# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
A. Electoral Process: 12 / 12

The president of Costa Rica and members of the 57-seat, unicameral Legislative Assembly are elected for single four-year terms and can seek a nonconsecutive second term. A special chamber of the Supreme Court chooses an independent national election commission. Ahead of the 2010 elections, Costa Rica approved reforms to its electoral law, including revised regulations on political party and campaign financing, and new quotas for women's participation in political parties. The main political parties are the National Liberation Party (PLN), the Citizens' Action Party (PAC), the Libertarian Movement Party (PML), and the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC).

In February 2010, Laura Chinchilla of the PLN became Costa Rica's first female president. She captured nearly 47 percent of the vote, defeating Ottón Solís of the PAC and Otto Guevara of the PML. In concurrent legislative elections, the PLN captured 24 seats, the PAC won 11, the PML took 9, the PUSC won 6, and the Accessibility without Exclusion Party (PASE) captured 4, with the remaining 3 seats going to other smaller parties. In April 2011, the PAC's Juan Carlos Mendoza was elected president of the Assembly; Mendoza's election marked the first time in 46 years that the president of the Assembly was not a member of the ruling party.

B. Political Pluralism and Participation: 15 / 16

Since 1949, power in Costa Rica has alternated between the PLN and the PUSC. Dissatisfaction with party politics and political scandals resulted in defections from the PLN in the early 2000s. The newly formed PAC then became a rising force in Costa Rican politics as the PUSC collapsed under the weight of scandal.

C. Functioning of Government: 10 / 12 (-1)

Every president since 1990 has been accused of corruption after leaving office, with the exception of Óscar Arias, who served from 2006 to 2010. In December 2012, an appeals court overturned the corruption conviction of former president Miguel Ángel Rodríguez. Rodríguez was convicted in 2011 on corruption charges related to a business deal between the Costa Rican Electricity Institute and Alcatel, a French telecommunications company. He returned to court in October 2013 to face embezzlement charges. Costa Rica was ranked 49 out of 177 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International's 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index.

As with her predecessors, President Chinchilla's government has been plagued by corruption revelations. Scandals and routine cabinet changes reinforced the lack of confidence in her administration; 13 cabinet ministers resigned for various reasons during her first two years in office.

In March 2012, Finance Minister Fernando Herrero; his wife, presidential consultant Floriasbel Rodriguez; and Tax Administrator Francisco Villalobos were accused of evading taxes by undervaluing their property. Herrero and Rodriguez had also benefited from irregular bidding on a state-owned oil refinery project, which led to an investigation of Vice President Luis Lieberman and Minister of Education Leonardo Garnier for influence peddling. Chinchilla's refusal to dismiss them resulted in a standoff with the Legislative Assembly. Minister of Public Works Francisco Jimenez resigned in May 2012 amid allegations of corruption surrounding a road project along the San Juan River.

In May 2013, a jet used by Chinchilla to travel to Peru and Venezuela was reportedly linked to drug traffickers. The scandal forced the resignation of three administration officials, including Presidency Vice Minister Mauricio Boraschi, who was also head of the Office of Intelligence and Security and the antidrug commissioner.

The lack of confidence in the Chinchilla administration has had a dramatic impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy, as support for the political system have declined during her presidency. A September 2012 opinion poll indicated that Chinchilla had the lowest approval rating in the hemisphere. In October 2013 her approval rating dropped to 9 percent.

Civil Liberties: 53 / 60

D. Freedom of Expression and Belief: 16 / 16

The Costa Rican media are generally free from state interference. A February 2010 Supreme Court ruling removed prison terms for defamation. There are six privately owned dailies, and both public and commercial broadcast outlets are available, including at least four private television stations and more than 100 private radio stations. There have been reports of abuse of government advertising and direct pressure from senior officials to influence media content. Internet access is unrestricted.

In April 2013, lawmakers removed a controversial provision from a 2012 law that threatened prison terms for those who published secret political information. Journalists had challenged the original measure at the Supreme Court. The revised law excludes prison sentences when the information's release is in the public interest.

The government upholds freedom of religion. Academic freedom is respected.

E. Associational and Organizational Rights: 11 / 12

The constitution provides for freedoms of assembly and association, and numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are active. Although labor unions organize and mount frequent protests with minimal governmental interference, employers often ignore minimum wage and social security laws, and the resulting fines are insignificant.

F. Rule of Law: 13 / 16

The judicial branch is independent, with members elected by the legislature. However, there are often substantial delays in the judicial process, resulting in lengthy pretrial detention. There have been complaints of police brutality, and organized criminal networks are suspected of having infiltrated law enforcement institutions. An attempted prison break at a maximum-security facility in May 2011 led to an investigation of prison conditions, which revealed corruption, overcrowding, guard shortages, and guard-initiated abuse. Deadly prison riots in January and October 2012 underscored the severity of overcrowding in prisons, which has more than quintupled since 2009.

The country's Pacific coast serves as a major drug transshipment route. Analysts have noted the presence of several Mexican drug cartels operating within the country.

During her first year in office, President Chinchilla created a national antidrug commission, hired 1,000 new police officers, earmarked additional funds for the country's judicial investigation agency, and made plans to expand prison capacity. In February 2011, she introduced a 10-year crime reduction plan, which aimed to promote interagency coordination to combat growing public insecurity, crime, and narcotics trafficking. The country's homicide rate fell to an estimated 10 murders for every 100,000 people in 2012, the first drop since 2004. In 2013, it was reported that more than 80 percent of the arrests in the country were related to drug trafficking. There have been concerns that crime is overwhelming local courts and other state institutions in some areas in the south of the country.

A 2006 law permits security forces to raid any home, business, or vehicle where they suspect undocumented immigrants, who can then be detained indefinitely. Abuse and extortion of migrants by the Border Guard have also been reported. Legislation governing migration issues imposes fines for employers who hire undocumented immigrants and controls on marriages between Costa Ricans and foreigners.

Indigenous rights are not a government priority, and NGOs estimate that about 73 percent of the country's 70,000 indigenous people have little access to health and education services, electricity, or potable water. Costa Ricans of African descent have also faced racial and economic discrimination.

G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights: 13 / 16

Women face discrimination in the economic realm. Female household workers are subject to exploitation and lack legal protections. Despite the existence of domestic violence legislation, violence against women and children is a major problem.

Costa Rica remains a transit and destination country for trafficked persons. In 2013, Costa Rica was a Tier 2 country in the U.S. State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report. A new law against human trafficking went into effect in February 2013. In addition to establishing penalties for human trafficking and organ trafficking, the law established a fund for victims and prevention efforts, to be financed by a $1 dollar increase in the exit tax paid by visitors upon departure.

Chinchilla faced criticism from civil society organizations and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights advocates in 2010 when she supported a referendum put forth by conservative groups against same-sex unions. However, the Constitutional Court ruled that year that holding a referendum on this issue was unconstitutional. In October 2011, the Supreme Court ruled against sexual orientation as grounds for discrimination by overturning a regulation that had prohibited same-sex conjugal visits for prisoners. In May 2012, PLN legislator Justo Orozco, known for his antigay views, was elected president of the Legislative Assembly's Human Rights Committee. His election was criticized by the LGBT community, which called on Chinchilla to speak out in support of LGBT rights. In July 2013 the legislature passed the Law of Young People, which some believed created a loophole for the legalization of gay marriage. However, the Family Court ruled in September that the language in the bill applied only to unions between a man and a woman.
Scoring Key: X / Y (Z) X = Score Received Y = Best Possible Score Z = Change from Previous Year

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Public confidence in President Laura Chinchilla's administration continued to decline in 2013 as resignations and corruption scandals plagued her government. Crime and drug-related violence remained a significant threat as Mexican drug cartels increased their activity in Costa Rica. Corruption, insecurity, and unemployment were the chief concerns of Costa Ricans as the country prepared for national elections in February 2014.

# data[].attributes.body
human right

article 9 article

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Since the end of the Salvadoran civil war in 1992, victims of human rights abuses have chafed at the country's Amnesty Law, which prevents the investigations of the grave human rights violations that occurred during the 12-year conflict. However, recent developments suggest that the tide is turning against the amnesty and its supporters.

Not surprisingly, the challenges to the amnesty are generating political tensions in the country; in the past few weeks, these tensions have been manifested in the debate about what should happen to the historical archives of Tutela Legal, the human rights and legal aid office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador. It is likely that the Salvadoran human rights community will be under fire for as long as challenges to the Amnesty Law continue and, as a result, will need both domestic and international support for its work.
Background
The Amnesty Law was enacted by the Legislative Assembly on March 20, 1993-one week after the U.N. -sponsored Truth Commission published a report on human rights abuses committed during the war. The Commission report concluded that 85 percent of abuses were committed by forces allied with the Salvadoran government. Its report detailed 30 high profile cases of severe human rights violations, including cases committed by both the Salvadoran armed forces and the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front ( Frente Faribundo Martí de Liberación Nacional, FMLN). Since the law's passage, victims, the families of victims, and their allies have criticized the amnesty and argued that it has denied justice and prevented closure and reconciliation.

Until now, both the right-wing ARENA party (explicitly) and the FMLN (implicitly) have supported the Amnesty Law. Defenders argue that the law-which shielded both politicians and military leaders on the right, and senior FMLN leaders on the left, from criminal prosecutions-was a necessary element of the broad political settlement that ended the twelve year civil war. The law's critics-human rights advocates, victims, and victims' families-believe that the amnesty was too broad, the terms too sweeping, and the price in terms of justice and human rights too high.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has urged El Salvador to eliminate the amnesty law on numerous occasions. In fact, in a 2012 sentence on the infamous El Mozote massacre, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights ruled that the law cannot be used to protect those that carried out the massacre. The Court also ordered the Salvadoran state to reopen the criminal investigation into the massacre and to carry out 14 reparation measures for the victims over the course of five years.
Challenges to the Amnesty Law
As in other countries (such as Chile and Argentina), challenges to the amnesty in El Salvador have increased over time, and support for the law has begun to erode. But, as in other countries, the process is complicated and politically difficult, as the possibility of criminal prosecutions threatens established interests in the political class and the security establishment.

On March 20, 2013-the twentieth anniversary of the Amnesty Law's passage-the Human Rights Institute of the Central American University ( Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana, IDHUCA) filed a challenge to constitutionality of the Amnesty Law. This is not the first domestic legal challenge to the law: in fact, in response to such a challenge in 2000, the Salvadoran Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber ruled that while the law is constitutional, individual judges had the discretion to rule that the amnesty did not prevent prosecution in cases that involved charges of crimes against humanity. But no judge has ever exercised that discretion, and de facto the amnesty has remained in place.

But the amnesty no longer appears as invincible as it once did. In an unexpected move, last month the Salvadoran Attorney General's office announced that it will open criminal investigations into the Mozote massacre. Several weeks later, on September 21, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court indicated that it had accepted the IDHUCA's challenge to the constitutionality of the amnesty law.

What's more, international events are contributing to the sense that the days of blanket amnesty in El Salvador could be numbered. Two years ago, a Spanish court filed an indictment against 20 retired Salvadoran military officers for their role in planning the 1989 slayings of six Jesuit priests. (Five of the six Jesuits were Spanish citizens.) But because most of the defendants are in El Salvador and the Salvadoran Supreme Court ruled that the Amnesty Law bars their extradition to Spain, the case did not advance. However, one named defendant, Colonel Orlando Montano, was living in the United States at the time of the indictment and was detained on immigration fraud charges. Recently, he was sentenced to two years in prison by a federal court in Boston; he will be in prison long enough that the Spanish court could seek his extradition from the United States. With one defendant physically present in Spain, the Spanish court will be in a position to move legal proceedings forward again. While convictions in Spain would not have direct legal consequences on defendants in El Salvador, they would put enormous political pressure on the defendants and their supporters, and make the amnesty that much harder to defend.
Implications
Since the post-war elections of 1994, Salvadoran politicians on both the right and the left have refrained from discussing the amnesty. Its supporters allege that the repeal of the Amnesty Law and subsequent prosecution of historical crimes will reopen old wounds and disrupt the reconciliation process within El Salvador; they argue that an amnesty of some kind was necessary in order for the leaders of the warring parties to sign a peace agreement 20 years ago. But the effect of the amnesty over time has been to prevent a true reconciliation from taking place. In generating broad and absolute impunity for past atrocities, the amnesty makes a mockery of the state's commitment to justice and the rule of law. In addition, the failure of the state to fully investigate or prosecute some of the most egregious violations of human rights that occurred during the conflict has led to the de facto continuation of what the Truth Commission referred to as "the tradition of impunity for officials and members of the most powerful families who commit abuses."

If the court finds the Amnesty Law unconstitutional, a backlash from some sectors of society is almost certain. Overturning the law and subsequently investigating emblematic cases of human rights violations would threaten to dramatically alter the status quo. High-level politicians, officials, and their associates could be implicated in crimes and even potentially prosecuted.

It appears that pushback from threatened sectors may already have begun. Some of the attacks on El Salvador's Constitutional Court over the last year can be understood as pre-emptive measures against a court considered likely to overturn the Amnesty Law. The recent events surrounding Tutela Legal-the legal aid office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador-may also reflect a backlash against attempts to overturn the amnesty. Tutela Legal's offices were abruptly closed by San Salvador's archbishop on September 30, and the future of
its archives is unclear. Tutela Legal was founded in 1981 and was instrumental in documenting human rights abuses during the war; its archives contain a wealth of evidence, including testimonies from witnesses. Many observers noted that it seems unlikely that Tutela Legal-which has carried out investigations of the Mozote massacre and whose lawyers are plaintiffs on that case-just happened to be closed only days after a challenge to the Amnesty Law was accepted by the court, and some have speculated that the action came in response to pressure from pro-amnesty groups.

At this point, the challenges to the amnesty are not likely to disappear for a number of reasons: the IDHUCA, the victims, and their international supporters aren't going anywhere; the Spanish court could move forward with the extradition and subsequent prosecution of Colonel Montano in the Jesuit case; and the Constitutional Court in El Salvador is likely to rule on the Mozote case sometime in the future. While these developments are encouraging and welcome, the accompanying political tension and uncertainty is concerning and, in all likelihood, will increase as events progress. The human rights community in El Salvador will need support, both domestically and internationally, in order to stand firm in the face of pressure and resistance.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Amnesty under Fire in El Salvador: Legal Challenges and Political Implications - WOLA

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Since the end of the Salvadoran civil war in 1992, victims of human rights abuses have chafed at the country's Amnesty Law, which prevents the investigations of the grave human rights violations that occurred during the 12-year conflict. However, recent developments suggest that the tide is turning against the amnesty and its supporters.

# data[].attributes.headline
human rights being practiced and enjoyed 

# data[].attributes.subject
human rights being practiced and enjoyed 

# data[].attributes.body
the right to life

article 1. article 3. article 6 article 15

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Carlos Quesada, Executive Director of the International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights
While the Republican primary debates are fueling anti-immigrant rhetoric including calls for recalling the birthright citizenship of immigrants in the United States, Dominico-Haitian human rights and migration activists are coming under attack based on the same logic.

Last week, the Dominican Republic began deporting Haitian descendants, people born in the Dominican Republic and now deemed to be illegally residing in the country. However, something even more sinister is happening. It appears that the citizenship of rights' advocates is being challenged in an attempt to intimidate those speaking out.

Manuel Dandre, a prominent Dominico-Haitian activist and lawyer advocating for Haitian and Dominico-Haitian rights, was told that his birth certificate could not be provided because he has a "rejected" status; as his mother was a foreigner and did not have the appropriate documents when she registered his birth. Despite weeks of legal struggles, he has yet to receive his birth certificate.

Mr. Dandre is not alone. Antonio Pol Emil; Executive Director of the Dominican Haitian Cultural Center (CCDH) is experiencing a similar situation. Mr. Pol has been requesting a copy of his birth certificate since May in order to renew his passport, but was asked to go to his hometown in the province of El Seibo to get it. When he went there he was told that they could not give him a copy of his birth certificate and he needed to return to Santo Domingo to obtain one there. He has been stuck in this procedural limbo ever since.

Another situation is Ana Maria Belique, an outspoken advocate for people affected by the denationalization process, who works with Movimiento Reconoci.do. Belique publicly challenged the President of the Junta Central Electoral (electoral body), Roberto Rosario Marquez, whom after being legally challenged by people affected by the denationalization process, along with other public officials, decided to retaliate against the activist. Mr. Rosario Marquez claimed in a press conference that when Ms. Belique's parents registered her at birth, they presented false documents; therefore, she is not Dominican.

These three Dominico-Haitian activists have been very outspoken critics of new Dominican migration policies. But there are many other activists who are in a similar situation, and the international community must act immediately to guarantee their protection.

All countries have a right to deport persons illegally residing within their borders who do not fall within the refugee categories of persons requiring international protection. However, as with many things, the issue is not so cut and dry. The current policy is complicated and affects groups of Dominicans of Haitian descendants in different ways.

In 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court issued order 168-13 that according to human rights groups took away the citizenship of hundreds of thousands of Haitian descendants including some 60,000 children. This abhorrent decision violates the American Convention on Human Rights that prohibits signatory countries from arbitrarily denying persons of their right to nationality. A year later, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) ruled against the Dominican government by urging it to compensate victims that were illegally deported, denied identity documents and who lost their nationality arbitrarily.

Ignoring the IACHR decision, the Dominican Congress changed the Constitution, making citizenship based on the parent's nationality and implementation of this provision retroactive going back 75 years! In essence removing citizenship from people born in the Dominican Republic, leaving them without a national identity.

In response to the outcry around 168-13, a new law, 169-14 was passed to address the plight of undocumented persons born in the Dominican Republic of Haitian ancestry and made stateless due to the change in the Constitution.

Now things get even more complicated.

One group impacted by these laws referred to as Group A, were denied identity documents by the 168-13 but, given until June 17, 2015 to adjust their status. While positive that this law allowed this group of persons to legalize their status, the deadline was unrealistic. Furthermore, administrative obstacles made it difficult for most persons and their children to register for new documents.

A second group, Group B, consists of Haitian descendants born in the Dominican Republic to undocumented parents. Thousands of these people have applied for naturalization under Law 169-14, but not yet received a response. Amnesty International details various legitimate reasons why many of these persons were not able to enroll in this plan and makes a series of concrete recommendations for how the Dominican Republic could remedy this.

The deadline for status adjustment passed. Fearing violence or intimidation, tens of thousands opted to leave "voluntarily" for Haiti rather than face forced deportations. Some of them faced mistreatment and exploitation at the hands of merchants and transporters, who took advantage of their desperation. According to the International Organization of Migration (OIM), an estimated 30 percent of the returnees, or over 6,000 people claim to have been deported by Dominican authorities. Many of the returnees are now living in displaced persons camps on the Haitian side of the border with the Dominican Republic. This is generating a humanitarian crisis that compounds that of a nation still recovering from the devastating 2010 earthquake.

On August 14, the Dominican government announced that it would deport persons deemed to be illegally present in the country. The press confirmed that operations were underway by the immigration police to place persons without the proper documents into seven detention centers built to house persons pending deportation.

On August 14, the State Department issued a timidly-worded statement that urges the Dominican Republic to not deport persons with a claim to Dominican citizenship and to respect the rights of deportees. While it is positive that the United States broke its silence on the horrendous treatment of Haitian descendants and migrants, this statement is not enough.

Concerned U.S. citizens have called upon the United States to do more in response to this human rights crisis. Five-hundred and sixty former members of the Peace Corps have asked the State Department to enforce the Leahy Law which requires that the United States suspend security assistance to foreign forces credibly accused of human rights abuse. According to the letter to Secretary Kerry, the Dominican security forces tasked with implementing these abusive policies have received training and $17.5 million from the United States since 2013. The letter highlights that the State Department acknowledged in its annual report that di
scrimination of Haitian migrants and descendants constitutes a serious violation of their human rights.

Migrants have rights and those born in any country have rights as well. We all must do more to confront racism and xenophobia. We in the U.S. should require our Department of State to demand greater protection in the Dominican Republic for the rights of Haitian descendants. The United States should ask the Dominican government to define what they are doing to protect the rights of human rights defenders, like those mentioned above.

Finally, it is easy for us in the United States to condemn the Dominican Republic for racist citizenship laws, but listening to presidential campaign speeches here at home reminds us that racist, anti-migrant sentiment must be confronted at home and abroad.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
International Community Must Guarantee Rights of Dominico-Haitian Defenders - WOLA

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Carlos Quesada, Executive Director of the International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights While the Republican primary debates are fueling anti-immigrant rhetoric including calls for recalling the birthright citizenship of immigrants in the United States, Dominico-Haitian human rights and migration activists are coming under attack based on the same logic.

# data[].attributes.body
the right to work

article 23. article 21. article 29.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The U.S. House of Representatives will likely vote before the end of this week on the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). The House should reject the accord for falling short on workers' human rights because it does not require countries to protect women workers from discrimination or to have laws that meet international labor standards.

Under a regional trade pact known as DR-CAFTA, which passed the U.S. Senate and is likely facing a vote in the House of Representatives by the end of July, the weak labor laws that allow such human rights abuses to flourish could remain intact in U.S. trading partners like El Salvador. Yet the Bush administration is attempting to sell this agreement with Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua as pro-worker. Congress should not be fooled. The accord falls short on workers' rights, and Congress should reject it in its current form.

Under existing laws that DR-CAFTA would replace, the United States can withdraw trade benefits from Central American and Caribbean countries if they do not enforce their labor laws and if those laws do not protect workers' rights. But DR-CAFTA only has one enforceable labor rights requirement: that countries apply their own labor laws-even if they are grossly inadequate. If governments change their laws to eliminate rights, that's okay, too, just so long as the new laws are enforced.

Equally troubling, DR-CAFTA affords women and other groups that have historically faced abuse in the workplace no protection from discrimination. Women workers predominate in Central American and Dominican free trade zones. This year, the State Department identified sexual harassment and pregnancy-based discrimination as serious problems in the region.

The Bush administration's spin is that DR-CAFTA's enforce-your-own-laws standard is sufficient because the labor laws in the region are fine. It claims that International Labor Organization (ILO) studies confirmed its analysis. In fact, these studies found no such thing. Instead, they identified at least twenty-seven areas in which labor laws in the region fall short of international standards, for example, by severely restricting workers' right to strike.

El Salvador's labor laws exemplify the weakness of workers' rights protections in the region. Several months ago, Congressman Kevin Brady (R.-Texas), a DR-CAFTA supporter, cited a Salvadoran law allowing workers to register a union with thirty-five supporters as an example of the region's allegedly strong labor protections. But an ILO decision says this minimum number, along with El Salvador's other union registration requirements, are so onerous that they "seriously infringe the principles of freedom of association."

The Bush administration claims that the real obstacle to greater respect for workers' rights in the region is weak labor law enforcement. It cites DR-CAFTA's Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism, designed to help governments better protect workers' rights, as a panacea for this problem. But DR-CAFTA does not require funding for this mechanism.

Recently, the U.S. Trade Representative, Rob Portman, promised to support $40 million a year for labor and environmental capacity building in Central America and the Dominican Republic. But this is a nonbinding pledge and only tells half the story. The other half of the story is the Bush administration's proposal to cut by 87 percent-from $93.2 million to $12 million-the 2006 budget for the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). ILAB is the principal U.S. agency charged with providing international workers' rights assistance and houses the Office of Trade Agreement Implementation, the national contact point for administering the labor chapters of all free trade agreements to which the United States is party.

Other governments in the region are also withholding resources for labor rights enforcement. According to the Central American and Dominican governments' white paper, in 2005, only half the countries in the region apparently increased Labor Ministry budgets more than the inflation rate.

Opponents of DR-CAFTA have been called many names, "protectionists" among the most common. But it is not protectionist to join a chorus of opposition from labor and women's movements, human rights activists and ombudsmen, and Catholic bishops throughout Central America and the Dominican Republic who understand that the region's workers will be the big losers under DR-CAFTA.

Such losers include the thirty union members fired from a baked goods factory in El Salvador in 2002. With no right to their jobs back under Salvadoran law, they accepted the severance pay due for illegal, anti-union dismissals, knowing that a successful court fight would still leave them out of work.

Rather than playing a game of smoke and mirrors, the Bush administration should renegotiate DR-CAFTA to strengthen workers' rights protections and provide the funds to make them a reality. For Congress to oppose DR-CAFTA until it does so isn't protectionist or anti-trade, it's pro-human rights.

* Carol Pier tracks labor rights and trade for Human Rights Watch.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The U.S. House of Representatives will likely vote before the end of this week on the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). The House should reject the accord for falling short on workers' human rights because it does not require countries to protect women workers from discrimination or to have laws that meet international labor standards.