003 What it Means to Violate Human Rights "The 'disappearances' of detainees in the custody of Russian federal forces in Chechnya is a major human rights crisis that the Russian government and the international community must address."

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Only for Children

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BLM movement

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Lil Baby - The Bigger Picture (Official Music Video)

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this always get to me (:

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Empire Cast - Powerful Lyrics (Jussie Smollett and Alicia Keys)

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Fight For You (From the Original Motion Picture "Judas and the Black Messiah" (Official...

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THEY DON'T CARE ABOUT US

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Michael Jackson - They Don't Care About Us

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Why domestic violence victims don't leave | Leslie Morgan Steiner | TED

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"This virus is no respecter of persons."[i] Coronavirus is a pandemic of global proportions which some have termed the third world war.[ii] Due to the pandemic, quarantine measures have been put in place across the globe. While typically restriction of movement of free people would fall under a human rights violation, there is an exception for threats to a nation that pandemics fall under. Nonetheless this exception does not cover the human rights violations in the enforcement of quarantine measures which have been brought to light around the globe. This abusive policing is not new, but the media coverage in most cases is. In response, the U.N. in a resolution about the Coronavirus pandemic should include recommendations that address these abuses.

As of April 13, 2020 Coronavirus has been around for less than 6 months and has been contracted through person-to-person contact by people in over 200 countries.[iii] By contrast, HIV/AIDS was found in 1983, can only be contracted through specific activities where body fluids are present, and incidents-after 37 years-have only been found in 142 countries (however, 32 million have died).[iv] The most recent Ebola crisis lasted from 2014-2016, was transmitted through direct contact with infected fluids, and spanned across just three African nations.[v] When a pandemic, such as AIDS and Ebola have been deemed "a threat to international peace and security" the United Nations Security Council has been known to step in by adopting resolutions.[vi] Today, the U.N. Security Council is mulling over some draft resolutions in response to Coronavirus, but without U.N. guidance countries have imposed quarantine and social distancing measures on their own. It is the enforcement of such quarantine measures that has concerning human rights implications.

As of today, April 15, 2020, over one third of the world's 7.8 billion people are on lockdown.[vii] In fact, more people are under lockdown today than were even alive during WWII.[viii] India has imposed a 21-day lockdown for its 1.3 billion citizens.[ix] Germany has banned meetings of more than two people.[x] This global lockdown has included 91% of all enrolled learners in the world.[xi]

These quarantine measures on their face, restricting the movement of free people, are a violation of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[xii] The Declaration was adopted in 1948 in "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family."[xiii] Some of the listed enumerated rights that are violated by quarantine orders are, the right to: liberty,[xiv] freedom of movement,[xv] freedom of religion in community with others,[xvi] freedom of peaceful assembly and association,[xvii] work and protection against unemployment,[xviii] education,[xix] and freely participate in community.[xx] However, while quarantines may violate these rights the U.N. has said that in response to serious public health threats to the "life of a nation," human rights law allows for restrictions on some rights. Those restrictions, however, must be justified on a legal basis as strictly necessary. This "strictly necessary" standard must: be based on scientific evidence that is not arbitrary nor discriminatory, be set for a determinant amount of time, maintain respect for human dignity, be subject to review, and be proportionate to the objective sought to achieve.[xxi] Putting quarantine measures in place from the worldwide medical communities' recommendations to stop the spread of a global pandemic seems to be exactly this type of situation, but the implementation is not without its own set of problems.

While social distancing has been lauded as the method to "flatten the curve" (until a vaccine can be found) it is a refuge for the privileged that exacts a far heavier toll on the poor.[xxii] People in poor countries rely more heavily on daily hands on labor and informal sector employment to earn enough cash each day to feed their families, they live day-to-day and cannot afford to stockpile food and necessities, and they frequently do not have easy access to clean water. In impoverished places social distancing cuts off access to wages, food, and water that is not supplemented in any other way.[xxiii] Further, and what the remainder of this paper will focus on is the policing used to enforce the quarantine measures in the developing world which is often abusive, an impermissible violation of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and an illustration of the colonial legacies still in place in the developing world.

Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says, "no one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment." As reported above there are some articles of this declaration that can be suspended when "strictly necessary" for "the life of a nation," however, Article 5 is not one of them. What follows is a survey of enforcement abuses taken from news articles documenting how the quarantine measures have been enforced around the world.

Filipino president Duterte told the country in a public address that lockdown violators could be shot.[xxiv] While there have not been any reports of anyone being shot, reports have alleged that police have put people in public animal cages, and subjected others to physical punishments which the police video and then post online to shame the violators.[xxv]

In Brazil, people found on the streets without a reason had their feet bound in the public square.[xxvi] This is occurring while the Brazilian president publicly criticizes the stay at home orders and actively contradicts the directions of Mayors and governors.[xxvii] Because of the inconsistent quarantine measures some criminal gangs have imposed there own "coronavirus curfew," posting signs and using megaphones to tell citizens to stay at home "or else."[xxviii] Police are also using helicopters to create sand storms to drive people off of the beaches.[xxix]

The South African police rounded up 1,000 homeless men and crammed them into a soccer stadium where they were assigned ten to a tent. Adequate social distancing would have required no more than two per tent. The homeless men interviewed said that the virus would spread like wildfire among this group, they would be safer "social distancing" by themselves on the street, and they were terrified they were sent there to die.[xxx] South African police also used physical punishments, water cannons, and rubber bullets on people violating restrictions.[xxxi]

Videos of quarantine violators from India and Pakistan show young and old men being forced to crawl, do squats, and being beaten.[xxxii] Sime people are also put into a stress position where they are made to hold there ears from between their legs and made to hop around.[xxxiii] In India migrant worker were sprayed with a chemical solution containing bleach to "disinfect them."[xxxiv] Another migrant who was caught violating quarantine orders had the words "I have violated lock down restrictions, keep away from me" written on his forehead.[xxxv]

Amnesty International reported that in Iran possibly 36 prisoners were killed who were protesting in fear of their risk of contracting coronavirus. These protests sprung up in multiple prisons that had promised to release certain categories of prisoners due to the pandemic and then went back on their promise.[xxxvi]

There are other instances that disproportionately affect the poor but perhaps do not rise to the level of an Article 5 human rights violation. A Chinese-Australian working in Beijing was fired from her job and deported for going for a run.[xxxvii] The United Arab Emirates, Australia, Singapore, Austria, Hong Kong, and Britain have imposed fines exceeding $3K for violations.[xxxviii] India, Britain, Mexico, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Russia have threatened and imposed prison time for violators.[xxxix]

Just as the Locust Effect points out it is countries with police forces set up to maintain the control of the ruling class from colonial times that have the most widespread reports of police abuses during this time of quarantine enforcement. Tellingly, it is not the police tactics that have changed in these places, only the international spotlight on them that this pandemic has created. However, it is precisely because of this spotlight that the U.N. should use the extra latitude afforded in times of crisis to speak out against the abuses and call for their end. Member states recognize that interference in their private internal affairs can be overridden times where international security and peace are threatened, and this is just a time as that.[xl]

Currently the U.N. General Assembly is deadlocked over two competing proposed Coronavirus resolutions.[xli] One proposal with 130 member-state co-sponsors calls for international cooperation by exchanging information, scientific knowledge, and best practices.[xlii] The other proposal sponsored by Russia, with support from the Central African Republic, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela calls for abandoning trade wars, rejecting any implementation of protectionist measures, and the lifting of unilateral sanctions without U.N. Security Council approval.[xliii] In light of the ongoing police abuses that are happening globally in the developing world as countries try to implement quarantine orders the U.N. resolution should incorporate a section on human rights acknowledging everyone's right to life, freedom from excessive force, torture and humiliation, the right to due process, and accountability to those standards.

During the West African Ebola pandemic, the West African Regional Office of the High Commission on Human Rights wrote an instructive memo expressing what should be contained in an Ebola resolution.[xliv] In this report they specifically recommended that a resolution should call for:

Peacefully diffusing protests before they take place.

Giving clear orders to security forces to refrain from excessive force and abuse of power. Give clear guidelines on what is reasonable force and what is not.

Assurance that there will be independent investigations for human rights violations.

Insure national and local laws are implemented in accordance with principals of due process.

The allowance of religious and education programming on public television and radio to supplement the inability to meet for educational and religious purposes.

Insurance that all quarantined people had access to food, water, sanitation, and medical assistance.

These measures even if adopted probably will not stop the bulk of human rights abuses happening due to this pandemic. However, just as the Locust Effect laid out the steps Georgia took to reform corruption, this resolution could be a good first step. The published abuses have already started to generate a grassroots social demand for change. This could be levied into some political movements that can identify the courageous reformers. Once the acute crisis is over this budding change could create the perfect window for NGO's to come in and support local reformers attack corruption, clean house in the local criminal justice system, create new respect for the reformed system and win public trust.[xlv]

The problem of human rights abuses will not be solved overnight. They will probably not be solved in our lifetime, but in this peculiar time of global crisis the daily reports of abusive policing in the third world can be a catalyst for change. The U.N. is in a particularly well-placed

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Human Rights Abuses in the Enforcement of Coronavirus Security Measures

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"This virus is no respecter of persons."[i] Coronavirus is a pandemic of global proportions which some have termed the third world war.[ii] Due to the pandemic, quarantine measures have been put in place across the globe. While typically restriction of movement of free people would fall under a human rights violation, there is an exception for threats to a nation that pandemics fall under.

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Rejection of military might in Myanmar

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Nanking Massacre

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women's suffrage movement

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Women's Rights Movement Begins

The campaign for women's suffrage began in earnest in the decades before the Civil War. During the 1820s and '30s, most states had extended the franchise to all white men, regardless of how much money or property they had.

At the same time, all sorts of reform groups were proliferating across the United States- temperance leagues, religious movements, moral-reform societies, anti- slavery organizations-and in many of these, women played a prominent role.

Meanwhile, many American women were beginning to chafe against what historians have called the "Cult of True Womanhood": that is, the idea that the only "true" woman was a pious, submissive wife and mother concerned exclusively with home and family.

Put together, all of these contributed to a new way of thinking about what it meant to be a woman and a citizen of the United States.

Seneca Falls Convention

In 1848, a group of abolitionist activists-mostly women, but some men-gathered in Seneca Falls, New York to discuss the problem of women's rights. They were invited there by the reformers Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott.

Most of the delegates to the Seneca Falls Convention agreed: American women were autonomous individuals who deserved their own political identities.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident," proclaimed the Declaration of Sentiments that the delegates produced, "that all men and women are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

What this meant, among other things, was that they believed women should have the right to vote.

Civil Rights and Women's Rights During the Civil War

During the 1850s, the women's rights movement gathered steam, but lost momentum when the Civil War began. Almost immediately after the war ended, the 14th Amendment and the 15th Amendment to the Constitution raised familiar questions of suffrage and citizenship.

The 14th Amendment, ratified in 1868, extends the Constitution's protection to all citizens-and defines "citizens" as "male"; the 15th, ratified in 1870, guarantees Black men the right to vote.

Some women's suffrage advocates believed that this was their chance to push lawmakers for truly universal suffrage. As a result, they refused to support the 15th Amendment and even allied with racist Southerners who argued that white women's votes could be used to neutralize those cast by African Americans.

In 1869, a new group called the National Woman Suffrage Association was founded by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. They began to fight for a universal-suffrage amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Others argued that it was unfair to endanger Black enfranchisement by tying it to the markedly less popular campaign for female suffrage. This pro-15th-Amendment faction formed a group called the American Woman Suffrage Association and fought for the franchise on a state-by-state basis.

Gallery: The Progressive Campaign for Suffrage

This animosity eventually faded, and in 1890 the two groups merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association. Elizabeth Cady Stanton was the organization's first president.

By then, the suffragists' approach had changed. Instead of arguing that women deserved the same rights and responsibilities as men because women and men were "created equal," the new generation of activists argued that women deserved the vote because they were different from men.

They could make their domesticity into a political virtue, using the franchise to create a purer, more moral "maternal commonwealth."

This argument served many political agendas: Temperance advocates, for instance, wanted women to have the vote because they thought it would mobilize an enormous voting bloc on behalf of their cause, and many middle-class white people were swayed once again by the argument that the enfranchisement of white women would "ensure immediate and durable white supremacy, honestly attained."

Did you know? In 1923, the National Woman's Party proposed an amendment to the Constitution that prohibited all discrimination on the basis of sex. The so-called Equal Rights Amendment has never been ratified.

Winning the Vote at Last

Starting in 1910, some states in the West began to extend the vote to women for the first time in almost 20 years. Idaho and Utah had given women the right to vote at the end of the 19th century.

Still, southern and eastern states resisted. In 1916, NAWSA president Carrie Chapman Catt unveiled what she called a "Winning Plan" to get the vote at last: a blitz campaign that mobilized state and local suffrage organizations all over the country, with a special focus on those recalcitrant regions.

Meanwhile, a splinter group called the National Woman's Party founded by Alice Paul focused on more radical, militant tactics-hunger strikes and White House pickets, for instance-aimed at winning dramatic publicity for their cause.

World War I slowed the suffragists' campaign but helped them advance their argument nonetheless: Women's work on behalf of the war effort, activists pointed out, proved that they were just as patriotic and deserving of citizenship as men.

Finally, on August 18, 1920, the 19th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified. And on November 2 of that year, more than 8 million women across the United States voted in elections for the first time.

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Women's Suffrage - The U.S. Movement, Leaders & 19th Amendment

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The women's suffrage movement was a decades-long fight to win the right to vote for women in the United States. On August 26, 1920, the 19th Amendment to the Constitution was finally ratified, enfranchising all American women and declaring for the first time that they, like men, deserve all the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

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Introduction

Following the liberation of the concentration camps in 1945, Holocaust survivors set forth on their newest journey -- the quest for a new life, home, and family. Often they suppressed the trauma they sustained during the Holocaust, pushing it to the backs of their minds, distancing themselves from the terror and the grief to embrace their new lives. Despite their best efforts to "move on," however, for many this shroud of wellness eventually gave way to a host of emotional and psychological difficulties. Their inability to mourn or to acknowledge their own suffering led them to exhibit a variety of symptoms. Over time, psychiatrists began to identify and to study these symptoms, grouping them under such names as "survivor syndrome," "concentration camp syndrome," and "post-traumatic stress disorder." The trauma of the Holocaust, quite obviously, did not end at liberation.

The following bibliography was compiled to guide readers to materials on psychological trauma and the Holocaust that are in the Library's collection. It is not meant to be exhaustive. Annotations are provided to help the user determine the item's focus, and call numbers for the Museum's Library are given in parentheses following each citation. Those unable to visit might be able to find these works in a nearby public library or acquire them through interlibrary loan. Follow the "Find in a library near you" link in each citation and enter your zip code at the Open WorldCat search screen. The results of that search indicate all libraries in your area that own that particular title. Talk to your local librarian for assistance.

Background Information

The Survivors

Krystal, Henry, editor. Massive Psychic Trauma. New York: International Universities Press, 1968. (D 810 .P753 M277 1968) [ Find in a library near you]

An early consolidation of Holocaust survivor psychiatric studies as presented in workshops at Wayne State University. Highlights the correlation between survivor guilt and ongoing depression.

The Second Generation

Additional Resources

Subject Files
Ask at the reference desk to see the subject file labeled "Holocaust survivors - Mental health" containing newspaper and periodical articles.

Subject Headings
To search library catalogs or other electronic search tools for materials on Psychological Trauma and the Holocaust, use the following Library of Congress subject headings to retrieve the most relevant citations:

Children of Holocaust survivors--Mental health

Children of Holocaust survivors--Psychological aspects

Children of Holocaust survivors--Psychology

Concentration camps--Psychological aspects

Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945)--Psychological aspects

Holocaust survivors--Mental health

Holocaust survivors--Psychological aspects

Holocaust survivors--Psychology

National socialism--Psychological aspects

Psychic trauma

See all Bibliographies

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Following the liberation of the concentration camps in 1945, Holocaust survivors set forth on their newest journey -- the quest for a new life, home, and family. Often they suppressed the trauma they sustained during the Holocaust, pushing it to the backs of their minds, distancing themselves from the terror and the grief to embrace their new lives.

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time stamp 1:46

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The importance is to be aware of our human rights violation and to not be against our citizens. The affect of ignoring human rights leads to destruction and broken citizenship.

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The universal danger of ignoring human rights violations

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The Rwandan genocide occurred between 7 April and 15 July 1994 during the Rwandan Civil War. During this period of around 100 days, members of the Tutsi minority ethnic group, as well as some moderate Hutu and Twa, were killed by armed Hutu militias. The most widely accepted scholarly estimates are around 500,000 to 662,000 Tutsi deaths.

In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group composed mostly of Tutsi refugees, invaded northern Rwanda from their base in Uganda, initiating the Rwandan Civil War. Over the course of the next three years, neither side was able to gain a decisive advantage. In an effort to bring the war to a peaceful end, the Rwandan government led by Hutu president, Juvénal Habyarimana signed the Arusha Accords with the RPF on 4 August 1993. The catalyst became Habyarimana's assassination on 6 April 1994, creating a power vacuum and ending peace accords. Genocidal killings began the following day when majority Hutu soldiers, police, and militia murdered key Tutsi and moderate Hutu military and political leaders.

The scale and brutality of the genocide caused shock worldwide, but no country intervened to forcefully stop the killings. Most of the victims were killed in their own villages or towns, many by their neighbors and fellow villagers. Hutu gangs searched out victims hiding in churches and school buildings. The militia murdered victims with machetes and rifles. Sexual violence was rife, with an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 women raped during the genocide. The RPF quickly resumed the civil war once the genocide started and captured all government territory, ending the genocide and forcing the government and génocidaires into Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

The genocide had lasting and profound effects. In 1996, the RPF-led Rwandan government launched an offensive into Zaire, home to exiled leaders of the former Rwandan government and many Hutu refugees, starting the First Congo War and killing an estimated 200,000 people. Today, Rwanda has two public holidays to mourn the genocide, and " genocide ideology" and "divisionism" are criminal offences. Although the Constitution of Rwanda states that more than 1 million people perished in the genocide, the real number killed is likely lower.

Background

Pre-independent Rwanda and the origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa groups

The earliest inhabitants of what is now Rwanda were the Twa, a group of aboriginal pygmy hunter-gatherers who settled in the area between 8000 BC and 3000 BC and remain in Rwanda today. Between 700 BC and 1500 AD, a number of Bantu groups migrated into Rwanda, and began to clear forest land for agriculture. Historians have several theories regarding the nature of the Bantu migrations: one theory is that the first settlers were Hutu, while the Tutsi migrated later and formed a distinct racial group, possibly of Cushitic origin. An alternative theory is that the migration was slow and steady from neighbouring regions, with incoming groups bearing high genetic similarity to the established ones, and integrating into rather than conquering the existing society. Under this theory, the Hutu and Tutsi distinction arose later and was not a racial one, but principally a class or caste distinction in which the Tutsi herded cattle while the Hutu farmed the land. The Hutu, Tutsi and Twa of Rwanda share a common language and are collectively known as the Banyarwanda.

The population coalesced, first into clans ( ubwoko), and then, by 1700, into around eight kingdoms. The Kingdom of Rwanda, ruled by the Tutsi Nyiginya clan, became the dominant kingdom from the mid-eighteenth century, expanding through a process of conquest and assimilation, and achieving its greatest extent under the reign of King Kigeli Rwabugiri in 1853-1895. Rwabugiri expanded the kingdom west and north, and initiated administrative reforms which caused a rift to grow between the Hutu and Tutsi populations. These included uburetwa, a system of forced labour which Hutu had to perform to regain access to land seized from them, and , under which Tutsi patrons ceded cattle to Hutu or Tutsi clients in exchange for economic and personal service. Although Hutu and Tutsi were often treated differently, they shared the same language and culture, the same clan names, and the same customs; the symbols of kingship served as a unifying bond between them.

Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi were assigned to Germany by the Berlin Conference of 1884, and Germany established a presence in the country in 1897 with the formation of an alliance with the king. German policy was to rule the country through the Rwandan monarchy; this system had the added benefit of enabling colonization with small European troop numbers. The colonists favoured the Tutsi over the Hutu when assigning administrative roles, believing them to be migrants from Ethiopia and racially superior. The Rwandan king welcomed the Germans, using their military strength to widen his rule. Belgian forces took control of Rwanda and Burundi in 1917 during World War I, and from 1926 began a policy of more direct colonial rule. The Belgians modernised the Rwandan economy, but Tutsi supremacy remained, leaving the Hutu disenfranchised.

In the early 1930s, Belgium introduced a permanent division of the population by classifying Rwandans into three ethnic (ethno-racial) groups, with the Hutu representing about 84% of the population, the Tutsi about 15%, and the Twa about 1%. Compulsory identity cards were issued labeling (under the heading for "ethnicity and race") each individual as either Tutsi, Hutu, Twa, or Naturalised. While it had previously been possible for particularly wealthy Hutus to become honorary Tutsis, the identity cards prevented any further movement between the groups and made socio-economic groups into rigid ethnic groups.

The ethnic identities of the Hutu and Tutsi were reshaped and mythologized by the colonizers. Christian missionaries in Rwanda promoted the theory about the " Hamitic" origins of the kingdom, and referred to the distinctively Ethiopian features and hence, foreign origins, of the Tutsi "caste". These mythologies provide the basis for anti-Tutsi propaganda in 1994.

Revolution and Hutu-Tutsi relations after independence

After World War II, a Hutu emancipation movement began to grow in Rwanda, fuelled by increasing resentment of the inter-war social reforms, and also an increasing sympathy for the Hutu within the Catholic Church. Catholic missionaries increasingly viewed themselves as responsible for empowering the underprivileged Hutu rather than the Tutsi elite, leading rapidly to the formation of a sizeable Hutu clergy and educated elite that provided a new counterbalance to the established political order. The monarchy and prominent Tutsis sensed the growing influence of the Hutu and began to agitate for immediate independence on their own terms. In 1957, a group of Hutu scholars wrote the " Bahutu Manifesto". This was the first document to label the Tutsi and Hutu as separate races, and called for the transfer of power from Tutsi to Hutu based on what it termed "statistical law".

On 1 November 1959 Dominique Mbonyumutwa, a Hutu sub-chief, was attacked close to his home in Byimana, Gitarama prefecture, by supporters of the pro-Tutsi party. Mbonyumutwa survived, but rumours began spreading that he had been killed. Hutu activists responded by killing Tutsis, both the elite and ordinary civilians, marking the beginning of the Rwandan Revolution. The Tutsi responded with attacks of their own, but by this stage the Hutu had full backing from the Belgian administration who wanted to overturn the Tutsi domination. In early 1960, the Belgians replaced most Tutsi chiefs with Hutu and organised mid-year commune elections which returned an overwhelming Hutu majority. The king was deposed, a Hutu-dominated republic created, and the country became independent in 1962. As the revolution progressed, Tutsis began leaving the country to escape the Hutu purges, settling in the four neighbouring countries: Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. These exiles, unlike the Banyarwanda who migrated during the pre-colonial and colonial era, were regarded as refugees in their host countries, and began almost immediately to agitate for a return to Rwanda. They formed armed groups who launched attacks into Rwanda; these were largely unsuccessful, and led to further reprisal killings of 10,000 Tutsis and further Tutsi exiles. By 1964, more than 300,000 Tutsis had fled, and were forced to remain in exile for the next three decades.

Grégoire Kayibanda presided over a Hutu republic for the next decade, imposing an autocratic rule similar to the pre-revolution feudal monarchy. He was overthrown following a coup in 1973, which brought President Juvénal Habyarimana to power. Pro-Hutu and Anti-Tutsi discrimination continued in Rwanda itself, although the indiscriminate violence against the Tutsi did decrease somewhat. Habyarimana founded the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) party in 1975, and promulgated a new constitution following a 1978 referendum, making the country a one-party state in which every citizen had to belong to the MRND.

At 408 inhabitants per square kilometre (1,060/sq mi), Rwanda's population density is among the highest in Africa. Rwanda's population had increased from 1.6 million people in 1934 to 7.1 million in 1989, leading to competition for land. Historians such as Gérard Prunier believe that the 1994 genocide can be partly attributed to population density.

Rwandan Civil War

In the 1980s, a group of 500 Rwandan refugees in Uganda, led by Fred Rwigyema, fought with the rebel National Resistance Army (NRA) in the Ugandan Bush War, which saw Yoweri Museveni overthrow Milton Obote. These soldiers remained in the Ugandan army following Museveni's inauguration as Ugandan president, but simultaneously began planning an invasion of Rwanda through a covert network within the army's ranks. In October 1990, Rwigyema led a force of over 4,000 rebels from Uganda, advancing 60 km (37 mi) into Rwanda under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Rwigyema was killed on the third day of the attack, and France and Zaire deployed forces in support of the Rwandan army, allowing them to repel the invasion. Rwigyema's deputy, Paul Kagame, took command of the RPF forces, organising a tactical retreat through Uganda to the Virunga Mountains, a rugged area of northern Rwanda. From there, he rearmed and reorganised the army, and carried out fundraising and recruitment from the Tutsi diaspora.

Kagame restarted the war in January 1991, with a surprise attack on the northern town of Ruhengeri. The RPF captured the town, benefiting from the element of surprise, and held it for one day before retreating to the forests. For the next year, the RPF waged a hit-and-run style guerrilla war, capturing some border areas but not making significant gains against the Rwandan army. In June 1992, following the formation of a multiparty coalition government in Kigali, the RPF announced a ceasefire and began negotiations with the Rwandan government in Arusha, Tanzania. In early 1993, several extremist Hutu groups formed and began campaigns of large scale violence against the Tutsi. The RPF responded by suspending peace talks and launching a major attack, gaining a large swathe of land across the north of the country. Peace negotiations eventually resumed in Arusha; the resulting set of agreements, known as the Arusha Accords, were signed in August 1993 and gave the RPF positions in a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and in the national army. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a peacekeeping force, arrived in the country and the RPF were given a base in the national parliament building in Kigali, for use during the setting up of the BBTG.

Hutu Power movement

In the early years of Habyarimana's regime, there was greater economic prosperity and reduced violence against Tutsis. Many hardline anti-Tutsi figures remained, including the family of the first lady Agathe Habyarimana, who were known as the or clan de Madame, and the president relied on them to maintain his regime. When the RPF invaded in October 1990, Habyarimana and the hardliners exploited the fear of the population to advance an anti-Tutsi agenda which became known as Hutu Power. Tutsi were increasingly viewed with suspicion. A pogrom was organised on 11 October 1990 in a commune in Gisenyi Province, killing 383 Tutsi. A group of military officers and government members founded a magazine called , which became popular throughout the country. This published anti-Tutsi propaganda, including the Hutu Ten Commandments, an explicit set of racist guidelines, including labelling Hutus who married Tutsis as "traitors". In 1992, the hardliners created the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) party, which was linked to the ruling party but more right-wing, and promoted an agenda critical of the president's alleged "softness" with the RPF.

Following the 1992 ceasefire agreement, a number of the extremists in the Rwandan government and army began actively plotting against the president, worried about the possibility of Tutsis being included in government. Habyarimana attempted to remove the hardliners from senior army positions, but was only partially successful; akazu affiliates Augustin Ndindiliyimana and Théoneste Bagosora remained in powerful posts, providing the hardline family with a link to power. Throughout 1992, the hardliners carried out campaigns of localised killings of Tutsi, culminating in January 1993, in which extremists and local Hutu murdered around 300 people. When the RPF resumed hostilities in February 1993, it cited these killings as the primary motive, but its effect was to increase support for the extremists amongst the Hutu population.

From mid-1993, the Hutu Power movement represented a third major force in Rwandan politics, in addition to Habyarimana's government and the traditional moderate opposition. Apart from the CDR, there was no party that was exclusively part of the Power movement. Instead, almost every party was split into "moderate" and "Power" wings, with members of both camps claiming to represent the legitimate leadership of that party. Even the ruling party contained a Power wing, consisting of those who opposed Habyarimana's intention to sign a peace deal. Several radical youth militia groups emerged, attached to the Power wings of the parties; these included the Interahamwe, which was attached to the ruling party, and the CDR's Impuzamugambi. The youth militia began actively carrying out massacres across the country. The army trained the militias, sometimes in conjunction with the French, who were unaware of their true purpose.

Preparation for genocide

To what extent the Rwandan genocide was planned in advance of the assassination of Habyarimana continues to be debated by historians. Prosecutors at the ICTR argued, but were unable to prove, that the defendants planned the genocide prior to Habyarimana's assassination.

In 1990, the army began arming civilians with weapons such as machetes, and it began training the Hutu youth in combat, officially as a programme of "civil defence" against the RPF threat, but these weapons were later used to carry out the genocide. In particular, the Hutu Power leaders organized a paramilitary or militia force known as the Interahamwe ("those who stand together") and the Impuzamugambi ("those who have the same goal"). These groups served to provide auxiliary slaughterhouse support to the police, the gendarmerie and the regular army. These militias were primarily recruited from the vast pool of Hutu internally displaced persons driven from their homes in the North, and claimed a total membership of 50,000 on the eve of genocide Rwanda also purchased large numbers of grenades and munitions from late 1990; in one deal, future UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his role as Egyptian foreign minister, facilitated a large sale of arms from Egypt. The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) expanded rapidly at this time, growing from less than 10,000 troops to almost 30,000 in one year. The new recruits were often poorly disciplined; a divide grew between the elite Presidential Guard and Gendarmerie units, who were well trained and battle ready, and the ordinary rank and file, respectively.

In March 1993, Hutu Power began compiling lists of "traitors" whom they planned to kill, and it is possible that Habyarimana's name was on these lists; the CDR were publicly accusing the president of treason.

The Power groups believed that the national radio station, Radio Rwanda, had become too liberal and supportive of the opposition; they founded a new radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). The RTLM was designed to appeal to the young adults in Rwanda and had extensive reach. Unlike newspapers that could only be found in cities, the radio broadcasts were accessible to Rwanda's largely rural population of farmers. The format of the broadcasts mirrored Western-style radio talk shows that played popular music, hosted interviews, and encouraged audience participation. The broadcasters told crude jokes and used offensive language that contrasted strongly with Radio Rwanda's more formal news reports. Just 1.52% of RTLM's airtime was dedicated to news, while 66.29% of airtime featured the journalists discussing their thoughts on different subjects. As the start of the genocide approached, the RTLM broadcasts focused on anti-Tutsi propaganda. They characterized the Tutsi as a dangerous enemy who wanted to seize the political power at the expense of Hutus. By linking the Rwandan Patriotic Army with the Tutsi political party and ordinary Tutsi citizens, they classified the entire ethnic group as one homogeneous threat to Rwandans. The RTLM went further than amplifying ethnic and political division; it also labeled the Tutsi as inyenzi, meaning non-human pests or cockroaches, which must be exterminated. Leading up to the genocide, there were 294 instances of the RTLM accusing the Rwandan Patriotic Army of atrocities against the Hutu, along with 252 broadcasts that call for Hutus to kill the Tutsis. One such broadcast stated, "Someone must... make them disappear for good... to wipe them from human memory... to exterminate the Tutsi from the surface of the earth." By the time the violence began, the young Hutu population had absorbed months of racist propaganda that characterized all Tutsis as dangerous enemies that must be killed before they seized control of the country. The RTLM's role in the genocide earned it the nickname "Radio Machete" as it related to their incitement to genocide. A 1994 study by Harvard Kennedy School researcher David Yanagizawa-Drott found that approximately 10% of the overall violence during the Rwandan genocide can be attributed to this new radio station. Gordon Danning, a researcher with the free speech advocacy group Foundation for Individual Rights in Education questioned the assumption of that paper that media availability correlated with media consumption.

During 1993, the hardliners imported machetes on a scale far larger than what was required for agriculture, as well as other tools which could be used as weapons, such as razor blades, saws and scissors. These tools were distributed around the country, ostensibly as part of the civil defence network.

In October 1993, the President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, who had been elected in June as the country's first ever Hutu president, was assassinated by extremist Tutsi army officers. The assassination sparked the Burundi Civil War between Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi and the Burundi genocide, with 50,000 to 100,000 people killed in the first year of war. The assassination caused shockwaves, reinforcing the notion among Hutus that the Tutsi were their enemy and could not be trusted. The CDR and the Power wings of the other parties realised they could use this situation to their advantage. The idea of a deliberate and systematic genocide, which had first been suggested in 1992 but had remained a fringe viewpoint, was now top of their agenda, and they began actively planning it. They were confident of persuading the Hutu population to carry out killings, given the public anger at Ndadaye's murder, as well as RTLM propaganda and the traditional obedience of Rwandans to authority. The Power leaders began arming the interahamwe and other militia groups with AK-47s and other weapons; previously, they had possessed only machetes and traditional hand weapons.

On 11 January 1994, General Roméo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, sent his "Genocide Fax" to UN Headquarters. The fax stated that Dallaire was in contact with "a top level trainer in the cadre of Interhamwe-armed [ sic] militia of MRND." The informant-now known to be Mathieu Ngirumpatse's chauffeur, Kassim Turatsinze, a.k.a. "Jean-Pierre"-claimed to have been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. According to the memo, Turatsinze suspected that a genocide against the Tutsis was being planned, and he said that "in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis". Dallaire's request to protect the informant and his family and to raid the weapons caches he revealed was denied.

The ICTR prosecution was unable to prove that a conspiracy to commit genocide existed prior to 7 April 1994. The supposed mastermind, Théoneste Bagosora, was acquitted of that charge in 2008, although he was convicted of genocide. André Guichaoua, an expert witness for the ICTR prosecution, noted in 2010:

What the Office of the Prosecutor has consistently failed to demonstrate is the alleged existence of a "conspiracy" among the accused-presuming an association or a preexisting plan to commit genocide. This is the central argument at the core of its prosecution strategy, borrowing from the contentions initially put forth by academics and human rights defenders. With the exception of two judgements, confirmed on appeal, the Trial Chambers have uniformly found the prosecution's proof of a conspiracy wanting, regardless of the case.

Assassination of Habyarimana

On 6 April 1994, the airplane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu president of Burundi, was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, killing everyone on board. Responsibility for the attack was disputed, with both the RPF and Hutu extremists being blamed. In 2006, an eight-year investigation by the French judge Jean-Louis Bruguière concluded that Paul Kagame had ordered the assassination. An investigation by the Rwandan government made public in 2010 blamed Hutu extremists in the Rwandan army. In January 2012, a French investigation was widely published as exonerating the RPF, but according to Filip Reyntjens, the report did not exonerate the RPF. In November 2014, Emmanuel Mughisa (also known as Emile Gafarita), a former Rwandan soldier who said he had evidence that Kagame had ordered Habyarimana's plane shot down, was abducted in Nairobi hours after he was called to testify at the French inquiry. He was reportedly "join[ing] a long list of Mr Kagame's opponents who have disappeared or died". Despite disagreements about the perpetrators, many observers believe the attack and deaths of the two Hutu presidents served as the catalyst for the genocide.

Following Habyarimana's death, on the evening of 6 April, a crisis committee was formed; it consisted of Major General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, and a number of other senior army staff officers. The committee was headed by Bagosora, despite the presence of the more senior Ndindiliyimana. Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana was legally next in the line of political succession, but the committee refused to recognise her authority. Roméo Dallaire met with the committee that night and insisted that Uwilingiyimana be placed in charge, but Bagosora refused, saying Uwilingiyimana did not "enjoy the confidence of the Rwandan people" and was "incapable of governing the nation". The committee also justified its existence as being essential to avoid uncertainty following the president's death. Bagosora sought to convince UNAMIR and the RPF that the committee was acting to contain the Presidential Guard, which he described as "out of control", and that it would abide by the Arusha agreement.

Killing of moderate leaders

UNAMIR sent an escort of ten Belgian soldiers to Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, with the intention of transporting her to the Radio Rwanda offices to address the nation. This plan was canceled because the Presidential Guard took over the radio station shortly afterward and would not permit Uwilingiyimana to speak on air. Later in the morning, a number of soldiers and a crowd of civilians overwhelmed the Belgians guarding Uwilingiyimana, forcing them to surrender their weapons. Uwilingiyimana and her husband were killed, although their children survived by hiding behind furniture and were rescued by Senegalese UNAMIR officer Mbaye Diagne. The ten Belgians were taken to the Camp Kigali military base, where they were tortured and killed. Major Bernard Ntuyahaga, the commanding officer of the Presidential Guard unit which carried out the murders, was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment by a court in Belgium in 2007.

In addition to assassinating Uwilingiyimana, the extremists spent the night of 6-7 April moving around the houses of Kigali with lists of prominent moderate politicians and journalists, on a mission to kill them. Fatalities that evening included President of the Constitutional Court Joseph Kavaruganda, Minister of Agriculture Frederic Nzamurambaho, Parti Liberal leader Landwald Ndasingwa and his Canadian wife, and chief Arusha negotiator Boniface Ngulinzira. A few moderates survived, including prime minister-designate Faustin Twagiramungu, but the plot was largely successful. According to Dallaire, "by noon on 7 April, the moderate political leadership of Rwanda was dead or in hiding, the potential for a future moderate government utterly lost." An exception to this was the new army chief of staff, Marcel Gatsinzi; Bagosora's preferred candidate Augustin Bizimungu was rejected by the crisis committee, forcing Bagosora to agree to Gatsinzi's appointment. Gatsinzi attempted to keep the army out of the genocide, and to negotiate a ceasefire with the RPF, but he had only limited control over his troops and was replaced by the hardline Bizimungu after just ten days.

Genocidal killings began the following day. Soldiers, police, and militia quickly executed key Tutsi and moderate Hutu military and political leaders who could have assumed control in the ensuing power vacuum. Checkpoints and barricades were erected to screen all holders of the national ID card of Rwanda, which contained ethnic classifications. This enabled government forces to systematically identify and kill Tutsi.

They also recruited and pressured Hutu civilians to arm themselves with machetes, clubs, blunt objects, and other weapons and encouraged them to rape, maim, and kill their Tutsi neighbors and to destroy or steal their property. The RPF restarted its offensive soon after Habyarimana's assassination. It rapidly seized control of the northern part of the country and captured Kigali about 100 days later in mid-July, bringing an end to the genocide. During these events and in the aftermath, the United Nations (UN) and countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium were criticized for their inaction and failure to strengthen the force and mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeepers. In December 2017, media reported revelations that the government of France had allegedly supported the Hutu government after the genocide had begun.

Planning and organization

Rwanda was divided into 11 prefectures and 145 communes in 1994.[150]

The large-scale killing of Tutsi on the grounds of ethnicity began within a few hours of Habyarimana's death. The crisis committee, headed by Théoneste Bagosora, took power in the country following Habyarimana's death, and was the principal authority coordinating the genocide. Following the assassination of Habyarimana, Bagosora immediately began issuing orders to kill Tutsi, addressing groups of interahamwe in person in Kigali, and making telephone calls to leaders in the prefectures. Other leading organisers on a national level were defence minister Augustin Bizimana; commander of the paratroopers Aloys Ntabakuze; and the head of the Presidential Guard, Protais Mpiranya. Businessman Félicien Kabuga funded the RTLM and the Interahamwe, while Pascal Musabe and Joseph Nzirorera were responsible for coordinating the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militia activities nationally.

Military leaders in Gisenyi prefecture, the heartland of the akazu, were initially the most organized, convening a gathering of the Interahamwe and civilian Hutus; the commanders announced the president's death, blaming the RPF, and then ordered the crowd to "begin your work" and to "spare no one", including infants. The killing spread to Ruhengeri, Kibuye, Kigali, Kibungo, Gikongoro and Cyangugu prefectures on 7 April; in each case, local officials, responding to orders from Kigali, spread rumours that the RPF had killed the president, followed by a command to kill Tutsi. The Hutu population, which had been prepared and armed during the preceding months, and maintained the Rwandan tradition of obedience to authority, carried out the orders without question. On the other hand, there are views that the genocide was not sudden, irresistible or uniformly orchestrated, but "a cascade of tipping points, and each tipping point was the outcome of local, intra-ethnic contests for dominance (among Hutu)". The protracted struggles for supremacy in local communes meant that a more determined stance from the international community would likely have prevented the worst from happening.

In Kigali, the genocide was led by the Presidential Guard, the elite unit of the army. They were assisted by the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, who set up roadblocks throughout the capital; each person passing the roadblock was required to show the national identity card, which included ethnicity, and any with Tutsi cards were killed immediately. The militias also initiated searches of houses in the city, killing Tutsi and looting their property. Tharcisse Renzaho, the prefect of Kigali-ville, played a leading role, touring the roadblocks to ensure their effectiveness and using his position at the top of the Kigali provincial government to disseminate orders and dismiss officials who were not sufficiently active in the killings.

In rural areas, the local government hierarchy was also in most cases the chain of command for the execution of the genocide. The prefect of each prefecture, acting on orders from Kigali, disseminated instructions to the commune leaders ( bourgmestres), who in turn issued directions to the leaders of the sectors, cells and villages within their communes. The majority of the actual killings in the countryside were carried out by ordinary civilians, under orders from the leaders. Tutsi and Hutu lived side by side in their villages, and families all knew each other, making it easy for Hutu to identify and target their Tutsi neighbours. Gerard Prunier ascribes this mass complicity of the population to a combination of the "democratic majority" ideology, in which Hutu had been taught to regard Tutsi as dangerous enemies, the culture of unbending obedience to authority, and the duress factor-villagers who refused to carry out orders to kill were often branded as Tutsi sympathisers and they themselves killed.

There were few killings in the prefectures of Gitarama and Butare during the early phase, as the prefects of those areas were moderates opposed to the violence. The genocide began in Gitarama after the interim government relocated to the prefecture on 12 April. Butare was ruled by the only Tutsi prefect in the country, Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana. Habyalimana refused to authorise any killings in his territory, and for a while Butare became a sanctuary for Tutsi refugees from elsewhere in the country. This lasted until 18 April, when the interim government dismissed him from his post and replaced him with government loyalist Sylvain Nsabimana.

The crisis committee appointed an interim government on 8 April; using the terms of the 1991 constitution instead of the Arusha Accords, the committee designated Théodore Sindikubwabo as interim president of Rwanda, while Jean Kambanda was the new prime minister. All political parties were represented in the government, but most members were from the "Hutu Power" wings of their respective parties. The interim government was sworn in on 9 April, but relocated from Kigali to Gitarama on 12 April, ostensibly fleeing RPF's advance on the capital. The crisis committee was officially dissolved, but Bagosora and the senior officers remained the de facto rulers of the country. The government played its part in mobilising the population, giving the regime an air of legitimacy, but was effectively a puppet regime with no ability to halt the army or the Interahamwe's activities. When Roméo Dallaire visited the government's headquarters a week after its formation, he found most officials at leisure, describing their activities as "sorting out the seating plan for a meeting that was not about to convene any time soon".

Death toll and timeline

During the remainder of April and early May, the Presidential Guard, gendarmerie and the youth militia, aided by local populations, continued killing at a very high rate. The goal was to kill every Tutsi living in Rwanda and, with the exception of the advancing rebel RPF army, there was no opposition force to prevent or slow the killings. The domestic opposition had already been eliminated, and UNAMIR were expressly forbidden to use force except in self-defence. In rural areas, where Tutsi and Hutu lived side by side and families knew each other, it was easy for Hutu to identify and target their Tutsi neighbours. In urban areas, where residents were more anonymous, identification was facilitated using roadblocks manned by military and interahamwe; each person passing the roadblock was required to show the national identity card, which included ethnicity, and any with Tutsi cards were killed immediately. Many Hutu were also killed for a variety of reasons, including alleged sympathy for the moderate opposition parties, being a journalist or simply having a "Tutsi appearance". Thousands of bodies were dumped into the Kagera River, which ran along the northern border between Rwanda and Uganda and flowed into Lake Victoria. This disposal of bodies caused significant damage to the Ugandan fishing industry, as consumers refused to buy fish caught in Lake Victoria for fear that they were tainted by decomposing corpses. The Ugandan government responded by dispatching teams to retrieve the bodies from the Kagera River before they entered the lake.

The RPF was making slow but steady gains in the north and east of the country, ending the killings in each area occupied. The genocide was effectively ended during April in areas of Ruhengeri, Byumba, Kibungo and Kigali prefectures. The killings ceased during April in the akazu heartlands of western Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, as almost every Tutsi had been eliminated. Large numbers of Hutu in the RPF-conquered areas fled, fearing retribution for the genocide; 500,000 Kibungo residents walked over the bridge at Rusumo Falls into Tanzania in a few days at the end of April, and were accommodated in United Nations camps effectively controlled by ousted leaders of the Hutu regime, with the former prefect of Kibungo prefecture in overall control.

In the remaining prefectures, killings continued throughout May and June, although they became increasingly low-key and sporadic; most Tutsi were already dead, and the interim government wished to rein in the growing anarchy and engage the population in fighting the RPF. On 23 June, around 2,500 soldiers entered southwestern Rwanda as part of the French-led United Nations Opération Turquoise. This was intended as a humanitarian mission, but the soldiers were not able to save significant numbers of lives. The genocidal authorities were overtly welcoming of the French, displaying the French flag on their own vehicles, but killing Tutsi who came out of hiding seeking protection. In July, the RPF completed their conquest of the country, with the exception of the zone occupied by Operation Turquoise. The RPF took Kigali on 4 July, and Gisenyi and the rest of the northwest on 18 July. The genocide was over, but as had occurred in Kibungo, the Hutu population fled en masse across the border, this time into Zaire, with Bagosora and the other leaders accompanying them.

The succeeding RPF government claims that 1,074,017 people were killed in the genocide, 94% of whom were Tutsi. In contrast, Human Rights Watch, following on-the-ground research, estimated the casualties at 507,000 people. According to a 2020 symposium of the Journal of Genocide Research, the official figure is not credible as it overestimates the number of Tutsi in Rwanda prior to the genocide. Using different methodologies, the scholars in the symposium estimated 500,000 to 600,000 deaths in the genocide-around two-thirds of the Tutsis in Rwanda at the time. Thousands of widows, many of whom were subjected to rape, became HIV-positive. There were about 400,000 orphans and nearly 85,000 of them were forced to become heads of families. An estimated 2,000,000 Rwandans, mostly Hutu, were displaced and became refugees. Additionally, 30% of the Pygmy Batwa were killed.

Means of killing

On 9 April, UN observers witnessed the massacre of children at a Polish church in Gikondo. The same day, 1,000 heavily armed and well trained European troops arrived to escort European civilian personnel out of the country. The troops did not stay to assist UNAMIR.[citation needed ] Media coverage picked up on the 9th, as The Washington Post reported the execution of Rwandan employees of relief agencies in front of their expatriate colleagues.

Most of the victims were killed in their own villages or in towns, often by their neighbors and fellow villagers. The militia typically murdered victims with machetes, although some army units used rifles. The Hutu gangs searched out victims hiding in churches and school buildings and massacred them. Local officials and government-sponsored radio incited ordinary citizens to kill their neighbors, and those who refused to kill were often murdered on the spot: "Either you took part in the massacres or you were massacred yourself."

One such massacre occurred at Nyarubuye. On 12 April, more than 1,500 Tutsis sought refuge in a Catholic church in Nyange, then in Kivumu commune. Local Interahamwe, acting in concert with the authorities, used bulldozers to knock down the church building. The militia used machetes and rifles to kill every person who tried to escape. Local priest Athanase Seromba was later found guilty and sentenced to life in prison by the ICTR for his role in the demolition of his church; he was convicted of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. In another case, thousands sought refuge in the Official Technical School ( École technique officielle) in Kigali where Belgian UNAMIR soldiers were stationed. On 11 April, the Belgian soldiers withdrew, and Rwandan armed forces and militia killed all the Tutsi.

Sexual violence

Rape was used as a tool by the Interahamwe, the chief perpetrators, to separate the consciously heterogeneous population and to drastically exhaust the opposing group. The use of propaganda played an important role in both the genocide and the gender specific violence. The Hutu propaganda depicted Tutsi women as "a sexually seductive ' fifth column' in league with the Hutus' enemies". The exceptional brutality of the sexual violence, as well as the complicity of Hutu women in the attacks, suggests that the use of propaganda had been effective in the exploitation of gendered needs which had mobilized both females and males to participate. Soldiers of the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda and the Rwandan Defence Forces, including the Presidential Guard, and civilians also committed rape against mostly Tutsi women. Although Tutsi women were the main targets, moderate Hutu women were also raped.

Along with the Hutu moderates, Hutu women who were married to or who hid Tutsis were also targeted. In his 1996 report on Rwanda, the UN Special Rapporteur Rene Degni-Segui stated, "Rape was the rule and its absence was the exception." He also noted, "Rape was systematic and was used as a weapon." With this thought and using methods of force and threat, the genocidaires forced others to stand by during rapes. A testimonial by a woman of the name Marie Louise Niyobuhungiro recalled seeing local peoples, other generals and Hutu men watching her get raped about five times a day. Even when she was kept under watch of a woman, the woman would give no sympathy or help and furthermore forced her to farm land in between rapes.

Many of the survivors became infected with HIV from the HIV-infected men recruited by the genocidaires. During the conflict, Hutu extremists released hundreds of patients suffering from AIDS from hospitals, and formed them into "rape squads". The intent was to infect and cause a "slow, inexorable death" for their future Tutsi rape victims. Tutsi women were also targeted with the intent of destroying their reproductive capabilities. Sexual mutilation sometimes occurred after the rape and included mutilation of the vagina with machetes, knives, sharpened sticks, boiling water, and acid. Men were also the victims of sexual violation, including public mutilation of the genitals.

Some experts have estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the genocide.

Killing of the Twa

The pygmy people called the Batwa (or "Twa") made up about 1% of Rwanda's population. A report shows that the group has been described as people who lived in forests and off lands, but currently the Twa are dispersed in the country in smaller groups while integrating into society. Although the Twa were not directly targeted by the genocidaires, an estimated 10,000 of a population of 30,000 were nonetheless killed. They are sometimes referred to as the "forgotten victims" of the Rwandan genocide. In the months leading up to the genocide, Hutu radio stations accused the Batwa of aiding the RPF and Twa survivors describe Hutu fighters as threatening to kill them all.

Rwandan Patriotic Front's military campaign and victory

On 7 April, as the genocide started, RPF commander Paul Kagame warned the crisis committee and UNAMIR that he would resume the civil war if the killing did not stop. The next day, Rwandan government forces attacked the national parliament building from several directions, but RPF troops stationed there successfully fought back. The RPF then began an attack from the north on three fronts, seeking to link up quickly with the isolated troops in Kigali. Kagame refused to talk to the interim government, believing that it was just a cover for Bagosora's rule and not committed to ending the genocide. Over the next few days, the RPF advanced steadily south, capturing Gabiro and large areas of the countryside to the north and east of Kigali. They avoided attacking the capital city Kigali or Byumba, but conducted manoeuvres designed to encircle the cities and cut off supply routes. The RPF also allowed Tutsi refugees from Uganda to settle behind the front line in the RPF controlled areas.

Throughout April, there were numerous attempts by UNAMIR to establish a ceasefire, but Kagame insisted each time that the RPF would not stop fighting unless the killings stopped. In late April, the RPF secured the whole of the Tanzanian border area and began to move west from Kibungo, to the south of Kigali. They encountered little resistance, except around Kigali and Ruhengeri. By 16 May, they had cut the road between Kigali and Gitarama, the temporary home of the interim government, and by 13 June, had taken Gitarama itself, following an unsuccessful attempt by the Rwandan government forces to reopen the road; the interim government was forced to relocate to Gisenyi in the far north west. As well as fighting the war, Kagame was recruiting heavily to expand the army. The new recruits included Tutsi survivors of the genocide and refugees from Burundi, but were less well trained and disciplined than the earlier recruits.

Having completed the encirclement of Kigali, the RPF spent the latter half of June fighting for the city itself. The government forces had superior manpower and weapons, but the RPF steadily gained territory as well as conducting raids to rescue civilians from behind enemy lines. According to Dallaire, this success was due to Kagame's being a "master of psychological warfare"; he exploited the fact that the government forces were concentrating on the genocide rather than the fight for Kigali, and capitalised on the government's loss of morale as it lost territory. The RPF finally defeated the Rwandan government forces in Kigali on 4 July, and on 18 July took Gisenyi and the rest of the northwest, forcing the interim government to flee into Zaire and finally ending the genocide. At the end of July 1994, Kagame's forces held the whole of Rwanda except for the zone in the south-west which had been occupied by a French-led United Nations force as part of Opération Turquoise.

The Liberation Day for Rwanda would come to be marked as 4 July and is commemorated as a public holiday.

Killings by the Rwandan Patriotic Front

During the genocide and in the months following the RPF victory, RPF soldiers killed many people, although the number of casualties is disputed. Alison Des Forges was one of the first researchers to conclude that RPF committed atrocities in a systematic fashion that were directed by officers with a high level of authority. She estimated that RPF killed around 30,000 people considered enemies of the Tutsi. Some witnesses blamed Kagame himself for ordering killings. After ICTR investigators reportedly discovered two layers of bodies in a mass grave in Kibuye in early 1996-one of Tutsi victims of the genocide and another left by RPF killings of Hutu civilians-further forensic investigations were prohibited by the Rwandan government. French scholar André Guichaoua charged the post-genocide government with deliberate destruction of evidence regarding killings of Hutu in order to avoid prosecution by the ICTR. Some critics have suggested that these crimes should have been prosecuted by the ICTR, or even amounted to genocide under international law. In contrast, the post-genocide regime maintains that killings by RPF soldiers were perpetrated by undisciplined recruits seeking revenge and that all such transgressions were promptly punished.

The first rumours of RPF killings emerged after 250,000 mostly Hutu refugees streamed into Tanzania at the border crossing of Rusumo on 28 April 1994. The refugees had fled before the Tutsi rebels arrived because they believed the RPF were committing atrocities. A spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) observed that "There's a lot of propaganda by the Government radio aimed at the Hutu" which "makes them feel very anti-Tutsi." After the RPF took control of the border crossing at Rusumo on 30 April, refugees continued to cross the Kagera River, ending up in remote areas of Tanzania. In early May, the UNHCR began hearing concrete accounts of atrocities and made this information public on 17 May.

After the RPF took power in Rwanda, UNHCR sent a team led by Robert Gersony to investigate the prospects for a speedy return of the nearly two million refugees that had fled Rwanda since April. After interviewing 300 people, Gersony concluded that "clearly systematic murders and persecution of the Hutu population in certain parts of the country" had taken place. Gersony's findings were suppressed by the United Nations. The Gersony Report did not technically exist because Gersony did not complete it, but a summary of an oral presentation of his findings was leaked in 2010. Gersony's personal conclusion was that between April and August 1994, the RPF had killed "between 25,000 and 45,000 persons, between 5,000 and 10,000 persons each month from April through July and 5,000 for the month of August." The new authorities categorically denied the allegations of Gersony, details of which leaked to the press. According to an RPA officer, "There was not time to do proper screening. ... We needed a force, and some of those recruited were thieves and criminals. Those people have been responsible for much of our trouble today." In an interview with journalist Stephen Kinzer, Kagame acknowledged that killings had occurred but stated that they were carried out by rogue soldiers and had been impossible to control.

The RPF killings gained international attention with the 1995 Kibeho massacre, in which soldiers opened fire on a camp for internally displaced persons in Butare prefecture. Australian soldiers serving as part of UNAMIR estimated at least 4,000 people were killed, while the Rwandan government claimed that the death toll was 338.

International involvement

United Nations

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda ( UNAMIR) had been in Rwanda since October 1993, with a mandate to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords. UNAMIR commander Roméo Dallaire learned of the Hutu Power movement during the mission's deployment, as well as plans for the mass extermination of Tutsi. He also became aware of secret weapons caches through an informant, but his request to raid them was turned down by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which felt that Dallaire was exceeding his mandate and had to be kept "on a leash". Seizing the weapons was argued to be squarely within UNAMIR's mandate; both sides had requested UNAMIR and it had been authorized by the UN Security Council in Resolution 872.

UNAMIR's effectiveness in peacekeeping was also hampered by President Habyarimana and Hutu hardliners, and by April 1994, the Security Council threatened to terminate UNAMIR's mandate if it did not make progress. Following the death of Habyarimana, and the start of the genocide, Dallaire liaised repeatedly with both the Crisis Committee and the RPF, attempting to re-establish peace and prevent the resumption of the civil war. Neither side was interested in a ceasefire, the government because it was controlled by the genocidaires, and the RPF because it considered it necessary to fight to stop the killings. UNAMIR's Chapter VI mandate rendered it powerless to intervene militarily, and most of its Rwandan staff were killed in the early days of the genocide, severely limiting its ability to operate.

UNAMIR was therefore largely reduced to a bystander role, and Dallaire later labelled it a "failure". Its most significant contribution was to provide refuge for thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu at its headquarters in Amahoro Stadium, as well as other secure UN sites, and to assist with the evacuation of foreign nationals. On 12 April, the Belgian government, which was one of the largest troop contributors to UNAMIR, and had lost ten soldiers protecting Prime Minister Uwilingiliyimana, announced that it was withdrawing, reducing the force's effectiveness even further. On 17 May 1994, the UN passed Resolution 918, which imposed an arms embargo and reinforced UNAMIR, which would be known as UNAMIR II. The new soldiers did not start arriving until June, and following the end of the genocide in July, the role of UNAMIR II was largely confined to maintaining security and stability, until its termination in 1996.

France and Opération Turquoise

During President Habyarimana's years in power, France maintained close relations with him, as part of its Françafrique policy, and assisted Rwanda militarily against the RPF during the Civil War; France considered the RPF, along with Uganda, as part of a "plot" to increase Anglophone influence at the expense of French influence. During the first few days of the genocide, France launched Amaryllis, a military operation assisted by the Belgian army and UNAMIR, to evacuate expatriates from Rwanda. The French and Belgians refused to allow any Tutsi to accompany them, and those who boarded the evacuation trucks were forced off at Rwandan government checkpoints, where they were killed. The French also separated several expatriates and children from their Tutsi spouses, rescuing the foreigners but leaving the Rwandans to likely death. They rescued several high-profile members of Habyarimana's government, as well as his wife, Agathe.

In late June 1994, France launched Opération Turquoise, a UN-mandated mission to create safe humanitarian areas for displaced persons, refugees, and civilians in danger; from bases in the Zairian cities of Goma and Bukavu, the French entered southwestern Rwanda and established the zone Turquoise, within the Cyangugu- Kibuye- Gikongoro triangle, an area occupying approximately a fifth of Rwanda. Radio France International estimates that Turquoise saved around 15,000 lives, but with the genocide coming to an end and the RPF's ascendancy, many Rwandans interpreted Turquoise as a mission to protect Hutu from the RPF, including some who had participated in the genocide. The French remained hostile to the RPF, and their presence temporarily stalled the RPF's advance.

A number of inquiries have been held into French involvement in Rwanda, including the 1998 French Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda, which accused France of errors of judgement, including "military cooperation against a background of ethnic tensions, massacres and violence", but did not accuse France of direct responsibility for the genocide itself. A 2008 report by the Rwandan government-sponsored Mucyo Commission accused the French government of knowing of preparations for the genocide and helping to train Hutu militia members. In 2019, President Macron decided to reopen the issue of French involvement in the genocide by commissioning a new team to sort through the state archives.

In April 2021, the Rwandan government announced the study they had commissioned alleged France "did nothing" to prevent what they deemed the "foreseeable" April and May 1994 massacres in the genocide.

United States

Intelligence reports indicate that United States president Bill Clinton and his cabinet were aware before the height of the massacre that a deliberate and systematic genocide to eliminate all Tutsis was planned. Fear of a repeat of the events in Somalia shaped US policy at the time, with many commentators identifying the graphic consequences of the Battle of Mogadishu as the key reason behind the US's failure to intervene in later conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide. After the battle, the bodies of several US casualties of the conflict were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by crowds of local civilians and members of Aidid's Somali National Alliance. According to the former US deputy special envoy to Somalia, Walter Clarke: "The ghosts of Somalia continue to haunt US policy. Our lack of response in Rwanda was a fear of getting involved in something like a Somalia all over again." President Clinton has referred to the failure of the U.S. government to intervene in the genocide as one of his main foreign policy failings, saying "I don't think we could have ended the violence, but I think we could have cut it down. And I regret it." Eighty percent of the discussion in Washington concerned the evacuation of American citizens.

Arms sales to Rwanda

In her 2004 book, Linda Melvern documented that "in the three years from October 1990, Rwanda, one of the poorest countries in the world, became the third largest importer of weapons in Africa, spending an estimated $US 112 million." She cited a significant contract with Egypt in 1992, and with France and South Africa, the next year.

Before the international embargo against Rwanda on 17 May 1994, South Africa and France were two of the main suppliers of arms to Rwanda. According to Human Rights Watch, after the embargo, they diverted their arm trade through Goma airport in Zaire. Zaire played a key role in supplying arms and facilitating arms flows to the Rwandan army. Some officials also encouraged arms trafficking by private dealers.

In 2017, according to Haaretz, Israel or Israeli private arm dealers had sold arms to the Rwandan government. Israeli officials repeatedly denied this allegation. In 2016, a petition was submitted to the Israeli Supreme Court, which ruled that the records which document Israel's arms sales, notably to Rwanda, will remain sealed, citing section nine of Israel's Freedom of Information Act which allows for non-disclosure if in releasing "the information there is a concern over harming national security, its foreign relations, the security of its public or the security or well-being of an individual".

Catholic Church

Pope John Paul II expressed his deep concern about what was happening in April 1994. On 9 April, in a message to Rwandan Catholics he urged them "not to give way to feelings of hatred and revenge but to courageously practice dialogue and forgiveness".

The Catholic Church affirms that genocide took place but states that those who took part in it did so without the permission of the Church. Though religious factors were not prominent, in its 1999 report Human Rights Watch faulted a number of religious authorities in Rwanda, including Catholics, Anglicans and other Protestant denominations, for failing to condemn the genocide - though that accusation was belied over time. Some in the Catholic Church's religious hierarchy have been tried and convicted for their participation in the genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Bishop Misago was accused of corruption and complicity in the genocide, but he was cleared of all charges in 2000. Many other clergymen gave their lives to prevent Tutsis from being killed.

Some clergy participated in the massacres. Catholic nuns Maria Kisito and Gertrude Mukangango were convicted in 2001 of involvement in the murders of 500 - 700 Tutsis who had sought refuge at their convent in Sovu. Witnesses testified that they had directed a death squad to the victims' hiding place and had given them petrol with which to burn down the building. In 2006, Father Athanase Seromba was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment (increased on appeal to life imprisonment) by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for his role in the massacre of 2,000 Tutsis. The court heard that Seromba lured the Tutsis to the church, where they believed they would find refuge. When they arrived, he ordered that bulldozers should be used to crush the refugees who were hiding inside the church and if any of them were still alive, Hutu militias should kill them all.

On 20 March 2017, Pope Francis acknowledged that while some Catholic nuns and priests in the country were killed during the genocide, others were complicit in it and took part in preparing and executing the genocide.

Kitali refugee camp, Zaire (1994)

Hutu refugees particularly entered the eastern portion of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC). Hutu genocidaires began to regroup in refugee camps along the border with Rwanda. Declaring a need to avert further genocide, the RPF-led government made military incursions into Zaire, resulting in the First (1996-97) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars. Armed struggles between the Rwandan government and their opponents in the DRC have continued through battles of proxy militias in the Goma region, including the M23 rebellion (2012-2013). Large Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi populations continue to live as refugees throughout the region.

Refugee crisis, insurgency, and two Congo Wars

Following the RPF victory, approximately two million Hutu fled to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, particularly Zaire, fearing RPF reprisals for the Rwandan genocide. The camps were crowded and squalid, and thousands of refugees died in disease epidemics, including cholera and dysentery. The camps were set up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but were effectively controlled by the army and government of the former Hutu regime, including many leaders of the genocide, who began rearming in a bid to return to power in Rwanda.

By late 1996, Hutu militants from the camps were launching regular cross-border incursions, and the RPF-led Rwandan government launched a counteroffensive. Rwanda provided troops and military training to the Banyamulenge, a Tutsi group in the Zairian South Kivu province, helping them to defeat Zairian security forces. Rwandan forces, the Banyamulenge, and other Zairian Tutsi, then attacked the refugee camps, targeting the Hutu militia. These attacks caused hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee; many returned to Rwanda despite the presence of the RPF, while others ventured further west into Zaire. The refugees fleeing further into Zaire were relentlessly pursued by the RPA under the cover of the AFDL rebellion and 232,000 Hutu refugees were killed, according to one estimate. The defeated forces of the former regime continued a cross-border insurgency campaign, supported initially by the predominantly Hutu population of Rwanda's northwestern prefectures. By 1999, a programme of propaganda and Hutu integration into the national army succeeded in bringing the Hutu to the government side and the insurgency was defeated.

In addition to dismantling the refugee camps, Kagame began planning a war to remove long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko from power. Mobutu had supported the genocidaires based in the camps, and was also accused of allowing attacks on Tutsi people within Zaire. Together with Uganda, the Rwandan government supported an alliance of four rebel groups headed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, which began waging the First Congo War in 1996. The rebels quickly took control of the North and South Kivu provinces and later advanced west, gaining territory from the poorly organised and demotivated Zairian army with little fighting, and controlling the whole country by 1997. Mobutu fled into exile, and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Rwanda fell out with the new Congolese government in 1998, and Kagame supported a fresh rebellion, leading to the Second Congo War, which would last up until 2003 and caused millions of deaths and massive damage. In 2010, a United Nations (UN) report accused the Rwandan army of committing wide-scale human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the Congo during those wars, charges denied by the Rwandan government.

Domestic situation

Graph showing the population of Rwanda from 1961 to 2003[321]

The infrastructure and economy of the country had suffered greatly during the genocide. Many buildings were uninhabitable, and the former regime had carried with them all currency and moveable assets when they fled the country. Human resources were also severely depleted, with over 40% of the population having been killed or fled. Many of the remainder were traumatised: most had lost relatives, witnessed killings or participated in the genocide. The long-term effects of war rape in Rwanda for the victims include social isolation, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies and babies, with some women resorting to self-induced abortions. The army, led by Paul Kagame, maintained law and order while the government began the work of rebuilding the country's structures.

Non-governmental organisations began to move back into the country, but the international community did not provide significant assistance to the new government, and most international aid was routed to the refugee camps which had formed in Zaire following the exodus of Hutu from Rwanda. Kagame strove to portray the new government as inclusive and not Tutsi-dominated. He directed the removal of ethnicity from Rwandan citizens' national identity cards, and the government began a policy of downplaying the distinctions between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.

Justice system after genocide

Government institutions, including judicial courts, were destroyed, and many judges, prosecutors, and employees were murdered during the genocide. Of Rwanda's 750 judges, 506 did not remain after the genocide-many were murdered and most of the survivors fled Rwanda. By 1997, Rwanda only had 50 lawyers in its judicial system. These barriers caused the trials to proceed very slowly: with 130,000 suspects held in Rwandan prisons after the genocide, 3,343 cases were handled between 1996 and the end of 2000. Of those defendants, 20% received death sentences, 32% received life in prison, and 20% were acquitted. It was calculated that it would take over 200 years to conduct the trials of the suspects in prison-not including the ones who remained at large.

The RPF government began the long-awaited genocide trials, which had an uncertain start at the end of 1996 and inched forward in 1997. It was not until 1996 that courts finally began trials for genocide cases with the enactment of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30 on 30 August 1996. This law initiated the prosecution of genocide crimes committed during the genocide and of crimes against humanity from October 1990. This law established the regular domestic courts as the core mechanism for responding to genocide until it was amended in 2001 to include the Gacaca courts. The Organic Law established four categories for those who were involved in the genocide, specifying the limits of punishment for members of each category. The first category was reserved those who were "planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders" of the genocide and any who used positions of state authority to promote the genocide. This category also applied to murderers who distinguished themselves on the basis of their zeal or cruelty, or who engaged in sexual torture. Members of this first category were eligible for the death sentence.

While Rwanda had the death penalty prior to the 1996 Organic law, in practice no executions had taken place since 1982. Twenty-two individuals, including Froduald Karamira, were executed by firing squad in public executions in April 1998. After this, Rwanda conducted no further executions, albeit it continued to issue death sentences until 2003. On 25 July 2007 the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty came into law, abolishing capital punishment and converting all existing death sentences to life in prison under solitary confinement. In parallel, the 2007 UN resolution presented and campaigns continued for a global moratorium on capital punishment.

Gacaca courts

In response to the overwhelming number of potentially culpable individuals and the slow pace of the traditional judicial system, the government of Rwanda passed Organic Law No. 40/2000 in 2001. This law established Gacaca Courts at all administrative levels of Rwanda and in Kigali. It was mainly created to lessen the burden on normal courts and provide assistance in the justice system to run trials for those already in prison. The least severe cases, according to the terms of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30, would be handled by these Gacaca Courts. With this law, the government began implementing a participatory justice system, known as Gacaca, in order to address the enormous backlog of cases. The Gacaca court system traditionally dealt with conflicts within communities, but it was adapted to deal with genocide crimes. Among the principal objectives of the courts were identification of the truth about what happened during the genocide, speeding up the process of trying genocide suspects, national unity and reconciliation, and demonstrating the capacity of the Rwandan people to resolve their own problems.

The Gacaca court system faced many controversies and challenges; they were accused of being puppets of the RPF-dominated government. The judges (known as Inyangamugayo, which means "those who detest dishonesty" in Kinyarwanda) who preside over the genocide trials were elected by the public. After election, the judges received training, but there was concern that the training was not adequate for serious legal questions or complex proceedings. Furthermore, many judges resigned after facing accusations of participating in the genocide; 27% of them were so accused. There was also a lack of defense counsel and protections for the accused, who were denied the right to appeal to ordinary courts. Most trials were open to the public, but there were issues with witness intimidation. The Gacaca courts did not try those responsible for massacres of Hutu civilians committed by members of the RPF, which controlled the Gacaca Court system.

On 18 June 2012, the Gacaca court system was officially closed after facing criticism. It is estimated that the Gacaca court system tried 1,958,634 cases during its lifetime and that 1,003,227 persons stood trial.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Meanwhile, the UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), based in Arusha, Tanzania. The UN Tribunal tried high-level members of the government and armed forces, while Rwanda prosecuted lower-level leaders and local people.

Since the ICTR was established as an ad hoc international jurisdiction, the ICTR was scheduled to close by the end of 2014, after it would complete trials by 2009 and appeals by 2010 or 2011. Initially, the U.N. Security Council established the ICTR in 1994 with an original mandate of four years without a fixed deadline and set on addressing the crimes committed during the Rwandan genocide. As the years passed, it became apparent that the ICTR would exist long past its original mandate. With the announcement of its closing, there was a concern over how residual issues would be handled, because "The nature of criminal judicial work ... is such that it never really ends." The ICTR officially closed on 31 December 2015, and its remaining functions were handed over to the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals.

Censorship

Article 38 of the Constitution of Rwanda 2003 guarantees "the freedom of expression and freedom of access to information where it does not prejudice public order, good morals, the protection of the youth and children, the right of every citizen to honour and dignity and protection of personal and family privacy". This has not guaranteed freedom of speech or expression given that the government has declared many forms of speech fall into the exceptions. Under these exceptions, longtime Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, asserted that any acknowledgment of the separate people was detrimental to the unification of post-Genocide Rwanda and has created numerous laws to prevent Rwandans from promoting a "genocide ideology" and "divisionism". The law does not explicitly define such terms, nor does it state that one's beliefs must be spoken. For example, the law defines divisionism as "the use of any speech, written statement, or action that divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination". Fear of the possible ramifications from breaking these laws have caused a culture of self-censorship within the population. Both civilians and the press typically avoid anything that could be construed as critical of the government/military or promoting "divisionism".

Under the Rwandan constitution, "revisionism, negationism and trivialisation of genocide" are criminal offences. Hundreds of people have been tried and convicted for "genocide ideology", "revisionism", and other laws ostensibly related to the genocide. According to Amnesty International, of the 489 individuals convicted of "genocide revisionism and other related crimes" in 2009, five were sentenced to life imprisonment, five were sentenced to more than 20 years in jail, 99 were sentenced to 10-20 years in jail, 211 received a custodial sentence of 5-10 years, and the remaining 169 received jail terms of less than five years. Amnesty International has criticized the Rwandan government for using these laws to "criminalize legitimate dissent and criticism of the government". In 2010, Peter Erlinder, an American law professor and attorney, was arrested in Kigali and charged with genocide denial while serving as defense counsel for presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire.

The number of Tutsi survivors of the genocide has been debated. Different figures between 150,000 and 309,368 have been offered. There are a number of organizations representing and supporting these survivors of the genocide. These include the Survivors Fund, IBUKA and AVEGA. The 2007 report on the living conditions of survivors conducted by the Ministry in charge of Social Affairs in Rwanda reported the following situation of survivors in the country:

Media and popular culture

At the Earth Made of Glass premiere, Rwandan President Paul Kagame stands with, from left, Jenna Dewan, director Deborah Scranton, documentary subject Jean Pierre Sagahutu, producer Reid Carolin and executive producer Channing Tatum.

Canadian Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire became the best-known eyewitness to the genocide after co-writing the book Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (2003) describing his experiences with depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Dallaire's book was made into the movie Shake Hands with the Devil (2007). Former journalist and United States Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power is interviewed about the Rwandan genocide in Watchers of the Sky (2014), a documentary by Edet Belzberg about genocide throughout history and its eventual inclusion in international law.

The critically acclaimed and multiple Academy Award-nominated film Hotel Rwanda (2004) is based on the experiences of Paul Rusesabagina, a Kigali hotelier at the Hôtel des Mille Collines who sheltered over a thousand refugees during the genocide. The independent documentary film Earth Made of Glass (2010), which addresses the personal and political costs of the genocide, focusing on Rwandan President Paul Kagame and genocide survivor Jean-Pierre Sagahutu, premiered at the 2010 Tribeca Film Festival.

HBO Films released the made-for-television historical drama film titled Sometimes in April in 2005.

In 2005, Alison Des Forges wrote that eleven years after the genocide, films for popular audiences on the subject greatly increased the "widespread realization of the horror that had taken the lives of more than half a million Tutsi". In 2007, Charlie Beckett, Director of POLIS, said: "How many people saw the movie Hotel Rwanda? [It is] ironically the way that most people now relate to Rwanda."

Pierre Rutare, the Tutsi father of Belgian-Rwandan singer Stromae, was killed in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.

Commemoration

Maps of Rwanda

Ethnic distribution of Tutsis in 1983. 0% Tutsi * 45.5% Tutsi

Map showing the geographical strongholds of the Rwandan political parties at the beginning of April 1994. Unknown / vacant / partyless * MRND * MDR * PSD * PL * ★ Tutsi burgomaster * ★ Unclear / complicated

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2. ^ Guichaoua, André (2 January 2020). "Counting the Rwandan Victims of War and Genocide: Concluding Reflections". Journal of Genocide Research. 22 (1): 125-141. doi:10.1080/14623528.2019.1703329. ISSN 1462-3528. S2CID 213471539.

3. ^ Sullo, Pietro (2018). "Writing History Through Criminal Law: State-Sponsored Memory in Rwanda". The Palgrave Handbook of State-Sponsored History After 1945. Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 69-85. ISBN 978-1-349-95306-6.

4. ^ Yakaré-Oulé, Jansen (11 April 2014). "Denying Genocide or Denying Free Speech? A Case Study of the Application of Rwanda's Genocide Denial Laws". Northwestern Journal of Human Rights. 12 (2): 192.

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6. ^ McDoom, Omar (2020). "Contested Counting: Toward a Rigorous Estimate of the Death Toll in the Rwandan Genocide". Journal of Genocide Research. 22 (1): 83-93. doi:10.1080/14623528.2019.1703252. S2CID 214032255. In comparison with estimates at the higher and lower ends, my estimate is significantly lower than the Government of Rwanda's genocide census figure of 1,006,031 Tutsi killed. I believe this number is not credible.

7. ^ Kamusella, Tomasz (19 July 2022). "Ethnicity and Estate: The Galician Jacquerie and the Rwandan Genocide Compared". Nationalities Papers. 50 (4): 684-703. doi:10.1017/nps.2021.12. hdl:10023/23154. S2CID 235573417 - via Cambridge University Press.

8. ^ Linden, Ian (1977). Church and Revolution in Rwanda. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

9. ^ THE PROSECUTOR VERSUS JEAN-PAUL AKAYESU Case No. ICTR-96-4-T at paras. 99-100

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12. Kimani, Mary (2007). "RTLM: the Medium That Became a Tool for Mass Murder". In Thompson, Allan (ed.). The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. Pluto Press. pp. 110-124. doi:10.2307/j.ctt18fs550.14. ISBN 978-0-7453-2625-2. JSTOR j.ctt18fs550.14.

13. ^ Fujii, Lee Ann (April 2007). "Jean Hatzfeld. Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005/Picador, 2006. Translated by Linda Coverdale. Preface by Susan Sontag. xiv + 253 pp. Maps. Chronology of Events. Photograph. Index. $24.00. Cloth. $14.00. Paper". African Studies Review. 50 (1): 155-156. doi:10.1353/arw.2005.0101. S2CID 142781769.

14. ^ Straus, Scott (December 2007). "What Is the Relationship between Hate Radio and Violence? Rethinking Rwanda's "Radio Machete"". Politics & Society. 35 (4): 609-637. doi:10.1177/0032329207308181. S2CID 154402375.

15. ^ Yanagizawa-Drott, David (1 November 2014). "Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide *". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 129 (4): 1947-1994. doi:10.1093/qje/qju020.

16. ^ Danning, Gordon (2 October 2018). "Did Radio RTLM Really Contribute Meaningfully to the Rwandan Genocide?: Using Qualitative Information to Improve Causal Inference from Measures of Media Availability". Civil Wars. 20 (4): 529-554. doi:10.1080/13698249.2018.1525677. S2CID 150075267.

17. ^ Reydams, Luc (2016). "NGO Justice: African Rights as Pseudo-Prosecutor of the Rwandan Genocide" (PDF). Human Rights Quarterly. 38 (3): 582. doi:10.1353/hrq.2016.0041. S2CID 151351680. Archived (PDF) from the original on 18 February 2019.

18. ^ Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (5 January 2012). "Rapport d'expertise. Destruction en vol du Falcon 50 Kigali" (PDF) (in French). Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 November 2018.

19. ^ "Genocide au Rwanda: des revelations sur le rôle de la France" Archived 19 January 2019 at the Wayback Machine, Le Monde, 27 June 2017 (in French)

20. ^ Guichaoua, André (August 1998). Local government in Rwanda: Expert report prepared at the request of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Report). Arusha: ICTR. p. 14. Record Number: 13685, Exhibit Number: P31B in ICTR-01-74.

21. ^ James, Paul (2015). "Despite the Terrors of Typologies: The Importance of Understanding Categories of Difference and Identity". Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies. 17 (2): 174-95. doi:10.1080/1369801x.2014.993332. S2CID 142378403. Archived from the original on 17 October 2015.

22. ^ Straus, Scott (2006). The Order of Genocide. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. p. 93.

23. ^ Straus, Scott (2006). The Order of Genocide. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

24. ^ Lemarchand, René (25 June 2018). "Rwanda: the state of Research | Sciences Po Violence de masse et Résistance - Réseau de recherche". www.sciencespo.fr. ISSN 1961-9898. Archived from the original on 19 November 2018.

25. ^ McDoom, Omar Shahabudin (2020). "Contested Counting: Toward a Rigorous Estimate of the Death Toll in the Rwandan Genocide" (PDF). Journal of Genocide Research. 22 (1): 83-93. doi:10.1080/14623528.2019.1703252. S2CID 214032255. If one examines the claims for the overall number killed, at the higher end lies the figure of 1,074,017 Rwandan dead. This number originates with the Rwandan government which conducted a nationwide census in July 2000, six years after the genocide. Toward the lower end lies an estimate from Human Rights Watch, one of the first organizations on the ground to investigate the genocide, of 507,000 Tutsi killed... I have estimated between 491,000 and 522,000 Tutsi, nearly two thirds of Rwanda's pre-genocide Tutsi population, were killed between 6 April and 19 July 1994. I calculated this death toll by subtracting my estimate of between 278,000 and 309,000 Tutsi survivors from my estimate of a baseline Tutsi population of almost exactly 800,000, or 10.8% of the overall population, on the eve of the genocide... In comparison with estimates at the higher and lower ends, my estimate is significantly lower than the Government of Rwanda's genocide census figure of 1,006,031 Tutsi killed. I believe this number is not credible.

26. Maximo, Dady De (2012). "A Genocide that could have been avoided". ^ New Times.

27. ^ ICTR Yearbook 1994-1996 (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. pp. 77-78. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 June 2003.

28. Chu, S. Ka Hon; de Brouwer, A.M. (Spring 2009). "Rwanda's Rape Victims Speak Out". Herizons. 22 (4): 16. Archived from the original on 11 February 2021.

29. ^ Waldorf, Lars (2011). ""A Mere Pretense of Justice": Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victor's Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal". Fordham International Law Journal. 33 (4): 1221. Archived from the original on 19 January 2019.

30. ^ Lemarchand, René (25 June 2018). "Rwanda: the state of Research | Sciences Po Violence de masse et Résistance - Réseau de recherche". www.sciencespo.fr. ISSN 1961-9898. Archived from the original on 19 November 2018. The double genocide thesis cannot be dismissed out of hand. After the publication of Judi Rever's expose of the crimes of the RPF, there appears to be considerable evidence to justify the use of the g-word to describe such atrocities.

31. ^ Gersony, Robert (10 October 1994). "Summary of UNHCR presentation before commission of experts, 10 October 1994 - Prospects for early repatriation of Rwandan refugees currently in Burundi, Tanzania and Zaïre" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 January 2019.

32. ^ Bakuramutsa, Manzi (29 September 1994). "Letter Dated 28 September 1994 From the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council". United Nations. S/1994/1115. Archived from the original on 17 January 2019. We categorically deny the following unfounded allegations made by the officials of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): (a) That there are systematic and organized killings by the Government causing insecurity in the country; (b) That there is a mass exodus of people fleeing the country to the neighbouring United Republic of Tanzania; (c) That refugees do not return because of the alleged insecurity in the country.

33. Pogge, Thomas (2010). Politics as Usual. Polity. pp. 168-70. ISBN 978-0-7456-3892-8.

34. ^ "France "enabled" 1994 Rwanda genocide, report says". Al Jazeera. 19 April 2021.

35. ^ "VATICAN - The Pope's anguished and repeated calls during the genocide in Rwanda: "Do not give in to the temptation of hatred and revenge. At this tragic stage of the life of your country, be builders of peace and love"". agenzia fides. Information service of the Pontifical Mission Societies. 6 April 2004.

36. Des Forges 1999, "The Organization " The Clergy"

37. ^ "Ch. 10: "The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath"" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 September 2007. in State of the World's Refugees 2000, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

38. ^ Emizet, Kisangani N. F. (July 2000). "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law". Journal of Modern African Studies. 38 (2): 163-202. doi:10.1017/S0022278X0000330X. JSTOR 161648. S2CID 154818651.

39. ^ Byman, Daniel; Chalk, Peter; Hoffman, Bruce; Rosenau, William; Brannan, David (2001). Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Rand Corporation. p. 18. ISBN 978-0-8330-3232-4.

40. ^ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Rwanda". Holocaust Encyclopedia. Archived from the original on 2 December 2012.

41. "The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Rwanda". Human Rights Review. 10:99.

42. ^ "Summary of the Report Presented at the Closing of Gacaca Courts Activities". Republic of Rwanda: National Service of Gacaca Courts. Kigali, 2012

43. ^ "Organic Law No. 08/96 of 303 August on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crimes of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed since 1 October 1990".

44. ^ Organic Law N° 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty

45. ^ "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2020". United Nations. 28 December 2020.

46. ^ Amnesty International (2010). "Safer to Stay Silent: The chilling effect of Rwanda's laws on "genocide ideology" and "sectarianism"". p. 19. Archived from the original on 12 March 2015.

47. ^ Gibson, Kate (2010). "The Arrest of ICTR Defense Counsel Peter Erlinder in Rwanda" (PDF). ASIL Insight. 14 (25). Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 November 2013.

48. ^ "Jacqueline's Human Rights Corner". Jacqueline's Human Rights Corner. 2007. Archived from the original on 1 May 2009.

49. ^ "Camouflage and exposure" Archived 14 August 2007 at the Wayback Machine, Canadian Medical Association Journal, 29 April 2003; 168 (9)

General and cited references

Akhavan, Payam (1996). "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment". American Journal of International Law. 90 (3): 501-10. doi:10.2307/2204076. JSTOR 2204076.

Aptel, Cicile (2008). "Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion Strategy and Residual Issues". New England Journal of International and Comparative Law. 14 (2): 169-88.

Brittain, Victoria (5 April 1999). "Rwanda makes its way to regeneration". The Guardian. London.

Dallaire, Roméo (2005). Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. London: Arrow Books. ISBN 978-0-09-947893-5.

Des Forges, Alison (1999). Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (Report). New York: Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1-56432-171-1.

Diamond, Jared (2005). Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking. ISBN 978-0-670-03337-9. (Chapter 10: "Malthus in Africa: Rwanda's Genocide", pp. 311-28).

Drumbl, Mark A. (2012). "'She makes me ashamed to be a woman': The Genocide Conviction of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 2011". Michigan Journal of International Law. 2013. SSRN 2155937.

Elbe, Stefan (2002). "HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa" (PDF). International Security. 27 (2): 159-77. doi:10.1162/016228802760987851. JSTOR 3092146. S2CID 57560544. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 October 2013.

Ferroggiaro, William, ed. (2001). The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction. Washington, DC: National Security Archive.

Hayden, Robert M. (2000). "Rape and Rape Avoidance in Ethno-National Conflicts: Sexual Violence in Liminalized States". American Anthropologist. 102 (1): 27-41. doi:10.1525/aa.2000.102.1.27. JSTOR 683536.

Ingelaere, Bert (2016). Inside Rwanda's Gacaca Courts: Seeking Justice After Genocide. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-0-299-30970-1.

James, Paul (2015). "Despite the Terrors of Typologies: The Importance of Understanding Categories of Difference and Identity". Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies. 17 (2): 174-95. doi:10.1080/1369801x.2014.993332. S2CID 142378403.

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Tully, L. Danielle (2003). "Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions in Rwanda". Boston College International and Comparative Law Review. 26 (2): 385-411.

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Further reading

External links

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The Rwandan genocide occurred between 7 April and 15 July 1994 during the Rwandan Civil War. During this period of around 100 days, members of the Tutsi minority ethnic group, as well as some moderate Hutu and Twa, were killed by armed Hutu militias.

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Each student is required to upload a picture, video, ad, article or that addresses a human rights violation.  NO REPEATS.

*Include your name and then you may use the icons at the bottom to upload your info on a human rights violation anywhere in the world.   Make sure if it's from another country, there's an English translation.