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Sobre o que se chama de "A Hipótese de Troca Cognitiva", sob a perspectiva do primatólogo Tetsuro Matsuzawa, de Tokyo. Muito interessante. É possível ativar legendas em português para o vídeo:

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Sobre o que se chama de "A Hipótese de Troca Cognitiva", sob a perspectiva do primatólogo Tetsuro Matsuzawa, de Tokyo. Muito interessante. É possível ativar legendas em português para o vídeo:

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Trailer para "O Homem Urso" (Grizzly Man )

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Trailer para "O Homem Urso" (Grizzly Man )

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Grizzly Man (2005) Official Trailer - Werner Herzog Documentary HD

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Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.

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Número especial sobre linguagem e comunicação animal 

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Número especial sobre linguagem e comunicação animal 

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1. Introduction

This theme issue is dedicated to the memory of Dorothy Cheney-an extraordinary and insightful primatologist who, with her husband Robert Seyfarth, studied vervet and baboon vocal communication and illuminated the importance of social cognition in primate evolution and language origins [ 1, 2].

For centuries, scientists have been interested in the biological origins of human language and its relations to other animal communication systems. Darwin, in his Descent of man, for instance, commented on babbling in songbirds, singing in gibbons and 'the intimate connection between the brain, as it is now developed in us, and the faculty of speech' [ 3, p. 88]. Since Darwin's time, though, much progress has been made in understanding the faculty of human language and its neurobiological underpinnings. Fundamental questions, of course, remain, as human language is a multi-faceted and highly specialized network of interlocking systems. In order to understand how the system arose, one approach is to analyse its multiple components, such as phonology, syntax, semantics, auditory perception and memory, the vocal-motor articulatory system, the conceptual-intentional system and theory of mind [ 4]. One can then investigate the structure, function and evolution of these components by drawing on comparative studies of animal communication and cognition in a diversity of species and by engaging a variety of methods and theoretical frameworks. Animal communication itself is incredibly diverse in its forms and mechanisms [ 5] (consider the diversity of song learning behaviour in songbirds alone [ 6]), necessitating extensive comparative and interdisciplinary efforts to understand human language and its origins in the context of the broader world of biological signalling.

This theme issue is driven by a recognition of the value of comparative perspectives on human language and the powerful insights that can be gained from studies of animal communication and cognition. The inspiration for this special issue, and many of the contributed articles, arose from an international conference entitled 'New Perspectives in Animal Models of Language' held at the University of Maryland, College Park, in September 2017. Researchers at this meeting, and a growing number of scientists worldwide, are engaged in comparative studies of animal communication in diverse species and using innovative new methods, so it is important to bring these voices together to encourage fruitful dialogue between linguists, ethologists, biologists, psychologists and neuroscientists, so that investigators can draw inspiration from each other's ideas and work together to generate new paths forward.

2. Part I: vocal learning

The questions of what constitutes vocal learning and which species are capable of it are sources of intense debate, and the subject of ongoing experimental studies, in discussions of the evolution of language. Humans are often described as the only primate capable of vocal learning, a trait shared with several disparate groups of mammals (bats, pinnipeds, cetaceans and elephants) and several orders of birds (songbirds, parrots and hummingbirds). But researchers consistently raise questions about how vocal learning in other species compares with that in humans, the extent of vocal learning in other primates and how vocal learning emerged in humans.

Tyack [ 7] provides an overview of vocal learning and clarifies the debate by distinguishing between limited and complex vocal learning. He describes limited vocal learning (which has a broad taxonomic distribution) as the ability to fine-tune the acoustic features of species-specific vocalizations, which can be generated by innate motor programmes. By contrast, complex vocal learning (which has a much narrower distribution, including humans) occurs when an animal hears a sound, creates an acoustic template in memory and then develops a vocalization that matches the template. Tyack emphasizes the importance of critically evaluating evidence for complex vocal learning, as animals with only limited vocal learning are likely not very good models for human vocal learning.

Bats are sometimes overlooked in discussions of vocal learning, but here Vernes & Wilkinson [ 8] provide a detailed overview of direct and indirect evidence for vocal learning in bats. Vocal learning in bats usually involves modifications to calls used for group integration and/or recognition, which Vernes & Wilkinson argue constitutes a form of 'limited' vocal learning according to Tyack's framework. With their small size and highly vocal nature (and also high diversity in gene variants of FoxP2-the gene famously implicated in human language evolution), the authors highlight the value of using bats in studies of the neural circuity and genetic basis of vocal learning.

In contrast with Tyack's approach and classification of different types of vocal production learning, Fischer & Hammerschmidt [ 9] shift the focus by discussing the importance of auditory comprehension learning in non-human primates and by examining the mechanisms that support vocal adjustment in relation to auditory experience. They describe, for instance, the influence of parental vocal feedback on vocal development in marmosets [ 10], which would not be described as complex vocal learning under Tyack's definition, but, they argue, involves a similar kind of sensory-motor integration to human language. Further, they emphasize a different framework from Tyack's by listing multiple mechanisms for vocal production in primates, some of which are unique to humans, while others are shared with non-human primates.

3. Part II: phonology, syntax, semantics

Since the mid twentieth century, the field of linguistics, led by the revolutionary work of Noam Chomsky, has significantly advanced our understanding of phonology, syntax and semantics. In recent decades, there has been an explosion of interest in the evolution of language and research exploring to what extent these components of human language are found in the communication systems of other animals [ 11]. Although the contributions in this issue show that progress has been made, they also make clear that there are still many difficult questions that remain.

Suzuki et al. [ 12] review evidence and criteria for compositional syntax in birds and primates, which has long been thought to be unique to humans. Some of the best evidence for compositional syntax in animals, they suggest, comes from recent studies in the southern pied babbler [ 13, 14] and in Japanese tits. In the latter, birds produce an alert-recruitment call sequence in which the meaning of the whole sequence depends not only on the meaning of the individual calls but also on the order in which they are combined. They also identify cases of idiomatic sequences (like the phrase 'kick the bucket') observed in animal calls, in which a vocal sequence is composed of meaningful elements, but the meaning does not depend on the meaning of the parts. Based on these insights, they propose new approaches for examining the syntax-semantics interface in animal communication.

Birdsong has been quite a popular and successful model for human speech production in large part because birds learn to produce their songs according to sequential rules, as humans do in phonology and syntax. But Fishbein et al. [ 15] argue that sequences may not be as important for conveying information in birdsong perception as they are in human language, despite the intriguing evidence presented by Suzuki et al. for a functional role of sequential rules in bird call perception in a few species. Fishbein et al. review behavioural evidence that zebra finches are quite poor at hearing changes to song syllable sequence and are much better at hearing changes in the acoustic properties of individual elements. While some species (e.g. budgerigars) are better than zebra finches and several other avian species at perceiving sequence information, the authors argue that birds might be communicating in a fundamentally different way in song, largely independent of sequence, compared with what we do in speech.

The question of whether animal communication exhibits even a primitive form of human syntax has sparked some of the fiercest debates in the field. Zuberbühler [ 16] reviews several theories for the evolution of syntax and distinguishes types of syntax (i.e. permutation and combination) and compositionality. He proposes that animal and human syntax may differ in the complexity of Merge operations (where two syntactic elements are merged into a set) but not in kind-a conceptualization that differs from the unitary, human-specific version of Merge as proposed by Friederici [ 17]. Zuberbühler suggests that the difference in complexity may be due to variation in short-term memory limits, with only large-brained animals capable of merging already merged units. He also highlights the importance of animal cognition of event perception (perceiving, representing and recalling natural events in ordered and hierarchical ways) for the evolution of syntax and compositionality.

Regarding animal models for phonology and syntax, Idsardi [ 18] offers cautions concerning Fitch's phonological continuity hypothesis [ 19]: that animals share with humans the ability to process finite-state patterns and not context-free ones, like those of human syntax. For a machine or brain to recognize context-free patterns, it requires push-down automata (PDA) computational capacity. But Idsardi points out that even with simple finite-state patterns, we might want to use a PDA architecture to accurately capture the computations made by animal and human learners. Similarly, if we find PDA circuits in the brain, he argues that they could be used for phonology/sound patterns, not necessarily syntax as others have suggested, posing a challenge for efforts to localize syntax in the brain.

4. Part III: neurobiological and genetic adaptations

Recent innovations in human neuroimaging, neurophysiological studies during vocal behaviour and new cellular and molecular techniques, such as genetically identifying and manipulating specific neural circuits, have enabled significant advances in our understanding of the neurobiology of language and animal communication. The contributions in this issue show the power of these techniques applied to animal models to reveal the neural mechanisms and genetic adaptations underlying the human language faculty.

Nieder & Mooney [ 20] offer a comprehensive review of the neural mechanisms underlying innate and learned vocalizations in birds and mammals. They describe the neural circuits controlling these systems from respiratory-vocal integration in the brainstem to the role of the periaqueductal grey (PAG) in the midbrain in switching on and off innate vocalizations, all the way to the forebrain networks that provide volitional control of vocalizations. In doing so, they emphasize the value of using multiple animal model systems, including birds, rodents, non-human primates and other mammals, as each has distinct advantages for understanding components of vocal production. Indeed, they provide considerable evidence that human speech is built upon ancient, conserved brainstem circuitry that forms a general platform for vocal production shared by most vertebrates and that speech (and birdsong) arose with the additional evolution of forebrain-brainstem coordination.

Seminal recent work by Jarvis and colleagues [ 21] revealed the evolutionary convergence of vocal learning at the level of gene expression in birds and humans. Here, Aamodt et al. [ 22] explore the genetic landscape of this convergence, analysing thousands of genes in avian song production to provide insights into the neurogenetic underpinnings of human communication disorders. They review shared genes in humans and songbirds related to vocal learning, including genes encoding a linked reward system that are also implicated in human communication disorders. They discuss shared genes in songbirds and humans that influence vocal communication, social cognition and intelligence, such as AUTS2. This gene is upregulated in both songbird and human striatum, which is part of the basal ganglia, and variants in humans have been linked to autism and dyslexia. Given the similarities between the songbird and human genomes, they suggest that studies of songbird genes could be used to drive translational research.

Echoing and extending the views of other authors in this issue, Bodin & Belin [ 23] emphasize the shared features of animal and human vocal communication, rather than focusing on divergent properties. Here, they review parallels in areas of human and non-human primate brains that are sensitive to conspecific voices. Similar to Nieder & Mooney, who emphasize the shared vocal production circuitry in vertebrates, Bodin & Belin emphasize the importance of the evolutionarily conserved voice perception system. Specifically, they argue for a conserved network of cortical voice areas or 'voice patches' in higher auditory cortical regions of the primate brain from which language could have emerged. They also draw parallels between this voice-processing system in the auditory cortex and the face-processing system of the visual cortex. They highlight how these systems interact to combine visual and auditory social information in the superior temporal sulcus and frontal cortex, which may have been a target of evolution in primates.

Friederici [ 17], in contrast with Bodin & Belin's emphasis on shared basic mechanisms in primate voice perception, focuses on specific neural adaptations in humans that enable the language capacity to emerge. She argues that human language is rooted in the capacity to process hierarchically structured sequences and that this ability is grounded in a system consisting of a left lateralized network with a frontal cortex hub in the posterior part of Broca's area (Brodmann's area 44) and its connection to temporal cortex via the dorsal pathway, which is more developed in adult humans than in non-human primates and prelinguistic infants. She contends that this network for processing hierarchy is language-specific and is not a general processor of hierarchy, such as in music or mathematics or in the hierarchy of event perception (in contrast with Zuberbühler). She also emphasizes Merge as the basis of the human-specific capacity for language which she argues can be localized in BA44. This is a controversial but testable claim-though Idsardi's article in this issue raises important questions about the localizability of the Merge function in the brain.

5. Part IV: intentionality and cognition

Human language is intimately linked to social cognition-we communicate concepts and intentionally influence other people's mental states. The three final contributions in this issue explore to what extent animals and humans share cognitive processes underlying their communication systems.

Graham et al. [ 24] critically evaluate the criteria used to identify the degree of intentionality in a signal and how the criteria are applied to animal, especially primate, communication. They emphasize the difficulty of differentiating between zero-order intentionality (in which an animal vocalizes with no intention of communicating to others, and no mentality is involved in signalling) and first-order intentionality (where the signaller intends to signal in order to alter the behaviour of the recipient). They argue that we need better ways to accurately assess arousal to rule out zero-order explanations of first-order intentionality. They stress the importance of such attempts to 'scratch beneath the surface' and avoid anthropomorphic assumptions, as communication behaviours of humans and non-human primates may appear to be the same on the surface but may fundamentally differ in underlying cognitive processes.

Similarly, Novack & Waxman [ 25] ask whether the signals used in ape communication influence core cognitive capacities, such as object representation or categorization. The authors review how these cognitive capacities develop links with vocalizations and gestures in human infants. For or instance, in infants as young as three months, listening to human language boosts formation of object categories. They review evidence in apes, focusing on gestures, and argue that signals are used primarily for imperative purposes (i.e. to get attention and make requests) rather than to share intentions. This urge and ability to share intentions, which human infants develop as early as 12 months, does not appear to emerge in great apes and may place constraints on cognitive development in non-human primates.

While most studies of the evolution of human language focus on communication, Fitch [ 26] argues for the importance of examining precursors for components of human language in animal cognition. He points out that many species share sophisticated cognitive abilities that long preceded human language. He reviews the evidence that animals know far more than they can communicate and have conceptual representations that they cannot express-e.g. honeybees can learn to discriminate and make associations with different flower colours or patterns but cannot express them in dance language-arguing for caution in identifying discontinuities between humans and animals in cognition based on discontinuities in communication. Fitch emphasizes the importance of complementing research in animal communication with comparative studies of animal cognition that may provide deeper insight into the evolutionary path to language.

6. Concluding remarks

The array of articles in this theme issue illustrates the value of using the comparative approach to investigate the mechanisms and origins of human language. While the authors find much common ground, the conflicting viewpoints expressed on several fundamental issues, such as the presence of proto-syntax or compositionality in animal communication, the neural basis and human specificity of the Merge operation, and the underlying neurogenetic changes leading to vocal learning and the emergence of language, also promise to inspire future research in animal communication that will teach us even more about the evolution, neurobiology and cognitive basis of human language.

Data accessibility

This article has no additional data.

Authors' contributions

A.R.F. wrote the first draft of the manuscript. All authors contributed to revisions and gave approval for publication.

Competing interests

We declare we have no competing interests.

Funding

The authors thank the Brain and Behavior Initiative and other programme support at the University of Maryland for funding the initial workshop in 2017 and the follow-up 2019 workshop.

Footnotes

† Present address: Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA.

One contribution of 15 to a theme issue ' What can animal communication teach us about human language? '

References

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What can animal communication teach us about human language?

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This theme issue is dedicated to the memory of Dorothy Cheney-an extraordinary and insightful primatologist who, with her husband Robert Seyfarth, studied vervet and baboon vocal communication and illuminated the importance of social cognition in primate evolution and language origins [ 1, 2].

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Roteiro de Perguntas A sombra de uma fabula etologia (1)

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Proposta para aula conjunta roteiro de leitura AEC

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Eugenia historicamente participe desse tema polêmico 

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Eugenia historicamente participe desse tema polêmico 

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Suplemento da revista HCSM discute conceito de "eugenia latina"

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Critica de um artigo de 2007 do mesmo tema que o do langdon down

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Critica de um artigo de 2007 do mesmo tema que o do langdon down

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Ben Goldacre
The Guardian
Saturday August 18 2007

Every now and then something comes along which is so bonkers and so unhinged that it unmoors itself from all cultural anchoring points, and floats off into a baffling universe all of its own. I am a connoisseur of freaky ideas, but nothing prepared me for this gem from the academic journal Medical Hypotheses: an article called "Down subjects and Oriental population share several specific attitudes and characteristics".

You'd be right to experience a shudder of nervousness at the title alone, since this is an academic journal, from 2007, and not 1866 when John Langdon Down wrote his classic "Observations on the Ethnic Classification of Idiots". This paper was the first to describe Down syndrome (which Down called "mongolism") and in it, the author explained that different forms of genetic disorder were, in fact, evolutionary regressions to what he viewed as the less advanced, non-white forms of humanity. He described an Ethiopian form of "idiot", a mongoloid form, and so on. Looking back, it reads as spectacularly offensive.

Now. People with Down syndrome - who have three copies of chromosome 21, learning difficulties, and other congenital health problems - do indeed look a tiny bit like people from east Asia, to westerners. This is because they have something called an "epicanthic fold", a piece of skin that joins the upper part of the nose to the inner part of the eyebrow. It makes the eyes almond shaped. You'll find epicanthic folds on faces from east Asia, south-east Asia, and some west Africans and Native Americans. People with Down syndrome have various other incidental anatomical differences too, if you're interested, such as a single crease in their palm.

Flash forward to 2007 - I think that's where we are - to two Italian doctors. They offer their theory that the parallels between Down syndrome and "oriental" people go beyond this fleeting facial similarity. What is the evidence they have amassed? I offer it almost in its totality.

One aspect, they say, is alimentary characteristics. "Down subjects adore having several dishes displayed on the table, and have a propensity for food which is rich in monosodium glutamate."

I, too, adore having several dishes displayed upon the table. Two doctors, in an academic journal, in 2007, go on: "The tendencies of Down subjects to carry out recreative-rehabilitative activities, such as embroidery, wicker-working, ceramics, book-binding, etc., that is renowned, remind [us of] the Chinese hand-crafts, which need a notable ability, such as Chinese vases, or the use of chopsticks employed for eating by Asiatic populations."

Perhaps you can think of cultural rather than genetic explanations for these observations. There's more. "Down persons during waiting periods, when they get tired of standing up straight, crouch, squatting down, reminding us of the 'squatting' position ... They remain in this position for several minutes and only to rest themselves." Amazing. "This position is the same taken by the Vietnamese, the Thai, the Cambodian, the Chinese, while they are waiting at a bus stop, for instance, or while they are chatting."

And that's not all. "There is another pose taken by Down subjects while they are sitting on a chair: they sit with their legs crossed while they are eating, writing, watching TV, as the Oriental peoples do."

To me, and I may be wrong, this article is so fantastical and so thoughtlessly crass that it's impossible to experience anything like outrage. But this is a proper academic journal, published by Elsevier, with a respectable "impact factor" - a measure of how frequently a journal is cited - of 1.299. I contacted the editor. He told me this paper was a very short, discursive and preliminary communication, floating a general idea for discussion and debate, and that taking scientific ideas out of their context could be misleading. I hope I am not misleading anybody. I contacted Elsevier, the journal publisher: they will consider making the article free to access, so that anyone can read it for themselves, and reach their own conclusion. I'll let you know... [see below]

· Please send your bad science to bad.science@guardian.co.uk

[Ooh, in case you're wondering why I wrote about this, it's a setup for something more interesting, and related, next week, assuming nothing topical comes in. And also because it is a fantastic paper.]

And here is the paper.
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2006.12.043

Down subjects and Oriental population share
several specific attitudes and characteristics q
Federica Mafrica 1, Vincenzo Fodale *,2
Department of Neuroscience, Psychiatric and Anesthesiological Sciences, University of Messina,
Policlinico Universitario ''G.Martino'', Via Consolare Valeria, 98125 Messina, Italy
Summary Down's syndrome is characterized not only by a typical ''habitus'', mental retardation of variable gravity and several alterations of the cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrenteric and immunitary system, but also by specific attitudes and characteristics that are in common with the Oriental population. Starting from the origin of the term mongolism, replaced with other terms such as Trisomy 21, Down's syndrome, and anomaly of Down because of the racist use made in the last century, we propose, in the light of modern knowledge about the heredity of features, a reflection on those aspects and attitudes which highlight a very particular twinning between a Down person and Asiatic peoples.

Introduction
Down's syndrome is a condition characterized by a
typical ''habitus'' and a mental retardation of variable
gravity. The face is oriental: the fissures of
eyes are oblique and present the epicantus; the
nose is short and the root is flat, the knape of the
neck is flat and covered with very loose skin and
subcutaneous. The limbs are short and stocky and
a marked laxity of ligaments is present. Several
alterations of the cardiovascular, respiratory,
gastrenteric and immunitary system can be associated.
In addition, specific attitudes and characteristics
may be shown evidences.
Origin of term ''Mongolism''
The first description of Down's syndrome dates
back to 1846 when Seguin [1] spoke about a ''furfuraceous
cretinism''. In 1866 John Langdon Haydon
Down published an ethnic classification of idiotis.
In this classification, the author distinguished the
idiotis according to an ethnic typology: the Ethiopic,
the Caucasian, the mongoloid. Therefore for
the first time the term ''mongolism'' appeared [2].

Today this syndrome is nominated with other
terms such as Trisomy 21, Down's syndrome, anomaly
of Down.
Down peoples and Asiatic peoples
The strong characteristic, that leads Langdon to
compare the Down population to the Asiatic one,
is the eyes with a typical almond-form. However,
it is possible to highlight other aspects of Down
subjects which remind the Asiatic population, such
as fine and straight hair, the distribution of apparatus
piliferous, which appears to be sparse.
Some attitudes and any daily habitus observed in
Down subjects, recall those of the oriental
population.
Down persons during waiting periods, when they
get tired of standing up straight, crouch, squatting
down, reminding us of the ''squatting'' position
described by medical semeiotic which helps the venous
return. They remain in this position for several
minutes and only to rest themselves this
position is the same taken by the Vietnamese, the
Thai, the Cambodian, the Chinese, while they are
waiting at a the bus stop, for instance, or while
they are chatting.
There is another pose taken by Down subjects
while they are sitting on a chair: they sit with their
legs crossed while they are eating, writing, watching
TV, as the Oriental peoples do.
Another aspect of Down person that remind the
Asiatic population, are alimentary characteristics.
Down subjects adore having several dishes displayed
on the table and have a propensity for food
which is rich in monosodium glutamate (a salt of
glutamate), such as parmigiano, beef broth, tinned
food, etc. [3]. The Chinese food abounds in monosodium
glutamate that seems to be responsible for
the fifth taste or ''umami taste'' [4] and of the
''Chinese restaurant syndrome'' [5], (a syndrome
characterized by flushing, tightness and breathing-
difficulties). Furthermore, it has been observed
that Down subjects present a deficit of GABA transmission
due to a higher consumption of glutamate.
In fact, it seems that a biological limit keeps the
brain of Down individuals from having too much
glucose, by acting on its intake. Glucose is a precursor
of l-glutamate acid via the Kreb's cycle
and glutamatic acid, in its turn, is the precursor
of GABA [6].
The incidence of thyroid disease in the Down
population is another aspect that may be highlighted
since it recall the Asiatic population. In
fact, thyroid disorders are common in the Down's
syndrome. The prevalence of hypothyroidism has
been found to be greater than that of hyperthyroidism.
Hypothyroidism may be either present from
birth or be acquired [7].
In several studies about the incidence of thyroid
disorders in the Asiatic populations, childhood
Grave's disease has been reported to be rare, but
epidemiological data showed to be higher in Hong
Kong children [8]. Another study observed that
one large Chinese family harboured susceptibility
loci for autoimmune thyroid disease which is distinct
from those previously found in the Caucasian
population. This suggests that different susceptibility
loci exist between different ethnic groups
[9].
The tendencies of Down subjects to carry out
recreative-reabilitative activities, such as embroidery,
wicker-working ceramics, book-binding, etc.,
that is renowned, remind the Chinese hand-crafts,
which need a notable ability, such as Chinese vases
or the use of chop-sticks employed for eating by
Asiatic populations.
Perhaps the explanation for their capacities resides
in the monkey-like cast of the hand or rather
in the single transversal solcus that replaces the
normal creases of the flexion of the hand, and their
laxity of ligaments. Also this characteristic of the
Down syndrome may be considered a point in common
with oriental populations.
The trisomy-16 murine, a biological model,
could be utilized to understand the molecular and
developmental effects associated with abnormal
chromosome numbers. In fact, the distal segment
of murine chromosome-16 is homologous to nearly
the entire long arm of human chromosome-21 [10].
Conclusion
These observations might highlight very interesting
aspects connected to the supernumerary chromosome
21 in Down's syndrome, whereas they are
natural features of Asians. It would be just as interesting
to understand why the chromosome should
be in triple copy to express ''these coincidences''
in the Down subject, whereas it is sufficient in double
copy in Asians, who do not show mental retardation
or malformation in various organs or
systems.
Furthermore, it may be interesting to know the
gravity with which the Downs syndrome occurs in
Asiatic population, especially in Chinese population.
This study may offer the possibility of to know
better the neuropathology mechanisms that are
responsible of mental retardation in Downs syn-
drome and to open a new diagnostic and therapeutic
way for to operate precociously.
Perhaps we could even clear Langdon of all
blame from the accusation of being a ''racist''
for having first observed a sort of twinning which
could be looked at in more depth in the light of
modern knowledge on the heredity of features
and on genic expression and inactivation.
References
[1] Seguin E. Idiocy and its treatment by physiological methods.
New York: William Wood; 1866.
[2] Langdon-Down J. Observation on an ethnic classification of
idiots. London Hospital Reports 1866;3:259-62.
[3] Cocchi R. Food habits in Down of 10 years or more. Int
J Intellect Impair 1994;7:149-57.
[4] de Araujio IE, Kringelbach ML, Rolls ET, Hobden P.
Representation of umami taste in the Human brain.
J Neurophysiol 2003;90:313-9.
[5] Keney RA. The Chinese restaurant syndrome: anecdote
revisited. Food Chem Toxicol 1986;24:351-4.
[6] Cocchi R. Precursori dell'ac. Glutammico e del GABA
e abitudini alimentari nei Down: Indagine epidemiologica
su 460 soggetti. Int J Intellect Impair 1990;3:
307-12.
[7] Prasher VP. Down sindrome and thyroid disorder: a review.
Down Syndr Res Pract 1999;6:25-42.
[8] Wong GW, Cheng PS. Increasing incidence pf childhood
Graves' disease in Hong Kong: a follow-up study. Clin
Endocrinol (Oxf.) 2001;54:547-50.
[9] Villanueva R, Tomer Y, Greenberg DA, et al. Autoimmune
thyroid disease susceptibility loci in a large Chinese family.
Clin Endocrinol (Oxf.) 2002;56:45-51.
[10] Galdzicki Z, Siarey RJ. Understanding mental retardation in
Down's syndrome using trisomy 16 mouse models. Genes
Brain Behav 2003;2(3):167-78.

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goldacre bad science nutrition nutritionism nutritionists nutritionist media pseudoscience gillian mckeith patrick holford mmr health scare medicine homeopathy homeopaths postmodernism alternative therapy therapies complementary hettie brain gym detox cosmetics evidence based medicine magnets mrsa phd kapferer statistics

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Observations on the Classification of Idiots - Bad Science

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Ben Goldacre The Guardian Saturday August 18 2007 Every now and then something comes along which is so bonkers and so unhinged that it unmoors itself from all cultural anchoring points, and floats off into a baffling universe all of its own.

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Introdução

O racismo/sexismo epistêmico é um dos problemas mais importantes do mundo contemporâneo. O privilégio epistêmico dos homens ocidentais sobre o conhecimento produzido por outros corpos políticos e geopolíticas do conhecimento tem gerado não somente injustiça cognitiva, senão que tem sido um dos mecanismos usados para privilegiar projetos imperiais/coloniais/patriarcais no mundo. A inferiorização dos conhecimentos produzidos por homens e mulheres de todo o planeta (incluindo as mulheres ocidentais) tem dotado os homens ocidentais do privilégio epistêmico de definir o que é verdade, o que é a realidade e o que é melhor para os demais. Essa legitimidade e esse monopólio do conhecimento dos homens ocidentais tem gerado estruturas e instituições que produzem o racismo/sexismo epistêmico, desqualificando outros conhecimentos e outras vozes críticas frente aos projetos imperiais/coloniais/patriarcais que regem o sistema-mundo.

Os projetos neoliberais, militares, internacionais, de direitos humanos estão informados pela autoridade do conhecimento Norte-cêntrica que se impõe por meio de mecanismos institucionais universitários, militares, internacionais (ONU, FMI, Banco Mundial), estatais etc. Essa autoridade não é democrática, impõe-se à base da superioridade do conhecimento imposta pela dominação ocidental capitalista do mundo e tem uma história de longa duração, objeto dos comentários que seguem.

Este artigo está inspirado na crítica de Dussel à filosofia cartesiana baseada em seu trabalho de história mundial acerca da conquista do continente americano no longo século XVI e na crítica de Boaventura de Sousa Santos às estruturas de conhecimento hegemônicas excludentes das epistemologias do Sul. Inspirado nos trabalhos de Dussel, o artigo agrega outra dimensão para as muitas contribuições sobre a conquista das Américas, relacionando três outros processos históricos que são constitutivos das estruturas de conhecimento do sistema-mundo: a conquista de Al-Andalus, a escravização de africanos nas Américas e o assassinato de milhões de mulheres queimadas vivas na Europa, acusadas de feitiçaria.

Uma vez que Dussel se centrou na lógica genocida da conquista, este artigo aponta para as implicações dos quatro genocídios do século XVI que Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010) chamou de "epistemicídio", ou seja, a destruição de conhecimentos ligada à destruição de seres humanos. O foco estará fundamentalmente direcionado para a emergência das estruturas de conhecimento modernas/coloniais, como a epistemologia fundante das universidades ocidentalizadas, e suas implicações para a decolonização do conhecimento.

As questões principais que serão abordadas estão baseadas nas análises realizadas por Boaventura de Sousa Santos acerca da universidade, das epistemologias do Sul e a epistemologia Norte-cêntrica. O que faço neste trabalho é tomar suas observações acerca das estruturas epistêmicas contemporâneas baseadas em homens ocidentais de cinco países (França, Alemanha, Inglaterra, Estados Unidos e Itália) e a partir de aí formular perguntas de investigações histórico-mundiais. As perguntas são as seguintes:

Como é possível que o cânone do pensamento em todas as disciplinas da ciências sociais e humanidades nas universidades ocidentalizadas (Grosfoguel, 2012) se baseie no conhecimento produzido por uns poucos homens de cinco países da Europa Ocidental (Itália, França, Inglaterra, Alemanha e os Estados Unidos)?

Como foi possível que os homens desses cinco países alcançaram tal privilégio epistêmico ao ponto de que hoje em dia se considere o seu conhecimento superior ao do resto do mundo?

Como eles conseguiram monopolizar a autoridade do conhecimento do mundo?

Por que o que hoje conhecemos como teoria social, histórica, filosófica, econômica ou crítica se baseia na experiência sócio-histórica e na visão de mundo de homens destes cinco países?

Como é que no século XXI, com tanta diversidade epistêmica existente no mundo, estejamos ancorados em estruturas epistêmicas tão provincianas camufladas de universais?

Quando se ingressa em qualquer departamento de ciências sociais ou humanidades, o cânone do pensamento a ser ensinado é fundamentalmente encontrado numa teoria produzida por homens dos cinco países da Europa ocidental citados anteriormente (Santos, 2010).

Entretanto, se a teoria emerge de uma conceituação baseada nas experiências e sensibilidades sócio-históricas concretas, assim como a concepção de mundo desses espaços e corpos sociais particulares, então as teorias científicas sociais ou qualquer outra teoria limitada à experiência e visão de mundo de somente cinco países no mundo são, para dizer o mínimo, provincianas. Mas esse provincianismo se disfarça debaixo de um discurso de "universalidade". A pretensão é que o conhecimento produzido por homens desses cinco países tenha o mágico efeito de apresentar uma capacidade universal: suas teorias são supostamente suficientes para explicar as realidades sócio-históricas do restante do mundo. Como resultado, nosso trabalho na universidade ocidentalizada é basicamente reduzido a aprender essas teorias oriundas da experiência e dos problemas de uma região particular do mundo, com suas dimensões espaciais/temporais muito particulares e "aplicá-las" em outras localizações geográficas, mesmo que as experiências espaciais/temporais destas sejam completamente diferentes daquelas citadas anteriormente. Essas teorias sociais, baseadas nas experiências sócio-históricas dos cinco países, constituem a base teórica das ciências humanas nas universidades ocidentais dos dias de hoje. A outra face desse privilégio epistêmico é a inferioridade epistêmica. O privilégio epistêmico e a inferioridade epistêmica são dois lados da mesma moeda. A moeda é chamada racismo/sexismo epistêmico (Grosfoguel, 2012), na qual uma face se considera superior e a outra inferior.

Nas universidades ocidentalizadas, o conhecimento produzido por epistemologias, cosmologias e visões de mundo "outras", ou desde geopolíticas e corpos políticos do conhecimento de diferentes regiões do mundo considerados como não ocidentais com suas diversas dimensões espaço/temporais, reputados "inferiores" em relação ao conhecimento "superior" produzido por uns poucos homens ocidentalizados dos cinco países, conformam o cânone do pensamento nas humanidades e nas ciências sociais. O conhecimento produzido a partir das experiências sócio-históricas e concepções de mundo do Sul global - também conhecido como mundo "não ocidental" - é considerado inferior e é segregado na forma de " apartheid epistêmico" (Rabaka, 2010) do cânone de pensamento das disciplinas das universidades ocidentalizadas. Mais ainda: o conhecimento produzido por mulheres (ocidentais ou não ocidentais) é também visto como inferior e fora do elenco do cânone do pensamento. As estruturas fundacionais do conhecimento das universidades ocidentalizadas são epistemicamente racistas e sexistas ao mesmo tempo. Quais os processos históricos que produziram as estruturas do conhecimento fundadas no racismo/sexismo epistêmico?

Para responder a essas perguntas, precisamos retornar vários séculos e examinar a formação do racismo/sexismo no mundo moderno/colonial e sua relação com a longue durée das modernas estruturas do conhecimento. Ao considerar que o legado cartesiano tem exercido tanta influência nas estruturas do conhecimento, este artigo começa com uma discussão sobre a filosofia cartesiana; a segunda parte trata da conquista de Al-Andalus; a terceira sobre a conquista do continente americano e suas implicações para as populações de origem judaica e muçulmana na Espanha do século XVI, assim como para as populações africanas tiradas à forca da África e escravizadas no continente americano; a quarta parte trata do genocídio/epistemicídio contra as mulheres indo-europeias acusadas de bruxaria e queimadas vivas pela Igreja cristã; a última parte trata do projeto de transmodernidade de Enrique Dussel e o que isso significa para a decolonização das universidades ocidentalizadas.

Filosofia cartesiana

Devemos começar qualquer discussão sobre as estruturas de conhecimento das universidades ocidentalizadas falando da filosofia cartesiana. A moderna filosofia é supostamente fundada por René Descartes (2013) . A frase mais famosa de Descartes - "penso, logo existo" - constitui uma nova fundação do conhecimento que desafiou a autoridade do conhecimento da cristandade ³ desde o Império Romano. A nova fundação do conhecimento produzida pelo cartesianismo não é mais o Deus cristão, mas o novo "Eu". Embora Descartes nunca tenha definido quem é esse "Eu", está claro em sua filosofia que o "Eu" substitui Deus como a nova fundação do conhecimento e seus atributos constituem a secularização dos atributos do Deus cristão. Para Descartes, o "Eu" pode produzir um conhecimento que é verdadeiro além do tempo e do espaço, universal no sentido que não está condicionado a nenhuma particularidade e "objetivo", sendo entendido da mesma forma que a "neutralidade" e equivalente à visão do "olho de Deus".

Para afirmar a existência de um "Eu", que produz conhecimento equivalente à visão do "olho de Deus", Descartes manteve dois argumentos principais: um é ontológico e o outro é epistemológico. Ambos constituem a condição de possibilidade para afirmação de que esse "Eu" pode produzir um conhecimento que é equivalente à visão do "olho de Deus". O primeiro argumento é o dualismo ontológico. Descartes afirma que a mente é uma substância diferente do corpo. Isso permite à mente estar indeterminada e incondicionada pelo corpo. Dessa maneira, Descartes pode afirmar que a mente é similar ao Deus cristão, flutuando no céu, indeterminada por nenhuma influência terrestre e que pode produzir conhecimento equivalente à visão do olho de Deus. A universalidade equivale aqui à universalidade do Deus cristão, no sentido que não está determinada por particularidade alguma, está além de qualquer condição particular da existência.

O que poderia acontecer a esse argumento da "visão do olho de Deus" se a mente fosse de uma substância similar ao corpo? A principal implicação é que se desmoronaria o argumento de que o "Eu" pode produzir a "visão do olho de Deus". Sem o dualismo ontológico, a mente estaria localizada num corpo, poderia ser similar em substância ao corpo e, então, ser condicionada pelo corpo. Este último indicaria que o conhecimento se produz a partir de um espaço particular do mundo e, assim, não existe produção de conhecimento não situada. Se for esse o caso, então não se poderia mais sustentar que um "Eu" humano possa produzir um conhecimento equivalente a uma visão do olho divino (Dussel, 1995; Haraway, 1988).

O segundo argumento de Descartes é epistemológico. Ele afirma que o único modo do "Eu" alcançar a certeza na produção do conhecimento é através do método do solipsismo. Como o "Eu" pode enfrentar o ceticismo e ser capaz de alcançar a certeza da produção do conhecimento? A resposta dada por Descartes é que esta poderia ser alcançada através de um monólogo interior do sujeito com ele próprio (o gênero aqui não é acidental por razões que irei explicar posteriormente). Com o método do solipsismo, o sujeito pergunta e responde questões num monólogo interior até alcançar a certeza do conhecimento. O que aconteceria se os sujeitos humanos produzissem um conhecimento dialógico, ou seja, em relações sociais com outros seres humanos? A principal implicação disso seria o desmoronamento da pretensão de um "Eu" capaz de produzir certeza em um conhecimento isolado nas relações sociais com outros seres humanos. Sem o solipsismo epistêmico, o "Eu" estaria situado nas relações sociais particulares, em contextos históricos e sociais concretos e, então, não haveria uma produção de conhecimento monológica, deslocada de lugar e antissocial. Se o conhecimento é produzido nas relações sociais particulares, ou seja, dentro de uma sociedade particular, então não se pode argumentar que o "Eu" humano pode produzir conhecimento equivalente à visão do "olho de Deus".

A filosofia cartesiana tem exercido grande influência nos projetos ocidentalizados de produção de conhecimento. A pretensão de uma "não localização" da filosofia de Descartes, um conhecimento "não situado" inaugurou o mito da egopolítica do conhecimento, um "Eu" que assume produzir conhecimento de um não lugar. Como afirma o filósofo colombiano Santiago Castro-Gomez (2003), a filosofia cartesiana assume a epistemologia do ponto zero, ou seja, um ponto de vista que não assume a si mesmo como ponto de vista. A importância de René Descartes para a epistemologia ocidentalizada pode ser percebida 370 anos depois: as universidades ocidentalizadas seguem carregando o legado cartesiano como critério para validar a produção da ciência e do conhecimento. Mesmo os que são críticos da filosofia cartesiana continuam utilizando-o como critério para diferenciar o que é ciência ou não.

A divisão de "sujeito-objeto", a "objetividade" - entendida como "neutralidade" -, o mito de um "Ego" que produz conhecimento "imparcial", não condicionados por seu corpo ou localização no espaço, a ideia de conhecimento como produto de um monólogo interior, sem laços sociais com outros seres humanos e a universalidade entendida como algo além de qualquer particularidade continuam sendo os critérios utilizados para a validação do conhecimento das disciplinas nas universidades ocidentalizadas. Qualquer conhecimento que pretenda partir do corpo político do conhecimento (Anzaldúa, 1987; ) e chegar à geopolítica do conhecimento (Dussel, 1977), em oposição ao mito do conhecimento da egopolítica cartesiana, é visto como tendencioso, inválido, irrelevante, sem seriedade, parcial, isto é, como conhecimento inferior.

O que é relevante para a "tradição do pensamento ocidental masculino" inaugurada pela filosofia cartesiana é o que constitui um evento histórico e mundial. Antes de Descartes, nenhuma tradição do pensamento pretendia produzir um conhecimento não situado que fosse divino ou equivalente a Deus. Este universalismo idolátrico da "tradição do pensamento ocidental masculino" inaugurado por Descartes (2013) em 1637 pretende substituir Deus e produzir um conhecimento que seja equivalente a ele. As perguntas dusselianas são:

Quais são as condições políticas, econômicas, históricas e culturais para que alguém, em meados do século XVII, pretenda ser equivalente aos olhos de Deus e pretenda substituir a divindade do cristianismo?

Quem fala e a partir de que corpo político do conhecimento ou da geopolítica do conhecimento o faz?

Enrique Dussel (2005) responde a essas perguntas com o seguinte argumento: o "penso, logo existo" de Descartes é precedido por 150 anos de "conquisto, logo existo". O Ego conquiro é a condição de existência do Ego cogito de Descartes. Segundo Dussel, a arrogante e idólatra pretensão de divindade da filosofia cartesiana vem da perspectiva de alguém que se pensa como centro do mundo porque já conquistou o mundo. Quem é esse ser? Segundo Dussel (2005), é o Ser imperial. O "eu conquisto", que começou com a expansão colonial em 1492, é a fundação e a condição da possibilidade do "eu penso" idolátrico que seculariza todos os atributos do Deus cristão e substitui Deus como fundamento do conhecimento. Uma vez que os europeus conquistaram o mundo, assim o Deus do cristianismo se fez desejável como fundamento do conhecimento. Depois de conquistar o mundo, os homens europeus alcançaram qualidades "divinas" que lhes davam um privilégio epistemológico sobre os demais.

No entanto, ainda há um elo perdido entre o "conquisto, logo existo" e o "penso, logo existo". Não há condição inerente e necessária para derivar do "conquisto, logo existo" o "universalismo idólatra" (a visão dos olhos de Deus), nem o "racismo/sexismo epistêmico" (a inferioridade de todos os conhecimentos vindos dos seres humanos classificados como não ocidentais, não masculinos ou não heterossexuais) do "penso, logo existo". O que conecta o "conquisto, logo existo" ( Ego conquiro) com o idolátrico "penso, logo existo" ( Ego cogito) é o racismo/sexismo epistêmico produzido pelo "extermino, logo existo" ( Ego extermino). É a lógica conjunta do genocídio/epistemicídio que serve de mediação entre o "conquisto" e o racismo/sexismo epistêmico do "penso" como novo fundamento do conhecimento do mundo moderno e colonial. O Ego extermino é a condição sócio-histórica estrutural que faz possível a conexão entre o Ego coquiro e o Ego cogito. Em seguida, se sustentará que os quatro genocídios/epistemicídios do longo século XVI são as condições da possibilidade sócio-histórica para a transformação do "conquisto, logo existo" no racismo/sexismo epistêmico do "penso, logo existo". Esses quatro genocídios/epistemicídios ao longo do século XVI são:

1. contra os muçulmanos e judeus na conquista de Al-Andalus em nome da "pureza do sangue";

2. contra os povos indígenas do continente americano, primeiro, e, depois, contra os aborígenes na Ásia;

3. contra africanos aprisionados em seu território e, posteriormente, escravizados no continente americano; e

4. contra as mulheres que praticavam e transmitiam o conhecimento indo-europeu na Europa, que foram queimadas vivas sob a acusação de serem bruxas.

Esses quatro genocídios/epistemicídios, são analisados com muita frequência de forma fragmentada, separados um dos outros. A tentativa aqui é de enxergá-los interconectados, inter-relacionados e como partes constitutivas das estruturas epistêmicas do "sistema-mundo capitalista, patriarcal, ocidental, cristão, moderno e colonialista" (Grosfoguel, 2011) criado a partir da expansão colonial, em 1492. Esses quatro genocídios foram ao mesmo tempo formas de epistemicídios que são partes constitutivas do privilégio epistêmico dos homens ocidentais. Para sustentar o argumento, devemos não apenas analisar a história do sistema-mundo, mas também explicar como e quando surgiu o racismo.

A conquista de Al-Andalus: genocídio/epistemicídio contra os muçulmanos e os judeus

A conquista definitiva de Al-Andalus, no final do século XV, foi realizada sob o lema da "pureza do sangue", que era um discurso protorracista (embora não totalmente racista), contra as populações muçulmanas e judias durante a conquista colonial do território por parte da monarquia cristã espanhola contra o califado de Granada, que foi a última autoridade política muçulmana na Península Ibérica (Maldonado-Torres, 2008a). A prática da limpeza étnica no território de Al-Andalus produziu um genocídio físico e cultural contra muçulmanos e judeus. Os judeus e muçulmanos que ficaram no território foram assassinados (genocídio físico) ou forçados a se converterem ao cristianismo (genocídio cultural).

Essa limpeza étnica foi realizada através do genocídio (físico) e do epistemicídio (cultural) a partir dos seguintes processos:

1. A expulsão forçada dos muçulmanos e judeus de suas terras (genocídio), levou ao repovoamento do território com populações cristãs do norte da Península Ibérica (Caro Barojas, 1991; Carrasco, 2009). Isso é o que a literatura chama hoje de "colonialismo de população".

2. A destruição massiva da espiritualidade e do conhecimento islâmico e judeu mediante o genocídio levou à conversão forçada (genocídio cultural) dos judeus e muçulmanos que decidiram permanecer no território (Barrios Aguilera, 2009; Kettami, 2012). Ao se converter os muçulmanos em mouriscos (muçulmanos convertidos) e os judeus em marranos (judeus convertidos), destruiu-se sua memória, seu conhecimento e sua espiritualidade (genocídio cultural). Isso era uma garantia de que os futuros descendentes de marranos e mouriscos nasceriam completamente cristãos, sem rastro da memória de seus ancestrais.

O discurso do Estado espanhol da "pureza do sangue" foi usado para vigiar as populações muçulmanas e judias que sobreviveram aos massacres. Com o objetivo de sobreviverem e se manterem no território, judeus e muçulmanos foram forçados a se converterem ao cristianismo (Galán Sánchez, 2010). Essas populações foram vigiados pela monarquia cristã que esperava assegurar-se que não estavam simplesmente simulando a conversão e praticando secretamente o islã ou o judaísmo. A "pureza do sangue" foi um discurso usado para vigiar os convertidos e seus descendentes. Referia-se à "árvore genealógica" da população. A "árvore genealógica" dava às autoridades estatais a informação necessária para conhecer se os antepassados de uma pessoa ou família eram cristãos "puros" ou "não cristãos", no caso de serem cristãos convertidos. O discurso da "pureza do sangue" não coloca em dúvida a humanidade das vítimas. Ele buscava vigiar aquelas populações que não tinham ascendência cristã em termos do quanto estavam próximas ou distantes do cristianismo, o seu objetivo era confirmar se a conversão era real ou fingida. Para a monarquia cristã espanhola, muçulmanos e judeus eram humanos com o "Deus equivocado" ou com uma "religião errada". Percebiam eles como uma "quinta coluna" do sultanado otomano na Península Ibérica (Martín Casares, 2000; Carrasco, 2009; Galán Sánchez, 2010). Assim, os velhos discursos medievais de discriminação religiosa na Europa, tais como os antigos discursos antissemitas (judeófobos ou islamófobos) foram usados contra judeus e muçulmanos nas conquistas de Al-Andalus. É importante enfatizar que a possibilidade de conversão ainda estava em aberto, a antiga discriminação religiosa antissemita da Europa medieval praticada pela monarquia cristã espanhola (no final do século XV) ainda não era racial, e incluía entre os semitas tanto muçulmanos como judeus. Sempre quando os muçulmanos e os judeus se convertiam ao cristianismo, as portas para a integração estavam abertas, isso perdurou por todo o período de conquista de Al-Andalus por parte da monarquia espanhola medieval (Galán Sánchez, 2010; Domínguez Ortiz, 2009). A humanidade das vítimas não era posta em julgamento. O que se colocava em dúvida era a identidade ideológica e teológica dos sujeitos sociais. A classificação social usada na época tinha relação com uma questão teológica de ter o "Deus equivocado" ou a "religião errada" para dividir a sociedade em grupos religiosos. Em suma, o que importa aqui é o discurso da "pureza do sangue", usado na conquista de Al-Andalus, que foi uma forma de discriminação religiosa, mas ainda não era plenamente racista, pois não colocava em dúvida, de maneira profunda, a humanidade de suas vítimas.

A conquista das Américas e a conquista de Al-Andalus: genocídio/epistemicídio contra povos indígenas, marranos, mouriscos e africanos

Quando Cristóvão Colombo apresentou, pela primeira vez, o documento conhecido como "Companhia das Índias" ao rei e à rainha da monarquia espanhola, a resposta foi de aceitação, mas com a postergação do projeto até a conclusão dos conflitos na região de Al-Andalus. Eles ordenaram que Colombo esperasse até a conquista final do califado de Granada, o último sultanato na Península Ibérica. A ideia da monarquia cristã espanhola era unificar todo o território sob o seu comando, com "um Estado, uma identidade, uma religião", em contraste com Al-Andalus, onde havia diversos sultanatos, com o reconhecimento dos direitos das "múltiplas identidades e espiritualidades nos limites de suas fronteiras" (Maíllo Salgado 2004; Kettami 2012).

O projeto da monarquia cristã espanhola - de criar uma correspondência entre as identidades do Estado e da população - constituiu a ideia de Estado-nação na Europa. O objetivo principal, conforme expresso pelo rei e pela rainha a Colombo, era a unificação de todos os territórios sob a autoridade da monarquia cristã, como um primeiro passo, que deveria anteceder a conquista de terras para além da Península Ibérica.

A conquista definitiva sobre a autoridade política muçulmana na Península Ibérica se concluiu em 2 de janeiro de 1492, com a capitulação do Emirado Nasrida de Granada. Apenas nove dias depois, em 11 de janeiro de 1492, Colombo encontrou-se novamente com a rainha Isabel. Mas, desta vez, o encontro aconteceu no Palácio Nasrida de Granada, onde Colombo obteve a autorização real e os recursos para sua viagem. Dez meses depois, em 12 de outubro de 1942, Colombo chegou à costa do território que denominou Índias Ocidentais.

A relação entre a conquista de Al-Andalus e a conquista das Américas é pouco explorada pela literatura. Os métodos de colonização e dominação utilizados em Al-Andalus foram transportados para as Américas (Garrido Aranda, 1980). A conquista de Al-Andalus foi tão importante para a mentalidade dos conquistadores espanhóis que Hernán Cortés - o conquistador do México - confundiu os templos astecas com mesquitas.

Além do genocídio, a conquista da região de Al-Andalus foi acompanhada por um epistemicídio. A queima das bibliotecas, por exemplo, foi um método fundamental para a conquista da região. A biblioteca de Córdoba, com um acervo de 500 mil livros, quando a maior biblioteca cristã da Europa não continha mais de mil livros, foi queimada no século XIII. Até a conclusão da conquista de Al-Andalus, muitas outras bibliotecas tiveram o mesmo destino, culminando com a queima dos 250 mil volumes da biblioteca de Granada pelo cardeal Cisneros, no início do século XVI. Estes métodos eram estendidos aos ameríndios. Assim, o mesmo aconteceu com os códices indígenas - a parte escrita da prática utilizada pelos ameríndios na busca pelo conhecimento. O genocídio e o epistemicídio caminharam juntos no processo de conquista das Américas e de Al-Andalus.

Um processo similar aconteceu com os métodos de evangelização empregados contra os povos indígenas nas Américas (Garrido Aranda 1980; Martín de la Hoz 2010). Este foi inspirado nos métodos utilizados contra os muçulmanos na Península Ibérica (Garrido Aranda 1980), que consistia simultaneamente em uma forma de aniquilação da espiritualidade e de epistemicídio. A destruição do conhecimento e da espiritualidade caminharam juntas, tanto na conquista de Al-Andalus quanto na conquista das Américas.

Entretanto, é fundamental compreender como a conquista das Américas afetou a conquista dos mouriscos (muçulmanos convertidos) e dos marranos (judeus convertidos) na Península Ibérica durante o século XVI. Neste momento, a conquista das Américas estava no centro de novos discursos e formas de dominação que emergiram ao longo do século XVI com a criação do sistema-mundo moderno-colonial. A contribuição de Nelson Maldonado-Torres é crucial, pois o autor afirma que no século XVI acontece uma transformação das antigas formas de classificação social imperialista existentes desde o século III-IV, quando Constantino transformou o cristianismo na ideologia dominante do Império Romano. De acordo com Maldonado-Torres,

[...] as coordenadas conceituais que definiram a "luta pelo império" e as formas de classificação do século IV e dos séculos seguintes, antecessores da "descoberta" e da conquista das Américas, mudaram drasticamente no século XVI. A relação entre a religião e o império estaria no centro de uma transformação dramática de um sistema de poder baseado em diferenças religiosas para outro baseado em diferenças raciais. É justamente por essa razão que na Modernidade a episteme dominante não seria mais definida pela tensão e pela colaboração mútuas entre a ideia de religião e a visão imperialista do mundo conhecido, mas, mais precisamente, através de uma relação dinâmica entre o império, a religião e a raça. Ideias sobre raça, religião e império funcionavam como cortes significativos no imaginário do mundo moderno e colonial emergente [...] (Maldonado-Torres, 2008a: 230).

Se os métodos de conquista militares e evangelizadores empregados em Al-Andalus para que se alcançasse o genocídio e o epistemicídio foram transplantados para a conquista dos povos indígenas das Américas, podemos afirmar que este domínio também criou um novo imaginário e uma nova hierarquia racial, capaz de transformar a conquista dos mouriscos e dos marranos na Península Ibérica, no século XVI. A conquista das Américas afetou as velhas formas de discriminação religiosa medieval contra os mouriscos e marranos na Espanha do século XVI. O primeiro ponto a ser enfatizado na história é que, depois de meses de navegação pelo Oceano Atlântico,

Colombo registrou em seu diário o momento em que pisou fora da embarcação, em 12 de outubro de 1492, o seguinte:

[...] a mim me parece que [eles] são um povo pobre de tudo. Todos andam nus como suas mães os puseram no mundo... Devem ser servos bons e desenvoltos, pois observei que assimilam rapidamente aquilo que lhes é dito. E acredito que podem ser facilmente convertidos em cristãos, me parece que não formam uma seita.

A afirmação de Colombo abriu um debate que se estendeu pelos 60 anos seguintes (1492-1552). De acordo com a argumentação de Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2008a), no fim do século XV, a noção colombiana de " gente sin secta" ("povos sem religião") significava uma coisa nova. Dizer "povos sem religião" hoje em dia quer dizer que estamos nos referindo a "povos ateus". Entretanto, no imaginário cristão do fim do século XV, a frase "povos sem religião" possuía uma conotação distinta. No imaginário cristão, todos os seres humanos são religiosos. Eles podem ter o "Deus errado" ou "os deuses errados", pode haver guerras onde se derrama sangue na luta contra o inimigo equivocado, mas a humanidade do outro, como algo a ser conquistado e uma forma de dominação, não estava posta em questão. O que estava sendo questionado era a "teologia" do outro. Tudo foi radicalmente modificado em 1492, com a conquista das Américas e a caracterização de povos indígenas por Colombo como "povos sem religião". Como dissemos, uma leitura anacrônica desta frase pode fazer parecer que Colombo se referia a "povos ateus". Mas, no imaginário cristão da época, não ter uma religião equivalia a não ter uma alma, isto é, ser expulso da esfera do humano. Como diz Nelson Maldonado (2008a):

A referência aos indígenas como sujeitos sem religião os remove da categoria humana. A religião é universal entre os seres humanos. Entretanto, a alegada falta de religiosidade entre os nativos não é tomada inicialmente para indicar a própria falsidade da assertiva, mas, ao contrário, serve para afirmar a existência de sujeitos não completamente humanos no mundo. A assertiva de Colombo sobre a falta de religião dos povos indígenas introduz um novo significado antropológico para o termo. À luz do que vimos até aqui, se faz necessário adicionar que este significado antropológico também se conecta a um método bastante moderno de classificação dos seres humanos: o racial. Com uma única jogada, Colombo trouxe o discurso sobre religião do plano teológico para o plano da antropologia filosófica moderna, que distingue diferentes graus de humanidade através de identidades fixadas, posteriormente denominadas raças (Maldonado, 2008a: 217).

Ao contrário do que atesta o senso comum contemporâneo, o "racismo de cor" não foi o primeiro discurso racista. O "racismo religioso" ("povos com religião" versus "povos sem religião" ou "povos com alma" versus "povos sem alma") foi o primeiro elemento racista do "sistema-mundo patriarcal, eurocêntrico, cristão, moderno e colonialista" (Grosfoguel, 2011) formado durante o longo século XVI. A definição de "povo sem religião" foi cunhada na Espanha, no final do século XV e início do século XVI. O debate suscitado pela conquista das Américas era sobre se os "povos sem religião" encontrados por Colombo em uma de suas viagens eram "povos com alma ou sem alma". A lógica da argumentação era a seguinte: 1. se você não tem uma religião, você não tem um Deus; 2. se você não tem um Deus, você não tem uma alma; e, por fim, 3. se você não tem uma alma não é humano, mas animal.

O debate tornou os "povos sem religião" em povos "sem alma". Este discurso racista colonial causou um efeito que redefiniu e transformou o imaginário dominante do tempo e os discursos discriminatórios medievais. O conceito de "pureza do sangue" adquiriu novo significado. A "pureza do sangue" não era mais uma tecnologia de poder para submeter pessoas com ancestrais muçulmanos ou judeus na árvore genealógica, com o objetivo de garantir que ele/ela não estivesse fingindo a conversão, como no século XV, durante a conquista de Al-Andalus. O significado de "pureza do sangue" depois da conquista das Américas, com a emergência do conceito de "povos sem alma", fez com que a questão deixasse de ser sobre confessar a "religião errada" e passasse a ser sobre a humanidade do sujeito praticante da "religião errada".

Como resultado, o grande debate, durante as primeiras cinco décadas do século XVI, foi sobre a existência ou a não de uma alma "índia". Na prática, tanto a Igreja quanto o Estado imperialista espanhol já escravizavam uma quantidade massiva de povos indígenas, assumindo a noção de que "índios" não possuíam alma. O racismo de Estado não é um fenômeno posterior ao século XVIII, emergiu da conquista das Américas no século XVI. Entretanto, existiam vozes críticas no interior da Igreja, questionando a ideia dominante e propondo que os "índios" possuíam uma alma, ainda que fossem bárbaros a serem cristianizados (Dussel, 1979; 1992). Eles afirmavam que, a partir do momento em que os "índios" possuíssem uma alma, seria pecado, aos olhos de Deus, escravizá-los. O trabalho da Igreja deveria ser o de cristianizá-los com a utilização de métodos pacíficos. Esse foi o primeiro debate racista na história do mundo e, do mesmo modo, o "índio" constituiu a primeira identidade moderna.

A categoria "índio" constituiu uma nova invenção da identidade moderna e colonial, homogeneizante das identidades heterogêneas que existiam nas Américas antes da chegada dos europeus. Além disso, é importante recordar que Colombo pensou ter chegado às Índias e, por isso, chamou de "índios" os povos que encontrou. Deste engano geográfico eurocêntrico, o "índio" emerge como nova identidade. Mas questionar se os "índios" possuíam ou não almas já era uma questão racista com referência direta à humanidade.

No século XVI, este debate tinha importantes implicações no imaginário cristão. Se os "índios" não possuíam uma alma, estava justificado escravizá-los e tratá-los como animais durante a execução de seu trabalho. Mas, caso possuíssem uma alma, seria um pecado, aos olhos de Deus, escravizá-los, assassiná-los ou maltratá-los. O debate foi crucial na transformação dos antigos discursos e práticas discriminatórias religiosas medievais. Até o fim do século XV os antigos discursos afirmavam que muçulmanos e judeus adoravam o "Deus errado", com uma "teologia errada", e que havia a influência de Satanás na "religião errada", mas sem o questionamento da humanidade dos praticantes. A possibilidade de conversão estava disponível para as vítimas dos discursos discriminatórios. Mas, com a colonização das Américas, os velhos discursos discriminatórios modificaram-se rapidamente, transformando-se na dominação racial moderna.

Ainda que naquele tempo a palavra "raça" não fosse utilizada, o debate sobre ser ou não dotado de alma era essencialmente racista, à semelhança do discurso científico do século XIX. O debate teológico do século XVI tinha a mesma conotação do discurso científico do século XIX sobre a constituição dos seres humanos ou não humanos. Ambos eram debates sobre a humanidade ou a animalidade do outro, articulados pelo discurso racista institucionalizado pelos Estados, como a monarquia espanhola no século XVI ou os Estados-nação da Europa Ocidental no século XIX. Esta lógica institucional racista de "não ter uma alma" no século XVI ou de "não ter uma biologia humana" no século XIX tornou-se o princípio organizador da divisão internacional do trabalho, que culminou na acumulação capitalista em escala mundial.

O debate continuou até o famoso julgamento de Valladolid, em 1552. Como a teologia cristã, encarnada na Igreja, centralizava o conhecimento, a monarquia imperialista cristã espanhola colocou nas mãos de um tribunal a questão sobre "os índios serem ou não dotados de alma". Os teólogos envolvidos eram Bartolomé de las Casas e Gines Sepúlveda. Após 60 anos (1492-1552) de debate, a monarquia espanhola finalmente solicitou de um tribunal uma decisão definitiva sobre a humanidade ou a não humanidade dos "índios".

Como sabemos, Gines Sepúlveda defendeu que os "índios" eram seres "sem alma" e, portanto, animais que poderiam ser escravizados no processo do trabalho, sem que houvesse qualquer pecado aos olhos de Deus. Parte da sua argumentação para demonstrar a inferioridade dos "índios" - criaturas abaixo da linha do humano - consistia no argumento capitalista moderno de que os "índios" não teriam qualquer senso de propriedade privada ou de mercado, pois se baseavam na coleta e na distribuição recíproca das riquezas.

Bartolomé de las Casas, por sua vez, argumentou que os "índios" possuíam uma alma, em estado bárbaro, necessitando de cristianização. Entretanto, para Las Casas era um pecado, aos olhos de Deus, escravizá-los. O que ele propunha era a cristianização. Tanto Las Casas como Sepúlveda representam, respectivamente, a inauguração dos dois maiores discursos racistas, com as consequências mais duradouras, capazes de mobilizar os impérios pelos 450 anos que se seguiram: os discursos racistas biológico e cultural.

O discurso biológico racista do século XIX é uma secularização do discurso teológico racista de Sepúlveda. Quando a autoridade do conhecimento passou da teologia cristã para a ciência moderna - após o projeto Iluminista do século XVIII e a Revolução Francesa -, o discurso teológico racista de Sepúlveda sobre "povos sem alma" sofreu uma mutação com a ascensão das ciências naturais, tornando-se um discurso biológico racista sobre "povos sem a biologia humana" e, posteriormente, "povos sem genes" (sem a genética humana). O mesmo aconteceu com o discurso de Bartolomé de las Casas. O discurso teológico de Las Casas, acerca dos "bárbaros a serem cristianizados" no século XVI transmutou-se com a ascensão das ciências sociais, agora em um discurso racista da antropologia cultural, sobre "primitivos a serem civilizados".

O desfecho do julgamento de Valladolid também é bastante conhecido. Embora a perspectiva de Sepúlveda tenha vencido nas instâncias maiores, a de Las Casas venceu em instâncias menores. Assim, a monarquia imperialista espanhola decidiu que os "índios" possuíam uma alma, mas que eram bárbaros a serem cristianizados. Entretanto, reconheceu-se que era um pecado, aos olhos de Deus, escravizá-los. A conclusão aparentemente significou a liberação dos "índios" do jugo colonial espanhol. Na divisão internacional do trabalho, os "índios" foram transferidos do trabalho escravo para outra forma de coerção denominada encomienda. Desde então, institucionalizou-se, de modo ainda mais sistemático, a ideia de raça. O racismo institucional consolidou-se como princípio organizador da divisão internacional do trabalho e da acumulação capitalista em escala mundial.

Enquanto os "índios" eram dispostos pela encomienda, sob um regime de trabalho imposto, os africanos, classificados como "povos sem alma", eram trazidos para as Américas para substituir os "índios" no trabalho escravo. Nesta época, os africanos eram percebidos como os muçulmanos e a racialização dos muçulmanos na Espanha do século XVI estendia-se a eles. A decisão de trazer cativos da África, a serem escravizados nas Américas, guardou uma relação direta com a conclusão do Julgamento de Valladolid, em 1552. Neste ponto tem início o sequestro massivo e a comercialização de cativos imposta pelos 300 anos seguintes. Com a escravização dos africanos, o racismo religioso foi complementado, ou vagarosamente substituído, pelo racismo de cor. Desde então o racismo contra o negro tornou-se uma estrutura fundamental e constitutiva da lógica do mundo moderno-colonial.

O sequestro de africanos, com sua escravização nas Américas, tornou-se um evento de suma importância na história mundial (Nimako & Willemsen, 2011). Milhões de africanos morreram nos processos de captura, transporte e escravização nas Américas. Foi um genocídio em escala massiva. E, conforme os casos anteriores delineados, o epistemicídio foi inerente ao genocídio. Nas Américas os africanos eram proibidos de pensar, rezar ou de praticar suas cosmologias, conhecimentos e visão de mundo. Estavam submetidos e um regime de racismo epistêmico que proibia a produção autônoma de conhecimento. A inferioridade epistêmica foi um argumento crucial, utilizado para proclamar uma inferioridade social biológica, abaixo da linha da humanidade. A ideia racista preponderante no século XVI era a de "falta de inteligência" dos negros, expressa no século XX como "os negros apresentam o mais baixo coeficiente de inteligência".

Outra consequência do debate sobre os "índios" e do Tribunal de Valladolid foi o seu impacto sobre os mouriscos e os marranos na Espanha do século XVI. Os velhos discursos de discriminação religiosa contra judeus e muçulmanos foram transformados em discriminação racial. A questão não era mais se a população da religião discriminada possuía um Deus e uma teologia equivocados. O racismo religioso contra os indígenas, que questionava a humanidade dos "índios", foi transportado para os mouriscos e para os marranos, levantando o questionamento sobre a humanidade daqueles que rezavam para o "Deus errado". Aqueles que rezavam para o "Deus errado" eram concebidos como faltosos de alma, como "sujeitos sem alma" ("sujeitos desalmados"), não humanos ou subumanos. De modo análogo ao dos povos indígenas nas Américas foram expulsos do "escopo da humanidade", descritos como "animalescos" (Perceval 1992; 1997). O último acontecimento representou uma transformação da inferioridade das religiões não cristãs (islamismo e judaísmo) na Europa medieval para a inferioridade dos seres humanos praticantes dessas religiões (judeus e muçulmanos) na Europa moderna emergente. Assim, podemos afirmar, como resultado do impacto da conquista das Américas no século XVI, a transformação dos velhos discursos de racismo religioso europeu, antes e depois das Cruzadas, em discursos de discriminação racial. Este é o efeito resposta do colonialismo, que volta para assombrar a Europa.

Houve um emaranhamento entre a religião centrada na hierarquia global do cristianismo e o centralismo racial e étnico do Ocidente, expresso em um "sistema-mundo capitalista, patriarcal, eurocêntrico, cristão, moderno e colonialista", criado após 1492, capaz de identificar os praticantes de uma espiritualidade não ocidental, sendo estes racializados como abaixo da linha do humano. Contra uma narrativa eurocêntrica, como a de pensadores como Foucault (1996), que situam a transmutação do antissemitismo religioso para o antissemitismo racial no século XIX, com a ascensão do racismo científico, afirmamos que o racismo antissemita surgiu na Espanha do século XVI, no momento em que a velha discriminação antissemita medieval emaranhou-se com o novo imaginário racial moderno, produzido na conquista das Américas. O novo imaginário racial moderno transformou o velho antissemitismo em antissemitismo racial. Ao contrário do que Foucault afirma, o racismo do século XVI já estava institucionalizado como racismo biopolítico do Estado.

O conceito de "povos sem alma" não foi imediatamente estendido aos mouriscos - foram necessárias algumas décadas no século XVI até que o conceito servisse a eles. Na segunda metade do século XVI e, especialmente, dos Julgamentos das Alpujarras, os mouriscos passaram a ser chamados "pessoas sem alma" ("sujeitos desalmados"). Além disso, sempre a partir da segunda metade do século XVI, como consequência de terem sido classificados como "pessoas sem alma", os mouriscos foram massivamente escravizados em Granada. A despeito da proibição da Igreja de que cristãos fossem escravizados, os mouriscos (muçulmanos convertidos ao cristianismo) eram escravizados (Martín Casares, 2000).

Agora, a "pureza do sangue" estava relacionada às "pessoas sem alma", tornando irrelevante a questão sobre o quanto essas pessoas teriam sido assimiladas pela cristandade. Era seu ser que estava sendo questionado, e sua humanidade declarada suspeita. Assim, a partir de então, eles não eram mais considerados cristãos verdadeiros ou iguais aos cristãos. O racismo antimourisco se intensificaria durante a segunda metade do século XVI, até a expulsão em massa dos mouros da Península Ibérica, em 1609 (Perceval 1992; 1997; Carrasco 2009).

Em resumo: a conquista das Américas no século XVI estendeu o processo de genocídio/epistemicídio que teve início com a conquista de Al-Andalus para novos sujeitos, tais como os povos indígenas e africanos, ao mesmo tempo em que estimulou a nova lógica racial de genocídio/epistemicídio por parte dos cristãos contra os judeus e os muçulmanos na Espanha.

A conquista da mulher indo-europeia: genocídio/epistemicídio contra a mulher

Há um quarto genocídio/epistemicídio no século XVI que não é relatado com frequência na história dos três genocídios/epistemicídios já mencionados. Trata-se da conquista e do genocídio das mulheres que transmitiam, de geração para geração, o conhecimento indo-europeu nos territórios europeus. Essas mulheres dominavam conhecimentos xamânicos de tempos ancestrais. O conhecimento que acumulavam abrangia diferentes áreas, tais como astronomia, biologia, ética etc. Elas eram empoderadas por resguardarem um conhecimento ancestral e o seu principal papel dentro das comunidades era o de estabelecer formas comunais de organização da política e da economia. A perseguição dessas mulheres começou na Baixa Idade Média. Entretanto, intensificou-se nos séculos XVI e XVII, com o advento das estruturas "modernas, coloniais, capitalistas e patriarcais" de poder.

Milhões de mulheres foram queimadas vivas, acusadas de bruxaria, ainda nos primórdios da Modernidade. Dadas as suas qualidades de autoridade e liderança, os ataques constituíram uma estratégia de consolidação do patriarcado centrado na cristandade, que também destruía formas autônomas e comunais de relação com a terra. A Inquisição foi a vanguarda dos ataques. A acusação era um ataque a milhares de mulheres, cuja autonomia, liderança e conhecimento ameaçavam o poder da aristocracia, que se tornava a classe capitalista transnacional tanto nas colônias quanto na agricultura europeia.

Silvia Federici (2004) defende que esta caça às bruxas se intensificou entre 1550 e 1660. A tese da autora é de que a caça às mulheres, em território europeu, relacionava-se à acumulação primitiva durante o início da expansão capitalista na formação de reserva de trabalho para o capitalismo global. Ela relacionou a escravização de africanos nas Américas e a caça de mulheres na Europa como dois lados da mesma moeda: a acumulação de capital, em escala global, com a necessidade de incorporar trabalho no processo de acumulação capitalista. Para atingir este objetivo, as instituições usaram métodos extremamente violentos.

Ao contrário do que ocorreu com o epistemicídio contra as populações indígenas e muçulmanas, quando milhares de livros foram queimados, no caso do genocídio contra as mulheres indo-europeias não houve livros queimados, pois, a transmissão de conhecimento acontecia, de geração para geração, por meio da tradição oral. Os "livros" eram os corpos das mulheres e, de modo análogo ao que aconteceu com os códices indígenas e com os livros dos muçulmanos, elas foram queimadas vivas.

Consequências dos quatro genocídios/epistemicídios para as estruturas globais de conhecimento: a formação de estruturas epistêmicas sexistas e a esperança por um mundo futuro transmoderno

Os quatro genocídios/epistemicídios do longo século XVI aqui discutidos trouxeram à tona a criação do poder racial e patriarcal e as estruturas epistêmicas em escala mundial emaranhadas com o processo da acumulação global capitalista. Quando, no século XVII, Descartes escreveu "penso, logo existo", em Amsterdã, no "senso comum" de seu tempo, o "Eu" não poderia ser um africano, um indígena, um muçulmano, um judeu ou uma mulher (ocidental ou não ocidental). Todos estes sujeitos eram considerados "inferiores" ao longo da estrutura de poder global, racial e patriarcal e seu conhecimento considerado inferior, resultando nos quatro genocídios/epistemicídios do século XVI. O único ser dotado de uma episteme superior era o homem ocidental. Os quatro genocídios/epistemicídios são constitutivos das estruturas epistêmicas racistas/sexistas que produziram um privilégio e uma autoridade para a produção de conhecimento do homem ocidental, com a inferiorização dos demais. De acordo com Maldonado-Torres (2008b), o outro lado do "penso, logo existo" é a estrutura racista/sexista do "não penso, não existo". O último expressa uma "colonização do ser" (Maldonado-Torres 2008b), pela qual todos os sujeitos considerados inferiores não pensam e não desfrutam de uma existência inteira, pois sua humanidade é questionada. Eles pertencem à zona que Fanon denomina "zona do não ser" e que Dussel chama de "exterioridade".

As universidades ocidentalizadas, desde o início, internalizaram as estruturas racistas/sexistas criadas pelos quatro genocídios/epistemicídios do século XVI. Essas estruturas eurocêntricas de conhecimento se tornaram consensuais. Considera-se normal haver homens ocidentais de cinco países que produzem o cânone de todas as disciplinas daquela universidade. Não há um escândalo nisso, é tudo um reflexo da naturalização das estruturas epistêmicas racistas/sexistas de conhecimento que imperam no mundo moderno e colonial.

No fim do século XVIII, quando as ditas universidades deixaram de ser cristãs e teológicas e se transformaram em seculares e humboltianas, utilizou-se a ideia antropológica kantiana de que a racionalidade está encarnada no homem branco ao norte dos Pirineus. A Península Ibérica foi relacionada ao estigma da irracionalidade, ao lado dos povos de pele negra, vermelha e amarela. As pessoas "sem racionalidade" foram epistemologicamente excluídas das estruturas de conhecimento das universidades. É a partir da estrutura kantiana que o cânone da universidade ocidental é fundado.

Quando o centro do sistema mundial passou da Península Ibérica para o norte da Europa Ocidental, em meados do século XVII, após a Guerra dos Trinta Anos, quando os holandeses derrotaram a Invencível Armada espanhola, o privilégio epistêmico passou, em conjunto com o poder sistêmico, da Península Ibérica para o norte da Europa Ocidental. A visão antropológica racista de Kant, posicionando os Pirineus como linha divisora da Europa, que separava a irracionalidade da racionalidade, seguiu as modificações geopolíticas que tomaram corpo no século XVI. Kant aplicou na Península Ibérica, no século XVIII, a mesma visão racista aplicada ao resto do mundo no século XVI. Isto é importante para que possamos entender porque os portugueses e os espanhóis estão de fora do cânone das universidades ocidentais nos dias de hoje, a despeito de terem estado no centro do sistema-mundial, criado após 1492. Desde o fim do século XVIII, apenas homens de cinco países (França, Alemanha, Inglaterra, Itália e Estados Unidos) monopolizam o cânone nas universidades ocidentalizadas.

Diante do desafio representado pela Modernidade eurocêntrica e suas estruturas coloniais racistas/sexistas de conhecimento, Dussel propõe a transmodernidade como projeto para dar conta do processo incompleto de decolonização. O "trans" quer dizer "além". Mas o que quer dizer ir além da Modernidade eurocêntrica?

Se, por um lado, o projeto colonial ocidental de genocídio/epistemicídio foi, em alguma extensão, bem-sucedido, em espaços particulares do mundo, por outro, fracassou totalmente. O pensamento de indígenas, muçulmanos, judeus, negros e mulheres críticos deste projeto continua vivo, ao lado do pensamento de outros críticos do Sul. Após 500 anos de colonização do saber, não existe qualquer tradição cultural ou epistêmica, em um sentido absoluto, que esteja fora da Modernidade eurocêntrica. Tudo foi afetado pela Modernidade eurocêntrica e muitos aspectos do eurocentrismo foram engessados nessas novas epistemologias. Entretanto, isto não significa que cada tradição está contida, em um sentido absoluto, e que não há uma saída da epistemologia ocidental. Ainda existem perspectivas epistêmicas não ocidentais, que guardam uma exterioridade relativa da Modernidade eurocêntrica. Elas foram afetadas pelo genocídio/epistemicídio, mas não foram completamente destruídas. É esta exterioridade relativa que, de acordo com Enrique Dussel, propicia esperança e possibilidade de um mundo transmoderno: "um mundo onde muitos mundos são possíveis", para usar o slogan zapatista.

A existência de diversidade epistêmica garante o potencial para os esforços de decolonização e de "despatrialização" que não mais estão centrados nas epistemologias e visões de mundo eurocêntricas. Para nos movermos além da Modernidade eurocêntrica, Dussel propõe um projeto de decolonização que utiliza continuamente o pensamento crítico das tradições epistêmicas do Sul. É a partir dessas tradições diversas que podemos construir processos que vão trazer ideias diferentes e instituições apropriadas pela Modernidade eurocêntrica para decolonizá-las, em diferentes direções. Na Modernidade eurocêntrica, o Ocidente sequestrou e monopolizou as definições de democracia, direitos humanos, libertação da mulher, economia etc. A transmodernidade implica uma redefinição desses elementos, em diferentes direções, de acordo com a diversidade epistêmica do mundo, em direção a uma multiplicidade de sentidos até um mundo pluriversal.

Se os povos do Sul não seguem as definições hegemônicas ocidentais, eles são imediatamente denunciados e marginalizados da comunidade global, acusados de fundamentalismo. Por exemplo, quando os zapatistas falam sobre democracia não o fazem a partir de uma perspectiva eurocêntrica, propõem um projeto de democracia que é bem diferente da democracia liberal. Eles redefinem a democracia a partir de uma perspectiva indígena, de "comandar enquanto obedece", com o "Caracoles" como prática democrática institucional. Entretanto, utilizar um novo conceito de democracia, na Modernidade eurocêntrica, é denunciado como fundamentalismo. O mesmo acontece com o conceito de feminismo. Se as mulheres muçulmanas desenvolvem um "feminismo islâmico" elas são imediatamente denunciadas pelas feministas ocidentais como patriarcais e fundamentalistas. A transmodernidade é um convite para que se produza, a partir de diferentes projetos epistêmicos políticos que existem no mundo hoje, uma redefinição dos muitos elementos apropriados pela Modernidade eurocêntrica e tratados como inerentes à Europa, rumo a um projeto decolonial de liberação para além das estruturas capitalistas, patriarcais, eurocêntricas, cristãs, modernas e coloniais. De acordo com Dussel:

Quando falo de transmodernidade estou me referindo a um projeto global que busca transcender a Modernidade da Europa e da América do Norte. Este projeto não é pós-moderno, pois a pós-Modernidade ainda é uma crítica incompleta da Modernidade, feita pelos europeus e pelos norte-americanos. A transmodernidade, ao contrário, é uma tarefa, em meu caso, expressa filosoficamente, cujo ponto de partida é aquilo que foi descartado, desvalorizado e julgado como inútil entre as culturas globais, incluindo a filosofia colonizada ou das periferias [...] (Dussel 2008b: 19-20).

Ademais, a transmodernidade pede por diálogos interfilosóficos para produzir a pluralidade de sentidos, onde o novo universo também é plural. Entretanto, a transmodernidade não é, de modo algum, equivalente a uma celebração liberal e multiculturalista da diversidade epistêmica do mundo, onde as estruturas de poder permanecem intactas. A transmodernidade é um reconhecimento da diversidade epistêmica sem o relativismo epistêmico. O chamado por uma pluralidade epistêmica, como uma oposição ao universalismo epistêmico, não é equivalente a uma posição relativista. Ao contrário, a transmodernidade reconhece a necessidade de um projeto global compartilhado contra o capitalismo, o patriarcado, o imperialismo e o colonialismo. Mas ele rejeita a universalidade das soluções, onde um define pelos outros qual é a "solução". Universalidade, na Modernidade europeia, significava "um define pelos outros". A transmodernidade clama por uma pluralidade de soluções, onde "muitos decidem por muitos". A partir de diferentes tradições epistemológicas e culturais surgirão também respostas diferentes para os mesmos problemas. O horizonte transmoderno tem como objetivo a produção de conceitos, significados e filosofias plurais, bem como de um mundo plural. Como Dussel atesta, a transmodernidade está

[...] orientada em direção a uma futura filosofia global plural. Este projeto é necessariamente transmoderno e, então, também transcapitalista [...]. Por um longo tempo, talvez séculos, as muitas tradições filosóficas seguiram seus caminhos, mas nenhuma delas se parecia com a pluralidade transmoderna (diferente do universal, e não pós-moderno) que aparece no horizonte. Agora, "outras filosofias" são possíveis, pois um "novo mundo" é possível, conforme proclamado pelo Movimento de Libertação Zapatista, em Chipas, no México (Dussel 2008b: 20).

Conclusão

Esta discussão tem grandes implicações para a decolonização das universidades ocidentalizadas. Até então, essas universidades têm operado a partir de um uni-versalismo no qual "um (homem ocidental de cinco países) define pelos outros" o que é conhecimento válido e verdadeiro. Descolonizar as estruturas de conhecimento da universidade ocidental vai requerer, entre outras coisas:

1. Reconhecimento do provincialismo e do racismo/sexismo epistêmico que constituem a estrutura fundamental resultante de um genocídio/epistemicídio implementado pelo projeto colonial e patriarcal do século XVI.

2. Rompimento com o universalismo onde um ("uni") decide pelos outros, a saber, a epistemologia ocidental.

3. Encaminhamento da diversidade epistêmica para o cânone do pensamento, criando o pluralismo de sentidos e conceitos, onde a conversação interepistêmica, entre muitas tradições epistemológicas, produz novas redefinições para velhos conceitos e cria novos conceitos plurais com "muitos decidindo por muitos" (pluri-verso), em lugar de "um definir pelos outros" (uni-verso).

Se as universidades ocidentalizadas assumirem estes três pontos programáticos deixarão de ser ocidentalizadas e uni-versais. Essas se transformarão, de uni-versidades ocidentais em pluri-versidades decoloniais. Se os projetos modernos eurocêntricos, racistas e sexistas de Kant e Humbolt tornaram-se a fundação epistemológica delas desde o século XVIII, como resultado de 300 anos de genocídio/epistemicídio no mundo, a transmodernidade de Enrique Dussel constitui a nova fundação epistêmica para a pluri-versidade decolonial, cuja produção de conhecimento deve estar a serviço de um mundo para além do "sistema-mundo capitalista, patriarcal, eurocêntrico, cristão, moderno e colonialista".

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A estrutura do conhecimento nas universidades ocidentalizadas: racismo/sexismo epistêmico e os quatro genocídios/epistemicídios do longo século XVI

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Introdução O racismo/sexismo epistêmico é um dos problemas mais importantes do mundo contemporâneo. O privilégio epistêmico dos homens ocidentais sobre o conhecimento produzido por outros corpos políticos e geopolíticas do conhecimento tem gerado não somente injustiça cognitiva, senão que tem sido um dos mecanismos usados para privilegiar projetos imperiais/coloniais/patriarcais no mundo.

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Matsuzawa sobre comportamento de chimpanzes

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Imagination: Human mind viewed from chimpanzee mind: Tetsuro Matsuzawa at TEDxYouth@Kyoto 2013

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"Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution" is a 1902 collection of essays by Russian naturalist and anarchist philosopher Peter Kropotkin. Originally published in "The Nineteenth Century" from 1890 to 1896, the essays examine mutually-beneficial cooperation and reciprocity in both animal and human societies.

# data[].attributes.body
Macaco não rouba
não tem dinheiro na floresta
violência

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Specismo == racismo/segragação social/politica
Comunicação de primatas? bater no peito (tarzan)
Macaco evoluiu, mas o que ele sugere assim é desenvolvimento.
Não cita o de Waal que é advogado da empatia e reconciliação

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Pyotr Alexeyevich Kropotkin (1842-1921) was a Russian anarchist and geographer known as a proponent of anarchist communism.

Born into an aristocratic land-owning family, Kropotkin attended a military school and later served as an officer in Siberia, where he participated in several geological expeditions. He was imprisoned for his activism in 1874 and managed to escape two years later. He spent the next 41 years in exile in Switzerland, France (where he was imprisoned for almost four years) and England. While in exile, he gave lectures and published widely on anarchism and geography. Kropotkin returned to Russia after the Russian Revolution in 1917, but he was disappointed by the Bolshevik state.

Kropotkin was a proponent of a decentralized communist society free from central government and based on voluntary associations of self-governing communities and worker-run enterprises. He wrote many books, pamphlets and articles, the most prominent being The Conquest of Bread and Fields, Factories, and Workshops, with Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution being his principal scientific offering. He contributed the article on anarchism to the Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition and left an unfinished work on anarchist ethical philosophy.

Kropotkin was born in Moscow on December 9, 1842, in the Konyushennaya (" Equerries") district. His father, Alexander, was a typical royal officer who owned serfs in three provinces and whose family descended from the Grand Princes of Smolensk. His mother, Ekatarina Sulima, was the daughter of General Nikolai Sulima and a descendant of a Zaporozhian Cossacks leader. Peter, the youngest of her four children, was three years old when she died of tuberculosis. Kropotkin's father remarried two years later. This stepmother was indifferent towards the Kropotkin children and had a streak of jealous vindictiveness, going through great lengths to remove the memory of Kropotkin's mother.

With his father mostly absent, Kropotkin and his older brother, Alexander, were raised by their German nurse. Kropotkin developed an enduring compassion for the estate's servants and serfs who cared for him and relayed stories of his mother's kindness. He was raised in the family's Moscow mansion and an estate in Nikolskoye, Kaluga Oblast, outside Moscow.

At the age of eight, Kropotkin attended Tsar Nicholas I's Royal Ball. Commending the child's costume, the tsar chose Kropotkin for his Page Corps, an elite school in St. Petersburg that combined military and court education and produced the tsar's imperial attendants. Kropotkin joined the Page Corps as a teenager and began a 14-year epistolary relationship with his brother that charts his intellectual and emotional development. By the time of his arrival, Kropotkin had already shown a populist position towards the emancipation of serfs and a nature of revolt against his father and the school's hazing. Kropotkin began his first underground revolutionary writings at the school, where he advocated for a Russian constitution. He developed interest in science, reading, and opera. As a top student, Kropotkin became a sergeant-major in 1861 and was thrust into court life, serving as the emperor's personal Page de Chambre. His views of the tsar and court life soured as imperial policy changed over the next year. Privately he was preoccupied with the need to live a societally useful life.

For his tour of service, in 1862 he chose the Amur Cossacks in east Siberia, an undesirable post that would let him study the technical mathematics of artillery, travel, live in nature, and become financially independent from his father. He developed a firm worldview of compassion for the poor, and contrasted the pride and dignity of the yeoman peasant farmers against the indignities of serfdom. He wrote approvingly of the cultivated Transbaikalia governor-general Boleslar Kazimirovich Kukel, to whom Kropotkin reported. Kukel engaged Kropotkin in prison reform and city self-governance projects that the central government ultimately denied. The exiled poet and political prisoner Mikhail Larionovitch Mikhailov introduced Kropotkin to anarchism by suggesting an essay by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Kropotkin's brother came to live with him in Irkutsk.

After Kukel's ouster in early 1863, Kropotkin found solace in geographical work. He led a disguised reconnaissance expedition to find a direct route through Manchuria from Chita to Vladivostok the next year. He explored the East Siberian Mountains in the north the year after. The mountain measurements from his 1866 Olekminsk- Vitimsk expedition confirmed his Manchurian hypothesis that the Siberian area from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean was a plateau and not a plain. This discovery of the Patom and Vitim Plateaus won him a gold medal from the Russian Geographical Society and led to the commercialization of the Lena gold fields. A range of mountains in this region was later named for him.

Kropotkin covered Siberia for St. Petersburg newspapers since his arrival, including the condition of the Polish political exiles who participated in the unsuccessful 1866 Baikal Insurrection. Kropotkin secured a promise from the governor-general to suspend the prisoners' death sentences, which was reneged. Disillusioned, Kropotkin and his brother resolved to leave the military. His time in Siberia taught him to appreciate peasant social organization and convinced him that administrative reform was an ineffectual means to improve social conditions.

After five years in Siberia, Kropotkin and his brother moved to St. Petersburg, where they continued their schooling and academic work. Kropotkin took a position with the Russian interior ministry with no duties. He studied physics, math, and geography at the university. After presenting his Vitim expedition findings, Kropotkin accepted the Russian Geographical Society's part-time offer of its Physical Geography section Secretaryship. Kropotkin translated Herbert Spencer for additional income. He continued to develop a theory, which he considered his best scientific contribution, that the East Siberian mountains were part of a large plateau and not independent ridges. Kropotkin participated in an 1870 polar expedition plan that postulated the existence of what was later discovered as the Franz Josef Land Arctic archipelago.

In early 1871, he was commissioned to study the Ice Age in Scandinavian geography, in which Kropotkin developed theories of the glaciation of Europe and the glacial lakes of its northeast. His father died later that year and Kropotkin inherited a wealthy estate in Tambov. Kropotkin turned down the Geographical Society's offer of its general secretary position, instead choosing work on his Ice Age data and interest in bettering the lives of peasants.

Kropotkin in 1876

While Kropotkin became increasingly revolutionary in his writings, he was not known for activism. He was spurred by the 1871 Paris Commune and trial of Sergey Nechayev. He and his brother attended meetings on the Franco-Prussian War and revolutionism. Likely at the encouragement of a Swiss extended family member and his own desire to see the socialist worker's movement, Kropotkin set out to see Switzerland and Western Europe in February 1872. Over three months, he met Mikhail Sazhin in Zurich, worked and fell out with Nikolai Utin's Marxist group in Geneva, and was introduced to the Jura Federation's James Guillaume and Adhémar Schwitzguébel. The Jura were the main internal opposition to the Marxist-controlled First International, as followers of Mikhail Bakunin. Kropotkin was quickly impressed and was instantly converted to anarchism by the group's egalitarianism and independence of expression, but narrowly missed meeting the leading anarchist, Bakunin, while there. Kropotkin visited Belgium's movement before returning to Russia in May with contraband literature.

Back in St. Petersburg, Kropotkin joined the Chaikovsky Circle, a group of revolutionaries that Kropotkin considered more educational than revolutionary in their activities. Kropotkin believed in the inevitability of social revolution and the need for stateless social organization. His populist revolutionary program for the group focused on urban workers and peasants whereas the group's moderates focused on students. Partially for this reason, he declined to contribute his personal wealth to the group. He viewed professionals as unlikely to forgo their privileges and judged them to not live societally useful lives. His program emphasized federated agrarian communes and a revolutionary party. While he could speak powerfully, Kropotkin was not a successful organizer.

Kropotkin's first political memo in November 1873 covered his basic plan for stateless social reconstruction including common property, worker control of factories, shared physical labor towards societal need, and labor vouchers in lieu of money. He emphasized living among commoners and using propaganda to focus mass dissatisfaction. He rejected the Nechayev conspiracy model. Members of the circle began to be arrested in late 1873 and the Third Section secret police came for Kropotkin in March 1874.

His arrest for agitation, as a former page de chambre and officer, was scandalous. Kropotkin had just filed his Ice Age report and had been recently elected president of the Geographical Society's Physical and Mathematical Department. At the society's request the tsar granted Kropotkin books to finish his glaciation report. Kropotkin was held in the Peter and Paul Fortress. His brother, who had also radicalized as a follower of Lavrov, was also arrested and exiled in Siberia, where he committed suicide about a decade later.

Kropotkin was moved to the House of Detention prison military hospital in St. Petersburg for poor health, with the help of his sister. With assistance from friends, he escaped from the minimal-security prison in June 1876. By way of Scandinavia and England, Kropotkin arrived in Switzerland by the end of the year, where he met Italian anarchists Carlo Cafiero and Errico Malatesta. He visited Belgium and Zurich, where he met French geographer Élisée Reclus, who became a close friend.

Kropotkin associated with the Jura Federation and began editing its publication. He met and married his wife, a Russian Jewish student, in 1878. In 1879, he started , a revolutionary fortnightly, in Geneva that published his personal articulation of anarchist communism, the idea of distributing work product communally based on need rather than by work. He became the philosophy's most prominent proponent, despite not creating it. The philosophy became part of the Jura program in 1880 at Kropotkin's advocacy. Le Révolté also published Kropotkin's best known pamphlet, "An Appeal to the Young", in 1880.

Switzerland expelled Kropotkin at Russia's behest after the assassination of Alexander II in early 1881. He moved to Thonon-les-Bains, France, near Geneva, so that his wife could finish her Swiss education. Upon learning that the Holy League, a tsarist group, intended to kill him for his alleged association with the assassination, he moved to London, but could only bear to live there for a year. Upon his return in late 1882, the French arrested him for agitation, partly to appease Russia. He was sentenced to five years in Lyons. In early 1883, he was transferred to the Clairvaux Prison, where he continued his academic work. A public campaign of intellectuals and French legislators called for his release. Reclus published Words of a Rebel, a compilation of Kropotkin's Révolté writings while he was in prison, which became a main source of Kropotkin's thoughts on revolution. As Kropotkin's health worsened from scurvy and malaria, France released him in early 1886. He would stay in England through 1917, settling in Harrow, London, apart from brief trips to other European countries.

In London in late 1886, he co-founded , an anarchist monthly and the first English anarchist periodical, which he continued to support for almost three decades. His first and only child was born the next year. He published multiple books over the next coming years including In Russian and French Prisons and The Conquest of Bread. His intellectual circle in London included William Morris and W. B. Yeats as well as old Russian friends Sergey Stepnyak-Kravchinsky and Nikolai Tchaikovsky. Kropotkin contributed to the Geographical Journal and Nature.

After 1890, according to biographers George Woodcock and Ivan Avakumović, Kropotkin became a scholarly recluse and less of a propagandist. His works' revolutionary zeal subsided as he turned to social, ethical, and scientific questions. He joined the British Association for the Advancement of Science. He continued to contribute to Freedom but was no longer an editor.

Several of Kropotkin's books began as journal articles. His writings on anarchist communist social life were printed in the French successor to Le Révolté and later revised into The Conquest of Bread in 1892. Kropotkin's writings on decentralizing production and industry against the countervailing trend of centralized industrialization were compiled into his Fields, Factories, and Workshops in 1899. His research throughout the 1890s on the animal instinct for cooperation as a counterpoint to Darwinism became a series of articles in Nineteenth Century and, later, the book Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, which was widely translated.

Following a scientific congress in Toronto in 1897, Kropotkin toured Canada. His experience there led him to advise the Russian Doukhobors who sought to immigrate there. He helped facilitate their emigration in 1899. Kropotkin entered the United States and met John Most, Emma Goldman, and Benjamin Tucker. American publishers published his Memoirs of a Revolutionist and Fields, Factories, and Workshops by the end of the decade. He visited the United States again in 1901 at the invitation of the Lowell Institute to give lectures on Russian literature that were later published. He published The Great French Revolution (1909), The Terror in Russia (1909), and Modern Science and Anarchism (1913). His 70th birthday in 1912 had celebratory gatherings in London and Paris.

Kropotkin's support for Western entry into World War I, siding with England and France, divided the anarchist movement, which had been anti-war, and damaged his esteem as a luminary of socialism. He exacerbated this by insisting, with returning to Russia, that Russians support the war as well.

Emma Goldman delivering a eulogy at Kropotkin's funeral

With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, Kropotkin returned to Russia in June 1917. He refused the Petrograd Provisional Government's offer of a cabinet seat. In August, he advocated for defending Russia and the revolution at the National State Conference. Kropotkin applied for a residence in Moscow in 1918, which was personally approved by Vladimir Lenin, head of the Soviet government. Months later, finding life in Moscow difficult in his old age, Kropotkin moved with his family to a friend's home in the nearby town of Dmitrov. In 1919, Emma Goldman visited his family there. Kropotkin met with Lenin in Moscow and corresponded by mail to discuss political questions of the day. He advocated for workers' cooperatives and argued against the Bolsheviks' hostage policy and centralization of authority while simultaneously encouraging Western comrades to stop their governments' military interventions in Russia. Kropotkin ultimately had little impact on the Russian revolution, but his advocacy work for political and anarchist prisoners in Russia and for the Russian revolution, during the last four years of his life replenished some of the goodwill he had lost from his support for Western powers in World War I.

Kropotkin died of pneumonia on February 8, 1921. His family refused an offer of a state funeral. With his Moscow funeral, the Bolsheviks permitted the diminished Russian anarchist movement an official, restrained occasion to memorialize their figurehead. It was the last major anarchist demonstration of the period in Russia, as the movement and Kropotkin's writings would be fully suppressed later that year.

Kropotkin critiqued what he considered to be the fallacies of the economic systems of feudalism and capitalism. He believed they create poverty and artificial scarcity and promote privilege. Alternatively, he proposed a more decentralized economic system based on mutual aid and voluntary cooperation. He argued that the tendencies for this kind of organization already exist, both in evolution and in human society.

Kropotkin disagreed in part with the Marxist critique of capitalism, including the labor theory of value, believing there was no necessary link between work performed and the values of commodities. His attack on the institution of wage labor was based more on the power employers exerted over employees, and not only on the extraction of surplus value from their labor. Kropotkin claimed this power was made possible by the state's protection of private ownership of productive resources. However, Kropotkin believed the possibility of surplus value was itself the problem, holding that a society would still be unjust if the workers of a particular industry kept their surplus to themselves, rather than redistributing it for the common good.

Kropotkin believed that a communist society could be established only by a social revolution, which he described as, "... the taking possession by the people of all social wealth. It is the abolition of all the forces which have so long hampered the development of Humanity". However, he criticized forms of revolutionary methods (like those proposed by Marxism and Blanquism) that retained the use of state power, arguing that any central authority was incompatible with the dramatic changes needed by a social revolution. Kropotkin believed that the mechanisms of the state were deeply rooted in maintaining the power of one class over another, and thus could not be used to emancipate the working class. Instead, Kropotkin insisted that both private property and the state needed to be abolished together.

The economic change which will result from the Social Revolution will be so immense and so profound, it must so change all the relations based today on property and exchange, that it is impossible for one or any individual to elaborate the different social forms, which must spring up in the society of the future. [...] Any authority external to it will only be an obstacle, only a trammel on the organic labor which must be accomplished, and beside that a source of discord and hatred.

Kropotkin believed that any post-revolutionary government would lack the local knowledge to organize a diverse population. Their vision of society would be limited by their own vindictive, self-serving, or narrow ideals. To ensure order, preserve authority, and organize production the state would need to use violence and coercion to suppress further revolution, and control workers. The workers would be reliant on the state bureaucracy to organize them, so they would never develop the initiative to self-organize as they needed. This would lead to the re-creation of classes, an oppressed workforce, and eventually another revolution. Thus, Kropotkin wrote that maintaining the state would paralyze any true social revolution, making the idea of a "revolutionary government" a contradiction in terms:

We know that Revolution and Government are incompatible; one must destroy the other, no matter what name is given to government, whether dictator, royalty, or parliament. We know that what makes the strength and the truth of our party is contained in this fundamental formula - "Nothing good or durable can be done except by the free initiative of the people, and every government tends to destroy it;" and so the very best among us, if their ideas had not to pass through the crucible of the popular mind, before being put into execution, and if they should become masters of that formidable machine - the government - and could thus act as they chose, would become in a week fit only for the gallows. We know whither every dictator leads, even the best intentioned, - namely to the death of all revolutionary movement.

Rather than a centralized approach, Kropotkin stressed the need for decentralized organization. He believed that dissolving the state would cripple counter-revolution without reverting to authoritarian methods of control, writing, "In order to conquer, something more than guillotines are required. It is the revolutionary idea, the truly wide revolutionary conception, which reduces its enemies to impotence by paralyzing all the instruments by which they have governed hitherto." He believed this was possible only through a widespread "Boldness of thought, a distinct and wide conception of all that is desired, constructive force arising from the people in proportion as the negation of authority dawns; and finally -- the initiative of all in the work of reconstruction -- this will give to the revolution the Power required to conquer."

Kropotkin applied this criticism to the Bolsheviks' rule following the October Revolution. Kropotkin summarized his thoughts in a 1919 letter to the workers of Western Europe, promoting the possibility of revolution, but also warning against the centralized control in Russia, which he believed had condemned them to failure. Kropotkin wrote to Lenin in 1920, describing the desperate conditions that he believed to be the result of bureaucratic organization, and urging Lenin to allow for local and decentralized institutions. Following an announcement of executions later that year, Kropotkin sent Lenin another furious letter, admonishing the terror which Kropotkin saw as needlessly destructive.

In 1902, Kropotkin published his book Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, which gave an alternative view of animal and human survival. At the time, some proponents of " Social Darwinism" such as Francis Galton proffered a theory of interpersonal competition and natural hierarchy. Instead, Kropotkin argued that "it was an evolutionary emphasis on cooperation instead of competition in the Darwinian sense that made for the success of species, including the human". In the last chapter, he wrote:

In the animal world we have seen that the vast majority of species live in societies, and that they find in association the best arms for the struggle for life: understood, of course, in its wide Darwinian sense - not as a struggle for the sheer means of existence, but as a struggle against all natural conditions unfavourable to the species. The animal species [...] in which individual struggle has been reduced to its narrowest limits [...] and the practice of mutual aid has attained the greatest development [...] are invariably the most numerous, the most prosperous, and the most open to further progress. The mutual protection which is obtained in this case, the possibility of attaining old age and of accumulating experience, the higher intellectual development, and the further growth of sociable habits, secure the maintenance of the species, its extension, and its further progressive evolution. The unsociable species, on the contrary, are doomed to decay.

Kropotkin did not deny the presence of competitive urges in humans, but did not consider them the driving force of human history. He believed that seeking out conflict proved to be socially beneficial only in attempts to destroy injustice, as well as authoritarian institutions such as the state or the Russian Orthodox Church, which he saw as stifling human creativity and impeding human instinctual drive towards cooperation.

Kropotkin claimed that the benefits arising from mutual organization incentivizes humans more than mutual strife. His hope was that in the long run, mutual organization would drive individuals to produce. Anarcho-primitivists and anarcho-communists believe that a gift economy can break the cycle of poverty. They rely on Kropotkin, who believed that the hunter-gatherers he had visited implemented mutual aid.

In his 1892 book The Conquest of Bread, Kropotkin proposed a system of economics based on mutual exchanges made in a system of voluntary cooperation. He believed that in a society that is socially, culturally, and industrially developed enough to produce all the goods and services it needs, there would be no obstacle, such as preferential distribution, pricing or monetary exchange, to prevent everyone to take what they need from the social product. He supported the eventual abolition of money or tokens of exchange for goods and services.

Kropotkin believed that Mikhail Bakunin's collectivist economic model was just a wage system by a different name and that such a system would breed the same type of centralization and inequality as a capitalist wage system. He stated that it is impossible to determine the value of an individual's contributions to the products of labor and thought that anyone who was placed in a position of trying to make such determinations would wield authority over those whose wages they determined.

According to Kirkpatrick Sale, "[w]ith Mutual Aid especially, and later with Fields, Factories, and Workshops, Kropotkin was able to move away from the absurdist limitations of individual anarchism and no-laws anarchism that had flourished during this period and provide instead a vision of communal anarchism, following the models of independent cooperative communities he discovered while developing his theory of mutual aid. It was an anarchism that opposed centralized government and state-level laws as traditional anarchism did, but understood that at a certain small scale, communities and communes and co-ops could flourish and provide humans with a rich material life and wide areas of liberty without centralized control."

Kropotkin's focus on local production led to his view that a country should strive for self-sufficiency - manufacture its own goods and grow its own food, lessening dependence on imports. To these ends, he advocated irrigation and greenhouses to boost local food production.

There was no cleavage between the man and his world. He spoke and acted in all things as he felt and believed and wrote. Kropotkin was a whole man.

Kropotkin married Sofia, a Russian Jewish student, in Switzerland in October 1878. She was over a decade younger and did not participate in Kropotkin's intellectual work. Their only child, Alexandra, was born in London in 1887. Kropotkin was reserved about his private life.

As an individual, Kropotkin was known for having exceptional integrity and moral character that matched his beliefs. Henry Hyndman, an ideological adversary, recalled Kropotkin's charm and sincerity. These traits, wrote Stepnyak-Kravchinsky, contributed to Kropotkin's power as a public speaker. As a thinker, Kropotkin focused more acutely on issues of morality than of economics or politics and carried himself by his own principles without imposition on others. In practice, this made him more of a "revolutionary humanitarian" than a revolutionist by deed. He was also known for being exceptionally kind and for forgoing material comforts to live a revolutionary, principled life by example. Wrote one philosopher, Kropotkin's "scholarly and saintly ways ... almost brought respectability to the movement."

The Kropotkinskaya metro station

Kropotkin was the leading anarchist theorist of his time. His oeuvre was the closest to a systemic anarchist doctrine, accessible by non-anarchists, and as historian Richard T. Drinnon put it, the "fullest and finest theoretical expression" of the political philosophy. Kropotkin was the main figure in the development of anarchist-communist social doctrine. His works, inventive and pragmatic, were the most read anarchist books and pamphlets, with translations into major European and Eastern languages that influenced revolutionaries (e.g., Nestor Makhno and Emiliano Zapata) and non-anarchist reformers alike (e.g., Patrick Geddes, Ebenezer Howard), as well as a wide range of intellectuals (including the writers Pa Chin and James Joyce). Much of Kropotkin's impact was in his intellectual writings prior to 1914. He had little influence on the Russian revolution, despite returning for it.

Emma Goldman regarded Kropotkin as her "great teacher" and as among the greatest minds and personalities of the 19th century.

After Kropotkin's 1921 death, the Bolsheviks permitted Kropotkin's Moscow house to become a Kropotkin Museum. This closed in 1938 with his wife's death.

Kropotkin is the namesake for multiple regional entities. The Konyushennaya district in Moscow, where Kropotkin was born, is now known by his name, as the Kropotkinsky district, including the Kropotkinskaya metro station. He is the namesake for a large town in the North Caucasus (southwest Russia) and a small town in Siberia. The Kropotkin Range he was first to cross in the Siberian Patom Highlands was named for him, as was a peak in East Antarctica.

In Russian and French Prisons, London: Ward and Downey; 1887.

The Conquest of Bread (Paris, 1892) Project Gutenberg e-text, Project LibriVox audiobook

The Great French Revolution, 1789-1793 (French original: Paris, 1893; English translation: London, 1909). e-text (in French), Anarchist Library e-text (in English)

The Terror in Russia, 1909, RevoltLib e-text

Fields, Factories, and Workshops (London and New York, 1898).

Memoirs of a Revolutionist, London: Smith, Elder; 1899. Anarchist Library e-text, Anarchy Archives e-text

Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (London, 1902) Project Gutenberg e-text, Project LibriVox audiobook

Modern Science and Anarchism, 1903, *

Russian Literature: Ideals and Realities (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1905). Anarchy Archives e-text

The State: Its Historic Role, published 1946,

Ethics: Origin and Development (unfinished). Included as first part of Origen y evolución de la moral (Spanish e-text)

"Research on the Ice age", Notices of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, 1876.

"Baron Toll", The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 6. (Jun. 1904), pp. 770-772, JSTOR

"The old beds of the Amu-Daria", The Geographical Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3. (Sep. 1898), pp. 306-310, JSTOR

Mr. Mackinder; Mr. Ravenstein; Dr. Herbertson; Prince Kropotkin; Mr. Andrews; Cobden Sanderson; Elisée Reclus, "On Spherical Maps and Reliefs: Discussion", The Geographical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Sep. 1903), pp. 294-299, JSTOR

"The desiccation of Eur-Asia", Geographical Journal, 23 (1904), 722-41.

"Finland" in Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.), 1911 (in part; with Joseph R. Fisher and John Scott Keltie)

Avrich, Paul (1988). Anarchist Portraits. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp. 53-106. ISBN 0-691-04753-7. OCLC 17727270.

Crowder, George (2003). "Petr Alekseevich Kropotkin". In Dinega, Alyssa W. (ed.). Russian Literature in the Age of Realism. Vol. 277. Detroit, MI: Gale. pp. 191-198. Gale OOSVCP062651800.

Green, Lara (2022). "The Transnational Life and Death of Peter Kropotkin, 1881-1921: Terrorism, the Anarchist Body, and the Russian Revolution". Anarchist Studies. 30 (1): 83-. ISSN 0967-3393. Gale A708386012.

Marshall, Peter (1992). "Peter Kropotkin: The Revolutionary Evolutionist". Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. London: HarperCollins. pp. 309-338. ISBN 978-0-00-217855-6.

Osofsky, Stephen (1979). Peter Kropotkin. Boston: Twayne Publishers. ISBN 978-0-8057-7724-6. OCLC 4497420.

Kropotkin, Peter; Walter, Nicolas (1971). Memoirs of a Revolutionist. New York: Dover. ISBN 978-0-486-22485-5.

Woodcock, George (1986). "The Explorer". Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (2nd ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. pp. 153-182. ISBN 978-0-14-022697-3. OCLC 489971695.

Afinogenov, Greg (May 4, 2023). "What should the action be?". London Review of Books. Vol. 45, no. 9. ISSN 0260-9592.

Alan, Barnard (March 2004). "Mutual Aid and the Foraging Mode of Thought: Re-reading Kropotkin on the Khoisan". Social Evolution & History. 3 (1): 3-21. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.515.4372.

Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Kropotkin, Peter Alexeivich" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 15 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 928.

Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1922). "Kropotkin, Peter Alexeivich, Prince" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 31 (12th ed.). London & New York: The Encyclopædia Britannica Company. p. 688.

Efremenko, Dmitry; Evseeva, Yaroslava (2012). "Studies of Social Solidarity in Russia: Tradition and Modern Trends". The American Sociologist. 43 (4): 349-365. doi:10.1007/s12108-012-9165-2. ISSN 0003-1232. JSTOR 23319618. S2CID 255519594.

Gould, S. J. (June 1997). "Kropotkin Was No Crackpot". Natural History. 106: 12-21.

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Pyotr Alexeyevich Kropotkin (1842-1921) was a Russian anarchist and geographer known as a proponent of anarchist communism. Born into an aristocratic land-owning family, Kropotkin attended a military school and later served as an officer in Siberia, where he participated in several geological expeditions.

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Herbert Spencer (27 April 1820 - 8 December 1903) was an English philosopher, biologist, anthropologist, and sociologist famous for his theory of social Darwinism whereby superior physical force shapes history.

Spencer is best known as the originator of the expression " survival of the fittest", which he coined in Principles of Biology (1864) after reading Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species. The term strongly suggests natural selection, yet Spencer saw evolution as extending into realms of sociology and ethics, so he also supported Lamarckism.

Spencer developed an all-embracing conception of evolution as the progressive development of the physical world, biological organisms, the human mind, and human culture and societies. As a polymath, he contributed to a wide range of subjects, including ethics, religion, anthropology, economics, political theory, philosophy, literature, astronomy, biology, sociology, and psychology. During his lifetime he achieved tremendous authority, mainly in English-speaking academia. "The only other English philosopher to have achieved anything like such widespread popularity was Bertrand Russell, and that was in the 20th century." Spencer was "the single most famous European intellectual in the closing decades of the nineteenth century" but his influence declined sharply after 1900: "Who now reads Spencer?" asked Talcott Parsons in 1937.

Spencer was born in Derby, England, on 27 April 1820, the son of William George Spencer (generally called George). Spencer's father was a religious dissenter who drifted from Methodism to Quakerism, and who seems to have transmitted to his son an opposition to all forms of authority. He ran a school founded on the progressive teaching methods of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and also served as Secretary of the Derby Philosophical Society, a scientific society which had been founded in 1783 by Erasmus Darwin, the grandfather of Charles Darwin.

Spencer was educated in empirical science by his father, while the members of the Derby Philosophical Society introduced him to pre-Darwinian concepts of biological evolution, particularly those of Erasmus Darwin and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. His uncle, the Reverend Thomas Spencer, vicar of Hinton Charterhouse near Bath, completed Spencer's limited formal education by teaching him some mathematics and physics, and enough Latin to enable him to translate some easy texts. Thomas Spencer also imprinted on his nephew his own firm free-trade and anti-statist political views. Otherwise, Spencer was an autodidact who acquired most of his knowledge from narrowly focused readings and conversations with his friends and acquaintances.

Both as an adolescent and as a young man, Spencer found it difficult to settle to any intellectual or professional discipline. He worked as a civil engineer during the railway boom of the late 1830s, while also devoting much of his time to writing for provincial journals that were nonconformist in their religion and radical in their politics. From 1848 to 1853 he served as sub-editor on the free-trade journal The Economist, during which time he published his first book, Social Statics (1851), which predicted that humanity would eventually become completely adapted to the requirements of living in society with the consequential withering away of the state.

Its publisher, John Chapman, introduced Spencer to his salon which was attended by many of the leading radical and progressive thinkers of the capital, including John Stuart Mill, Harriet Martineau, George Henry Lewes and Mary Ann Evans ( George Eliot), with whom he was briefly romantically linked. Spencer himself introduced the biologist Thomas Henry Huxley, who would later win fame as 'Darwin's Bulldog' and who remained his lifelong friend. However, it was the friendship of Evans and Lewes that acquainted him with John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic and with Auguste Comte's positivism and which set him on the road to his life's work. He strongly disagreed with Comte.

The first fruit of his friendship with Evans and Lewes was Spencer's second book, Principles of Psychology, published in 1855, which explored a physiological basis for psychology. The book was founded on the fundamental assumption that the human mind was subject to natural laws and that these could be discovered within the framework of general biology. This permitted the adoption of a developmental perspective not merely in terms of the individual (as in traditional psychology), but also of the species and the race. Through this paradigm, Spencer aimed to reconcile the associationist psychology of Mill's Logic, the notion that human mind was constructed from atomic sensations held together by the laws of the association of ideas, with the apparently more 'scientific' theory of phrenology, which located specific mental functions in specific parts of the brain.

Spencer argued that both these theories were partial accounts of the truth: repeated associations of ideas were embodied in the formation of specific strands of brain tissue, and these could be passed from one generation to the next by means of the Lamarckian mechanism of use-inheritance. The Psychology, he believed, would do for the human mind what Isaac Newton had done for matter. However, the book was not initially successful and the last of the 251 copies of its first edition were not sold until June 1861.

Spencer's interest in psychology derived from a more fundamental concern which was to establish the universality of natural law. In common with others of his generation, including the members of Chapman's salon, he was possessed with the idea of demonstrating that it was possible to show that everything in the universe - including human culture, language, and morality - could be explained by laws of universal validity. This was in contrast to the views of many theologians of the time who insisted that some parts of creation, in particular the human soul, were beyond the realm of scientific investigation. Comte's Système de Philosophie Positive had been written with the ambition of demonstrating the universality of natural law, and Spencer was to follow Comte in the scale of his ambition. However, Spencer differed from Comte in believing it was possible to discover a single law of universal application which he identified with progressive development and was to call the principle of evolution.

In 1858 Spencer produced an outline of what was to become the System of Synthetic Philosophy. This immense undertaking, which has few parallels in the English language, aimed to demonstrate that the principle of evolution applied in biology, psychology, sociology (Spencer appropriated Comte's term for the new discipline) and morality. Spencer envisaged that this work of ten volumes would take twenty years to complete; in the end it took him twice as long and consumed almost all the rest of his long life.

Despite Spencer's early struggles to establish himself as a writer, by the 1870s he had become the most famous philosopher of the age. His works were widely read during his lifetime, and by 1869 he was able to support himself solely on the profit of book sales and on income from his regular contributions to Victorian periodicals which were collected as three volumes of Essays. His works were translated into German, Italian, Spanish, French, Russian, Japanese and Chinese, and into many other languages and he was offered honours and awards all over Europe and North America. He also became a member of the Athenaeum, an exclusive Gentleman's Club in London open only to those distinguished in the arts and sciences, and the X Club, a dining club of nine founded by T.H. Huxley that met every month and included some of the most prominent thinkers of the Victorian age (three of whom would become presidents of the Royal Society).

Members included physicist-philosopher John Tyndall and Darwin's cousin, the banker and biologist Sir John Lubbock. There were also some quite significant satellites such as liberal clergyman Arthur Stanley, the Dean of Westminster; and guests such as Charles Darwin and Hermann von Helmholtz were entertained from time to time. Through such associations, Spencer had a strong presence in the heart of the scientific community and was able to secure an influential audience for his views. Despite his growing wealth and fame he never owned a house of his own.

The last decades of Spencer's life were characterised by growing disillusionment and loneliness. He never married, and after 1855 was a perpetual hypochondriac who complained endlessly of pains and maladies that no physician could diagnose at that time.[citation needed ] By the 1890s his readership had begun to desert him while many of his closest friends died and he had come to doubt the confident faith in progress that he had made the center-piece of his philosophical system. His later years were also ones in which his political views became increasingly conservative. Whereas Social Statics had been the work of a radical democrat who believed in votes for women (and even for children) and in the nationalisation of the land to break the power of the aristocracy, by the 1880s he had become a staunch opponent of female suffrage and made common cause with the landowners of the Liberty and Property Defence League against what they saw as the drift towards 'socialism' of elements (such as Sir William Harcourt) within the administration of William Ewart Gladstone - largely against the opinions of Gladstone himself. Spencer's political views from this period were expressed in what has become his most famous work, The Man Versus the State.

The exception to Spencer's growing conservatism was that he remained throughout his life an ardent opponent of imperialism and militarism. His critique of the Boer War was especially scathing, and it contributed to his declining popularity in Britain.

Spencer also invented a precursor to the modern paper clip, though it looked more like a modern cotter pin. This "binding-pin" was distributed by Ackermann & Company. Spencer shows drawings of the pin in Appendix I (following Appendix H) of his autobiography along with published descriptions of its uses.

In 1902, shortly before his death, Spencer was nominated for the Nobel Prize for literature, that was assigned to the German Theodor Mommsen. He continued writing all his life, in later years often by dictation, until he succumbed to poor health at the age of 83. His ashes are interred in the eastern side of London's Highgate Cemetery facing Karl Marx's grave. At Spencer's funeral the Indian nationalist leader Shyamji Krishna Varma announced a donation of £1,000 to establish a lectureship at Oxford University in tribute to Spencer and his work.

The basis for Spencer's appeal to many of his generation was that he appeared to offer a ready-made system of belief which could substitute for conventional religious faith at a time when orthodox creeds were crumbling under the advances of modern science. Spencer's philosophical system seemed to demonstrate that it was possible to believe in the ultimate perfection of humanity on the basis of advanced scientific conceptions such as the first law of thermodynamics and biological evolution.

In essence Spencer's philosophical vision was formed by a combination of deism and positivism. On the one hand, he had imbibed something of eighteenth century deism from his father and other members of the Derby Philosophical Society and from books like George Combe's immensely popular The Constitution of Man (1828). This treated the world as a cosmos of benevolent design, and the laws of nature as the decrees of a 'Being transcendentally kind.' Natural laws were thus the statutes of a well governed universe that had been decreed by the Creator with the intention of promoting human happiness. Although Spencer lost his Christian faith as a teenager and later rejected any 'anthropomorphic' conception of the Deity, he nonetheless held fast to this conception at an almost sub-conscious level. At the same time, however, he owed far more than he would ever acknowledge to positivism, in particular in its conception of a philosophical system as the unification of the various branches of scientific knowledge. He also followed positivism in his insistence that it was only possible to have genuine knowledge of phenomena and hence that it was idle to speculate about the nature of the ultimate reality. The tension between positivism and his residual deism ran through the entire System of Synthetic Philosophy.

Spencer followed Comte in aiming for the unification of scientific truth; it was in this sense that his philosophy aimed to be 'synthetic.' Like Comte, he was committed to the universality of natural law, the idea that the laws of nature applied without exception, to the organic realm as much as to the inorganic, and to the human mind as much as to the rest of creation. The first objective of the Synthetic Philosophy was thus to demonstrate that there were no exceptions to being able to discover scientific explanations, in the form of natural laws, of all the phenomena of the universe. Spencer's volumes on biology, psychology, and sociology were all intended to demonstrate the existence of natural laws in these specific disciplines. Even in his writings on ethics, he held that it was possible to discover 'laws' of morality that had the status of laws of nature while still having normative content, a conception which can be traced to George Combe's Constitution of Man.

The second objective of the Synthetic Philosophy was to show that these same laws led inexorably to progress. In contrast to Comte, who stressed only the unity of scientific method, Spencer sought the unification of scientific knowledge in the form of the reduction of all natural laws to one fundamental law, the law of evolution. In this respect, he followed the model laid down by the Edinburgh publisher Robert Chambers in his anonymous Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844). Although often dismissed as a lightweight forerunner of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species, Chambers' book was in reality a programme for the unification of science which aimed to show that Laplace's nebular hypothesis for the origin of the solar system and Lamarck's theory of species transformation were both instances of 'one magnificent generalisation of progressive development' (Lewes' phrase). Chambers was associated with Chapman's salon and his work served as the unacknowledged template for the Synthetic Philosophy.

Spencer first articulated his evolutionary perspective in his essay, 'Progress: Its Law and Cause', published in Chapman's Westminster Review in 1857, and which later formed the basis of the First Principles of a New System of Philosophy (1862). In it he expounded a theory of evolution which combined insights from Samuel Taylor Coleridge's essay 'The Theory of Life' - itself derivative from Friedrich von Schelling's Naturphilosophie - with a generalisation of von Baer's law of embryological development. Spencer posited that all structures in the universe develop from a simple, undifferentiated, homogeneity to a complex, differentiated, heterogeneity, while being accompanied by a process of greater integration of the differentiated parts. This evolutionary process could be found at work, Spencer believed, throughout the cosmos. It was a universal law, that was applying to the stars and the galaxies as much as to biological organisms, and to human social organisation as much as to the human mind. It differed from other scientific laws only by its greater generality, and the laws of the special sciences could be shown to be illustrations of this principle.

The principles described by Herbert Spencer received different interpretations. Bertrand Russell stated in a letter to Beatrice Webb in 1923: 'I don't know whether [Spencer] was ever made to realize the implications of the second law of thermodynamics; if so, he may well be upset. The law says that everything tends to uniformity and a dead level, diminishing (not increasing) heterogeneity'. The alleged contradiction between Spencer's theory and the second law of thermodynamics might arise from limiting the definition of homogeneity and heterogeneity to the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the spatial distribution of matter. For instance, according to the second law of thermodynamics, molecules of gas filling a room eventually fill the room at similar intervals. On the other hand, the directions of motion of the molecules become more heterogeneous. Increasing heterogeneity of this sort aligns with the increase of entropy, related to the number of microscopic configurations consistent with the macroscopic quantities characterizing the system. Herbert Spencer considers Evolution, defined as the integration of matter and the dissipation of motion, to be necessarily followed by Dissolution, defined as the dissipation of matter and the integration of motion. Therefore, the heterogeneity of matter alone is not claimed to be ever increasing. Additionally, Herbert Spencer states that Dissolution goes towards Equilibration, a state of the system with no differential Force between its parts. A comparison can be made of such state with Thermodynamic equilibrium, a state with no net macroscopic flows of matter or of energy.

Spencer's attempt to explain the evolution of complexity was radically different from that to be found in Darwin's Origin of Species which was published two years later. Spencer is often, quite erroneously, believed to have merely appropriated and generalised Darwin's work on natural selection. But although after reading Darwin's work he coined the phrase ' survival of the fittest' as his own term for Darwin's concept, and is often misrepresented as a thinker who merely applied the Darwinian theory to society, he only grudgingly incorporated natural selection into his preexisting overall system. The primary mechanism of species transformation that he recognised was Lamarckian use-inheritance which posited that organs are developed or are diminished by use or disuse and that the resulting changes may be transmitted to future generations. Spencer believed that this evolutionary mechanism was also necessary to explain 'higher' evolution, especially the social development of humanity. Moreover, in contrast to Darwin, he held that evolution had a direction and an end-point, the attainment of a final state of equilibrium. He tried to apply the theory of biological evolution to sociology. He proposed that society was the product of change from lower to higher forms, just as in the theory of biological evolution, the lowest forms of life are said to be evolving into higher forms. Spencer claimed that man's mind had evolved in the same way from the simple automatic responses of lower animals to the process of reasoning in the thinking man. Spencer believed in two kinds of knowledge: knowledge gained by the individual and knowledge gained by the race. Intuition, or knowledge learned unconsciously, was the inherited experience of the race.

Spencer in his book Principles of Biology (1864), proposed a pangenesis theory that involved "physiological units" assumed to be related to specific body parts and responsible for the transmission of characteristics to offspring. These hypothetical hereditary units were similar to Darwin's gemmules.

Spencer read with excitement the original positivist sociology of Auguste Comte. A philosopher of science, Comte had proposed a theory of sociocultural evolution that society progresses by a general law of three stages. Writing after various developments in biology, however, Spencer rejected what he regarded as the ideological aspects of Comte's positivism, attempting to reformulate social science in terms of his principle of evolution, which he applied to the biological, psychological and sociological aspects of the universe.

Given the primacy which Spencer placed on evolution, his sociology might be described as social Darwinism mixed with Lamarckism. However, despite its popularity, this view of Spencer's sociology is mistaken. While his political and ethical writings had themes consistent with social Darwinism, such themes are absent in Spencer's sociological works, which focus on how processes of societal growth and differentiation lead to changing degrees of complexity in social organization

The evolutionary progression from simple, undifferentiated homogeneity to complex, differentiated heterogeneity was exemplified, Spencer argued, by the development of society. He developed a theory of two types of society, the militant and the industrial, which corresponded to this evolutionary progression. Militant society, structured around relationships of hierarchy and obedience, was simple and undifferentiated; industrial society, based on voluntary, contractually assumed social obligations, was complex and differentiated. Society, which Spencer conceptualised as a ' social organism' evolved from the simpler state to the more complex according to the universal law of evolution. Moreover, industrial society was the direct descendant of the ideal society developed in Social Statics, although Spencer now equivocated over whether the evolution of society would result in anarchism (as he had first believed) or whether it pointed to a continued role for the state, albeit one reduced to the minimal functions of the enforcement of contracts and external defense.

Though Spencer made some valuable contributions to early sociology, not least in his influence on structural functionalism, his attempt to introduce Lamarckian or Darwinian ideas into the realm of sociology was unsuccessful. It was considered by many, furthermore, to be actively dangerous. Hermeneuticians of the period, such as Wilhelm Dilthey, would pioneer the distinction between the natural sciences ( Naturwissenschaften) and human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). In the United States, the sociologist Lester Frank Ward, who would be elected as the first president of the American Sociological Association, launched a relentless attack on Spencer's theories of laissez-faire and political ethics. Although Ward admired much of Spencer's work he believed that Spencer's prior political biases had distorted his thought and had led him astray. In the 1890s, Émile Durkheim established formal academic sociology with a firm emphasis on practical social research. By the turn of the 20th century the first generation of German sociologists, most notably Max Weber, had presented methodological antipositivism. However, Spencer's theories of laissez-faire, survival-of-the-fittest and minimal human interference in the processes of natural law had an enduring and even increasing appeal in the social science fields of economics and political science, and one writer has recently made the case for Spencer's importance for a sociology that must learn to take energy in society seriously.

The end point of the evolutionary process would be the creation of 'the perfect man in the perfect society' with human beings becoming completely adapted to social life, as predicted in Spencer's first book. The chief difference between Spencer's earlier and later conceptions of this process was the evolutionary timescale involved. The psychological - and hence also the moral - constitution which had been bequeathed to the present generation by our ancestors, and which we in turn would hand on to future generations, was in the process of gradual adaptation to the requirements of living in society. For example, aggression was a survival instinct which had been necessary in the primitive conditions of life, but was maladaptive in advanced societies. Because human instincts had a specific location in strands of brain tissue, they were subject to the Lamarckian mechanism of use-inheritance so that gradual modifications could be transmitted to future generations. Over the course of many generations the evolutionary process would ensure that human beings would become less aggressive and increasingly altruistic, leading eventually to a perfect society in which no one would cause another person pain.

However, for evolution to produce the perfect individual it was necessary for present and future generations to experience the 'natural' consequences of their conduct. Only in this way would individuals have the incentives required to work on self-improvement and thus to hand an improved moral constitution to their descendants. Hence anything that interfered with the 'natural' relationship of conduct and consequence was to be resisted and this included the use of the coercive power of the state to relieve poverty, to provide public education, or to require compulsory vaccination. Although charitable giving was to be encouraged even it had to be limited by the consideration that suffering was frequently the result of individuals receiving the consequences of their actions. Hence too much individual benevolence directed to the 'undeserving poor' would break the link between conduct and consequence that Spencer considered fundamental to ensuring that humanity continued to evolve to a higher level of development.

Spencer adopted a utilitarian standard of ultimate value - the greatest happiness of the greatest number - and the culmination of the evolutionary process would be the maximization of utility. In the perfect society individuals would not only derive pleasure from the exercise of altruism ('positive beneficence') but would aim to avoid inflicting pain on others ('negative beneficence'). They would also instinctively respect the rights of others, leading to the universal observance of the principle of justice - each person had the right to a maximum amount of liberty that was compatible with a like liberty in others. 'Liberty' was interpreted to mean the absence of coercion, and was closely connected to the right to private property. Spencer termed this code of conduct 'Absolute Ethics' which provided a scientifically-grounded moral system that could substitute for the supernaturally-based ethical systems of the past. However, he recognized that our inherited moral constitution does not currently permit us to behave in full compliance with the code of Absolute Ethics, and for this reason we need a code of 'Relative Ethics' which takes into account the distorting factors of our present imperfections.

Spencer's distinctive view of musicology was also related to his ethics. Spencer thought that the origin of music is to be found in impassioned oratory. Speakers have persuasive effect not only by the reasoning of their words, but by their cadence and tone - the musical qualities of their voice serve as "the commentary of the emotions upon the propositions of the intellect," as Spencer put it.

Music, conceived as the heightened development of this characteristic of speech, makes a contribution to the ethical education and progress of the species. "The strange capacity which we have for being affected by melody and harmony, may be taken to imply both that it is within the possibilities of our nature to realize those intenser delights they dimly suggest, and that they are in some way concerned in the realization of them. If so the power and the meaning of music become comprehensible; but otherwise they are a mystery."

Spencer's last years were characterized by a collapse of his initial optimism, replaced instead by a pessimism regarding the future of mankind. Nevertheless, he devoted much of his efforts in reinforcing his arguments and preventing the mis-interpretation of his monumental theory of non-interference.

Spencer's reputation among the Victorians owed a great deal to his agnosticism. He rejected theology as representing the 'impiety of the pious.' He was to gain much notoriety from his repudiation of traditional religion, and was frequently condemned by religious thinkers for allegedly advocating atheism and materialism. Nonetheless, unlike Thomas Henry Huxley, whose agnosticism was a militant creed directed at 'the unpardonable sin of faith' (in Adrian Desmond's phrase), Spencer insisted that he was not concerned to undermine religion in the name of science, but to bring about a reconciliation of the two. The following argument is a summary of Part 1 of his First Principles (2nd ed 1867).

Starting either from religious belief or from science, Spencer argued, we are ultimately driven to accept certain indispensable but literally inconceivable notions. Whether we are concerned with a Creator or the substratum which underlies our experience of phenomena, we can frame no conception of it. Therefore, Spencer concluded, religion and science agree in the supreme truth that the human understanding is only capable of 'relative' knowledge. This is the case since, owing to the inherent limitations of the human mind, it is only possible to obtain knowledge of phenomena, not of the reality ('the absolute') underlying phenomena. Hence both science and religion must come to recognise as the 'most certain of all facts that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.' He called this awareness of 'the Unknowable' and he presented worship of the Unknowable as capable of being a positive faith which could substitute for conventional religion. Indeed, he thought that the Unknowable represented the ultimate stage in the evolution of religion, the final elimination of its last anthropomorphic vestiges.

Spencerian views in 21st-century circulation derive from his political theories and memorable attacks on the reform movements of the late 19th century. He has been claimed as a precursor by libertarians and anarcho-capitalists. Economist Murray Rothbard called Social Statics "the greatest single work of libertarian political philosophy ever written." Spencer argued that the state was not an "essential" institution and that it would "decay" as voluntary market organisation would replace the coercive aspects of the state. He also argued that the individual had a "right to ignore the state." As a result of this perspective, Spencer was harshly critical of patriotism. In response to being told that British troops were in danger during the Second Afghan War (1878-1880) he replied: "When men hire themselves out to shoot other men to order, asking nothing about the justice of their cause, I don't care if they are shot themselves."

Politics in late Victorian Britain moved in directions that Spencer disliked, and his arguments provided so much ammunition for conservatives and individualists in Europe and America that they are still in use in the 21st century. The expression ' There is no alternative' (TINA), made famous by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, may be traced to its emphatic use by Spencer.

By the 1880s he was denouncing "the new Toryism" (that is, the "social reformist wing" of the Liberal party - the wing to some extent hostile to Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone, this faction of the Liberal party Spencer compared to the interventionist " Toryism" of such people as the former Conservative party Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli). In The Man versus the State (1884), he attacked Gladstone and the Liberal party for losing its proper mission (they should be defending personal liberty, he said) and instead promoting paternalist social legislation (what Gladstone himself called "Construction" - an element in the modern Liberal party that he opposed).

Spencer denounced Irish land reform, compulsory education, laws to regulate safety at work, prohibition and temperance laws, tax funded libraries, and welfare reforms.

His main objections were threefold: the use of the coercive powers of the government, the discouragement given to voluntary self-improvement, and the disregard of the "laws of life." The reforms, he said, were tantamount to "socialism", which he said was about the same as "slavery" in terms of limiting human freedom. Spencer vehemently attacked the widespread enthusiasm for annexation of colonies and imperial expansion, which subverted all he had predicted about evolutionary progress from 'militant' to 'industrial' societies and states.

Spencer anticipated many of the analytical standpoints of later libertarian theorists such as Friedrich Hayek, especially in his "law of equal liberty", his insistence on the limits to predictive knowledge, his model of a spontaneous social order, and his warnings about the "unintended consequences" of collectivist social reforms.

While often caricatured as ultra-conservative, Spencer had been more radical earlier in his career - opposing private property in land and claiming that each person has a latent claim to participate in the use of the earth (views that influenced Georgism), calling himself "a radical feminist" and advocating the organisation of trade unions as a bulwark against "exploitation by bosses", and favoured an economy organised primarily in free worker co-operatives as a replacement for wage-labor. Although he retained support for unions, his views on the other issues had changed by the 1880s. He came to predict that social welfare programmes would eventually lead to socialisation of the means of production, saying "all socialism is slavery"; Spencer defined a slave as a person who "labours under coercion to satisfy another's desires" and believed that under socialism or communism the individual would be enslaved to the whole community rather than to a particular master, and "it means not whether his master is a single person or society".

Social Darwinism

For many, the name of Herbert Spencer is virtually synonymous with social Darwinism, a social theory that applies the law of the survival of the fittest to society and is integrally related to the nineteenth century rise in scientific racism. In addition to Spencer's many positive contributions to intellectual thought, his contributions to racist ideology must also be acknowledged. In his famed work Social Statics (1850), he argued that imperialism had served civilization by clearing the inferior races off the earth: "The forces which are working out the great scheme of perfect happiness, taking no account of incidental suffering, exterminate such sections of mankind as stand in their way. ... Be he human or be he brute - the hindrance must be got rid of." Yet, in the same work, Spencer goes on to say that the incidental evolutionary benefits derived from such barbarous practices do not serve as justifications for them going forward.

Spencer's association with social Darwinism might have its origin in a specific interpretation of his support for competition. Whereas in biology the competition of various organisms can result in the death of a species or organism, the kind of competition Spencer advocated is closer to the one used by economists, where competing individuals or firms improve the well being of the rest of society. Spencer viewed private charity positively, encouraging both voluntary association and informal care to aid those in need, rather than relying on government bureaucracy or force. He further recommended that private charitable efforts would be wise to avoid encouraging the formation of new dependent families by those unable to support themselves without charity.

Focusing on the form as well as the content of Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy", one writer has identified it as the paradigmatic case of "social Darwinism", understood as a politically motivated metaphysic very different in both form and motivation from Darwinist science.

In a letter to the Japanese government regarding intermarriage with Westerners, Spencer stated that "if you mix the constitution of two widely divergent varieties which have severally become adapted to widely divergent modes of life, you get a constitution which is adapted to the mode of life of neither-a constitution which will not work properly". He goes on to say that America has failed to limit the immigration of Chinese and restrict their contact, especially sexual, with the presumed European stock. He states "if they mix they must form a bad hybrid" regarding the issue of Chinese and (ethnically European) Americans. Spencer ends his letter with the following blanket statement against all immigration: "In either case, supposing the immigration to be large, immense social mischief must arise, and eventually social disorganization. The same thing will happen if there should be any considerable mixture of European or American races with the Japanese."

While most philosophers fail to achieve much of a following outside the academy of their professional peers, by the 1870s and 1880s Spencer had achieved an unparalleled popularity, as the sheer volume of his sales indicate. He was probably the first, and possibly the only, philosopher in history to sell over a million copies of his works during his own lifetime. In the United States, where pirated editions were still commonplace, his authorised publisher, Appleton, sold 368,755 copies between 1860 and 1903. This figure did not differ much from his sales in his native Britain, and once editions in the rest of the world are added in the figure of a million copies seems like a conservative estimate. As William James remarked, Spencer "enlarged the imagination, and set free the speculative mind of countless doctors, engineers, and lawyers, of many physicists and chemists, and of thoughtful laymen generally." The aspect of his thought that emphasised individual self-improvement found a ready audience in the skilled working class.

Spencer's influence among leaders of thought was also immense, though it was most often expressed in terms of their reaction to, and repudiation of, his ideas. As his American follower John Fiske observed, Spencer's ideas were to be found "running like the weft through all the warp" of Victorian thought. Such varied thinkers as Henry Sidgwick, T.H. Green, G.E. Moore, William James, Henri Bergson, and Émile Durkheim defined their ideas in relation to his. Durkheim's Division of Labour in Society is to a very large extent an extended debate with Spencer, from whose sociology, many commentators now agree, Durkheim borrowed extensively.

In post- 1863-Uprising Poland, many of Spencer's ideas became integral to the dominant fin-de-siècle ideology, " Polish Positivism". The leading Polish writer of the period, Bolesław Prus, hailed Spencer as "the Aristotle of the nineteenth century" and adopted Spencer's metaphor of society-as-organism, giving it a striking poetic presentation in his 1884 micro-story, " Mold of the Earth", and highlighting the concept in the introduction to his most universal novel, (1895).

The early 20th century was hostile to Spencer. Soon after his death, his philosophical reputation went into a sharp decline. Half a century after his death, his work was dismissed as a "parody of philosophy", and the historian Richard Hofstadter called him "the metaphysician of the homemade intellectual, and the prophet of the cracker-barrel agnostic." Nonetheless, Spencer's thought had penetrated so deeply into the Victorian age that his influence did not disappear entirely.

In recent years, much more positive estimates have appeared, as well as a still highly negative estimate.

Political influence

Despite his reputation as a social Darwinist, Spencer's political thought has been open to multiple interpretations. His political philosophy could both provide inspiration to those who believed that individuals were masters of their fate, who should brook no interference from a meddling state, and those who believed that social development required a strong central authority. In Lochner v. New York, conservative justices of the United States Supreme Court could find inspiration in Spencer's writings for striking down a New York law limiting the number of hours a baker could work during the week, on the ground that this law restricted liberty of contract. Arguing against the majority's holding that a "right to free contract" is implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Spencer has also been described as a quasi- anarchist, as well as an outright anarchist. Marxist theorist Georgi Plekhanov, in his 1909 book Anarchism and Socialism, labelled Spencer a "conservative Anarchist."

Spencer's ideas became very influential in China and Japan largely because he appealed to the reformers' desire to establish a strong nation-state with which to compete with the Western powers. His thought was introduced by the Chinese scholar Yen Fu, who saw his writings as a prescription for the reform of the Qing state. Spencerism was so influential in China that it was synthesized into the Chinese translation of the Origin of Species, in which Darwin's branching view of evolution was converted into a linear-progressive one. Spencer also influenced the Japanese Westernizer Tokutomi Soho, who believed that Japan was on the verge of transitioning from a "militant society" to an "industrial society," and needed to quickly jettison all things Japanese and take up Western ethics and learning. He also corresponded with Kaneko Kentaro, warning him of the dangers of imperialism. Savarkar writes in his Inside the Enemy Camp, about reading all of Spencer's works, of his great interest in them, of their translation into Marathi, and their influence on the likes of Tilak and Agarkar, and the affectionate sobriquet given to him in Maharashtra - Harbhat Pendse.

Influence on literature

Spencer greatly influenced literature and rhetoric. His 1852 essay, "The Philosophy of Style", explored a growing trend of formalist approaches to writing. Highly focused on the proper placement and ordering of the parts of an English sentence, he created a guide for effective composition. Spencer aimed to free prose writing from as much " friction and inertia" as possible, so that the reader would not be slowed by strenuous deliberations concerning the proper context and meaning of a sentence. Spencer argued that writers should aim "To so present ideas that they may be apprehended with the least possible mental effort" by the reader.

He argued that by making the meaning as readily accessible as possible, the writer would achieve the greatest possible communicative efficiency. This was accomplished, according to Spencer, by placing all the subordinate clauses, objects and phrases before the subject of a sentence so that, when readers reached the subject, they had all the information they needed to completely perceive its significance. While the overall influence that "The Philosophy of Style" had on the field of rhetoric was not as far-reaching as his contribution to other fields, Spencer's voice lent authoritative support to formalist views of rhetoric.

Spencer influenced literature inasmuch as many novelists and short story authors came to address his ideas in their work. Spencer was referenced by George Eliot, Leo Tolstoy, Machado de Assis, Thomas Hardy, Bolesław Prus, George Bernard Shaw, Abraham Cahan, Richard Austin Freeman, D. H. Lawrence, and Jorge Luis Borges. Arnold Bennett greatly praised First Principles, and the influence it had on Bennett may be seen in his many novels. Jack London went so far as to create a character, Martin Eden, a staunch Spencerian. It has also been suggested[by whom? ] that the character of Vershinin in Anton Chekhov's play The Three Sisters is a dedicated Spencerian. H.G. Wells used Spencer's ideas as a theme in his novella, The Time Machine, employing them to explain the evolution of man into two species. It is perhaps the best testimony to the influence of Spencer's beliefs and writings that his reach was so diverse. He influenced not only the administrators who shaped their societies' inner workings, but also the artists who helped shape those societies' ideals and beliefs. In Rudyard Kipling's novel Kim, the Anglophile Bengali spy Hurree Babu admires Herbert Spencer and quotes him to comic effect: "They are, of course, dematerialised phenomena. Spencer says." "I am good enough Herbert Spencerian, I trust, to meet little thing like death, which is all in my fate, you know." "He thanked all the Gods of Hindustan, and Herbert Spencer, that there remained some valuables to steal." Upton Sinclair, in One Clear Call, 1948, quips that "Huxley said that Herbert Spencer's idea of a tragedy was a generalization killed by a fact; ..."

Papers of Herbert Spencer in Senate House Library, University of London

System of Synthetic Philosophy, in ten volumes

Principles of Biology (1864, 1867; revised and enlarged: 1898), in two volumes

Principles of Psychology (1870, 1880), in two volumes

Volume I - Part I: The Data of Psychology; Part II: The Inductions of Psychology; Part III: General Synthesis; Part IV: Special Synthesis; Part V: Physical Synthesis; Appendix

Volume II - Part VI: Special Analysis; Part VII: General Analysis; Part VIII: Congruities; Part IX: Corollaries

Principles of Sociology, in three volumes

Principles of Ethics, in two volumes
Volume I - Part I: The Data of Ethics (1879); Part II: The Inductions of Ethics (1892); Part III: The Ethics of Individual Life (1892); References

The Study of Sociology (1873, 1896)

An Autobiography (1904), in two volumes

See also Spencer, Herbert (1904). An Autobiography. D. Appleton and Company.

Essay Collections:

Illustrations of Universal Progress: A Series of Discussions (1864, 1883)

The Man Versus the State (1884)

Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative (1891), in three volumes:

Volume I (includes "The Development Hypothesis," "Progress: Its Law and Cause," "The Factors of Organic Evolution" and others)

Volume II (includes "The Classification of the Sciences", The Philosophy of Style (1852), The Origin and Function of Music," "The Physiology of Laughter," and others)

Volume III (includes "The Ethics of Kant", "State Tamperings With Money and Banks", "Specialized Administration", "From Freedom to Bondage", "The Americans", and others)

Various Fragments (1897, enlarged 1900)

Facts and Comments (1902)

Great Political Thinkers (1960)

Philosophers' critiques

1. Weinstein, David, ^ Herbert Spencer, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/spencer/>.

2. "Letter 5145 - Darwin, C. R. to Wallace, A. R., 5 July (1866)". Darwin Correspondence Project.
Maurice E. Stucke. "Better Competition Advocacy" (PDF). Herbert Spencer in his Principles of Biology of 1864, vol. 1, p. 444, wrote "This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has called 'natural selection', or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life."

3. Riggenbach, Jeff (24 April 2011) ^ The Real William Graham Sumner, Mises Institute

4. Richards, Peter (4 November 2010) ^ Herbert Spencer: Social Darwinist or Libertarian Prophet?, Mises Institute

5. Talcott Parsons, ^ The Structure of Social Action (1937; New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 3; quoting from C. Crane Brinton, English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century (London: Benn, 1933).

6. Rev. Thomas Spencer (14 October 1796 - 26 January. 1853) - See: ^ http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/26138/?back=,36208

7. In 1844, Spencer published three articles on phrenology in ^ The Zoist: A Journal of Cerebral Physiology & Mesmerism, and Their Applications to Human Welfare: "A New View of the Functions of Imitation and Benevolence" (Vol.1, No.4, (January 1844), pp. 369-85); "On the Situation of the Organ of Amativeness" (Vol.2, No.6, (July 1844), pp. 186-89); and "A Theory concerning the Organ of Wonder" (Vol.2, No.7, (October 1844), pp. 316-25).

8. ^ Steven Shapin (13 August 2007). "Man with a plan". newyorker.com. Archived from the original on 30 April 2015. A lifelong hypochondriac, he had come for his health, to reinvigorate his "greatly disordered nervous system," and he withstood all inducements to what he called "social excitement."

9. ^ M. Francis (23 December 2014). Recension of Herbert Spencer's life. Routledge. pp. 7-8. ISBN 9781317493464. Archived from the original on 30 December 2018 - via ndpr.nd.edu.

10. Deichmann, Ute. (2010). ^ Darwinism, Philosophy, and Experimental Biology. Springer. pp. 41-42. ISBN 978-90-481-9901-3

11. ^ McKinnon, AM (2010). "'Energy and society: Herbert Spencer's 'energetic sociology' of social evolution and beyond'" (PDF). Journal of Classical Sociology. 10 (4): 439-55. doi:10.1177/1468795x10385184. hdl:2164/2623.

12. ^ "Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative, Vol. 2 - Online Library of Liberty". oll.libertyfund.org.

13. ^ Doherty, Brian, Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the Modern American Libertarian Movement, p. 246.

14. Ronald F. Cooney, "Herbert Spencer: Apostle of Liberty" ^ Freeman (January 1973)online Archived 7 November 2018 at the Wayback Machine

15. Chris Matthew Sciabarra, "Libertarianism", in ^ International Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology, ed. Jens Beckert and Milan Zafirovski (2006), pp. 403-07 online.

16. ^ "Herbert Spencer on the Land Question: A Criticism, by Alfred Russel Wallace". people.wku.edu.

17. ^ Stewart, Iain (2011). "Commandeering Time: The Ideological Status of Time in the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer". Australian Journal of Politics and History. 57 (3): 389-402. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2011.01604.x.

18. ^ Perrin, Robert G. (1995). "Émile Durkheim's Division of Labor and the Shadow of Herbert Spencer". Sociological Quarterly. 36 (4): 791-808. doi:10.1111/j.1533-8525.1995.tb00465.x.

19. Gertrude Himmelfarb, ^ Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution, 1968, p. 222; quoted in Robert J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 243.

20. Plekhanov, Georgiĭ Valentinovich (1912), trans. Aveling, Eleanor Marx. ^ Anarchism and Socialism, p. 143. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company. (See here.)

21. ^ Jin, Xiaoxing (27 March 2019). "Translation and transmutation: the Origin of Species in China". The British Journal for the History of Science. 52 (1): 117-141. doi:10.1017/S0007087418000808. PMID 30587253.

22. ^ Sinclair, Upton; One Clear Call; R. & R. Clark, Ltd., Edinburgh; August, 1949

Carneiro, Robert L. and Perrin, Robert G. "Herbert Spencer's 'Principles of Sociology:' a Centennial Retrospective and Appraisal." Annals of Science 2002 59(3): 221-261 online at Ebsco

Duncan, David. The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer (1908) online edition

Elliot, Hugh. Herbert Spencer. London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1917

Elwick, James (2003). "Herbert Spencer and the Disunity of the Social Organism" (PDF). History of Science. 41: 35-72. doi:10.1177/007327530304100102. Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 June 2007.

Elliott, Paul. 'Erasmus Darwin, Herbert Spencer and the Origins of the Evolutionary Worldview in British Provincial Scientific Culture', Isis 94 (2003), 1-29

Francis, Mark. Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life. Newcastle UK: Acumen Publishing, 2007 ISBN 0-8014-4590-6

Harris, Jose. "Spencer, Herbert (1820-1903)", Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004) online, a standard short biography

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. "Social Darwinism in Anglophone Academic Journals: A Contribution to the History of the Term" (2004) 17 Journal of Historical Sociology 428.

Hofstadter, Richard. Social Darwinism in American Thought. (1944) Boston: Beacon Press, 1992 ISBN 0-8070-5503-4.

Kennedy, James G. Herbert Spencer. Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1978

Mandelbaum, Maurice. History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-century Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971.

Parsons, Talcott. The Structure of Social Action. (1937) New York: Free Press, 1968.

Rafferty, Edward C. "The Right to the Use of the Earth". Herbert Spencer, the Washington Intellectual Community, and American Conservation in the Late Nineteenth Century.

Richards, Robert J. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Smith, George H. (2008). "Spencer, Herbert (1820-1903)". In Hamowy, Ronald (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE; Cato Institute. pp. 483-85. doi:10.4135/9781412965811.n295. ISBN 978-1-4129-6580-4. LCCN 2008009151. OCLC 750831024.

Stewart, Iain. "Commandeering Time: The Ideological Status of Time in the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer" (2011) 57 Australian Journal of Politics and History 389.

Taylor, Michael W. Men versus the State: Herbert Spencer and Late Victorian Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Taylor, Michael W. The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. London: Continuum, 2007.

Turner, Jonathan H. Herbert Spencer: A Renewed Appreciation. Sage Publications, 1985. ISBN 0-8039-2426-7

Versen, Christopher R. Optimistic Liberals: Herbert Spencer, the Brooklyn Ethical Association, and the Integration of Moral Philosophy and Evolution in the Victorian Trans-Atlantic Community. Florida State University, 2006.

Duncan, David. The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer (1908) online edition

Spencer, Herbert. Spencer: Political Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) edited by John Offer (1993)

Spencer, Herbert. Social Statics: The Man Versus the State

Spencer, Herbert. The Study of Sociology; full text online free

Spencer, Herbert. The Principles of Psychology; full text online

Spencer, Herbert. Social Statics, Abridged and Revised: Together with the Man Versus the State (1896), highly influential among libertarians full text online free

Spencer, Herbert. Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical (1891) 283pp full text online

Spencer, Herbert. An Autobiography (1905, 2 vol) full text online

Online writings of Spencer

Burrow, J. W. "Herbert Spencer: The Philosopher of Evolution" History Today (1958) 8#10 pp 676-683 online

Biographical

Sources

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Herbert Spencer (27 April 1820 - 8 December 1903) was an English philosopher, biologist, anthropologist, and sociologist famous for his theory of social Darwinism whereby superior physical force shapes history. Spencer is best known as the originator of the expression " survival of the fittest", which he coined in Principles of Biology (1864) after reading Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species .

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History of Evolutionary Thought: Pre 1800

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