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Ministry of Education - Very good summary

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The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 assesses the
competitiveness landscape of 140 economies, providing insight
into the drivers of their productivity and prosperity.
The Report series remains the most comprehensive assessment
of national competitiveness worldwide.

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The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 assesses the competitiveness landscape of 140 economies, providing insight into the drivers of their productivity and prosperity. The Report series remains the most comprehensive assessment of national competitiveness worldwide.

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Encourage students to recognize the multiple causal factors behind an event from history, the present, or literature, using the visual of an iceberg.

English & Language Arts

History

Social Studies

Using the strategies from Facing History is almost like an awakening.

- Claudia Bautista, Santa Monica, Calif

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Encourage students to recognize the multiple causal factors behind an event from history, the present, or literature, using the visual of an iceberg.

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Addressing environmental degradation and climate change in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (2017-6)
Author(s): Oluseyi Olutoyin Olugbire

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2017.

Pursuing a Silver Standard for Sustainability (2017-5)
Author(s): Meghan Wagner

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2017.

Manoomin: Where Science and the Sacred Meet (2017-4)
Author(s): Kristi Kremers, Mary Hannemann, Beth Mercer-Taylor

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2017. This case has been classroom tested.

Socio-environmental synthesis of a water conflict - A teaching case study (2017-3)
Author(s): Pranay Ranjan

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2017.

Sustainable Development: It's as easy as F-E-W (2017-2)
Author(s): Thushara Gunda, Katherine Nelson, Nirav Patel

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2017. This case has been classroom tested.

Our Coffee Conundrum: The Socio-Environmental Issues of our Cultural Addiction (2017-1)
Author(s): Dustin Wilgers

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2017. This case has been classroom tested.

To Plant or Not to Plant? Regulating Invasive Plant Species in the Mid-Atlantic States (2015-13)
Author(s): Lea R. Johnson

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2015. This case has been classroom tested.

Using existing data to improve community forestry outcomes (2016-13)
Author(s): Sarah Wilson, Reem Hajjar, and Laura Vang Rasmussen

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2016.

The FiNile Solution (2016-12)
Author(s): Hoda Mostafa, Mahmoud Shaltout, Sherif Osman, and Tamer Shoeib

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2016. This case has been classroom tested

The Three-Wattled Bellbird: Corridor, Conservation, and Costa Rica (2016-11)
Author(s): Jennifer Penner, Peter Gess, and Noelle Beckman

This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2016. This case has been classroom tested

Pages

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Addressing environmental degradation and climate change in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (2017-6) Author(s): Oluseyi Olutoyin Olugbire This resource was developed as part of the Teaching Socio-Environmental Synthesis with Case Studies short course, held at SESYNC in July 2017.

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The Nile, Egypt River Regulation. - ppt download

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The Nile River River data Key concepts Irrigation Discharge Control of flow Population and crops Irrigation Controlling the river

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Ethiopia & Egypt: Visualizing Nile Data - Access to Electricity vs Fresh Water

Tadias Magazine
By Tadias Staff

Updated: Saturday, June 15th, 2013

New York (TADIAS) - In 2009, over 99% of Egypt's residents had access to electricity, while in Ethiopia, a country of 80 million, less than 18% of the population had access to power. In neighboring Sudan 35% of its roughly 30 million inhabitants received energy generated by the Nile river.

In 2011 the annual fresh water withdrawal in Egypt was recorded as 68.30 billion cubic meters. The same year Sudan also took in 37.14 billion cubic meters of fresh water. In comparison, Ethiopia's withdrawal of fresh water for the same period was a meager 5.56 billion cubic meters.

These statistics come from the World Bank's "World Development Indicators" and are now compiled by a newly launched website that employs data visualization and creative interactive timelines of Ethiopian history and current affairs.

"While working on my first historical item to publish, on the Solomonic Dynasty, the whole Nile issue exploded into the international news scene," said Jomo Tariku, the site's founder, who works as a designer and publishing officer at the World Bank's Development Data Group in Washington, D.C. that includes the Open-Data team. "So I thought that was a perfect vehicle to do a data-based analysis, as much as possible, on facts and not emotions."

Ethiopia and Egypt, next to Nigeria, are both among the top-three most populated countries in Africa. Jomo told Tadias that research driven stories are something he deals with on a daily basis, and he hopes that this would particularly assist journalists in providing a balanced coverage of the rather heated current exchange between the two nations on the Nile matter.

"Our main site and the most visited one at the World Bank is under our wing at data.worldbank.org," Jomo said. "Our other popular asset that really makes the World Bank stand out compared to any organization that has vast amounts of data is our databank tool that lets you query our indicators and build your own analysis."

Graph: Access to Electricity vs. Total Fresh Water Withdrawals (Source: data.worldbank.org)

"What inspired this project?" we asked Jomo. "Even though I have been meaning to do a data visualization site on the continent and Ethiopia, discovering a similar Ghanaian site really got me off my lazy chair," Jomo said.

So what's the next topic he is researching? "I will publish one on Abebe Bekila by Monday," Jomo said. "I am sticking with Wikipedia and World Bank but I will be using any free data source I can find to generate the visualizations."
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You can learn more and add to the information at www.timelineethiopia.com.

Related:
Ethiopia: Dam Causes No Harm On Ethio-Egypt Ties (All Africa)
Hydropolitics Between Ethiopia and Egypt: A Historical Timeline (TADIAS)
Egypt Map Shows Why Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam Is Such A Big Deal (Huffington Post)
Law Professor Urges Ethiopia to Take Nile Issue to International Court (TADIAS)
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Join the conversation on Twitter and Facebook

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Tadias Magazine By Tadias Staff Updated: Saturday, June 15th, 2013 New York (TADIAS) - In 2009, over 99% of Egypt's residents had access to electricity, while in Ethiopia, a country of 80 million, less than 18% of the population had access to power.

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In 2015 demographers, teachers and politicians will stop talking about the population pyramid and start referring to the population dome. The change in terminology will reflect a profound shift in the shape and structure of societies-a shift that has been going on for 50 years and is only half complete.

The pyramid is a traditional way of visualising and explaining the age structure of a society. If you draw a chart with each age group represented by a bar, and each bar ranged one above the other-youngest at the bottom, oldest at the top, and with the sexes separated-you get a simple shape. In 1970 that shape was a pyramid because the largest segment of the global population was the youngest (0-5 years old, comprising 14% of the total), followed by the next-youngest (6-10, with 13%), and so on in regular increments until, above 85 years, there were so few people that the shape vanished into a point (see left-hand chart).
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The pyramid was characteristic of human populations since the day organised societies emerged. With lifespans short and mortality rates high, children were always the most numerous group, and old people the least. A population chart of England in 1700 looks like a pyramid, as well.

But now look at the chart of the global population in 2015. It looks more like the dome of the Capitol building in Washington, DC (middle chart). Young children are still the largest group, but now make up only 10% of the population, and those above them are almost as big a cohort, with 9.5%. The age groups start to become markedly smaller only about the age of 40, so the incline starts much further up the chart than with the pyramid. In 1970 the youngest had not only been the largest but also the fastest-growing section of the population. But between 1970 and 2015, the population aged 0-19 grew by only 42%, whereas the population aged 20-39 rose by 128%. This group added almost twice as many people to the overall numbers as the group aged below 20 did. There are now also 50m people above 85, so the dome of 2015 has a spike.

In 1970-2015 the dominating influence on the global population was the fertility rate, the number of children a women would typically bear during her lifetime. It fell dramatically over the period, meaning that the world shifted from having larger to smaller families. But in 2015-60 the biggest influence upon the population will be ageing. Small families are already becoming the norm, the fall in fertility is slowing down and now almost everyone is living longer than their parents-dramatically so in developing countries.

So, by 2060, the dome will have come and gone and now the shape of the population looks more like a column (or perhaps an old-fashioned beehive). It is a little fatter near the bottom and curves in at the top. But up to the age of about 50, the generations are of almost equal size and the shape has near-vertical sides.

The size of the Earth's population is still rising, from 7.2 billion in 2015 to 9.5 billion in 2060. But, according to calculations by Emi Suzuki and Wolfgang Fengler of the World Bank, two-thirds of the extra 2.2 billion people in 2060 will be in the age group between 40 and 79, not from younger people. The increase in the last, oldest segment is especially marked. Between 2015 and 2060, the number of 60- to 79-year-olds will increase by 1.1 billion, or 131%. That is five times the increase in the number of children and teenagers, which will rise by only 220m, or 9%. The numbers of the oldest people of all (those above 85, here lumped together in one bar) will rise at the fastest rate of all (by 281% in 2015-60), but from a much lower base, so they do not add as many people to the total.

For all of history, humans have lived in societies dominated (in numbers at least) by children. By 2060 children will be barely more numerous than any other age group up to 65. And looking after parents and grandparents will be as big a, or a bigger, social requirement as bringing up children and grandchildren. The year 2015 is, roughly, the halfway point in this astounding transformation.

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In 2015 demographers, teachers and politicians will stop talking about the population pyramid and start referring to the population dome. The change in terminology will reflect a profound shift in the shape and structure of societies-a shift that has been going on for 50 years and is only half complete.

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Page last updated on August 19, 2020

The regularity and richness of the annual Nile River flood, coupled with semi-isolation provided by deserts to the east and west, allowed for the development of one of the world's great civilizations. A unified kingdom arose circa 3200 B.C., and a series of dynasties ruled in Egypt for the next three millennia. The last native dynasty fell to the Persians in 341 B.C., who in turn were replaced by the Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines. It was the Arabs who introduced Islam and the Arabic language in the 7th century and who ruled for the next six centuries. A local military caste, the Mamluks took control about 1250 and continued to govern after the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1517. Completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 elevated Egypt as an important world transportation hub. Ostensibly to protect its investments, Britain seized control of Egypt's government in 1882, but nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Empire continued until 1914. Partially independent from the UK in 1922, Egypt acquired full sovereignty from Britain in 1952. The completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1971 and the resultant Lake Nasser have reaffirmed the time-honored place of the Nile River in the agriculture and ecology of Egypt. A rapidly growing population (the largest in the Arab world), limited arable land, and dependence on the Nile all continue to overtax resources and stress society. The government has struggled to meet the demands of Egypt's fast-growing population as it implements far-reaching economic reforms, including the reduction of select subsidies, large-scale infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, and foreign direct investment appeals.

Inspired by the 2010 Tunisian revolution, Egyptian opposition groups led demonstrations and labor strikes countrywide, culminating in President Hosni MUBARAK's ouster in 2011. Egypt's military assumed national leadership until a new legislature was in place in early 2012; later that same year, Muhammad MURSI won the presidential election. Following protests throughout the spring of 2013 against MURSI's government and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Armed Forces intervened and removed MURSI from power in July 2013 and replaced him with interim president Adly MANSOUR. Simultaneously, the government began enacting laws to limit freedoms of assembly and expression. In January 2014, voters approved a new constitution by referendum and in May 2014 elected former defense minister Abdelfattah ELSISI president. Egypt elected a new legislature in December 2015, its first Hose of Representatives since 2012. ELSISI was reelected to a second four-year term in March 2018. In April 2019, Egypt approved via national referendum a set of constitutional amendments extending ELSISI's term in office through 2024 and possibly through 2030 if re-elected for a third term. The amendments would also allow future presidents up to two consecutive six-year terms in office, re-establish an upper legislative house, allow for one or more vice presidents, establish a 25% quota for female legislators, reaffirm the military's role as guardian of Egypt, and expand presidential authority to appoint the heads of judicial councils.

Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Libya and the Gaza Strip, and the Red Sea north of Sudan, and includes the Asian Sinai Peninsula

more than eight times the size of Ohio; slightly more than three times the size of New Mexico

Area comparison map:

border countries (4): Gaza Strip 13 km, Israel 208 km, Libya 1115 km, Sudan 1276 km

desert; hot, dry summers with moderate winters

vast desert plateau interrupted by Nile valley and delta

lowest point: Qattara Depression -133 m

highest point: Mount Catherine 2,629 m

petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, manganese, limestone, gypsum, talc, asbestos, lead, rare earth elements, zinc

arable land: 2.8% / permanent crops: 0.8% / permanent pasture: 0%

approximately 95% of the population lives within 20 km of the Nile River and its delta; vast areas of the country remain sparsely populated or uninhabited

periodic droughts; frequent earthquakes; flash floods; landslides; hot, driving windstorms called khamsin occur in spring; dust storms; sandstorms

agricultural land being lost to urbanization and windblown sands; increasing soil salination below Aswan High Dam; desertification; oil pollution threatening coral reefs, beaches, and marine habitats; other water pollution from agricultural pesticides, raw sewage, and industrial effluents; limited natural freshwater resources away from the Nile, which is the only perennial water source; rapid growth in population overstraining the Nile and natural resources

party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands

signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements

controls Sinai Peninsula, the only land bridge between Africa and remainder of Eastern Hemisphere; controls Suez Canal, a sea link between Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea; size, and juxtaposition to Israel, establish its major role in Middle Eastern geopolitics; dependence on upstream neighbors; dominance of Nile basin issues; prone to influxes of refugees from Sudan and the Palestinian territories

Egyptian 99.7%, other 0.3%

note: data represent respondents by nationality

Arabic (official), Arabic, English, and French widely understood by educated classes

Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10%

MENA religious affiliation: PDF

Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third most populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt's land area. Egypt's rapid population growth - 46% between 1994 and 2014 - stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.

Although the country's total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt's TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and has plateaued the last few years. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum).

Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt's public sphere.

Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.

Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt's largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.

In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada).

During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards.

approximately 95% of the population lives within 20 km of the Nile River and its delta; vast areas of the country remain sparsely populated or uninhabited

20.901 million CAIRO (capital), 5.281 million Alexandria

note: median age at first birth among women 25-29

rural: 98.8% of population

total: 100% of population

rural: 1.2% of population

rural: 97.6% of population

total: 98.5% of population

rural: 2.4% of population

degree of risk: intermediate

food or waterborne diseases: bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever

water contact diseases: schistosomiasis

note: widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Egypt; as of 19 August 2020, Egypt has reported 96,753 confirmed cases of COVID-19 with 5,184 deaths, the second largest outbreak in Africa

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

conventional long form: Arab Republic of Egypt

conventional short form: Egypt

local long form: Jumhuriyat Misr al-Arabiyah

former: United Arab Republic (with Syria)

etymology: the English name "Egypt" derives from the ancient Greek name for the country "Aigyptos"; the Arabic name "Misr" can be traced to the ancient Akkadian "misru" meaning border or frontier

geographic coordinates: 30 03 N, 31 15 E

time difference: UTC+2 (7 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)

etymology: from the Arabic "al-Qahira," meaning "the victorious"

27 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazat); Ad Daqahliyah, Al Bahr al Ahmar (Red Sea), Al Buhayrah, Al Fayyum, Al Gharbiyah, Al Iskandariyah (Alexandria), Al Isma'iliyah (Ismailia), Al Jizah (Giza), Al Minufiyah, Al Minya, Al Qahirah (Cairo), Al Qalyubiyah, Al Uqsur (Luxor), Al Wadi al Jadid (New Valley), As Suways (Suez), Ash Sharqiyah, Aswan, Asyut, Bani Suwayf, Bur Sa'id (Port Said), Dumyat (Damietta), Janub Sina' (South Sinai), Kafr ash Shaykh, Matruh, Qina, Shamal Sina' (North Sinai), Suhaj

28 February 1922 (from UK protectorate status; the military-led revolution that began on 23 July 1952 led to a republic being declared on 18 June 1953 and all British troops withdrawn on 18 June 1956); note - it was ca. 3200 B.C. that the Two Lands of Upper (southern) and Lower (northern) Egypt were first united politically

Revolution Day, 23 July (1952)

history: several previous; latest approved by a constitutional committee in December 2013, approved by referendum held on 14-15 January 2014, ratified by interim president on 19 January 2014

amendments: proposed by the president of the republic or by one fifth of the House of Representatives members; a decision to accept the proposal requires majority vote by House members; passage of amendment requires a two-thirds majority vote by House members and passage by majority vote in a referendum; articles of reelection of the president and principles of freedom are not amendable unless the amendment "brings more guarantees;" amended 2019

mixed legal system based on Napoleonic civil and penal law, Islamic religious law, and vestiges of colonial-era laws; judicial review of the constitutionality of laws by the Supreme Constitutional Court

accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations; non-party state to the ICCt

citizenship by descent only: if the father was born in Egypt

dual citizenship recognized: only with prior permission from the government

residency requirement for naturalization: 10 years

18 years of age; universal and compulsory

chief of state: President Abdelfattah ELSISI (since 8 June 2014)

head of government: Prime Minister Mostafa MADBOULY (since 7 June 2018)

cabinet: Cabinet ministers nominated by the executive branch and approved by the House of Representatives

elections/appointments: president elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 6-year term (eligible for 3 consecutive terms); election last held on 26-28 March 2018 (next to be held in 2024); prime minister appointed by the president, approved by the House of Representatives; note - following a constitutional amendment approved by referendum in April 2019, the presidential term was extended from 4 to 6 years and eligibility extended to 3 consecutive terms

election results: Abdelfattah ELSISI reelected president in first round; percent of valid votes cast - Abdelfattah ELSISI (independent) 97.1%, Moussa Mostafa MOUSSA (El Ghad Party) 2.9%; note - more than 7% of ballots cast were deemed invalid

description:
unicameral House of Representatives (Majlis Al-Nowaab) (596 seats; 448 members directly elected by individual candidacy system, 120 members - with quotas for women, youth, Christians and workers - elected in party-list constituencies by simple majority popular vote, and 28 members appointed by the president; members serve 5-year terms; note - inaugural session held on 10 January 2016

note: a referendum held in April 2019, approved a constitutional amendment - effective following the 2020 election - to restore the upper chamber of the legislative body, designated the Senate, with 180 seats - 60 members to be appointed by the president and 120 members to be directly elected; the amendment also calls for the reduction of the existing People's Assembly from 596 to 450 seats

elections: multi-phase election completed on 16 December 2015 (next to be held in 2020)

election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party -- Free Egyptians Party 65, Future of the Nation 53, New Wafd Party 36, Homeland's Protector Party 18, Republican People's Party 13, Congress Party 12, Al-Nour Party 11, Conservative Party 6, Democratic Peace Party 5, Egyptian National Movement 4, Egyptian Social Democratic Party 4, Modern Egypt Party 4, Freedom Party 3, My Homeland Egypt Party 3, Reform and Development Party 3, National Progressive Unionist Party 2, Arab Democratic Nasserist Party 1, El Serh El Masry el Hor 1, Revolutionary Guards Party 1, independent 351; composition - men 507, women 89, percent of women 14.9%

Note: a referendum held in April 2019 approved a constitutional amendment - effective for the next election - allows the executive branch to restore the upper chamber of the legislative body with 180 seats - 60 members to be appointed by the president and 120 members to be directly elected; the amendment also calls for the reduction of the existing House of Representatives membership from 596 to 450 seats

highest courts: Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) (consists of the court president and 10 justices); the SCC serves as the final court of arbitration on the constitutionality of laws and conflicts between lower courts regarding jurisdiction and rulings; Court of Cassation (CC) (consists of the court president and 550 judges organized in circuits with cases heard by panels of 5 judges); the CC is the highest appeals body for civil and criminal cases, also known as "ordinary justices"; Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) (consists of the court president and NA judges and organized in circuits with cases heard by panels of 5 judges); the SAC is the highest court of the State Council

judge selection and term of office: under the 2014 constitution, all judges and justices selected and appointed by the Supreme Judiciary Council and approved as a formality by the president of the Republic; judges appointed for life; under the 2019 amendments, the president has the power to appoint heads of judiciary authorities and courts, the prosecutor general, and the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court

subordinate courts: Courts of Appeal; Courts of First Instance; courts of limited jurisdiction; Family Court (established in 2004)

Al-Nour [Yunis MAKHYUN]
Arab Democratic Nasserist Party [Dr. Mohamed ABDUL ELLA ]
Congress Party [Omar Al-Mokhtar SEMIDA]
Conservative Party [Akmal KOURTAM]
Democratic Peace Party [Ahmed FADALY]
Egyptian National Movement Party [Gen. Raouf EL SAYED]
Egyptian Social Democratic Party [Farid ZAHRAN]
El Ghad Party [Moussa Mostafa MOUSSA]
El Serh El Masry el Hor [Tarek Ahmed Abbas NADIM]
Freedom Party [Salah HASSABALAH]
Free Egyptians Party [Essam KHALIL]
Homeland's Protector Party [Lt. Gen. (retired) Galal AL-HARIDI]
Modern Egypt Party [Nabil DEIBIS]
Nation's Future Party (Mostaqbal Watan) [Mohamed Ashraf RASHAD]
My Homeland Egypt Party [Gen. Seif El Islam ABDEL BARY ]
National Progressive Unionist (Tagammu) Party [Sayed Abdel AAL]
Reform and Development Party [Mohamad Anwar al-SADAT]
Republican People's Party [Hazim AMR]
Revolutionary Guards Party [Magdy EL-SHARIF]
Wafd Party [Bahaa ABU SHOKA]

ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AU, BSEC (observer), CAEU, CD, CICA, COMESA, D-8, EBRD, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OAPEC, OAS (observer), OIC, OIF, OSCE (partner), PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO

Ambassador Yasser REDA (since 19 September 2015)

chancery: 3521 International Court NW, Washington, DC 20008

telephone: [1] (202) 895-5400

consulate(s) general: Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York

chief of mission: Ambassador Jonathan R. COHEN (since 17 November 2019)

telephone: [20-2] 2797-3300

embassy: 5 Tawfik Diab St., Garden City, Cairo

mailing address: Unit 64900, Box 15, APO AE 09839-4900; 5 Tawfik Diab Street, Garden City, Cairo

three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black; the national emblem (a gold Eagle of Saladin facing the hoist side with a shield superimposed on its chest above a scroll bearing the name of the country in Arabic) centered in the white band; the band colors derive from the Arab Liberation flag and represent oppression (black), overcome through bloody struggle (red), to be replaced by a bright future (white)

note: similar to the flag of Syria, which has two green stars in the white band, Iraq, which has an Arabic inscription centered in the white band, and Yemen, which has a plain white band

golden eagle, white lotus; national colors: red, white, black

name: "Bilady, Bilady, Bilady" (My Homeland, My Homeland, My Homeland)

lyrics/music: Younis-al QADI/Sayed DARWISH

note: adopted 1979; the current anthem, less militaristic than the previous one, was created after the signing of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel; Sayed DARWISH, commonly considered the father of modern Egyptian music, composed the anthem

Occupying the northeast corner of the African continent, Egypt is bisected by the highly fertile Nile valley where most economic activity takes place. Egypt's economy was highly centralized during the rule of former President Gamal Abdel NASSER but opened up considerably under former Presidents Anwar EL-SADAT and Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK. Agriculture, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, tourism, and other service sectors drove the country's relatively diverse economic activity.

Despite Egypt's mixed record for attracting foreign investment over the past two decades, poor living conditions and limited job opportunities have contributed to public discontent. These socioeconomic pressures were a major factor leading to the January 2011 revolution that ousted MUBARAK. The uncertain political, security, and policy environment since 2011 has restricted economic growth and failed to alleviate persistent unemployment, especially among the young.

In late 2016, persistent dollar shortages and waning aid from its Gulf allies led Cairo to turn to the IMF for a 3-year, $12 billion loan program. To secure the deal, Cairo floated its currency, introduced new taxes, and cut energy subsidies - all of which pushed inflation above 30% for most of 2017, a high that had not been seen in a generation. Since the currency float, foreign investment in Egypt's high interest treasury bills has risen exponentially, boosting both dollar availability and central bank reserves. Cairo will be challenged to obtain foreign and local investment in manufacturing and other sectors without a sustained effort to implement a range of business reforms.

note: data are in 2017 dollars

note: data are in 2017 dollars

cotton, rice, corn, wheat, beans, fruits, vegetables; cattle, water buffalo, sheep, goats

textiles, food processing, tourism, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, hydrocarbons, construction, cement, metals, light manufactures

note: data cover central government debt and include debt instruments issued (or owned) by government entities other than the treasury; the data include treasury debt held by foreign entities; the data include debt issued by subnational entities, as well as intragovernmental debt; intragovernmental debt consists of treasury borrowings from surpluses in the social funds, such as for retirement, medical care, and unemployment; debt instruments for the social funds are sold at public auctions

UAE 10.9%, Italy 10%, US 7.4%, UK 5.7%, Turkey 4.4%, Germany 4.3%, India 4.3%

crude oil and petroleum products, fruits and vegetables, cotton, textiles, metal products, chemicals, processed food

machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, chemicals, wood products, fuels

China 7.9%, UAE 5.2%, Germany 4.8%, Saudi Arabia 4.6%, US 4.4%, Russia 4.3%

Egyptian pounds (EGP) per US dollar -

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Page last updated on August 19, 2020 The regularity and richness of the annual Nile River flood, coupled with semi-isolation provided by deserts to the east and west, allowed for the development of one of the world's great civilizations. A unified kingdom arose circa 3200 B.C., and a series of dynasties ruled in Egypt for the next three millennia.

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Egypt is divided into 27 governorates, which include two city-governorates: Alexandria ( Alexandria Governorate) and Cairo ( Cairo Governorate). There are nine governorates of Lower Egypt in the Nile Delta region, ten of Upper Egypt along the Nile river south from Cairo to Aswan and five frontier governorates covering Sinai and the deserts that lie west and east of the Nile river.

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This piece is the first of two that look at Egypt's demographic situation and how it affects the country. Here, Dr. Ahmed Wagih discusses the background details and addresses some of the problems already facing the Egyptian government. A future piece will present some potential steps that governments to come could take in response to the challenges presented by Egypt's growing population.
The statement read by General Abu Bakr al-Gindi, head of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS; Egypt's equivalent of the U.S. Census Bureau), on March 24, 2014 revealed many worrying facts regarding Egypt's demographic future. The Egyptian population has been growing at unsustainable rates for decades, but 2013 was a year of record growth, with the number of births reaching 2.6 million (compared to about 0.5 million deaths). This population boom comes at a time when the Egyptian government has struggled to provide even basic government services, and the authorities seem unprepared to deal with the additional stressors that emerge from the accelerating population growth rate seen in the country..

Common sense (and planning theory) tells us that there needs to be a balance between the providers of any service and the number of people benefiting from that service in order for there to be an acceptable level of performance. In Egypt, this balance has long been missing. The population boom that has overwhelmed the system results from improvement in medical care at both ends of the life spectrum-according to World Bank data, infant mortality has fallen from 113 per 1,000 births in 1980 to 17.9 per 1,000 in 2012, and life expectancy has grown from 48 years in 1960 to 71 in 2012. The boom is not yet over, either-Egypt's current fertility rate of 2.87 children per woman (calculated in 2014), while not among the highest in the world, is still well above the world average of 2.45 (calculated in 2013).

To provide some further context against which we can appreciate the rate of population growth in Egypt, it is enough to examine the figure below, which illustrates graphically the population growth of some select countries in terms of the ratio between their respective populations in the years 2013, 2000, and 1950. In the graph, it is clear how Egypt has fared in comparison to these countries: while all grew considerably between 1950 and 2000, growth rates for most markedly declined over the next 13 years. Egypt's fourfold growth since 1950 tops the pack, with Turkey coming in with the second-highest overall growth; of course, Turkey has an abundant supply of water and agricultural/pasture land compared to the mostly desert landscape of Egypt.

Demographic concerns in Egypt do not only lie in the size of the population; the composition of the population is also important. One of the most economically prominent countries in the world today is South Korea, which managed to create a world-class economy in a relatively short period of time. Egypt and South Korea had roughly the same population in early 1960s, yet today, Egypt's population of 86 million is almost 75% larger than South Korea's 49 million.

A quick look at the two countries' population pyramids in the figure below reveals the tremendous differences between them. The highest percentages in the case of South Korea are in the currently productive categories, whereas the highest percentages in the case of Egypt are at the bottom, outside of the currently productive age groups. Clearly, South Korea was able to harness an earlier large expansion of its population in a productive manner, which then helped to reduce its overall growth rate-this is the challenge that Egypt faces today.

Putting aside the question of simply sustaining its vast population, Egypt faces additional difficulties in promoting its people's economic productivity. The argument that has been championed for quite some time-sometimes by prominent public figures-is that Egypt's population is a resource in itself that, if managed properly, can generate wealth and promote broad development. While this argument has the theory right, it faces tremendous hurdles in moving from theory to real-world application.

As one example, the public education system in Egypt today is under severe stress due to the continual high rate of growth in the school-age population.

Classroom densities in excess of 100 students per class are common, and studies have found that significant percentages of eighth-grade students cannot read or write properly. In addition to these problems among younger students, there is also a distribution problem among older students: hundreds of thousands are crammed into a university system that produces far too many graduates who have difficulty finding jobs due to having had either an insufficiently rigorous education or an education in a field that is not demanded in the labor market.

While factories in Suez are asking for government authorization to import technicians from abroad, tens of thousands of Commerce, Law, and Arts graduates are mostly sipping tea in Cairo coffee shops or taking petty jobs that do not require their university degrees. This is the opposite of the problem presented by the continued overcrowding of university programs that are in high demand in the labor market: one example is the department of Urban & Regional Planning at Cairo University, which has been forced to accept 250 students per year instead of its initial design capacity of 100 students. Medicine, Engineering, Pharmacy, and other departments have also been subjected to similar measures to accommodate more students, and these forced increases in enrollments are not met with an equal increase of resources. Consequently, the quality of graduates in these fields has deteriorated.

These increased admittance measures were implemented to placate Egyptians who invest heavily in private tutoring to ensure better grades for their children only to find GPA requirements moving up every year due to limited spaces at the public universities. By addressing the problem in this way, however, there has simply been a substitution of one problem for another. the madee mismatch between graduates and jo: theis.Tis latter, however, otdue to a

Unfortunately, the challenge for Egypt does not stop with improving the educational system and aligning students with job opportunities-more basic concerns are present, including security and simply providing for the population's basic needs. For example, anyone who has studied planning knows that one of the initial parameters needed before planning any space is the Holding Capacity (HC), which is based on the availability of basic resources. If we apply the international water poverty line-set by the United Nations at 1,000 m3-as the main parameter to determine Egypt's HC, we reach the conclusion that Egypt will be challenged, in the long run, to appropriately provide for more than 58 million people (based on an annual water income of around 58 billion m3).

Ultimately, Egypt needs to move away from piecemeal efforts to deal with the current and future concerns that emerge from its demographic realities. This will require cooperation between the authorities governing the health care system, the educational system, industry, housing, transportation, agriculture, and more. In short, solving Egypt's demographic dilemma will require a government that can come together to enact a cohesive, multi-departmental plan of action. We can only hope that the next government proves up to the task.

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Population Growth in Egypt: More People, More Problems?

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This piece is the first of two that look at Egypt's demographic situation and how it affects the country. Here, Dr. Ahmed Wagih discusses the background details and addresses some of the problems already facing the Egyptian government. A future piece will present some potential steps that governments to come could take in response to the challenges presented by Egypt's growing population.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
This piece is the first of two that look at Egypt's demographic situation and how it affects the country. Here, Dr. Ahmed Wagih discusses the background details and addresses some of the problems already facing the Egyptian government. A future piece will present some potential steps that governments to come could take in response to the challenges presented by Egypt's growing population.
The statement read by General Abu Bakr al-Gindi, head of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS; Egypt's equivalent of the U.S. Census Bureau), on March 24, 2014 revealed many worrying facts regarding Egypt's demographic future. The Egyptian population has been growing at unsustainable rates for decades, but 2013 was a year of record growth, with the number of births reaching 2.6 million (compared to about 0.5 million deaths). This population boom comes at a time when the Egyptian government has struggled to provide even basic government services, and the authorities seem unprepared to deal with the additional stressors that emerge from the accelerating population growth rate seen in the country..

Common sense (and planning theory) tells us that there needs to be a balance between the providers of any service and the number of people benefiting from that service in order for there to be an acceptable level of performance. In Egypt, this balance has long been missing. The population boom that has overwhelmed the system results from improvement in medical care at both ends of the life spectrum-according to World Bank data, infant mortality has fallen from 113 per 1,000 births in 1980 to 17.9 per 1,000 in 2012, and life expectancy has grown from 48 years in 1960 to 71 in 2012. The boom is not yet over, either-Egypt's current fertility rate of 2.87 children per woman (calculated in 2014), while not among the highest in the world, is still well above the world average of 2.45 (calculated in 2013).

To provide some further context against which we can appreciate the rate of population growth in Egypt, it is enough to examine the figure below, which illustrates graphically the population growth of some select countries in terms of the ratio between their respective populations in the years 2013, 2000, and 1950. In the graph, it is clear how Egypt has fared in comparison to these countries: while all grew considerably between 1950 and 2000, growth rates for most markedly declined over the next 13 years. Egypt's fourfold growth since 1950 tops the pack, with Turkey coming in with the second-highest overall growth; of course, Turkey has an abundant supply of water and agricultural/pasture land compared to the mostly desert landscape of Egypt.

Demographic concerns in Egypt do not only lie in the size of the population; the composition of the population is also important. One of the most economically prominent countries in the world today is South Korea, which managed to create a world-class economy in a relatively short period of time. Egypt and South Korea had roughly the same population in early 1960s, yet today, Egypt's population of 86 million is almost 75% larger than South Korea's 49 million.

A quick look at the two countries' population pyramids in the figure below reveals the tremendous differences between them. The highest percentages in the case of South Korea are in the currently productive categories, whereas the highest percentages in the case of Egypt are at the bottom, outside of the currently productive age groups. Clearly, South Korea was able to harness an earlier large expansion of its population in a productive manner, which then helped to reduce its overall growth rate-this is the challenge that Egypt faces today.

Putting aside the question of simply sustaining its vast population, Egypt faces additional difficulties in promoting its people's economic productivity. The argument that has been championed for quite some time-sometimes by prominent public figures-is that Egypt's population is a resource in itself that, if managed properly, can generate wealth and promote broad development. While this argument has the theory right, it faces tremendous hurdles in moving from theory to real-world application.

As one example, the public education system in Egypt today is under severe stress due to the continual high rate of growth in the school-age population.

Classroom densities in excess of 100 students per class are common, and studies have found that significant percentages of eighth-grade students cannot read or write properly. In addition to these problems among younger students, there is also a distribution problem among older students: hundreds of thousands are crammed into a university system that produces far too many graduates who have difficulty finding jobs due to having had either an insufficiently rigorous education or an education in a field that is not demanded in the labor market.

While factories in Suez are asking for government authorization to import technicians from abroad, tens of thousands of Commerce, Law, and Arts graduates are mostly sipping tea in Cairo coffee shops or taking petty jobs that do not require their university degrees. This is the opposite of the problem presented by the continued overcrowding of university programs that are in high demand in the labor market: one example is the department of Urban & Regional Planning at Cairo University, which has been forced to accept 250 students per year instead of its initial design capacity of 100 students. Medicine, Engineering, Pharmacy, and other departments have also been subjected to similar measures to accommodate more students, and these forced increases in enrollments are not met with an equal increase of resources. Consequently, the quality of graduates in these fields has deteriorated.

These increased admittance measures were implemented to placate Egyptians who invest heavily in private tutoring to ensure better grades for their children only to find GPA requirements moving up every year due to limited spaces at the public universities. By addressing the problem in this way, however, there has simply been a substitution of one problem for another. the madee mismatch between graduates and jo: theis.Tis latter, however, otdue to a

Unfortunately, the challenge for Egypt does not stop with improving the educational system and aligning students with job opportunities-more basic concerns are present, including security and simply providing for the population's basic needs. For example, anyone who has studied planning knows that one of the initial parameters needed before planning any space is the Holding Capacity (HC), which is based on the availability of basic resources. If we apply the international water poverty line-set by the United Nations at 1,000 m3-as the main parameter to determine Egypt's HC, we reach the conclusion that Egypt will be challenged, in the long run, to appropriately provide for more than 58 million people (based on an annual water income of around 58 billion m3).

Ultimately, Egypt needs to move away from piecemeal efforts to deal with the current and future concerns that emerge from its demographic realities. This will require cooperation between the authorities governing the health care system, the educational system, industry, housing, transportation, agriculture, and more. In short, solving Egypt's demographic dilemma will require a government that can come together to enact a cohesive, multi-departmental plan of action. We can only hope that the next government proves up to the task.

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Population Growth in Egypt: More People, More Problems?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
This piece is the first of two that look at Egypt's demographic situation and how it affects the country. Here, Dr. Ahmed Wagih discusses the background details and addresses some of the problems already facing the Egyptian government. A future piece will present some potential steps that governments to come could take in response to the challenges presented by Egypt's growing population.

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Egypt is the most populous country in the Arabic speaking world and the third-most populous on the African continent (after Nigeria and Ethiopia). About 95% of the country's 97 million people (2017) live along the banks of the Nile and in the Nile Delta, which fans out north of Cairo; and along the Suez Canal.

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Setting the mood

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The Nile River has been flowing south to north for about 30 million years, and the human race's cradle may have been along the Blue Nile stemming from Ethiopia. Find out some amazing facts about what may be the world's most important river.

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The Nile River has been flowing south to north for about 30 million years, and the human race's cradle may have been along the Blue Nile stemming from Ethiopia. Find out some amazing facts about what may be the world's most important river.