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There is extensive research evidence indicating the benefits of economic immigration for the Australian economy across a broad range of measures. For example, immigrants have played an important role in generating entrepreneurial business activity and contributing to greater workforce diversity, which have had positive effects on the economy.[30] Moreover, economic linkages between local and international businesses can be created and strengthened through mechanisms facilitating greater international labour mobility.[31] This suggests that the free trade agreements that Australia has recently negotiated with various countries have the potential to produce positive economic benefits, although further research is required.

Australia's current approach to economic immigration has many benefits. The system of permanent skilled visas enables migrant workers to move freely within the labour market, at the same time delivering higher employment rates, earnings, and skills utilisation among immigrants than comparable systems operating in other countries. The positive effects of economic immigration are most pronounced among permanent skilled visas and 457 temporary skilled visas and are particularly strong in four key areas: population; fiscal impact; productivity and innovation; and immigrants' employment and labour market outcomes. Nevertheless, there are challenges within existing policy arrangements, in particular: the treatment of temporary migrants in the workplace; the difficulty of transition to permanent residency for temporary migrants; the role of immigration in addressing skills shortages and labour market needs; and the underutilisation of immigrants' skills and gender bias in skills assessment. The benefits and challenges to economic immigration arising from these issues are explored below.

Population

The positive effects of immigration on population and labour force participation are particularly evident in regional and rural areas, which face acute challenges in attracting and retaining workers to address local labour market shortfalls. Despite some challenges relating to community settlement and a lack of employment information and support, state-specific and regional migration schemes have helped to attract skilled migrants to areas where they are needed.[39] These schemes have also proved beneficial in other areas. A recent study found that, following the introduction and expansion of state and regional migration schemes, the migrant population in regional and rural Australia records similar outcomes compared with the Australian-born population in terms of labour force participation, unemployment, median individual weekly income, and proportion in high skill level occupations. These findings provide a case for further encouraging the settlement of migrants in regional and rural areas.[40]

However, challenges in retaining migrants in regional and rural areas remain, particularly once visa requirements for permanent residency are met. Barriers to retention include the relatively greater opportunities for employment and education in larger cities, distance from family and friends, remoteness from urban centres, and the high living and housing costs in some regional areas such as in the Northern Territory.[41] Greater settlement assistance by government, especially at the state or local levels, has been proposed for increasing migrant retention in regional areas, for instance by enabling attractive and well-paid employment opportunities, access to affordable housing, and quality schooling for children.[42]

The growth of temporary visas has been a boon for industries concentrated in regional areas. For example, horticulture has traditionally struggled to attract and retain workers but has benefited from the growth in the number of working holidaymakers.[43] Industries such as education have also benefited greatly from the expansion of international student visas and the creation and strengthening of pathways between student and skilled visas. In 2012, international students accounted for 18.3 per cent of total tertiary education enrolments in Australia, which represents a higher proportion than any other OECD country other than Luxembourg. Moreover, Australia accounted for 5.5 per cent in the worldwide market of foreign students in 2012, the fourth highest share behind only the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, all of which have much larger populations than Australia.[44]

Fiscal impact

The current focus of immigration selection policy is on prioritising those who arrive at a younger stage in their working life, who participate in the workforce, who work in high-paying jobs, and who use fewer government services, meaning the fiscal impact of skilled visa arrangements is positive for Australia. However, this will change over time: permanent skilled immigrants will have a positive impact on public finances when they are in the workforce and a negative impact once they retire. Family stream immigrants and humanitarian visa holders are less likely to be in high-income employment and tend to be more reliant on government-provided benefits, meaning the fiscal impact of these visa classes is negative.[48] By contrast, the fiscal impact of immigration is highly positive among 457 visa holders, because of their tendency to be employed in well-paying jobs, because they are not afforded access to a range of social welfare payments and settlement services, and because their temporary status means they are less likely to settle permanently, and therefore retire, in Australia.[49]

Productivity and innovation

There are potential benefits from immigration policies for productivity and innovation. A recent report on migration and productivity in Australia noted that "migration has had a (weakly) positive impact on aggregate productivity" in recent years. Immigrants have made a notable contribution to the rate of labour and multifactor productivity growth, particularly in industries where immigrants have contributed to increased skills, and among immigrants with advanced proficiency in English and university qualifications.[50]

A review of the existing literature on immigration and innovation concludes that Australia's increasingly skilled and targeted migration program, together with the knowledge and skills of returning expatriates, is most likely contributing to innovation and productivity gains.[58] However, there is insufficient available data in Australia to allow conclusive findings to be drawn regarding the immigration-innovation relationship.[59] There needs to be more research on this issue, which is particularly important given changes in the skill composition of the immigrant workforce and the need for Australian organisations to innovate to remain globally competitive.

Employment and the labour market

Immigrants in Australia, particularly those on skilled visas, have high levels of employment including in high-income occupations that utilise their skills.[60] The relatively low levels of unemployment among skilled immigrants is one reason why some experts claim that immigration selection policies in Australia are more effective at integrating immigrants into the labour market than immigration policies in Canada, for example, which are often held up as a model for other countries to follow.[61]

According to several accounts, the impact of economic immigration on the Australian labour market has been positive. For example, one study found that the highly educated nature of the immigration intake produced positive flow-on effects on wages for the local workforce, including for lower-skilled non-migrant workers. This is because immigrants create new businesses and jobs throughout the economy. Also, the study found that there is minimal competition between high-skilled immigrants and lower-skilled non-migrants for the same jobs.[65] These findings indicate that maintaining an immigration selection policy that prioritises highly qualified immigrants with skills in demand will produce aggregate benefits for the Australian economy and minimise adverse consequences for the workforce.

However, there are some indications that immigrants in lower-skilled occupations may be displacing young local workers concentrated in low-skilled employment.[66] Intakes in the working holidaymaker scheme and international student visas (discussed below) have increased significantly in recent years. At the same time, youth unemployment levels have remained high including among recent graduates.[67] It is possible that compared with citizens and permanent residents, temporary immigrants are working in distinct occupations and industries such as in horticulture where employers particularly in regional areas find it difficult to attract and retain local workers.[68] However, temporary immigrants account for much of the recent growth in youth employment. A forthcoming report by Anna Boucher argues for greater scrutiny of the findings of economists[69] that immigration has benign effects on the Australia labour market and that more research on the relationship between immigration and youth unemployment is needed, particularly in light of the recent growth on temporary migrants in low-skilled employment.[70] Other significant challenges relating to the position of immigrants in the labour market, particularly those on temporary visas engaged in lower-skilled work, are discussed below.

The treatment of temporary migrants at work

Vulnerability of temporary migrant workers to mistreatment at work, often in the form of underpayment of wages, poses a significant challenge for immigration and employment policy. Recent media reports, government inquiries, and academic studies have brought to light widespread underpayment, harassment, and other mistreatment of working holidaymakers and international students in the workplace. In 2015, a joint investigation by the ABC's Four Corners program and Fairfax media uncovered systematic gross underpayment of wages in 7‑Eleven franchises.[71] Many of the workers appeared to be international students who were threatened to be reported to the DIBP for working in excess of the number of hours allowed under their visas. Reports from inquiries by the Productivity Commission and the Senate Education and Employment References Committee confirm that such practices are not limited to 7-Eleven.[72]

There are several reasons why temporary migrant workers are vulnerable to mistreatment. First, studies of workers on 457 and international student visas have indicated that migrants employed by members of their own immigrant community, who they may depend on for employment opportunities and information about their rights, are susceptible to underpayment of wages.[77] Second, some visa arrangements create conditions where migrant workers can become dependent on unscrupulous employers and that discourage migrant workers from seeking redress. For example, international students are required to work no more than 40 hours per fortnight; a small transgression exposes an international student to potential visa cancellation and removal. Their ongoing visas, enrolment in education, and employment are then dependent on employers not sharing any breaches of their visa conditions with the DIBP. Under the 417 working holiday visa subclass, workers have an incentive to work 88 days in a designated regional area to gain a 12-month visa extension. These workers are dependent on their employers certifying completion of this work. Workers under the 457 temporary skilled visa have limited mobility between employers in that they face a 90-day limit to finding another sponsored job. Continuation of their visas is therefore dependent on their employer. Unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their requirements to employ and treat workers lawfully can manipulate these conditional requirements.

Difficult transitions to permanent residency

The challenges confronting temporary migrants are not confined to the workplace and extend to the transition that many seek to make towards permanent residency. The position of international students illustrates these challenges. Despite being depicted by some accounts as "designer migrants" whose shift to the skilled labour market is assisted by the process of receiving an Australian education, international students often face difficulties in transferring to skilled visas and permanent residency.[82] Although many international students successfully transition to skilled visas, the process is still a precarious one with students often "living in limbo" as they make the "staggered" journey towards permanent residency.[83]

Numerous reforms since the late 1990s governing the student-skilled visa pathway, while providing greater opportunity for permanent residency among international students, have intensified this uncertainty. Temporary student-skilled migrants waiting for their applications for permanent residency to be processed report that bureaucratic procedures and frequent policy changes creates uncertainty and diminishes their social, economic, and psychological capacity to deal with challenges such as travelling abroad to see relatives, making financial commitments, and establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships.[84]

Skills shortages

Immigration has helped to address inadequacies in Australia's education and training systems, which have found it difficult to respond to labour market needs in a changing and more competitive economy. Immigration policy reforms over the past two decades designed to meet the immediate needs of employers have contributed to labour market efficiency by matching workers with desired skills and attributes to employers' demands. In the case of skilled visas, they have also produced better employment and earnings outcomes for immigrants. Using employer needs as the basis for immigration selection has also helped to alleviate some of the political contestation that once surrounded the annual intake determination process,[85] as it arguably provides a more 'rational' and transparent basis for allocating visas.[86]

However, the 'privatisation' of the immigrant selection process has also produced distortions. This is particularly evident in relation to the 457 visa scheme. While 457 visas enable employers to source workers with desired skills at short notice,[87] they dampen the incentives for employers to invest in training,[88] to pay better wages or to create higher-quality jobs to attract local applicants.[89] A key problem with the scheme is that existing regulations requiring employers to prove that a skill shortage exists before sponsoring a 457 visa holder are weak and ineffective.[90] For example, the Consolidated Sponsored Occupations List, which defines the occupations that the visa can be used for, is too broad. This list includes virtually all of the 600-plus occupations listed as 'managers', 'professionals', and 'technicians and trades workers' under the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations. As such it is essentially a list of occupations deemed appropriately skilled rather than those identified as being in shortage.[91]

Skills utilisation and gender bias in skills assessment

Highly educated immigrants in employment are more likely to be overqualified compared with Australian-born employees, suggesting that more could be done to improve the recognition of overseas qualifications.[96] Over the past decade, successive policy changes in the area of overseas qualifications recognition has led to improvements in employment, earnings, and skills utilisation for permanent skilled migrants, particularly for health professionals and for applicants in the employer nominated and offshore independent categories.[97]

Nevertheless, there remain concerns over the process relating to the assessment of immigrants' skills.[98] A particular problem is the focus on 'skill' itself, which is usually constructed in a way that favours the types of qualifications and earnings outcomes associated with male-dominated occupations, and disadvantages female-dominated occupations such as aged carers. A related problem is a failure to acknowledge that female applicants' care responsibilities can disadvantage their ability to get the required points to qualify for a skilled visa.[99] As noted above, the disproportionate allocation of primary skilled visas to males compared with females is a reflection of this gender bias. Several issues that may help to address problems of gender bias in skilled immigration selection in Australia are outlined in the recommendations section below.

Future challenges: Competing for skilled workers in the global marketplace

The concentration of economic migrants in higher-skilled and lower-skilled occupations largely accords with forecasts regarding the likely areas of growth in the Australian labour market. These forecasts project that there will be sustained demand for higher-skilled and lower-skilled jobs and a continued erosion of demand for intermediate skilled occupations.[100] These shifts include the likely growth of jobs associated with rapid technological change and projected increased demand for health care, personal services, and occupations requiring managerial expertise. Ensuring that policy settings remain responsive to local labour market needs is particularly important given that technological change is likely to diminish demand for occupations such as accountants that have in the past been the main focus of policies aimed at attracting skilled migrants.[101]

Maintaining a focus on employer sponsorship is one way of ensuring that economic immigration policy responds to structural shifts in the labour market. An important advantage of employer sponsored visas is that they match the supply of migrant labour to prevailing demand within the labour market, which can also help to ensure that immigrants gain employment that utilises their qualifications.[102] However, these visas are less effective at delivering longer-term skills and talents, such as advanced science and engineering qualifications and managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities, that are likely to help organisations innovate in the context of technological change and intensified global competition. The Productivity Commission's recommendation to move away from separate permanent visa categories based on points and employer nomination towards a universal points system would allow Australia's immigration selection policy to remain competitive in terms of global competition for skills. Under this proposal, a job offer from an employer in an area of identified shortage is just one of several criteria, alongside qualifications and age among others, which would be used to determine the points awarded to applicants.[103]

The shift away from immigration policies that privilege the short-term interests of employers would have additional advantages. It would help to address concerns that existing immigration policies are failing migrants, particularly temporary migrant workers many of whom are often underpaid or mistreated (particularly in industries where temporary migrant workers are concentrated, such as hospitality, retail, and horticulture). Moving policy arrangements away from the priority given to employers' immediate needs would also encourage employers to invest more in developing the skills of Australian citizens and permanent residents, particularly the young who are more likely to be unemployed or underemployed. Ensuring that immigration policies contain adequate protections for temporary migrants and that they are designed in ways that complement rather than undermine the Australian labour market is vital for maintaining public confidence in policies that have facilitated high recent intakes of economic migrants.[104]

Existing visa arrangements are largely unable to address labour shortages in areas of likely growth in lower- and intermediate-skilled and in many cases female-dominated occupations, such as social care. The size of the aged care workforce, for example, will need to increase significantly over the coming decades to meet the projected rise in demand for aged care services, including in regional and remote areas which struggle to attract and retain labour.[105] Among the undersupplied occupations are aged and disabled carers, which generally require an Australian Qualifications Framework Certificate II or III qualification but are not deemed to be sufficiently skilled occupations under existing visa regulations.[106] It is therefore possible that current immigration regulations that seek to maintain skills thresholds are too strict for ensuring adequate workforce planning to enable the provision of quality social care services.

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Economic migration and Australia in the 21st century

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This Analysis assesses the benefits and challenges of contemporary economic immigration in Australia. It argues that Australian governments have managed significant recent changes to immigration policy successfully. The authors recommend various reforms to maintain public confidence in expansive economic immigration arrangements that are important for sustaining national prosperity.

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Goldman Sachs thinks that Australia's economy "has moved through an important transition point" that will lead to faster economic growth and a higher Australian dollar in the period ahead.

And it could see the RBA lift interest rates as soon as the second half of next year.

"We have upgraded our economic growth forecasts for Australia and now forecast economic growth will average 2.8% in 2017, 2.9% in 2018, 3.0% in 2019 and 3.3% in 2020," said Tim Toohey, Andrew Boak and Bill Zu, Goldman's Australian economics team.

"This represents a 40 percentage point (ppt) upgrade in 2017, a 10ppt upgrade in 2018 and a 50ppt upgrade in 2019."

Reflective of stronger economic growth, Goldman also lifted its AUD/USD forecasts over the next three, six and 12 months to 78 cents, 77 cents and 75 cents respectively.

Previously it saw the Aussie trading at 75 cents, 73 cents and 72 cents over the same time horizon.

The factor underpinning the optimistic view is the recent price spike in Australia's key commodity exports, creating what it calls a "sharp turn in Australia's national income dynamic" that will "likely to set off a chain of events through the Australian economy in coming months".

Bullish.

Here's Toohey, Boak and Zu on why that bodes well for Australia's economic rebalancing:

The resulting surge in national income should be reflected via much stronger mining profits, a large taxation windfall for the Federal government (and elimination of the threat of a sovereign downgrade), a restarting of idle capacity in the coal sector, a better climate for broader business investment and ultimately better employment and wage outcomes.

It also sows the seeds for a more material handover of the economic growth baton to the private sector, and importantly this transition can proceed despite our forecast of a sharp decline in new dwelling investment in 2017-18.

Perhaps the most dramatic transformation will come via Australia's external accounts with a run of trade surpluses now in prospect for 2017 - indeed the combination stronger commodity prices and the ramp-up of LNG production suggests Australia will post the largest trade surpluses as a share of GDP during 2017 since any time since the early 1970s.

This, says Goldman, will not only help to boost economic growth and the level of the Australian dollar, but also increases the odds that the RBA will start to lift interest rates as soon as the second half of next year.

"The RBA's focus has increasingly shifted under the stewardship of Governor Lowe towards minimising risks in the financial cycle rather than just the economic cycle," says Toohey, Boak and Zu, acknowledging that "the RBA may begin to question the rationale for keeping official interest rates at a record low of 1.5%".

"At this stage we have kept our forecast for the RBA to commence its hiking cycle in 1Q18 with the RBA forecast to increase interest rates 75bps through 2018 and a further 75bps spread over 2019 and 2020 to a 3.0% cash rate.

"Nevertheless, the risk of the RBA increasing the cash rate in 2H17 has risen materially and the evolution of financial conditions, house prices and underlying inflation will ultimately guide the decision."

Here's Goldman's forecasts for real GDP growth, the AUD/USD and Australian CPI looking out to 2020:

They're fairly optimistic forecasts, and the polar opposite to the view communicated by Macquarie Bank's Australian economics team less than a week ago.

Instead of seeing faster growth and higher interest rates like Goldman next year, it believes the opposite outcome will occur in 2017: slower growth and further interest rate cuts from the RBA, thanks largely to heightened levels of business and consumer uncertainty following the US election result.

"Much will depend on the evolution of markets' response to the surprise outcome, and the extent to which questions of 'what now' and 'who's next' dampen confidence and induce a risk premium into decision-making by businesses and consumers," said James McIntyre, Macquarie's head of Australian economic research.

"Risks remain tilted to the downside, particularly on the inflation front, with the avoidance of downside risks dependent on the response of the AUD, and of policy makers (monetary, but especially fiscally)."

McIntyre sees Australian real GDP growth of just 2.1% in 2017. He also sees the RBA reducing interest rates to 1%, some 50 basis points below its present level.

One major investment bank thinks Australia's economy will do swimmingly, the other that it'll deteriorate sharply.

A more than appropriate reflection of the heightened levels of uncertainty that presently exist.
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Goldman Sachs has upgraded its outlook for Australia

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Goldman Sachs thinks that Australia's economy "has moved through an important transition point" that will lead to faster economic growth and a higher Australian dollar in the period ahead. And it could see the RBA lift interest rates as soon as the second half of next year.

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Posted November 30, 2016 15:19:26

It appears Donald Trump is no longer the devil.

The OECD's secretary-general Angel Gurria has joined a growing list of those hoping America's new leader will do more good than harm.

Mr Gurria was prepared to disregard Donald Trump's strong protectionist streak in the hope that he might initiate a global trend away from the use of low interest rates to stimulate growth.

Instead the OECD wants governments to consider prudent, well-targeted spending measures.

"If policymakers can avoid the pitfalls of protectionism and seize the opportunity for collective fiscal action offered by still very low interest rates, combined with high-priority structural reforms, the global economy can at last escape from the low growth trap," he said.

The organisation has revised up its global growth forecasts.

From 2.9 per cent this year, the world growth rate is predicted to jump to more than 3 per cent next year, due largely to Donald Trump's stimulus measures including massive tax cuts and infrastructure spending.

But Melbourne University professor of economics Ross Garnaut said his spending plans are unnecessarily damaging.

"Unless he backtracks completely on his program, we're going to end up with much bigger US budget deficits at a time when the US economy's been growing more strongly," he argued.

'Dangerous time for America, the world and Australia'

The need to finance rising deficits would trigger an inflow of capital forcing the US dollar higher, making American industry less competitive and playing back into Trump's protectionism.

It also means more aggressive interest rate hikes.

"I think this is a dangerous time for America, for the world and for Australia," warned Professor Garnaut.

"In Australia over the past few years we have seen the growth of protectionist ideas. It would be very easy for these to be strengthened by developments in America."

Rising public sector debt does not appear to be a major concern at the OECD.

"Low interest rates have opened the window of opportunity by reducing government debt servicing costs, and increasing the so-called fiscal space," Mr Gurria observed.

"It is a window that may not remain open for long. So the opportunity should be seized."

Concerns about Australia's triple A credit rating were nowhere to be seen in the OECD's commentary on the domestic economy.

It argued there is space for fiscal loosening given Australia low public-debt burden. It also called for the introduction of more efficient taxes, such as a land tax and a higher or broader GST.

But with the Government struggling in the polls, Finance Minister Mathias Cormann was quick to shut down any hint he might consider revisiting the GST debate.

"These are issues which are will and truly settled. They were settled in the lead up to the last election," he said.

Transition from mining investment has years to run: economist

Australia's economic growth economy is expected to remain tepid - below 3 per cent until 2018, according to the OECD.

But the transition is taking place.

The Reserve Bank says mining investment has a bit further to fall, but about 80 per cent of the adjustment has already occurred.

But economic consultancy BIS Shrapnel, which monitors investment activity, disputes that estimate.

BIS Shrapnel's chief economist Frank Gelber said the Reserve Bank is being wildly optimistic.

"A lot of commentators, including the journalists and economists who should know a lot better, seem to think that this transition is already well and truly happening. It's not," he argued.

"This is just the very beginning of what will be a long and very difficult process."

Mr Gelber said it will take years to rebuild industries that were decimated due to the mining boom as the Australian dollar soared, and capital and labour were sucked into the resources sector.

On the other side of the ledger, the deterioration in mining investment still has a way to go.

"We're only about halfway through the falling mining investment. The next two years will see the bulk of it," he observed.

"So that's another shock to the economy that we'll have to whether before we come out the other end."

Interest rate rises a long way off: Garnaut

If Frank Gelber is right, the economy will not deliver the improvements necessary to see interest rates higher at the end of next year, as the OECD predicted.

The Paris-based organisation said interest rates are expected to rise towards the end of 2017 and this is appropriate given the likely move to higher rates globally and an improvement in the Australian economy, as well as the need to take some of the heat out of the property market.

But Australia still has a significant underemployment problem and wages growth is extremely weak, so Ross Garnaut said the economy's performance will not support higher interest rates next year.

Under those circumstances targeting the property sector would be foolish.

"It's never appropriate to set your interest rates which affect the economy as a whole, the exchange rate, for a single sector and, in this case, a single sector in two cities - Sydney and Melbourne," he added.

That is a job for the regulators, who might need to take a tougher approach.

Topics: economic-trends, money-and-monetary-policy, housing-industry, mining-industry, australia

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Australian economy faces 2017 challenge with mining bust a long way from over

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Posted November 30, 2016 15:19:26 It appears Donald Trump is no longer the devil. The OECD's secretary-general Angel Gurria has joined a growing list of those hoping America's new leader will do more good than harm.

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Around Christmas each year, the ABS (rather sneakily) releases one of the most interesting and important population data sets - the Australian Demographic Statistics which gives us the full financial year population figures. Between 2015-2016, the national population growth continued to pick up with one state powering ahead in the growth stakes: Victoria.

It's worth noting that these numbers do NOT yet incorporate any information from the 2016 Census - that data will be released progressively by the ABS this later year.

Population growth and building approvals in Australia between 1997 to 2016

Australia's population grew by 337,800 people in 2015-16, to sit near 24,127,200. The chart also shows an increase in the building of new dwellings for the 5th year running, hitting 240,000 new dwelling units for the year. This is the reason you may see talk about an "apartment glut" in some areas but if you look back a few years, you will see that it may just be making up for low rates of building in earlier years of high growth.

Breakdown of population and growth by state and territory

Population growth by state in 2015-2016

And the winner is... Victoria

The amazing thing about this is the growth rate of Victoria. It is the only state or territory that exceeded the national growth rate of 1.42% in 2015-16 - all others were below this rate. And Victoria exceeded the national growth rate by a large margin, with a growth rate of 2.07%.

The last time Victoria had population growth this high in percentage terms was in 1964, and the state has NEVER added this many people in one year before.

The main drivers of this change in Victoria are a high level of overseas migration (65,000 for the year, just over half total growth), and the largest net interstate migration of any state, a massive turnaround from a decade ago when Victoria was losing people interstate. In 2015-16, 16,699 more people moved to Victoria than from Victoria, adding to the population boom. The rest of the growth, about 41,000 people, is due to natural increase (births minus deaths).

The below chart shows the incredible interstate migration story for Victoria over the past 40 years.

Net interstate migration to Victoria, 1972 to 2016

Population growth in the rest of Australia

Among the other states, New South Wales continues to grow strongly, close to the national average growth rate at 1.4%, adding over 100,000 people again. Western Australia's growth continues to fall after the mining boom but still added 27,000 people for the year. Queensland, while no longer booming, continues to add 64,000 people per year. Growth has almost stopped in the Northern Territory, with only 500 extra people for the year. In Tasmania which has never been a boom state, population growth has picked up a little, adding 2,400 people with a growth rate of 0.5% to now be nudging 520,000 in state population.

Updated Census information

These population figures will all be updated and adjusted based on the 2016 Census results, which are due to start being released in April 2017. Here are some preliminary dates for the release of Census data from the ABS:

From 11 April - First release; This will include national, state and capital city data for selected key person, family and dwelling characteristics, such as age, sex, religion, language and income

From 14 June - Second and main release; It includes the bulk of the community-level data for a wide range of topics, including information on small population groups and for small geographic areas such as Suburbs and Local Government Areas

From 17 October - Census variables such as employment and occupation data, and migration numbers will be released.

Once the data is released by the ABS, .id will start progressively updating the .id community of local government websites with the new Census data. This is a big job to process the data and get it ready to use on the sites, so to get the information to you faster, we plan to incrementally release updates to our sites with the most popular topics from the main release starting from the end of June 2017. We'll update you with the latest information as to the timing of our updates as soon as we can, so stay tuned to our blog!
.id is a team of demographers, population forecasters, spatial planners, urban economists, and data experts who use a unique combination of online tools and consulting to help governments and organisations understand their local areas. Access our free demographic resources here.

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The winners and losers of population growth in Australia for 2016 | .id blog

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Around Christmas each year, the ABS (rather sneakily) releases one of the most interesting and important population data sets - the Australian Demographic Statistics which gives us the full financial year population figures. Between 2015-2016, the national population growth continued to pick up with one state powering ahead in the growth stakes: Victoria.

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It is commonly stated that there is a need for flexible child care to be available to parents especially for those who work variable or non-standard hours, given the 24/7 nature of today's labour market. But Australian and international research shows that parents' decision-making about work and child care is complex and varied. This research report explores how parents make decisions about work and care, especially when faced with shift work or inflexible job conditions.

We ask here, what flexible child care arrangements are families seeking, and are those arrangements available? We further ask what are the barriers to families accessing different models of flexible care? This research draws upon interviews with Australian parents, with many of them working as police or nurses and so directly able to discuss how their child care needs are met in a context of working variable or non-standard hours. This interview data is examined along with some national survey data, and also survey data from parents of children engaged with specific school-aged care services, to include the perspectives of other Australian families.

There were many different stories that emerged from this research. In some families, parents had adapted their work situation to fit the care they had available to them. This included changing work hours to part-time, moving jobs to one that did not involve variable shifts, or even taking a period of time out of employment. Such adjustments were necessary for some parents who knew that they could not find a care solution to otherwise match their work arrangements. Others made adjustments such as these as they wished to prioritise caring for children, at least for a time. Understanding this proved critical to understanding parents' needs for flexible care, which were actually already met within many families when we spoke with them because of the work adjustments that had been made.

It was also important to understand that many parents valued the ways they could meet their care needs informally, either by arranging their work schedules to cover care needs themselves or calling on the help of extended family, such as grandparents. While such options were not always easy, and not available to all families, informal care was especially valued at "non-standard" times, such as early mornings, overnight or even on weekends. Informal care was often used to supplement formal care options.

Formal care options were used by many families, and centre-based care was seen as particularly desirable for children approaching school age, because of the social and learning opportunities it gave those children. The downside of this type of care was that it usually lacked flexibility, such that parents were not able to vary their times to match varying rosters, and some parents had difficulties with the opening hours their service offered. Shift-working families would nevertheless use centre-based care, often with informal care or their own juggling of work schedules. Family Day Care provided another type of formal care, which could be more flexible than centre-based care and could operate at non-standard hours. While national statistics show this form of care is less often used than centre-based care, the parents in this study who used it, and who had access to flexible care as a result, were very positive about this as a solution to their care needs. Family Day Care was not available to everyone and, indeed, was not always offered with a high degree of flexibility, as educators are able to determine whether they wish to provide overnight or varying hours of care.

With much diversity in terms of need among parents, of central importance was the availability of a range of child care options, so they can choose the care that best suits their needs at a particular time. Parents generally did not feel this to be the case at present and, in particular, had difficulties accessing formal care options that could match varying rosters or be called upon for short periods of care when work hours did not quite align with their available (parental or non-parental) care arrangements.

In terms of the barriers, the lack of availability of care at the times that parents needed it was the greatest barrier. Some parents sought better flexibility in the workplace, as a means of being able to better address their work and care responsibilities.

Beyond this, workplace and family characteristics meant different parents had more or less success in meeting their flexible care needs. Family factors that proved challenging included having a larger family, and having children of both school age and under-school age, whose child care services might have different operating hours. Living away from extended family, or living in areas with more limited care options such as in regional areas also proved challenging for some.

Overall, many parents expressed a wish for improved access to flexible child care, especially for care to match variable shifts and non-standard work hours. However, there remained a lack of certainty about the degree to which formal care options would be taken up by parents who have already found solutions to their care needs through informal care or adjusting their own work patterns. Such solutions were often preferred over formal care by parents, despite being challenging to negotiate or requiring some compromises to incomes, family time or careers.

This research highlights that decision-making about child care is not straightforward but varied. Future development of child care policy, especially that which attends to care at non-standard hours, needs to be done with consideration of the ways in which parents make decisions about work and care, and the value placed on non-formal care solutions as well as that placed on formal care.

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It is commonly stated that there is a need for flexible child care to be available to parents especially for those who work variable or non-standard hours, given the 24/7 nature of today's labour market. But Australian and international research shows that parents' decision-making about work and child care is complex and varied.

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This fact sheet examines the views of Australians about the obligations of parents and their adult children to provide financial and accommodation support to one another, and compares the views of respondents according to demographic characteristics.

Key messages

The majority of respondents agreed that both parents and adult children should help the other if financial support is needed. However, fewer respondents (47%) agreed that adult children should let their ageing parents live with them.

Men were slightly more likely to agree with providing intergenerational support than women.

Respondents under 35 years were the most likely to agree that they should support their parents financially and with accommodation. As respondents got older, the numbers of those agreeing decreased.

Within the adult children group, non-parents were more likely than parents to agree that adult children should provide their parents with accommodation or financial support.

Respondents born in a non-English-speaking country were the most likely to agree with the idea of intergenerational support.

Background

Australia's population is not only ageing but is already "more aged" than many countries in the world (United Nations, 2013). In 2016 the first of the baby boomers turned 70, and increasing numbers are entering or already in their late 60s-thereby joining the growing numbers of Australians deemed "older people" in demographic analyses (e.g., Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2012b; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 2014).

The steady increase in population ageing, which has been apparent for over four decades, largely results from increasing life expectancy in the context of a total fertility rate that was particularly high in 1946-66 and below replacement level since 1976 (ABS, 2012b).

At 30 June 2014, 15% of Australians were aged 65 years and over (ABS, 2016a). Depending on the set of assumptions adopted, the ABS (2013b) projects that the proportion of the total population in this older age category will increase to 22-25% by 2061 and 25-27% by 2101. The proportion of those aged 85 years and older is projected to increase from 2% in 2014 to 4-6% in 2061 and 6-8% in 2101.

Population ageing is a cause for celebration. As the Productivity Commission (2013) explained: "The primary 'culprit' is a virtuous one-Australians are experiencing lower mortality rates and enjoying longer lives" (p. 5). Furthermore, increasing life expectancy will typically entail a greater number of additional years of good health than of profound or severe disability (AIHW, 2014).

However some authors (e.g., Morris, 2013; van Onselen, 2014) have argued that the current level of ageing in western countries, including Australia, means that we are facing a "tsunami" or "time bomb" of social and economic challenges.

The consequences of an ageing population

An ageing population draws heavily on government budgets, given the high costs of pensions, health care and aged care. In order to better meet current and future challenges, the Australian Government now prepares 5-yearly Intergenerational Reports, the first of which was published in 2002. These reports focus on the implications of current and future demographic trends for economic growth, assuming current policies continue over the subsequent 40 years.

Although labour force participation rates of men and women in their early and late 60s have been steadily increasing in recent years, Treasury projections outlined in the Australian Government's 2015 Intergenerational Report suggest that the overall proportion of Australians aged 15 years and over who are actively engaged in the workforce will decline over the next 40 years as a result of continuing population ageing (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015).

Such trends have important implications for the living standards of younger generations and associated issues of "intergenerational fairness". In their report, The Wealth of Generations, Daley, Wood, Weidman, and Harrison (2014) provided evidence suggesting that older Australians tend to be not only considerably better off financially than younger generations, but most of the growth in wealth that occurred in the decade since the new millennium went to the older generation. In addition, they point out that government expenditure on pensions and services, especially for older households, has increased, with much of the increase being paid for by budget deficits, the costs of which would be incurred by future generations. In their view:

There are fundamental issues of intergenerational fairness if future taxpayers are forced to bear the burden of today's spending that they neither have a say in, nor benefit from. (Daley et al., 2014, p. 29)

The then Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon. Tony Abbott MP, summed up the situation in more controversial terms, describing it as one of intergenerational theft:

Reducing the deficit is the fair thing to do-because it ends the intergenerational theft against our children and grandchildren. (Abbott, 2015)

Intergenerational conflict?

Do these wealth and government spending trends foreshadow a growing falling out between the generations? Potter (2014) argued this, as summarised by the title of his article Australia's Next Battleground: Generational Conflict. So too does Spies-Butcher (2014) in his article Generational War: A Monster of Our Own Making, and Schipp (2016), whose article Is it Generational Warfare, or Generation Not-Share? begins with the statement: "Locked out of housing, jobs and a free education? Blame your parents."

Current evidence for intergenerational conflict in Australia is by no means clear-cut, though there is considerable evidence that negative stereotypes about older people are entrenched, affecting the way older people tend to be treated, for example, by healthcare and employment sectors, with repercussions for their wellbeing (see Australian Human Rights Commission, 2013, 2015, 2016; Chi-Wai, Warburton, Winterton, & Bartlett, 2011; Minichiello, Browne, & Kendig, 2000).

Using data from an Australian survey of around 1,500 people aged 18 years and over, Kendig, O'Loughlin, Hussain, Heese, and Cannon (2015) found that most respondents believed there was some degree of conflict between older people and younger people, with more than half in all age groups describing the conflict as "not very strong". Nearly half of those aged under 30 years believed that the life-long opportunities for baby boomers were worse than those for younger people, while 55% in this age group believed that "older people" (undefined) were getting less than their fair share of government benefits and only 4% believed that they were getting more than their fair share.

Hodgkin (2014) focused on answers to a different set of questions in the same survey as that used by Kendig et al. She found widespread support for the idea of the state directing considerable resources towards the support of elderly people. Most respondents in her study (85%) agreed that the government should provide home care and/or institutional care for elderly people in need, and most (80%) agreed that the government should pay an income to those who had to give up working or reduce their working time to care for a dependent person.

Flows of intergenerational support

Regardless of whether intergenerational conflict at this macro level is brewing, the same may not necessarily apply at the micro level-that is, within families. In fact, the above-mentioned previous research regarding older people's relative wealth and extended years of good health suggest that they would have an increased capacity to support their adult children in financial and practical ways.

Such support appears to be occurring, in line with changing needs of young adults. For example, increasing proportions of young adults are remaining in, or returning to, the parental home for a variety of reasons, especially for the pursuit of tertiary education (ABS, 2009; Baxter, 2016; Flatau, James, Watson, Wood, & Hendeershott, 2007). When the younger generation of parents separate, the older generation may also house the grandchildren on a part- or full-time basis (see Burn & Szoeke, 2016). Furthermore, grandparents are important providers of informal childcare, especially when the children are under 3 years old. Baxter (2013) reported that around four in 10 children under 3 years of age with employed mothers were cared for by a grandparent at some time during the week. Competing with this opportunity, however, is the trend for older people to remain in paid work.

The tables can be turned as disability or frailty develops in the older generation, particularly if there is no partner to care for the older parent in need. According to an ABS 2012 survey, 90% of people aged 65 years and over live in a private dwelling, with 77% of those aged 85 years and over doing so (ABS, 2013a). One-third of people aged 65 years indicated that they required some assistance with personal activities (e.g., health care, mobility tasks, property maintenance and household chores).

The provision of informal care for elders is particularly gendered. After female partners, daughters are the most common source of informal care. Of all adult children aged 45-64 years who were primary carers in the 2012 survey, 73% were daughters. Of carers in this age group, 47% lived with the parent receiving care.>

Although there is considerable evidence that many younger Australians are supporting their elderly parents, Hodgkin's (2014) study suggests that there is a limit to how much support can be expected from close relatives towards elderly people. For example, two in three respondents in her study rejected the notion that "Care should be provided by close relatives of the dependent person, even if this means they have to sacrifice their career to some extent".

How equal is the exchange occurring to and from elderly parents? Based on a study of intergenerational transfers of money and time (including babysitting) occurring in 10 European countries, Albertini, Kohli, and Vogel (2007) concluded that, consistent with earlier European studies, downward flow of support (from older parents to their adult children) tends to be greater than upward flow (from adult children to their parents). Although weaker, this trend was apparent where the parents were in the oldest age group (70 years and over). Many adult children would also be parents. As such, their responsibilities towards their own children would generally take precedence.

Albertini et al. (2007) also maintained that the impact of welfare state provisions on intergenerational transfers is complex. For example, they argued that the capacity of upward financial support may have eroded through the provision of welfare state provisions, but public pension incomes and health care coverage may enable older people to provide financial support to adult children.

Norms and behaviour, of course, would also vary according to broader cultural values. For example, compared with other Australians, overseas-born Australians with a non-English-speaking background appear to be more likely to place greater reliance on familial support rather than the state, and a lower emphasis on the value of personal autonomy (see Sawrikar & Katz, 2008).

Views about parents and their adult children

To examine the views of Australians about the obligations of parents and their adult children, we used data from the 2012 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA). Questionnaires were sent by mail in four waves during 2012-13 to random samples of people drawn from the Australian Electoral Roll. In total, 1,588 persons aged 18 years and over (687 men and 858 women) returned a completed questionnaire. This represented a response rate of 34%.

Figure 1 provides the relevant extract from the AuSSA questionnaire which sought views about intergenerational support obligations. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with four statements, each of which maintained that one party (parents or adult children) should provide support to the other party, if the latter needed such support. The first two issues focused on the provision of financial support, and the second concerned sharing accommodation-that is, that parents or adult children should allow the other party to live with them.
Figure 1: Sample question from AuSSA 2012
We have classified the second response option ("Agree") as reflecting moderate agreement, and the fourth ("Disagree") as reflecting moderate disagreement. We also refer to "agreement" and "disagreement" in general (or "acceptance" and "rejection" of a statement), ignoring the strength of the stance taken.

The following discussion focuses first on the views of all respondents, then on views according to the respondents' gender, age, educational level, parental status (i.e., whether or not the respondents were parents), and country of birth.

Views of all respondents

Figure 2 depicts the patterns of results for the entire sample. Respondents most commonly indicated moderate agreement with each statement (taken separately). Only 1-2% of respondents expressed strong disagreement with each statement, whereas 5-6% indicated strong agreement. All four statements were more likely to generate a neutral or ambivalent stance than to be rejected.
Figure 2: Views about the four intergenerational support issues, 2012-13: Survey responses
Reading from the top of Figure 2 downwards, it can be seen that patterns of answers for the first three statements were similar, and respondents were considerably more likely to agree than disagree with the statements. This is not the case for the last issue: that adult children should let their vulnerable ageing parents live with them.

When the proportions of respondents expressing strong and moderate stances were combined:

59% agreed that parents should provide needed financial support to their adult children if they were in financial difficulty;

64% agreed that adult children should provide financial support to their parents if they needed it;

63% agreed that parents should allow adult children to live with them if they needed such support; and

11-13% of respondents disagreed with these three statements (taken separately) and 26-28% took an uncommitted or ambivalent stance.

On the other hand, just under half the respondents (47%) agreed that adult children should let their ageing parents live with them in cases of need, while 33% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 20% disagreed.

Overall, then, there was greater support for "downward" (i.e., from parents to adult children) than "upward" (i.e., from adult children to parents) support regarding meeting accommodation needs, but similar levels of agreement with "downward" and "upward" support in relation to meeting financial needs.

For simplicity, the remaining sets of analysis focus on rates of agreement only.

Views according to gender

Figure 3 shows that the overall patterns of trends for men and women were fairly similar, though men seemed more inclined than women to agree with each statement.
Figure 3: Percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement by gender, 2012-13
Chi-square test was applied for association between responses and gender for each statement (* p < .05; *** p < .001)

Most men and women agreed that, where the potential recipient needed the help, each generation ought to provide the other with financial assistance, and parents should let their adult children live with them.

The rates of agreements with the statements were lowest in relation to whether adult children should let their ageing parents live with them, if the parents needed this. This pattern applied to both men and women. Only half of the men and 45% of the women agreed with this statement.

Both men and women therefore appeared more likely to agree that parents should allow their adult children to live with them if needed rather than to agree that adult children held this obligation in relation to their elderly parents.

Regarding financial needs, however, a higher proportion of women were in favour of "upward" than "downward" support (62% vs 55%), while similar proportions of men (67% and 65%) were in favour of financial support flowing in the two directions.

Views according to age

Figure 4 shows the extent to which patterns of answers varied according to respondents' age (under 35 years, 35-49 years, 50-64 years and 65 years and over).
Figure 4: Percentage of respondent who agreed with each statement by age, 2012-13
Note: Chi-square test was applied for association between responses and age groups for each statement (* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001)

Unlike the other three patterns of answers, higher proportions of respondents in the two oldest groups (aged 50 years or more) agreed that parents ought to help their adult children financially should the latter face financial difficulties (61-65% vs 53-56%), with those aged 35-40 years being the least likely to support this.

Agreement rates concerning the other three issues tended to decrease with increasing age, with the greatest age-related differences emerging for the second and fourth issues, both of which focused on adult children's responsibilities towards their ageing parents.

The youngest respondents (those under 35 years old) were particularly likely to endorse the statement that adult children should support their ageing parents financially should the latter need this. Respondents aged 65 years and over were the least likely to agree with the statement. This viewpoint was endorsed by just over three-quarters (77%) of the youngest group and around three in five respondents (60-61%) in the two oldest groups.

Whereas close to 60% of respondents in the youngest group agreed that adult children should allow their ageing parents to live with them, less than 40% of respondents in the oldest group endorsed this statement.

Views according to educational attainment

Because educational attainment varies strongly according to age, we examined links between views and education for respondents under 55 years old and those 55 years and over, using the following educational categories: a tertiary degree or higher qualification (here referred to as having a degree), having some other post-school qualification (such as a trade certificate or diploma), and having no post-school qualifications ( Figure 5).
Figure 5: Percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement by education and age, 2012-13
Note: Chi-square test was applied for association between responses and education for each statement (* p < .05 for under 55 years)

Of respondents aged under 55 years:

Those with a degree were more likely than others to agree that adult children should provide financial support to their parents if they needed it (77% vs 61-64%), and to agree that parents should help adult children financially (57% vs 51-52%), though differences for the latter issue were not statistically significant.

Compared with the two groups with a post-school qualification, a higher proportion of those without any such qualification believed that parents should let their adult children live with them if they needed this (72% vs 63-64%), though the differences were not statistically significant.

Similar proportions across the three education groups agreed that adult children should let their ageing parents live with them should they need to do so (51-57%).

Of the respondents aged 55 years and older:

Views on these four matters did not vary significantly according to educational status for the older respondents.

Although not significant, the largest difference in views concerned parents allowing their adult children to live with them: 68% of those with a degree and 57% of those with no post-school qualification believed that parents should provide this support if needed.

Views by whether ever had children

Issues concerning the responsibilities of parents towards adult children would be more personally relevant (i.e., less "academic" or "hypothetical") to respondents who are parents than to those who have never had children. On the other hand, with the unlikely exception of any respondent whose parents had died when they were children, the responsibilities of adult children to their parents would hold some personal relevance. Because 21% of respondents under 35 years old had had children, and the vast majority of those aged 65 years and over (89%) were parents, the following analysis (see Figure 6) focuses on the views of parents and non-parents aged 35-64 years.
Figure 6: Percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement by whether they had had a child, respondents aged 35-64 years, 2012-13
Note: Chi-square test was applied for association between responses and whether had children for each statement (* p < .05; *** p < .001)

Similar proportions of parents and non-parents (around two in three) agreed that parents should let their adult children live with them if these children needed this.

Parents were more inclined than non-parents to think that parents should provide financial support to their vulnerable adult children (60% vs 50%).

Parents were less inclined than non-parents to accept the notion that adult children held responsibilities to their parents regarding both forms of support: financial (60% vs 76%) and accommodation (46% vs 62%).

Views by country of birth

Intergenerational exchange practices appear to vary according to cultural background. For instance, Sawrikar and Katz (2008) concluded that overseas-born Australians with a non-English-speaking background appear to place greater reliance on familial support rather than the state and lower emphasis on the value of personal autonomy, compared with other Australians. For this reason, we compared the views of people who were born in Australia, in another country where English is the main language (here referred to as "another English-speaking country"), and in a country where the main language is not English (here called "non-English-speaking counties") ( Figure 7).
Figure 7: Percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement by country of birth, 2012-13
Note: Chi-square test is applied for association between responses and country of birth for each statement (*** p < .001)

Respondents who were born in a non-English-speaking country were the most likely of the three groups to agree with each statement.

Of the four statements, respondents in all three groups were least likely to agree with statement that adult children should let their ageing parents live with them.

Nevertheless, most respondents from non-English-speaking countries (65%) agreed with this statement.

Only 39% of those born in another English-speaking country and 45% of Australian-born respondents believed that adult children held this responsibility.

Each of the other three statements (that parents and adult children should provide financial support to the other if needed, and that parents should let their vulnerable adult children live with them) was supported by over 70% of those from a non-English speaking country, 58-64% of those born in another English-speaking country, and 56-61% of those born in Australia.

Controlling for inter-relationships between the characteristics examined

Although we took some account of age in the analysis of trends relating to educational attainment and parenting status, each of the above-mentioned variations in views across the subgroups may have been largely a function of other factors examined in this analysis (and/or factors that were not included in this analysis-an issue not addressed here).

Logistic regression was therefore applied to the data to identify whether views varied according to one of the factors examined, when the effects of the other factors were controlled. The factors were: gender, age (four subgroups), educational attainment level (three subgroups), whether a parent or not (two subgroups), and country of birth (three subgroups). See the Table of results in Appendix A.

For each of the four issues, rates of agreement varied significantly according to gender and country of birth.

Women were less likely to agree with each statement than men.

Respondents born in non-English-speaking countries were more likely than those born in Australia to agree with each statement.

No significant differences emerged in the agreement rates of respondents born in other English-speaking countries and those born in Australia.

Rates of agreement on three of the four issues varied significantly according to parental status. Compared with the parents, those who had never had children were:

less likely to agree that parents should help their adult children financially if needed;

more likely to agree that adult children should help their parents financially and let their ageing parents live with them if needed; and

equally likely to agree with the statement that parents should let their adult children live with them where needed.

Views on only one issue varied significantly according to age and education.

Respondents aged 65 years and over were the only group that was significantly less likely than those aged under 35 years to agree with the statement that adult children should let their ageing parents live with them.

Compared with respondents with a degree, those with no post-school qualifications were less likely to agree that adult children should help their parents financially if they needed this support.

Summary

This paper focuses on beliefs about the financial and accommodation obligations of parents and adult children towards each other, where needs for support in these areas prevailed.

Most respondents agreed with statements that, under such circumstances, parents ought to provide financial support to their adult children and vice versa, and parents ought to let their adult children live with them.

On the other hand, just under half agreed that adult children should let their ageing parents live with them.

Those who did not agree with these various statements were more likely to provide a neutral / ambivalent stance than to disagree with the statements.

Agreement rates were compared across the following demographic characteristics (gender, age, education by age, parenting status, and country of birth), with the potential inter-relationships between these factors being controlled in the last set of analysis, through application of multivariate analysis. For the most part the two sets of analyses yielded very similar results.

Overall men and women shared similar views on obligations concerning the provision of financial and accommodation support between parents and adult children. Nevertheless, men appeared more inclined than women to endorse each statement.

Views about intergenerational support varied somewhat with age.

The youngest groups were more in favour of adult children supporting elderly parents financially than the reverse.

Respondents aged 50 years and older were more likely than those who were younger to agree that parents ought to help their adult children financially should the latter face financial difficulties.

Although there was tendency with more acceptance of "downward" than "upward" accommodation support, this pattern was considerably more marked for respondents aged 50 years and older.

Respondents aged 65 years and over were the least likely to agree that adult children should let their ageing parents live with them if they needed this.

Education appeared to have little bearing on views about intergenerational support. However, among respondents aged under 55 years, those with a degree were more likely than others to agree with the notion that adult children should help their parents financially if they needed it.

Views about intergenerational support varied with parental status.

Parents were more inclined than non-parents to think that parents should provide financial support to their vulnerable adult children.

But parents were less inclined to accept the notions that adult children ought to support their parents either financially or by letting them to live with them if they needed to do so.

Views on intergenerational support also varied according to the country of birth measure.

Respondents with a non-English-speaking background were more likely than those who were born in Australia or in an other English-speaking country to endorse both "upward" and "downward" support regarding the financial and accommodation issues addressed. The different views were particularly marked in relation to accommodation support for ageing parents.

While some authors have argued that intergenerational conflict will intensify at the macro-level, with younger adults resenting their relatively low financial and material opportunities in life, this paper suggests that the notion intergenerational solidarity is strong within families.

The monitoring of views on such issues is important to ensure that policies are in place to promote intergenerational solidarity. Such views may well change in line with changing family trends (e.g., rates of parental separation and fertility trends), changing levels of state support provided to older and younger generations, likely increases in life expectancy (see ABS, 2013b), and advances in technologies that help elderly people remain in their own homes for longer.

Furthermore, inter-generational exchanges within families appear to be not only relevant for the wellbeing of individuals and their families, but also for social policy issues and intergenerational solidarity at the macro level (see Albertini et al., 2007). Policy-makers, researchers, and families themselves need to "watch this space" at both macro and micro levels.

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Appendix A: Coefficients of logistic regression results

Parents should help their adult children financially when the children are having financial difficulty

Adult children should help their parents financially if they need it

Parents should let their adult children live with them if they need to

Adult children should let their ageing parents live with them if they need to

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Reference categories are shown in brackets.

Endnotes

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Ruth Weston and Lixia Qu

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
This fact sheet examines the views of Australians about the obligations of parents and their adult children to provide financial and accommodation support to one another, and compares the views of respondents according to demographic characteristics. The majority of respondents agreed that both parents and adult children should help the other if financial support is needed.