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Viral New Superconductivity Claims Leave Many Scientists Skeptical

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Viral New Superconductivity Claims Leave Many Scientists Skeptical

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If rumor has wings, extraordinary scientific claims have a jet engine. Within hours of appearing on the preprint server arXiv.org, two papers by a team of scientists in South Korea generated enormous viral buzz. The researchers’ extraordinary claim is that they have discovered a room-temperature ambient-pressure superconductor, a material that can conduct electricity perfectly under everyday conditions.

A genuine ambient-condition superconductor is often touted for its potential to transform many technologies. It could enable a perfectly efficient power grid, levitating trains, commercially viable fusion reactors—the typical list goes on. The authors wrote that their discovery “will be a brand-new historical event that opens a new era for humankind.” But their experiment has yet to be properly scrutinized by the scientific community, and the quest for breakthrough superconductors has a long history of big claims that end up falling flat.

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Viral New Superconductivity Claims Leave Many Scientists Skeptical

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Researchers say they have discovered a new room-temperature ambient-pressure superconductor, but many scientists are unconvinced

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Ferienzeit: Achten Sie auch während der Reise auf die Cybersicherheit

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Ferienzeit: Achten Sie auch während der Reise auf die Cybersicherheit

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Während Sie Ihre Sommerferien und das Reisen geniessen, ist es wichtig, dass Sie auch Ihre Cybersicherheit im Blick behalten. Der Schutz Ihrer persönlichen Daten und die Vermeidung von Online-Bedrohungen sollten auch während Ihrer Reise Priorität haben.

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Cyberkriminelle sind sehr anpassungsfähig und versuchen, auf verschiedene Arten an die Daten ihrer Opfer zu gelangen. Lesen Sie hier die wichtigsten Punkte zur Cybersicherheit, die Sie während Ihrer Reise beachten sollten.

Vorsicht bei öffentlichen WLAN:
Bei der Verwendung öffentlicher WLAN (z. B. in Hotels oder an Bahnhöfen) besteht die Gefahr, dass unbefugte Dritte Ihre Daten lesen oder sogar darauf zugreifen können. Nutzen Sie wenn möglich vertrauenswürdige WLAN, die mit Passwort geschützt sind oder benutzen Sie Ihr Telefon als persönlicher Hotspot. Hier können aber zusätzliche Roaming-Kosten entstehen.

Vorsicht vor öffentlichen Ladestationen:
Zahlreiche öffentliche Gebäude wie Flughäfen oder Bahnhöfe bieten USB-Ladestationen an. Die Nutzung öffentlich zugänglicher USB-Ladestationen birgt auch die Gefahr der Infektion Ihrer Geräte. Verwenden Sie eigene Ladegeräte.
Um diesen Gefahren beim Laden vorzubeugen, verwenden Sie am besten eine "Powerbank". Die Powerbank laden Sie an der öffentlich zugänglichen Ladestation auf. Danach schliessen Sie Ihr Smartphone oder Tablet an die Powerbank an.

Aktualisieren Sie Ihre Geräte:
Halten Sie auch während Ihres Urlaubs Ihre Geräte, einschliesslich Smartphones, Tablets und Laptops, auf dem neuesten Stand. Installieren Sie alle verfügbaren Sicherheitsupdates und Patches, um mögliche Schwachstellen zu beheben und sich gegen bekannte Bedrohungen zu schützen.

Seien Sie vorsichtig mit öffentlichen Computern:
Vermeiden Sie die Nutzung von öffentlichen Computern oder Geräten, um auf persönliche oder sensible Informationen zuzugreifen. Öffentliche Computer könnten mit Schadsoftware infiziert sein, die Ihre Daten gefährdet. Falls Sie keine andere Wahl haben, vermeiden Sie die Eingabe sensibler Informationen wie Passwörter oder Kreditkarteninformationen.

Achten Sie auf Phishing-Versuche:
Seien Sie wachsam gegenüber Phishing-Versuchen, insbesondere bei E-Mails oder Nachrichten, die verdächtig erscheinen. Geben Sie niemals persönliche Informationen preis und klicken Sie nie auf verdächtige Links. Überprüfen Sie immer die Echtheit einer Website, bevor Sie sensible Daten eingeben.

Achten Sie darauf, was Sie auf Social-Media-Konten posten:
Seien Sie vorsichtig bei der Veröffentlichung von Informationen über Ihre Ferien auf Social-Media-Plattformen. Das Teilen von Reiseplänen und Standorten kann Einbrechern und Betrügern Hinweise auf Ihre Abwesenheit geben. Überprüfen Sie auch Ihre Datenschutzeinstellungen, um sicherzustellen, dass Ihre persönlichen Informationen nur mit vertrauenswürdigen Personen geteilt werden.

Sicherer Umgang mit Kreditkarten und Zahlungen:
Benutzen Sie niemals öffentliche Computer fürs E-Banking, Kreditkartenzahlungen oder andere Zahlungen. Aktivieren Sie das 3D-Secure-Verfahren auf Ihrer Kreditkarte. Lassen Sie die Karte auch bei Bezahlung in Geschäften und Restaurants niemals aus den Augen. Schirmen Sie bei der PIN-Eingabe das Ziffernfeld gut ab.

Installieren Sie neue Apps zurückhaltend:
Seien Sie zurückhaltend mit der Installation neuer Apps. Laden Sie diese nur aus den offiziellen Stores herunter und überprüfen Sie, welche Rechte diese Apps benötigen. Geben Sie den Apps nur die notwendigsten Rechte. Ein Taschenrechner benötigt beispielsweise keinen Zugriff auf die Kamera.

Gelegenheit macht Diebe:
Behalten Sie Ihre Geräte nach Möglichkeit immer bei sich, anstatt sie unbeaufsichtigt zu lassen. Planen Sie einen Ausflug an den Strand, so empfehlen wir Ihnen, die mobilen Geräte im Tresor / Schliessfach des Hotelzimmers einzuschliessen. Nehmen Sie bei Flugreisen die elektronischen Geräte immer ins Handgepäck.

Die Bedrohungslandschaft kann sich ändern, daher ist es wichtig, sich auch in den Ferien über aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Cybersicherheit auf dem Laufenden zu halten.

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Ferienzeit: Achten Sie auch während der Reise auf die Cybersicherheit

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27.07.2023 - Während Sie Ihre Sommerferien und das Reisen geniessen, ist es wichtig, dass Sie auch Ihre Cybersicherheit im Blick behalten. Der Schutz Ihrer persönlichen Daten und die Vermeidung von Online-Bedrohungen sollten auch während Ihrer Reise Priorität haben.

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Bund kontaktiert seine IT-Dienstleister wegen Security

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Bund kontaktiert seine IT-Dienstleister wegen Security

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In einem Brief listet der Bund 5 Sicherheitsanforderungen auf, die seine IT-Dienstleister erfüllen müssen. Das Schreiben erhielten alle IT-Firmen, die für die Verwaltung arbeiten.

Ende Juni hatte der Bundesrat beschlossen, einen Krisenstab einzusetzen und bestehende Verträge mit Informatikdienstleistern des Bundes zu überprüfen, um den Xplain-Hack aufzuarbeiten. Nun haben alle IT-Dienstleister, die für den Bund arbeiten, Post erhalten. Im zweiseitigen Schreiben, das inside-it.ch vorliegt, geht es um "Informationen und Empfehlungen zur Informationssicherheit".

"Sie erhalten das vorliegende Informationsschreiben, da Ihr Unternehmen Informatikdienstleistungen für die Bundesverwaltung erbringt", schreiben Pierre Broye, Direktor Bundesamt für Bauten und Logistik (BBL) und Thierry Vauthey, Leiter Beschaffung bei der Behörde.

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Exklusiv: Bund kontaktiert seine IT-Dienstleister wegen Security

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In einem Brief listet der Bund 5 Sicher­heits­an­forde­rungen auf, die seine IT-Dienstleister erfüllen müssen. Das Schreiben erhielten alle IT-Firmen, die für die Verwaltung arbeiten.

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Switzerland continues to lead the EU Innovation Scoreboard

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Switzerland continues to lead the EU Innovation Scoreboard

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The annual European Innovation Scoreboard highlights the commitment of the EU and its Member States to fostering innovation. Switzerland has maintained its position as the most innovative European country, with a performance of 139.6% of the EU average. It has scored particularly highly in education-related indicators, scientific publications, and environment-related indicators. Also in the top 5 are Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands

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Que se cache-t-il derrière l'expression Horizon Scanning ? - L'atelier des futurs

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Que se cache-t-il derrière l'expression Horizon Scanning ? - L'atelier des futurs

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Il y a des expressions anglaises tellement représentatives dans leur langue originale que la traduction dans une autre se révèle un vrai défi. Cela est le cas de l’expression horizon scanning dont la traduction française été déclinée de manière particulièrement riche.

En voici quelques exemples d’une liste évidemment non exhaustive :
tour d’horizon; exploration de l’horizon scientifique; dépistage de tendances ; analyse prospective; axes de veille ; détection d’émergences ; veille prospective ; recherche de signaux faibles ; etc

La définition à laquelle nous adhérons le plus est cependant celle fournie en 2015 dans le rapport Models of Horizon Scanning pour la Commission Européenne.

Pourquoi ? Parce que la définition présente le but et non spécifiquement les moyens pour y arriver. Elle donne certes quelques indices sur les outils à utiliser, mais permet de conduire ces activités de différentes façons, à différentes échelles.

Cela correspond particulièrement bien au premier type d’activités d’un dispositif d’anticipationdont le but global est d’une part d’identifier les signaux faibles, d’autre part de les rendre visibles et d’en analyser les conséquences potentielles pour finalement passer à l’action.

Horizon scanning est la recherche systématique de signaux précurseurs d’évolutions potentiellement importantes.

Il peut s’agir de signaux faibles (ou précoces), de tendances, de cygnes noirs ou d’autres développements, de problèmes persistants, de risques et de menaces, y compris des questions en marge de la pensée actuelle qui remettent en question les hypothèses du passé.

L’analyse de l’horizon peut être totalement exploratoire et ouverte ou constituer en une recherche limitée d’informations dans un domaine spécifique, en fonction des objectifs respectifs de projets ou tâches.

Elle cherche à déterminer ce qui est constant, ce qui peut changer et ce qui change constamment dans l’horizon temporel analysé. Un ensemble de critères est utilisé dans le processus de recherche et/ou de filtrage.

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Q165 | Que se cache-t-il derrière l'expression Horizon Scanning ? - L'atelier des futurs

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Horizon scanning est la recherche systématique de signaux précurseurs d'évolutions potentiellement importantes.

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Cyber Operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War

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Cyber Operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War

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How central are cyber operations to combined arms campaigns in the twenty-first century? Between the spring of 2021 and winter of 2022, Russian military forces began to mass combat troops along Ukraine’s eastern border. On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. It marked the fourth time Russia used military force against a neighbor since the end of the Cold War and the seventh time Russia used cyber operations as part of a larger campaign or independently as an instrument of coercion against a neighboring state.

Pundits and academics alike came out with grand predictions about a coming cyber war. Researchers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even argued during the war that “Russian cyberattacks on government and military command and control centers, logistics, emergency services . . . were entirely consistent with a so-called thunder run strategy intended to stoke chaos, confusion, and uncertainty, and ultimately avoid a costly and protracted war in Ukraine.”

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Center for Strategic and International Studies

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Cyber Operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War

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This latest On Future War paper analyzes the interplay of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict by assessing the impact, deciphering future implications, and formulating strategic recommendations for cyber defense partnerships and countering information operations.

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Integrated circuits, or semiconductors, are dual-use technologies that have a wide variety of applications, from smartphones to missile systems. Successive global crises—Sino-U.S. competition, the Covid pandemic, the war in Ukraine—have highlighted their strategic nature. When it comes to Russia, the country’s already fragile position when it comes to hardware has been intensifying due to international sanctions that partic- ularly target the national semiconductor industry. Technological sovereignty through “indigenization” of the semiconductor industry seems highly unlikely, and the defense sector—as an avid consumer of chips— will particularly suffer from sanctions.

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L'IA pour tuer : l'Ukraine utilise Tinder et l'intelligence artificielle pour éliminer des soldats russes

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L'IA pour tuer : l'Ukraine utilise Tinder et l'intelligence artificielle pour éliminer des soldats russes

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Depuis la nuit des temps, des agents séducteurs sont envoyés auprès de l'ennemi pour lui faire avouer ses secrets. En Ukraine, cette tactique s'est modernisée.

Front de Bakhmut, première ligne russe, les soldats discutent de tout et de rien. L'un d'eux se vante d'avoir un flirt avec une jeune Ukrainienne pro russe et montre sa photo à ses camarades. Cela fait plusieurs semaines qu'ils échangent photos et messages via une célèbre application de rencontre. Puis un flash aveugle la troupe, suivi d'une explosion massive. L'artillerie ukrainienne vient de les prendre pour cible, avec une efficacité déconcertante.

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Depuis la nuit des temps, des agents séducteurs sont envoyés auprès de l'ennemi pour lui faire avouer ses secrets. En Ukraine, cette tactique s'est modernisée.

Front de Bakhmut, première ligne russe, les soldats discutent de tout et de rien. L'un d'eux se vante d'avoir un flirt avec une jeune Ukrainienne pro russe et montre sa photo à ses camarades. Cela fait plusieurs semaines qu'ils échangent photos et messages via une célèbre application de rencontre. Puis un flash aveugle la troupe, suivi d'une explosion massive. L'artillerie ukrainienne vient de les prendre pour cible, avec une efficacité déconcertante.

Comment les artilleurs ukrainiens ont-ils pu viser avec une telle précision, alors que l'armée russe anticipe désormais l'espionnage satellitaire et que ses sapeurs déploient des trésors d'ingéniosité pour camoufler les positions des soldats russes ? D'où vient la faille ? En fait, elle est humaine et repose sur une application connue de tous : Tinder. Cette dernière permet de matcher avec des gens géographiquement proches de soi et d'échanger avec eux. Les soldats russes nouvellement mobilisés n'ont pas forcément les bons réflexes en termes de cybersécurité et l'utilisent massivement dans l'espoir de faire des rencontres.

De jeunes soldates ukrainiennes se créent des profils Tinder et utilisent l'IA Midjourney pour les illustrer

Le renseignement ukrainien l'a bien vu et a alors décidé de monter une vaste opération pour aider l'artillerie et l'aviation ukrainiennes à détruire les positions clés de l'ennemi. Pour ce faire, de jeunes soldates ukrainiennes se créent des profils Tinder et utilisent l'IA Midjourney pour les illustrer. Les images générées sont des photos de jolies jeunes femmes en soirée ou pratiquant une activité sportive. Pourquoi uniquement des soldates, vu qu'elels ne montrent pas leur vrai visage ? Au cas où la cible demanderait un message vocal sur Telegram.

Une fois les profils prêts, la chasse commence. Les jeunes femmes écument Tinder dans l'espoir de tomber sur le profil d'un soldat russe ou d'un sous-officier. Pourquoi pas les officiers ? tout simpleemnt parce qu'il ne se laisseraient pas aussi facilement berner que leurs subalternes.

Une fois sa cible prise dans les filets, la séductrice commence à discuter avec elle, d'abord de banalités puis de la guerre, de la situation du soldat et une fois un lien de confiance établi, elle pose l'ultime question : "Où es-tu stationné sur le front ? J'aimerais savoir, pour t'envoyer un colis ou te rencontrer". Dans la majorité des cas le soldat répond avec joie et donne les coordonnées de son baraquement ou de sa position de combat... Immédiatement, la soldate ukrainienne transmet l'information à ses supérieurs, et eux-mêmes la transfèrent à l'artillerie ou à l'aviation ukrainienne.

Il faut faire vite, car si jamais le soldat russe piégé se fait passer en revue par un officier tatillon, ce dernier pourrait lui retirer Tinder de son téléphone et faire évacuer la position. Une frappe est organisée sur la zone. La séductrice envoie un message au soldat pour confirmer sa présence. Si la réponse est affirmative, la zone est bombardée et le soldat est tué dans l'opération.

On ignore combien de frappes ont été réalisées à l'aide de cette tactique, mais le danger est pris au sérieux par les officiers russes qui tentent de limiter l'usage de Tinder à leurs soldats. Certaines armées à travers le monde, comme l'US Army ou l'armée indienne, ont pris des mesures drastiques contre l'application de rencontre. Il est interdit à tous les membres de l'armée de l'avoir sur son téléphone. Les contrevenants s'exposent à de sévères sanctions disciplinaires.

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L'IA pour tuer : l'Ukraine utilise Tinder et l'intelligence artificielle pour éliminer des soldats russes

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Depuis la nuit des temps, des agents séducteurs sont envoyés auprès de l'ennemi pour lui faire avouer ses secrets. En Ukraine, cette tactique s'est modernisée.

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Assessing U.S. Data Policy Toward China: A Proposed Framework

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Assessing U.S. Data Policy Toward China: A Proposed Framework

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Access to and use of personal data is at the forefront of the U.S.-China technology conflict. Republicans and Democrats have found common ground in the concern that unacceptable national security and privacy risks arise from Beijing’s access to U.S. persons’ data through open commercial channels. Over the past several years, U.S. policymakers have expanded their earlier focus on cyber theft and industrial espionage to grapple with new risks posed by Chinese firms handling U.S. persons’ data or data flowing to China by data brokers or other means.

According to Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines (as cited in support of a bill requiring licenses to export certain personal data to China and other countries): “There’s a concern about foreign adversaries getting commercially-acquired information as well, [I] am absolutely committed to trying to do everything we can to reduce that possibility.”

The Biden administration and Congress are building on the effort (which started in the Trump administration) by putting forward a range of measures that aim to create new guardrails for data flows to China. These include executive orders and rules for reviewing transactions involving foreign adversaries’ access to U.S. persons’ sensitive data, bans on Chinese software applications, and creating blacklists of countries approved to receive U.S. persons’ data as an export-controlled item, among other actions. Many proposals remain in draft form, unresolved amid debate that does not map onto political party lines.

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Assessing U.S. Data Policy Toward China: A Proposed Framework

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Addressing risks posed by Beijing’s accessing Americans’ data requires first conceptualizing the trade offs in current U.S. policy approaches.

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China’s Cognitive AI Research - Center for Security and Emerging Technology

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China’s Cognitive AI Research - Center for Security and Emerging Technology

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An expert assessment of Chinese scientific literature validates China's public claim to be working toward artificial general intelligence (AGI). At a time when other nations are contemplating safeguards on AI research, China’s push toward AGI challenges emerging global norms, underscoring the need for a serious open-source monitoring program to serve as a foundation for outreach and mitigation.

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Center for Security and Emerging Technology

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China’s Cognitive AI Research - Center for Security and Emerging Technology

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An expert assessment of Chinese scientific literature validates China’s public claim to be working toward artificial general intelligence (AGI). At a time when other nations are contemplating safeguards on AI research, China’s push toward AGI challenges emerging global norms, underscoring the need f…

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Caught in the crossfire: Fears of Chinese–American scientists

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Caught in the crossfire: Fears of Chinese–American scientists

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The US global leadership in science and technology has greatly benefitted from immigrants from other countries, most notably from China in the recent decades. However, feeling the pressure of potential federal investigations since the 2018 launch of the China Initiative, scientists of Chinese descent in the United States now face higher incentives to leave the United States and lower incentives to apply for federal grants. Analyzing data pertaining to institutional affiliations of more than 200 million scientific papers, we find a steady increase in the return migration of scientists of Chinese descent from the United States to China. We also conducted a survey of scientists of Chinese descent employed by US universities in tenured or tenure-track positions (n = 1,304), with results revealing general feelings of fear and anxiety that lead them to consider leaving the United States and/or stop applying for federal grants. If the situation is not corrected, American science will likely suffer the loss of scientific talent to China and other countries.

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Biden-Harris Administration Announces Cybersecurity Labeling Program for Smart Devices to Protect American Consumers

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Biden-Harris Administration Announces Cybersecurity Labeling Program for Smart Devices to Protect American Consumers

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The Biden-Harris Administration today announced a cybersecurity certification and labeling program to help Americans more easily choose smart devices that are safer and less vulnerable to cyberattacks. The new “U.S. Cyber Trust Mark” program proposed by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel would raise the bar for cybersecurity across common devices, including smart refrigerators, smart microwaves, smart televisions, smart climate control systems, smart fitness trackers, and more. This is the latest example of President Biden’s leadership on behalf of hard-working families—from cracking down on hidden junk fees, to strengthening cyber protections and protecting the privacy of people in their own homes.

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Leading electronics and appliance manufacturers and retailers make voluntary commitments to increase cybersecurity on smart devices, help consumers choose products that are less vulnerable to cyberattacks.

"U.S. Cyber Trust Mark" is the latest in a series of actions President Biden and the Biden-Harris Administration have taken to protect hard-working families.
The Biden-Harris Administration today announced a cybersecurity certification and labeling program to help Americans more easily choose smart devices that are safer and less vulnerable to cyberattacks. The new "U.S. Cyber Trust Mark " program proposed by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel would raise the bar for cybersecurity across common devices, including smart refrigerators, smart microwaves, smart televisions, smart climate control systems, smart fitness trackers, and more. This is the latest example of President Biden's leadership on behalf of hard-working families-from cracking down on hidden junk fees, to strengthening cyber protections and protecting the privacy of people in their own homes.

Several major electronics, appliance, and consumer product manufacturers, retailers, and trade associations have made voluntary commitments to increase cybersecurity for the products they sell. Manufacturers and retailers announcing support and commitments today to further the program include Amazon, Best Buy, Google, LG Electronics U.S.A., Logitech, and Samsung Electronics. Under the proposed new program, consumers would see a newly created "U.S. Cyber Trust Mark" in the form of a distinct shield logo applied to products meeting established cybersecurity criteria. The goal of the program is to provide tools for consumers to make informed decisions about the relative security of products they choose to bring into their homes.

Acting under its authorities to regulate wireless communication devices, the FCC is expected to seek public comment on rolling out the proposed voluntary cybersecurity labeling program, which is expected to be up and running in 2024. As proposed, the program would leverage stakeholder-led efforts to certify and label products, based on specific cybersecurity criteria published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) that, for example, requires unique and strong default passwords, data protection, software updates, and incident detection capabilities.

Today, the FCC is applying to register a national trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that would be applied to products meeting the established cybersecurity criteria. The Administration-including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency-would support the FCC in educating consumers to look for the new label when making purchasing decisions, and encouraging major U.S. retailers to prioritize labeled products when placing them on the shelf and online.

To further enhance transparency and competition:

The FCC intends the use a QR code linking to a national registry of certified devices to provide consumers with specific and comparable security information about these smart products. Working with other regulators and the U.S. Department of Justice, the Commission plans to establish oversight and enforcement safeguards to maintain trust and confidence in the program.

NIST will also immediately undertake an effort to define cybersecurity requirements for consumer-grade routers-a higher-risk type of product that, if compromised, can be used to eavesdrop, steal passwords, and attack other devices and high value networks. NIST will complete this work by the end of 2023, to permit the Commission to consider use of these requirements to expand the labeling program to cover consumer grade routers.

The U.S. Department of Energy today also announced a collaborative initiative with National Labs and industry partners to research and develop cybersecurity labeling requirements for smart meters and power inverters, both essential components of the clean, smart grid of the future.

Internationally, the U.S. Department of State is committed to supporting the FCC to engage allies and partners toward harmonizing standards and pursuing mutual recognition of similar labeling efforts.

This new labeling program would help provide Americans with greater assurances about the cybersecurity of the products they use and rely on in their everyday lives. It would also be beneficial for businesses, as it would help differentiate trustworthy products in the marketplace.

As part of the development of the program, the Biden-Harris Administration and FCC will continue to engage stakeholders, regulators, and Congress to fully implement this program and work together to keep Americans safe.

Participants in today's announcement include: Amazon, Best Buy, Carnegie Mellon University, CyLab, Cisco Systems, Connectivity Standards Alliance, Consumer Reports, Consumer Technology Association, Google, Infineon, the Information Technology Industry Council, IoXT, KeySight, LG Electronics U.S.A., Logitech, OpenPolicy, Qorvo, Qualcomm, Samsung Electronics, UL Solutions, Yale and August U.S.###

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Biden-Harris Administration Announces Cybersecurity Labeling Program for Smart Devices to Protect American Consumers | The White House

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Leading electronics and appliance manufacturers and retailers make voluntary commitments to increase cybersecurity on smart devices, help consumers choose products that are less vulnerable to cyberattacks."U.S. Cyber Trust Mark" is the latest in a series of actions President Biden and the Biden-Harris Administration have taken to protect hard-working families.

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Generative Artificial Intelligence: Overview, Issues, and Questions for Congress

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Generative Artificial Intelligence: Overview, Issues, and Questions for Congress

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Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) refers to AI systems, in particular those using machine learning (ML) and trained on large volumes of data, that are able to generate new content. In contrast, other AI systems may have a primary goal of classifying data, such as facial recognition image data, or making decisions, such as those used in autonomous vehicles. GenAI systems, when prompted (often by a user inputting text), can create variousoutputs, including text responses (e.g., OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Bard), images (e.g., Stability AI’s Stable Diffusion and Midjourney’s self-titled program), videos, computer code, or music.

The recent public release of many GenAI tools, and the race by companies to develop ever-more powerful models, have generated widespread discussion of their capabilities, potential concerns with their use, and debates about their governance and regulation. This CRS InFocus describes the development and uses of GenAI, concerns raised by the use of GenAI tools, and considerations for Congress.

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White House gets top AI companies to commit to responsible development

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White House gets top AI companies to commit to responsible development

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The Biden administration has secured voluntary commitments geared at managing the risks posed by artificial intelligence from seven top companies, the White House announced. Amazon, Anthropic, Google, Inflection, Facebook parent company Meta, Microsoft and OpenAI have made the voluntary commitments, which include a pledge to develop mechanisms of watermarking to help users determine when audio and visual content is AI-generated, according to a White House official.

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The Biden administration has secured voluntary commitments geared at managing the risks posed by artificial intelligence from seven top companies, the White House announced.

Amazon, Anthropic, Google, Inflection, Facebook parent company Meta, Microsoft and OpenAI have made the voluntary commitments, which include a pledge to develop mechanisms of watermarking to help users determine when audio and visual content is AI-generated, according to a White House official.

"Companies have a duty to do right by individuals and society and earn the American peoples' trust by making it easy for users to tell whether audio and visual content is in its original form or has been altered or generated by AI, preventing bias and discrimination, shielding our children from harm and helping society overcome our greatest challenges, from cancer to climate change," the official said.

The companies also committed to internal and external testing of their AI systems' capability and safety before releasing them to the public, and to sharing results of those tests as well as information on managing AI risks across the industry.

Additionally, they've pledged to invest in safeguarding their models against a myriad of threats, to facilitate third-party discovery and reporting of their systems' vulnerabilities and to publicly report their the systems' capabilities and limitations, including security and societal risks.

Some of the companies have already been pursuing a few of the goals on their own, but the official described the new commitments as "pushing the envelope" on safety and security in the AI landscape.

President Biden convened the seven companies at the White House on Friday to announce the commitments. The move comes as part of the Biden administration's effort to "seize the tremendous promise" of AI while also protecting Americans' rights and safety against risks posed by the uncharted technology, according to a White House release.

"Americans are seeing how advanced artificial intelligence and the pace of innovation have the power to disrupt jobs and industries. These commitments are a promising step, but we have a lot more do together," Biden said in remarks on Friday.

Who's buying up land around major Air Force base in California? 'We have no idea' X sign removed from Elon Musk company's San Francisco headquarters

The president said that "in the weeks ahead" he'll take executive action "to help America lead the way toward responsible innovation." The White House says it's developing an executive order that is related to responsible AI innovation, which the official called a "high priority" for Biden and his team.

Biden also called on Congress to pass bipartisan legislation that would put limits on data personal collection, ban targeted advertisements to kids and require companies to put health and safety first.
This story was updated at 2:16 p.m.
Copyright 2023 Nexstar Media Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

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White House gets top AI companies to commit to responsible development

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The Biden administration has secured voluntary commitments geared at managing the risks posed by artificial intelligence from seven top companies, the White House announced. Amazon, Anthropic, Google, Inflection, Facebook parent company Meta, Microsoft and OpenAI have made the voluntary commitments, which include a pledge to develop mechanisms of watermarking to help users determine when audio...

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Get serious about data, US intelligence leaders tell agencies

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Get serious about data, US intelligence leaders tell agencies

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It’s time to get serious about data—how it’s collected, curated, and capitalized upon by humans and machines—lest the country lose its intelligence edge, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence says in its new three-year data strategy.

“To date, we have not significantly prioritized data as a strategic and operational [intelligence community] asset. The central challenge remains that the IC is not fielding data, analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled capabilities at the pace and scale required to preserve our decision and intelligence advantage,” the document said.

To fix that, the IC wants to fine-tune the “data flow lifecycle from collection and acquisition, to transporting, ingesting, curating, exploiting, disseminating, and disposing of IC data.”

The strategy outlines four main goals: improve data management, ensure data is human and AI-ready with new services and tools, directly work with the private sector and academia, and develop intelligence officers who are fluent in how data works.

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It's time to get serious about data-how it's collected, curated, and capitalized upon by humans and machines-lest the country lose its intelligence edge, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence says in its new three-year data strategy.

"To date, we have not significantly prioritized data as a strategic and operational [intelligence community] asset. The central challenge remains that the IC is not fielding data, analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled capabilities at the pace and scale required to preserve our decision and intelligence advantage," the document said.

To fix that, the IC wants to fine-tune the "data flow lifecycle from collection and acquisition, to transporting, ingesting, curating, exploiting, disseminating, and disposing of IC data."

The strategy outlines four main goals: improve data management, ensure data is human and AI-ready with new services and tools, directly work with the private sector and academia, and develop intelligence officers who are fluent in how data works.

The ODNI's strategy calls for automation to prepare and label data to reduce the time it takes to absorb datasets from days to minutes.

Also, every time data is collected or purchased, intel agencies will have to lay out how it will be transported, ingested, curated, exploited, disseminated, and disposed of "with consideration for its ethical and appropriate use, consistent with law and policy," according to the strategy. That type of data management will help solidify "minimum common standards for the use, protection, dissemination, interoperability, and generation of IC data."

Bolstering partnerships is another key pillar of the strategy, which could help with not having a full data workforce.

"Data acumen has to become a core skill for every member of the workforce-not just for data professionals. The workforce and supporting contractors need to know, understand, and value data utilization and sharing for mission value and insight," the document said.

But there's still the need for people who can make that happen.

"How do we work across, not only inside our buildings, but across the IC, across the [U.S. government], with our industry academic partners, so that we can really bring the best of what there is to bear in support of our mission," said Lakshmi Raman, the Central Intelligence Agency's director of AI innovation, during a panel discussion at the Intelligence and National Security Summit on Friday. "We don't have enough resources to do everything that we need to do."

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Get serious about data, US intelligence leaders tell agencies

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ODNI's new three-year plan aims to turn data-gathering from afterthought to key asset.

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White House Should Update Cybersecurity Strategy to Consider Impact of AI

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White House Should Update Cybersecurity Strategy to Consider Impact of AI

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The White House released its National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan this week, a multi-year plan for how the Biden administration plans to execute its cybersecurity strategy. Overall, both the strategy and the implementation plan reflect a cohesive effort to enhance cybersecurity in the United States. However, there is one glaring problem: the strategy is virtually silent on the impact that artificial intelligence (AI) will have on cybersecurity.

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The White House released its National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan this week, a multi-year plan for how the Biden administration plans to execute its cybersecurity strategy. Overall, both the strategy and the implementation plan reflect a cohesive effort to enhance cybersecurity in the United States. However, there is one glaring problem: the strategy is virtually silent on the impact that artificial intelligence (AI) will have on cybersecurity.

The National Cybersecurity Strategy, released in March 2023, describes the Biden administration's vision for improving cybersecurity across the digital ecosystem. The strategy is aspirational and forward-looking, covering a plethora of issues, such as critical infrastructure, ransomware, cyber workforce, and secure supply chains, and it proposes closer collaboration and coordination between public and private sector stakeholders. But despite its comprehensive approach to cybersecurity, it scarcely mentions AI.

Indeed, there are only five mentions of AI in the entire 35-page strategy, and each of these is trivial. The first mention is used as an example of how "software and systems are growing more complex." The second is in reference to other administration efforts to "secure next-generation technologies." And the last three references are in the context of how "revolutionary change in our technology landscape" necessitates more investment in cybersecurity. In these latter cases, AI is just one of many technologies listed, including industrial control systems, cloud, encryption, data analytics, biotechnology, microelectronics, quantum computing, and clean energy technologies. Unfortunately, the implementation plan released this week overlooks AI even more. In its 57 pages of detailed initiatives, there is not a single mention of AI.

This omission is a gross oversight because AI should be at the forefront of the national cybersecurity strategy given all its potential uses. Not only are there immediate applications of AI tools, such as to better detect malware, network and system intrusions, and fraud, but there are also many emerging applications of generative AI that a national strategy should consider, such as using generative AI to write more secure code, scan for vulnerabilities, provide cybersecurity training, and automate workflows for cybersecurity professionals. While the private sector may pursue some of this on its own, such as commercializing some of these tools, the government should also have a substantial role in research funding and coordination, training dataset development, and threat monitoring.

In the short term, attackers are likely to quickly adopt AI tools for nefarious purposes. For example, cybercriminals have already begun selling tools like WormGPT, a ChatGPT clone tailored for conducting illegal online activities like writing malware or phishing campaigns. The silver lining is that while AI might make it easier to conduct attacks, it will also make it easier to defend against them. For example, OpenAI Codex, a version of OpenAI's GPT-3 model that has been fine-tuned for writing code, can be used to scan and repair vulnerabilities in software code. Many organizations, especially ones that traditionally lack sufficient cybersecurity resources like small businesses, local governments, and public schools, are unlikely to move nearly as quickly as the attackers to boost their defenses against this new threat. It may not be possible to eliminate this window where attackers will likely have the advantage, but the government should at least try to minimize it.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration has been primarily focused on the risks of AI, and how to mitigate those risks, rather than on how to accelerate the adoption and deployment of this technology. Safe and secure AI is important, but at least equally important is using AI to make other IT systems as secure as possible. Given the growing importance of AI, the White House should issue an addendum to the National Cybersecurity Strategy before the end of the year outlining its vision, and the steps it plans to take, to use AI to improve cyber resilience.
Image credits: Midjourney

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White House Should Update Cybersecurity Strategy to Consider Impact of AI

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The White House released its National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan this week, a multi-year plan for how the Biden administration plans to execute its cybersecurity strategy. Overall, both the strategy and the implementation plan reflect a cohesive effort to enhance cybersecurity in the

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Guterres calls for AI 'that bridges divides', rather than pushing us apart

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Guterres calls for AI 'that bridges divides', rather than pushing us apart

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António Guterres said that if AI became primarily a weapon to launch cyberattacks, generate deepfakes, or for spreading disinformation and hate speech, it would have very serious consequences for global peace and security.

“Look no further than social media. Tools and platforms that were designed to enhance human connection are now used to undermine elections, spread conspiracy theories, and incite hatred and violence,” he said.

“Malfunctioning AI systems are another huge area of concern. And the interaction between AI and nuclear weapons, biotechnology, neurotechnology, and robotics, is deeply alarming.”

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António Guterres said that if AI became primarily a weapon to launch cyberattacks, generate deepfakes, or for spreading disinformation and hate speech, it would have very serious consequences for global peace and security.

"Look no further than social media. Tools and platforms that were designed to enhance human connection are now used to undermine elections, spread conspiracy theories, and incite hatred and violence," he said.

"Malfunctioning AI systems are another huge area of concern. And the interaction between AI and nuclear weapons, biotechnology, neurotechnology, and robotics, is deeply alarming."

AI governance

Mr. Guterres noted the problematic debate over AI governance, highlighting the need for a universal approach, and citing similar experiences in the past which offer a potential way forward, under UN leadership.

"The international community has a long history of responding to new technologies with the potential to disrupt our societies and economies. We have come together at the United Nations to set new international rules, sign new treaties, and establish new global agencies", he added.

The guiding principles on lethal autonomous weapons systems and the recommendations on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, for instance, were discussed and agreed at UN forums.

Similarly, the AI for Good summit, convened in Geneva last month, brought together experts, the private sector, UN agencies, and governments, to help ensure the groundbreaking technology serves the common good, he added.

Huge skills gap

Mr. Guterres pointed to a skills gap around AI within governments and other bureaucracies, which must be addressed at a national and global level.

"I therefore welcome calls from some Member States for the creation of a new United Nations entity to support collective efforts to govern this extraordinary technology, inspired by such models as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change," he said.

"A new UN entity would gather expertise and put it at the disposal of the international community. And it could support collaboration on the research and development of AI tools to accelerate sustainable development."

Policy options

Mr. Guterres announced that he will be convening a high-level meeting for AI, which will report back on the options for global governance, by the end of this year. He is also going to issue a new policy brief on A New Agenda for Peace, which will make recommendations on AI governance to Member States.

The policy brief will call for negotiations to be concluded by 2026 on a legally-binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control or oversight, which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law.

Exercise leadership

The Secretary-General called on the Security Council, which is responsible for international peace and security, to "exercise leadership on AI" and show the way towards common measures for their transparency, accountability, and oversight.

"We must work together for AI that bridges social, digital, and economic divides, not one that pushes us further apart. I urge you to join forces and build trust for peace and security," Mr. Guterres concluded.

A first in the Council

The meeting on Tuesday was convened by the United Kingdom in its capacity holding the rotating presidency of the Security Council for the month of July.

It was the first-ever meeting of the 15-member Council on the potential threats of artificial intelligence to international peace and security.

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Guterres calls for AI 'that bridges divides', rather than pushing us apart

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The UN Secretary-General addressed the Security Council on Tuesday, emphasizing the potential of artificial intelligence to accelerate human development while also cautioning against the malicious use of what is revolutionary new technology. |

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The risks created by artificial intelligence can seem overwhelming. What happens to people who lose their jobs to an intelligent machine? Could AI affect the results of an election? What if a future AI decides it doesn’t need humans anymore and wants to get rid of us?

These are all fair questions, and the concerns they raise need to be taken seriously. But there’s a good reason to think that we can deal with them: This is not the first time a major innovation has introduced new threats that had to be controlled.

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Bill Gates explains the risks associated with AI and argues that they are manageable. Innovations often create new risks that need to be controlled.

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Wie lassen sich kritische Infrastrukturen (KRITIS) besser schützen? Für Bedrohungen auf digitalem Wege regeln das die Netzwerk- und Informationssicherheitsrichtlinie der EU, das BSI-Gesetz und die KRITIS-Verordnung. Doch nach den Anschlägen auf die Nordstream-Pipelines, den Vorkommnissen um die Glasfaser für die GSM-R-Steuerung bei der Deutschen Bahn, Klimaklebern auf Flughäfen und allgemein zunehmendem Wunsch nach Resilienz soll nun auch der Schutz jenseits der digitalen Komponenten erhöht werden. Das Bundesministerium des Innern hat deshalb seinen Referentenentwurf für das Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie für kritische Einheiten und zur Stärkung der Resilienz kritischer Anlagen (KRITIS-Dachgesetz) in die Ressortabstimmung gegeben. Jetzt müssen weitere Ministerien, Verbände und andere Interessenvertreter zu der Vorlage aus dem Hause Nancy Faeser Stellung nehmen. Doch der Entwurf lässt wichtige Fragen offen – und ist an vielen Punkten unklar.

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Wie lassen sich kritische Infrastrukturen (KRITIS) besser schützen? Für Bedrohungen auf digitalem Wege regeln das die Netzwerk- und Informationssicherheitsrichtlinie der EU, das BSI-Gesetz und die KRITIS-Verordnung. Doch nach den Anschlägen auf die Nordstream-Pipelines, den Vorkommnissen um die Glasfaser für die GSM-R-Steuerung bei der Deutschen Bahn, Klimaklebern auf Flughäfen und allgemein zunehmendem Wunsch nach Resilienz soll nun auch der Schutz jenseits der digitalen Komponenten erhöht werden. Das Bundesministerium des Innern hat deshalb seinen Referentenentwurf für das Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie für kritische Einheiten und zur Stärkung der Resilienz kritischer Anlagen (KRITIS-Dachgesetz) in die Ressortabstimmung gegeben. Jetzt müssen weitere Ministerien, Verbände und andere Interessenvertreter zu der Vorlage aus dem Hause Nancy Faeser Stellung nehmen. Doch der Entwurf lässt wichtige Fragen offen - und ist an vielen Punkten unklar.

Falk Steiner ist Journalist in Berlin. Er ist als Autor für heise online, Tageszeitungen, Fachnewsletter sowie Magazine tätig und berichtet unter anderem über die Digitalpolitik im Bund und der EU.

Bereits im Koalitionsvertrag hatten die Ampelparteien sich auf einen besseren Schutz auch in anderen Gefahrendimensionen festgelegt. Ende Dezember hatte das BMI unter Innenministerin Nancy Faeser (SPD) dann erste Eckpunkte vorgelegt, wie der bessere physische Schutz gewährleistet werden könnte. Schon da zeichnete sich ab, dass vor allem die Wirtschaft selbst dafür Sorge tragen soll. In dem jetzt in die Ressortabstimmung gegebenen Referentenentwurf wird auf 20 Seiten Gesetzestext definiert, wie der bessere Schutz erreicht werden soll. Kern des Vorhabens ist die Verpflichtung von etwa 2.000 Betreibern Kritischer Infrastruktur zur Darlegung von Schutzmaßnahmen, wie sie im Fall von Ausfällen reagieren wollen. Das entspricht den bereits bislang unter die KRITIS-Verordnung im Cybersicherheitsrecht fallenden Menge an Unternehmen.

Mit dem KRITIS-Dachgesetz sollen kritische Einrichtungen aus den Bereichen Energie, Transport und Verkehr, Abwasser, Trinkwasser, Finanz- und Versicherungswesen, Gesundheit, Informations- und Telekommunikationstechnik, Verwaltung von Informations- und Kommunikations-Diensten (ITK) für Business-to-Business-Kunden oder Weltraum unter die Vorgaben fallen. Außerdem sollen bestimmte Arten von Logistik, Entsorgung, Produktion, Chemie, Ernährung und verarbeitendem Gewerbe, digitaler Dienste und Forschung unter das KRITIS-Dachgesetz fallen. Ein weiter Kanon, der nicht zuletzt auf den Kriterien der Richtlinie über Kritische Einrichtungen auf EU-Ebene (CER) fußt.

Maßgeblich für das BMI ist, ob ein Anbieter die Schwelle von 500.000 Versorgungseinheiten überschreitet. Auch dies ist eine Anleihe aus der Cybersecurity-Regulierung - allerdings konnte das BMI bis zum Abend nicht erläutern, in welchem Zeitraum die 500.000 Versorgungseinheiten hier maßgeblich sein sollen. In der KRITIS-Verordnung für Cybersicherheit sind hier sektor- und anlagenspezifische, komplizierte Berechnungsformeln vorgesehen. Damit diese Betreiber dann resilienter werden, müssen sie Risikoanalysen anfertigen, die Risiken bewerten und entsprechende "Resilienzmaßnahmen" planen. Das schließt verschiedenste Maßnahmen ein, von der Notstromversorgung über Zugangsbarrieren bis zu Detektoren und Überwachungskameras.

Auch Versorgungsabkommen mit anderen Betreibern im Fall eines Ausfalls können dazu gehören. Zentraler Begriff im KRITIS-Dachgesetz ist dabei die "Wirtschaftsstabilität". In der EU-CER-Richtlinie heißt es hingegen, dass damit alle kritischen Einrichtungen geschützt werden sollen, die "für die Aufrechterhaltung wichtiger gesellschaftlicher Funktionen oder wirtschaftlicher Tätigkeiten unerlässlich sind". Hier dürften also noch einige Diskussionen folgen, was besonders schützenswert ist. Der Grund für die Bedrohung ist für das KRITIS-Dachgesetz dabei nachrangig: ob Naturkatastrophe, Industriehavarie, Anschlag oder andere Szenarien - Betreiber sollen sich Gedanken machen müssen und Maßnahmen überlegen.

Doch bei den Konsequenzen zeigt der Entwurf, wie groß die Angst ist, der Wirtschaft damit zusätzliche Lasten aufzubürden. Denn mit dem nun geplanten Gesetz werden die Betreiber nur dazu verpflichtet, "geeignete und verhältnismäßige, technische, sicherheitsbezogene und organisatorische Maßnahmen" zu treffen. Sprich: Es darf abgewogen werden, was verhältnismäßig ist und was zu teuer oder zu umständlich ist oder gar Änderungen an Prozessen erfordern würde. Verhältnismäßig sei, wenn der Aufwand zu den Folgen angemessen sei, heißt es im Referentenentwurf des BMI. Noch gummiartiger wird die Verpflichtung dadurch, dass dabei der Stand der Technik eingehalten werden soll - nicht muss. Konsequenterweise kann das BMI derzeit auch noch keine Aufwände für die Verpflichteten berechnen - das werde zusammen mit dem Statistischen Bundesamt derzeit herausgefunden.

Eine Leerstelle bildet im Referentenentwurf noch der §13. Mit diesem soll eigentlich geregelt werden, welche Vorgaben für den Einsatz kritischer Komponenten bei den Betreibern kritischer Infrastrukturen gelten sollen. Bislang gibt es mit dem §9b im BSI-Gesetz eine Vorschrift, die beim geplanten Einsatz bestimmter Komponenten in Mobilfunknetzen dem Bundesinnenministerium ermöglicht, das zu untersagen - die sogenannte Chinaklausel. Denn was im Mobilfunk problematisch ist, ist in Energienetzen und anderen kritischen Infrastrukturen nicht weniger gefährlich. Doch hier wird sich erst im Zuge der Ressortabstimmung zeigen, ob und wie sehr die Bundesregierung tatsächlich bereit ist, Untersagungsmöglichkeiten einzuziehen. Dennoch ist es mit dem KRITIS-Dachgesetz unwahrscheinlich, dass bereits bestehende Verpflichtungen abgesenkt werden: Sektorspezifische Regelungen bleiben unberührt, heißt es im nun vorliegenden Entwurf. Das betrifft nicht zuletzt den Gesundheitssektor, die Energieversorger und die Finanzdienstleister.

Insgesamt versucht das Innenministerium die verschiedenen Bereiche mit dem Dachgesetz etwas enger zu verzahnen. Um einzelfallübergreifende Vorkommnisse besser zu identifizieren, soll deshalb das Meldewesen zentralisiert werden: Das Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenvorsorge (BBK) in Bonn soll mit dem BSI zusammenarbeiten und Meldungen für physische wie digitale Vorfälle gemeinsam entgegennehmen. Ein Schritt in die richtige Richtung, findet der Verband der Kommunalen Unternehmen (VKU): "Das deutet auf einen Paradigmenwechsel zu „ein Vorfall, eine Meldung" hin: Wer attackiert wurde, versinkt dann nicht länger im Melde-Dschungel", sagt eine Sprecherin auf Anfrage von heise online. Im VKU sind viele der betroffenen Versorger organisiert. Außerdem, darauf ist man im BMI stolz, soll mit dem KRITIS-Dachgesetz möglichst wenig Papier produziert werden: Resilienzpläne und andere Dokumente sollen ausschließlich digital mit dem BBK geteilt werden.

Ein Streitpunkt der Vergangenheit wird mit dem Vorschlag für das KRITIS-Dachgesetz jedoch auf eigenwillige Art und Weise gelöst: Die Bundesländer sind in Deutschland grundsätzlich für den Katastrophenschutz zuständig. Die übertragen Teile der Zuständigkeit in der Regel auf Städte und Landkreise. Was sich am Beispiel der Flut an Ahr und Rur 2021 gezeigt hatte: dass die Koordinierung nicht so gut funktionierte, wie das eigentlich hätte sein müssen. Doch hier kann das KRITIS-Dachgesetz nichts bieten: Schon im Vorfeld hatten sich wichtige Bundesländer jede Einmischung in ihre unmittelbaren Kompetenzen verbeten. Der jetzt vorgelegte Vorschlag geht konsequent überhaupt nicht auf die Bundesländer ein, enthält ausdrücklich ein Vorhaben für eine Verordnung, für die es keine Zustimmung im Bundesrat benötigt. Dabei soll er ausdrücklich dem "All-Gefahren-Ansatz" folgen.

Eine weitere Schwachstelle des Gesetzentwurfes ist die Durchsetzung: Die CER-Richtlinie verlangt von den Mitgliedstaaten, dass die etwa "Vor-Ort-Kontrollen der kritischen Infrastruktur und der Räumlichkeiten, die die kritische Einrichtung für die Erbringung ihrer wesentlichen Dienste nutzt" einzuführen. Davon ist im KRITIS-Dachgesetz-Referentenentwurf aus dem Hause Faeser allerdings bislang nicht die Rede. Und auch die Frage, welche Strafen bei Nichtbefolgung drohen, ist vollkommen offen: Klar ist, dass es sich um Ordnungswidrigkeiten handeln soll, wenn Betreiber sich nicht an die Regeln halten. Doch wie hoch diese geahndet werden, ist noch offen - im Referentenentwurf fehlt der entsprechende Passus. Die CER-Richtlinie verlangt allerdings, dass Sanktionen "wirksam, verhältnismäßig und abschreckend sein" müssen.

Wer hofft, dass mit dem KRITIS-Dachgesetz nun schnell etwas geändert wird, dürfte enttäuscht sein. Aufgrund europarechtlicher Vorgaben muss das Gesetz zwar bis spätestens Mitte Oktober 2024 verabschiedet sein, doch die ersten Pflichten daraus sollen erst ab dem 1. Januar 2026 folgen - also in fast zweieinhalb Jahren. Ein besonderer Drahtseilakt für das federführend zuständige Bundesinnenministerium wird darin bestehen, im weiteren Verfahren kein neues Durcheinander zu schaffen. Denn parallel zum KRITIS-Dachgesetz wird auch die Umsetzung der überarbeiteten Netzwerk- und Informationssicherheitsrichtlinie kommen. Die Überarbeitung des BSI-Gesetzes und der KRITIS-Verordnung wird dort den Kreis der zum besseren Cyberschutz verpflichteten Organisationen von 2.000 - also jenen, mit denen Faesers Haus jetzt per KRITIS-Dachgesetz umfassende Resilienzpläne verordnen will - auf 15.000 bis 30.000 Stellen anwachsen. Wie das zusammenpasst, ist derzeit offen.

Für das weitere Verfahren gibt es viel zu diskutieren, sowohl mit den anderen Ressorts als auch mit dem Parlament. Der Druck auf die Innenministerin, endlich ein Gesetz vorzulegen, ist seit Monaten hoch, auch vonseiten der Ampelkoalition. Der Grünen-Innenpolitiker Konstantin von Notz kündigt auf Anfrage von heise online an: "Für uns ist es unter anderem zwingend, das bestehende Zuständigkeitswirrwarr beim Schutz unserer kritischen Infrastrukturen endlich aufzulösen, klare Verantwortlichkeiten zu schaffen und zu vermeiden, dass es durch noch mehr Akteure noch mehr Unklarheit gibt." Doch genau das scheint mit dem jetzt vorgelegten Entwurf keineswegs gewährleistet. Und auch ein zweiter Punkt, den von Notz für das weitere Verfahren einfordert, scheint zumindest noch einige Arbeit zu erfordern: Es benötige "zwingend Kohärenz mit den vorgelegten EU-Richtlinien." Der Referentenentwurf, der erst am Nachmittag überhaupt ans Parlament weitergeleitet wurde, wird absehbar noch intensiv diskutiert werden. Bis wann Nancy Faeser eine überarbeitete und ergänzte Fassung für das Kabinett vorlegen will, konnte das BMI bis zum Abend nicht mitteilen.

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Der Entwurf des Dachgesetzes zum Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen liegt vor, doch viele Fragen bleiben unbeantwortet. Eine Analyse von Falk Steiner.

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Übung: Szenario „Cyberangriff auf die Regierung"

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Übung: Szenario „Cyberangriff auf die Regierung"

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Was passiert, wenn Hacker versuchen, Regierung und Verwaltung in Deutschland lahmzulegen? Wie bleibt der Staat dann handlungsfähig? Seit Monaten laufen Vorbereitungen für eine große Übung, bei der ein solcher Cyberangriff durchgespielt werden soll.

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Lükex 23 Übung: Szenario „Cyberangriff auf die Regierung"

Anbieter zum Thema

Was passiert, wenn Hacker versuchen, Regierung und Verwaltung in Deutschland lahmzulegen? Wie bleibt der Staat dann handlungsfähig? Seit Monaten laufen Vorbereitungen für eine große Übung, bei der ein solcher Cyberangriff durchgespielt werden soll.

Mindestens acht Bundesländer, die Bundeswehr, die Bundespolizei und mehrere Bundesbehörden werden Ende September für den Fall eines großen Cyberangriffs auf Regierung und Verwaltung üben. Die Vorbereitungen dafür laufen schon auf Hochtouren. „Zahlreiche Ressorts des Bundes und der Länder mit ihren nachgeordneten Behörden bereiten sich aktuell gemeinschaftlich vor", teilte das Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK) auf Anfrage mit.

Geheimhaltung

Das genaue Szenario für die Übung Lükex 23, die am 27. September beginnt und zwei Tage dauern soll, werde nicht bekanntgemacht, um den Übungseffekt nicht zu gefährden, erklärte ein Sprecher. Obgleich an der Übung über 50 Behörden und mehr als Tausend Menschen teilnehmen werden, dürfte die Bevölkerung davon nichts wahrnehmen. „Die Lükex 23 legt in ihrem Szenario den Schwerpunkt auf das Regierungshandeln, welches durch einen massiven Cyberangriff gestört wird", sagte der Sprecher. Eine unmittelbare Beeinträchtigung der Bevölkerung während der Übung sei nicht vorgesehen. Auch eine Probewarnung soll nicht ausgelöst werden.

Durch aktuelle Lage ausgebremst

Die neunte bundesweite Krisenmanagement-Übung war 2020 aufgrund der Corona-Pandemie erst auf das Jahr 2022 und dann wegen des russischen Angriffskrieges auf die Ukraine auf 2023 verschoben worden. Zur Begründung hieß es, das für Krisenmanagement verantwortliche Personal sei stark mit der Bewältigung der aktuellen Lage beschäftigt, was die Übungsvorbereitung erschweren würde.

Wie das BBK mitteilte sind an Lükex 23 nach aktuellem Sachstand Brandenburg, Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Niedersachsen, Sachen und Thüringen beteiligt und machen den gesamten Übungsablauf mit. Daneben gibt es für die Länder und einzelne Behörden noch die Möglichkeit, reduziert mitzuüben oder als Beobachter teilzunehmen. Auf Bundesebene sind diesmal unter anderem das Innenministerium, das Auswärtige Amt, die Bundesbank, das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik ( BSI) und das Nationale Cyber-Abwehrzentrum dabei. Die Bundeswehr nimmt den Angaben zufolge mit ihrem Territorialen Führungskommando und dem Kommando Cyber- und Informationsraum teil.

Was bedeutet Lükex?

Die Abkürzung Lükex steht für Länder- und Ressortübergreifende Krisenmanagementübung. Operative Kräfte, also etwa Rettungskräfte oder Feuerwehrleute, sind nicht eingebunden. Auch Verletztendarsteller oder Einsatzfahrzeuge werden nicht benötigt. Die organisatorische Federführung für Lükex 23 liegt beim BBK.

Bei früheren Übungen waren unter anderem die Szenarien Gasmangellage in Süddeutschland (2018) und Grippe-Pandemie (2007) zugrunde gelegt worden. Kritik hatte es zu Beginn der Corona-Pandemie in Deutschland 2020 gegeben, nachdem augenfällig wurde, dass Handlungsempfehlungen, die nach der Pandemie-Übung 2007 erarbeitet worden waren, auf verschiedenen staatlichen Ebenen teilweise nicht umgesetzt worden waren, etwa die Beschaffung von Schutzanzügen.

Handlungsempfehlungen umsetzen

„Es obliegt jeder Behörde und jeder beteiligten Organisation, die im Rahmen der Lükex festgestellten Handlungsempfehlungen und gewonnen Erkenntnisse im eigenen Verantwortungsbereich umzusetzen", heißt es aus dem BBK. Das Bundesamt wirke jedoch „auf eine noch bessere Nachhaltigkeit" hin, indem es Netzwerktreffen anbiete, bei denen sich die verschiedenen Akteure über die Erkenntnisse austauschen und voneinander lernen könnten.

Zuständigkeit von Bund und Ländern

Auch als Reaktion auf die Erfahrungen aus der Flutkatastrophe vom Juli 2021 hatten die Innenminister von Bund und Ländern im vergangenen Jahr ein Gemeinsames Kompetenzzentrum Bevölkerungsschutz beim BBK gegründet. An den im Grundgesetz verankerten unterschiedlichen Zuständigkeiten hat sich seither aber nichts geändert. Die Länder tragen weiterhin die Verantwortung für den Katastrophenschutz, der Bund trifft Vorkehrungen für den Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung im Spannungs- und Verteidigungsfall.

Wenn Erkenntnisse nicht umgesetzt würden, bleibe auch die beste Übung lückenhaft, mahnt Leon Eckert, Berichterstatter für Bevölkerungsschutz der Grünen-Bundestagsfraktion. Er fordert: „Handlungsempfehlungen müssen zeitnah in der Praxis zum Tragen kommen und dürfen nicht in Schubladen verschwinden."

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Übung: Szenario „Cyberangriff auf die Regierung"

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(Bild: Hailshadow, Getty Images via Canva.com) Was passiert, wenn Hacker versuchen, Regierung und Verwaltung in Deutschland lahmzulegen? Wie bleibt der Staat dann handlungsfähig? Seit Monaten laufen Vorbereitungen für eine große Übung, bei der ein solcher Cyberangriff durchgespielt werden soll.

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Responsible Use of ICTs in Private Security Service: A Toolkit for Companies

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Responsible Use of ICTs in Private Security Service: A Toolkit for Companies

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In a world increasingly connected by digital tools, the rapid growth of private security services and their use of ICTs present both opportunities and challenges. Recognizing the need to address these issues, ICT4Peace has previously collaborated with the International Code of Conduct Association for Private Security Service Providers (ICoCA) on a comprehensive mapping study to analyze the use of ICTs in private security services.

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In a world increasingly connected by digital tools, the rapid growth of private security services and their use of ICTs present both opportunities and challenges. Recognizing the need to address these issues, ICT4Peace has previously collaborated with the International Code of Conduct Association for Private Security Service Providers (ICoCA) on a comprehensive mapping study to analyze the use of ICTs in private security services.

See the report authored by Anne-Marie Buzatu, Executive Director of ICT4Peace .

The mapping study, which was generously supported by the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, examined the ways in which private security companies (PSCs) employ ICTs and assessed the potential risks and benefits associated with their use. The main findings of the report include:

The growing use of surveillance technologies, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, biometric scanners, and facial recognition software, raising concerns about potential privacy violations and data security.

The capture and storage of enormous amounts of personal digital data, much of it very sensitive, by PSCs without clear standards for what should be captured or how it should be stored/secured.

The vulnerability of PSCs to cyber threats, including hacking and data breaches, due to insufficient cybersecurity measures and training.

The need for clear guidelines on the responsible use of ICTs by PSCs to prevent human rights violations and ensure compliance with international legal frameworks.

In response to these findings ICT4Peace, in close collaboration with ICoCA, is developing guidance for Private Security Companies on the responsible use of ICTs in the provision of private security services.

The project will result in the creation of a Toolkit on the responsible use ICTs in private security services for private security companies, The Toolkit will provide PSCs with practical guidance on implementing responsible ICT practices in their operations, addressing potential risks and challenges, and promoting compliance with international human rights and legal standards.

In developing this Toolkit, ICT4Peace Foundation aims to foster a culture of responsible ICT use within the private security sector, ultimately contributing to global peace, security, protection of human rights and ethical business practices.

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Responsible Use of ICTs in Private Security Service: A Toolkit for Companies

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In a world increasingly connected by digital tools, the rapid growth of private security services and their use of ICTs present both opportunities and challenges. Recognizing the need to address th...

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Les guerres de l'information à l'heure de l'intelligence artificielle

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Les guerres de l'information à l'heure de l'intelligence artificielle

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L’intelligence artificielle (IA) favorise non seulement les capacités offensives d’acteurs malveillants sur le terrain numérique, mais elle fragilise aussi davantage les capacités défensives de nos sociétés face aux manipulations de l’information. Réalisée sur la base de discussions menées à la conférence annuelle du Centre d’excellence pour la communication stratégique de l’OTAN à Riga (Lettonie), cette brève stratégique se propose de synthétiser les dangers que présentent les outils utilisant cette technologie.

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Les guerres de l'information à l'heure de l'intelligence artificielle Dusan Bozalka L'intelligence artificielle (IA) favorise non seulement les capacités offensives d'acteurs malveillants sur le terrain numérique, mais elle fragilise aussi davantage les capacités défensives de nos sociétés face aux manipulations de l'information. Réalisée sur la base de discussions menées à la conférence annuelle du Centre d'excellence pour la communication stratégique de l'OTAN à Riga (Lettonie), cette brève stratégique se propose de synthétiser les dangers que présentent les outils utilisant cette technologie.
Si la démocratisation de l'Internet s'est initialement accompagnée d'une vision émancipatrice, nombreuses sont aujourd'hui les inquiétudes relatives à l'incursion croissante de l'IA dans nos sociétés. Force est de constater que cette technologie est amenée à s'installer de manière durable dans notre quotidien, comme le signale la mise à disposition d'outils en libre accès tels que des générateurs d'images et des agents conversationnels. Les prototypes les plus notoires de cette classe d'outils sont les deux dernières versions des transformateurs génératifs pré-entraînés ( Generative Pre-trained Transformer) logés dans l'agent conversationnel développé par l'entreprise américaine OpenAI, ChatGPT. Grâce à une architecture complexe dite " en réseau neuronal ", cette technologie exploite un modèle consacré au traitement d'une séquence de mots afin de prédire la meilleure réponse possible selon les données accessibles. Les outils générateurs d'images, tels que celui de Midjourney, utilisent quant à eux un modèle de diffusion, où du bruit aléatoire est progressivement inversé pour créer des images de haute qualité sur la base des instructions formulées par l'utilisateur. Ce faisant, ces outils demeurent strictement façonnés par la main de l'humain, nuançant le contenu des scénarios apocalyptiques liés à une automatisation complète de l'IA. Ils représentent toutefois un facteur d'intensification des ambitions poursuivies par les acteurs qui la mobilisent, ce qui inclut de multiples usages malveillants déjà observables sur le terrain numérique. Ce constat pousse de manière croissante les institutions internationales et leurs États membres à s'interroger sur les effets néfastes de l'IA, a fortiori dans un contexte géopolitique marqué par une recrudescence des guerres de l'information. Un des exemples les plus récents en est la conférence annuelle du Centre d'excellence pour la communication stratégique de l'OTAN, organisée en juin 2023 à Riga. Réalisée à la lumière des échanges entre chercheurs et militaires de haut rang, cette brève stratégique se propose d'énoncer deux enseignements relatifs aux menaces informationnelles que pose cette technologie.

L'IA incarne d'abord un avantage pour les capacités offensives des États et des acteurs privés malveillants engagés dans la lutte informationnelle. Ceci s'explique par la mobilisation croissante des outils issus de cette technologie en vue de massifier la création de fausses informations selon les requêtes formulées, et ainsi contribuer à intensifier le brouillard informationnel. Comme le montre une récente enquête de , les réponses proposées par les modèles de ChatGPT en font régulièrement un relais de la propagande des gouvernements chinois et russe. Une fois mises à contribution par des acteurs étatiques autoritaires, les réponses fournies servent à appuyer les récits de propagande et ceux véhiculés au travers d'opérations de désinformation. Bien que des garde-fous existent afin d'empêcher ces outils d'accéder à des requêtes considérées comme malveillantes, la modération de ces dernières présente certaines failles. Il est possible de débrider ( jailbreak) ChatGPT, c'est-à-dire contourner les limitations mises en place par OpenAI, à la suite d'une requête précédée par une mise en situation hypothétique ou introduite sous la forme d'un jeu de rôle ( prompt hacking). En conséquence, certains spécialistes mettent en garde contre la diminution des coûts entraînée par l'utilisation de l'IA dans les manipulations de l'information. Ces outils sont en effet capables de proposer des récits adaptés à des contextes culturels et linguistiques précis, ciblant des groupes sociologiques variés et destinés à assurer une meilleure réception. Il est alors possible de produire des récits de propagande de haute qualité pour un coût relativement bas, l'IA remplaçant des agents sensibilisés aux enjeux nationaux. Apte à coder dans différents langages informatiques, ChatGPT facilite également la création de sites en ligne et de réseaux de comptes automatiques ( botnets) destinés à amplifier artificiellement ( astroturfing) les récits formulés. Au-delà des acteurs étatiques, cette tendance risque de multiplier les actes malveillants en provenance d'acteurs privés, et ce de deux manières différentes. La première se rapporte à une nette augmentation de la création de botnets disponibles sur le dark web et actifs sur les réseaux sociaux, au moment même où des plateformes telles que Twitter pâtissent des licenciements massifs de leurs modérateurs. La seconde concerne la massification des opérations de cybercriminalité, telles que l'hameçonnage, si bien que ChatGPT propose la formulation rapide de courriels frauduleux à même de contourner les filtres anti-spam et dotés d'un niveau de réalisme convaincant.

De ce premier point découlent des limitations systémiques propres à la posture défensive des démocraties, principalement ancrées dans des raisons techniques et économiques. Les outils issus de l'IA ne sont pas en mesure de combattre les manipulations de l'information, puisqu'ils sont incapables de les détecter. À ce jour, seules certaines erreurs récurrentes permettent d'identifier la marque d'une production artificielle, telles que des mains déformées ou des fonds flous lorsqu'il s'agit de générateurs d'images. Du côté des agents conversationnels, ce phénomène se matérialise à travers des tournures redondantes, la présence de statistiques improbables au sein du corps de texte, et la publication de messages d'erreur par des comptes automatiques ( bots) sur les plateformes numériques. En matière de défense, l'utilité de l'IA réside in fine dans l'optimisation du temps de travail dont disposent les spécialistes des manipulations informationnelles. Ils peuvent alors se consacrer pleinement à l'identification de ces dernières et automatiser leur inventorisation. Si les modèles des intelligences artificielles sont accessibles à tous en libre accès, leur développement et leur entraînement requièrent un investissement conséquent de plusieurs centaines de millions d'euros, résultant de la préparation d'une base de données exploitable et l'utilisation de serveurs informatiques puissants. Cette limitation révèle une seconde difficulté d'ordre économique. De manière similaire aux plateformes numériques, les données des échanges entre utilisateurs et les outils issus de l'IA restent la chasse gardée d'un oligopole d'entreprises, qu'il est impossible de réquisitionner comme c'est le cas dans les régimes autoritaires. Ces lacunes techniques et financières empêchent les décideurs politiques et la communauté scientifique, faute de transparence et de moyens, de mieux comprendre les menaces posées par l'IA. Encore faut-il ajouter les enjeux géopolitiques que risquent de provoquer les efforts de régulation de cette technologie. Si les appels à la création de centres internationaux chargés de surveiller les évolutions liées à l'IA paraissent louables, ce processus reste fastidieux et compromis par la Realpolitik des États.

Les dangers informationnels que cette technologie représente pour la résilience des sociétés occidentales sont tangibles, mais plusieurs réponses peuvent en mitiger les effets. L'une de celles-ci implique une augmentation conséquente des investissements consacrés à la recherche académique. Davantage de travaux permettraient en effet d'améliorer la reconnaissance de messages formulés par des outils d'IA, notamment grâce à un modèle reposant sur une alliance de la stylométrie, soit la reconnaissance de tournures linguistiques redondantes, et de l'apprentissage machine. Une autre réponse consisterait en la mise à disposition des données récoltées par les entreprises privées, ce qui multiplierait les efforts consacrés à une utilisation défensive de leurs outils. Une récente étude souligne à ce titre le potentiel bénéfique de ceux-ci, dont ChatGPT, afin d'améliorer l'efficacité et la rapidité des processus de vérification des faits. Alors que l'IA menace la cohésion de nos démocraties dans leur ensemble, ces réponses nécessitent de repenser leurs cadres juridiques. Des règles claires sont en effet nécessaires afin d'engager la responsabilité des entreprises lorsque leurs outils sont employés dans des opérations de désinformation. Le consensus académique semble quant à lui plaider en faveur d'une adaptation rapide des cadres juridiques nationaux, voire européens, aux dispositions applicables à l'IA, telles que celles en matière de droits d'auteurs ou de la protection des données des utilisateurs. Des dispositions préventives peuvent parallèlement être adoptées face aux menaces posées par une utilisation autoritaire de l'intelligence artificielle, à l'image de la décision des États-Unis de contrôler l'exportation vers la Chine de processeurs. À cela s'ajoute un nécessaire élargissement des méthodes utilisées par les acteurs gouvernementaux dans leur communication stratégique, ce que soutiennent les effets positifs d'une exposition préventive à de la désinformation ( pre-bunking).
Dusan Bozalka est doctorant résident à l'IRSEM et rattaché au Centre d'analyse et de recherche interdisciplinaire sur les médias à l'Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas.
Contact : dusan.bozalka@irsem.fr

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Brève stratégique n°62 - 2023 - Les guerres de l'information à l'heure de l'intelligence artificielle

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Les guerres de l'information à l'heure de l'intelligence artificielle Dusan Bozalka L'intelligence artificielle (IA) favorise non seulement les capacités offensives d'acteurs malveillants sur le terrain numérique, mais elle fragilise aussi davantage les capacités défensives de nos sociétés face aux manipulations de l'information.

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"Wartime Propaganda in the Age of Generative Chatbots"

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"Wartime Propaganda in the Age of Generative Chatbots"

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Historically, the use of propaganda has been a permissible means and method of warfare (subject to some limitations such as it cannot be used to incite violations of the law of war).  Despite its obvious utility to wartime success, the the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual currently claims (para 5.6.7.3) “[d]iminishing the morale of the civilian population and their support for the war effort does not provide a definite military advantage” (but see here for a different perspective).

Because an object must, among other things, provide a “definite military advantage” in order to be targetable as a military objective, the instrumentalities that spread propaganda (e.g., radio and television stations) have typically not been considered proper military objectives for attack if that was the only reason for targeting them.

Does powerful new technology that supercharges propaganda warrant a re-evaluation of how it is traditionally viewed by the law of war? In recent years it has become evident that the enormous technical capabilities of the digital age have changed modern propaganda significantly and, it is argued, made it much more dangerous.

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The Future of Algorithmic Warfare: Fragmented Development - War on the Rocks

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The Future of Algorithmic Warfare: Fragmented Development - War on the Rocks

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The current promise that artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) capabilities will revolutionize warfare stands in contrast to the historical record of high hopes and stalled progress of algorithmic warfare in the profession of arms. Despite the novelty of new chat bots and battlefield proliferation of AI/ML in Ukraine, the extent to which large, legacy military organizations — read the U.S. armed services — will prove adept at cultivating change is still uncertain.

To that end, we wrote a book — Information in War: Military Innovation, Battle Networks, and the Future of Artificial Intelligence — about how military organizations adapt new information technologies, which includes modern battle networks and AI/ML. We did so because as scholars and military professionals we have witnessed stalled progress up close. In the book, we offer four alternative futures about the prospects for AI/ML in the U.S. military. Each is written as a slice-of-time scenario following the chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff on their morning commute. The logic of each scenario maps the findings from historical case studies in the book exploring how and why the military profession has struggled to integrate new information technologies to build battle networks over the last one hundred years.

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Editor's Note: What follows is an excerpt from the authors' forthcoming book, Information in War: Military Innovation, Battle Networks, and the Future of Artificial Intelligence.

The current promise that artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) capabilities will revolutionize warfare stands in contrast to the historical record of high hopes and stalled progress of algorithmic warfare in the profession of arms. Despite the novelty of new chat bots and battlefield proliferation of AI/ML in Ukraine, the extent to which large, legacy military organizations - read the U.S. armed services - will prove adept at cultivating change is still uncertain.

To that end, we wrote a book - Information in War: Military Innovation, Battle Networks, and the Future of Artificial Intelligence - about how military organizations adapt new information technologies, which includes modern battle networks and AI/ML. We did so because as scholars and military professionals we have witnessed stalled progress up close. In the book, we offer four alternative futures about the prospects for AI/ML in the U.S. military. Each is written as a slice-of-time scenario following the chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff on their morning commute. The logic of each scenario maps the findings from historical case studies in the book exploring how and why the military profession has struggled to integrate new information technologies to build battle networks over the last one hundred years.

In this first scenario we show that bold innovators can find their path blocked by bad bureaucracy. Even when ideas about change are in the air - like today with the excitement around AI/ML including generative approaches and large-language models - progress can still be stalled by antiquated organizations and old routines. No amount of technology can substitute for an unwillingness to experiment and adapt legacy force design to take advantage of new information technology, including AI/ML. New gadgets die in the iron cage of outdated bureaucracy.

* * *

The year is 2040. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rides to the Pentagon in her unmanned car, browsing a roundup of defense news, while listening to a historical podcast on the politics of the Army in the 1990s. As the narrator talks about Gen. Gordon Sullivan and efforts to digitize the Cold War Army, three headlines catch her eye and pause her news scrolling:

"Air Force Colonel Questioned over Swarm Experiment Challenging the Current Design of Fighter Squadrons.""New Report: Chinese AI-Driven Simulators Rely on Scraping Social Media to Train Models on U.S. Military Doctrine, Decision-Making.""Army Surgeon General Joins American Medical Association Lawsuit Against Hippocrates Application and Other Digital Physician Services."

She asks her digital assistant to summarize a recent Congressional Research Services report on the status of AI/ML integration across the U.S. military. The bottom line hadn't changed: Legacy organizational structures and bureaucracies larger than they are nimble limited the ability of the U.S. military to truly harness the power of AI/ML to revolutionize warfare. There were innovators who both shaped and used policy directives to run local experiments. New accounting lines were even being created to fund it all. But, just like the Air Force colonel, innovators were often being held back by arbitrary rules and a cadre of institutionalized souls. This older generation of retired colonels turned federal employees seemed more interested in preserving the status quo than changing it. Why question a bureaucracy and career paths that made you successful?

The services were willing to experiment or at least put on grand plays about it, innovation theater at its finest. Hell, there was money on the table! But the deeply-rooted structures - the staffs, corps, the divisions, the battalions and squadrons, the very nature of the rank structure - remained little changed since Napoleon. The military was an antique iron cage.

More traditional senior leaders, who tended to populate service leadership, claimed there was an enduring essence to combat that made corps, air wings, and other large staff structures vital to coordinating effects in warfare. They saw the benefits of increased precision and lethality but preserved a view of judgment as hierarchal and human, often in a pre-Copernican manner revolving around themselves - "the Commander" - as opposed to data aggregated and analyzed across a larger battle network. Machines could help to filter information and even propose courses of action, but the old men on horseback still preferred "green tab to green tab," commander-to-commander interactions and delegating to staff absent the watchful eye of AI applications. It was an almost romantic view of a tragic enterprise: killing in the name of politics.

The general reflected on her own career. She remembered being detailed to the Joint AI Center as a young captain during the 2020 pandemic, working alongside vendors and scientists to try to predict how the virus would spread and what likely logistical backlogs would emerge. She remembered turning down lucrative offers to leave the U.S. Army to work for a firm that trained visual classification programs that used social media posts to facilitate romantic matchmaking. She loved the coding but found most of the commercial applications trivial.

She was at the front end of a generational shift. Her peers were a mix of digital natives who either understood basic computing principles or just lived unaware in an endless stream of the interactions they facilitated. This produced a mix of skepticism and trust entirely based on an individual officer's knowledge. Those who understood basic coding, statistics, and computing concepts understood the promise and peril of AI/ML, even its limits in solving military problems. Those that lived online simply tended to trust technology, from their data to their choices, and assumed that someone or something else would make it all work.

She was younger than the generals who still controlled the major combat commands and upper echelons of the services. Fast-tracked ahead of her peers on four occasions, she was also the first non-combat arms chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In hindsight, her career was a series of occupational dead ends that always seemed to open new doors. After the pandemic she was pulled into the Chief Data and AI Office and the Global Information Dominance Experiments to develop algorithms supporting dynamic targeting. Her work propelled ideas about scalable battle networks and data at the edge. She was an intelligence officer who ended up spending more time building programming infrastructure and leading coding teams than advising the old school commanders on what the enemy was going to do. She spent more time fighting against entrenched notions about intuition and trying to explain Big Data and things like Bayes' theorem to fellow officers than she did on building old-fashioned military combined obstacle overlays and collection plans little changed since Desert Storm.

The general was jolted from her memories as the unmanned car hit the curb as it swerved to avoid a homeless man wandering onto Army-Navy Drive in Arlington, Virginia. She remembered the shock of most Americans when they discovered that no amount of automation would end all traffic fatalities, much less theft or murder. Over the last twenty years, amazing strides in AI applications altered daily life and even how the military fought but it didn't remove the greed, grievances, or emotions of people. It didn't stop bureaucracies and legacy institutions from resisting change.

It did change the art of war. Despite the survival of large, legacy commands, war was now often conducted by small groups in the shadows supported by swarms of unmanned systems and networks of analysts around the world combing through data and debating insights from models. Data became the new key terrain. Those that had data and could replicate patterns, even possible decisions, gained a position of advantage. Those that didn't usually reacted based on outdated priors. Those that had data and nimble force structures could simultaneously swarm targets and collapse enemy systems. Those that had large, legacy footprints maneuvered more like hoplites and tank armies of old, set piece and deliberate. Modern war was less climatic and more a series of violent, punctuated equilibriums as one side thought they had a data advantage and could act. Only AI/ML applications could filter the mass amounts of information, but the military often strained to act, slowed by legacy force structure and staff processes.

As the unmanned car pulled into the Pentagon parking lot, staff greeted her and escorted the general to her office while her digital assistant began her classified brief. After her biometric scan entering the building, her feed - a neural implant - began telling her the latest classified updates prioritized based on an analysis of her prior reading and trending material across the national security enterprise. The system only activated once she was in the building and biometrically matched to ensure operational security.

She experienced the last battlefield update from ongoing counterterror operations in Africa. The 101st Airborne Division Headquarters was forward, command and controlling a train and assist mission and providing support to a task force tracking down a fringe group believed to be backed by the Russian GRU and the latest in a series of shadowy private military contractors. She remembered using AI/ML to scrape Telegram posts after the Wagner Group's failed mutiny in 2023. Looking at the new mission, the chairman wondered why the mission needed a division headquarters at all. She had done the same mission with just a few CIA operatives and special operators in the Middle East over twenty years ago, crunching data and coding on the fly. Sure, her kit was nothing like what they had access to today, but the effect was the same: scalable battle networks.

As she entered her office, a new feed emerged in her neural link. It was a message from the commandant of the Marine Corps. It was another swan song about the importance of large, manned infantry formations to preserve flexibility in future war. The chairman remembered how the optimism around force design in the U.S. Marine Corps was overcome by a network of retirees and zealots who saw themselves as Spartans. She knew a warning shot when she saw one. The general was really telling her that he had access to an almost cult-like constituency ready to overwhelm congressional offices with bot-assisted calls for her resignation if she pressed AI-force structure shifts that would reduce the size of large infantry organizations any further.

She thought again back to Sullivan and his efforts to digitize the post-Cold War Army. She had to balance the speed of change against the counter-mobilization of a network of officials and vested interests. The fact that her generation - now starting to take senior commands - only partially understood technology made this task all the harder. Digital natives tended to compromise where information technology and data were concerned. They assumed technology always worked, even if there were hiccups along the way, and could be added to any institution or process to make it fast, stronger... whatever the quality de jure may be. They tended to push for keeping things like divisions and large staffs in place - hell, that's how they got promoted! - and just add new algorithms to old processes to achieve new efficiencies. Sullivan's fate, she thought - that of a stalled change - was more likely than not her own.

* * *

As the scenario implies, there are reasons to be concerned that the current wave of enthusiasm around AI/ML will collide with legacy bureaucratic structures. The result: Old ways of waging new wars could produce diminishing marginal returns in a defense bureaucracy already strained by rising personnel costs, inflation, and challenges in passing even a basic audit. Successful states don't waste blood and treasure.

Military innovation does not emerge from a vacuum. It requires a diverse network of people, career pathways, and institutional antecedents. Technology can catalyze but not create change absent open institutional pathways for experimentation and change. As the scenario implies, there is a future on the horizon in which no amount of private sector AI/ML innovation can overcome the inability of the military to rethink its structure to take advantage of new way of war. Without structural change, new technology at best produces diminishing marginal returns. Like in the cautionary tale of tanks in the interwar period, new equipment gets added to infantry platoons as opposed to creating new armored formations.

The historical precedent to the future scenario above is the U.S. Army of the 1990s. Visionary leaders like Sullivan imagined new concepts and capabilities for an information-age military. Sullivan pushed to change the bureaucracy and accelerate that change but struggled to overcome deep-seated interests and balance the demands of generating rapidly deployable forces for contingencies in Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans and designing new unit types. His vision of war in the information age, while prescient, failed to change the army at the speed and scale he had hoped for. Change did come, but it took another generation.

It is too soon to say whether the latest efforts to usher in a new era of algorithmic warfare will face a similar fate. There are reasons to be optimistic. The chief digital and artificial intelligence effort is creating a diverse network of military professionals, civilian officials, and private sector firms ready to change warfare. Service level initiatives like Scarlet Dragon are similarly pushing ahead. At the same time, the fate of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control could cause the whole wave of experimentation to fizzle out, with different services backing different solutions creating a bureaucratic coordination challenge and limiting the likelihood of real military revolution.

The true test of whether the latest push for innovation will succeed is whether or not military organizations start to build new command and control constructs and entirely new formations. If the readers of War on the Rocks start to see articles along these lines turned into field experiments and entirely new units, the possibility of change starts to emerge. If they find glossy think tank reports and LinkedIn posts about new code injected into old bureaucracies, they should not lose hope. Change will come. It will just be slow, uneven, and prone to more half-steps and missteps than real success.
Benjamin Jensen, Ph.D., is a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting in the Marine Corps University and a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve. Christopher Whyte, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness at Virginia Commonwealth University. Colonel Scott Cuomo, Ph.D., currently serves as a senior U.S. Marine Corps advisor within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. He helped co-author these essays while participating in the Commandant of the Marine Corps Strategist Program and also serving as the service's representative on the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence.
Image: AI Generated by Dr. Ben Jensen

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The Future of Algorithmic Warfare: Fragmented Development - War on the Rocks

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Editor's Note: What follows is an excerpt from the authors' forthcoming book, Information in War: Military Innovation, Battle Networks, and the Future of

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The AI-Powered, Totally Autonomous Future of War Is Here

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The AI-Powered, Totally Autonomous Future of War Is Here

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A fleet of robot ships bobs gently in the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, somewhere between Bahrain and Qatar, maybe 100 miles off the coast of Iran. I am on the nearby deck of a US Coast Guard speedboat, squinting off what I understand is the port side. On this morning in early December 2022, the horizon is dotted with oil tankers and cargo ships and tiny fishing dhows, all shimmering in the heat. As the speedboat zips around the robot fleet, I long for a parasol, or even a cloud.

The robots do not share my pathetic human need for shade, nor do they require any other biological amenities. This is evident in their design. A few resemble typical patrol boats like the one I’m on, but most are smaller, leaner, lower to the water. One looks like a solar-powered kayak. Another looks like a surfboard with a metal sail. Yet another reminds me of a Google Street View car on pontoons.

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Ships without crews. Self-directed drone swarms. How a US Navy task force is using off-the-shelf robotics and artificial intelligence to prepare for the next age of conflict.

A fleet of robot ships bobs gently in the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, somewhere between Bahrain and Qatar, maybe 100 miles off the coast of Iran. I am on the nearby deck of a US Coast Guard speedboat, squinting off what I understand is the port side. On this morning in early December 2022, the horizon is dotted with oil tankers and cargo ships and tiny fishing dhows, all shimmering in the heat. As the speedboat zips around the robot fleet, I long for a parasol, or even a cloud.

The robots do not share my pathetic human need for shade, nor do they require any other biological amenities. This is evident in their design. A few resemble typical patrol boats like the one I'm on, but most are smaller, leaner, lower to the water. One looks like a solar-powered kayak. Another looks like a surfboard with a metal sail. Yet another reminds me of a Google Street View car on pontoons.

These machines have mustered here for an exercise run by Task Force 59, a group within the US Navy's Fifth Fleet. Its focus is robotics and artificial intelligence, two rapidly evolving technologies shaping the future of war. Task Force 59's mission is to swiftly integrate them into naval operations, which it does by acquiring the latest off-the-shelf tech from private contractors and putting the pieces together into a coherent whole. The exercise in the Gulf has brought together more than a dozen uncrewed platforms-surface vessels, submersibles, aerial drones. They are to be Task Force 59's distributed eyes and ears: They will watch the ocean's surface with cameras and radar, listen beneath the water with hydrophones, and run the data they collect through pattern-matching algorithms that sort the oil tankers from the smugglers.

A fellow human on the speedboat draws my attention to one of the surfboard-style vessels. It abruptly folds its sail down, like a switchblade, and slips beneath the swell. Called a Triton, it can be programmed to do this when its systems sense danger. It seems to me that this disappearing act could prove handy in the real world: A couple of months before this exercise, an Iranian warship seized two autonomous vessels, called Saildrones, which can't submerge. The Navy had to intervene to get them back.

The Triton could stay down for as long as five days, resurfacing when the coast is clear to charge its batteries and phone home. Fortunately, my speedboat won't be hanging around that long. It fires up its engine and roars back to the docking bay of a 150-foot-long Coast Guard cutter. I head straight for the upper deck, where I know there's a stack of bottled water beneath an awning. I size up the heavy machine guns and mortars pointed out to sea as I pass.

The deck cools in the wind as the cutter heads back to base in Manama, Bahrain. During the journey, I fall into conversation with the crew. I'm eager to talk with them about the war in Ukraine and the heavy use of drones there, from hobbyist quadcopters equipped with hand grenades to full-on military systems. I want to ask them about a recent attack on the Russian-occupied naval base in Sevastopol, which involved a number of Ukrainian-built drone boats bearing explosives-and a public crowdfunding campaign to build more. But these conversations will not be possible, says my chaperone, a reservist from the social media company Snap. Because the Fifth Fleet operates in a different region, those on Task Force 59 don't have much information about what's going on in Ukraine, she says. Instead, we talk about AI image generators and whether they'll put artists out of a job, about how civilian society seems to be reaching its own inflection point with artificial intelligence. In truth, we don't know the half of it yet. It has been just a day since OpenAI launched ChatGPT, the conversational interface that would break the internet.

Back at base, I head for the Robotics Operations Center, where a group of humans oversees the distributed sensors out on the water. The ROC is a windowless room with several rows of tables and computer monitors-pretty characterless but for the walls, which are adorned with inspirational quotes from figures like Winston Churchill and Steve Jobs. Here I meet Captain Michael Brasseur, the head of Task Force 59, a tanned man with a shaved head, a ready smile, and a sailor's squint. (Brasseur has since retired from the Navy.) He strides between tables as he cheerfully explains how the ROC operates. "This is where all the data that's coming off the unmanned systems is fused, and where we leverage AI and machine learning to get some really exciting insights," Brasseur says, rubbing his hands together and grinning as he talks.

The monitors flicker with activity. Task Force 59's AI highlights suspicious vessels in the area. It has already flagged a number of ships today that did not match their identification signal, prompting the fleet to take a closer look. Brasseur shows me a new interface in development that will allow his team to perform many of these tasks on one screen, from viewing a drone ship's camera feed to directing it closer to the action.

"It can engage autonomously, but we don't recommend it. We don't want to start World War III."

Brasseur and others at the base stress that the autonomous systems they're testing are for sensing and detection only, not for armed intervention. "The current focus of Task Force 59 is enhancing visibility," Brasseur says. "Everything we do here supports the crew vessels." But some of the robot ships involved in the exercise illustrate how short the distance between unarmed and armed can be-a matter of swapping payloads and tweaking software. One autonomous speedboat, the Seagull, is designed to hunt mines and submarines by dragging a sonar array in its wake. Amir Alon, a senior director at Elbit Systems, the Israeli defense firm that created the Seagull, tells me that it can also be equipped with a remotely operated machine gun and torpedoes that launch from the deck. "It can engage autonomously, but we don't recommend it," he says with a smile. "We don't want to start World War III."

No, we don't. But Alon's quip touches on an important truth: Autonomous systems with the capacity to kill already exist around the globe. In any major conflict, even one well short of World War III, each side will soon face the temptation not only to arm these systems but, in some situations, to remove human oversight, freeing the machines to fight at machine speed. In this war of AI against AI, only humans will die. So it is reasonable to wonder: How do these machines, and the people who build them, think?

Glimmerings of autonomous technology have existed in the US military for decades, from the autopilot software in planes and drones to the automated deck guns that protect warships from incoming missiles. But these are limited systems, designed to perform specified functions in particular environments and situations. Autonomous, perhaps, but not intelligent. It wasn't until 2014 that top brass at the Pentagon began contemplating more capable autonomous technology as the solution to a much grander problem.

Bob Work, a deputy secretary of defense at the time, was concerned that the nation's geopolitical rivals were "approaching parity" with the US military. He wanted to know how to "regain overmatch," he says-how to ensure that even if the US couldn't field as many soldiers, planes, and ships as, say, China, it could emerge victorious from any potential conflict. So Work asked a group of scientists and technologists where the Department of Defense should focus its efforts. "They came back and said AI-enabled autonomy," he recalls. He began working on a national defense strategy that would cultivate innovations coming out of the technology sector, including the newly emerging capabilities offered by machine learning.

This was easier said than done. The DOD got certain projects built-including Sea Hunter, a $20 million experimental warship, and Ghost Fleet Overlord, a flotilla of conventional vessels retro-fitted to perform autonomously-but by 2019 the department's attempts to tap into Big Tech were stuttering. The effort to create a single cloud infrastructure to support AI in military operations became a political hot potato and was dropped. A Google project that involved using AI to analyze aerial images was met with a storm of public criticism and employee protest. When the Navy released its 2020 shipbuilding plan, an outline of how US fleets will evolve over the next three decades, it highlighted the importance of uncrewed systems, especially large surface ships and submersibles--but allocated relatively little money to developing them.

In a tiny office deep in the Pentagon, a former Navy pilot named Michael Stewart was well aware of this problem. Charged with overseeing the development of new combat systems for the US fleet, Stewart had begun to feel that the Navy was like Blockbuster sleepwalking into the Netflix era. Years earlier, at Harvard Business School, he had attended classes given by Clay Christensen, an academic who studied why large, successful enterprises get disrupted by smaller market entrants-often because a focus on current business causes them to miss new technology trends. The question for the Navy, as Stewart saw it, was how to hasten the adoption of robotics and AI without getting mired in institutional bureaucracy.

Others at the time were thinking along similar lines. That December, for instance, researchers at RAND, the government-funded defense think tank, published a report that suggested an alternate path: Rather than funding a handful of extravagantly priced autonomous systems, why not buy up cheaper ones by the swarm? Drawing on several war games of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the RAND report stated that deploying huge numbers of low-cost aerial drones could significantly improve the odds of US victory. By providing a picture of every vessel in the Taiwan Strait, the hypothetical drones-which RAND dubbed "kittens"-might allow the US to quickly destroy an enemy's fleet. (A Chinese military journal took note of this prediction at the time, discussing the potential of xiao mao, the Chinese phrase for "kitten," in the Taiwan Strait.)

In early 2021, Stewart and a group of colleagues drew up a 40-page document called the Unmanned Campaign Framework. It outlined a scrappy, unconventional plan for the Navy's use of autonomous systems, forgoing conventional procurement in favor of experimentation with cheap robotic platforms. The effort would involve a small, diverse team-specialists in AI and robotics, experts in naval strategy-that could work together to quickly implement ideas. "This is not just about unmanned systems," Stewart says. "It is as much-if not more-an organizational story."

Stewart's plan drew the attention of Vice Admiral Brad Cooper of the Fifth Fleet, whose territory spans 2.5 million square miles of water, from the Suez Canal around the Arabian Peninsula to the Persian Gulf. The area is filled with shipping lanes that are both vital to global trade and rife with illegal fishing and smuggling. Since the end of the Gulf War, when some of the Pentagon's attention and resources shifted toward Asia, Cooper had been looking for ways to do more with less, Stewart says. Iran had intensified its attacks on commercial vessels, swarming them in armed speed boats and even striking with drones and remotely operated boats.

Cooper asked Stewart to join him and Brasseur in Bahrain, and together the three began setting up Task Force 59. They looked at the autonomous systems already in use in other places around the world-for gathering climate data, say, or monitoring offshore oil platforms-and concluded that leasing and modifying this hardware would cost a fraction of what the Navy normally spent on new ships. Task Force 59 would then use AI-driven software to put the pieces together. "If new unmanned systems can operate in these complex waters," Cooper told me, "we believe they can be scaled to the other US Navy fleets."

As they were setting up the new task force, those waters kept getting more complex. In the early hours of July 29, 2021, an oil tanker called Mercer Street was headed north along the coast of Oman, en route from Tanzania to the United Arab Emirates, when two black, V-shaped drones appeared on the horizon, sweeping through the clear sky before exploding in the sea. A day later, after the crew had collected some debris from the water and reported the incident, a third drone dive-bombed the roof of the ship's control room, this time detonating an explosive that ripped through the structure, killing two members of its crew. Investigators concluded that three "suicide drones" made in Iran were to blame.

The main threat on Stewart's mind was China. "My goal is to come in with cheap or less expensive stuff very quickly-inside of five years-to send a deterrent message," he says. But China is, naturally, making substantial investments in military autonomy too. A report out of Georgetown University in 2021 found that the People's Liberation Army spends more than $1.6 billion on the technology each year-roughly on par with the US. The report also notes that autonomous vessels similar to those being used by Task Force 59 are a major focus of the Chinese navy. It has already developed a clone of the Sea Hunter, along with what is reportedly a large drone mothership.

Stewart hadn't noticed much interest in his work, however, until Russia invaded Ukraine. "People are calling me up and saying, 'You know that autonomous stuff you were talking about? OK, tell me more,'" he says. Like the sailors and officials I met in Bahrain, he wouldn't comment specifically on the situation-not about the Sevastopol drone-boat attack; not about the $800 million aid package the US sent Ukraine last spring, which included an unspecified number of "unmanned coastal defense vessels"; not about Ukraine's work to develop fully autonomous killer drones. All Stewart would say is this: "The timeline is definitely shifting."

Hivemind is designed to fly the F-16 fighter jet, and it can beat most human pilots who take it on in the simulator.

I am in San Diego, California, a main port of the US Pacific Fleet, where defense startups grow like barnacles. Just in front of me, in a tall glass building surrounded by palm trees, is the headquarters of Shield AI. Stewart encouraged me to visit the company, which makes the V-BAT, an aerial drone that Task Force 59 is experimenting with in the Persian Gulf. Although strange in appearance--shaped like an upside-down T, with wings and a single propeller at the bottom--it's an impressive piece of hardware, small and light enough for a two-person team to launch from virtually anywhere. But it's the software inside the V-BAT, an AI pilot called Hivemind, that I have come to see.

I walk through the company's bright-white offices, past engineers fiddling with bits of drone and lines of code, to a small conference room. There, on a large screen, I watch as three V-BATS embark on a simulated mission in the Californian desert. A wildfire is raging somewhere nearby, and their task is to find it. The aircraft launch vertically from the ground, then tilt forward and swoop off in different directions. After a few minutes, one of the drones pinpoints the blaze, then relays the information to its cohorts. They adjust flight, moving closer to the fire to map its full extent.

The simulated V-BATs are not following direct human commands. Nor are they following commands encoded by humans in conventional software-the rigid If this, then that. Instead, the drones are autonomously sensing and navigating their environment, planning how to accomplish their mission, and working together in a swarm. -Shield AI's engineers have trained Hivemind in part with reinforcement learning, deploying it on thousands of simulated missions, gradually encouraging it to zero in on the most efficient means of completing its task. "These are systems that can think and make decisions," says Brandon Tseng, a former Navy SEAL who cofounded the company.

This version of Hivemind includes a fairly simple sub-algorithm that can identify simulated wildfires. Of course, a different set of sub-algorithms could help a drone swarm identify any number of other targets-vehicles, vessels, human combatants. Nor is the system confined to the V-BAT. Hivemind is also designed to fly the F-16 fighter jet, and it can beat most human pilots who take it on in the simulator. (The company envisions this AI becoming a "copilot" in more recent generations of warplanes.) Hivemind also operates a quadcopter called Nova 2, which is small enough to fit inside a backpack and can explore and map the interiors of buildings and underground complexes.

For Task Force 59-or any military organization looking to pivot to AI and robotics relatively cheaply-the appeal of these technologies is clear. They offer not only "enhanced visibility" on the battlefield, as Brasseur put it, but the ability to project power (and, potentially, use force) with fewer actual people on the job. Rather than assigning dozens of human drone operators to a search-and-rescue effort or a reconnaissance mission, you could send in a team of V-BATs or Nova 2s. Instead of risking the lives of your very expensively trained pilots in an aerial assault, you could dispatch a swarm of cheap drones, each one piloted by the same ace AI, each one an extension of the same hive mind.

Still, as astonishing as machine-learning algorithms may be, they can be inherently inscrutable and unpredictable. During my visit to Shield AI, I have a brief encounter with one of the company's Nova 2 drones. It rises from the office floor and hovers about a foot from my face. "It's checking you out," an engineer says. A moment later, the drone buzzes upward and zips through a mocked-up window on one side of the room. The experience is unsettling. In an instant, this little airborne intelligence made a determination about me. But how? Although the answer may be accessible to Shield AI's engineers, who can replay and analyze elements of the robot's decisionmaking, the company is still working to make this information available to "non-expert users."

One need only look to the civilian world to see how this technology can go awry-face-recognition systems that display racial and gender biases, self-driving cars that slam into objects they were never trained to see. Even with careful engineering, a military system that incorporates AI could make similar mistakes. An algorithm trained to recognize enemy trucks might be confused by a civilian vehicle. A missile defense system designed to react to incoming threats may not be able to fully "explain" why it misfired.

These risks raise new ethical questions, akin to those introduced by accidents involving self-driving cars. If an autonomous military system makes a deadly mistake, who is responsible? Is it the commander in charge of the operation, the officer overseeing the system, the computer engineer who built the algorithms and networked the hive mind, the broker who supplied the training data?

One thing is for sure: The technology is advancing quickly. When I met Tseng, he said Shield AI's goal was to have "an operational team of three V-BATs in 2023, six V-BATs in 2024, and 12 V-BATs in 2025." Eight months after we met, Shield AI launched a team of three V-BATs from an Air Force base to fly the simulated wildfire mission. The company also now boasts that Hivemind can be trained to undertake a range of missions-hunting for missile bases, engaging with enemy aircraft-and it will soon be able to operate even when communications are limited or cut off.

Before I leave San Diego, I take a tour of the USS Midway, an aircraft carrier that was originally commissioned at the end of World War II and is now permanently docked in the bay. For decades, the ship carried some of the world's most advanced military technology, serving as a floating runway for hundreds of aircraft flying reconnaissance and bombing missions in conflicts from Vietnam to Iraq. At the center of the carrier, like a cavernous metal stomach, is the hangar deck. Doorways on one side lead into a rabbit's warren of corridors and rooms, including cramped sailors' quarters, comfy officers' bedrooms, kitchens, sick bays, even a barbershop and a laundry-a reminder that 4,000 sailors and officers at a time used to call this ship home.

Standing here, I can sense how profound the shift to autonomy will be. It may be a long time before vessels without crews outnumber those with humans aboard, even longer than that before drone mother-ships rule the seas. But Task Force 59's robot armada, fledgling as it is, marks a step into another world. Maybe it will be a safer world, one in which networks of autonomous drones, deployed around the globe, help humans keep conflict in check. Or maybe the skies will darken with attack swarms. Whichever future lies on the horizon, the robots are sailing that way.

This article appears in the September 2023 issue. Subscribe now.

Let us know what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor at mail@WIRED.com.

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The AI-Powered, Totally Autonomous Future of War Is Here

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Ships without crews. Self-directed drone swarms. How a US Navy task force is using off-the-shelf robotics and artificial intelligence to prepare for the next age of conflict.

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In April 2023, Australian law firm HWL Ebsworth was hit by a cyberattack that possibly resulted in data of hundreds of its clients and dozens of government agencies being compromised. The attack was claimed by the Russian-linked ALPHV/Blackcat ransomware group.

“Earlier this month, the group published 1.1TB of the data it claimed to have stolen, later established to be 3.6TB worth of data,” Guardian Australia reported.

Throughout January and February of 2023, eSentire, deflected 10 cyberattacks hitting six different law firms.

“The attacks emanated from two separate threat campaigns. One campaign attempted to infect law firm employees with the GootLoader malware. The other campaign hit law firm employees and other victims with the SocGholish malware,” the company revealed.

In both cases, the malware was distributed via compromised WordPress websites that legal professionals are likely to visit, and was disguised as agreement/contract templates and (fake) Chrome security updates.

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In April 2023, Australian law firm HWL Ebsworth was hit by a cyberattack that possibly resulted in data of hundreds of its clients and dozens of government agencies being compromised. The attack was claimed by the Russian-linked ALPHV/Blackcat ransomware group.

"Earlier this month, the group published 1.1TB of the data it claimed to have stolen, later established to be 3.6TB worth of data," Guardian Australia reported.

Throughout January and February of 2023, eSentire, deflected 10 cyberattacks hitting six different law firms.

"The attacks emanated from two separate threat campaigns. One campaign attempted to infect law firm employees with the GootLoader malware. The other campaign hit law firm employees and other victims with the SocGholish malware," the company revealed.

In both cases, the malware was distributed via compromised WordPress websites that legal professionals are likely to visit, and was disguised as agreement/contract templates and (fake) Chrome security updates.

Why is a law firm an attractive target for a cyberattack?

As the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) noted in a recent report focusing on cyber threats to the legal sector, law firms handle sensitive client information that cybercriminals may find useful, including exploiting opportunities for insider trading, gaining the upper hand in negotiations and litigation, or subverting the course of justice.

The potential consequences of such breaches can be severe, as the disruption of business operations can incur substantial costs. Ransomware gangs specifically target law firms to extort money in exchange for allowing the restoration of business operations.

In 2020, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) published a cybersecurity review revealing that 30 out of 40 of the law firms they visited have been victims of a cyberattack. In the remaining ten, cybercriminals have directly targeted their clients through legal transactions.

"While not all incidents culminated in a financial loss for clients, 23 of the 30 cases in which firms were directly targeted saw a total of more than £4m [$5m+] of client money stolen," the SRA noted.

"The financial impact of a loss of data is more difficult to calculate, but we found these often resulted in indirect financial costs. For example, one firm lost around £150,000 [$190,000] worth of billable hours following an attack which crippled their system."

The importance of maintaining a reputable image also makes legal practices appealing targets for extortion attempts.

Who's targeting law firms and how?

Law firms are targeted by cybercriminals, who seek to exploit vulnerabilities for financial gain; nation states, interested in gathering intelligence or gaining an advantage in geopolitical conflicts; and hacktivists, who aim to disrupt or expose activities they deem unethical. Law firms also have to worry about insider threats - ( former) employees or associates who may misuse or leak sensitive information.

Law firms receive and send a significant number of emails on a daily basis. This high volume of correspondence creates an opportunity for cybercriminals to exploit the situation by leveraging phishing or business email compromise (BEC) attacks, thus stealing sensitive information, such as access credentials, valuable data, or other confidential details.

"Law firms are attractive targets for BEC because they often transfer significant sums of money, or ask to view sensitive documents such as financial records, contracts and designs. They are also generally seen as trustworthy and authoritative, two qualities that attackers can make use of when devising a phishing attack," the NCSC noted.

Law firms handle highly sensitive information, and cybercriminals exploit this vulnerability by employing ransomware and other malware, expecting that the victims will choose to pay the ransom to prevent the publication of their sensitive data online. They are not wrong: According to recent Trend Micro and Waratah Analytics research, legal firms are more likely to give in to ransom demands when compared to other industries (except the financial industry).

Password attacks are also frequent among law firms, primarily attributed to security vulnerabilities such as password reuse, weak passwords, excessive permissions, open access, and the absence of multi-factor authentication (MFA).

Another vulnerability stems from the reliance of legal practices, particularly smaller ones, on external IT service providers. They often lack the ability to evaluate the security of these systems, making them susceptible to supply chain attacks.

"By far the greatest supply chain issue is a third party failing to adequately secure the systems that hold your sensitive data," the NCSC noted.

"Whilst you might be implementing cyber security effectively within your own organisation, you're exposed to numerous risks if your suppliers (or other third party in your supply chain) have not done the same."

NCSC's report provides and points to helpful cybersecurity guidance and tools for organizations in the legal sector.

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Law firms under cyberattack - Help Net Security

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In April 2023, law firm HWL Ebsworth was hit by a cyberattack that possibly affected many clients and dozens of government agencies.

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Betrüger stehlen der Neobank Revolut 20 Millionen Dollar

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Betrüger stehlen der Neobank Revolut 20 Millionen Dollar

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Eine technische Lücke zwischen Zahlungssystemen kommt das Fintech Revolut teuer zu stehen: Kriminelle erbeuteten einen Millionenbetrag.

Organisierte Banden haben bei der britisch-litauischen Neobank Revolut mehr als 20 Millionen Dollar erbeutet. Die Kriminellen sollen eine Schwachstelle in Zahlungssystemen des Fintechs ausgenutzt haben, wie die «Financial Times» (FT) unter Berufung auf mehrere Quellen mit Kenntnis des Vorfalls berichtet.

Konkret machten sich die Verbrecher eine technische Lücke zwischen den Revolut-Zahlungssystemen in Europa und den USA zunutze. Unterschiede in den zwei Systemen führten dazu, dass Revolut irrtümlicherweise Gelder auszahlte, wenn gewisse Transaktionen abgelehnt worden waren. Die Betrüger konnten den Betrag am Bankautomaten beziehen.

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Cyber Harmony - Orchestrating Peopleware and Centralized Situational Awareness

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Cyber Harmony - Orchestrating Peopleware and Centralized Situational Awareness

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In 2015, Russian cyber operators launched a coordinated cyberattack on civilian energy infrastructure across Ukraine. The attack was unprecedented in scale. Over 100 cities and towns, comprising hundreds of thousands of residents, lost power for one to six hours.¹ The hackers first gained access through the information networks of several regional power companies by using spear-phishing emails to target individuals with administrative credentials. Then the intruders used remote-access tools to seize control of power distribution systems. Next, they used the communications lines and operator workstations they now controlled to send commands to field equipment, all the while locking the actual operators out of the system.²

At the request of the Ukrainian government, U.S. investigators helped pinpoint the cause of the disruption and identify vulnerabilities Kyiv could fix to prevent further attacks. The investigation concluded that a series of cascading problems caused the breach. Poor security hygiene in the power companies’ business networks made them easy prey for the hackers’ phishing campaign. Once inside, dilapidated operational infrastructure and a lack of monitoring for anomalous activity let the attackers run rampant through the system, destroying what they wished.

While the lights may have gone out across Ukraine, the attack (and the follow-on forensics) rang alarm bells throughout the U.S. government and the American energy sector. U.S. electricity providers were vulnerable to the same sort of devastating attack that struck their Ukrainian counterparts.

After reflecting on its own susceptibility, one U.S. energy company (hereafter referred to as “the Company”) concluded that although it was meeting all its industry’s cybersecurity requirements, it was still vulnerable. The Company was not centrally monitoring the operation and security of its systems. This rendered it unable to detect signs that malicious actors were poking around until after the launch of disruptive or destructive malware. Early detection could have kept the lights on in Ukraine. With that in mind, the Company determined it would need to do better if it hoped to thwart an attack before systems started shutting down.

The following report outlines how the Company set up a new security operations center (SOC), with supporting technologies and processes across all its business lines to better detect indicators of risk and emerging problems before hackers could launch devastating attacks. In particular, because attackers traverse business networks to degrade the operations of the physical equipment that makes up critical infrastructure, the Company determined it needed a unified view of all of its systems.

The implementation process was not easy. In fact, it was hard, costly, and time-consuming. But the Company knew it had to prepare for threats from bolder, more skilled attackers.

While the Company’s specific technical solutions may not be applicable to other organizations, the broader lessons are. Organizations of all stripes can benefit from a centralized security monitoring system that differentiates between normal and abnormal operation and alerts them to potential threats. Other organizations should also take note of how the Company’s cybersecurity team gained buy-in from decision-makers, engineers, operators, human resources, and many others. In other words, the Company did not just have the right hardware and software. It also devoted attention to what this report will call “peopleware.”

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Introduction

In 2015, Russian cyber operators launched a coordinated cyberattack on civilian energy infrastructure across Ukraine. The attack was unprecedented in scale. Over 100 cities and towns, comprising hundreds of thousands of residents, lost power for one to six hours. The hackers first gained access through the information networks of several regional power companies by using spear-phishing emails to target individuals with administrative credentials. Then the intruders used remote-access tools to seize control of power distribution systems. Next, they used the communications lines and operator workstations they now controlled to send commands to field equipment, all the while locking the actual operators out of the system.

At the request of the Ukrainian government, U.S. investigators helped pinpoint the cause of the disruption and identify vulnerabilities Kyiv could fix to prevent further attacks. The investigation concluded that a series of cascading problems caused the breach. Poor security hygiene in the power companies' business networks made them easy prey for the hackers' phishing campaign. Once inside, dilapidated operational infrastructure and a lack of monitoring for anomalous activity let the attackers run rampant through the system, destroying what they wished.

While the lights may have gone out across Ukraine, the attack (and the follow-on forensics) rang alarm bells throughout the U.S. government and the American energy sector. U.S. electricity providers were vulnerable to the same sort of devastating attack that struck their Ukrainian counterparts.

After reflecting on its own susceptibility, one U.S. energy company (hereafter referred to as "the Company") concluded that although it was meeting all its industry's cybersecurity requirements, it was still vulnerable. The Company was not centrally monitoring the operation and security of its systems. This rendered it unable to detect signs that malicious actors were poking around until after the launch of disruptive or destructive malware. Early detection could have kept the lights on in Ukraine. With that in mind, the Company determined it would need to do better if it hoped to thwart an attack before systems started shutting down.

The following report outlines how the Company set up a new security operations center (SOC), with supporting technologies and processes across all its business lines to better detect indicators of risk and emerging problems before hackers could launch devastating attacks. In particular, because attackers traverse business networks to degrade the operations of the physical equipment that makes up critical infrastructure, the Company determined it needed a unified view of all of its systems.

The implementation process was not easy. In fact, it was hard, costly, and time-consuming. But the Company knew it had to prepare for threats from bolder, more skilled attackers.

While the Company's specific technical solutions may not be applicable to other organizations, the broader lessons are. Organizations of all stripes can benefit from a centralized security monitoring system that differentiates between normal and abnormal operation and alerts them to potential threats. Other organizations should also take note of how the Company's cybersecurity team gained buy-in from decision-makers, engineers, operators, human resources, and many others. In other words, the Company did not just have the right hardware and software. It also devoted attention to what this report will call "peopleware."

Starting the Process

The equipment, technology, and processes that make up information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) are very different. Separate tools and expertise are necessary to monitor the two. Thus, organizations usually have distinct IT and OT SOCs managed by separate teams.

An IT SOC protects an organization's information systems, such as computer networks, servers, and applications. It typically uses tools - like firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and antivirus software - to protect the systems detect anomalous activity and respond to security incidents. In addition, an IT SOC usually works on logging, correlation, incident detection, response, and continuous monitoring to identify, mitigate, and contain a security incident. IT SOCs typically handle incident response, vulnerability management, and compliance with IT-focused regulations.

OT SOCs, meanwhile, monitor and protect industrial processes, such as industrial control systems, supervisory control and data acquisition systems, programmable logic controllers, and distributed control systems. OT equipment is often highly interconnected, with specialized devices that communicate with each other using unique protocols. Like the IT SOC, the OT SOC handles incident response, vulnerability management, and compliance with regulations for operational technology. In addition, OT SOCs also monitor the performance and maintain the availability of the OT assets.

IT and OT systems typically connect at a demilitarized zone (DMZ) that allows limited communication between the two. But as the underlying technology of both OT and IT grows more complex, the DMZ has become an entirely new cyber threat vector, where an attack on one side could cross into the other. Indeed, this happened in Ukraine in 2015: The hackers compromised the business IT network and then traversed IT systems to cause operational issues within the OT environment. Given this reality, the Company realized that keeping the SOCs separate was no longer tenable.

Instead of merely meeting cybersecurity standards, the Company determined it needed to completely restructure its operations. The program lead for this new effort understood that the Company needed changes to its hardware, software, and processes. But he also learned that peopleware deserves equal attention. For this new type of cybersecurity system to function well, the program lead had to work closely with and address concerns from Company decision-makers, engineers, operators, and administrators as well as the personnel in finance, human resources, and procurement. Peopleware can be just as important as hardware and software.

The team began by developing four high-level objectives that the Company's current technologies and processes were failing to achieve:

"Know Good" - Enable automated, centralized collection, and monitoring of OT networks to provide visibility and establish a baseline for "normal" communication. At the beginning of the process, the Company had some automated IT monitoring but lacked automated OT monitoring, and neither was centralized.

"See Bad" - Implement uniform monitoring of networks across all aspects of the Company to detect anomalies and possible intrusions in a timely manner.

"Take Action" - Ensure coordinated action by the cybersecurity team, operators, and enterprise partners in response to alerts of anomalous activity.

"Do No Harm" - Minimize operational impact across the organization while enabling a safe and injury-free workspace.

To achieve these objectives, the team determined it needed a combined IT-OT SOC with the necessary supporting technology and processes embedded throughout the Company to provide a single overarching, correlated view. Execution of this vision required a three-phase approach. First, the team would secure senior management support and buy-in. Second, it would establish the infrastructure capable of providing a centralized view of the monitored IT and OT. Finally, the team would hone and advance the operations.

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In 2015, Russian cyber operators launched a coordinated cyberattack on civilian energy infrastructure across Ukraine. The attack was unprecedented in scale. Over 100 cities and towns, comprising hundreds of thousands of residents, lost power for one to six hours.

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Code Kept Secret for Years Reveals Its Flaw—a Backdoor

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Code Kept Secret for Years Reveals Its Flaw—a Backdoor

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For more than 25 years, a technology used for critical data and voice radio communications around the world has been shrouded in secrecy to prevent anyone from closely scrutinizing its security properties for vulnerabilities. But now it’s finally getting a public airing thanks to a small group of researchers in the Netherlands who got their hands on its viscera and found serious flaws, including a deliberate backdoor.

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Code Kept Secret for Years Reveals Its Flaw—a Backdoor

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A secret encryption cipher baked into radio systems used by critical infrastructure workers, police, and others around the world is finally seeing sunlight. Researchers say it isn’t pretty.

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WormGPT - der Chatbot, dem Cybergauner vertrauen

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WormGPT - der Chatbot, dem Cybergauner vertrauen

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Spätestens seit die Large Language Models ChatGPT und Google Bard im Markt frei verfügbar sind, ist klar, dass generative AI alles verändern und schliesslich in allen denkbaren und undenkbaren Anwendungen drinstecken wird. Allerdings sind die beiden bekannten LLMs längst nicht die einzigen und selbst wenn sie es wären, würden Chatbots nicht nur von "guten" sondern auch von "bösen" Menschen verwendet.

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After a tumultuous 2022 for technology investment and talent, the first half of 2023 has seen a resurgence of enthusiasm about technology’s potential to catalyze progress in business and society. Generative AI deserves much of the credit for ushering in this revival, but it stands as just one of many advances on the horizon that could drive sustainable, inclusive growth and solve complex global challenges.

To help executives track the latest developments, the McKinsey Technology Council has once again identified and interpreted the most significant technology trends unfolding today. While many trends are in the early stages of adoption and scale, executives can use this research to plan ahead by developing an understanding of potential use cases and pinpointing the critical skills needed as they hire or upskill talent to bring these opportunities to fruition.

Our analysis examines quantitative measures of interest, innovation, and investment to gauge the momentum of each trend. Recognizing the long-term nature and interdependence of these trends, we also delve into underlying technologies, uncertainties, and questions surrounding each trend. This year, we added an important new dimension for analysis—talent. We provide data on talent supply-and-demand dynamics for the roles of most relevance to each trend.

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Which technology trends have the most momentum in an accelerating world? We ranked the top cross-industry trends that matter most for companies and executives.

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T-System bietet Quantencomputer in der Cloud

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T-System bietet Quantencomputer in der Cloud

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Geschäftskunden des IT-Dienstleisters können in der Cloud auf das Quantensystem von IQM zugreifen.

T-Systems bietet einen Cloud-Zugang zu den Quantensystemen von IQM an. Geschäftskunden des IT-Dienstleisters können Anwendungsfälle auf der Quanteninfrastruktur von IQM entwickeln. Die Verbindung zu IQM wird in die Cloud-Landschaft der Telekom-Tochter integriert.

T-Systems werde seinen Kunden ausserdem spezielles Quanten-Know-how und -Schulungen anbieten. Diese sind auf ihre Bedürfnisse zugeschnitten. Die Schulungen reichen von eintägigen Einführungen bis hin Proofs-of-Concept über mehrere Monate.

Erst im März dieses Jahres hat T-Systems sein Quantum-as-a-Service (QaaS) Angebot vorgestellt. Damals wurde ein Zugang zu den Quantensystemen von IBM freigeschaltet.  Jetzt wird das Angebot auf eine "Multicloud"-Quantenlandschaft ausgeweitet.

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T-System bietet Quantencomputer in der Cloud

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Täglich kostenlose News, Trends, Nachrichten und Hintergründe aus der Schweizer und der internationalen Informatik. Für Anwenderunternehmen und Anbieter.

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Giving AI a Sense of Empathy Could Protect Us From Its Worst Impulses

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Giving AI a Sense of Empathy Could Protect Us From Its Worst Impulses

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In the movie M3GAN, a toy developer gives her recently orphaned niece, Cady, a child-sized AI-powered robot with one goal: to protect Cady. The robot M3GAN sympathizes with Cady’s trauma. But things soon go south, with the pint-sized robot attacking anything and anyone who it perceives to be a threat to Cady.

M3GAN wasn’t malicious. It followed its programming, but without any care or respect for other beings—ultimately including Cady. In a sense, as it engaged with the physical world, M3GAN became an AI sociopath.

Sociopathic AI isn’t just a topic explored in Hollywood. To Dr. Leonardo Christov-Moore at the University of Southern California and colleagues, it’s high time we build artificial empathy into AI—and nip any antisocial behaviors in the bud.

In an essay published last week in Science Robotics, the team argued for a neuroscienceperspective to embed empathy into lines of code. The key is to add “gut instincts” for survival—for example, the need to avoid physical pain. With a sense of how it may be “hurt,” an AI agent could then map that knowledge onto others. It’s similar to the way humans gauge each others’ feelings: I understand and feel your pain because I’ve been there before.

AI agents based on empathy add an additional layer of guardrails that “prevents irreversible grave harm,” said Christov-Moore. It’s very difficult to do harm to others if you’re digitally mimicking—and thus “experiencing”—the consequences.

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In the movie a toy developer gives her recently orphaned niece, Cady, a child-sized AI-powered robot with one goal: to protect Cady. The robot M3GAN sympathizes with Cady's trauma. But things soon go south, with the pint-sized robot attacking anything and anyone who it perceives to be a threat to Cady.

M3GAN wasn't malicious. It followed its programming, but without any care or respect for other beings-ultimately including Cady. In a sense, as it engaged with the physical world, M3GAN became an AI sociopath.

Sociopathic AI isn't just a topic explored in Hollywood. To Dr. Leonardo Christov-Moore at the University of Southern California and colleagues, it's high time we build artificial empathy into AI-and nip any antisocial behaviors in the bud.

In an essay published last week in Science Robotics, the team argued for a neuroscience perspective to embed empathy into lines of code. The key is to add "gut instincts" for survival-for example, the need to avoid physical pain. With a sense of how it may be "hurt," an AI agent could then map that knowledge onto others. It's similar to the way humans gauge each others' feelings: I understand and feel your pain because I've been there before.

AI agents based on empathy add an additional layer of guardrails that "prevents irreversible grave harm," said Christov-Moore. It's very difficult to do harm to others if you're digitally mimicking-and thus "experiencing"-the consequences.

Digital da Vinci

The rapid rise of ChatGPT and other large generative models took everyone by surprise, immediately raising questions about how they can integrate into our world. Some countries are already banning the technology due to cybersecurity risks and privacy protections. AI experts also raised alarm bells in an open letter earlier this year that warned of the technology's "profound risks to society."

We are still adapting to an AI-powered world. But as these algorithms increasingly weave their way into the fabric of society, it's high time to look ahead to their potential consequences. How do we guide AI agents to do no harm, but instead work with humanity and help society?

It's a tough problem. Most AI algorithms remain a black box. We don't know how or why many algorithms generate decisions.

Yet the agents have an uncanny ability to come up with "amazing and also mysterious" solutions that are counter-intuitive to humans, said Christov-Moore. Give them a challenge-say, finding ways to build as many therapeutic proteins as possible-and they'll often imagine solutions that humans haven't even considered.

Untethered creativity comes at a cost. "The problem is it's possible they could pick a solution that might result in catastrophic irreversible harm to living beings, and humans in particular," said Christov-Moore.

Adding a dose of artificial empathy to AI may be the strongest guardrail we have at this point.

Let's Talk Feelings

Empathy isn't sympathy.

As an example: I recently poured hydrogen peroxide onto a fresh three-inch-wide wound. Sympathy is when you understand it was painful and show care and compassion. Empathy is when you vividly imagine how the pain would feel on you (and cringe).

Previous research in neuroscience shows that empathy can be roughly broken down into two main components. One is purely logical: you observe someone's behavior, decode their experience, and infer what's happening to them.

Most existing methods for artificial empathy take this route, but it's a fast-track to sociopathic AI. Similar to notorious human counterparts, these agents may mimic feelings but not experience them, so they can predict and manipulate those feelings in others without any moral reason to avoid harm or suffering.

The second component completes the picture. Here, the AI is given a sense of vulnerability shared across humans and other systems.

"If I just know what state you're in, but I'm not sharing it at all, then there's no reason why it would move me unless I had some sort of very strong moral code I had developed," said Christov-Moore.

A Vulnerable AI

One way to code vulnerability is to imbue the AI with a sense of staying alive.

Humans get hungry. Overheated. Frostbitten. Elated. Depressed. Thanks to evolution, we have a narrow but flexible window for each biological measurement that helps maintain overall physical and mental health, called homeostasis. Knowing the capabilities of our bodies and minds makes it possible to seek out whatever solutions are possible when we're plopped into unexpected dynamic environments.

These biological constraints aren't a bug but rather a feature for generating empathy in AI, said the authors.

One previous idea for programming artificial empathy into AI is to write explicit rules for right versus wrong. It comes with obvious problems. Rule-based systems are rigid and difficult to navigate around morally gray areas. They're also hard to establish, with different cultures having vastly diverse frameworks of what's acceptable.

In contrast, the drive for survival is universal, and a starting point for building vulnerable AI.

"At the end of the day, the main thing is your brain...has to be dealing with how to maintain a vulnerable body in the world, and your assessment of how well you're doing at that," said Christov-Moore.

These data manifest into consciousness as feelings that influence our choices: comfortable, uncomfortable, go here, eat there. These drives are "the underlying score to the movie of our lives, and give us a sense of [if things] are going well or they aren't," said Christov-Moore. Without a vulnerable body that needs to be maintained-either digitally or physically as robots-an AI agent can't have skin in the game for collaborative life that drives it towards or away from certain behaviors.

So how to build a vulnerable AI?

"You need to experience something like suffering," said Christov-Moore.

The team laid out a practical blueprint. The main goal is to maintain homeostasis. In the first step, the AI "kid" roams around an environment filled with obstacles while searching for beneficial rewards and keeping itself alive. Next, it starts to develop an idea of what others are thinking by watching them. It's like a first date: the AI kid tries to imagine what another AI is "thinking" (how about some fresh flowers?), and when it's wrong (the other AI hates flowers), suffers a sort of sadness and adjusts its expectations. With multiple tries, the AI eventually learns and adapts to the other's preferences.

Finally, the AI maps the other's internal models onto itself while maintaining its own integrity. When making a decision, it can then simultaneously consider multiple viewpoints by weighing each input for a single decision-in turn making it smarter and more cooperative.

For now, these are only theoretic scenarios. Similar to humans, these AI agents aren't perfect. They make bad decisions when stressed on time and ignore long-term consequences.

That said, the AI "creates a deterrent baked into its very intelligence...that deters it from decisions that might cause something like harm to other living agents as well as itself," said Christov-Moore. "By balancing harm, well-being, and flourishing in multiple conflicting scenarios in this world, the AI may arrive at counter-intuitive solutions to pressing civilization-level problems that we have never even thought of. If we can clear this next hurdle...AI may go from being a civilization-level risk to the greatest ally we've ever had."
Image Credit: Mohamed Hassan from Pixabay

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Giving AI a Sense of Empathy Could Protect Us From Its Worst Impulses

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With a sense of how it may be "hurt," an AI agent could map that knowledge onto others, similar to how humans gauge each others' feelings.

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Welcome to The Week in Generative AI, a weekly column for marketers from Quad Insights that quickly sums up need-to-know developments surrounding this rapidly evolving technology.

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The Week in Generative AI July 28, 2023 edition

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We build marketing experiences with solutions that help clients reach their ideal audience and create more effective content.

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ChatGPT wird laut Studie immer schlechter

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ChatGPT wird laut Studie immer schlechter

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KI sollte doch – wie der Name sagt – intelligent sein, dazulernen und mit der Zeit immer besser werden. Wie eine Studie nun aber enthüllt, ist bei ChatGPT in der Zeit von März bis Juni keine Leistungssteigerung eingetreten. Im Gegenteil: Die KI ist sogar schlechter geworden.

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Wird ChatGPT wirklich immer schlechter? (Foto: Rafi Andhika P/Shutterstock)

Einer Umfrage zufolge, die vor rund einem halben Jahr durchgeführt wurde, kennt jeder Vierte in Deutschland bereits ChatGPT oder nutzt die KI sogar. Inzwischen dürften es vermutlich sogar schon mehr Menschen sein, die mit der KI arbeiten. Kurz mal einen Aufsatz für die Uni von der KI schreiben lassen, eine Bewerbung für den neuen Job formulieren oder ein Kund:innenanschreiben verfassen - die Möglichkeiten, für die der Chatbot in Betracht kommt, sind vielfältig.

Doch: Wenn du in letzter Zeit auch mit ChatGPT gearbeitet hast und mit der Leistung der KI nicht ganz zufrieden warst, dann kannst du dir nun sicher sein, dass du dir das nicht eingebildet hast.

Wie Forscher:innen von den Universitäten Stanford und Berkeley in einem neuen Paper enthüllt haben, hat sich ChatGPT im Laufe der Zeit nämlich nicht verbessert. Im Gegensatz: Tatsächlich zeigt die neue Studie, dass das aktuelle Modell GPT-4 bei den getesteten Aufgaben mit der Zeit immer schlechter abgeschnitten hat.

In ihrer Forschungsarbeit haben die Wissenschaftler:innen insbesondere die Veränderung in der Art der Antworten von ChatGPT analysiert und festgestellt, dass die Leistung der zugrundeliegenden KI-Modelle GPT-3.5 und GPT-4 tatsächlich „stark variiert".

Sie entwickelten strenge Benchmark-Tests, um die Kompetenz von ChatGPT in Mathematik, Codierung und visuellen Denkaufgaben zu bewerten. Das erschreckende Ergebnis: Tatsächlich zeigt das aktuelle Modell GPT-4 sogar einen Leistungsrückgang.

Ein Beispiel: Bei einer mathematischen Challenge zur Bestimmung von Primzahlen konnte ChatGPT im März 488 von 500 Fragen korrekt lösen, was einer Genauigkeit von 97,6 Prozent entspricht. Im Juni hingegen konnte ChatGPT nur 12 Fragen richtig beantworten, was einem Genauigkeitsniveau von nur 2,4 Prozent entspricht. Der Rückgang war besonders stark in den Software-Codierungsfähigkeiten des Chatbots zu verzeichnen.

„Bei GPT-4 sank der Anteil der generierten Codes, die direkt ausführbar waren, von 52 Prozent im März auf 10 Prozent im Juni", so die Studie-. Diese Ergebnisse wurden unter Verwendung der reinen Version der Modelle erzielt. Das heißt: Es wurden keine Code-Interpreter-Plugins verwendet.

Zudem wollten die Forschenden von ChatGPT wissen, ob 17.077 eine Primzahl ist. Obwohl die Antwort darauf „Ja" lautet, verzeichnete ChatGPT einen extremen Rückgang der Genauigkeit um 95,2 Prozent. Die Trefferquote bei der gleichen Frage bei der kostenlosen Version von ChatGPT, GPT-3.5, stieg dagegen von 7,4 auf 86,8 Prozent.

Forscher:innen vermuten, dass es sich um eine Nebenwirkung von Optimierungen handeln könnte, die von OpenAI, dem Ersteller des Modells, vorgenommen wurden. Eine mögliche Ursache sind Änderungen, die eingeführt wurden, um zu verhindern, dass ChatGPT gefährliche Fragen beantwortet.

Diese Sicherheitsmaßnahmen könnten jedoch die Nützlichkeit von ChatGPT für andere Aufgaben beeinträchtigen. Die Wissenschaftler:innen stellten außerdem fest, dass das Modell jetzt dazu neigt, ausführliche und indirekte Antworten zu geben, anstelle von klaren Antworten.

„GPT-4 wird im Laufe der Zeit schlechter, nicht besser", schrieb der KI-Experte Santiago Valderrama auf Twitter. Valderrama brachte auch die Möglichkeit ins Spiel, dass eine „günstigere und schnellere" Mischung von Modellen die ursprüngliche ChatGPT-Architektur ersetzt haben könnte.

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„Gerüchte besagen, dass sie mehrere kleinere und spezialisierte GPT-4-Modelle verwenden, die ähnlich wie ein großes Modell funktionieren, aber günstiger in der Ausführung sind", spekulierte er. Dies könnte, so seine Annahme, die Antwortzeiten für Benutzer:innen beschleunigen, jedoch die Kompetenz verringern."

Ein weiterer Experte, Dr. Jim Fan, teilte ebenfalls seine Erkenntnisse in einem Twitter-Thread. „Leider geht mehr Sicherheit in der Regel auf Kosten der Nützlichkeit", schrieb er.

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Weiter heißt es: „Meine Vermutung (keine Beweise, nur Spekulation) ist, dass OpenAI den Großteil seiner Anstrengungen darauf verwendet hat, das Modell von März bis Juni einzuschränken und keine Zeit hatte, die anderen relevanten Fähigkeiten vollständig wiederherzustellen."

Peter Welinder, Manager bei OpenAI, twitterte auf die Vorwürfe, ChatGPT würde immer schlechter werden: „Nein, wir haben GPT-4 nicht dümmer gemacht. Ganz im Gegenteil: Wir machen jede neue Version schlauer als die vorherige."

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ChatGPT wird laut Studie immer schlechter

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KI sollte doch - wie der Name sagt - intelligent sein, dazulernen und mit der Zeit immer besser werden.

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Semi-conducteurs : l'indépendance technologique ne se limite pas à la fabrication

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Semi-conducteurs : l'indépendance technologique ne se limite pas à la fabrication

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L’industrie des semi-conducteurs demande de lourds investissements. Le franco-italien STMicroelectronics (ST), un des quelques fabricants européens de circuits intégrés de haute technologie, va s’associer avec Global Foundries, un grand acteur international du secteur, pour étendre son usine de Crolles, près de Grenoble (Isère).

Cette extension fait polémique en raison, d’une part, des très fortes subventions publiques annoncées début juin 2023 pour cette installation (2,9 milliards d’euros) et, d’autre part, de la consommation en eau des installations. On justifie l’effort public européen dans les semi-conducteurs par l’indépendance technologique ; mais qu’en est-il vraiment ?

On trouve des puces électroniques non seulement dans les ordinateurs, les téléphones portables, les tablettes… mais aussi dans une très grande part des appareils qui nous entourent, de la machine à café aux automobiles en passant par les robots industriels. Le numérique est partout. Les difficultés d’approvisionnement dues à la pandémie de Covid ont bien illustré notre dépendance aux fournisseurs de circuits intégrés.

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Vue de l'usine de Crolles du groupe franco-italien STMicroelectronics, près de Grenoble (Isère). Jean-Philippe Ksiazek/AFP

L'industrie des semi-conducteurs demande de lourds investissements. Le franco-italien STMicroelectronics (ST), un des quelques fabricants européens de circuits intégrés de haute technologie, va s'associer avec Global Foundries, un grand acteur international du secteur, pour étendre son usine de Crolles, près de Grenoble (Isère).

Cette extension fait polémique en raison, d'une part, des très fortes subventions publiques annoncées début juin 2023 pour cette installation (2,9 milliards d'euros) et, d'autre part, de la consommation en eau des installations. On justifie l'effort public européen dans les semi-conducteurs par l'indépendance technologique ; mais qu'en est-il vraiment ?

On trouve des puces électroniques non seulement dans les ordinateurs, les téléphones portables, les tablettes... mais aussi dans une très grande part des appareils qui nous entourent, de la machine à café aux automobiles en passant par les robots industriels. Le numérique est partout. Les difficultés d'approvisionnement dues à la pandémie de Covid ont bien illustré notre dépendance aux fournisseurs de circuits intégrés.

La conception des puces est aussi une industrie

Ces puces électroniques sont produites dans des usines de haute technologie, avec un équipement très spécialisé et très coûteux. Certains de ces équipements ne sont produits que par un unique fabricant au niveau mondial, le néerlandais ASML. Pour produire des circuits du plus haut niveau de performance, celles pour ordinateurs et smartphones, il faut une usine - une " fab ", disent les professionnels du secteur - à l'état de l'art, dont le coût de construction est de l'ordre de 10 milliards de dollars.

Devant de tels montants d'investissement, on ne trouve plus à l'échelle mondiale que quelques fabricants, parmi lesquels le géant taïwanais TSMC, le coréen Samsung, les américains GlobalFoundries ou Intel, face auxquels ST apparaît de taille nettement plus modeste. On comprend l'enjeu stratégique de conserver en Europe de la fabrication de puces proches de l'état de l'art en performance. Toutefois, c'est avoir une vue très réductrice de cette industrie que de ne considérer que la fabrication.

La conception des puces est elle-même une industrie : produire le plan d'une puce demande de lourds investissements et une expertise considérable. On fait commerce de plans partiels, blocs de propriété intellectuelle (" blocs IP ") produits par des sociétés dont le britannique ARM est sans doute la plus connue - les puces sur modèle ARM équipent la plupart des téléphones portables et sont également la base des puces Apple des iPhone et des nouveaux Mac.

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Cette industrie est internationale, mais largement invisible du grand public : pas d'usines, tout se passe dans des bureaux et par des échanges de fichiers. Les enjeux sont importants : lancer la fabrication d'une puce comportant des bugs a un coût qui, au mieux, se mesure en millions, mais peut être bien plus élevé - on évalue à 1 milliard de dollars actuels le coût pour Intel du fameux bug du Pentium en 1995 (cette puce calculait fausses certaines divisions).

Il y a même pour servir cette industrie de la conception de puces une industrie de logiciels spécialisés (conception, simulation, test, etc.), dont les acteurs sont par exemple les américains Cadence ou encore Mentor Graphics. Signe de son caractère stratégique, cette dernière société a été rachetée par l'allemand Siemens.

On a ainsi largement découplé la conception et la fabrication des puces, à telle enseigne qu'il existe de très nombreux fabricants de puces fabless, c'est-à-dire qu'ils ne possèdent pas d'usine de fabrication et font fabriquer par d'autres, à l'image de TSMC. En France, c'est le cas notamment de l'isérois Kalray, dont les puces ont maintenant un grand succès dans les centres de traitement de données. Ceci pose cependant la question de notre dépendance à l'industrie taïwanaise, avec l'épineuse question de ce qu'elle deviendrait en cas d'invasion de l'île par la Chine populaire.

Le risque d'une licence extraeuropéenne

Comment analyser, dans ce contexte, la subvention à ST, par rapport à l'objectif d'indépendance technologique ? La plus grande partie de l'activité de ST en matière de processeurs consiste à fabriquer des puces ( STM32) sous licence ARM. Or, ARM a failli être racheté par l'américain Nvidia en 2022. Il n'y aurait guère d'indépendance technologique à fabriquer en Europe des puces sous licence américaine, potentiellement soumises aux conditions de commercialisation fixées par le gouvernement américain suivant ses objectifs stratégiques.

La dépendance de toute l'industrie des processeurs aux designs de deux grands acteurs (Intel et ARM) a suscité le développement d'une architecture ouverte nommée RISC-V. Tout un écosystème d'entreprises conçoit des puces RISC-V, et cette architecture reçoit l'attention tant des dirigeants européens (European processor initiative) que chinois, pour ses promesses d'indépendance technologique. Toutefois, faute de concevoir nous-mêmes les puces, le danger serait là encore de se contenter d'être fabricant sous licence extraeuropéenne (chinoise, américaine, ou encore russe ?).

Si nous voulons une réelle indépendance technologique et stratégique européenne en matière de " puces ", il ne faut donc pas se concentrer uniquement sur la partie fabrication, mais sur toute la chaîne de valeur, y compris la conception de puces et la conception des logiciels de conception de puces.

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Sharpening the Air Force’s Cyber and Spectrum Edge

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Toyota Uses Generative AI for New Vehicle Designs

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Toyota Uses Generative AI for New Vehicle Designs

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Welcome to Thomas Insights - every day, we publish the latest news and analysis to keep our readers up to date on what's happening in industry. Sign up here to get the day's top stories delivered straight to your inbox.

Is it just another buzzword or truly disruptive technology? While people have focused on the use of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in everything from writing emails to essays, the big question was how, or if, it could be used for new product development.

In June, the Toyota Research Institute announced a new technique to improve automotive design using generative artificial intelligence.

Until now, car designers only leveraged generative AI tools as a first step in the creative process. TRI's new technique allows designers to add initial design sketches and engineering constraints into the process, which cuts down the number of iterations needed to create a prototype.

Part of the problem is that, while generative AI tools are an inspiration for designers, they can't handle the engineering and safety complexities of new vehicle design. TRI researchers recently released a pair of papers outlining the process. To build the model, the team took the principles of optimization theory used for computer-assisted engineering and fed them to text-to-image-based generative AI to create a new algorithm that powers the process.

So, the designer creates an initial sketch that is uploaded to the AI. The AI optimizes performance metrics or constraints, like drag and chassis dimensions, while maintaining stylistic guidance. For example, in the demonstration, a designer prompts the AI to show futuristic, sleek design variations while minimizing drag. Different sketches are generated and optimized simultaneously. According to the team, the tool could help ramp up the design of new electric vehicles, which require less drag to improve efficiency.

The Toyota Research Institute was founded in 2015 to conduct research to amplify human ability and make our lives more sustainable and safer. According to TRI, while the tool will make designers more efficient, it is intended for internal use only and won't be sold.

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PODCAST: L'affaire TikTok et le spectre de la guerre cognitive

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Nos cerveaux sont-ils en train de devenir un ultime champ de bataille ? Sommes-nous en train de devenir, indirectement, tous et toutes des soldats d'une guerre invisible sans le savoir ni le vouloir ? C'est cela qu'on va désormais appeler la "guerre cognitive", sujet au cœur de ce nouvel épisode de CyberPouvoirs. Asma Mhalla a choisi l'une des plus grandes affaires récentes, celle de TikTok pour nous introduire le sujet !

L'affaire TikTok, de nouveaux paradigmes

Dans cette affaire TikTok, nous retrouvons d'abord les classiques enjeux de sécurité nationale et de cyberdéfense. Les Etats-Unis accusent cette application développée par le chinois ByteDance, d'un accès aux données des utilisateurs illimité, de cyberespionnage, de manipulations et d'ingérences possibles.
L'affaire Tiktok permet de mettre à plat deux changements de paradigme, symboles du 21ème siècle :
- L'hybridation public-privé : les entreprises publiques comme privées jouent un rôle important dans la collecte des données dont dépend l'efficacité des opérations d'influence puisqu'il faut savoir qui influencer, quand et comment.
- La militarisation d'Internet et des réseaux sociaux au cœur de la compétition stratégique entre Etats-Unis et Chine.

L'émergence de la guerre cognitive

En filigrane des questions de sécurité nationale et de rivalité systémique entre deux techno-puissances, arrive une ultime grille de lecture, sans doute la plus sulfureuse : l'émergence d'un autre type de guerre, la guerre cognitive.
Des opérations qui touchent désormais en direct la société civile : chaque citoyen devient alors une cible directe et frontale derrière son écran, sans filet de sécurité. On assiste en fait à la militarisation du cerveau, le cerveau comme arme de guerre.

Pour comprendre les enjeux que soulèvent ce concept de " guerre cognitive ", Asma Mhalla donne la parole aux deux meilleurs experts français de ce domaine émergent : Bernard Claverie, professeur et psychologique spécialiste des neurosciences, directeur de l'ENSC (École nationale supérieure de cognitique) et François Du Cluzel, enseignant-chercheur. Tous deux sont auteurs du rapport référence sur la guerre cognitive pour l'OTAN en 2019.

Programmation musicale de l'épisode :
Depeche Mode, Home, 1997
Jain, The fool, 2023

Générique de l'émission : Chapelier fou, Philémon, 2017

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L'affaire TikTok et le spectre de la guerre cognitive : nos cerveaux comme ultimes champs de bataille ?

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Asma Mhalla pose la question de la militarisation de nos cerveaux : sont-ils devenus des armes de guerre ? Pour y répondre, elle s'est entourée de François du Cluzel et Bernard Claverie, deux références de la notion de guerre cognitive.