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North Korea is a one party state led by a totaltarian dictatorship.

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THE leaders of North Korea and the United States have never met since Korea was divided in 1953. That drought is set to end on June 12th, when Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un will hold a joint summit in Singapore. The historical record of such groundbreaking get-togethers is mixed. Some led to diplomatic breakthroughs; others failed to forestall war. And in many cases, historians' eventual verdict was utterly different from that of observers at the time.

To measure this gap, we chose seven high-stakes summits from the past 80 years. As a proxy for their importance, we list the participants' economic and military strength. We also dug up The Economist's coverage of the summits as they occurred, and ran each sentence through Google Cloud's sentiment-analysis tool. The average score should provide a rough measure of whether the information available at the time offered more cause for hope or for despair.

In 1938 Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, flew to Munich in a last-ditch attempt to avert a war with Germany. Adolf Hitler, the German Führer, had already dissolved the country's democracy, built up its army and started to persecute its Jews. Chamberlain returned home believing that he had cast-iron assurances from Hitler not to invade Czechoslovakia, famously waving the letter Hitler had signed as he disembarked in Britain. Writing in 1938, The Economist was far more cautious. "There is nothing optimistic," we wrote "in a forecast that sees only a breathing space before the return of crisis, whether that breathing space be six months or two years. For in either case we are dependent on the whim of the dictators, and there is neither optimism nor security" in that. The second world war began the following year.

As the second world war drew to a close, the three remaining Great Powers gathered together in Yalta, Crimea. Franklin Roosevelt, the American president; Winston Churchill, the British prime minister; and Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, met to draw up the outlines of the post-war world order. The Economist was somewhat optimistic after the conference: we wrote that "there will be no room for aggression if the Great Powers can remain united in friendship nor will the the smaller nations resent this hegemony, if it is the servant and not the master, of international life." During the subsequent decades, however, the billions of people still living under colonial rule or as Soviet vassals wound up resenting their hegemony quite a bit.

Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, had run the Soviet Union for eight years when he met John F. Kennedy, America's fresh-faced president, in Vienna. They had much to discuss: America had just launched a failed invasion of Cuba, a Soviet ally, and the two countries were embroiled in a proxy war in Laos. The Economist thought the meeting brought a welcome reduction in tensions: "So long as this delicate balance of trust continues," we said, "neither side is likely to take actions that stretch the other's patience to the snapping point." That "delicate balance" barely lasted a year: in 1962 Khrushchev set off the Cuban missile crisis by deploying nuclear weapons on America's doorstep.

In 1949, at the close of the Chinese Civil War, it was American warships that helped the Nationalists protect their final stronghold in Taiwan from Communist forces. The United States and China were estranged for the following two decades. But Richard Nixon, the Republican president whose foreign policy was driven by realpolitik, sought to capitalise on a diplomatic split that had divided China and the Soviet Union, its former Communist ally. In 1972 he visited China in person, setting the stage for American recognition of the government in Beijing seven years later. The Economist rated the visit a mixed bag. "The President gave away rather more than he got," we said, but nonetheless "the result cannot be ruled a defeat or a victory for either side."

Ronald Reagan took a strong line against the Soviet Union early in his presidency: in 1983 he dubbed America's Cold War adversary an "evil empire". Two years later, however, he met his new Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, for the first time, and in 1986 they met in Reykjavik to discuss arms control. The talks were far-ranging and ambitious. Reagan pressed Mr Gorbachev on human rights, while Mr Gorbachev insisted on limits to America's missile-defence programme. The two leaders nearly agreed to complete nuclear disarmament, but the talks ultimately failed. Although The Economist thought it probably "a mere stumble on the road", we feared that the failure might have been part of an effort by Mr Gorbachev "to break Western Europe away from America". The former prediction proved correct: the next year, the two countries signed a new arms agreement that, for the first time, saw each country's nuclear arsenals shrink.

The first meeting between the heads of state of divided Korea took place in June 2000. Kim Jong Il, the current supreme leader's father, met the then-South Korean president, Kim Dae-jung, at the airport near Pyongyang. The three-day conference began with the pair holding hands for the 50-minute journey from the airport to the city, as some 600,000 North Koreans lining the route waved at them. Details of an agreement were fleshed out in a follow-up meeting months later. Although The Economist welcomed the rapprochement, we warned that the "summit may have shown people in the South how much more deeply Koreans are divided than the two Germanies were. Because of that, the cost of reconciliation, both financial and emotional, is bound to be far higher." That analysis still holds true today.

Donald Trump has brought his own unorthodox style to his meeting with Kim Jong Un. Just ten months ago he was threatening North Korea with "fire and fury". He now thinks that he can cut a deal with a dictator who has called him a "mentally deranged US dotard". In a startling break from diplomacy-as-normal, no lower-level dialogue or groundwork has preceded the summit in Singapore. Instead, Mr Trump and Mr Kim will face off in a room with just a translator to separate them. Expect fireworks.
Update: June 12th
In Mr Trump's estimation his meeting with Mr Kim was successful. "We had a really fantastic meeting. A lot of progress", Mr Trump effusively reported to the hordes of press. Yet the document the two signed was long on symbolism and extremely short on detail. Mr Trump agreed to halt joint military exercises with South Korea for fear of provoking the North. Mr Kim, for his part, has been rewarded with the propaganda victory of appearing as an equal to an American president. The Economist's take is that "the hard work of turning rhetoric into substance will be left to others" and that "whatever leverage Mr Trump had over Mr Kim a few weeks ago, he has less now."

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THE leaders of North Korea and the United States have never met since Korea was divided in 1953. That drought is set to end on June 12th, when Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un will hold a joint summit in Singapore. The historical record of such groundbreaking get-togethers is mixed.

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This database provides a chronology of North Korea missile launches and nuclear detonations, also reflected in the graphics above. These entries include full flight tests of ballistic and cruise missiles, both successful and unsuccessful, and nuclear tests. It does not include partial tests of missile subsystems such as static engine firings or cold-launch ejection system tests. It also does not show tests of air defense systems, or short-range rocket and artillery firings.

On March 24, North Korea flight tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from a site off its east coast. South Korean authorities announced that the missile, reported elsewhere as the Hwasong-17, reached a maximum altitude of 6,200 km and a range of 1,080 km from its launch site, while Japanese officials stated that the "new...

On February 27, North Korea test fired an unknown short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). The missile was launched from Sunan, located near the capital of Pyongyang, and ranged around 300 km and reached an altitude of 620 km. This launch marks the eighth of its kind this year, with the most recent test taking place on...

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North Korean Missile Launches & Nuclear Tests: 1984-Present | Missile Threat

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This database provides a chronology of North Korea missile launches and nuclear detonations, also reflected in the graphics above. These entries include full flight tests of ballistic and cruise missiles, both successful and unsuccessful, and nuclear tests. It does not include partial tests of missile subsystems such as static engine firings or cold-launch ejection system tests.

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The death of Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia on Feb. 13 eliminates another member of the Kim family, which has ruled North Korea with an iron fist for more than 70 years. Current Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un is suspected to have ordered the murder of his estranged older half-brother, who died en route to the hospital after two women held what police believe to be a poison-soaked rag over his face at Kuala Lumpur International Airport.

It is unclear if there was a direct motive for the 45-year-old's assassination, as he never expressed any desire to overthrow his younger sibling. However, Kim Jong Nam's close ties to Beijing - Pyongyang's increasingly reluctant sponsor - may have vexed the young despot. In any case, his death sheds light on the dysfunctional and murderous dynasty whose tireless pursuit of nuclear weapons could threaten the whole world.

More Must-Reads From TIME

Write to Charlie Campbell at charlie.campbell@time.com.

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A Look At North Korean Dictator Kim Jong Un's Dwindling Family Tree

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The death of Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia on Feb. 13 eliminates another member of the Kim family, which has ruled North Korea with an iron fist for more than 70 years.

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eonmi Park was born in the North Korean city of Hyesan, close to the Chinese border, and brought up in the brutal and paranoid atmosphere of the Kim dictatorships. Aged 13, she and her mother braved the frontier guards and fled to China. In Order to Live, her clear-eyed and devastating autobiography tells of her famine-struck childhood in North Korea, her defection and the years in which she was trafficked around northern China by gangsters running forced marriage and prostitution rackets. She and her mother, finally reunited, travelled across the Gobi desert before reaching freedom. Park is now studying criminal justice in South Korea and working as an activist, most recently speaking at the One Young World summit in Dublin and at the UN Human Rights session on North Korea.

How has seeing your life on the page made you feel? It's a harrowing story.
Until I started to write this book, I didn't know what trauma was, I didn't know what a counsellor did, because in North Korea we don't have these words, we don't have these jobs. I didn't know what post-traumatic stress disorder was and I didn't think I had it. I thought that I was a totally normal person. Until I started writing the book, I just shut my mind off. I couldn't even remember what had happened - a lot of things I had just blacked out. As I started writing it down, I started remembering: writing was a process of remembering.

It was also reliving it. After I wrote the book, when I read it on my own, I could see the order of the story. I said: "Wow, this is what happened and this is how it happened." Because I wrote it not only using my own memory, but using my mother's memory, my sister's memory, using the memories of the people who escaped with us. So lots of people had their input. And it's only now that I feel free. I don't feel like I did before, when something was pushing me down. Now I've written the book all that pressure has gone.

Was there any of your own past that you were tempted to leave there?
Honestly, I was never going to let this story out. I was determined to forget these memories. Now I'm thinking about the fact that - wow! - my grandchildren will read this book. Am I going to have a normal family after this? Someone who will see me and say: "You are not crazy." To know a girl who's been through that, do you really want to be friends with that person? Or be their partner? To me, it was surrendering everything - my privacy, my dignity as a woman who wants to be a normal person.

You write frankly about the way North Korean women in China are treated as "merchandise" by the people traffickers...
There are thousands of people who are going through this and their stories cannot be heard. If you can be more open about this, then it will help others talk about it. In North Korean society, for a woman to admit these kinds of things, it's the end of the world. Our tradition is purity, virginity - for a woman, that is everything. A woman cannot talk about the bad things that happen to her. So writing this did feel like the end of the world for me.

With a few notable exceptions, the men in your story are monsters, exploiting women for gain or pleasure.
For a long time, I lost faith in humanity, especially men. I couldn't imagine that I'd ever see men as normal people and I could never trust them. I couldn't bear any human connection with men. Until recently, I just couldn't do it. It has been six years and there has been no contact with men. It was only when I started writing this book that I refound hope in humanity, and especially in men. It was bad for me to hate men for such a long time, to think they were the worst thing in the world. My father was a man.

Another Holocaust is happening and the west is saying: It isn't happening, it's a joke, it's funny

One man, in particular, stands out - Hongwei. He's a violent gangster, but he also clearly loved you. Do you have mixed emotions about him now? He, after all, helped you escape.
Later, I could understand him in some ways. I thought about this a lot. I was going to kill him. I said I'd never forgive him, that there was nothing he could do to make me feel that he could justify what he did. But people can make mistakes. He'd lost his own parents, he knew what it was to live without your parents, so he knew what I was going through. So I cannot hate him any more, but everything is very complex; I cannot say exactly what I feel.

Will there be a Kim in charge of North Korea in 50 years' time?
Of course we won't let that happen. I'm not going to let that happen. I'll live longer than Kim Jong-un - he's fatter than me. He doesn't like me.

It must be a sign that you're doing something right that the Kim regime feels the need to spread malicious propaganda about you?
That's what I tell myself. Honestly, it's terrifying that one of the most brutal regimes in the world is against me. To them, life means nothing compared with their need for power. Now not only my life is at risk, but all of my relatives' lives are at risk. It's a huge responsibility and it almost made me want to give up the whole project altogether. I'm terrified that they'll do something to my relatives. But I knew what was going on in North Korea and I knew I had to speak about it. It was unacceptable.

Your mother and sister went through journeys as difficult as your own. What did this experience teach you about the importance of family?
Family are everything; everyone understands the strength of family. For me, they were the reason that I managed to get by while I was in captivity and now they are the reason to live in freedom. They are the biggest blessing I have in the world.

You're currently speaking to me from New York. How do you like it there?
I'm still scared about food. In North Korea, hunger means death. Here, hunger just means you go to the corner to buy something. I worry about food. I eat a lot - too much. But one day I will be fully adapted to the free world.

What do you hope people will get from reading your book?
I really hope this book will shine a light on the darkest place in the world. We don't feel like human beings: people don't feel that they can connect with North Koreans, that we're so different. People are making jokes about Kim Jong-un's haircut, about how fat he is - this country is a joke, really. It is a joke, but it is a tragic joke, that this kind of thing can happen to 25 million people. These things shouldn't be allowed to happen to anyone, because another Holocaust is happening and the west is saying: "It isn't happening, it's a joke, it's funny - things can't be that serious." But we are repeating history - there are thousands of testimonies, you can see the concentration camps from satellite photos, so many people are dying. Just listen to my testimony, to the testimonies in front of the United Nations. I just hope people will read the book and will listen.

In order to live by Yeonmi Park (Penguin, £18.99). To order a copy for £13.29, go to bookshop.theguardian.com or call 0330 333 6846. Free UK p&p over £10, online orders only. Phone orders min. p&p of £1.99.

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Yeonmi Park: 'I hope my book will shine a light on the darkest place in the world'

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eonmi Park was born in the North Korean city of Hyesan, close to the Chinese border, and brought up in the brutal and paranoid atmosphere of the Kim dictatorships. Aged 13, she and her mother braved the frontier guards and fled to China.

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There are countless statistics and facts about global poverty on the internet. While this is very helpful in providing readers with a sense of what is happening around the world, it can be overwhelming. Unfortunately, statistics and facts do not adequately reflect the reality of impoverished nations. Thus, many people rely on novels to understand the human experiences within impoverished nations. Poverty in North Korea is unknown to most people, and books are a good way to educate readers.

Storytelling relays information and allows people to collect official data. It allows readers to grasp the reality and emotions of others. According to the BBC, personal experiences are paramount in effectively bringing attention to the significant problems around them. The emotional response readers have serves as a catalyst for aid.

North Korea and Poverty

North Korea is a mysterious and unknown country to many people. Since 1948, its population has reached 25 million. As a result of its economic structure and lack of participation within the world economy, poverty in North Korea is prevalent. Approximately 60% of North Korea's population lives in poverty.

North Korea has a command economy, which is commonplace among communist countries. The government has control over all monetary exchanges, causing the economy to remain relatively stagnant due to a lack of competition between businesses. Additionally, North Korea's trade restrictions and sanctions have deeply hurt the country's economy. As a result, the lack of participation has effectively barred the country from growing within the international market. Its economy is vulnerable to collapse and rates of poverty in North Korea continue to soar. Fortunately, these books below strengthen the fight against global poverty by illustrating the suffering that occurs there and showing why action is needed.

The Girl with Seven Names by Hyeonseo Lee

This novel was published in 2015 and has been universally praised for its ability to convey such deep human emotion in harrowing situations. The Girl With the Seven Names is a biography of the author's experiences in North Korea. It reflects Lee's struggle to escape poverty with her family. In this book, Lee describes the horrid treatments and deplorable conditions that she faced living under the current North Korean regime.

Furthermore, she explains how such experiences have emotionally affected her and those around her. This work provides an inside look into the realities of poverty in North Korea. Additionally, readers are able to better understand the living conditions faced by this country's populace.

The Accusation by Bandi

The Accusation is a series of short stories published between 1989 and 1995. This work is unique being it is not a traditional memoir, rather, it contains small chapters reflecting the everyday lives of those living in poverty in North Korea. The country's secretive nature has made it difficult to acquire information. As such, Bandi's work has become one of the very few sources within the country. Bandi has chosen to live within North Korea in order to continue reporting. The Accusation has been given tremendous praise for its honest writing and its importance as a primary source.

Dear Leader: My Escape from North Korea by Jang Jin-Sung

Dear Leader: My Escape from North Korea is critically acclaimed as an exposé on the way high-ranking officers of North Korea live. Author Jang Jin-Sung was previously the poet laureate to Kim Jong-il. Thus, he obtained access to extremely censored information. In this work, the author and protagonist lend a forbidden magazine to a friend and are forced to flee the country as fugitives. His writing gives an insightful account of how the upper-class lives and how the hierarchical power structure operates.

Additionally, Jin-Sung's novel discloses the political pressure of working close with Kim Jong-il and the harsh consequences of spreading information. Jin-Sung is able to provide an astonishing amount of valuable information for readers to understand the social injustice in North Korea.

How These Books Help

These are only several books that shed light on people's experiences and poverty in North Korea. Fortunately, many NGOs and countries continue to sent food and monetary aid to help those living in poverty. The most prevalent of North Korea's donors are China and South Korea, with China having specifically sent an astonishing 240,074 tons of food to North Korea in 2012. Additionally, the United Nations has received pledges from Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Norway, France, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Ireland to aid in alleviating poverty in North Korea.

Although North Korea appears to be mysterious and secretive, researching the living conditions within this nation is not impossible. Through the primary sources and biographies reflecting life in North Korea, readers are able to understand human struggles which have occurred in this area for over half a century. Acknowledging poverty and understanding the means to provide aid has motivated many to take action today.

Photo: -Stella Vallon
Flickr

Few places in the world have aroused as much curiosity and suspicion as North Korea. Known as the "hermit kingdom," the multiple facets of daily life are secret from the rest of the world, but what is little known about the country paints a very poor economic picture. North Korea's enigmatic persona on the world stage makes any attempt to uncover its true economic standing rather difficult. This could be due to the fact that the nation has not released any statistics to the global community since the 1960s. Also, while the exact numbers regarding North Korea's economy and poverty in North Korea are a mystery, there is still quite a bit the world knows about its economic progress (or lack thereof) and how it is affecting the quality of life of its citizens.

Poverty in North Korea

Firstly, many know that along with North Korea's cult of personality style of governance with Kim Jong-un as its poster boy, it keeps a tight grip on all of the business affairs of the country, resulting in a command economy. As a result, the free market is essentially non-existent with the state determining not only which goods people should produce, but also how and at what price to fix them at. According to the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), "the standard of living has deteriorated to extreme levels...." Even citizens, not fortunate enough to be part of the political or social elite, do not receive the basic necessities of health care and food security.

The KINU has even estimated that poverty in North Korea extends to about half of North Korea's population of 24 million.

North Korea's ironclad grip on its economic and political structures, coupled with its military-centric ideology, makes for a chaotic mix resulting in a struggling population. Even with modest attempts to modernize-including special economic zones, price liberalization and limited transactions with its South Korean neighbor-North Korea still finds itself focused on military and foreign policy. By doing so, it is absorbing much-needed market capital. Also, while North Korea fears that economic liberalization will lead to political and social liberalization, it is unprepared to take the economic risks that its neighbor and ally China has taken to marry its communist politics with a partially free-market economic approach.

Global Scrutiny and Aid

North Korea has faced increased global scrutiny due to its nuclear weapons ambitions, and this has resulted in not only immense political pressure but also crippling economic sanctions. Even with the post-Soviet push for rapid industrialization, North Korea has shown little economic resilience in the face of global disconnection. This has only exacerbated the ripple effect which inevitably leads to its suffering citizens.

Additionally, while the internal systems of the hermit kingdom were not enough to overcome, North Korea finds itself repeatedly on the receiving end of climate change and natural disasters. With alternating and equally devastating periods of both droughts and floods, paired with a government unable to respond, this only aggregates North Korea's agricultural problems.

It is even suffering its worst drought in four decades, according to its state-run media. With a majority of North Koreans relying on crops and livestock for survival, and with the intensity of irregular weather on the horizon, the country could soon find itself in dire straits that it will be unable to shield from the global community.

Even with the multitude of economic, social and political problems North Korea has in front of it, there are still signs that the global community is willing to help eliminate poverty in North Korea. With China and South Korea right along its borders, North Korea has seen help in the form of aid. South Korea has pledged $8 million for aid. China has been even more generous. In 2012, China gave 240,074 tons of rice, more than 80 times what Europe gave North Korea that same year. These pledges signal that some are offering help to lessen the burden of poverty and struggle for the citizens of North Korea, but there is still more that others can and should do.

Photo: - Connor Dobson
Flickr

The amount of people suffering from hunger in North Korea has been on a steady incline since the 1990s. North Korea is home to about 25 million people and 10.5 million of these people are undernourished. While 70 percent of the population relies on food aid, the country's military ambitions have invited harsh sanctions that severely hamper its people.

Roughly a quarter of North Korea's GDP is funneled into helping Kim Jong-Un present a façade of power via nuclear weapons development. The continued missile launches have caused a lessening of support from charities and world leaders, making it even harder for North Koreans to find food.

Because of this, the vulnerable citizens of North Korea are desperately in need of aid. According to a United Nations report, "More predictable funding is urgently required to ensure the immediate needs of the most vulnerable are addressed."

In November 2017, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile. The heightened tensions that resulted instigated the United Nations to respond with new sanctions on the regime's energy supplies.

But while sanctions grip the country in an attempt to incentivize halting nuclear weapons development, the sanctions have also impacted hunger in North Korea. About 60,000 children are at risk of dying due to a lack of food, according to the United Nations Children's Fund. On Tuesday, Jan. 30, 2018, UNICEF launched a $16.5 million emergency relief for North Korea.

President Donald Trump announced new sanctions against North Korea on Friday, Feb. 23, 2018, and called them "the strongest sanctions on Korea that we have ever put on a country." The move puts pressure on North Korea's shipping and trade.

Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said in January that the international sanctions are "really starting to hurt" North Korea and was confident it would lead the regime to negotiate. The sanctions, combined with drought, corruption and a decline in crop production, add to hunger in North Korea more than they prevent weapon development.

The poor farmers of North Korea have, in some instances, resorted to using human waste as fertilizer for their crops, according to the BBC. This practice leads to the contamination of food grown in the soil. Furthermore, in January, a soldier was shot as he defected from North Korea and attempted to run across the demilitarized zone. An autopsy revealed his severe undernourishment, as well as the presence of many parasites in his stomach.

Kim Jong-Un has leveraged the threat of nuclear weapons and military to attain the opportunity to sit down with the President of the United States. All the while, the North Korean people suffer starvation in exchange. Hunger in North Korea will only continue to worsen if other charitable organizations, such as UNICEF, are unable to provide assistance to the nation.
- Sam Bramlett
Photo: Flickr

Refugees and journalists consistently cite dire living conditions in North Korea, one of the most repressive authoritarian nations in the world. Leaking information from the secretive police state, they report firsthand knowledge to outsiders. According to these sources, the North Korean government commits severe human rights abuses against its citizens, and the government can barely feed its own people.

A 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry report cited numerous human rights abuses in North Korea, including murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, forced abortions and sexual violence. The government extracts unquestioning obedience through public executions, arbitrary detention, forced labor, tight travel restrictions and religious persecution. Citizens have no basic freedoms such as the right to expression, assembly, political opposition or independent media. A sociopolitical stratification system divides North Koreans into three classes: "loyal," "wavering" and "hostile."

The specter of prison is one means of keeping the population in line. North Korea's draconian three generations rule punishes the entire immediate family if one member is convicted of a serious crime. The next two generations born in the camp are then detained there for life. Existence in the camps is extreme. Clothing and food are so scarce that prisoners survive on rats and anything else they can catch. Inmates are frequently left stunted and deformed from long hours of hard labor. Twelve-hour days, seven days a week is the normal work schedule.

Life outside of the prison camps has its own grave challenges. Living conditions in North Korea are characterized by deprivation. The elite ruling class enjoys basic benefits of modern life such as indoor plumbing, cars, meat, coffee and a few luxury items. The middle class receives sufficient food and occasional new clothes. Most people, however, struggle to survive. Half of the nation's 24 million people live in extreme poverty. North Korea's annual GDP per capita is $1,800, making it 197th in the world and only 2 percent of South Korea's.

One-third of North Korean children are stunted from malnutrition. For most people, meat is an unaffordable luxury. They subsist on fermented cabbage known as kimchi, rice, corn and porridge. Most homes are heated by open fireplaces, and many have no flush toilets. Electricity, for those fortunate enough to have it, is unreliable and sporadic. Power might be available for only a few hours each day. Frequently, cell phones are used as flashlights during outages.

Theoretically, education and healthcare are free in North Korea. However, school children must provide financially for desks, chairs, building materials and heat. Patients must provide their own medications, pay for heat and cook their own meals at home.

Still, living conditions in North Korea are showing some improvement, particularly for the elite who are privileged enough to reside in the capital of Pyongyang. According to the South Korea Central Bank, the North Korean economy grew by almost 4 percent in 2016. Despite spotty service and no internet, there are now 1.5 million mobile phone users. Even in smaller cities outside of Pyongyang, electric bikes from China and Japan can be seen mingling with the country's ubiquitous bicycles.

In Pyongyang, people are buying smartphones, tablets, hi-fi speakers and HDTVs. With the exception of accessing the internet, North Korean smartphones have similar capacities to those in other nations. In place of the internet, citizens use a state-controlled intranet. There are North Korean versions of Google, Facebook, chat rooms and online dating. Food courts in Pyongyang malls offer American-style fast food restaurants serving milkshakes and French fries. Skating rinks opened in 2013, ushering in a rollerblading craze for those wealthy enough to afford skates.

Despite difficult living conditions in North Korea, its people make the best of their circumstances. In some ways, their lives are not so different from those in democratic countries. North Koreans play video games and beach volleyball. They enjoy picnics complete with food, beer and karaoke. And of course, their teenagers take lots of selfies. Hope remains that the situation can improve so that all of its people can enjoy the living conditions that its wealthiest citizens currently do.
- Anna Parker
Photo: Flickr

North Korea is constantly in the news due to its nuclear tests programs. The majority of state funds are spent on its nuclear program while social institutions are overlooked. Millions suffer from extreme poverty in North Korea as a result.

10 Leading Facts on Poverty in North Korea

1. The poverty line. Forty percent of the population, about 24 million people, live below the poverty line. Most workers earn $2 to $3 per month. The standard of living has deteriorated to extreme levels of deprivation while the average life expectancy has fallen by five years since early the 1980s.

2. Food shortages. With the prevalent poverty in North Korea, food shortages are widespread. A famine that started in the 1990s had a lasting effect, forcing the country to become reliant on international aid to feed its people. However, since 2009 food assistance has declined significantly. A study by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization found that 84% of households have "borderline or poor food consumption." The food crises had resulted in thousands of deaths. According to the World Food Programme, one-third of children are stunted due to malnutrition and the infant mortality rate is 33%. Due to the government's "two meals a day campaign" food riots are a common occurrence.

3. The giant rabbit feeding program. In order to solve the widespread food shortages, Kim Jun-il began to breed giant overweight rabbits in 2007. He got this idea after seeing Karl Szmolinsky, a German rabbit breeder, breed the world's largest rabbit. Szmolinsky sent overweight rabbits to North Korea but the experiment turned out to be a failure when it was suspected Kim was eating the rabbits himself.

4. Human feces government program. Farming fertilizers used to be imported from South Korea. However, South Korea stopped sending them in 2008. The government, therefore, created a program where farmers had to use their own feces as fertilizers. Factory workers have to meet a quota of two tons of human feces.

5. Right to health is denied. Although the country declares that healthcare is free, residents are denied medical treatment unless they can pay the high prices for medicine.

6. Military programs use most of the funds. North Korea spends a lot of its funds on the military. In 2001, the country spent more than $5 billion on military spending alone, which is more than 30% of the country's GDP. North Korea is believed to have around half a dozen nuclear weapons.

7. Despite high poverty rates, the leader is worth $5 billion. According to the 2011 corruption index from Transparency International, North Korea is officially the world's most corrupt country. It is estimated that Kim inherited $4 billion from his father. According to a South Korean news organization, he is worth as much $5 billion. The money is held in secret accounts in European banks and comes from counterfeiting, the sales of narcotics and other illegal endeavors. Kim also spends vast amounts of money on luxury goods. It is reported he spent $645.8 million in 2012.

8. Refugees who are caught are sent to prison labor camps. Leaving the country without official permission is a crime. The government uses the threat of detention and forced labor as repercussions for disobedience. Many families flee to China to seek refuge overseas. However, those that are caught are sent to political prisoner camps. The camps carry out systemic abuse. Death rates at these camps are reportedly very high. U.S. and South Korean officials estimate that between 80,000 to 120,000 people are imprisoned in these camps.

9. Crystal meth epidemic. North Korea suffers a widespread meth epidemic. To negate the horrid economy with little to no government help, the production of drugs is used as an economic stimulus. In 2000, North Korean factories began to produce methamphetamine. This caused an increase in the domestic use of meth. The drug is now very occurrence and is seen as something of a luxury. As a result, many North Koreans have become addicted to the drug. It is estimated that 80% of residents have used the drug while 40% are addicted.

10. The satire film "The Interview" gets a lot right. According to an expert, the film gets a lot right, specifically the psychology of North Korea. Visitors to Pyongyang in the famine years used to describe supermarkets that displayed plastic produce, just as is portrayed in the film.

Kim Jong Un's rise to power is seen as a threat to western political leaders. However, the international community has begun to focus on North Korea's human rights violations and poverty in the country.

- Marcelo Guadiana

Photo: Flickr

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Poverty in North Korea - The Borgen Project

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There are countless statistics and facts about global poverty on the internet. While this is very helpful in providing readers with a sense of what is happening around the world, it can be overwhelming. Unfortunately, statistics and facts do not adequately reflect the reality of impoverished nations.

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Timeline: North Korean Nuclear Negotiations

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Negotiations between the United States and North Korea have proceeded in fits and starts for decades. But they have failed to halt the advance of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

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Juche (, JOO-chay; Korean: ), officially the Juche idea, is the state ideology of North Korea and the official ideology of the Workers' Party of Korea. North Korean sources attribute its conceptualization to Kim Il Sung, the country's founder and first leader. Juche was originally regarded as a variant of Marxism-Leninism until Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung's son and successor, declared it a distinct ideology in the 1970s. Kim Jong Il further developed Juche in the 1980s and 1990s by making ideological breaks from Marxism-Leninism and increasing the importance of his father's ideas.

Juche incorporates the historical materialist ideas of Marxism-Leninism but also strongly emphasizes the individual, the nation state, and national sovereignty. Juche posits that a country will prosper once it has become self-reliant by achieving political, economic, and military independence. As Kim Jong Il emerged as Kim Il Sung's likely successor in the 1970s, loyalty to the leader was increasingly emphasized as an essential part of Juche, as expressed in the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System.

Juche has been variously described by critics as a quasi-religion, a nationalist or fascistic ideology, and a deviation from Marxism-Leninism.

Juche comes from the Sino-Japanese word ( modern spelling: ), whose Japanese reading is shutai. The word was coined in 1887 to translate the concept of in German philosophy ( subject, meaning "the entity perceiving or acting upon an object or environment") into Japanese. The word migrated to the Korean language at around the turn of the century and retained this meaning. Shutai went on to appear in Japanese translations of Karl Marx's writings. North Korean editions of Marx used the word Juche even before the word was attributed to Kim Il Sung in its supposedly novel meaning in 1955.

In contemporary political discourse on North Korea, Juche has a connotation of "self-reliance", "autonomy", and "independence". It is often defined in opposition to the Korean concept of , or reliance on the great powers. South Koreans use the word without reference to the North Korean ideology.

The ideology is officially known as Juche sasang () in Korean and the Juche idea in English. Juche sasang literally means " subject idea" and has also been translated as Juche thought or Jucheism. Adherents of Juche are sometimes referred to as "Jucheists".

Official statements by the North Korean government attribute the origin of Juche to Kim Il Sung's experiences in the Down-with-Imperialism Union during Korea's liberation struggle against Japan. However, the first documented reference to Juche as an ideology did not appear until 1955, when Kim Il Sung delivered a speech entitled " On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work". The speech had been delivered to promote a political purge similar to the earlier Yan'an Rectification Movement in China. It later became known as the " Juche speech" and is considered one of Kim Il Sung's most important works.

Western scholars generally agree that Hwang Jang-yop, Kim Il Sung's top adviser on philosophy, was the actual person responsible for the conceptualization and early development of Juche. Hwang rediscovered the Juche speech sometime in the late 1950s, when Kim Il Sung, having established a cult of personality, sought to develop his own version of Marxism-Leninism and solidify his position within the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Hwang subsequently expanded upon the meaning of Juche and rewrote Korean communist history to make it appear as though Kim Il Sung had been the WPK's leader since its inception. Andrei Lankov, a Russian scholar of Korean studies, argues that the first reference to Juche as an ideology did not come until 14 April 1965, when Kim Il Sung gave a speech in Indonesia entitled "On Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the South Korean Revolution" (조선민주주의인민공화국에서의사회주의건설과남조선혁명에대하여 ). Lankov posits that the 1955 speech "used the word in a different meaning" and that Juche was not adopted as the "basic ideological principle of North Korean politics" until after the 1965 speech.

On the Juche Idea, the principal work on Juche, was published under Kim Jong Il's name in 1982. In North Korea it serves as "the authoritative and comprehensive explanation of Juche". According to the treatise, the WPK is responsible for educating the masses in the ways of Juche thinking. Juche is inexorably linked with Kim Il Sung and "represents the guiding idea of the Korean revolution". Although Juche has its roots in Marxism-Leninism, it is not merely a creative application of the ideas of Marx and Lenin to Korean conditions. Rather, it is a "new phase of revolutionary theory" and represents "a new era in the development of human history". Kim Jong Il also criticized the Korean communists and nationalists of the 1920s for their "elitist posture", claiming that they were "divorced from the masses".

The North Korean government issued a decree on 8 July 1997, the third anniversary of the death of Kim Il Sung, declaring the adoption of the Juche calendar. The Central People's Committee subsequently promulgated regulations regarding its use in August 1997, and the calendar entered public usage on 9 September 1997, the Day of the Foundation of the Republic. Gregorian calendar dates are used for years before 1912 while years from 1912 (the year of Kim Il Sung's birth) onwards are described as " Juche years". The Gregorian year 2024, for example, is " Juche 113" as 2024 − 1911 = 113. When used, " Juche years" are often accompanied by the Gregorian equivalent, i.e. " Juche 113, 2024" or " Juche 113 (2024)".

Core principles

The goal of Juche is to establish a self-reliant state which independently determines its political, economic, and military affairs. Kim Il Sung summarized the application of this objective to North Korea in a 1967 speech to the Supreme People's Assembly entitled "Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-sustenance and Self-defence More Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activity":

First, the government of the republic will implement with all consistency the line of independence, self-sufficiency, and self-defence to consolidate the political independence of the country, build up more solidly the foundations of an independent national economy capable of insuring the complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation and increasing the country's defence capabilities, so as to safeguard the security of the fatherland reliably by our own force, by splendidly embodying our party's idea of Juche in all fields.

Political independence (; jaju) is a core principle of Juche. Juche stresses equality and mutual respect among nations, asserting that every state has the right to self-determination. Yielding to foreign pressure or intervention would violate the principle of political independence and threaten a country's ability to defend its sovereignty. This is in contrast to (), which advocates reliance on a great power. Juche, however, does not advocate total isolation and encourages cooperation between socialist states. As Kim Jong Il summarizes in his work On the Juche Idea: "Independence is not in conflict with internationalism but is the basis of its strengthening". Kim Il Sung acknowledged that it was important for North Korea to learn from other socialist states, in particular the Soviet Union and China, but he did not want to follow their examples dogmatically. In this regard, Kim Il Sung said that the WPK needed to "resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically", attributing the early success of North Korea to the WPK's independence in policymaking.

Economic self-sufficiency (; jarip) is required to achieve political independence, according to adherents of Juche. Kim Il Sung believed that excessive foreign aid threatened a country's ability to develop socialism, which only a state with a strong, independent economy could build. In his work On the Juche Idea, Kim Jong Il argued that a state can only achieve economic self-sufficiency once it has created an "independent national economy" based on heavy industry, as this sector would theoretically drive the rest of the economy. Kim Jong Il also emphasized the importance of technological independence and self-sufficiency in resources. However, he stated that this did not rule out "economic cooperation" between socialist states.

Military self-reliance (; jawi) is also crucial for a state to maintain its political independence. To accomplish military self-reliance, states must develop a domestic defence industry to avoid dependence on foreign arms suppliers. Kim Jong Il argued that it was acceptable for socialist states to receive military aid from their allies, but such aid would only be effective if the state is militarily strong in its own right.

North Korea maintained close relations with the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, having emerged from Soviet occupation and a war which it fought alongside Chinese communists. However, North Korea also opposed what it viewed as Soviet and Chinese attempts to interfere in its post-war affairs. For example, a failed challenge against Kim Il Sung's leadership in 1956 led to the purge of both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements from the WPK. Although North Korea rejected the de-Stalinization efforts of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, it avoided taking sides during the Sino-Soviet split.

North Korea was admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement in 1975 and has since presented itself as a leader of the Third World, promoting Juche as a model for developing countries to follow.

National survival has been seen as a guiding principle of North Korea's diplomatic strategy. As countries in the Eastern Bloc collapsed and introduced market reforms, North Korea increasingly emphasized Juche in both theory and practice. Even in the midst of economic and political crises, North Korea continues to emphasize its independence on the world stage.

After the devastation of the Korean War, North Korea began to rebuild its economy with a base in heavy industry, with the aim of becoming as self-sufficient as possible. As a result, North Korea developed what has been called the "most autarkic industrial economy in the world". While North Korea received economic aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and China, it did not join Comecon, the communist common market. In the 1990s, it had one of the world's lowest rates for dependence on petroleum, using hydroelectric power and coal instead of imported oil. Its textile industry uses vinylon, known as the " Juche fiber", which was invented by a Korean and which is made from locally available coal and limestone. The history of the development of vinylon often featured in propaganda that preached the virtues of technological self-reliance. North Korea had 10,000 CNC machines in 2010. The first domestic homemade CNC machine was introduced in 1995 and in 2017 it has around 15,000 machines.

Commentators have often pointed out the discrepancy between the principle of self-sufficiency and North Korea's dependence on foreign aid, especially during its economic crisis in the 1990s. The pursuit of economic autarky has been blamed for contributing to the crisis. On this view, attempts at self-sufficiency led to inefficiency and to the neglect of export opportunities in industries where there was a comparative advantage.

The Korean People's Army is one of the largest on earth and has developed its own nuclear missiles. It produces UDMH fuel for liquid fuelled missiles and Tumansky RD-9 Turbojet engines, which power the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19 and Shenyang J-6. CNC machines are used for production of missiles and centrifuges. North Korea's propaganda since the Korean War has contrasted its military autonomy with the presence of U.S. forces in the South.

Tribute plaques to Juche from foreign delegates, contained in the interior entrance of the Juche Tower

Kim Il Sung believed that Juche's principles could be applied around the world, not just in Korea. North Korea has organized international seminars on Juche since 1976. The International Scientific Seminar on the Juche Idea took place in Antananarivo, Madagascar, from 28 to 30 September 1976 under the sponsorship of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. Many prominent party and government officials, public figures, representatives of revolutionary and progressive organizations, scientists and journalists from more than fifty countries attended. Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka expressed strong sympathies and support for North Korea. An excerpt from the opening speech says:

Regardless of the opposition forces, the determination of the people and their strength and conviction are not measured by territorial dimensions, possession of advanced technology, still less, opulence or riches. For those who wish to forget the lesson of history so easily and so quickly, Algeria, Vietnam, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola - and closer to us - Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Azania are excellent examples which make them deeply reflect on. What we want is not the perfection of political independence alone. The evil forces craftily manipulate the economic levers in order to perpetuate their supremacy and reduce us to vassals and eternal mendicants.

The North Korean government established the International Institute of the Juche Idea (initially the International Juche Research Centre) in Tokyo in 1978 in order to supervise the activities of international Juche study groups. Tribute plaques from these groups are contained in the Juche Tower in Pyongyang. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Black Panther Party of the United States studied Juche. In 2016, the Nepal Workers' and Peasants' Party declared Juche its guiding idea.

A number of far-right groups have also adopted Juche. The Order of Nine Angles-affiliated Rural People's Party adheres to Juche and reportedly has connections with North Korean officials. The Atomwaffen Division also promotes Juche.

Propaganda art promoting Songun. The Korean text reads, "Long live the great victory of military-first (Songun) politics!"

Songun (; Sŏn'gun chŏngch'i; lit. military-first politics) was first mentioned on 7 April 1997 in Rodong Sinmun under the headline "There Is a Victory for Socialism in the Guns and Bombs of the People's Army" (인민군대의 총창우에 사회주의의 승리가 있다 ). Its description in the article echoed the military-centered thinking of the time: "[ Songun is] the revolutionary philosophy to safeguard our own style of socialism under any circumstances". The concept was credited to Kim Jong Il, who posited that Songun was the next stage of development of Juche.

A joint editorial () entitled "Our Party's Military-First Politics Will Inevitably Achieve Victory and Will Never Be Defeated" (우리 당의 선군정치는 필승불패이다 ) was published by Kulloja and Rodong Sinmun (the WPK's theoretical magazine and newspaper, respectively) on 16 June 1999. In it, it was stated that Songun meant "the leadership method under the principle of giving priority to the military and resolving the problems that may occur in the course of revolution and construction as well as establishing the military as the main body of the revolution in the course of achieving the total tasks of socialism". While the article often referred to "our Party", this was not a reference to the WPK but rather to the personal leadership of Kim Jong Il.

The National Defence Commission, the highest military body, was designated the supreme body of the state by a 1998 revision of the North Korean Constitution. The Songun era is considered to have begun with this revision.

In late 2021, Kim Jong Un declared that the "military-first" politics of Songun would be replaced by "people-first politics" () guided by himself.

Visitors of the Mansu Hill Grand Monument in Pyongyang bow to massive bronze statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

Suryong (; Suryŏng hyŏngsang ch'angjo; lit. creation of the lead figure) is a revolutionary theory concerning the relationship between leadership and society. Unlike Marxism-Leninism, which considers developments in the material conditions of production and exchange as the driving force of historical progress (known as historical materialism), Juche considers human beings in general the driving force in history. It is summarized as "the popular masses are placed in the center of everything, and the leader is the center of the masses". Juche, North Korea maintains, is a "man-centered ideology" in which "man is the master of everything and decides everything". In contrast to Marxism-Leninism, in which a people's decisions are conditioned by their relations to the means of production, Juche argues that people's decisions take consideration of, but are independent from, external factors. Just like Marxism-Leninism, Juche believes history is law-governed, but that it is only man who drives progress, stating that "the popular masses are the drivers of history". The process for the masses to reach consciousness, independence, and creativity requires the "leadership of a great leader". Marxism-Leninism argues that the popular masses will lead (on the basis of their relation to production), but in North Korea the role of a correct leadership is required to organize a unified and effective group. South Korean political scientist Lee Kyo-duk argues that Suryong helped Kim Il Sung establish a unitary system over North Korea.

The theory says the leader has a decisive role as an absolute supreme leader. The leader is like the brain of the working class, who is the driving force of revolution. The leader is also a flawless human being who never commits mistakes, who guides the masses. The popular masses are the driving force of history, but they require the guidance of the party leadership.

Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism

Kimilsungism () and the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System were formally introduced by Kim Jong Il in 1974. Kim Jong Il reportedly did so to strengthen his position within the WPK, taking advantage of his father's political supremacy. Kimilsungism refers to the ideas of Kim Il Sung, while the Ten Principles serve as a guide for North Korean political and social life. Kim Jong Il argued that his father's ideas had evolved and they therefore deserved their own distinct name. North Korean state media had previously described Kim Il Sung's ideas as "contemporary Marxism-Leninism"; by calling them "Kimilsungism", Kim Jong Il sought to elevate the ideas of his father to the same level of prestige as Stalinism and Maoism. Not long after the introduction of "Kimilsungism" into the North Korean lexicon, Kim Jong Il began calling for a "Kimilsungist transformation" of North Korean society.

Political analyst Lim Jae-cheon argues that there is no discernible difference between Kimilsungism and Juche, and that the two terms are interchangeable. However, in his 1976 speech "On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsungism", Kim Jong Il said that Kimilsungism comprises the " Juche idea and a far-reaching revolutionary theory and leadership method evolved from this idea". He further added that "Kimilsungism is an original idea that cannot be explained within the frameworks of Marxism-Leninism. The Juche idea, which constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism, is an idea newly discovered in the history of mankind". Kim Jong Il went further, stating that Marxism-Leninism had become obsolete and must be replaced by Kimilsungism:

The revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a revolutionary theory which has provided solutions to problems arising in the revolutionary practice in a new age different from the era that gave rise to Marxism-Leninism. On the basis of Juche idea, the leader gave a profound explanation of the theories, strategies and tactics of national liberation, class emancipation and human liberations in our era. Thus, it can be said that the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a perfect revolutionary theory of Communism in the era of Juche.

According to analyst Shin Gi-wook, the ideas of Juche and Kimilsungism are in essence the "expressions of North Korean particularism over supposedly more universalistic Marxism-Leninism". The new terminology signalled a move from socialism to nationalism. This was evident in a speech presented by Kim Jong Il in 1982, during celebrations of his father's 70th birthday, in which he stated that love for the nation came before love for socialism. This particularism gave birth to such concepts as "A Theory of the Korean Nation as Number One" () and "Socialism of Our Style" ().

Following the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, Kimilsungism became Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism () at the 4th Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea in April 2012. Party members at the conference also stated that the WPK was "the party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il" and declared Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism "the only guiding idea of the party". Afterwards, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that "the Korean people have long called the revolutionary policies ideas of the President [Kim Il Sung] and Kim Jong Il as Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and recognized it as the guiding of the nation". Kim Jong Un, the son of Kim Jong Il who succeeded him as leader of the WPK, said:

Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is an integral system of the idea, theory and method of Juche and a great revolutionary ideology representative of the Juche era. Guided by Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, we should conduct Party building and Party activities, so as to sustain the revolutionary character of our Party and advance the revolution and construction in line with the ideas and intentions of the President [Kim Il Sung] and the General [Kim Jong Il].

"Socialism of Our Style" (), also referred to as "Korean-style socialism" and "our-style socialism" within North Korea, is an ideological concept Kim Jong Il introduced on 27 December 1990 in the speech "Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied by the Juche Idea" (우리 나라 사회주의는 주체 사상을 구현한 우리식 사회주의이다 ). Speaking after the Revolutions of 1989 that brought down the Eastern Bloc countries, Kim Jong Il explicitly stated that North Korea needed - and survived because of - Socialism of Our Style. He argued that socialism in Eastern Europe failed because they "imitated the Soviet experience in a mechanical manner". According to Kim, they failed to understand that the Soviet experience was based on specific historical and social circumstances and could not be used by other countries aside from the Soviet Union itself. He added that "if experience is considered absolute and accepted dogmatically it is impossible to build Socialism properly, as the times change and the specific situation of each country is different from another". Kim Jong Il went on to criticize "dogmatic application" of Marxism-Leninism, stating:

Marxism-Leninism presented a series of opinions on building of Socialism and Communism, but it confined itself to presupposition and hypothesis owing to the limitations of the conditions of their ages and practical experiences... But many countries applied the principles of Marxist-Leninist materialistic conception of history dogmatically, failing to advance revolution continually after the establishment of the socialist system.

North Korea would not encounter such difficulties because of the conceiving of Juche. In his words, North Korea was "a backward, colonial semifeudal society" when the communists took over, but since the North Korean communists did not accept Marxism, which was based on European experiences with capitalism, or Leninism, which was based on Russia's experience, they conceived of Juche. He believed that the situation in North Korea was more complex because of the American presence in nearby South Korea. Thanks to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il argued, the revolution had "put forward original lines and policies suited to our people's aspirations and the specific situation of our country". "The Juche idea is a revolutionary theory which occupies the highest stage of development of the revolutionary ideology of the working class", Kim Jong Il said, further stating that the originality and superiority of the Juche idea defined and strengthened Korean socialism. He then conceded by stating that Socialism of Our Style was "a man-centered Socialism", explicitly making a break with basic Marxist-Leninist thought, which argues that material forces are the driving force of historical progress, not people. Socialism of Our Style was presented as an organic sociopolitical theory, using the language of Marxism-Leninism, saying:

The political and ideological might of the motive force of revolution is nothing but the power of single-hearted unity between the leader, the Party, and the masses. In our socialist society, the leader, the Party, and the masses throw in their lot with one another, forming a single socio-political organism. The consolidation of blood relations between the leader, the Party and the masses is guaranteed by the single ideology and united leadership.

Juche has been described by critics as a nationalist ideology and a departure from Marxist-Leninist principles. American Koreanist Brian Reynolds Myers goes further and argue that Juche has more in common with Japanese fascism and ultranationalism than Marxism-Leninism. Korean political scientist Suh Dae-sook argues that Kim Il Sung failed to explain the difference between socialist patriotism, which Kim Il Sung stated that he supported, and nationalism, which Kim Il Sung stated that he opposed. Suh also criticized Kim Il Sung's initial conceptualization of Juche, saying that he had failed to explain how Marxism-Leninism had been applied to Korean conditions. American historian Derek R. Ford, by contrast, emphasizes the continuity between Marxism-Leninism and Juche, and credits Juche as the unique guiding principle which allowed North Korea to survive the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.

American historian Charles K. Armstrong argues that North Korea may appear "Stalinist in form" but is "nationalist in content". Shin Gi-wook similarly argues that "there is no trace of Marxism-Leninism or the Stalinist notion of nationhood" in North Korea, and its government instead stresses the importance of the Korean people's blood, soul, and national traits, echoing earlier Korean nationalists such as Sin Chaeho, Yi Kwangsu and Choe Namson. Shin believes that the key difference between Marxism-Leninism and Juche is that the latter places the primacy of ideology over materialism; the vocabulary of family lineage and nationalism is retained and given primacy over class struggle, while social distinction and hierarchy are supported instead of a classless society and egalitarianism.

A few critics have dismissed the notion that Juche is an ideology altogether. Myers argues that Juche cannot be described as a true political ideology because it does not have an underlying belief system, while Alzo David-West describes it as "meaningless on logical and naturalistic grounds". American political analyst Robert E. Kelly argues that Juche exists solely to protect the Kim family's monopoly over political power in North Korea. However, Myers dismisses the idea that Juche is North Korea's leading ideology, regarding its public exaltation as being designed to deceive foreigners. He argues that it exists to be praised and not actually read. Based on his own experiences living in North Korea, Swiss businessman Felix Abt describes Myers' arguments as "shaky" and "questionable". Having seen the extent to which North Korean university students actually believe in Juche, Abt says it is "rather absurd" to describe the ideology as "window-dressing" for foreigners. American historian Bruce Cumings and Professor of International Relations Christoph Bluth similarly argue that Juche is not mere rhetoric, but rather an ideal of self-reliance that North Korea has attempted to put into practice.

Juche has been compared to Ba'athism, an Arab nationalist ideology which advocates the establishment of a unified Arab state based on socialism and national self-reliance. South Korean political commentator Park Sang-seek argues that Syrian Ba'athism in particular has rhetorical similarities to Juche, but the latter has a stronger ideological basis.

A number of scholars have compared facets of Juche to those of pre-existing religions in Korea. Jung Tae-il argues that certain elements of Christianity, Cheondoism, and Confucianism were appropriated by and incorporated into Juche. Korean cultural anthropologists Byung Ho Chung and Heonik Kwon liken the commemorations of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il to Confucian ancestor worship. Ju Jun-hui similarly contends that Korean shamanism also influenced the development of Juche, comparing the ecstatic state experienced in a shamanic ritual (gut) to the enthusiasm and fervor displayed by North Koreans for their supreme leader. Armstrong accordingly describes Juche as a quasi-religion.

The ideology teaches that the role of a Great Leader is essential for the popular masses to succeed in their revolutionary movement because without leadership they are unable to survive. This is the foundation of the personality cult directed at Kim Il Sung. The personality cult explains how the Juche ideology has been able to endure until today, even during the North Korean government's undeniable dependence on foreign assistance during its famine in the 1990s. The concept of a "sacred leader" in Juche as well as the cult around the Kim family has been compared to the State Shinto ideology of Imperial Japan in which the Emperor was seen as a divine being.

Through the fundamental belief in the essential role of the Great Leader, the former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung has become the "supreme deity for the people" and the Juche doctrine is reinforced in North Korea's constitution as the country's guiding principle. The parallel relationship structure between Kim Il Sung and his people to religious founders or leaders and their followers has led many scholars to consider Juche a religious movement as much as a political ideology. However, those familiar with cults would again posit that Juche bypasses the tenets of religion completely and instead meets the criteria of a totalitarian cult.

Juche's emphasis on the political and sacred role of the leader and the ensuing worshipping by the popular masses has been critiqued by various Western Marxist intellectuals. They argue that the North Korean working class or the proletariat has been stripped of their honour and therefore call the cult of personality non-Marxist and non-democratic.

The religious behaviour of Juche can also be seen in the perspectives of the North Korean people through refugee interviews from former participants in North Korea's ritual occasions. One pertinent example is the Arirang Festival, which is a gymnastics and artistic festival held in the Rungrado May Day Stadium in Pyongyang. All components of the festival, from the selection of performers, mobilization of resources, recruitment of the audience and publicity for the show have been compared to facets of a national religious event.

The Arirang Festival has been described to demonstrate the power of the North Korean government to arrange a form of religious gathering. It has done so by "appropriating a mass of bodies for calisthenic and performative arts representing the leader as the father and his faithful followers". The festival's effectiveness in transforming its participants into loyal disciples of Juche seems to originate from the collectivist principle of "one for all and all for one" and the ensuing emotional bond and loyalty to the leader. According to the accounts of refugees who have been recruited to mass gymnastics, the collectivist principle has been nurtured through physical punishment such as beatings and more importantly the organization of recruits into small units, whose performances were held accountable by larger units. The festival's ritual components of collectivism serve to reinforce a "certain structure of sociality and affect", establishing Kim Il Sung as the "father" in both the body and psyche of the performers.

American historian Charles K. Armstrong argues that familism has transformed itself into a kind of political religion in the form of Juche. With the emergence of Juche as North Korea's guiding political principle since the 1960s, the familial relationship within the micro-family unit has been translated into a national, macro-unit with Kim Il Sung representing the father figure and the North Korean people representing his children. Juche is thus based on the language of family relationships with its East Asian or neo-Confucian "resonances of filial piety and maternal love".

Armstrong also notes that North Korea has actually transferred the " filial piety of nationalism in the family of the leader himself" by positioning Kim Il Sung as the universal patriarch. He argues that while the official pursuit of the Juche ideology in the 1960s signalled North Korea's desire to separate from the "fraternity of international socialism", the ideology also replaced Stalin as the father figure with Kim Il Sung. In effect, North Korea's familial nationalism has supplanted the "rather abstract, class-oriented language of socialism with a more easily understandable and identifiable language of familial connections, love and obligations".

After attaining significant positions in the WPK and military in the early 1980s, Kim Jong Il transformed the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung into a family cult and became the heir apparent. Armstrong calls this a "family romance", which is a term Freud had used to describe "the neurotic replacement of a child's real parents with fantasy substitutes". Kim Il Sung's consecration as the "Great Father" has been strengthened by the development of the North Korean family romance with the language, symbols, and rituals associated with familism.

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Juche (, JOO-chay ; Korean: ), officially the Juche idea, is the state ideology of North Korea and the official ideology of the Workers' Party of Korea. North Korean sources attribute its conceptualization to Kim Il Sung, the country's founder and first leader.

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Agreed Framework (US & DPRK nuke treaty)

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Agreed Framework (US & DPRK nuke treaty)

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, Contact: Kelsey Davenport Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

On Oct. 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an agreement- the Agreed Framework-calling upon Pyongyang to freeze operation and construction of nuclear reactors suspected of being part of a covert nuclear weapons program in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors. The agreement also called upon the United States to supply North Korea with fuel oil pending construction of the reactors. An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was formed to implement the agreement.

The Agreed Framework ended an 18-month crisis during which North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), under which North Korea committed not to develop nuclear weapons. (See ACA's Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy for more information on U.S.-North Korean nuclear relations.)

The Agreed Framework succeeded in temporarily freezing North Korea's plutonium production capabilities and placing it under IAEA safeguards by freezing operation of North Korea's 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon and stopping construction of two other reactors - a 50 MWe reactor at Yongbyon and a 200 MWe reactor at Taechon. In 2003, former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard concluded that without the Agreed Framework, North Korea could have as many as 100 nuclear weapons in 2003.
Agreed Framework Breakdown
Following North Korea's 1998 Taepodong missile test, the Clinton administration, with the assistance of former Secretary of Defense William Perry, conducted a North Korea policy review, which recommended building additional agreements on top of the Agreed Framework. However, just before the Clinton administration could reach an additional agreement with North Korea, President Bush was elected and began his own North Korea policy review, which stretched into 2002.

Although the Bush administration review initially also called for further negotiations, before it could release the review, U.S. intelligence sources revealed that North Korea's centrifuge program was pursuing technology for a uranium enrichment program, which would produce material for nuclear weapons.

Rather than confront the North Koreans and demand they halt their efforts to create a uranium enrichment capability, the intelligence findings gave those in the Bush administration who opposed the Agreed Framework a reason to abandon it. John Bolton, then- undersecretary of state for arms control and international security under President Bush, later wrote that " this was the hammer I had been looking for to shatter the Agreed Framework."

At the behest of the Bush administration, KEDO announced Nov. 21, 2003 that it would suspend construction of the two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea for one year beginning Dec. 1. The suspension came in response to Pyongyang's failure to meet "the conditions necessary for continuing" the project, according to the KEDO announcement.

KEDO further stated that the project's future "will be assessed and decided by [its] Executive Board before the expiration of the suspension period." But a Department of State spokesperson said several days earlier that there is "no future for the project."

Furthermore, Washington announced that Pyongyang admitted during an Oct. 4, 2002 bilateral meeting to possessing a uranium-enrichment program, which could be used to build nuclear weapons and would violate North Korea's commitment to forgo the acquisition of such weapons. North Korea initially denied that it said this, but later admitted to the existence of such a program when confronted with new evidence by U.S. officials. In response to the admission, KEDO suspended oil shipments to North Korea the next month. North Korea reacted Dec. 12 by announcing that it would restart the nuclear facilities governed by the Agreed Framework.

After a series of exchanges with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA inspectors left the country Dec. 31 after Pyongyang expelled them. North Korea announced Jan. 10, 2003, that it was withdrawing from the NPT, effective the next day. Pyongyang's official status with the treaty remains ambiguous.

The construction of the future light-water reactors was far behind schedule. The first reactor was initially slated for completion in 2003 but was not likely to be operational until 2008 at the earliest. Numerous events-most notably North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 missile test-firing in 1998-strained relations between Washington and Pyongyang, resulting in the construction delays.

The agreement ultimately broke down, and negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program shifted to a larger process known as the Six Party Talks, which also included South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the United States.

Terms of the Agreed Framework
Joint U.S.-North Korean Obligations:

The United States and North Korea committed to move toward normalizing economic and political relations, including by reducing barriers to investment, opening liaison offices, and ultimately exchanging ambassadors.

The Clinton administration made some progress on fulfilling this aspect of the framework toward the end of its second term, most notably when then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang in October 2000. Additionally, in June 2000, Washington eased longstanding sanctions against North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Export Administration Act, clearing the way for increased trade, financial transactions, and investment. Pyongyang is still prohibited, however, from receiving U.S. exports of military and sensitive dual-use items and most related assistance.

Both sides commit not to nuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The United States must "provide formal assurances" not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Pyongyang is required to "consistently take steps" to implement the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The United States' most recent commitment to this obligation was in the Oct. 12, 2000 Joint Communiqué between Washington and Pyongyang. The relevant portion reads: "The two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity."

Bush administration officials have said several times that the United States has no intention of attacking North Korea. A Jan. 7, 2003 joint statement from the United States, Japan, and South Korea reaffirmed this commitment in writing, stating that the United States "has no intention of invading" North Korea.

The Bush administration, however, has sent mixed signals about its intentions toward North Korea. Pyongyang argues that the United States has not lived up to its commitment because President George W. Bush called North Korea part of an "axis of evil" in January 2002. North Korea reacted to the speech by accusing Washington of "pursuing [a] hostile policy to stifle the DPRK."

In September 2002, the Bush administration released a report which emphasizes pre-emptively attacking countries developing weapons of mass destruction. It explicitly mentions North Korea. In addition, a leaked version of the Bush administration's January 2002 classified Nuclear Posture Review lists North Korea as a country against which the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons, although it does not mention pre-emptive nuclear strikes.

North Korean Obligations

North Korea has restarted the reactor. Although North Korea has said it is developing a nuclear deterrent, it has not explicitly threatened to use any spent fuel from its restarted reactor to build nuclear weapons.

The Agreed Framework states that North Korea must fully comply with IAEA safeguards when "a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components." The United States, however, had been demanding that North Korea begin cooperation with the IAEA as soon as possible, because the agency needs approximately three to four years to complete inspections. There had been concerns that waiting to start inspections until a significant portion of the project is completed would jeopardize the Agreed Framework's ultimate success, because it would further delay completion of the reactors. North Korea will no longer be required to comply with IAEA inspections once its withdrawal from the NPT is complete.

The canning process, conducted with U.S. financing, began April 27, 1996, and was finished in April 2000. The spent fuel, however, remains in North Korea, and Pyongyang may have reprocessed it into weapons-grade plutonium. The amount of fuel is sufficient for several nuclear weapons, according to the CIA.

North Korea announced Jan. 10, 2003 that it was withdrawing from the treaty, effective Jan. 11. Although Article X of the NPT requires that a country give three months' notice in advance of withdrawing, North Korea argues that it has satisfied this requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day before it was to become legally binding. Whether North Korea remains an NPT state-party is ambiguous.

U.S. Obligations

KEDO was established March 9, 1995, and membership included 12 states and the European Union, which provide electrical-power supplies and financial assistance to help KEDO implement the Agreed Framework. On May 31, 2006, KEDO officially ended its light-water reactor project, citing the failure of the DPRK to carry out the steps outlined in the KEDO-DPRK Supply Agreement.

KEDO delegated responsibility to Japan and South Korea to finance and supply North Korea with two light-water reactors. After several years of site preparation, ground was broken in August 2001 in Kumho, North Korea. KEDO poured the concrete for the first reactor in August 2002, but suspended the project Dec. 1, 2003.

KEDO suspended the shipments in November 2002. The United States had provided the largest financial contribution for these shipments.

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The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance | Arms Control Association

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Contact: Kelsey Davenport Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102 On Oct. 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an agreement- the Agreed Framework-calling upon Pyongyang to freeze operation and construction of nuclear reactors suspected of being part of a covert nuclear weapons program in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors.

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Kim Jong-Un, also spelled Kim Jong-Eun, (born January 8, 1984?, North Korea), North Korean political official who succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il, as leader of North Korea (2011- ).

Childhood and rise to power

The youngest of Kim Jong Il's three sons, Kim Jong-Un lived most of his life out of the public eye, and little was known about him. Reportedly educated in Gümligen, Switzerland, at the International School of Berne, he went on to study at Kim Il-Sung National War College in P'yŏngyang from 2002 to 2007. As a young adult, Kim Jong-Un began accompanying his father on military inspections. It was thought that he worked either for the Korean Workers' Party (KWP; the country's ruling party) or in the army's General Political Bureau; both organizations were involved in surveillance of government officials.

Rumours began to circulate early in 2009 that he was being groomed as his father's eventual successor. He was listed as a candidate for the Supreme People's Assembly in 2009, and that April he was given a post on the powerful National Defense Commission (NDC); the chairmanship of the NDC, defined in the constitution as the country's highest office, was held by Kim Jong Il. By mid-2009 Kim Jong-Un was being referred to within the country by the title "Brilliant Comrade," and in June it was reported that he had been named head of the State Security Department, the government agency responsible for political control and counterintelligence. That year he also reportedly married Ri Sol-Ju. In September 2010 Kim Jong-Un was given the high rank of four-star general, although he was not known to have had any prior military experience. The timing of his appointment was considered significant, as it came shortly before the first general meeting of the KWP since the session in 1980 at which his father had been named Kim Il-Sung 's successor. Over the next year his own position as successor became clearer.

After the death of his father in December 2011, Kim Jong-Un was declared the country's supreme leader, an unofficial title that nonetheless signaled his position as the head of both the government and North Korea's military forces. In April 2012 his status was validated by the acquisition of several official titles: first secretary of the KWP, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and chairman of the NDC, which was then the country's highest bureaucratic authority. Kim's national strategy of byungjin (often translated as "parallel development"), which emphasized the development of the country's economy along with its defense capabilities, was officially adopted during a 2013 meeting of the KWP central committee. In June 2016 the congress of the Supreme People's Assembly revised the constitution to broaden and solidify Kim Jong-Un's position. The revisions created a new organization, the State Affairs Commission, with Kim as its head. The new commission replaced the NDC as North Korea's most powerful governing agency.
Lorraine Murray

Leader of North Korea

The early years of Kim's reign were characterized by a ruthless consolidation of power and the sharp acceleration of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In December 2013 Kim executed his uncle Jang Song-Thaek, saying that he had "removed the scum" from the KWP. Jang was a member of Kim Jong Il's inner circle and had served as a virtual regent for the younger Kim after his father's death. Jang's execution also marked a break with Beijing, as Jang had long been an advocate of closer ties with China. Although Jang was the highest-profile official to be purged by Kim, defectors and South Korean intelligence services reported that people who had displeased the regime were being executed on a routine basis. In several cases, individuals who reportedly had been killed in a spectacularly grisly fashion resurfaced years later; such instances provided a clear illustration of just how difficult it was to obtain accurate information about events inside North Korea.

Under Kim Jong Il, North Korea's nuclear weapons program had advanced in fits and starts. The country's first underground nuclear detonation, in October 2006, came just months after a series of ballistic missile tests, but observers characterized these early forays as middling successes at best. After February 2013, which saw the first nuclear test of the Kim Jong-Un regime, the pace of both underground detonations and long-range missile tests quickened dramatically. By 2017 North Korea had conducted a total of six nuclear tests, including at least one of a device that North Korean officials claimed was small enough to mount on an intercontinental ballistic missile. With a significant part of the mainland United States now theoretically within range of a North Korean nuclear attack, a war of words erupted between Kim and U.S. Pres. Donald Trump.

While Washington and P'yŏngyang engaged in a steady exchange of insults and bombastic rhetoric, Kim was initiating an unlikely charm offensive of sorts at home. The election of Democratic Party of Korea candidate Moon Jae-In as president of South Korea in May 2017 had opened the door for possible reengagement between North and South Korea. Moon had overseen previous "sunshine" policy overtures toward the North during the administration of South Korean Pres. Roh Moo-Hyun, but the escalation of the North Korean nuclear program led Moon to adopt a much more hawkish tone once in office. Nevertheless, in the weeks before the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in P'yŏngch'ang (Pyeongchang), South Korea, the two countries initiated a dialogue that led to North and South Korean athletes marching into the opening ceremonies as a single body and under a flag that depicted a unified Korea. Kim's sister, Kim Yo-Jong, attended the games, becoming the first member of North Korea's ruling family to visit the South since the end of the Korean War. In a historic meeting with Moon on February 10, Yo-Jong delivered a handwritten note from her brother that invited the South Korean president to visit him in P'yŏngyang "at the earliest date possible."

The following month Kim hosted members of Moon's administration at a dinner in P'yŏngyang, the first such meeting he had held with senior South Korean officials since taking power in 2011. At that time, Kim stated that he was open to discussing the elimination of North Korea's nuclear arsenal if the United States was willing to guarantee the security of North Korea and his regime. That announcement was followed by talk of an unprecedented summit between Kim and Trump, which the Trump administration indicated would take place in or before May 2018. On April 27, 2018, Kim and Moon met for a historic summit at the "peace village" of P'anmunjŏm. It marked the first time that the leaders of the two Koreas had met face-to-face in more than a decade, and the pair discussed the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the conclusion of an armistice that would officially end the Korean War.

By mid-May the details of the meeting between Kim and Trump had begun to crystallize. The summit was scheduled to be held in Singapore. However, a fresh war of words broke out between Washington and P'yŏngyang. Expanding on earlier comments from national security adviser John R. Bolton, U.S. Vice Pres. Mike Pence threatened that North Korea's government could meet the same fate as deposed and slain Libyan Pres. Muammar al-Qaddafi. North Korean officials responded that Pence's statement was "ignorant and stupid." On May 24 Trump announced that he was pulling out of the meeting, and Kim's government immediately adopted a conciliatory tone, urging Trump to reconsider. Eight days later Trump reversed himself and announced that the summit would proceed as planned. On June 12, 2018, for the first time in history, the leaders of the United States and North Korea met face-to-face. Kim pledged to work "toward complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula" while Trump promised to end joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica

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Kim Jong-Un | Facts, Biography, & Nuclear Program

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Kim Jong-Un, North Korean political official who succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il, as leader of North Korea in 2011. Little of his early life is known, but in 2009 it became clear that he was being groomed as his father's successor. Once in office, he ramped up North Korea's nuclear program.

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World Report 2013: Rights Trends in World Report 2013: North Korea

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Kim Jong-Un’s succession as North Korea’s supreme leader after the death of his father, Kim Jong-Il, in December 2011 had little impact on the country’s dire human rights record.

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Kim Jong Il: Kim Jong Il, North Korean politician, son of the former North Korean premier and Korean Workers' Party (KWP) chairman Kim Il-Sung, and successor to his father as ruler (1994-2011) of North Korea. During his leadership of the country, Kim built on the mystique already surrounding his family.

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Table of Contents

What was Kim Il-Sung's childhood like?

How did Kim Il-Sung change the world?

What were Kim Il-Sung's beliefs?

Where is Kim Il-Sung buried?

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Kim Il-Sung, original name Kim Song-Ju, (born April 15, 1912, Man'gyŏndae, near P'yŏngyang, Korea [now in North Korea]-died July 8, 1994, P'yŏngyang, North Korea), communist leader of North Korea from 1948 until his death in 1994. He was the country's premier from 1948 to 1972, chairman of its dominant Korean Workers' Party from 1949, and president and head of state from 1972.

Early life and anti-Japanese resistance

Kim was the son of parents who fled to Manchuria during his childhood to escape the Japanese rule of Korea. He attended elementary school in Manchuria and, while still a student, joined a communist youth organization. He was arrested and jailed for his activities with the group in 1929-30. After Kim's release from prison, he joined the Korean guerrilla resistance against the Japanese occupation sometime during the 1930s and adopted the name of an earlier legendary Korean guerrilla fighter against the Japanese. Kim was noticed by the Soviet military authorities, who sent him to the Soviet Union for military and political training. There he joined the local Communist Party.

During World War II, Kim led a Korean contingent as a major in the Soviet army. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, Korea was effectively divided between a Soviet-occupied northern half and a U.S.-supported southern half. At this time Kim returned with other Soviet-trained Koreans to establish a communist provisional government under Soviet auspices in what would become North Korea. He became the first premier of the newly formed Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948, and in 1949 he became chairman of the Korean Workers' (communist) Party.

Korean War and leadership of North Korea

Hoping to reunify Korea by force, Kim launched an invasion of South Korea in 1950, thereby igniting the Korean War. His attempt to extend his rule there was repelled by U.S. troops and other UN forces, however, and it was only through massive Chinese support that he was able to repel a subsequent invasion of North Korea by UN forces. The Korean War ended in a stalemate in 1953.

As head of state, Kim crushed the remaining domestic opposition and eliminated his last rivals for power within the Korean Workers' Party. He became his country's absolute ruler and set about transforming North Korea into an austere, militaristic, and highly regimented society devoted to the twin goals of industrialization and the reunification of the Korean peninsula under North Korean rule. Kim introduced a philosophy of juche, or "self-reliance," under which North Korea tried to develop its economy with little or no help from foreign countries. North Korea's state-run economy grew rapidly in the 1950s and '60s but eventually stagnated, with shortages of food occurring by the early '90s. The omnipresent personality cult sponsored by Kim was part of a highly effective propaganda system that enabled him to rule unchallenged for 46 years over one of the world's most isolated and repressive societies. In his foreign policy he cultivated close ties with both the Soviet Union and China and remained consistently hostile to South Korea and the United States. While retaining control of the Korean Workers' Party, Kim relinquished the office of premier and was elected president of North Korea in December 1972. In 1980 he raised his eldest son, Kim Jong Il, to high posts in the party and the military, in effect designating the younger Kim as his heir.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s left China as North Korea's sole major ally, and China cultivated more cordial relations with South Korea. Meanwhile, North Korean policy toward the South alternated between provocation and overtures of peace throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Relations improved somewhat with Seoul's hosting of the Olympic Games in 1988, to which the North sent a team of athletes. In 1991 the two countries were simultaneously admitted to the United Nations, and a series of prime-ministerial talks produced two agreements between North and South Korea: one that pledged nonaggression, reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation, and a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The agreements went into effect in February 1992, although little of substance came of them, especially after the North became embroiled in controversy over its nuclear program and suspended all contacts with the South in early 1993.

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South Korean Pres. Kim Young-Sam was scheduled to travel to P'yŏngyang in July 1994 for an unprecedented summit between the two Korean leaders, but Kim Il-Sung died before the meeting could take place. Kim Jong Il ascended to power after his father's death, and, in the revised constitution that was promulgated in 1998, the office of president was written out and the elder Kim was written in as "eternal president of the republic."

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica Michael Ray.

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Kim Il-Sung | Biography, Facts, Leadership of North Korea, Significance, & Death

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Kim Il-Sung, original name Kim Song-Ju, (born April 15, 1912, Man'gyŏndae, near P'yŏngyang, Korea [now in North Korea]-died July 8, 1994, P'yŏngyang, North Korea), communist leader of North Korea from 1948 until his death in 1994. He was the country's premier from 1948 to 1972, chairman of its dominant Korean Workers' Party from 1949, and president and head of state from 1972.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is an authoritarian state led by the Kim family since 1949. Shortly after Kim Jong Il's death in 2011, his son Kim Jong Un was named marshal of the country and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army. His titles also include chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Worker's Party of Korea, chairman of the State Affairs Commission, and supreme representative of the Korean People. Kim Jong Un's grandfather, the late Kim Il Sung, remains "eternal president." The most recent national elections, held in March 2019, were neither free nor fair.

The internal security apparatus includes the Ministries of Social Security and State Security and the Military Security Command. A systematic and intentional overlap of powers and responsibilities existed between these organizations to prevent any potential subordinate consolidation of power and assure that each unit provides a check and balance on the other. Authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Members of the security forces committed numerous abuses.

Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings by the government; forced disappearances by the government; torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment by government authorities; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, including in political prison camps; arbitrary arrests and detentions; political prisoners and detainees; politically motivated reprisals against individuals located outside the country; no judicial independence; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including violence, threats of violence, or unjustified arrests and prosecutions against journalists, censorship, and site blocking; substantial interference with freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; severe restrictions of religious freedom; serious restrictions on freedom of movement; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; severe restrictions on political participation; widespread corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for violence against women; coerced abortion and forced sterilization; trafficking in persons; the outlawing of independent trade unions; the worst forms of child labor; the use of domestic forced labor through mass mobilizations and as a part of the re-education system; and the imposition of forced labor conditions on overseas contract workers.

The government took no credible steps to prosecute officials who committed human rights abuses. Furthermore, the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the country reported that COVID-19 preventive measures limited international presence in the country and reduced escapee arrivals. As of year's end, the government had not accounted for the circumstances that led to the death of Otto Warmbier, who had been held in unjust and unwarranted detention by authorities, and who died soon after his release in 2017. Impunity continued to be a widespread problem.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings

There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary and unlawful killings. The government had no functioning investigative mechanism.

Defector reports noted instances in which the government executed political prisoners, opponents of the government, forcibly returned asylum seekers, government officials, and others accused of crimes. The law prescribes the death penalty upon conviction for the most "serious" cases of "antistate" or "antination" crimes. These terms are broadly interpreted to include: participation in a coup or plotting to overthrow the state; acts of terrorism for an antistate purpose; treason, which includes defection or handing over state secrets; providing information regarding economic, social, and political developments routinely published elsewhere; and "treacherous destruction." Additionally, the law allows for capital punishment in less serious crimes such as theft, destruction of military facilities and national assets, distribution of narcotics, counterfeiting, fraud, kidnapping, distribution of pornography, and trafficking in persons. Defectors and media also reported that the government carried out infanticide or required mothers to commit infanticide if they were political prisoners, persons with disabilities, raped by government officials or prison guards, or forcibly repatriated from the People's Republic of China.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and press reports indicated that those attempting to leave the country without permission could be killed on the spot or publicly executed, and guards at political prison camps were under orders to shoot to kill those attempting to escape.

The state also subjected private citizens to public executions. A 2016 survey found that 64 percent of defectors had witnessed public executions. Defectors reported going to public executions on school field trips. The 2019 edition of the White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, a report based on interviews with recent escapees and published annually by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a South Korean government-affiliated think tank, reported that testimonies recounted continued public and secret executions. Escapees declared the purpose of the executions was to punish offenses including drug dealing, watching and disseminating South Korean videos, and violent crimes such as murder and rape. One defector said he witnessed the public execution of a man who shared South Korean movies in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, in 2014. Two others said they saw the execution of another Hyesan man on the same charges and the killing of an estimated 20 South Hwanghae Province residents for drug dealing and distributing South Korean videos in 2017. Testimonies also stated executions were carried out for possession of Bibles, circulating antiregime propaganda material, and superstitious activities. KINU noted, however, that public executions might have become less frequent in recent years.

In March 2019 the Malaysian prosecutor dropped charges against one woman accused of assassinating Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Un's half-brother, at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport in 2017. Later that month a second woman charged in the case accepted a plea deal and received early release in Malaysia. Four government agents, including Ri Ji U and Hong Song Hac, returned to the country from Malaysia immediately following the attack without standing trial.

As of year's end, the government still had not accounted for the circumstances that led to the death of Otto Warmbier, who had been held in unjust and unwarranted detention by authorities, and who died soon after his release in 2017.

Killings by security forces did not appear to vary depending on race or ethnicity.

b. Disappearance

NGO, think tank, and press reports indicated the government was responsible for disappearances.

South Korean media reported the government dispatched Ministry of State Security agents to cities in China near the country's border to kidnap and forcibly return refugees. According to international press reports, the government may have also kidnapped defectors traveling in China after relocating to South Korea. In some cases the government reportedly forced these defectors' family members to encourage the defectors to travel to China in order to capture them. According to the Committee for Human Rights Committee in North Korea (HRNK), as political prison camps in border areas near China closed, thousands of inmates reportedly disappeared in the process of their transfer to inland facilities, amounting to enforced disappearance.

During the year there was no progress in the investigation into the whereabouts of 12 Japanese citizens believed to have been abducted by the government in the 1970s and 1980s.

South Korean government and media reports noted the government also kidnapped other foreign nationals from locations abroad in the 1970s and 1980s. The government continued to deny its involvement in the kidnappings. The UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the country reported South Korea officially recognized 516 South Korean civilians abducted by regime authorities since the end of the Korean War with thousands more unaccounted for. South Korean NGOs estimated that 20,000 civilians abducted by the government during the Korean War remained in the country or had died.

Authorities took no steps to ensure accountability for disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The penal code prohibits torture or inhuman treatment, but many sources reported these practices continued. Numerous defector accounts and NGO reports described the use of torture by authorities in several detention facilities. Methods of torture and other abuse reportedly included severe beatings; electric shock; prolonged periods of exposure to the elements; humiliations such as public nakedness; confinement for up to several weeks in small "punishment cells" in which prisoners were unable to stand upright or lie down; being forced to kneel or sit immobilized for long periods; being hung by the wrists; water torture; and being forced to stand up and sit down to the point of collapse, including "pumps," or being forced to repeatedly squat and stand up with their hands behind their back.

Defectors continued to report many prisoners died from torture, disease, starvation, exposure to the elements, or a combination of these causes. Detainees in re-education through labor camps reported the state forced them to perform difficult physical labor under harsh conditions (see section 7.b.).

A report released on July 28 from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) catalogued numerous allegations of beatings, torture, and sexual violations against women who were forcibly repatriated after seeking to flee the country to find work, usually in neighboring China. KINU's white paper for 2019 reported that children repatriated from China underwent torture, verbal abuse, and violence including beatings, hard labor, and hunger.

Impunity for acts of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by members of the security forces was endemic.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care. NGO, defector, and press reports noted the government operated several types of prisons, detention centers, and camps, including forced labor camps and camps for political prisoners. NGO reports documented six types of detention facilities: kwanliso (political penal-labor camps), kyohwaso (correctional or re-education centers), kyoyangso (labor-reform centers), jipkyulso (collection centers for low-level criminals), rodong danryeondae (labor-training centers), and kuryujang or kamok (interrogation facilities or jails). According to KINU's white paper for 2019, the Ministry of State Security administered kwanliso camps, and either it or the Ministry of Social Security administered the other detention centers.

According to a March report by the HRNK, the government operated six kwanliso-Camps 14, 15, 16, 18, and 25, as well as Choma-bong Restricted Area. According to KINU's most recent estimate in 2013, there were between 80,000 and 120,000 prisoners in the kwanliso. Defectors claimed the kwanliso camps contained unmarked graves, barracks, worksites, and other prison facilities. KINU identified the five kwanliso facilities as Gaecheon (Camp 14), Yodok (Camp 15), Hwaseong/Myeonggan (Camp 16), Gaechon (Camp 18), and Cheongjin (Camp 25). In addition the HRNK reported that the Choma-bong Restricted Area, constructed between 2013 and 2014, had not been confirmed by eyewitness reports, but it appeared to be operational and bore all the characteristics of a kwanliso.

Kwanliso camps consist of total-control zones, where incarceration is for life, and may include "revolutionary" or re-education zones from which prisoners may be released. Those whom the state considered hostile to the government or who committed political crimes reportedly received indefinite sentencing terms in political prison camps. In many cases the state also detained all family members if one member was accused or arrested. According to KINU's white paper for 2019, children were allowed to leave the camp after rising numbers of defectors made it difficult to send entire defector families to political prison camps. The government continued to deny the existence of political prison camps.

Reports indicated the state typically sent those sentenced to prison for nonpolitical crimes to re-education prisons, where authorities subjected prisoners to intense forced labor.

Defectors noted they did not expect many prisoners in political prison camps and the detention system to survive. Detainees and prisoners consistently reported violence and torture. Defectors described witnessing public executions in political prison camps. According to defectors, prisoners received little to no food or medical care in some places of detention. Sanitation was poor, and former labor camp inmates reported they had no changes of clothing during their incarceration and were rarely able to bathe or wash their clothing. The South Korean and international press reported that the kyohwaso re-education through labor camps held populations of up to thousands of political prisoners, economic criminals, and ordinary criminals. A March HRNK report entitled North Korea's Long-Term Prison Labor Facility Kyohwaso Number 1, Kaechon postulated that the government may have operated more than 20 kyohwaso. That report, which relied on extensive analysis of satellite imagery, estimated the population of Kyohwaso Number 1, located near Kaechon in South Pyongan Province, at 2,000 to 6,000 prisoners.

A September report by the HRNK entitled North Korea's Long-Term Prison Labor Facility Kyohwaso Number 12, Jongori stated the kyohwaso held both political and nonpolitical prisoners. According to the HRNK, based on extensive analysis of satellite imagery, Kyohwaso Number 12, located near Hoeryong City in North Hamgyong Province, held approximately 5,000 individuals, the majority of whom were accused of illegal border crossings into China. The HRNK described frequent deaths within Kyohwaso Number 12 from injury, illness, and physical and mental abuse by prison officials, and included first-hand accounts of crematorium operations designed to dispose of prisoners' bodies surreptitiously.

In both kyohwaso and kwanliso prison camps, conditions were extremely brutal, according to the HRNK's 2017 report The Parallel Gulag: North Korea's "An-Jeon-Bu" Prison Camps. The report cited defector accounts of imprisonment and forced labor and the provision of below-subsistence-level food rations "for essentially political crimes."

Physical Conditions: Physical abuse by prison guards was systematic. Anecdotal reports from the South Korea-based NGO Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) 2019 White Paper on Human Rights stated that in some prisons authorities held women in separate units from men and often subjected the women to sexual abuse. Reports from previous years attributed rape to the impunity and unchecked power of prison guards and other officials. OHCHR reporting noted that, contrary to international human rights standards that require women prisoners to be guarded exclusively by female prison staff to prevent sexual violence, female escapees reported they were overseen almost exclusively by male officers. In the same report, victims alleged widespread sexual abuse at holding centers ( jipkyulso) and pretrial detention and interrogation centers ( kuryujang) by secret police ( bowiseong) or police interrogators, as well as during transfer between facilities.

An October report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) entitled Worth Less Than An Animal: Abuses and Due Process Violations in Pretrial Detention in North Korea stated the pretrial detention system was opaque, arbitrary, violent, and lacked any semblance of due process. Individuals in pretrial detention reportedly endured brutal conditions and to be routinely subjected to systematic torture, sexual violence, dangerous and unhygienic conditions, and forced labor.

Nutrition, hygiene, and the medical situation inside prison camps were dire, according to KINU's 2019 white paper. There were no statistics for deaths in custody, but defectors reported deaths were commonplace as the result of summary executions, torture, lack of adequate medical care, and starvation. The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) report cited an "extremely high rate of deaths in custody," due to starvation and neglect, arduous forced labor, disease, and executions.

Political prisoners faced significantly harsher conditions than the general prison population. KINU's 2019 white paper noted political prisoners were often forced into hard labor, which one defector of Camp 18 said led to 10 deaths a year at the camp from overwork. Defectors reported that in Camp 14, prisoners worked 12 hours a day during the summer and 10 hours a day during the winter, with one day off a month. The camps observed New Year's Day and the birthdays of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong Il. Children ages 12 or older worked, and guards gave light duty to prisoners older than age 65. According to the 2016 HRNK report Gulag, Inc., three political prison camps and four re-education camps contained mines where prisoners worked long hours with frequent deadly accidents. One prisoner reported suffering an open foot fracture and being forced to return to the mine the same day. Prisoners were forced to work even when they were sick. Prisoners who failed to meet work quotas reportedly faced reduced meals and violence. Those caught stealing faced arbitrary and serious violence.

By law the state dismisses criminal cases against a person younger than age 14. The state applies public education in case of a crime committed by a person older than 14 and younger than 17, but little information was available regarding how the law was applied. Authorities often detained juveniles along with their families and reportedly subjected them to torture and abuse in detention facilities.

Administration: There was little evidence to suggest prisoners and detainees had reasonable access to visitors. Refugees reported authorities subjected Christian inmates to harsher punishment than others. According to the NKDB, there was a report in 2016 of disappearances of persons whom prison authorities found were practicing religion within detention facilities. No information was available regarding whether authorities conducted proper investigations of credible allegations of abuse. There was no publicly available information on whether the government investigated or monitored prison and detention conditions. The 2019 HRNK Imagery Analysis of Pokchong-ni Lab noted officials, especially those within the military and the internal security organizations, continued to camouflage and conceal activity at prison camps.

Independent Monitoring: The government did not allow the UN special rapporteur into the country to assess prison conditions. The government did not permit other human rights monitors to inspect prisons and detention facilities.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but according to defectors, media, and NGO reports, the government did not observe these prohibitions.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

The law limits detention during prosecution and trial, requires arrest by warrant, and prohibits forced confessions. The application of these provisions was not verified.

Members of the security forces arrested and reportedly transported citizens suspected of committing political crimes to prison camps without trial. According to one South Korean NGO, the Ministry of Social Security handles criminal cases directly without the approval of prosecutors, reportedly to bypass prosecutorial corruption. An NGO reported that, by law, investigators could detain an individual for investigation for up to two months. The HRNK reported Ministry of State Security or Ministry of Social Security units nonetheless interrogated suspects for months on end. No functioning bail system or other alternatives for release pending trial exists.

There were no restrictions on the government's ability to detain and imprison persons at will or to hold them incommunicado. Family members and other concerned persons reportedly found it virtually impossible to obtain information on charges against detained persons or the lengths of their sentences. According to defector reports, families were not notified of arrest, detention, or sentencing. Judicial review or appeals of detentions did not exist in law or practice. According to an opinion adopted in 2015 by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, family members have no recourse to petition for the release of detainees accused of political crimes, as the state may deem any such advocacy for political prisoners an act of treason against the state and could result in the detention of family members. No information on detainees' access to a lawyer was available.

Arbitrary Arrest: Arbitrary arrests reportedly occurred. According to the 2019 report of the UN secretary-general on the situation of human rights in the country, arbitrary arrests appeared to be carried out in a widespread and systematic manner. According to KINU's 2019 white paper, arbitrary arrest commonly occurred for political crimes, attempting to enter South Korea, and engaging in religious activities, as well as for watching or distributing foreign media.

Detainee's Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: According to defectors there was no mechanism for persons to challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution states courts are independent and must carry out judicial proceedings in strict accordance with the law; however, an independent judiciary did not exist. According to KINU's white paper for 2019, there were many reports of bribery and corruption in the investigations or preliminary examination process and in detention facilities, as well as by judges and prosecutors in the trial stage. In October, HRW reported treatment of individuals in pretrial detention often depended on access to connections and money.

Trial Procedures

Little information was available on formal criminal justice procedures and practices, and outside access to the legal system was limited to trials for traffic violations and other minor offenses.

The constitution contains elaborate procedural protections, providing that cases should be public, except under circumstances stipulated by law. The constitution also states the accused has the right to a defense, and when the government held trials, they reportedly assigned lawyers. Some reports noted a distinction between those accused of political, as opposed to nonpolitical, crimes and claimed the government offered trials and lawyers only to the latter. The Ministry of State Security conducted "pretrials" or preliminary examinations in all political cases, but the court system conducted the trial. Some defectors testified that the ministry also conducted trials. KINU's white paper for 2019 cited defector testimony that imprisonment in political prison camps is decided exclusively by the ministry, regardless of trial. There was no indication that independent, nongovernmental defense lawyers existed. There were no indications authorities respected the presumption of innocence. According to the 2014 UNCOI report, "the vast majority of inmates are victims of arbitrary detention, since they are imprisoned without trial or on the basis of a trial that fails to respect the due process and fair trial guarantees set out in international law."

Political Prisoners and Detainees

While the total number of political prisoners and detainees remained unknown, KINU's white paper for 2019 reported the state detained between 80,000 and 120,000 in the kwanliso political penal-labor camps. Incarceration in a kwanliso is in most cases for life and in many cases includes three generations of the prisoner's family. NGOs and media reported political prisoners were subject to harsher punishments and fewer protections than other prisoners and detainees. The government considered critics of the regime to be political criminals. Reports from past years described political offenses as including attempting to defect to South Korea or contacting family members who had defected to South Korea, sitting on newspapers bearing Kim Il Sung's or Kim Jong Il's picture, mentioning Kim Il Sung's limited formal education, or defacing photographs of the Kims. The 2014 UNCOI report noted that many "ordinary" prisoners were, in fact, political prisoners, "detained without a substantive reason compatible with international law."

Politically Motivated Reprisal Against Individuals Located Outside the Country

There were credible reports that for political purposes the regime attempted to exert bilateral pressure on another country to repatriate refugees. According to the UN secretary-general, several UN member states, as well as OHCHR and the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the country, expressed concern that forcibly returned defectors, including children, faced a significant risk of human rights violations, including torture. Additionally, the government attempted to target, harass, and threaten defectors and other perceived enemies resident outside of the country.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

According to the constitution, "citizens are entitled to submit complaints and petitions. The state shall fairly investigate and deal with complaints and petitions as fixed by law." By law citizens are entitled to submit complaints to stop encroachment upon their rights and interests or seek compensation for the encroached rights and interests. Reports noted government officials did not respect these rights. For example, when individuals submitted anonymous petitions or complaints regarding state administration, the Ministry of Social Security and the Ministry of State Security sought to identify the authors and subject them to investigation and punishment.

Individuals and organizations do not have the ability to appeal adverse domestic decisions to regional human rights bodies.

f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The constitution provides for the inviolability of person and residence and the privacy of correspondence; however, the government did not respect these provisions. The regime subjected its citizens to rigid controls. According to a December 2019 HRNK report entitled Digital Trenches: North Korea's Information Counter-Offensive, the regime relied upon a massive, multilevel system of informants called inminban, which may be loosely translated as "neighborhood watch unit," to identify critics or political criminals. Authorities sometimes subjected entire communities to security checks, entering homes without judicial authorization.

The government appeared to monitor correspondence, telephone conversations, emails, text messages, and other digital communications. Private telephone lines operated on a system that precluded making or receiving international calls; international telephone lines were available only under restricted circumstances.

The Ministry of State Security strictly monitored mobile telephone use and access to electronic media in real time. Government authorities frequently jammed cellular telephone signals along the Chinese border to block use of the Chinese network to make international telephone calls. Authorities arrested those caught using cell phones with Chinese SIM cards and required violators to pay a fine, bribe, or face charges of espionage or other crimes with harsh punishments, including lengthy prison terms. An HRNK October report entitled Eroding the Regime's Information Monopoly: Cell Phones in North Korea stated the number of both illegal Chinese-made cell phones and legally registered cell phones had risen sharply in recent years. Mobile networks were said to reach approximately 94 percent of the population, although only 18 percent of the population owned a cell phone. The Ministry of State Security and other organs of the state actively and pervasively surveilled citizens, maintained arresting power, and conducted special purpose nonmilitary investigations.

The government divided citizens into strict loyalty-based classes known as songbun, which determined access to employment, higher education, place of residence, medical facilities, certain stores, marriage prospects, and food rations.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Expression, Including for the Press

The constitution provides for freedom of expression, including for the press, but the government prohibited the exercise of these rights.

Freedom of Speech: There were numerous instances of persons interrogated or arrested for saying something construed as negative towards the government. In June 2019 Australian citizen Alek Sigley was detained and deported after the government cited "antistate incitement" in articles Sigley published in international publications. In its September 2019 report entitled North Korea's Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial, the HRNK asserted that all citizens are required to participate in monitored political meetings and regular self-criticism sessions to demonstrate their loyalty to the Kim family, and that failure to participate enthusiastically may be punished, including through forced labor, internal exile, detention, or denial of food and medical attention. KINU's 2019 white paper reported that expression of political opinion differing from that of North Korean authorities, negative reference to the Kim family, and positive reference to South Korea constituted "misspeaking" and often resulted in extrajudicial detention in a kwanliso political prisoner camp.

Freedom of Press and Media, Including Online Media: The government sought to control virtually all information; independent media do not exist. Domestic journalists had no freedom to investigate stories or report freely. The government tightly controlled print media, broadcast media, book publishing, and online media through the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Within the department, the Publication and Broadcasting Department controls all media content, including content used on television, in newspapers, and on the radio. The law allows for up to one-year sentences to a labor camp for individuals who access or disseminate unapproved broadcasts or content and up to five years for multiple offenses.

The government carefully managed visits by foreigners, especially journalists, and at times expelled or denied foreign journalists' entry to the country. During visits by foreign leaders, authorities permitted groups of foreign journalists to accompany official delegations and file reports. In all cases the state strictly monitored journalists. Government officials generally prevented journalists from talking to officials or to persons on the street.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Strict enforcement of domestic media censorship continued, with no toleration for deviation from official messages. The government prohibited listening to foreign media broadcasts except by the political elite, and violators were subjected to severe punishment. Radios and television sets, unless altered, received only domestic programming; radios obtained from abroad were altered for the same end. Elite citizens and facilities for foreigners, such as hotels, had access to international television broadcasts via satellite. The government continued attempts to jam all foreign radio broadcasts, but the HRNK's Digital Trenches: North Korea's Information Counter-Offensive noted a proliferation of foreign broadcasting transmitters had in recent years begun to overwhelm the jamming effort. Officials imprisoned and punished citizens for listening to foreign radio or watching foreign television broadcasts and, in some cases, for simply owning radio or television sets able to receive nongovernment broadcasts.

National Security: Defector and NGO reports included accounts of individuals detained and punished, including by execution, for antistate crimes such as criticism of the government and Kim Jong Un.

Internet Freedom

Internet access was limited to high-ranking officials and other designated elites, including selected university students. In December 2019 the HRNK reported that the government maintained complete visibility of all network traffic. The Korea Computer Center, which acts as the government's gatekeeper to the internet, granted access only to information it deemed acceptable, and employees constantly monitored users' screens.

A tightly controlled and regulated intranet was reportedly available to a growing group of users centered in Pyongyang, including an elite primary school; selected research institutions, universities, and factories; and a few individuals. The NGO Reporters without Borders reported some email access existed through this internal network. Government employees sometimes had limited, closely monitored access to email accounts. The 3G cell phone network was described by the HRNK in an October report as antiquated and limiting users' access to an internal intranet. The HRNK separately reported that the government installed monitoring programs on every smartphone and tablet that, among other things, log every webpage visited and randomly take undeletable screenshots.

The government continued its attempt to limit foreign influence on its citizens. Individuals accused of viewing or possessing foreign films were reportedly subjected to imprisonment and possibly execution. According to KINU's white paper for 2019, defectors reported varying penalties for consuming South Korean media ranging from three to 10 years in a correctional labor prison, as well as proclamations stating that those caught would be sentenced to death. According to KINU's white paper for 2019, the number of persons executed for watching or distributing South Korean video content increased in recent years, with additional reports of correctional labor punishment. In December 2019 the HRNK reported the government's introduction of a file watermarking system on Android smartphones and on personal computers that adds a user- or device-specific data string to the end of the filename of any media file each time it is shared.

Based on defector interviews conducted in 2015, InterMedia estimated as many as 29 percent of defectors listened to foreign radio broadcasts while inside the country and that approximately 92 percent of defectors interviewed had seen foreign DVDs while in the country. The HRNK reported that younger individuals preferred foreign digital video content to foreign radio broadcasts.

The government maintained efforts to prevent the import of South Korean popular culture, especially television dramas. According to media and NGO reports, police could search homes to enforce restrictions on foreign films. According to the HRNK, the government added a software-based censorship program known as the "signature system" to all domestic mobile telephones. This system makes it impossible to view foreign media on mobile phones. Mobile phones were randomly inspected physically for illegal media, and a history of all activity on the device was available for export upon inspection through monitoring software called TraceViewer. In October 2019 NW News reported that Kim Jong Un created a special police unit to restrict and control the flow of outside information into the country.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The government restricted academic freedom and controlled artistic works. School curricula were highly controlled by the state. The government severely restricted academic travel. The primary function of plays, movies, operas, children's performances, and books was to buttress the cult of personality surrounding the Kim family and support of the regime.

The state carried out systematic indoctrination through the mass media, schools, and worker and neighborhood associations. Such indoctrination involved mass marches, rallies, and staged performances, sometimes including hundreds of thousands of persons.

b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The government severely restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and of association.

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

While the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government did not respect this provision and continued to prohibit public meetings not previously authorized and not under government control.

Freedom of Association

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government failed to respect this provision. There were no known organizations other than those created by the government. Professional associations existed primarily to facilitate government monitoring and control over organization members.

c. Freedom of Religion

See the Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/ .

d. Freedom of Movement

The law provides for the "freedom to reside in or travel to any place"; however, the government did not respect this right.

In-country Movement: The government restricted freedom of movement for those lawfully within the state. Those who violated travel regulations were subject to warnings, fines, or forced labor. Only members of a very small elite class and those with access to remittances from overseas reportedly had access to personal vehicles. Security checkpoints on main roads at entry and exit points from every town hampered movement. KINU's white paper for 2019 reported that individuals were able to move more freely within their own province as the use of bribery as a means to circumvent the law became more widespread. An increasing number of persons traveled without a permit, only to pay a bribe when caught.

The government strictly controlled permission to reside in, or even to enter, Pyongyang, where food availability, housing, health, and general living conditions were much better than in the rest of the country. Foreign officials visiting the country observed checkpoints on the highway leading into Pyongyang.

Due to fears regarding the spread of COVID-19, media and NGOs reported the government tightened in-country movement restrictions, making internal movement extremely difficult since March. NGOs, foreign diplomats, and UN agency personnel were not allowed to leave Pyongyang. This severely hampered foreign observers' already extremely limited ability to monitor human rights and humanitarian aid conditions in the country.

Foreign Travel: The government restricted foreign travel. The government limited issuance of exit visas for foreign travel to officials and trusted businesspersons, artists, athletes, academics, and workers. Short-term exit papers were available on a very limited basis for some residents to visit relatives, undertake short-term work opportunities, or to engage in small-scale trade.

The government did not allow emigration, and media and NGOs reported that due to fears of importing COVID-19, it continued to tighten security on the border, dramatically limiting the flow of persons crossing into China with and without required permits. NGOs reported strict patrols and surveillance of residents of border areas and a crackdown on border guards who may have been aiding border crossers in return for bribes.

The law criminalizes defection and attempted defection. Individuals, including children, who cross the border with the purpose of defecting or seeking asylum in a third country are subject to a minimum of five years of "labor correction." In "serious" cases the state subjects asylum seekers to indefinite terms of imprisonment and forced labor, confiscation of property, or death. According to KINU's white paper for 2019, most repatriated defectors were detained at kyohwasos in Jeongeori, North Hamgyeong Province, or Gaechon, South Pyeongan Province.

Many would-be refugees who returned involuntarily from foreign states were imprisoned under harsh conditions. OHCHR reporting included the accounts of several forcibly repatriated escapees who said authorities reserved particularly harsh treatment for those who had extensive contact with foreigners or religious groups or who had spent time in South Korea, including those with family members resettled in South Korea.

Media reported in 2018 that Kim Jong Un ordered government agencies to exert greater pressure on family members of defectors to pressure them to return home. Defectors reported that family members in the country contacted them to urge their return, apparently under pressure from government officials. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification website, the number of defectors leaving the country remained nearly the same from 2017 (188) to 2018 (168), rose slightly in 2019 (204), and fell to 39 as of March.

Past reports from refugees noted the government differentiated between persons who crossed the border in search of food (who may be sentenced only to a few months of forced labor or in some cases merely issued a warning) and persons who crossed repeatedly for "political" purposes (who were sometimes sentenced to harsher punishment), including those who had alleged contact with religious organizations based near the Chinese border. The law stipulates a sentence of up to two years of "labor correction" for illegally crossing the border.

Exile: The government reportedly forced the internal exile of some citizens. In the past it forcibly resettled thousands of persons from Pyongyang to the countryside. Sometimes this occurred as punishment for offenses and included those judged to be politically unreliable based on their family's songbun, or loyalty-based class.

e. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons

Not applicable.

f. Protection of Refugees

The government did not cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.

Access to Asylum: The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government has not established a system for providing protection for refugees. The government did not grant refugee status or asylum. The government had no known policy or provision for refugees or asylum seekers and did not participate in international refugee fora.

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

Citizens do not have the ability to choose their government peacefully.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: The most recent national elections to select representatives to the Supreme People's Assembly occurred in March 2019. These elections were neither free nor fair. The government openly monitored voting, resulting in a reported 100 percent participation rate and 100 percent approval of the preselected government candidates. Local elections in 2015 were likewise neither free nor fair. The government reported a 99.97 percent turnout, with 100 percent approval for the government candidates.

Political Parties and Political Participation: The government has created several "minority parties." Lacking grassroots organizations, the parties existed only as rosters of officials with token representation in the Supreme People's Assembly.

Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: Although the law affords women equal right to vote and hold political office, few women were elected or appointed to senior government positions. As of 2016 women constituted approximately 3.1 percent of members and 2.8 percent of candidate members of the Central Committee of the WPK and held few key WPK leadership positions. In August media reported the appointment of a woman, Pak Myong Sun, to the WPK Central Committee Political Bureau, the party's highest-level body, and as director of a WPK Central Committee department. With her appointment, the country had only two women in the 31-member Political Bureau, the other being Kim Jong Un's sister, Kim Yo Jong. Among approximately 20 party departments and offices, only one was headed by a woman. The 2014 UNCOI report indicated only 10 percent of central government officials were women.

The country is racially and ethnically homogenous. There are officially no minorities.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

Verifiable information was not available on whether criminal penalties for official corruption were actually applied. International organizations widely reported senior officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.

Corruption: Corruption was reportedly widespread in all parts of the economy and society and endemic in the security forces. A 2016 meeting chaired by Kim Jong Un marked the first public recognition of systemic abuse of power and reportedly addressed the practice of senior officials who sought privileges, misused authority, abused power, and manifested "bureaucratism" in the party. Defectors interviewed for the OHCHR 2019 report, The Price Is Rights, said workers paid off guidance officers at government factories so that they would not have to report to work and could engage in outside commercial activity.

Reports of diversion of food to the military and government officials were further indicators of corruption.

Multiple ministries and party offices were responsible for handling issues of corruption.

Financial Disclosure: Information was not publicly available on whether the state subjects public officials to financial disclosure laws and whether a government agency is responsible for combating corruption.

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights

There were no independent domestic organizations to monitor human rights conditions or comment on the status of such rights. The government reported many organizations, including the Democratic Lawyers' Association, General Association of Trade Unions, Agricultural Workers Union, and Democratic Women's Union, engaged in human rights activities, but observers could not verify the activities of these organizations.

The international NGO community and numerous international experts continued to testify to the grave human rights situation in the country. The government decried international statements regarding human rights abuses in the country as politically motivated interference in internal affairs. The government asserted criticism of its human rights record was an attempt by some countries to cover up their own abuses and that such hypocrisy undermined human rights principles.

The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government emphasized it had ratified a number of UN human rights instruments, but it continued to refuse to cooperate with UN representatives. The government prevented the UN special rapporteur from visiting the country to carry out his mandate, which it continued to refuse to recognize. In October the special rapporteur reported that COVID-19 preventative measures made it impossible for diplomats and international organizations to continue operating inside the country and lamented the resultant decline in the amount of first-hand knowledge available to the international community concerning the human rights situation in the country. He further stated that the number of escapees from the country who arrived in South Korea during the year declined significantly.

The UN special rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities has not visited the country since 2017. The visit did not focus on allegations of human rights abuses, and the government continued to resist the special rapporteur's mandate.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The government's Association for Human Rights Studies denied the existence of any human rights violations.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: The government criminalized rape of women. Conviction of Rape is punishable by reform through labor for up to five years; if the assailant "commits a grave offense," a term of more than 10 years; and if the rape was "particularly grave," a life term or the death penalty. No information was available on how effectively the law was enforced. The 2014 UNCOI report found the subjugation of inmates and a general climate of impunity created an environment in which guards and other prisoners in privileged positions raped female inmates. This was reconfirmed in OHCHR reporting on women who attempted to flee the country, were forcibly repatriated, and finally escaped for good. The women testified they had been subjected to widespread, systemic sexual violence while detained after repatriation. The 2018 HRW report You Cry at Night but Don't Know Why reported endemic sexual and gender-based violence and detailed cases of sexual assault or coerced sexual acts by men in official positions of authority between 2011 and 2015. When cases of rape came to light, the perpetrator often escaped with mere dismissal or no punishment. For example, HRW reported a 2009 case in which a woman arrested for illegally fleeing the country was raped by a police chief. After she told her lawyer, the lawyer refused to mention it during her trial and said nothing would be done and the woman could be punished more severely for bringing it up. As noted in the KINU white paper for 2019, the law prohibits domestic violence, but the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women expressed concern that the government was not taking any protective or preventive measures against such violence. Defectors continued to report violence against women was a systematic problem both inside and outside the home. According to the KINU white paper, in a survey of defectors conducted from 2013 to 2017, more than 75 percent of respondents believed domestic violence was "common." It also stated that spousal rape was not considered a crime.

Sexual Harassment: Despite the law defectors reported the populace generally accepted sexual harassment of women due to patriarchal traditions. They reported there was little recourse for women who had been harassed. Defectors also reported lack of enforcement and impunity enjoyed by government officials made sexual harassment so common as to be accepted as part of ordinary life. According to the 2019 KINU white paper, authorities repeatedly stated there was no sexual harassment issue in workplace, suggesting willful ignorance on the part of the government.

Reproductive Rights: Obtaining accurate information regarding reproductive rights was difficult, as data supplied by the government is impossible to verify and international presence in country is severely limited. Although the country's 2002 report to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women claimed couples and individuals made their own decisions on the spacing of children, independent sources were not able to substantiate this claim.

According to the 2014 Socio-demographic Health Survey, 92 percent of demand for family planning was reportedly satisfied, but contraceptive choice and access to counseling services were limited. According to the UN Fund for Population, the lack of essential medical supplies, equipment, and skills is the main barrier to quality reproductive health services. A 2020 white paper by the South Korean Institute of National Unification reported that, according to health personnel who worked in the department of obstetrics and gynecology, more than half of patients in North Korea sought abortion and the most common cause of maternal death during childbirth was excessive bleeding. There was no information on what sexual and reproductive health services, if any, the government provided to survivors of sexual violence.

Coercion in Population Control: NGOs and defectors reported state security officials subjected women to forced abortions for political purposes, to cover up human rights abuses and rape in particular, and to "protect" ethnic purity, and not population control. KINU's white paper for 2019 stated that officials had in some cases prohibited live births in prison and ordered forced abortions as recently as 2013. According to a July OHCHR report on women detained who were forcibly returned, detainees were denied maternity protections mandated in legislation to protect women's rights. Detainees reported being sent for forced abortions as recently as 2015 and that prison officials sought to force abortion through beatings and hard labor. Cases of infanticide were also reported.

Discrimination: The constitution states, "women hold equal social status and rights with men"; however, few women reached high levels of the party or the government, and defectors said gender equality was nonexistent. KINU reported discrimination against women emerged in the form of differentiated pay scales, promotions, and types of work assigned to women, in addition to responsibility for the double burden of labor and housework, especially considering the time and effort required to secure food.

Children

Birth Registration: Children derive citizenship from one's parents and, in some cases, birth within the country's territory.

Education: The law provides for 12 years of free compulsory education for all children. Many NGO reports indicated that authorities denied some children educational opportunities and subjected them to punishment and disadvantages as a result of the songbun loyalty classification system and the principle of "collective retribution" for the transgressions of family members. NGO reports also noted some children were unable to attend school regularly because of hidden fees or insufficient food. NGOs reported that children in the total-control zones of political prisons did not receive the same curriculum or quality of education available to those outside the total-control zones.

Foreign visitors and academic sources reported that from the fifth grade, schools subjected children to several hours a week of mandatory military training and that all children received political indoctrination. In its 2019 report The Lost Generation: The Health and Human Rights of North Korea's Children, 1990-2018, the HRNK characterized the national curriculum as prioritizing political indoctrination and unswerving loyalty to the regime, while punishing those who deviate from the curriculum.

Medical Care: There was no verifiable information available on whether boys and girls had equal access to state-provided medical care. Access to health care largely depended on loyalty to the government. In a December 2019 report on broader health and well-being trends in the country, the NKDB, using publicly available data and interviews of defectors who arrived in the South Korea during the year, documented widespread inadequacies in medical care for children.

Child Abuse: Information regarding societal or familial abuse of children remained unavailable. The law states that a man convicted of having sexual intercourse with a girl younger than age 15 shall be "punished gravely." There was no reporting on whether the government enforced this law.

Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum age for marriage is 18 for men and 17 for women.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: Because many girls and young women attempted to flee repressive conditions, poverty, and food shortages for their own survival or the betterment of their families, 2019 international media reports and the 2014 UNCOI report noted they were often subjected to sexual exploitation by traffickers. Traffickers promised these young girls jobs in other parts of the country or in China but then exploited them in forced marriages or domestic servitude or made them work in prostitution after being smuggled out of the country. In its November 2019 publication Inescapable Violence: Child Abuse within North Korea, the Seoul-based NGO People for Successful Corean Unification documented endemic child abuse, including child sexual abuse, in schools, homes, camps, orphanages, and detention centers.

See the Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ .

Displaced Children: According to NGO reports, there were numerous street children. The HRNK reported in 2019 that while not all were orphans, some were abandoned due to economic difficulties or escaped abusive family situations. Displaced children were forced to survive by begging and stealing at local markets or in front of train stations.

Institutionalized Children: Guards subjected children living in prison camps to torture if they or a family member violated the prison rules. Reports noted authorities subjected children to forced labor for up to 12 hours per day and did not allow them to leave the camps. Prisons offered them limited access to education.

Daily NK, a defector-run online newspaper operating in South Korea, reported children at boarding schools for orphans received inadequate nutrition and that staff stole food to pay school debts.

In addition to children in detention facilities, the number of children living in orphanages and other institutions drastically increased following the famines of the 1990s. In 2019 the HRNK reported that Kim Jong Un directed that 40 child-protection facilities, including orphanages, elementary academies, and middle academies, be modernized to accommodate these children. The HRNK's interviews of those who had lived in these facilities reported substandard conditions, including lack of adequate food, clothing, and shelter. As a result many were malnourished and in poor physical condition. While living in orphanages, children often received only one meal a day, leading them to compete and fight for food or run away from the orphanage to survive. Children living in orphanages were often subjected to forced labor instead of attending school. Several respondents explained how children were forced to perform "simple work" such as carrying stones rather than being cared for and protected in orphanages.

International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the Department of State's Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html .

Anti-Semitism

There was no known Jewish population, and there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ .

Persons with Disabilities

Although the government claims the law meets the international standards of rights for persons with disabilities, in a 2016 National Human Rights Commission of Korea survey, 89 percent of defectors said there was no consideration for persons with disabilities.

While the law mandates equal access to public services for persons with disabilities, the government did not provide consistent support for them. Traditional social norms condone discrimination against persons with disabilities, including in the workplace (also see section 7.d.). NGO reports, including KINU's 2019 white paper, stated that while the government on balance treated veterans with disabilities well, escapees often described support for veterans with disabilities as inconsistent and only at a perfunctory level. The government reportedly provided no support to other persons with physical and mental disabilities. In some cases authorities sent persons with disabilities from Pyongyang to internal exile, quarantined them within camps, and forcibly sterilized them. Persons with disabilities experienced discrimination in accessing public life.

The UN special rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities visited the country for the first time in 2017 and noted most infrastructure, including newly constructed buildings, was not accessible to persons with physical disabilities.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child repeatedly expressed concern, most recently in 2017, regarding de facto discrimination against children with disabilities and insufficient measures taken by the state to ensure these children had effective access to health, education, and social services. KINU's 2019 white paper evaluated the provision of special education to children with disabilities as poor.

Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

There are no laws against consensual same-sex sexual activity between adults, but little information was available on discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. NGOs expressed concern that decency and obscenity laws could be used legally to discriminate based on sexual orientation or gender identity. In 2014 the Korean Central News Agency, the state news agency, denied the existence of consensual same-sex sexual activity in the country. According to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) rights group Equaldex, no legal mechanisms exist for LGBTI individuals to protect against discrimination in housing and employment. Same-sex adoption is illegal. Equaldex characterized legal protections toward same-sex sexual activity, the right to change legal gender, and gay and lesbian persons serving openly in the military as ambiguous.

Section 7. Worker Rights

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

Workers do not have the right to form or join independent unions, bargain collectively, or strike. There were no known labor organizations other than those created and controlled by the government. While the law stipulates that employees working for foreign companies may form trade unions and that foreign enterprises must provide conditions for union activities, the law does not protect workers who might attempt to engage in union activities from employer retaliation, nor does it provide penalties for employers who interfere in union activities. Unlawful assembly may result in five years of correctional labor.

The WPK purportedly represents the interests of all labor. The WPK Central Committee directly controls several labor organizations in the country, including the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea and the Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea. Operating under this umbrella, unions functioned according to a classic Stalinist model, with responsibility for mobilizing workers to support production goals and for providing health, education, cultural, and welfare facilities, and did not provide a vehicle for worker voice.

The government controlled all aspects of the formal employment sector, including assigning jobs and determining wages. Joint ventures and foreign-owned companies were required to hire employees from government-vetted lists. The government organized factory and farm workers into councils, which purportedly afforded a mechanism for workers to provide input into management decisions.

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor. Nonetheless, the government mobilized the population for construction and other labor projects. "Reformatory labor" and "re-education through labor," sometimes of entire families, were common punishments for political offenses. Forced and compulsory labor in such activities as logging, mining, tending crops, and manufacturing continued to be the common fate of political prisoners.

The law requires all citizens of working age to work and "strictly observe labor discipline and working hours." There were numerous reports that farms and factories did not pay wages or provide food to their workers. Forced labor continued to take place in the brick making, cement manufacturing, coal mining, gold mining, logging, iron production, agriculture, and textile industries. The Walk Free Foundation, in its 2018 Global Slavery Index, estimated that one of every 10 individuals, or approximately 2.6 million persons, in the country were in situations of modern slavery.

According to reports from an NGO, during the implementation of short-term economic plans, factories and farms increased workers' hours and asked workers for contributions of grain and money to purchase supplies for renovations and repairs. By law failure to meet economic plan goals may result in two years of "labor correction." In 2019 workers were reportedly required to work at enterprises to which the government assigned them and then the enterprises failed to compensate or undercompensated them for their work. In June women in Hyesan reported that government officials required all women in the area to work daily on construction and other projects. Those physically unable to work had to pay a fine, and security forces arrested evaders.

The May 2019 UN report The Price Is Rights noted work "outside the State system, in the informal sector, has become a fundamental means to survival [but] access to work in the informal sector has become contingent on the payment of bribes." In addition NGOs and media reported that stricter border and internal travel restrictions, due to government fears concerning the spread of COVID-19, made it extremely difficult for persons to pursue a living through informal trading. The HRNK's September report entitled Imagery Analysis of Kyo-hwa-so No. 12, Jongno-ri, Update 3 detailed the use of forced labor by prison officials in the production of false eyelashes.

According to Open North Korea's report Sweatshop North Korea, 16- or 17-year-old individuals from the low-loyalty class were assigned to 10 years of forced labor in military-style construction youth brigades. One worker reportedly earned a mere 120 won (less than $0.15) per month. During a 200-day labor mobilization campaign in 2016, for example, these young workers worked as many as 17 hours per day. State media boasted that the laborers worked in subzero temperatures. One laborer reported conditions were so dangerous while building an apartment building that at least one person died each time a floor was added. Loyalty class status also determines lifelong job assignments, with the lowest classes relegated to dangerous mines.

HRW reported the government operated regional, local, or subdistrict level "labor training centers" and forced detainees to work for short periods doing hard labor, with little food and subject to abuse, including regular beatings. Authorities reportedly sent individuals to such centers if suspected of engaging in simple trading schemes or unemployed. In 2018 the HRNK reported that thousands of citizens including children were detained in prison-like conditions in these centers and suggested that satellite imagery indicated the number and size of such camps were expanding.

The vast majority of North Koreans employed outside the DPRK were located in Russia and China. Workers were also reportedly in the following countries: Angola, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Iran, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, South Sudan, and Vietnam. Some of these countries subsequently removed most or all of these workers during the year. Reports suggested several countries either had not taken action or had resumed issuing work authorizations or other documentation, allowing these individuals to resume work.

Numerous NGOs noted workers abroad were subjected to forced labor. NGO reports indicated the government managed these laborers as a matter of state policy and that they were under constant and close surveillance by government security agents. Laborers worked between 12 and 16 hours per day, and sometimes up to 20 hours per day, with only one or two rest days per month. Employers stated the average wage was 270,000 to 900,000 won per month ($300 to $1,000), but in most cases employing firms paid salaries directly to the government, which took between 70 percent and 90 percent of the total earnings, leaving approximately 90,000 won ($100) per month for worker take-home pay. The government reportedly received hundreds of millions of dollars from this system each year. The state reportedly withheld some wages in certain instances until the laborers returned home after the completion of their three-year contracts. Workers reportedly worked in a range of industries, including but not limited to apparel, construction, footwear manufacturing, hospitality, information technology services, logging, medical, pharmaceuticals, restaurant, seafood processing, textiles, and shipbuilding.

Also see the Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ .

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

By law the state prohibits work by children younger than age 16 and restricts children 16 to 17 from working in hazardous conditions. The law criminalizes forced child labor, but there were reports such practices occurred. NGOs reported government officials held thousands of children and forced them to work in labor camps with their parents.

Officials occasionally sent schoolchildren to work in factories or fields for short periods to assist in completing special projects, such as snow removal on major roads or meeting production goals. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted children were also sometimes subjected to mass mobilizations in agriculture away from their families, with long working hours per day, sometimes for periods of a month at a time. HRW previously published students' reports that their schools forced them to work without compensation on farms twice a year for one month each time. HRW also reported schools required students under the minimum working age to work in order to raise funds for faculty salaries and maintenance costs for school facilities. According to August 2019 media reports, students ages 14 and 15 were required to work in WPK opium fields.

Children ages 16 and 17 were enrolled in military-style youth construction brigades for 10-year periods and subjected to long working hours and hazardous work. Students suffered from physical and psychological injuries, malnutrition, exhaustion, and growth deficiencies as a result of required forced labor.

d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation

While the law provides that all citizens "may enjoy equal rights in all spheres of state and public activities" and all "able-bodied persons may choose occupations in accordance with their wishes and skills," the law does not prohibit discrimination with respect to employment or occupation based on race, religion, ethnicity, or other factors. There is no direct reference to employment discrimination in the law; classification based on the songbun loyalty system has a bearing on equal employment opportunities and equal pay.

Despite the law according women equal social status and rights, societal and legal discrimination against women continued. Labor laws and directives mandate sex segregation of the workforce, assigning specific jobs to women while impeding access of others to these jobs. Women's retirement age is also set at age 55, compared with age 60 for men, which has material consequences for women's pension benefits, economic independence, and access to decision-making positions.

Persons with disabilities also faced employment discrimination. Most of the approximately 1,200 workshops or light factories for persons with disabilities built in the 1950s were reportedly no longer operational; there were limited inclusive workplaces.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no legal minimum wage in the country. No reliable data were available on the minimum wage paid by state-owned enterprises. Wages are sometimes paid at least partially in kind rather than in cash.

The law stipulates an eight-hour workday, although some sources reported that laborers worked longer hours, perhaps including additional time for mandatory study of the writings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The law provides all citizens with a "right to rest," including one day's rest per week (Sunday), paid leave, holidays, and access to sanitariums and rest homes funded at public expense. The state's willingness and ability to provide these services were unknown, however.

The law recognizes the state's responsibility for providing modern and hygienic working conditions. The law criminalizes the failure to heed "labor safety orders" pertaining to worker safety and workplace conditions but only if the conditions result in the loss of lives or other "grave loss." Workers themselves do not have a designated right to remove themselves from hazardous working conditions. No information is available on enforcement of labor laws.

Mandatory participation in mass events on holidays and practice sessions for such events sometimes compromised leave or rest from work. Workers were often required to "celebrate" at least some part of public holidays with their work units and were able to spend an entire day with their families only if the holiday lasted two days. Failures to pay wages were common and reportedly drove some workers to seek income-generating activity in the informal or underground economy.

Many worksites were hazardous, and the industrial accident rate was high.

Endnote: Note on Sourcing
The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The DPRK does not allow representatives of foreign governments, journalists, or other invited guests the freedom of movement that would enable them to assess fully human rights conditions or confirm reported abuses.

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North Korea - United States Department of State

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The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is an authoritarian state led by the Kim family since 1949. Shortly after Kim Jong Il's death in 2011, his son Kim Jong Un was named marshal of the country and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army.

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Cold War & Korean War (General Overview)

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Cold War & Korean War (General Overview)

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Table of Contents

1. North vs. South Korea

2. The Korean War and the Cold War

3. 'No Substitute for Victory'

4. The Korean War Reaches a Stalemate

5. Korean War Casualties&nbsp;

The Korean war began on June 25, 1950, when some 75,000 soldiers from the North Korean People's Army poured across the 38th parallel, the boundary between the Soviet-backed Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the north and the pro-Western Republic of Korea to the south. This invasion was the first military action of the Cold War. By July, American troops had entered the war on South Korea's behalf. As far as American officials were concerned, it was a war against the forces of international communism itself. After some early back-and-forth across the 38th parallel, the fighting stalled and casualties mounted with nothing to show for them. Meanwhile, American officials worked anxiously to fashion some sort of armistice with the North Koreans. The alternative, they feared, would be a wider war with Russia and China-or even, as some warned, World War III. Finally, in July 1953, the Korean War came to an end. In all, some 5 million soldiers and civilians lost their lives in what many in the U.S. refer to as "the Forgotten War" for the lack of attention it received compared to more well-known conflicts like World War I and II and the Vietnam War. The Korean peninsula remains divided today.

North vs. South Korea

"If the best minds in the world had set out to find us the worst possible location in the world to fight this damnable war," U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893-1971) once said, "the unanimous choice would have been Korea." The peninsula had landed in America's lap almost by accident. Since the beginning of the 20th century, Korea had been a part of the Japanese empire, and after World War II it fell to the Americans and the Soviets to decide what should be done with their enemy's imperial possessions. In August 1945, two young aides at the State Department divided the Korean peninsula in half along the 38th parallel. The Russians occupied the area north of the line and the United States occupied the area to its south.

Did you know? Unlike World War II and Vietnam, the Korean War did not get much media attention in the United States. The most famous representation of the war in popular culture is the television series "M*A*S*H," which was set in a field hospital in South Korea. The series ran from 1972 until 1983, and its final episode was the most-watched in television history.

By the end of the decade, two new states had formed on the peninsula. In the south, the anti-communist dictator Syngman Rhee (1875-1965) enjoyed the reluctant support of the American government; in the north, the communist dictator Kim Il Sung (1912-1994) enjoyed the slightly more enthusiastic support of the Soviets. Neither dictator was content to remain on his side of the 38th parallel, however, and border skirmishes were common. Nearly 10,000 North and South Korean soldiers were killed in battle before the war even began.

The Korean War and the Cold War

Even so, the North Korean invasion came as an alarming surprise to American officials. As far as they were concerned, this was not simply a border dispute between two unstable dictatorships on the other side of the globe. Instead, many feared it was the first step in a communist campaign to take over the world. For this reason, nonintervention was not considered an option by many top decision makers. (In fact, in April 1950, a National Security Council report known as NSC-68 had recommended that the United States use military force to "contain" communist expansionism anywhere it seemed to be occurring, "regardless of the intrinsic strategic or economic value of the lands in question.")

"If we let Korea down," President Harry Truman (1884-1972) said, "the Soviet[s] will keep right on going and swallow up one [place] after another." The fight on the Korean peninsula was a symbol of the global struggle between east and west, good and evil, in the Cold War. As the North Korean army pushed into Seoul, the South Korean capital, the United States readied its troops for a war against communism itself.

At first, the war was a defensive one to get the communists out of South Korea, and it went badly for the Allies. The North Korean army was well-disciplined, well-trained and well-equipped; Rhee's forces in the South Korean army, by contrast, were frightened, confused and seemed inclined to flee the battlefield at any provocation. Also, it was one of the hottest and driest summers on record, and desperately thirsty American soldiers were often forced to drink water from rice paddies that had been fertilized with human waste. As a result, dangerous intestinal diseases and other illnesses were a constant threat.

By the end of the summer, President Truman and General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), the commander in charge of the Asian theater, had decided on a new set of war aims. Now, for the Allies, the Korean War was an offensive one: It was a war to "liberate" the North from the communists.

Initially, this new strategy was a success. The Inch'on Landing, an amphibious assault at Inch'on, pushed the North Koreans out of Seoul and back to their side of the 38th parallel. But as American troops crossed the boundary and headed north toward the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and Communist China, the Chinese started to worry about protecting themselves from what they called "armed aggression against Chinese territory." Chinese leader Mao Zedong (1893-1976) sent troops to North Korea and warned the United States to keep away from the Yalu boundary unless it wanted full-scale war.

'No Substitute for Victory'

This was something that President Truman and his advisers decidedly did not want: They were sure that such a war would lead to Soviet aggression in Europe, the deployment of atomic weapons and millions of senseless deaths. To General MacArthur, however, anything short of this wider war represented "appeasement," an unacceptable knuckling under to the communists.

As President Truman looked for a way to prevent war with the Chinese, MacArthur did all he could to provoke it. Finally, in March 1951, he sent a letter to Joseph Martin, a House Republican leader who shared MacArthur's support for declaring all-out war on China-and who could be counted upon to leak the letter to the press. "There is," MacArthur wrote, "no substitute for victory" against international communism.

For Truman, this letter was the last straw. On April 11, the president fired the general for insubordination.

The Korean War Reaches a Stalemate

In July 1951, President Truman and his new military commanders started peace talks at Panmunjom. Still, the fighting continued along the 38th parallel as negotiations stalled. Both sides were willing to accept a ceasefire that maintained the 38th parallel boundary, but they could not agree on whether prisoners of war should be forcibly "repatriated." (The Chinese and the North Koreans said yes; the United States said no.)

Finally, after more than two years of negotiations, the adversaries signed an armistice on July 27, 1953. The agreement allowed the POWs to stay where they liked; drew a new boundary near the 38th parallel that gave South Korea an extra 1,500 square miles of territory; and created a 2-mile-wide "demilitarized zone" that still exists today.

Korean War Casualties

The Korean War was relatively short but exceptionally bloody. Nearly 5 million people died. More than half of these-about 10 percent of Korea's prewar population-were civilians. (This rate of civilian casualties was higher than World War II's and the Vietnam War's.) Almost 40,000 Americans died in action in Korea, and more than 100,000 were wounded. Today, they are remembered at the Korean War Veterans Memorial near the Lincoln Memorial on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., a series of 19 steel statues of servicemen, and the Korean War memorial in Fullerton, California, the first on the West Coast to include the names of the more than 30,000 Americans who died in the war.

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Korean War - Causes, Timeline & Veterans

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On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began when some 75,000 soldiers from the North Korean People's Army poured across the 38th parallel, the boundary between the Soviet-backed Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the north and the pro-Western Republic of Korea to the south. Explore the war's causes, timeline, facts and end.

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Korean War | Combatants, Summary, Years, Map, Casualties, & Facts | Britannica

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The Korean War was a conflict (1950–53) between North Korea, aided by China, and South Korea, aided by the UN with the U.S. as the principal participant. At least 2.5 million people lost their lives in the fighting, which ended in July 1953 with Korea still divided into two hostile states separated by the 38th parallel.

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North Korea: The Problem That Won’t Go Away | Brookings

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Article by James Goodby, Axess (May 2003)

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North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, igniting the Korean War. Cold War assumptions governed the immediate reaction of US leaders, who instantly concluded that Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had ordered the invasion as the first step in his plan for world conquest. "Communism," President Harry S. Truman argued later in his memoirs, "was acting in Korea just as [Adolf] Hitler, [Benito] Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier." If North Korea's aggression went "unchallenged, the world was certain to be plunged into another world war." This 1930s history lesson prevented Truman from recognizing that the origins of this conflict dated to at least the start of World War II, when Korea was a colony of Japan. Liberation in August 1945 led to division and a predictable war because the US and the Soviet Union would not allow the Korean people to decide their own future.

Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely indifferent to its fate.

Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely in- different to its fate. But after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisors acknowledged at once the importance of this strategic peninsula for peace in Asia, advocating a postwar trusteeship to achieve Korea's independence. Late in 1943, Roosevelt joined British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek in signing the Cairo Declaration, stating that the Allies "are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, Stalin endorsed a four-power trusteeship in Korea. When Harry S. Truman became president after Roosevelt's death in April 1945, however, Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe had begun to alarm US leaders. An atomic attack on Japan, Truman thought, would preempt Soviet entry into the Pacific War and allow unilateral American occupation of Korea. His gamble failed. On August 8, Stalin declared war on Japan and sent the Red Army into Korea. Only Stalin's acceptance of Truman's eleventh-hour proposal to divide the peninsula into So- viet and American zones of military occupation at the thirty-eighth parallel saved Korea from unification under Communist rule.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that might strengthen its adversary.

US military occupation of southern Korea began on September 8, 1945. With very little preparation, Washing- ton redeployed the XXIV Corps under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge from Okinawa to Korea. US occupation officials, ignorant of Korea's history and culture, quickly had trouble maintaining order because al- most all Koreans wanted immediate in- dependence. It did not help that they followed the Japanese model in establishing an authoritarian US military government. Also, American occupation officials relied on wealthy land- lords and businessmen who could speak English for advice. Many of these citizens were former Japanese collaborators and had little interest in ordinary Koreans' reform demands. Meanwhile, Soviet military forces in northern Korea, after initial acts of rape, looting, and petty crime, implemented policies to win popular support. Working with local people's committees and indigenous Communists, Soviet officials enacted sweeping political, social, and economic changes. They also expropriated and punished landlords and collaborators, who fled southward and added to rising distress in the US zone. Simultaneously, the Soviets ignored US requests to coordinate occupation policies and allow free traffic across the parallel.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that might strengthen its adversary. This became clear when the US and the Soviet Union tried to implement a revived trusteeship plan after the Moscow Conference in December 1945. Eighteen months of intermittent bilateral negotiations in Korea failed to reach agreement on a representative group of Koreans to form a provisional government, primarily because Moscow refused to consult with anti-Communist politicians opposed to trustee- ship. Meanwhile, political instability and economic deterioration in southern Korea persisted, causing Hodge to urge withdrawal. Postwar US demobilization that brought steady reductions in defense spending fueled pressure for disengagement. In September 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) added weight to the withdrawal argument when they advised that Korea held no strategic significance. With Communist power growing in China, however, the Truman administration was unwilling to abandon southern Korea precipitously, fearing domestic criticism from Republicans and damage to US credibility abroad.

Seeking an answer to its dilemma, the US referred the Korean dispute to the United Nations, which passed a resolution late in 1947 calling for internationally supervised elections for a government to rule a united Korea. Truman and his advisors knew the Soviets would refuse to cooper- ate. Discarding all hope for early reunification, US policy by then had shifted to creating a separate South Korea, able to defend itself. Bowing to US pressure, the United Nations supervised and certified as valid obviously undemocratic elections in the south alone in May 1948, which resulted in formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August. The Soviet Union responded in kind, sponsoring the creation of the Democratic People's Re- public of Korea (DPRK) in September. There now were two Koreas, with President Syngman Rhee installing a repressive, dictatorial, and anti-Communist regime in the south, while wartime guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung imposed the totalitarian Stalinist model for political, economic, and social development on the north. A UN resolution then called for Soviet-American withdrawal. In December 1948, the Soviet Union, in response to the DPRK's request, removed its forces from North Korea.

South Korea's new government immediately faced violent opposition, climaxing in October 1948 with the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion. Despite plans to leave the south by the end of 1948, Truman delayed military withdrawal until June 29, 1949. By then, he had approved National Security Council (NSC) Paper 8/2, undertaking a commitment to train, equip, and supply an ROK security force capable of maintaining internal order and deterring a DPRK attack. In spring 1949, US military advisors supervised a dramatic improvement in ROK army fighting abilities. They were so successful that militant South Korean officers began to initiate assaults northward across the thirty-eighth parallel that summer. These attacks ignited major border clashes with North Korean forces. A kind of war was already underway on the peninsula when the conventional phase of Korea's conflict began on June 25, 1950. Fears that Rhee might initiate an offensive to achieve reunification explain why the Truman administration limited ROK military capabilities, withholding tanks, heavy artillery, and warplanes.

Pursuing qualified containment in Korea, Truman asked Congress for three-year funding of economic aid to the ROK in June 1949. To build sup- port for its approval, on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Ache- son's speech to the National Press Club depicted an optimistic future for South Korea. Six months later, critics charged that his exclusion of the ROK from the US "defensive perimeter" gave the Communists a "green light" to launch an invasion. However, Soviet documents have established that Acheson's words had almost no impact on Communist invasion planning. Moreover, by June 1950, the US policy of containment in Korea through economic means appeared to be experiencing marked success. The ROK had acted vigorously to control spiraling inflation, and Rhee's opponents won legislative control in May elections. As important, the ROK army virtually eliminated guerrilla activities, threatening internal order in South Korea, causing the Truman administration to propose a sizeable military aid increase. Now optimistic about the ROK's prospects for survival, Washington wanted to deter a conventional attack from the north.

Stalin worried about South Korea's threat to North Korea's survival. Throughout 1949, he consistently refused to approve Kim Il Sung's persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. Communist victory in China in fall 1949 pressured Stalin to show his support for a similar Korean outcome. In January 1950, he and Kim discussed plans for an invasion in Moscow, but the Soviet dictator was not ready to give final consent. How- ever, he did authorize a major expansion of the DPRK's military capabilities. At an April meeting, Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy because of southern guerilla support and an anticipated popular uprising against Rhee's regime. Still fearing US military intervention, Stalin informed Kim that he could invade only if Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing to gain the consent of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Significantly, Mao also voiced concern that the Americans would defend the ROK but gave his reluctant approval as well. Kim Il Sung's patrons had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On the morning of June 25, 1950, the Korean People's Army (KPA) launched its military offensive to conquer South Korea. Rather than immediately committing ground troops, Truman's first action was to approve referral of the matter to the UN Security Council because he hoped the ROK military could defend itself with primarily indirect US assistance. The UN Security Council's first resolution called on North Korea to accept a cease- fire and withdraw, but the KPA continued its advance. On June 27, a second resolution requested that member nations provide support for the ROK's defense. Two days later, Truman, still optimistic that a total commitment was avoidable, agreed in a press conference with a newsman's description of the conflict as a "police action." His actions reflected an existing policy that sought to block Communist expansion in Asia without using US military power, thereby avoiding increases in defense spending. But early on June 30, he reluctantly sent US ground troops to Korea after General Douglas MacArthur, US Occupation commander in Japan, advised that failure to do so meant certain Communist destruction of the ROK.

Kim Il Sung's patrons [Stalin and Mao] had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On July 7, 1950, the UN Security Council created the United Nations Command (UNC) and called on Truman to appoint a UNC commander. The president immediately named MacArthur, who was required to submit periodic reports to the United Nations on war developments. The ad- ministration blocked formation of a UN committee that would have direct access to the UNC commander, instead adopting a procedure whereby MacArthur received instructions from and reported to the JCS. Fifteen members joined the US in defending the ROK, but 90 percent of forces were South Korean and American with the US providing weapons, equipment, and logistical support. Despite these American commitments, UNC forces initially suffered a string of defeats. By July 20, the KPA shattered five US battalions as it advanced one hundred miles south of Seoul, the ROK capital. Soon, UNC forces finally stopped the KPA at the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula.

On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea

Despite the UNC's desperate situation during July, MacArthur developed plans for a counteroffensive in coordination with an amphibious landing behind enemy lines allowing him to "compose and unite" Korea. State Department officials began to lobby for forcible reunification once the UNC assumed the offensive, arguing that the US should destroy the KPA and hold free elections for a government to rule a united Korea. The JCS had grave doubts about the wisdom of landing at the port of Inchon, twenty miles west of Seoul, because of narrow access, high tides, and sea- walls, but the September 15 operation was a spectacular success. It allowed the US Eighth Army to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and advance north to unite with the X Corps, liberating Seoul two weeks later and sending the KPA scurrying back into North Korea. A month earlier, the administration had abandoned its initial war aim of merely restoring the status quo. On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea.

Invading the DPRK was an incredible blunder that transformed a three-month war into one lasting three years. US leaders had realized that extension of hostilities risked Soviet or Chinese entry, and therefore, NSC- 81 included the precaution that only Korean units would move into the most northern provinces. On October 2, PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai warned the Indian ambassador that China would intervene in Korea if US forces crossed the parallel, but US officials thought he was bluffing. The UNC offensive began on October 7, after UN passage of a resolution authorizing MacArthur to "ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea." At a meeting at Wake Island on October 15, MacArthur assured Truman that China would not enter the war, but Mao already had decided to intervene after concluding that Beijing could not tolerate US challenges to its regional credibility. He also wanted to repay the DPRK for sending thou- sands of soldiers to fight in the Chinese civil war. On August 5, Mao instructed his northeastern military district commander to prepare for operations in Korea in the first ten days of September. China's dictator then muted those associates opposing intervention.

On October 19, units of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) under the command of General Peng Dehuai crossed the Yalu River. Five days later, MacArthur ordered an offensive to China's border with US forces in the vanguard. When the JCS questioned this violation of NSC-81, MacArthur replied that he had discussed this action with Truman on Wake Island. Having been wrong in doubting Inchon, the JCS remained silent this time. Nor did MacArthur's superiors object when he chose to retain a divided command. Even after the first clash between UNC and CPV troops on October 26, the general remained supremely confident. One week later, the Chinese sharply attacked advancing UNC and ROK forces. In response, MacArthur ordered air strikes on Yalu bridges without seeking Washing- ton's approval. Upon learning this, the JCS prohibited the assaults, pending Truman's approval. MacArthur then asked that US pilots receive permission for "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft fleeing into Manchuria. He was infuriated upon learning that the British were advancing a UN proposal to halt the UNC offensive well short of the Yalu to avert war with China, viewing the measure as appeasement.

On November 24, MacArthur launched his "Home-by-Christmas Offensive." The next day, the CPV counterattacked en masse, sending UNC forces into a chaotic retreat southward and causing the Truman administration immediately to consider pursuing a Korean cease-fire. In several public pronouncements, MacArthur blamed setbacks not on himself but on unwise command limitations. In response, Truman approved a directive to US officials that State Department approval was required for any comments about the war. Later that month, MacArthur submitted a four- step "Plan for Victory" to defeat the Communists-a naval blockade of China's coast, authorization to bombard military installations in Manchuria, deployment of Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist forces in Korea, and launching of an attack on mainland China from Taiwan. The JCS, despite later denials, considered implementing these actions before receiving favorable battlefield reports.

Early in 1951, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, new commander of the US Eighth Army, halted the Communist southern advance. Soon, UNC counterattacks restored battle lines north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In March, MacArthur, frustrated by Washington's refusal to escalate the war, issued a demand for immediate surrender to the Communists that sabotaged a planned cease-fire initiative. Truman reprimanded but did not recall the general. On April 5, House Republican Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin Jr. read MacArthur's letter in Congress, once again criticizing the administration's efforts to limit the war. Truman later argued that this was the "last straw." On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the president fired MacArthur, justifying his action as a defense of the constitutional principle of civilian control over the military, but another consideration may have exerted even greater influence on Truman. The JCS had been monitoring a Communist military buildup in East Asia and thought a trusted UNC commander should have standing authority to retaliate against Soviet or Chinese escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons that they had deployed to forward Pacific bases. Truman and his advisors, as well as US allies, distrusted MacArthur, fearing that he might provoke an incident to widen the war.

MacArthur's recall ignited a firestorm of public criticism against both Truman and the war. The general returned to tickertape parades and, on April 19, 1951, he delivered a televised address before a joint session of Congress, defending his actions and making this now-famous assertion: "In war there is no substitute for victory." During Senate joint committee hearings on his firing in May, MacArthur denied that he was guilty of in- subordination. General Omar N. Bradley, the JCS chair, made the administration's case, arguing that enacting MacArthur's proposals would lead to "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." Meanwhile, in April, the Communists launched the first of two major offensives in a final effort to force the UNC off the peninsula. When May ended, the CPV and KPA had suffered huge losses, and a UNC counteroffensive then restored the front north of the parallel, persuading Beijing and Pyongyang, as was already the case in Washington, that pursuit of a cease-fire was necessary. The belligerents agreed to open truce negotiations on July 10 at Kaesong, a neutral site that the Communists deceitfully occupied on the eve of the first session.

North Korea and China created an acrimonious atmosphere with at- tempts at the outset to score propaganda points, but the UNC raised the first major roadblock with its proposal for a demilitarized zone extending deep into North Korea. More important, after the talks moved to Panmunjom in October, there was rapid progress in resolving almost all is- sues, including establishment of a demilitarized zone along the battle lines, truce enforcement inspection procedures, and a postwar political conference to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops and reunification. An armistice could have been concluded ten months after talks began had the negotiators not deadlocked over the disposition of prisoners of war (POWs). Rejecting the UNC proposal for non-forcible repatriation, the Communists demanded adherence to the Geneva Convention that required return of all POWs. Beijing and Pyongyang were guilty of hypocrisy regarding this matter because they were subjecting UNC prisoners to unspeakable mistreatment and indoctrination.

On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the presi- dent fired MacArthur.

Truman ordered that the UNC delegation assume an inflexible stand against returning Communist prisoners to China and North Korea against their will. "We will not buy an armistice," he insisted, "by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery." Although Truman unquestionably believed in the moral rightness of his position, he was not unaware of the propaganda value derived from Communist prisoners defecting to the "free world." His advisors, however, withheld evidence from him that contradicted this assessment. A vast majority of North Korean POWs were actually South Koreans who either joined voluntarily or were impressed into the KPA. Thousands of Chinese POWs were Nationalist soldiers trapped in China at the end of the civil war, who now had the chance to escape to Taiwan. Chinese Nationalist guards at UNC POW camps used terrorist "re-education" tactics to compel prisoners to refuse repatriation; resisters risked beatings or death, and repatriates were even tattooed with anti- Communist slogans.

In November 1952, angry Americans elected Dwight D. Eisenhower president, in large part because they expected him to end what had be- come the very unpopular "Mr. Truman's War." Fulfilling a campaign pledge, the former general visited Korea early in December, concluding that further ground attacks would be futile. Simultaneously, the UN General Assembly called for a neutral commission to resolve the dispute over POW repatriation. Instead of embracing the plan, Eisenhower, after taking office in January 1953, seriously considered threatening a nuclear attack on China to force a settlement. Signaling his new resolve, Eisenhower announced on February 2 that he was ordering removal of the US Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, implying endorsement for a Nationalist assault on the mainland. What influenced China more was the devastating impact of the war. By summer 1952, the PRC faced huge domestic economic problems and likely decided to make peace once Truman left office. Major food shortages and physical devastation persuaded Pyongyang to favor an armistice even earlier.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953.

Early in 1953, China and North Korea were prepared to resume the truce negotiations, but the Communists preferred that the Americans make the first move. That came on February 22 when the UNC, repeating a Red Cross proposal, suggested exchanging sick and wounded prisoners. At this key moment, Stalin died on March 5. Rather than dissuading the PRC and the DPRK as Stalin had done, his successors encouraged them to act on their desire for peace. On March 28, the Communist side accepted the UNC proposal. Two days later, Zhou Enlai publicly proposed transfer of prisoners rejecting repatriation to a neutral state. On April 20, Operation Little Switch, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, began, and six days later, negotiations resumed at Panmunjom. Sharp disagreement followed over the final details of the truce agreement. Eisenhower insisted later that the PRC accepted US terms after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed India's prime minister in May that without progress toward a truce, the US would terminate the existing limitations on its conduct of the war. No documentary evidence has of yet surfaced to support his assertion.

Also, by early 1953, both Washington and Beijing clearly wanted an armistice, having tired of the economic burdens, military losses, political and military constraints, worries about an expanded war, and pressure from allies and the world community to end the stalemated conflict. A steady stream of wartime issues threatened to inflict irrevocable damage on US relations with its allies in Western Europe and nonaligned members of the United Nations. Indeed, in May 1953, US bombing of North Korea's dams and irrigation system ignited an outburst of world criticism. Later that month and early in June, the CPV staged powerful attacks against ROK defensive positions. Far from being intimidated, Beijing thus displayed its continuing resolve, using military means to persuade its adversary to make concessions on the final terms. Before the belligerents could sign the agreement, Rhee tried to torpedo the impending truce when he released 27,000 North Korean POWs. Eisenhower bought Rhee's acceptance of a cease-fire with pledges of financial aid and a mutual security pact.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953. Since then, Koreans have seen the war as the second-greatest tragedy in their recent history after Japanese colonial rule. Not only did it cause devastation and three million deaths, it also confirmed the division of a homogeneous society after thirteen centuries of unity, while permanently separating millions of families. Meanwhile, US wartime spending jump-started Japan's economy, which led to its emergence as a global power. Koreans instead had to endure the living tragedy of yearning for reunification, as diplomatic tension and military clashes along the demilitarized zone continued into the twenty-first century.

Korea's war also dramatically reshaped world affairs. In response, US leaders vastly increased defense spending, strengthened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily, and pressed for rearming West Germany. In Asia, the conflict saved Chiang's regime on Taiwan, while making South Korea a long-term client of the US. US relations with China were poisoned for twenty years, especially after Washington persuaded the United Nations to condemn the PRC for aggression in Korea. Ironically, the war helped Mao's regime consolidate its control in China, while elevating its regional prestige. In response, US leaders, acting on what they saw as Korea's primary lesson, relied on military means to meet the challenge, with disastrous results in Việt Nam.

SUGGESTED RESOURCES

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean Conflict. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999.

"Korea: Lessons of the Forgotten War." YouTube video, 2:20, posted by KRT Productions Inc., 2000. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fi31OoQfD7U.

Lee, Steven Hugh. The Korean War. New York: Longman, 2001.

Matray, James I. "Korea's War at Sixty: A Survey of the Literature." Cold War History 11, no. 1 (February 2011): 99-129.

US Department of Defense. Korea 1950-1953, accessed July 9, 2012, http://koreanwar.defense.gov/index.html.

JAMES I. MATRAY joined the faculty of California State University, Chico, in 2002 as Department Chair and Professor of History. Author or editor of seven books, he also has published over fifty articles, book chapters, and essays on US-Korean relations since World War II. His most recent publications are Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Japan, China, and the Two Koreas (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2012); "Mixed Message: The Korean Armistice Talks at Kaesong," in Pacific Historical Review (2012), and "Needless Quarrel: President George W. Bush Confronts North Korea," International Journal of Korean Studies (spring/summer 2013).

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The Korean War 101: Causes, Course, and Conclusion of the Conflict - Association for Asian Studies

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North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, igniting the Korean War. Cold War assumptions governed the immediate reaction of US leaders, who instantly concluded that Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had ordered the invasion as the first step in his plan for world conquest. "Communism," President Harry S.

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firsthand stories from people in/from NK

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firsthand stories from people in/from NK

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In late 2014, police officers entered the home of Lim Ok Kyung, a smuggler in her forties from North Korea's South Hwanghae province. The police were looking for, and found, home appliances smuggled from China. Lim Ok Kyung was detained at a detention and interrogation facility ( kuryujang) run by the police near the border. Her husband, a mid-level party member, had good connections, so she was released after 10 days. Yet that did not prevent the investigator or police guards from beating her. Lim Ok Kyung described her experience to Human Rights Watch:

The investigator didn't hit me at the waiting cell (daegisil). But they hit me during questioning.... First, they said to write everything, everything from the moment of my birth until the present. I had to write my whole story
for hours.

The next day the preliminary examination officer came in, said what I wrote was a lie, and asked me to write it again.... When things didn't match, he slapped me in the face.... Beatings were hardest the first day... [At the individual cell,] some guards who passed by would hit me with their hands or kick me with their boots..... For five days, they forced me to stay standing and didn't let me sleep.... When a police guard I knew came in, they'd give me candy saying I was suffering, they'd let me sit and rest. But when the guards I didn't know were in charge of watching me... they wouldn't let me sleep.

Yoon Young Cheol, at the time a government worker in his thirties, also experienced the arbitrariness of the North Korean legal system. On a winter night in 2011, five men dressed as police officers entered his home and took him to the office of the secret police ( bowibu) in the city bordering China where he lived. Yoon Young Cheol was detained and, before he was even questioned, severely beaten. It was only the next day that he found out that somebody had accused him of being a spy. He told Human Rights Watch:

They put me in a waiting cell. It was small and I was alone. They searched my body. Afterwards, the head of the city's secret police department, the party's political affairs head, and the investigator came in. It was very serious, but I didn't know why. They just beat me up for 30 minutes, they kicked me with their boots, and punched me with their fists, everywhere on my body....

The next day they moved me to the next room, which was a detention and interrogation facility cell, and my preliminary examination started. But the questioning didn't really have any protocols or procedures. They just beat me.... The preliminary examiner hit me violently first... I asked, 'Why? Why? Why?' but I didn't get an answer.... As the questioning went on, I found out that I had been reported as a spy. Violent beatings and hitting were constant in the beginning of [the preliminary examination] questioning for one month. They kicked me with their boots, punched me with their fists or hit me with a thick stick, all over my body. After [when they had most of my confession ready], they were gentler.

Six months later, Yoon Young Cheol says the secret police concluded that he was not a spy and passed him over to the police. The police then investigated him for two more months on allegations of smuggling forbidden products such as herbal medicines, copper, or gold. After a summary trial, Yoon Young Cheol was sentenced to unpaid hard labor for five years. He explained that anybody making noteworthy amounts of money in North Korea can easily be found guilty of crimes, as most profit-making activities can be considered illegal.

The experiences of Lim Ok Kyung and Yoon Young Cheol are hardly unique. As is widely known, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) is one of the most repressive countries in the world. It is a totalitarian, militaristic, nationalistic, and highly corrupt state. All basic civil, political, social and economic rights are severely restricted under the rule of Kim Jong Un and his family's political dynasty. The ruling party and government use the constitution, laws and regulations, control of the legal and justice system, and other methods to legitimize Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and government directives.

In 2014, a United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) on human rights in the DPRK established that systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations committed by the North Korean government constituted crimes against humanity. These crimes include murder, extermination, imprisonment, enslavement, persecution, as well as enforced disappearances of and sexual violence perpetrated against North Koreans in prison and in detention after forced repatriation. The COI also documented torture, humiliation, and intimidation, as well as deliberate starvation, during investigation and questioning in pretrial detention and interrogation facilities as an established feature of the process in efforts to subdue detainees and extract confessions, particularly from people forcibly returned from China to North Korea.

This report-based largely on research and interviews conducted with 22 North Koreans detained in detention and interrogation facilities after 2011 (when Kim Jong Un came to power) and eight former North Korean officials who fled the country-provides new information on North Korea's opaque pretrial detention and investigation system. It describes the criminal investigation process; North Korea's weak legal and institutional framework; the dependence of law enforcement and the judiciary on the ruling WPK; the apparent presumption of guilt; bribery and corruption; and inhumane conditions and mistreatment of those in detention and interrogation facilities ( kuryujang) that often amounts to torture.

Because North Korea is a "closed" country, not much is known about the legal processes in its pretrial detention system, but the experiences of those interviewed and the other evidence detailed below, show that torture, humiliation, coerced confessions, hunger, unhygienic conditions, and the necessity of connections and bribes to avoid the worst treatment appear to be fundamental characteristics.

Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that once a detainee faces an official investigation ( susa), there is little chance of avoiding short-term sentences of unpaid hard labor at detention centers ( rodong d anryeondae, literally "labor training centers") or a long-term or life sentence of hard labor at an ordinary crimes prison camp ( rodong kyohwaso, literally "reform through labor centers").

All former detainees told Human Rights Watch that they were forced to sit still on the floor, kneeling or with their legs crossed, fists or hands on top of their laps, heads down, with their eyesight directed to the floor for 7-8 hours or, in some cases, 13-16 hours a day. If a detainee moves, guards punish the detainee or order collective punishment for all detainees. Abuse, torture, and punishment, including for failing to remain immobilized when ordered, appear to be more acute when interrogators are attempting to obtain confessions. Because detainees are treated as though they are inferior human beings, unworthy of direct eye contact with law enforcement officers, they are referred to by a number instead of their names. Some female detainees reported sexual harassment and assault, including rape.

Interviewees described unhealthy and unhygienic detention conditions: very little food with low nutritious value (80-200 grams of boiled corn and soup with wild greens or radishes three times a day), overcrowded cells with no space to sleep, little opportunity to bathe, and a lack of blankets, clothes, soap, and menstrual hygiene supplies. At times, guards or interrogators allowed family members or friends to bring food, clothes, soap, blankets, or money after questioning was over. Bribes and connections could persuade law enforcement officials to ignore or reduce the charges, improve conditions and treatment while in detention, or even have the case dismissed entirely.

North Korean laws are generally vaguely phrased, and while they make passing reference to certain rights, they do not include important safeguards for defendant and detainee rights set forth in international standards. They contain important omissions and lack clear definitions, leaving them open to interpretation and maximizing the discretion of government officials to decide how, or indeed whether, to execute the law.

For instance, North Korean law recognizes citizens' right to a fair trial, and testimonies obtained under duress or inducement and confessions that are the sole evidence of proof are not supposed to be used in court. However, there is no prohibition against using evidence gathered illegally, and no safeguard for the presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination, or the right to remain silent. The DPRK Criminal Code and the DPRK Criminal Procedure Code do not contain any provisions allowing for judicial review of detention at the investigation or preliminary examination stages. And, because the ruling party controls all institutions in North Korea, the Party Security Committee ( dang anjeon wiwonhoi) has to give approval for law enforcement agents to finalize a decision to pursue criminal charges.

Boanseong: police, Ministry of People's Security, full name inmin boanseong, renamed in May 2020 as the Ministry of Social Security, in Korean s ahoe anjeonseong, formerly also called boanbu

police, currently called s ahoe anjeonseong

Boanseong danryeondae: short-term (between six months and one year) hard labor detention center run by the police

Bowi saryeongbu: Military Security Command

secret police, State Security Department, full name kugga anjeon bowibu, currently called bowiseong

secret police, Ministry of State Security, full name kugga bowiseong, formerly called bowibu

Chepo: arrest with a warrant

Daegisil: holding cell, literally "waiting room"

Dang anjeon wiwonhoi: Party Security Committee

Dansok: Regulation, control, crackdown

Do: province

Gugumsil: jail, holding cell in small or remote security and law enforcement agency offices, literally "detention room"

Gun/Guyeok: district

methamphetamines, also called bingdu

Inmin boanseong: Ministry of People's Security, police, often referred to as boanseong

Inminban: neighborhood watch system, literally "people's unit/group"

Jangmadang: private markets

Jeongsang: severity, circumstances (of a crime)

Jipkyulso: temporary holding facility, literally "gathering place"

Kimchi: vegetables, usually cabbage, fermented with salt and other spices

Kukga bowiseong: Ministry of State Security, secret police, often called bowiseong, formerly called bowibu

Kuryu: detention without a warrant

Kuryujang: pretrial detention and interrogation facility, literally "place for detention"

Kwanliso: penal hard labor colony for serious political crimes or political prisoners' camps, literally "control center"

long-term (over one year) hard labor ordinary crimes prison camp, also called rodong kyohwaso or re-education camp, literally "reform through labor center"

Mugi rodong kyohwahyeong: unpaid hard labor for life at ordinary crimes prison camps ( kyohwaso), literally "life-term of reform through labor criminal penalty"

Ri: village

Rodong danryeondae: short-term (less than six months) hard labor detention center, literally "labor training center"

Rodong danryeonghyeong: short-term (between six months and one year) unpaid hard labor sentence, literally "labor training criminal penalty"

Rodong kyohwahyeong: long-term (more than one year)unpaid hard labor sentence at hard labor ordinary crimes prison camps ( rodong kyohwaso), literally"reform through labor criminal penalty"

Rodong kyohwaso: long-term (over one year)hard labor ordinary crimes prison camp, sometimes also called re-education camp or kyohwaso, literally "reform through labor center"

Rodong kyoyang cheobun: short-term (between five days and six months) unpaid hard labor administrative penalty, literally "labor awareness penalty"

ahoe anjeonseong: police, also referred to as anjeonseong, formerly called boanbu or boanseong

Sahoejeok kyoyang cheobun: short-term administrative penalty to be spent self-reflecting on proper citizenshipmorality, literally "social awareness penalty"

Si: city

Suryong: Supreme Leader

Susa: investigation

Songbun: a socio-political classification system, literally "ingredient, element"

Yesim: preliminary examination

Yesimwon: preliminary examination officer or preliminary examiner

Yugi rodong kyohwahyeong: fixed long-term (between one and 15 years) unpaid hard labor at hard labor ordinary crimes prison camps, literally "limited term of reform through labor criminal penalty"

CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child

CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

COI Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DPRKDemocratic People's Republic of Korea

FIDH International Federation for Human Rights

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

KINU Korea Institute of National Unification

MPS Ministry of People's Security

MSC Military Security Command

MSS Ministry of State Security

NKDB Database Center for North Korean Human Rights

OGD Organization Guidance Department

SPA Supreme People's Assembly

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN United Nations

WPK Workers' Party of Korea

To the North Korean Government

North Korea rarely publishes data on any aspect of life in the country. When it does, it is often limited, inconsistent, inaccurate, or otherwise of questionable utility. North Korea strictly limits foreigners' access to the country and contact between local residents and foreigners. It does not allow independent human rights research of any kind in the country. For these reasons, Human Rights Watch did not conduct any interviews in North Korea for this report.

This report is based on interviews and research conducted by Human Rights Watch staff and a consultant between January 2015 and May 2020. Human Rights Watch interviewed 46 North Koreans outside the country. Among them, 22 (15 women and seven men) had been held in pretrial detention and interrogation facilities ( kuryujang) after 2011, when North Korea's current leader Kim Jong Un came to power.

We interviewed more women because they constitute the vast majority of North Koreans who are able to leave the country since surveillance is less stringent on women than men, and illegal networks are more willing to assist North Korean women as trafficked persons.

We also interviewed eight former government officials who worked at detention and interrogation facilities or had professional connections with them and who still have regular contacts in North Korea. These include three former police officers, a prison guard, an official from the Ministry of State Security (MSS, secret police, kukga bowiseong), a military officer who visited detention and interrogation facilities near the border, and two party officials.

All interviews were conducted in Korean. Interviewees were advised of the purpose of the research and how the information would be used. They were advised of the voluntary nature of the interview and that they could refuse to be interviewed, refuse to answer any question, and terminate the interview at any point. In all cases, interviews were conducted in surroundings chosen to enable interviewees to feel comfortable, relatively private, and secure.

Human Rights Watch did not remunerate any interviewees for doing interviews. Human Rights Watch provided minimum wage compensation to interviewees who had to miss work to make time for the interview. For those living far from the location of the interviews, Human Rights Watch covered transportation costs.

Most interviewees expressed concern about possible repercussions for themselves or their family members in North Korea and asked to remain anonymous. To protect these individuals from possible punishment, all names of former detainees used in this report are pseudonyms. Human Rights Watch also has not included personal details that could help identify victims and witnesses.

North Koreans who flee the country are almost always called "defectors" by North Koreans, South Koreans, foreign experts and observers, researchers, journalists, NGO workers, government officials, and so on. This report, however, refers to them simply as "North Koreans" or as "escapees": the word "defector" presupposes a political motivation for leaving that may or may not be present. North Koreans leave their country for many reasons, including for economic and medical reasons.

We also conducted additional interviews with experts familiar with issues concerning North Korea's detention and prison system, activists, legal experts, and academics. We obtained and reviewed relevant documents available in the public domain from UN agencies, local NGOs in South Korea working on North Korea's detention and prison system, North Korean government agencies, researchers, and international analysts. These documents helped provide important insight into the context of pretrial detention in North Korea.

Unfortunately, many North Korean laws, internal regulations, and decrees that may be relevant to the pretrial detention and criminal procedure process are not publicly available or when accessible, may be outdated. No official information was available about the pretrial detention process for political crimes under the Ministry of State Security, which has its own set of confidential internal guidelines that supersede publicly available laws and procedures.

The relatively small number of interviews conducted for this report limits the ability of Human Rights Watch to reach conclusions about conditions in all detention and interrogation facilities in North Korea. However, the diversity in geographic location and the similarities in conditions and personal experiences of the interviewees suggest the issues identified here are of general concern. Based on our findings and previous documentation, we have every reason to believe mistreatment of detainees, dangerous and unhealthy conditions, presumption of guilt, lack of due process and flawed trials are the norm.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter North Korea) is perhaps the world's most restrictive police state. The ruling Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) oversees a complex and highly developed security system that employs strict surveillance, violence, coercion, fear, and harsh punishment to ensure ideological conformity in order to silence dissent among the country's 25 million citizens and maintain the power of the country's leader, Kim Jong Un, and the WPK.[1]

Telephones, computers, and correspondence are monitored, the internet is inaccessible except to a very small number of high-ranking party officials, radios and televisions receive only government-authorized stations, and all media content is heavily censored.[2] From childhood, people's thoughts are continually monitored and shaped by an all-encompassing indoctrination machine to manufacture absolute obedience to the Supreme Leader ( suryong). Informant networks exist in every social, economic, and political group and all North Korean citizens are under constant surveillance by the party through mass associations or the neighborhood watch system ( inminban, literally "people's unit/group").[3] An elaborate political caste system ( songbun) classifies the population into categories based on the regime's determination of a person's loyalty and performance and assigns every individual a narrowly prescribed role in society.[4]

The Ministry of State Security (MSS, secret police, or kukga bowiseong) investigates political crimes, which are considered crimes committed by enemies or "counter-revolutionaries" against the people, the party and the government.[5] The MSS has its headquarters in Pyongyang and offices at the provincial ( do), city ( si) and local ( gun/guyeok) levels.[6] It officially works under the State Affairs Commission, but also reports to the Supreme Leader. It reportedly has tens of thousands of employees.[7]

The MSS runs political prisoner camps ( kwanliso), as well as temporary holding facilities ( jipkyulso) at the provincial level. The MSS also operates some holding cells ( gugumsil or daegisil) and a network of detention and interrogation facilities ( kuryujang).[8] It also runs a number of secret guarded holding buildings, euphemistically described as "guest houses."[9] The MSS is the most obscure institution within the North Korean government, as it has its own set of secret, confidential internal regulations and guidelines.[10]

The Ministry of Social Security (police, in Korean sahoe anjeonseong) is responsible for maintaining law and order and social control, investigating ordinary crimes, detaining and interrogating offenders, and imposing penalties for misbehavior deemed not serious enough to prosecute under the criminal law.[11] It is responsible for administering short-term unpaid hard labor detention centers ( boanseo danryeondae and rodong danryeondae ) and ordinary prison camps ( rodong kyohwaso).[12] The police has its headquarters in Pyongyang and offices at the provincial, city and various local ( guyeok/gun/jigu) and village (ri) levels.[13] The police also operates a network of pretrial detention and interrogation facilities ( kuryujang) at the national, provincial, city, and local levels.[14]

The Military Security Command (MSC, in Korean bowi saryeongbu) serves as the political police of the Korean People's Army (KPA) under the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. It operates under a set of secret, confidential internal regulations.[15] It is in charge of internal security within the army, investigates and conducts surveillance of military organizations and high-ranking military officers, local party organizations, and individual cadres.[16] The MSC reportedly runs pretrial detention and interrogation facilities and short-term forced labor detention centers ( rodong danryeondae) adjacent to political prison camps.[17] The MSC's mandate also extends to providing security for the Supreme Leader during his visits to military units and monitoring military and civilian movements along North Korea's northern and southern borders.[18]

The MSS, police, and MSC report to the State Affairs Commission. The State Affairs Commission is the supreme policy-oriented leadership body of the state. It is in charge of all important state policies, including defense and the armed forces, ensuring the fulfilment of the orders of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, and abrogating decisions and directives of state organs which run counter to the orders of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission and the decisions and directives of the State Affairs Commission.[19] Kim Jong Un is the head of the State Affairs Commission.[20]

While there is a clear official chain of command within the main security agencies, there is also control and guidance by special bodies in the party, which also have surveilling and investigative roles over senior officials or security agencies. For example, the WPK's Central Committee's Organization Guidance Department (OGD) is in charge of implementing the Supreme Leader's directives. The OGD has oversight and a guiding role over the police, MSS and MSC.[21] The OGD is also in charge of surveillance and inspection, as well as the appointment, of senior party officials.[22]

The Prosecutor's Office directly investigates crimes related to administrative and economic projects and those involving law enforcement agencies.[23] It is one of the country's most powerful agencies, with the power to audit other state organs.[24] Its official responsibilities include ensuring the strict observance of state laws by institutions, enterprises, organizations and citizens; ensuring the decisions and directives of state bodies conform with the Constitution, the laws, ordinances and decisions of the Supreme People's Assembly, the orders of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, the decisions and directives of the State Affairs Commission, the decrees, decisions and directives of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly,[25] and the decisions and directives of the Cabinet; and identifying and instituting legal proceedings against criminals and offenders in order to protect the state power of the DPRK, the socialist system, the property of the state and social, cooperative organizations, personal rights as guaranteed by the Constitution and the people's lives and property.[26] Some of the prosecutor's offices have holding cells ( gugumsil) or detention and interrogation facilities ( kuryujang).[27]

The prosecutor's office, as all bodies connected to the party, is structured with a central prosecutor's office, provincial, city, and local ( gun) level offices.[28] It also has special prosecutor's offices, like the military prosecutor's office, which has jurisdiction over ordinary crimes committed by personnel from the military and the police, the railway prosecutor's office, in charge of ordinary crimes related to the railway transport sector, and the military logistics prosecutor's office, in charge of specific crimes related to the military logistics department.[29] The prosecutor's office is accountable to the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), North Korea's unicameral legislature, or, when it is not in session, its presidium.[30]

Despite the official roles of the various security agencies, in practice their remit has varied over time and in different parts of the country. This has been a function of changing political priorities, available capacity, the relative power of senior officials, and the extent to which a particular agency enjoys the trust of the Supreme Leader. The three main security agencies, the MSS, police and Military Security Command, frequently compete to gain the leadership's favor by identifying ideological opponents and threats.

The criminal justice system in North Korea, like its constitution, laws, other legal instruments, and government bodies, is a byproduct of the government's efforts to protect the leadership and its political system, and to legitimize ruling party directives. In service of these ends, it also prescribes harsh punishment for non-compliance.[31] The system is grounded in a guiding ideology that gives primacy to the statements and personal directives of the country's leader; [32] the "Ten Principles of the Establishment of the Monolithic Ideological System" of the WPK;[33] the rules of the party;[34] the Socialist Constitution;[35] and, finally, domestic laws.[36] For example, article 2 of the criminal procedure code requires the state to carefully identify friends and enemies of the state in its struggle against "anti-state and anti-people crimes."[37] Article 162 of the constitution requires the courts to ensure obedience of state law and "to staunchly combat class enemies."[38]

North Korea's legal system is governed by the "law of the socialist society and national sovereignty that perform a function of the proletarian dictatorship."[39] A Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the situation of human rights in North Korea stated "the law and the justice system serve to legitimize violations, there is a rule by law in the DPRK, but no rule of law, upheld by an independent and impartial judiciary. Even where relevant checks have been incorporated into statutes, these can be disregarded with impunity."[40]

Criminal Law, Procedure and Punishment

The North Korean system for the investigation, trial and sentencing of crimes is both straightforward and complex. North Korea's Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code are relatively short and, in many respects, similar to other countries. But the laws have many gaps and inconsistencies that make them complicated to understand. The country has an official, law-based judicial system, but it also has a party-based quasi-judicial system that works in parallel and can supersede the official system in an opaque manner. Arbitrariness in the application of the law adds another layer of confusion for North Korean detainees and even law enforcement personnel.

The Criminal Code was adopted in 1990, and last amended in 2015. In 2007, the Addendum of the Criminal Code, a separate law that complements the Criminal Code, was adopted and introduced stronger penalties.[41] Broadly, criminal sanctions are applied for committing "dangerous acts that with intention or negligence infringe in the sovereignty of the state, the socialist system, and law and order."[42] The main criminal penalties are death; unpaid hard labor for life ( mugi rodong kyohwahyeong, in Korean literally "life-term of reform through labor criminal penalty"); a fixed long term (between one to 15 years) of unpaid hard labor ( yugi rodong kyohwahyeong, in Korean literally "limited term of reform through labor criminal penalty"); and a short term (between six months and one year) of unpaid hard labor ( rodong danryeonhyeong, literally "labor training criminal penalty").[43]

Minor criminal offenses are dealt with under the Administrative Penalty Law, which was adopted in 2004 and was last amended in 2011. It applies sanctions "to institutions, businesses, organizations and citizens who committed an offense that doesn't reach the point of requiring a criminal penalty."[44] Violations of the law are adjudicated by the "Socialist Lawful Lifestyle Guidance Committee" as well as the Cabinet ( naegak, the highest administrative and executive body of the government), the Prosecutor's Office, courts, police, inspection agencies, state-owned enterprises and other institutions. All administrative penalties applied must be reported every quarter to the "Socialist Lawful Lifestyle Guidance Committee."[45]

The DPRK Criminal Procedure Code was adopted in 1950 and last amended in 2012. It sets out the process for detention, arrest, investigation, trial and sentencing under North Korean law.

The Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code apply to all security agencies, such as the police or the secret police.[49] Time limitations and procedural steps provided by the law are usually respected for ordinary crimes handled by the police. However, the secret police, or the Military Security Command have a higher status since their main priority is regime protection and their secret internal regulations and guidelines allow them to ignore or override the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code in certain circumstances.[50]

North Korean law also contains important omissions. Neither the Criminal Code nor the Criminal Procedure Code contains any provisions allowing for judicial review of detention at the investigation or preliminary examination ( yesim) stages. This gives officials wide discretion in the stages after detention or arrest. North Korean laws are also generally vague and do not adhere to international standards. They lack clear definitions, leaving them open to arbitrary interpretation that maximizes the discretion of government officials to decide how or, indeed, whether to follow the law.[54]

North Korean law professes that the state fully guarantees human rights in handling criminal cases.[55] While the term "torture" ( komun) is not used in the law, the law forbids the use of force or inducements during evidence gathering.[56] Testimonies obtained under duress or inducement, and confessions that are the sole evidence of guilt, cannot be used in court.[57] Article 166 of the DPRK Criminal Procedure Code prohibits a preliminary examiner from using "forceful methods to make the suspect admit the crime or to make a statement."[58] Article 37 of the law states that "the statements of the suspect received by means of coercion and inducement shall not be used as evidence. If the testimony of the suspect is the only evidence, it is admitted that the crime could not be proved. Even with the surrender and confession of a suspect, other relevant evidence must be found to be admitted. If it is objectively found that the statements of a suspect who does not acknowledge the crime are false by other evidence, the crime is recognized as proven."[59]

Criminal Investigation and Prosecution

The DPRK Criminal Procedure Code outlines the stages of investigation ( susa), preliminary examination ( yesim), prosecution ( kiso), trial, and sentencing for criminal cases. The investigation's goal is to "uncover the criminal" and hand the suspect over to a preliminary examination procedure.[64] The aim of the preliminary examination ( yesim) is "to expose the offender and reveal all details of the criminal case completely and accurately."[65] The duty of the prosecution is to "conduct a full review of the case records of the finalized preliminary examination and hand over the criminal case to the court if it recognizes that all details of the crime have been completely and accurately revealed during the preliminary examination."[66] The objective of the first-instance trial is "to confirm crimes and criminals and to analyze them based on the law and make a court ruling."[67]

Investigation

The investigation ( susa) period, which usually lasts a few days, is crucial, as an individual will either be released or sent to the next stage, preliminary examination, which usually results in a trial and conviction and could lead to a heavy sentence. Investigations are usually conducted by investigators from the police or the secret police, the main law enforcement agencies.[68]

Article 135 of the DPRK Criminal Procedure Code allows law enforcement officials 24 hours to officially register an investigation with the Prosecutor's Office, which can turn down the request if there are no reasonable grounds to start the investigation.[69] During this period, the law enforcement or security official in charge of the investigation can obtain a warrant from a prosecutor allowing the arrest of a suspect for questioning for up to 10 days in a holding or waiting cell ( gugumsil or daegisil) or detention and interrogation facility ( kuryujang).[70] It is worth noting that none of the former detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch ever saw a warrant.[71] During this 10-day period the police or other investigator decides whether to release the suspect or send the case to the preliminary examination stage.[72]

The police or investigators are also allowed to detain suspects without prosecutorial approval. In such cases, the investigator must obtain approval from the prosecutor within 48 hours of arrest ( chepo, with a warrant) or detention ( kyuru, without a warrant). As above, the investigator must release the suspect within 10 days of detention or send the case for preliminary examination.[73] If the investigator cannot obtain the approval of the prosecutor, the investigator needs to prove the crime within 10 days or release the suspect.[74]

A former police officer familiar with pretrial detention procedures told Human Rights Watch that investigators send many people accused of minor crimes to short-term hard labor detention centers, others for short-term administrative penalties to self-reflect on proper social behavior or the improper citizen behavior committed ( sahoejeok kyoyang cheobun, literally "social awareness penalty") and about half for preliminary examination.[75] A former party official with connections within the criminal procedure system estimated that as many as 90 percent of possible cases may be dropped or sent for short-term hard labor, with only 10 percent being sent for preliminary examination, for criminal prosecution and trial.[76] "The police also need to survive, and they need to get bribes to do so," he said.[77] Indeed, bribery is reportedly rampant. Four former government officials, including two former police officers, told Human Rights Watch that most crimes that could be considered minor would not even lead to an investigation if the offender paid a bribe or had enough connections.[78]

Preliminary Examination

The preliminary examination ( yesim) usually takes place while detainees are in custody. The preliminary examination officer may detain or arrest a suspect if the alleged crime is punishable by hard labor for life or long-term or death, or if the suspect interferes with the investigation, does not cooperate with the preliminary examination procedure, or flees preliminary examination or trial.

In cases in which the preliminary examination starts before a suspect is detained, the preliminary examination officer may issue a subpoena to question the suspect. If the suspect is not detained before the preliminary examination is finished and the decision is to charge the suspect, the preliminary examination officer (yesimwon) can request an arrest warrant from prosecutors if the alleged crime is punishable by long-term hard labor, hard labor for life, or death. When the offense is punishable by short-term labor the suspect can only be arrested or detained in (undefined) special circumstances. The law says that female suspects cannot be detained three months before childbirth or within seven months after childbirth, but it is unclear whether this would be the case if a woman committed a serious crime.[79]

While the investigation focuses on identifying the criminal, the preliminary examination is supposed to develop a complete and accurate understanding of the case, including the nature of the crime, the motives and objective, the means and role of the accused, and the results of the crime.[80]

A former police officer familiar with pretrial procedures told Human Rights Watch that he estimated that in 80 to 90 percent of cases the recommendation is to send the accused to trial on charges that would carry a short-term or long-term hard labor sentence, with the majority for long-term hard labor.[85] He said the rest of the cases were dismissed and the accused were sent to short-term hard labor detention centers.[86]

Because the ruling party controls all institutions in North Korea, detainees face a parallel process, a review by the Party Security Committee ( dang anjeon wiwonhoi), before a decision to pursue criminal responsibility is finalized.[87] This process has no statutory basis. Instead, it operates in a quasi-judicial system run by the WPK.[88] As in other Communist countries, the ruling party oversees the courts to ensure control of the judiciary and that the courts act in conformity with party rules and policies.[89]

Once the Party Security Committee approves a case to be sent to the next stage, a male accused's hair is shaved and a female accused's hair is cut to ear length. If the accused is later found guilty, the length of the sentence is counted from that day.[98]

If the preliminary examination officer concludes there is enough evidence to send the accused to trial and the prosecutor agrees, the officer informs the accused, shows the accused the case file, and asks if the accused has any questions or requests to fix errors.[102] The preliminary examination office then writes a report and submits it, along with all case files and evidence, to the prosecutor.[103]

Prosecution

After the preliminary examination officers send a case to a prosecutor, the law requires a prosecutor to "conduct a full review of the case records of the finalized preliminary examination and hand over the criminal case to the court if it recognizes that all details of crime have been completely and accurately revealed during the preliminary examination."[104]

Three former government officials said that while prosecutors do review cases, this is almost a symbolic step and almost all cases are sent to trial.[108]

Trial

The court must conclude the trial within 25 days, with the possibility of a 10-day extension, after receipt of the charges.[113] Proceedings against those accused of crimes punishable by short-term hard labor must be completed within 10 days.[114]

North Korean Courts

North Korean law states that in administering justice "the courts are independent and judicial proceedings shall be carried out in strict accordance with the law." Yet it goes on to state that the Supreme Court, the highest court in North Korea, is accountable to the Supreme People's Assembly and to its Presidium when the SPA is not in session.[118]

The lowest court that hears most first-instances cases in North Korea is the People's Court, which has jurisdiction at the city and county ( gun) levels.[119] However, for cases related to political crimes against the state and the nation, the court of first instance is the Provincial Court, the high court of a province.[120] In cases in which there is the possibility of the death penalty or a life-term of hard labor, the Provincial Court again has jurisdiction. The Provincial Court also retains the discretion to try a case falling under the jurisdiction of the People's Court or to transfer a case to another People's Court. Generally, the People's Court is the first-instance court and the Provincial Court hears appeals from the
People's Court.[121]

North Korea also has three special courts, the Military Court, the Military Logistics Court and the Railway Court.[122] The Military Court tries criminal cases committed by members of the military or the police or cases that affect military activities, while the Military Logistics Court tries criminal offenses committed by employees of the military logistics department or that affect the military transportation business. The Railway Court tries offenses committed by employees of the railway transportation industry or that disturb the railway transportation business.[123]

The Supreme Court hears cases on appeal and cases contesting first-instance decisions by the Provincial Court and special courts. The Supreme Court can directly hear any first-instance case or transfer a case to another court of the same level or type as the court of original jurisdiction.[124]

Although there are three regional levels of courts, the North Korean court system allows for only one appeal. Moreover, because the Supreme Court has the power to hear first-instance cases without any appeal, the benefits of the two-instance system may be nullified at the will of the court.[125]

Quasi-Judiciary System

In addition to the system described above, North Korea operates a separate quasi-judicial system to exercise control over its people.[126] This system is opaque and complex. Parts of this system are based on party decrees and structures, such as the Party Security Committee or the Organization and Guidance Department from the WPK Central Committee mentioned above, and some are secret, such as those related to the Ministry of State Security or the Military Security Command.[127] Others, such as the "Socialist Lawful Lifestyle Guidance Committee," have a legal basis.[128] This committee is in charge of processing administrative penalties and petitions.[129] It also "oversees the country's leading economic agencies and their leading workers so they don't abuse their power and work observing the socialist laws and regulations."[130] It is also organized at the central, provincial, city and local levels, under the supervision of the People's Committees. At the central level, Socialist Lawful Lifestyle Guidance Committees appear to include five or six members including the head of the party guidance committee, the party organization director, the director of People's Safety, and the head of the Prosecutor's Office. At the provincial and regional levels, it includes the heads and deputy head of the Peoples' Committee, the head of the police, the Prosecutor's Office, and a member of the legal department.[131]

The treatment of ordinary crimes and political crimes is strictly divided. Political crimes are considered anti-state and anti-nation crimes committed by enemies or "counter-revolutionaries" against the party and government. These cases are under the jurisdiction of the secret police, and the Military Security Command when connected to the army.[132] Though certainly broad, the exact powers of the Ministry of State Security are secret and therefore unclear.

North Korean citizens who have allegedly committed severe anti-state or anti-nation offenses disappear and are sent to political prison camps ( kwanliso) without notice, trial or judicial order.[133] There, they are held incommunicado, subjected to torture, forced labor and other severe mistreatment, and their families are not informed of their fate even if they die.[134]

Corruption and Law Enforcement

After the Great Famine of the mid-1990s, private markets ( jangmadang) became an alternative to the public distribution of food and a source of income to stave off starvation. As trading was still technically illegal, government officials and people in positions of power, including police and secret police officers, detention and interrogation facility guards, prosecutors and party officials, saw opportunities to demand bribes to avoid detention, arrest and prosecution.[135] Bribes soon became an important source of income for many of those in power. According to the COI, government officials "are increasingly engaging in corruption in order to support their low or non-existent salaries."[136] According to Transparency International's 2019 Corruption Perception Index, North Korea ranked 172 out of 180 countries.[137]

Despite this, interviewees told Human Rights Watch those in positions of power are careful about taking bribes and would return or reject money or gifts in some cases.[138] A former police officer told Human Rights Watch: "We [government officials] also have our morals and we only get [bribes] when we can deliver." A former trader explained that "government officials are very careful on who they get bribes from, and only keep [the money] when they can give what they offered or have been asked for. They don't want somebody blabbing around, word could get out there, threaten their reputation or future possible income, or end up triggering an investigation of the officer himself [for corrupt practices]."[139]

Detention facilities that the North Korean government acknowledges include:

Jails: small cells in small or remote security and law enforcement agency offices, gugumsil, literally "detention room" or daegisil, literally "waiting room".[140]

Detention and Interrogation facilities (kuryujang, literally "place of detention"): facilities that include security and law enforcement agency offices, rooms where detainees undergoing investigation and/or preliminary examination (yesim) are interrogated, and cells where they are held during that period. Those cells are also used to hold detainees awaiting trial; to be transferred to their home districts; to be sent to long-term hard labor ordinary crimes prison camps; or to be executed.[141]

Temporary holding facilities (jipkyulso, literally "gathering place"): located mostly near the Chinese border, they are used to temporarily detain people forced back after crossing the border, or for violating domestic travel restrictions. Detainees are held here until a law enforcement officer from the area where they are registered as residents picks them up and escorts them back to their hometown.[142] Some detainees may be required to engage in forced labor and others may carry out short-term hard labor sentences for up to a year.[143] The use of these facilities as a place for punishment does not appear to have any legal standing or clear time limits on how long a person may be detained.[144] The facilities may be run by the police, secret police, or army.[145] The COI found that conditions in temporary holding facilities were inhumane and that authorities implemented a policy of imposing deliberate starvation on detainees.[146]

Short-termunpaid hard labor detention centers (rodong danryeondae, literally "labor training centers"): the most common detention centers for misdemeanors with short-term sentences with less than one year of hard labor.[147] They are generally run by the People's Committees of the WPK at the provincial, city and district level.[148]

Short-term unpaid hard labor police detention centers (boanseong danryeondae): detention centers run by the police at the national level for crimes sentenced to short- term (six months to one year) hard labor criminal penalties (rodong danryeonhyung).[149] These centers are adjacent to hard labor ordinary crimes prison camps (kyohwaso).[150]

The North Korean government has repeatedly rejected the findings of the COI, contending that there are no prisons in North Korea.[154] Instead, offering a distinction that has no practical effect, the government contends that criminals are held in labor reform institutions where they are held for "reform through labor" ( rodong kyohwa).[155] These reform through labor centers ( rodong kyohwaso), which are de-facto long-term hard labor prison camps, are run by the police to hold perpetrators of serious ordinary crimes and minor political crimes with sentences of "reform through labor criminal penalty" ( rodong kyowhahyeong) for a limited term (yugi rodong kyohwahyeong) between one and 15 years, or a "reform through labor criminal penalty for life" ( mugi rodong kyohwahyeong).[156]

The North Korean government also strenuously denies the existence of penal hard labor colonies for serious political crimes-in effect, political prisoner camps-called in Korean kwanliso, literally "control centers," which are considered a state secret.[157] These camps are run by the secret police. Political prisoners, and in some cases their whole families, are often forcibly disappeared, held incommunicado, and detained in these camps.[158] Prisoners in "reform through labor centers" and "control centers" are subjected to crimes against humanity, face brutal and inhumane conditions, arduous forced labor, malnutrition, and starvation due to insufficient food rations.[159]

Beaten and Abused

Mistreatment in custody is a standard feature of the criminal justice system in North Korea. Twenty-two former detainees and eight former government officials told Human Rights Watch that mistreatment of detainees is especially harsh in the early stages of questioning in pretrial detention and interrogation facilities ( kuryujang).[160] The former officials explained that the authorities consider harsh treatment to be necessary to obtain confessions, which are crucial in the interrogation process during the investigation and preliminary examination stages.[161] They added that humiliation and mistreatment are considered important to preempt future crimes by detainees.[162]

A former police officer involved in the detention processes told Human Rights Watch:

The regulations say there shouldn't be any beatings, but we need confessions during the investigation and early stages of the preliminary examination. The detainees have confessed all the crimes they committed, and they need to write their self-criticism documents as many times as necessary, one time or ten times. So you have to hit them in order to get the confession. [One] can hit them with a pine stick or kick them with the boot. It is the only way to get their finger stamp at the end of the finalized document ... even after the investigation process is finished, if they later deny it or not confess again to the preliminary examiner, we'll hit the detainee and think this person might be out of their mind.[163]

He related that in the beginning, outside food is not allowed, the same as cigarettes, or other things that may make detainees be more comfortable. Those are only allowed after the confession and the necessary documents are almost finalized. He added that:

Even for those who are innocent and end up being released, being held in the detention and interrogation facility must be re-educational, and for that they need to have a very hard experience, that is humiliating, so they become like machines and make the clear decision never to commit crimes again.[164]

The testimonies received by Human Rights Watch are in line with the findings of the UN COI, which found that "inmates (held in detention and interrogation facilities run by the secret police), who are not undergoing interrogations or who are not at work, are forced to sit or kneel the entire day in a fixed posture in often severely overcrowded cells. They are not allowed to speak, move, or look around without permission. Failure to obey these rules is punished with beatings, food ration cuts or forced physical exercise. Punishment is often also imposed collectively on all cellmates."[174] It also found conditions in detention and interrogation facilities run by the police are "similar to that of [MSS] detention, except that suspects are often allowed to receive occasional visits from family members."[175]

Some female detainees reported that they experienced or observed sexual violence, including rape in detention and interrogation facilities.[176] Interviewees said that agents from the police, secret police, and the prosecutor's office, most in charge of their personal interrogation, touched their faces and their bodies, including their breasts and hips, either through their clothes or by putting their hands inside their clothes. They said they were powerless to resist because their fate was in the hands of these men.[177]

Case of Heo Yun Mi

Heo Yun Mi, a former accountant in her 50s from South Hamgyong province, escaped North Korea in late 2015. She told Human Rights Watch that because her daughter had attempted to escape to South Korea she was detained for a week in early 2015 at a detention and interrogation facility ( kuryujang) run by the secret police. She said she was forced to spend the entire time sitting on the ground in line, with her legs crossed and her hands on her knees, except when she was being questioned, had a break, was eating or was being punished.[178] She said that officially they had 5-10 minute breaks in the morning and the afternoon, but whether they got them depended on the mood of the guards. They were monitored by a camera. She explained:

Guards watched us sitting in lines through the CCTV. Suddenly they'd speak through the speaker and say, 'Cell X, detainee Y, get up.' [...] Sometimes they'd punish the whole room, but it depended on the guard, one out of ten was nice, but most were horrible.... The punishment was getting up and extending the arms to the front, or to the top for a long time. Or getting up and sitting 20 times, or 100 times or more. Punishment for moving would happen once a day, as people were busy being sent for questioning. If you kept moving after being punished, the guards would hit you with a club in the hands. They would also hit you if you didn't apologize and beg when being punished. Men's cells had more violence, and sometimes they asked the detainee chief to hit other detainees.... We had to call the guards 'teacher.' When we went out of the cell to get questioned, we had to bend our bodies 90 degrees as we walked, our gaze towards the floor while being questioned, never able to look straight at the guards. They'd beat us according to the regulations if we did. Detainees were called by a name like 'Cell X, number Y.' Guards would refer to us with insults like, 'You fucking whatever.'

Heo Yun Mi explained that the secret police questioned her for six days. They beat and tortured her for three days. She recounted:

Mainly the investigator hit me with his palm in the cheek. In the beginning, after [the investigator] hit me, I couldn't hear well. I heard they mainly beat women in the face, but if they didn't like your statement, they'd also hit them with a stick.

Heo Yun Mi's daughter was also detained in the same facility around the same time. The daughter told Heo Yun Mi that she had been questioned for two days for her attempt to cross to China by the secret police, but they only beat her on the first day. Heo Yun Mi explained:

I was sitting in a chair during questioning, but my daughter told me she had to sit on the floor kneeling and there was another person who was being questioned at the same time as her and she was sitting on a chair.

Heo Yun Mi also described how a woman held in her cell "had been questioned while kneeling on top of the heater and had been burned. They also hit her with a stick in the calves.... There was a military doctor, the woman who got burned was treated by the doctor." She also recalled that a male colleague from her work was detained at the samedetention and interrogation facility run by the secret police in June 2015 for one month and could not walk properly after he was beaten.

Case of Park Ji Cheol

Park Ji Cheol, a former lumberjack in his 20s from a bordering province with China who left North Korea in late 2014, was detained in detention and interrogation facilities run by the police twice, in 2010 and in 2014.[179] He told Human Rights Watch that on many occasions he managed to avoid detention because his uncle, who was a large-scale smuggler, often gave gifts like corn-based liquor, cigarettes, mushrooms, or cash to police officers, soldiers, and MSSofficials to facilitate his activities. In 2014, he was held in a police detention and interrogation facility for three days for not going to work at a government-sanctioned workplace and was then sent to a hard labor detention center for three months.

In 2010, he was also detained for smuggling, this time for almost one year, at a detention and interrogation facility. After an investigation and preliminary examination, he was sentenced to five years of hard labor at an ordinary crimes prison. Because his uncle was able to pay bribes to the right people, Park Ji Cheol ended up serving just one year before receiving a general pardon following the death of the former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

The detention and interrogation facility where Park Ji Cheol was held had nine separate cells. Men and women were held separately. He stayed in a 15 square meter cell holding between 13 and 16 cellmates. The detainees remained in their cell, unable to move, except when questioned by the investigator or the preliminary examiner in charge or when given permission to move by the guards. The detainees slept on the floor from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., when the police guards woke them up and brought in a large bucket with water, which all cellmates used to wash their faces and to drink. The guards provided breakfast at 7 a.m., lunch at noon and dinner at 6 p.m. for 30 minutes. Every two hours, there was a change of guards who gave cellmates 10 to 30 minutes to walk outside to the yard or to stand. According to Park Ji Cheol:

Every single day was horrible, so painful and unbearable.... Many times, if I or others moved [in the cell], the guards would order me or all the cellmates to extend our hands through the cell bars and would step on them repeatedly with their boots or hit our hands with their leather belts. Even then we weren't allowed to move. If we responded and they didn't like us, they'd beat us up.

Park Ji Cheol said that after the investigation process was over, the guards allowed his family members to pay some bribes to allow them to bring food once a week. He said:

The food from prison was terrible and so little. I was hungry all the time. They gave us three meals a day, a handful of crushed and boiled corn, around 70 grains of soybeans per meal, which they said was very nutritious so we wouldn't get sick from weakness, and a soup made with boiled wild greens.... You can't survive with the food there. If the family visits, you eat. My mom could come once a week, she brought white rice enough for one meal, also corn powder that mixed with water becomes corncake. I'd eat this with the rice and wait for the next visit during the whole week.

He said the men detained with him were at different stages of the criminal process. Some were still under investigation, others were undergoing preliminary investigation or waiting for trial, and others had already been sentenced and were waiting to be transferred. Two detainees were waiting to be executed. He said:

Two of my cellmates were sentenced to death after trial. The guards kept them in the detention and interrogation facility for 90 or 100 days. They just existed, they were a human shell, but were watched closely so they couldn't commit suicide. Afterwards, they executed them.... Five people died while I was there. In February 2010, one woman was [accused of] killing and eating her child because of hunger, right after the currency reform [2009] when many people suffered. She died of starvation, she was only skin and bone. In June 2010, a man who went into a house to steal took 2.5 kgs. of rice and NKW5000 [worth 8 kgs. of rice at the time][180] from a house and killed the woman living in the house. He died also of hunger. Another detainee died after being detained for consumption of 'ice' [methamphetamines, also called bingdu in North Korea].

In 2014, Park Ji Cheol was detained for three days at a police detention and interrogation facility. He told Human Rights Watch:

The detention and interrogation facility was the hardest. You had to sit still all day. I could only think of when I was detained the last time. I remembered after two months, I just wanted to kill myself, but I couldn't. The day the [official] three months [extension] finished I was going crazy, I thought I'd be released then.... This time the police investigator quickly prepared the investigation document and sent me to three months at a hard labor detention center.

Case of Kim Sun Young

Kim Sun Young, a former trader in her 50s from North Hamgyong province, escaped North Korea for the last time in 2015. However, she suffered badly after being forcibly returned from China at the end of 2012.[181] She said she was sent to at a detention and interrogation facility run by the secret police near the border for a few days and after establishing that she did not commit serious political crimes was transferred to one run by the police in her hometown. She was held for five months and then sentenced to five years of hard labor at an ordinary crimes prison camp with two-and-a-half years suspended because of the bribe her son managed to pay. In the end she spent five months at the police detention and interrogation facility, followed by almost two years at the Chongori ordinary crimes prison camp.

At the police detention and interrogation facility, Kim Sun Young was held in a cell less than 12 square meters in size. The cell usually held about 12 detainees, leaving insufficient space to lie down and stretch her legs at night. Men and women were held in separate cells at the facility. She said that detainees were awakened at 7 a.m., washed their faces, and then had to sit immobilized all day for 12 or 13 hours except when they were allowed to move to eat, be questioned, or have a short break. She said:

Beatings were the worst in the detention and interrogation facilities. While waiting to be investigated, we had to sit still. Our hands had to be folded on top of our legs, which had to be crossed. Every hour or every three hours, we could stand for 10 to 30 minutes depending on the mood of the guard in charge.... We had to sit without moving. When I moved, the guard would hit me. If you fell asleep, they'd make you stand and squat up to 1,000 times. You think it is too many and you cannot do it, but if they force you, you can. The body is in extreme pain and you think you'll die, but you do it. Sometimes, all the detainees are punished with you. People complain and hate it when others move.

She said women were more scared of physical punishment, so the women kept quieter than men and tried to follow the guard's instructions. But the men were more rebellious and would be beaten more often. Kim Sun Young explained she could not see the beatings, but she could hear the conversations and the insults and degrading comments accompanied with sounds of violence.

Kim Sun Young said a bowiseong interrogator in charge of her case at the detention and interrogation facility raped her, while another police officer sexually assaulted her by touching her body over and underneath her clothes while interrogating her. She said her fate was in their hands and she was powerless to resist.[182]

Case of Kim Keum Chul

Kim Keum Chul, a former smuggler of medicinal herbs in his 30s from North Hamgyong province, escaped North Korea in 2017.[183] He was detained four times in pretrial detention and interrogation facilities between 2000 and 2014: once in the bowiseong detention and interrogation facility in a town bordering China and three separate times in a police detention and interrogation facility in his district bordering China. In each case he was able to shorten his time in detention after paying bribes.

Kim Keum Chul's first experience in detention under the secret police was in 2000, where he was held for just over a month for smuggling. He said he was beaten every time he was questioned. He explained that as it was a case with possible connections to Christian missionaries in China, the beatings and mistreatment were more severe, since cases connected with Christians are considered to be serious political cases. He said:

I don't know if that was a special torture room, but it was dark, it had no windows and it was full of broken thick wooden sticks. There were lots of wooden clubs and sticks. If I fell, they would kick me with their feet. The first day, three [bowibu] officers beat me aggressively, but later even the person in charge of questioning me came and the four beat me up. I was hit so much the only thing I could do was to say I was wrong.... I lost consciousness after being beaten for an hour. I woke up and I was in the questioning room. I opened my eyes, but I was hit so much, I couldn't see anything. I thought it was incredible how much a person could be beaten. I remember thinking there you'd confess to anything you haven't even done. Every time they hit me, it'd be for three or four hours. They'd just beat me, ask some questions and continued to beat me. Sometimes they looked at the statements of a friend [who had been detained with me] and continued to question me.... By the time they transferred me to the police detention and interrogation facility the investigation was almost finished, and my father had worked [his connections] so the police didn't torture me or beat me there. [In the mid-2000s,] the [police] guards held me for nine days and questioned me for eight days but only hit me once in the beginning and once in the middle. The first day, six people came and violently beat me with their hands, feet, wooden and metal sticks. They hit me all day long. I sat on a chair while being questioned and had to kneel while the six people were beating me up.

But he said that the last time police detained him in a detention and interrogation facility in 2014, bribes were more effective, and the abuse was less intense.

During questioning, which lasted two or three days, the police investigator only slapped me or hit me a few times in the head.... In between questioning, [thanks to bribes my wife gave] I could stay a long time in my investigator's office, resting, cleaning or smoking, and go back to my cell after a while.... Even when I had to stay in the detention cell, the mistreatment was different. I wondered if there had been some orders from high up ... before we had to sit in lines, with our backs straight, and our hands on our knees. But this time, we could stretch a bit our legs and we could move a little.

Case of Yoon Young Cheol

Yoon Young Cheol, a former government worker in his 30s, left North Korea in the summer of 2018. He was detained at a detention and interrogation facility in a border city with China in winter 2011.[184] Somebody had reported him to the secret police on suspicion he was a spy. He said the treatment in the detention and interrogation facility was harshest before extracting his confession and had no apparent procedural system. He explained:

One night five police officers came into my house and detained me. I was surprised because I had not done anything wrong, but they didn't take me to the police station. We arrived at the bowibu office. They were secret police officers dressed as police. They put me in a waiting cell. It was small and I was alone. They searched my body. Afterwards, the head of the city secret police department, the party's political affairs head and the investigator came in. It was very serious, but I didn't know why. They just beat me up for 30 minutes, they kicked me with their boots, and punched with their fists, everywhere in my body.... The next day, they moved me to the next room, which was a detention and interrogation facility cell, and my preliminary examination started. But the investigations didn't really have any protocols or procedures, they just beat me... The preliminary examiner hit me violently first... I asked, "Why, why, why?" but I didn't get an answer.... As the questioning went on, I found out I had been reported as a spy. Violent beatings and hitting were constant in the beginning of [the preliminary examination] questioning for one month. They kicked me with their boots, punched me with their fists or hit me with a thick stick, all over my body. After [one month when they had most of my confession ready], they were gentler. At some point, the examiner even offered me cigarettes....

The beatings, humiliation and uncertainty were terrible, but the worst part for me was the hunger. Especially during the beginning of questioning. They make you starve so you lose your mind, you just exist, you become an animal, and you are not rational anymore.

Unhealthy and Inhumane Detention Conditions

Food was insufficient. Most detention and interrogation facilities provided food three times a day, but in small amounts, often consisting of a handful of cooked crushed corn kernels, sometimes accompanied with cabbage fermented with salt ( kimchi) or a soup of dried wild greens or radish.

Two former detainees said two detention and interrogation facilities run by the MSS in remote areas provided even smaller amounts of food than those run by the police. Their relatives did not know where they were held, so they could not receive any food or goods from outside.[188] According to a former police officer, detainees without relatives suffer more and get weak quickly.[189]

Two former police officers said that detention and interrogation facilities are in theory supposed to provide toothbrushes, soap, blankets, and clean water, but that in reality, they have no resources and at best provide some buckets of water on a daily basis and a few blankets left behind by previous detainees.[190]

A former police officer explained that, "according to the regulation, detainees should change their clothes once every week, but the reality is that they barely can change clothes once a month, only if their families would bring them clean clothes. Those that didn't have family [or came from different regions], couldn't even change. Some detainees without family could be six months or whatever length of their time there without changing once."[195]

Another former police officer also said the smell at the detention center where he worked was terrible.[196]

[The detainees] are supposed to wash themselves and brush their teeth every morning, but especially in the winter it was very cold and some didn't want to clean themselves. The detainees tell each other to wash because the smell is so unbearable. Some may even go half a week without washing themselves.... The smell was terrible even from the corridor. Sometimes we had to force people to wash in cold water, there was no warm water, and they'd be shaken and didn't want to. The smell was so strong it was hard for some to be able to sleep. The windows had to be opened all the time, to ventilate.... I had to change clothes every time I left the station, because people would complain so much [about the smell of my uniform].[197]

Female detainees said the facilities did not provide menstrual pads; they said they used pieces of cloth torn from their own clothing or cloth that relatives were able to bring. At times, relatives could give money to the police guards who would buy some pads.[198] But one former police officer said many guards did not care about women having their period and sometimes women bled through their trousers and had no other clothes to change into, and were not able to wash properly.[199]

Case of Baek Sol Hee

Baek Sol Hee, a former trader in her 40s from South Pyongan province, left North Korea in 2017.[200] She told Human Rights Watch she was detained in the police detention and interrogation facility in Suncheon, South Pyongan province, in the early 2010s for two months for selling banned products, and again in 2016 for over a month for getting into a fight with a party member with better connections than her. She was also detained in the mid-2010s at a district ( gun) police detention and interrogation facility in South Hamgyung province and at a district secret police detention and interrogation facility in Ryanggang province a year later.

Baek Sol Hee said police officers told her the police station in Suncheon was considered a model. The conditions of the detention and interrogation facility ( kuryujang), waiting cell ( daegisil) and hard labor detention center ( rodong danryeondae) were good; and police officers from around the country visited to learn from it. She explained the offices were remodelled in 2015 and had more resources the second time she was detained there.

All toiletries came from the homes of the detainees. After detention, the police informed the families and the investigator in charge went over and brought things like soap, toothpaste, toothbrushes, towels, or menstrual pads. [The guards] broke the body of the toothbrush and would only leave the head [to avoid it being used to commit suicide]. The people without family didn't have toiletries and had to use the things of other detainees. We were all in similar situations, so we women shared our things, but I heard that men didn't, that the men that didn't have relatives suffered more and were all covered by lice, but the other men didn't care [and didn't share]. [The first time I was detained,] family members could send [menstrual] pads. One detainee [who had no relatives] had to wash a sock and use it as a [menstrual] pad. In 2016, we could ask the police officer in charge for pads during our period and the officer would go to the store outside and buy them. We didn't have to give money, they just bought them for us.

[In the early 2010s], the waiting cell was in the basement, it was very poor, dark and it had cement floor.... When I was in the waiting cell, I had to wake up at 5 a.m., clean up my place, and wash my face in 30 minutes. At 6 a.m. we ate for 30 minutes and afterwards we had to sit immobilized. We had lunch for 30 minutes at noon and dinner for 30 minutes at 7 p.m. We went to bed at 10 p.m. We had to sit and stay in one position. We sat crossed leg in three lines, with our hands on our knees. Everybody had to sit immobilized like that except those that were being questioned.

Out of the 50 days I was in the waiting cell, I was questioned for 10 days. There are cameras in the Suncheon detention center, guards watched the cells from cameras. If one person moved, they would make all detainees stand. Harsh police officers would make you stand for one hour. We'd get collective punishments at least three times a week. I saw people fall because they were too weak for not eating enough. In the waiting cell they didn't beat us, but in the detention and interrogation facility they'd hit you if you didn't obey.

Food was similar [both times I was detained]. Nothing improved on that front. I think police don't improve the food because it is better for them that detainees are hungry and suffering.... Food was boiled crushed corn cobs, which amounted to five big tablespoons. It was supposed to be 70 grams, but it wasn't that much. There was no soup, but they gave some boiled water with salt and wild greens. They gave the same food every day.

She explained conditions and treatment in the waiting cells[201] were harsher than in the detention and interrogation facility cells:

The waiting cells were harder than the detention and interrogation facility cells. In the detention and interrogation facility, after investigation and questioning was over outside food was allowed, but it is totally forbidden in the waiting cells ... First, [when you are in the waiting cells] they don't let you get visits. Then if relatives give them money, they allow food to get in, but you never get it. If the family or relatives complain, they say they'll give it, but they don't. It is how it works in the waiting cells ... In the detention and interrogation facility cell, the family and friends could send in food at least once a week. They are not allowed to visit, but they could pass food and a note to the guards, and they'd give it to us. If they paid bribes, the guards would let the family members see the detainees in a private room. My husband paid some bribes and I was able to see him once.... The food in the waiting cell and the detention cell was similar. But because food from outside was allowed in the detention and interrogation facility cell, I wasn't hungry there.... We could get a plastic bag with rice, fried corn powder, or dried sticky rice. Then you could add water and eat it. We could get dried side dishes for the week, like dried and marinated seafood or fish, or meat marinated in fermented bean paste sauce, as much as we wanted, but there was no point in getting too much, as it could go bad.

I was beaten during questioning. Even if I said the right answer, they hit me. They thought there was more. I was severely beaten up for three days [the first time I was there]. They kicked me with their feet or hit my face against the wall. They hit me so hard, I had dark bruises all over. Beatings happened in the beginning. They want to maximize pressure in the beginning. There are a lot of people involved in smuggling, but if you mention everybody the hard labor sentence becomes longer so I didn't speak. If you speak, the only thing you do is to increase the possibilities for incriminating yourself in more possible crimes. The police beat you so you say those things. But if they continue but you don't give information, they can't just continue hitting you. If they hit you and really hurt you [become severely injured, or die], the police officer is blamed. After being beaten just for three days, I couldn't walk properly, and my eyes really hurt.

There was no toilet paper. Everybody washed with water. When I was in the waiting cell [in the early 2010s], I washed with water, but in the detention and interrogation facility cell, I was able to get toilet paper from my family, rolled toilet paper in pieces. People without relatives used water. At the waiting cells, only basic toiletries are allowed.

Baek Sol Hee said the size of the waiting cell of the Suncheon police office was larger than normal, about eight by seven meters. It held around 20 detainees, and up to 30 people when it was very crowded.

One side had metal bars, and the three other walls were made with cement. In the back wall, there was a small window for ventilation. The toilet was in the corner of the back and had no partition. In the detention and interrogation facility cell, the toilet had a partition that went up to the waist. The waiting cells are places that make people suffer however way possible so (we) confess our crimes. The toilet was next to a water tank ... which was made with rocks and cement. Every morning we filled it up with running water ... we used that water for the toilet and to drink. We also showered. In the winter, I didn't, but in the summer, everybody smelled, so the guards told detainees to shower. People covered themselves with blankets to shower. It wasn't possible during the day when we had to sit immobilized, but at night, we asked permission to the guards and every night two or three people were able to wash ... we could wash our underwear and dry it on a heater, which had heat for two or three hours every day (in the winter).

In the waiting cell, I just wore the clothes I was brought in with. In the detention and interrogation facility cell, family members could send
clean clothes.

Baek Sol Hee explained that the other two detention and interrogation facilities she was detained at, which were small and in remote areas, had worse conditions than the detention and interrogation facility in Suncheon. She described the detention and interrogation facility run by the police in South Hamgyong province in the mid-2010s:

Even if detainees had their period, the police guards said there was nothing they could do, so women had to rip off their underwear and use that. The toilet was at the end wall of the detention and interrogation facility cell and had a partition that showed just your face. There was a big bucket with water used to clean the toilet. We couldn't use that water to wash our faces. Once a week they let us go outside to get some sunlight outside of the building, and we could wash our face with water from a tap there. We did not have toothbrushes in that district police detention and interrogation facility.... There wasn't any toilet paper. I didn't go to the toilet once over two weeks, we were almost starving. I think others washed with water.... The waiting cell didn't have blankets, but the detention and interrogation facility did, one per person.

In Suncheon, we could wash our clothes, but not here ... there were no blankets in the waiting cell, so we only wore the clothes we had. The detainees in the detention and interrogation facility cell had blankets and left them behind when they left, but we couldn't even wash them.

There were no bugs, except for mosquitos in the summer at the Suncheon detention and interrogation facility, but in the detention and interrogation facility [in South Hamgyong province], there were so many lice, that when men took off their clothes you could see them falling off. Guards gave time to catch lice, asking them to take their clothes off for 10 minutes and kill the insects. Male detainees were too lazy to clean themselves. They didn't even wash their faces.

She said the detention and interrogation facility run by the secret police in Ryanggang province near the border with China where she ended up one year later for making illegal calls overseas was the harshest.

It was winter and very cold. One male detainee's foot was frozen and dripping water. The guard massaged the leg with snow and tried to fix it, but the detainee was released, and the rumor was that they had to cut off the leg. The secret police officer was concerned and went to the hospital asking them not to cut off the leg, that he would pay the necessary medicines.

The conditions were terrible, especially as the detention and interrogation facility was up north in a remote area. The cells didn't have metal bars, they were wooden, and there was no hitting ... the floor was made of cement, and it was so cold, the wall was covered with white ice. That's why the detainees' foot froze, mine did too. The bowibu office had a heater but not in the detention and interrogation facility cell. There were six female detainees, but only two blankets. We slept all together, but we still froze. The man was at the end cell, it must have been colder there, so his frostbite was more severe. There were only two cells ... six women in my cell, and two women and one man in the other cell. They didn't have enough space to keep men and women separate.

The toilet was in the building yard, and we had to go the whole group together. The toilet was a hole made on the floor covered with cement. The guards accompanied us to the toilet. There was no water, so I wasn't able to wash my face, not even once [for two weeks]. After going to the toilet, I grabbed a bit of snow and washed my hands.

I was questioned for one week there. They didn't beat me, but it was more painful than any other experience I had. The conditions were so terrible, and the punishments were also harsher. As punishment in Suncheon, they made us stand, but here, we had to stand with our arms straight up, or with our knees slightly bent. That was a lot more painful. Other times, they'd make us to lie down face down and get up repeatedly. We were punished almost every day, instead of being beaten. Nice guards would punish us for 30 minutes, but the mean ones would punish us for one hour. It was designed to make questioning easy.

I paid bribes, 3,000RMB [480 USD] to the bowiseong officer in charge of my case, so I was released after two weeks.

Case of Heo Yun Mi

Heo Yun Mi, a former accountant in her 50s from South Hamgyong province, left North Korea in autumn 2015.[202] She was detained at a detention and interrogation facility run by thesecret policein 2015 (her case is also discussed above in the Beaten and Abused section). Her oldest daughter had tried to go to South Korea via China, without success, but another woman who also tried to go with her was caught. The bowiseong officials came to Heo Yun Mi's house and took her and her daughter into custody for questioning. Her daughter, a former soldier who had been released early from the army because she had tuberculosis, was released after three days and Heo Yun Mi after one week in detention. She said:

We were able to come out [of detention] soon because we had good jobs and good statements. My older daughter said she left the army because she had tuberculosis. Her sister told her that there was some good medicine in China and she was just trying to find out some information about that. We were safe because she wasn't caught escaping and was detained at home. But the young woman who had been caught was detained trying to escape, so she was investigated for a longer time. She and my daughter had agreed that if they were caught, they'd never confess they were trying to go to South Korea because that would mean their end, and luckily she didn't. My daughter said she didn't know anything about the escape attempt and said I gave her the connections. She was released after three days. Also, the state-owned enterprise I worked for used their connections to help me because they needed me.

Heo Yun Mi said the general conditions were terrible. She explained the space she was held in was small, crowded, and cold. The food provided by the center (a cob or corn and soup with some wild greens and salt three times a day) was insufficient. The hygienic conditions were poor. She explained that there was some running water and the detainees could use a small plastic bucket to wash their hands, face, their teeth, and their cell. She also said the facilities were better than in other detention and interrogation facilities because it was a large detention and interrogation facility in Hamhung, the capital of South Hamgyong province. The facility usually dealt with major cases such as people trying to go to South Korea,[203] large-scale smugglers, users of cellphones, big drug cases, or trafficking. She said:

The detention and interrogation facility had the cells on the first floor and the investigation rooms on the second floor. I don't know the exact number of cells they had, but I saw seven: two for men, three for women and two for individual detention.... The cell I was detained in had around 20 detainees and was around 30 square meters. It had iron bars in the front towards a corridor and a small door in the back. The toilet was in the back left and there was a running water hose, which was connected to the toilet and we could use after using the toilet, although we couldn't use a lot of water. There were many times when there was no running water, so we'd fill up a water tank ... The toilet was a squatting toilet made with old ceramic, that was not clean like here. There was no partition.

I don't know what happened when women had their period.... The cell detainee chief was in charge of the toilet paper and gave us small pieces. The amount is limited and we couldn't use a lot, maybe they used toilet paper during their period.... I wasn't able to wash my hair, but detainees who stayed long didn't wash their hair either. There was some soap, but no shampoo. I wasn't able to change clothes. Detainees who stayed there long could have relatives send new clothes sometimes. There is no way to do laundry.... [It was winter, but] we had 5 blankets for 20 detainees. There was a heater that burned wood in the corridor, but none in the cells. There were a lot of people and I didn't see anybody with frostbite.

We were able to wash with the running water, using a small plastic pot. We also used that pot for cleaning [the cell]. We were allowed to wash our faces every day, but there were people who wouldn't wash their faces for over one or two months. Those who knew they would be sent to a political prison camp or ordinary prison camp didn't care about washing their faces. The water was cold, there wasn't hot water. We also brushed our teeth. There was a collective bowl with toothbrushes, and they'd give it to us at the washing time, we'd pick a random toothbrush and give it back [to the guards] immediately. There wasn't any toothpaste but they gave us salt.

We woke up at 5 a.m., washed ourselves, brushed our teeth, and cleaned the cell, then had breakfast at 6 a.m. They gave us the same for breakfast, lunch, and dinner, a cob of corn and soup with some wild greens and salt. Those who had been caught for longer, or who may later be sent to ordinary prison camp, political prison camp [or had severe sentences] also received some tofu, and more corn than others. This was to prevent them from dying or because they were going to suffer too much there, so they gave them more food.

Case of Yoon Young Cheol

Yoon Young Cheol (his case is also discussed above in the Beaten and Abused section) was detained at a bowiseong detention and interrogation facility in a border city with China and then a police detention and interrogation facility before being sent to an ordinary prison camp for five years.[204] Yoon Young Cheol was making a lot of money smuggling forbidden products, like herbal medicines, copper or gold, into China. He said that one day in late 2011 someone reported to the secret police that he was a spy. He said that the conditions were terrible.

It was winter, but there was no heating. There was only one small wood heater right in front of us, next to the guard. It was so cold ... and nobody knew where we were, so we couldn't get anything from outside. It was really cold, but it was worse because there were so many bedbugs and other bugs that bit you. The wooden floor was also hard and cold.... The toilet was at the end of the cell in a corner, next to a tank with running water, which hid part of our body when we used it. Still, the smell was also terrible, and I would imagine it would be worse in the summer.

Hunger was the worst.... I was hungry all the time.... In the morning we got one third of a bowl of grated boiled corn with some fermented bean paste soup with cabbage in the same bowl, which we'd eat in three or four spoons. The spoons didn't have the stick, so it couldn't be used to hurt ourselves. For lunch, we got a bowl of thick corn noodles, and for dinner the same corn with soup.

We had to wake up at 6 a.m. and go to sleep at 10 p.m. [in between interrogations] we had to be sitting on the floor all day. I had to sit for such a long time on that hard and cold floor that the skin on my butt started to become darker. That was my skin and muscle starting to die. We couldn't move, we had to sit with legs crossed, looking down all the time. If we moved, they hit us in the butt with their foot, or with their fist, or make us do squats.... Sometimes, if we moved or talked, they would ask us to extend our hands through the cell bars and hit us on the hands with their rifle. Once my hands were so swollen and thick, and so painful, I thought I'd never be able to use them again. But at the time, it didn't even occur to me that there could be a doctor there, able to treat me if I was injured, or that I could have any rights to ask for treatment.... there, you are just treated like you are worth less than an animal, and that's what you end up becoming.

The bowibu office had a small waiting cell for investigation, and next to it, there were three detention and interrogation facility cells. The first one for men, one for women, and one with an ethnic Korean Chinese man who was there for 10 days for helping some North Korean women. There were eight men in the cell, three were passed to the police, including me, and five were sent to political prisoners' camp. Four of them had confessed to trying to go to South Korea.

He managed to bribe the secret police and after six months the secret police established that he was not a spy. Yoon Young Cheol said the secret police found a big stash of cash when they raided his home. He agreed to exclude any mention of that money in his confession and used it to bribe the secret police officials. Then, the bowiseong transferred him to the police. He was detained at a police detention and interrogation facility in the same border city for two months and, as most of the investigation was already done, the police officers did not beat him up. He said:

[At the police detention and interrogation facility] we also had to sit on the floor all day, our gaze to the floor and our legs crossed. Every hour we were supposed to get a 10-minute break, but we'd get it only if the guard in charge wanted us to, so we could be sitting there straight for two or more hours. None of the detainees could complain ... if we complained, they would kick us in the back or legs, punch us, or punish us.

The cells were always crowded, there were 12 cells, six with women and six with men. There were always around 150-160 detainees, with nine to ten or 12 detainees in each cell. It was hard to lie down properly to sleep at night because of the lack of space. Each cell had around 11 or 12 square meters. We had to wake up at 6 a.m., eat breakfast at 7:30 a.m., lunch at noon, dinner at 6 p.m. and go to sleep at 10 p.m. Of all the suffering, hunger was the worst for me.

It was cold. The police are supposed to give blankets, coats, and other things, but they didn't. There were some blankets and coats that previous detainees could get from their families and left behind. It was so dirty and the situation so pathetic there, people don't want to take anything home with them. With the police, if you have family or friends, they can pay some bribes and get you better clothes, food, cigarettes, soap, and other things. But I wasn't in my hometown, so I couldn't get anything. I managed to get a blanket and a coat that somebody left behind.

Bribes and Connections

All interviewees told Human Rights Watch that those with the capacity to pay bribes or mobilize connections received better treatment in detention. In many cases, law enforcement officials would ignore or reduce their "crimes." If they were detained, they would not be held at a detention and interrogation facility or they would be released even before the official investigation started. Others would receive short or suspended sentences at hard labor detention centers or at hard labor ordinary crimes prison camps, or avoid being sent to political prison camps, depending on the latest set of directives from Pyongyang.[205]

All interviewees told Human Rights Watch that when someone is caught while committing a crime, the capacity to pay bribes and having the right connections with people who can influence the detention itself, the initial investigation and the preliminary examination are crucial to being released or receiving shorter sentences.[206]

Kim Sun Young, the former trader in her 50s from North Hamgyong province who escaped North Korea in 2015, explained she was investigated and examined in late 2012 after she had been forcibly returned from China to North Korea.[207] She said:

The investigation process is complex, so it is crucial to bribe the right officials and institutions to get a sentence that is more beneficial. Also, the timing is important, otherwise, you may just lose money for nothing.... When I was in a detention and interrogation facility, my son was looking for the right people to influence, but he had a hard time to connect with the right high-ranking officials, so he bribed some low-level agents who would try to help me and my son gave a 'donation' to the central bank in my name. The bank issued a certificate, which he submitted to the authorities. It helped in the trial, so I got half of my sentence suspended.[208]

The relatives of Heo Yun Mi, the former accountant, also gave some bribes when she was detained by the secret police in 2015 in an effort to get her released as soon as possible.[209] She explained:

When you are detained by the secret police, nobody knows where you are. Although in our case it was different. After we were released after such a short time, our neighbors were surprised because the secret policeofficial of our neighborhood watch (imminban) had spread the rumor we had been caught by the secret police. People assumed that because my younger daughter was in South Korea, we must have had enough money to pay up. Our relatives also found out where we were after three days of detention thanks to the secret police official. They figured out who the interrogator in charge of our case was and reached out to his wife and gave her 1,000 RMB [160 USD]. They also invited the neighborhood secret police official to lunch. The officials don't just take bribes, they look first into the case and the testimony and decide afterwards. I was released after one week and paid bribes, so I got a 20-day sentence of hard labor. But I just went to the hard labor detention center's office with the document and went home. I gave 700 RMB [100 USD] to the police supervisor. We gave some 8.3 (palsam) money to the hard labor detention center.[210] There was a pretty established system to pay to not have to work. Only those without money do the hard work there. [211]

Case of Kim Keum Chul

Kim Keum Chul, the former medicinal herb smuggler in his 30s from North Hamgyong province who was detained at detention and interrogation facilities four times between 2000 and 2014 (his case is also discussed above in the "Beaten and Abused" section), explained how being able to bribe officials improved his treatment. In his experience, bribery worked depending on the investigation type and officer in charge, connections and timing.[212] He said that in 2000, at a bowibu detention and interrogation facilityin a town bordering China, it was impossible to use bribes. But in transit to his hometown at the Chongjin holding center, bribes made it possible to meet relatives or receive soap or clothes. He added that at his home district's police detention and interrogation facility, his father had used his connections, who agreed to build a new fence for the house of the bowibu official of the district in exchange for a transfer document and speeding up the process. He also gave a pig to the police investigator to wrap up the case with a sentence of just three months at a hard labor detention center.

Kim Keum Chul said that in the mid-2000s he was not able to give bribes because he did not have enough connections with the secret police to influence the investigation, though he was able to get some extra food because the detention and interrogation facility where he was held was run by the police. In 2014, the last time he was detained, he did. His wife gave 100,000 NKW [worth between 15 and 25 kgs. of rice] and four cartons of cigarettes to the wife of the police investigator in his case, while his father gave the wife a big bag of peppers and other agricultural products. In exchange, his family members were allowed to visit every day and brought more cigarettes and other things of value. He said he was supposed to get a hard labor sentence for six months but got 15 days instead. He also had a connection with the head of the hard labor detention center, so he did not really do labor there and instead took care of the sick. He gave the head of the facility two cartons of cigarettes to thank him. Kim Keum Chul explained some of his experiences to Human Rights Watch:

We were called numbers in the bowibu detention and interrogation facility, but at the police detention and interrogation facilityeven though we had numbers we were called by our names or nicknames.... They called
me 'escape.'

The [district] bowibu only had one cell to question political criminals, so they put them in a police detention and interrogation facility. Their facilities were three minutes away.... The police detention and interrogation facility was in the basement. The floors were covered with wood, but some cells had just cement floors. My brother [who was also detained there in early 2000s] had been in a cell without wood cover. The infrastructure facilities of the detention and interrogation facility didn't change [between the early 2000s and 2014], except that in 2014 there was a new wooden floor cover. I think all cells were covered the last time. Each cell could have up to 20 people, but when I was held there [in the mid-2000s] there were six detainees ... and ten in 2014 ... On one side there was a cement wall and door with a small window with bars, the other three sides were just walls. There were no ventilation shafts. There was a light in the corridor but none in the cell.... The toilet was in the back of the cell. There was a partition, so if we sat, it covered us up until our necks. They gave us toilet paper, also pillows and blankets, one per person. There were used ones from former detainees, but family members could send some in too. I got one from my home and left it there. There was no running water, in the kitchen on the first floor there was a water pump that could be used for the toilet, to clean up or to drink.

We could not see our relatives, but we could get food from outside, clothes, toiletries like soap and a toothbrush, and send back our dirty clothes. Guards checked all our clothes and food. I didn't brush my teeth. [When] I got some money, I'd give it to the guards and ask them to buy me some cigarettes, although it was forbidden according to the regulations. If I paid for five packs of cigarettes, I'd get one. They didn't do this for those who committed serious crimes or were under [investigation or] preliminary examination, only to those like me who were likely to get a short-term sentence in hard labor detention centers.

The detention and interrogation facility gave food three times a day.... In the mid-2000s, I was allowed to get outside food every day. My father knew the police officers well and gave them cartons of cigarettes. The usual food at the detention and interrogation facility was boiled corn cobs and cabbage. I got some corn powder, added water and made corn cake and ate that. Guards let outside food in, but we needed to thank them. In 2014, outside food was allowed once a week, but [thanks to bribes] my investigator would call me out to his office and gave me food and clothes there. I'd spend the whole day there, cleaning or smoking and go back to my cell in the evening.

Case of Lim Ok Kyung

Lim Ok Kyung, a former smuggler in her forties from South Hwanghae province, escaped North Korea in the summer of 2016. [213] She explained how bribes and connections were key to avoiding long detention, long-term imprisonment, or extended torture and mistreatment, but also showed their limits.

In 2014, Lim Ok Kyung was held at a detention and interrogation facility run by the police near the border with China in Ryanggang province for smuggling dozens of Chinese and South Korean home appliances to North Korea. The soldier who was helping her got in trouble with the police and she was detained.

Thanks to the connections of her husband, who was a mid-level party member, her uncle and her husband's friend, she was released after 10 days. The city police political head officer was her husband's friend, so they asked him for help and gave him some "Peace" cigarettes, a Japanese tobacco brand considered very high-end in North Korea. She said that while they only gave some cigarettes to a friend, the key was the good long-term relations her husband maintained. She said:

I had some guts; a young guard talked rubbish to me, so I responded and fought back.... The police said it was the first time somebody insulted and got into a fight with 'law people' and they took me to the detention and interrogation facility. I was in a waiting cell for one day and then transferred to the detention and interrogation facility cell. They had problems with the soldier but couldn't attack him, so they decided to put my case as their first reporting case. [In ordinary circumstances] I could have left faster, but it wasn't possible. By the time my uncle, my husband, and his friend were able to use their connections 10 days had already passed.

Because of her connections, Lim Ok Kyung was held in an individual cell at the detention and interrogation facility, but she was not allowed to sleep because of her fight with the guard. She explained:

For five days, they forced me to stay standing and didn't let me sleep. Luckily, I had been smuggling for many years, so I knew many 'law people.' When a police guard I knew came in, they'd give me candy saying I was suffering, they'd let me sit and rest. But when the guards I didn't know were in charge of watching me, they'd hear the young guard saying they should 'kill me' and they wouldn't let me sleep. They wouldn't be watching all the time, so I had to quickly get up whenever I heard their steps, it was really hard during those first five days.

She was also beaten during the three days she was questioned and forced to sit immobilized while waiting. She said:

I was beaten the day I was detained. The guards didn't hit me at the waiting cell, but after I was moved to the individual cell of the detention and interrogation facility, they hit me during questioning ...The investigation took place at a desk ... First, they said to write everything, everything from the moment of my birth until the present. I had to write my whole story for hours. Then they looked into all I wrote. Then the next day the preliminary examination officer came in, said what I wrote was a lie, and asked me to write it again. Then they'd compare notes and ask more questions. When things didn't match, they'd hit me with their hands in the face. I complained about my rights and they'd hit me more.

The preliminary examination officer had documents saying I had smuggled [home appliances into North Korea and banned metals to China]. He asked me about that, but I kept not answering, so he hit me. As I was beaten, I told him this was a violation of my rights and complained, so he hit me more and harder.... The questioning didn't go on for long [around three days], because of the work [of putting pressure through connections]. The preliminary examination officer had some evidence, but the political officer at the provincial police office was putting pressure, as well as the political officer at the city police, so there wasn't much he could do. The first day the beating was the hardest.... [At the individual cell,] some guards who passed by would hit me or kick me, I also complained about that. I knew they could hit me more for that, but I think I really trusted my husband's connections.... The day at the waiting cell, I had to sit cross-legged with hands on top of the knees.

In detention, she was barely given any food and there was no heating system. She said:

After five days in detention, our pressure through connections appeared to work, and I received some food from outside. Before that, outside food wasn't allowed. I could brush my teeth and wash my face. It was [winter and] very cold, so a guard I knew let me bring in cotton winter clothes. The first three days I wasn't given any white rice, they gave me a bit of boiled barley and a soup with a little fermented bean paste and a bit of cabbage. In the evening, they gave me a boiled corn cob. After three days starving like that, the barley rice and the corn rice tasted delicious. The floor was made with cement and they gave me one blanket. It was so cold I couldn't sleep. The individual room was 2.5 pyeong (8.2 square meters) and I was surprised to see it had no electricity. In the floor underneath, there were other detention and interrogation facility cells, [the walls were so thin] I could hear people talking and [guards'] insults.

After being released, Lim Ok Kyung was scared and stopped smuggling, but she needed money to survive so three months later she started smuggling forbidden products again.

In 2015, Lim Ok Kyung was working in connection with networks that sent money from South Korea to North Korea and smuggling illegal Chinese cellphones to North Korea. One of her clients got caught with a Chinese cellphone, gave her name as the provider and five bowiseong officers went into her home to detain her. One of the officers happened to be her husband's former university classmate, so he managed to pay him 5,000 RMB (800 USD) for the construction of the provincial ( do) bowibu building, and the case was closed.

Case of Jin Sol

Jin Sol, a former soldier in his 30s from Ryanggang province, left North Korea in 2017. He was detained for smuggling in 2013 by the police for almost six months and in 2016 for less than six months by the secret police for allegedly trying to escape to South Korea. He said he had some connections with the police and had some money, but one complicating factor was that prices could go up and make bribery unaffordable.[214] He said:

In 2013, I went to China [for smuggling] and returned, but I was caught.... The bowibu [in my village district] didn't have a detention and interrogation facility, so I was held at the police detention and interrogation facility [for almost six months] and questioned for 10 days by the MSS official ... My wife contacted the chief guard of the detention and interrogation facility, gave him 100 RMB, and was able to visit me once. She worked really hard to avoid a long-term hard labor sentence [at an ordinary crimes prison camp] but failed [and I got a two-year hard labor sentence]. Then she tried to get me out with an illness certificate. But just around that time, Kim Jong Un had given an order saying illegal border crossing into China had to be strongly punished, so that option disappeared. She had agreed with the chief police officer to get me a positive result with hepatitis and tuberculosis during the physical examination, but he asked for more money at the last minute because of the new orders [and she couldn't afford it]. But she spent a lot of money on the chief guard and the other guards, so she could visit me and bring some food. Sometimes they'd let me smoke a cigarette or go out and clean up the snow. I was able to go outside at least one hour every day. After sitting in the same position all day, it felt really good to be able to work and move around.

Bribery did not always prevent abuse. He explained:

[In 2013] if we moved, we were punished by standing and sitting, doing push-ups, sit-ups, or holding onto the metal bars. Some guards made us put our face between the bars or hit our fingers through the bars with a stick or with the gun. If they were really upset, they'd come into the cell and beat us. This happened every day, if not in our cell in the others, we could hear it, it was to maintain tension.

There were also beatings during questioning, before the [Party] Security Committee decision. The interrogator questioned me sitting at a chair, and I wasn't wearing handcuffs.

In 2016, the MSS investigator hit me in the beginning of the investigation for about a week, but I could hear sounds of beatings every day [during the time I was there] from the individual questioning room. The beatings were severe. The physical facilities of the bowibu detention and interrogation facility were cleaner and nicer [than the one run by the police] but the fear and terror I felt was bigger, incomparable ... The atmosphere was totally different. Bowibu guards wore military uniforms. I was beaten severely for a week ... There were times I was almost about to give up on life. I didn't have any connections [or money] and I was detained for trying to go to South Korea. There, among 100 that go in, barely 10 [with connections] may get a warning, 70 go to political prison camp, and 20 are sent to the police ... While I was there, more than 50 detainees disappeared [into the political prison camp system].

Because trying to escape to South Korea is considered a severe political crime, in 2016, he was detained in a bowiseong detention and interrogation facility in Ryanggang province. He said that nobody really knew where the facility was located and therefore it was not possible to pay bribes, although personal connections still were helpful. He was held there for less than six months and ended up getting just a warning and "social awareness penalty" ( sahoe kyoyang cheobun) thanks to the background and connections of the person he went to China with.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees the right to a fair trial and the right to be free of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and torture. Freedom from torture is also a jus cogens or peremptory norm of international law, binding on all states. The North Korean government also has ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which has been interpreted as forbidding gender-based violence against women as a form of discrimination. In addition, the DPRK is bound by international customary law contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[215]

Right to Fair Trial and Due Process

These basic rights instruments have been supplemented over the years by interpretation and elaboration by treaty bodies, and further international principles affirmed by the United Nations, as well as considerable international jurisprudence. For example, the right to a fair trial, articulated in article 14 of the ICCPR, includes the right to an independent judiciary, which requires both that the state guarantee independence in law and in practice, and forbids pressure, influence, intervention or revision in judicial decision-making.[216] The UN Human Rights Committee, the official treaty body that monitors and interprets the ICCPR, issued General Comment No. 32 on the right to a fair trial under article 14 of the ICCPR, in which it emphasized that there is no exception to the requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and that the judiciary must be protected from "political interference by the executive branch and legislature" as well as "any form of political influence in their decision-making."[217]

Right to freedom from torture and ill-treatment

While the North Korean government is not a state party to the Convention against Torture, the absolute prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in international law is articulated in the ICCPR and the CRPD, which the DPRK has ratified and must comply with.

Officials must never use force to compel a detainee to confess to a crime or to testify against other persons.[232] The interrogation process must not include violence, threats or methods that impair an individual's capacity to make decisions.[233] Deprivation of food or water, lack of hygiene, or lack of appropriate medical care to coerce a confession may amount to torture and ill-treatment.[234] Domestic laws must prohibit the use of statements or confessions obtained through torture or other prohibited treatment in judicial proceedings.[235] Corporal punishment and any other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments, as well as collective punishment, for disciplinary purposes must
be prohibited.[236]

In order to prevent torture, all law enforcement officials must be fully informed and educated about the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment.[237] The law must also provide the right to lodge complaints against torture and such complaints must be investigated promptly and impartially.[238]

The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) call for, among other things, a limit to the number of people held in a room, depending on its size, appropriate sleeping arrangements, adequate facilities for personal hygiene, clothing and bedding, adequate food, and access to medical services. Women should be held in premises entirely separate from men and guarded by female staff.[239]

Women's Rights

International bodies have established that gender-based violence, or "violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately," constitutes a form of discrimination.[243] The committee responsible for monitoring and reporting on CEDAW (the CEDAW Committee) has clarified that states' responsibility to eliminate discrimination requires them to take appropriate measures to regulate the actions of non-state actors. The particular risk of sexual violence and other forms of violence that women face in pretrial detention should be recognized, and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure women's safety.[244]

To the North Korean Government:

Publicly acknowledge the existence of human rights violations in detention and launch a nationwide campaign to educate officials and the public, emphasizing the rights of detainees under international law and standards.

Cooperation with the United Nations

As an initial step in implementing the above recommendations, begin consultations with relevant UN human rights mechanisms, including the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and other relevant thematic rapporteurs and mechanisms. Invite officials with these offices to visit North Korea and provide technical assistance and training for courts, police, and prison and detention officials; monitor trials; and carry out visits to prisons and other places of detention.

Legal and Judicial Reform

Undertake legal, constitutional, and institutional reforms to establish an independent and impartial judiciary and introduce genuine checks and balances on the powers of the police, security services, government, the Workers' Party of Korea, and the Supreme Leader.

Reform the legal system to ensure due process and fair trials that meet international standards, including the presumption of innocence during investigations and at trials and access to legal counsel of one's own choosing throughout the entire legal and judicial process.

Amend domestic laws and regulations to allow judicial review of allegations of unlawful or abusive detention or imprisonment.

Review the domestic legal framework to ensure that it fully complies with the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the "Bangkok Rules").

Abolish the People's Security Committee review system of the criminal trial process, which interferes with the independent role of the judiciary under international law.

Abolish overly broad and vague "anti-state" and "anti-people" provisions in North Korean criminal law which are subject to abuse by police and other investigators, prosecutors, and judges.

Sign and ratify the United Nations Convention against Torture and incorporate its provisions into North Korean law.

Introduce the term "torture," which is currently not mentioned in the criminal code or criminal procedure code, into North Korean law, and ensure it correlates to the definition of "torture" in international human rights law. Specifically prohibit the use of evidence obtained through "torture." Enforce existing provisions in the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code that prohibit and criminalize the use of force or inducement.

Limit pretrial detention to cases in which the person is a genuine threat to public safety, a serious flight risk, or likely to tamper with witnesses or evidence. Detainees are particularly susceptible to torture in pretrial detention. Incommunicado pretrial detention should be disallowed, and all persons should have access to an independent lawyer in no less than 24 to 48 hours following detention.

Review domestic laws to ensure they are in compliance with international standards prohibiting forced hard labor for free, as a form of inhumane and degrading punishment.

Law Enforcement

Detention Facilities and Prisons

End endemic torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in detention and prison, including sexual violence, hard labor, being forced to sit immobilized for any period as a disciplinary or punitive measure, and other mistreatment.

Investigate allegations of torture and inhumane treatment, including beatings, deliberate starvation, sexual violence, and failure to provide basic hygienic conditions in detention and interrogation facilities, and hold officials accountable, including by suspending, or dismissing officials responsible and publicizing such cases.

Take immediate steps to improve abysmal prison conditions and bring them up to basic standards of hygiene, health care, nutrition, clean water, clothing, floor space, ventilation, light, and heat.

Take steps to protect and meet the needs of female prisoners and detainees, including providing female guards to supervise all housing areas for female prisoners and detainees; establishing an effective system for detainees and prisoners to report sexual violence and obtain protection against retaliation, and for preventing and punishing sexual violence by guards; providing adequate medical care, including sexual and reproductive health care; providing sufficient menstrual hygiene management supplies and ensuring access to running water and safe and private toilet facilities; and increasing food rations for pregnant and lactating women.

International Human Rights Obligations

To South Korea, the United States, Japan, the European Union and its Member States, the UK, China, Other Concerned Governments, UN Agencies, and International NGOS with a Presence in North Korea:

This report was researched and written by Asia division staff at Human Rights Watch. Some interviews were conducted by consultant Kim Sung-joong. The report was edited by Brad Adams, Asia director. Dinah PoKempner, general counsel, and Danielle Haas, senior editor, provided legal and program review. Seashia Vang, senior associate in the Asia Division, provided editing and production assistance. Cover and illustrations were designed by Choi Seong-Guk. This report was prepared for publication by Travis Carr, publications coordinator. This report was translated into Korean by Jinouk Chung and vetted by Choi Ha-young.

We are particularly indebted to external reviewer Lee Young-hwan, director at Transitional Justice Working Group. We are very grateful to the local NGOs, journalists, and academics who assisted in our research-including Kwon Eun-kyoung, secretary general at the International Coalition to stop crimes against humanity in North Korea (ICNK); Jong Hyeon Mu, board member at Unification Media Group; Joanna Hosaniak, deputy director general at Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights; Ahn Myung Chul, director at NK Watch; Cho Chung Hui, researcher at Good Farmers Research Institute; Yoon Yeo-sang, director, and Teodora Gyupchanova, researcher, at the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights- as well as those who assisted in the field, including "Superman" and Kim Seong-eun, missionary at Caleb Mission.

Above all, we express our sincere gratitude to all the North Korean women and men who shared their stories with us, and many others who could not be named for security reasons. We hope that this report will contribute to the reform of pretrial detention procedures and conditions, the creation of an independent judiciary and law enforcement body in North Korea and bringing to justice those responsible for these violations.

While Human Rights Watch benefitted from the expertise of many organizations and experts in preparing this report, Human Rights Watch is solely responsible for its contents. None of the findings, assessments, or conclusions of the report should be attributed to any of the organizations listed here.

Human Rights Watch gratefully acknowledges the support of donors whose generosity made this work possible, including the Robin Foundation and those who wish to remain anonymous.

[2] Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (COI), paras. 259 & 262.

[3] Between ages 7 and 13, all children must become members of the Korean Children's Union. Their activities are overseen by members of the Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist Youth League, which is made up of students between age 14 and their early 30s, when people may finish higher education degrees. After leaving school, a citizen becomes a member of a relevant mass organization, such as the General Federation of Korean Trade Unions, the Union of Agricultural Working People, or the Socialist Women's Union of Korea (Women's Union), depending on employment and marital status. Party members also become officials of the mass associations for party members. The inminban is made up of about 20-40 households with one leader appointed to report to the Ministry of Social Security (police) and/or the Ministry of State Security (secret police, MSS) on unusual activities in the neighborhood. Human Rights Watch, "You Cry at Night but Don't Know Why": Sexual Violence in North Korea, November 2019, p. 16 - 19, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/northkorea1118_web2.pdf; COI, para. 110, 111, 183 & 260.

[5] Formerly called gukga anjeon bowibu or bowibu for short, it carries the functions normally associated with secret police. It is also translated as National Security Agency, State Security Agency or State Security Department. DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (adopted 1950, last amended 2012), art. 46; COI, paras. 1169 & 1170.

[7] COI, para. 1169.

[8] For further details on detention and imprisonment facilities, see section III. Pretrial Detention Facilities in North Korea.

[9] COI, para. 700.

[10] Human Rights Watch interview with three former government officials, including a former MSS official, between December 2016 and October 2019.

[11] The police was called Ministry of People's Security ( inmin boanseong or boanseong) until May 2020. It was also often translated as People's Security Agency or Department or People's Safety Agency or Department. It was formerly also called inmin boanbu or boanbu in Korean, literally Department of People's Security. Kim Se-won, North, Changes Name of Ministry of People's Security to Ministry of Social Security, June 2, 2020, Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/namechange-06022020092208.html (accessed July 7, 2020); COI, paras. 1171 & 1172.

[12] For further details on detention facilities and ordinary crimes prisons, see section III. Pretrial Detention Facilities in North Korea. Ibid; Gause, "Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment," p.26-35.

[14] COI, para. 700; Gause, "Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment," p.26.

[15] COI, para. 134.

[16] Ibid.; Gause, "Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment," p. 57.

[18] Gause, "Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment," p.36.

[19] DPRK Socialist Constitution (adopted 1972, last amended 2016), arts. 106 & 109; all publicly available North Korean laws are available in Korean in the Unification Legal Database, https://www.unilaw.go.kr/bbs/selectBoardList.do?bbsId=BBSMSTR_000000000021 (accessed July 29, 2020).

[23] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 46.

[24] The Prosecutor's Offices has oversight over the criminal process from investigation, going through preliminary examination and trial, including detention, raids or searches without the intervention of a court or judge. Also, the role of the prosecutor during trial not only include proving the crimes of the accused but also monitoring trial proceedings. DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), arts.12, 14, 46 & 47; Gause, "Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment," p. 93 & 94; DPRK Prosecutor Surveillance Law (adopted 1985, last amended 1998).

[25] Also often translated as Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly.

[26] DPRK Socialist Constitution (1972, 2016), art. 156.

[27] Human Rights Watch interviews with two former detainees and four government officials between April 2016 and October 2019.

[28] DPRK Socialist Constitution (1972, 2016), art. 153.

[29] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 47 & 49.

[30] The Presidium often also called Standing Committee, of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) has the power to adopt its own legislation. In 2007, the Standing Committee of the SPA 's Decision No. 2483 adopted new criminal offenses for ordinary crimes as an "Addendum to the Criminal Code." For further details on this law, see section II, A Flawed Criminal Procedure Law and System, Criminal Law, Procedure and Punishment. FIDH-International Federation for Human Rights, "The Death Penalty in North Korea: In the Machinery of a Totalitarian State," May 16, 2013, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/en-report-northkorea-high-resolution.pdf (accessed May 12, 2020); DPRK Socialist Constitution (1976, 2016), art. 158.

[32] The "Ten principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System" of the WPK" ("Ten Principles") stipulate that the instructions of the founder of the country and Eternal and Great Leader Kim Il Sung (1912-1994), his son known as the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il (1941-2011) and his grandson Kim Jong Un (1994) are legal and supreme orders. Joanna Hosaniak, "Prisoners of Their Own Country", NKHR, 2004, p.57, http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/include/dn.php?mode=n_r_reports&ufile=20161208131257.pdf&rfile=Prisoners%20of%20their%20own%20country%20north%20korea.pdf (accessed January 18, 2018).

[33] The Ten Principles are the highest norms in official North Korean government ideology. They consist of ten main principles and 65 specific directives which govern the thoughts and behavior of the North Korean people. The Ten Principles describe how to establish the one-ideology system: 1) We must give our all in the struggle to unify the entire society with the revolutionary ideology of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung. 2) We must honor the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung with all our loyalty. 3) We must make absolute the authority of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung. 4) We must make the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung's revolutionary ideology our faith and make his instructions our creed. 5) We must adhere strictly to the principle of unconditional obedience in carrying out the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung's instructions. 6) We must strengthen the entire party's ideology and willpower and revolutionary unity, centering on the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung. 7) We must learn from the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung and adopt the communist look, revolutionary work methods and people-oriented work style. 8) We must value the political life we were given by the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung, and loyally repay his great political trust and thoughtfulness with heightened political awareness and skill. 9) We must establish strong organizational regulations so that the entire party, nation, and military move as one under the one and only leadership of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung. 10) We must pass down the great achievement of the revolution by the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung from generation to generation, inheriting and completing it to the end. Jeong-ho Roh, "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One Ideology System," Columbia Law School, 2006, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/10%20principles%20of%20juche.html (accessed March 21, 2016). For a complete listing of the sixty-five directives see translation by Joanna Hosaniak, Kyung Eun Ha and Markus Simpson Bell, NKHR, http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Ten-Great-Principles-of-the-Establishment-of-the-Unitary-ideology.pdf (accessed March 31, 2017).

[35] DPRK Socialist Constitution (1972, 2016), art.11.

[36] Report on Human Rights in North Korea 2014, Korea Bar Association, p. 48, http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Ten-Great-Principles-of-the-Establishment-of-the-Unitary-ideology.pdf (accessed March 31, 2017).

[37] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 2.

[38] DPRK Socialist Constitution (1972, 2016), art. 162.

[40] COI, para. 123.

[41] On December 19, 2007, North Korea adopted, by Decision No. 2483 of the Standing Committee [the current Presidium] of the Supreme People's Assembly, an "Addendum to the Criminal Code" for ordinary crimes. This expanded the "crimes" for which the death penalty is applied. The addendum has functioned as a complement to the Criminal Code and comprises 23 articles, of which 16 stipulate the death penalty for crimes including smuggling and dealing in narcotics, seizing state property, currency counterfeiting and illicitly selling state resources. The addendum permits the application of capital punishment as long as the authorities are able to establish that the crime in question was "extremely serious." FIDH, "The Death Penalty in North Korea: In the Machinery of a Totalitarian State."

[42] DPRK Criminal Code (1990, 2015), art. 10.

[45] DPRK Administrative Penalty Law (2004, 2011), arts. 229-238, & 251; Park Ju-hyun, "The Human Rights Guaranteeing Characteristics and Problem of the North Korean Criminal Justice System," Kyungnam University, December 2015, p. 65, http://www.riss.kr/search/detail/DetailView.do?p_mat_type=be54d9b8bc7cdb09&control_no=a1a694fcf7c4ac56ffe0bdc3ef48d419&outLink=N (accessed May 11, 2010).

[47] Other covered offenses include extortion of institutions/people's property, violation of import/export orders, breaking set market prices, selling food that is supposed to be provided for free, (undefined) illegal money-making, not properly taking care of agricultural machinery, illegal (unregistered) foreign currency making, stealing electricity, not taking proper attendance of government workers, mobilizing organizations or groups for projects that are not assigned to them, not mobilizing organizations or groups for assigned projects, fighting, gang fighting, public drunken behavior, public property destruction, walking on railroads or highways, making (illegal) alcohol for sale, smuggling, trafficking or crossing the border illegally, hiding bandits, misuse of ID cards, traffic violations, cutting trees, and polluting water and soil. DPRK People's Security Regulation Law (adopted 1992, last amended 2005), arts. 8-40.

[48] DPRK People's Security Regulation Law (adopted 1992, last amended 2005), art. 7.

[50] Human Rights Watch interview with three former government officials between December 2016 and October 2019; COI, paras. 701 & 702; Gause, North Korean House of Cards, p. 244 & 258.

[51] The Criminal Procedure Code says that the MSS will investigate and conduct the preliminary examination of political cases and the provincial court will hear the first instance trial for anti-state and anti-nation cases. However, the Supreme Court can decide to directly try political cases. DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), arts. 46, 51 & 53.

[52] COI, paras. 696 & 720-724.

[53] COI, para. 703, for further details on a case passed from the secret police onto the police, see section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities, Beaten and Abused, Case of Yoon Young Cheol.

[54] Human Rights Watch, "You Cry at Night but Don't Know Why,", p. 36; Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), "Status of women's rights in the context of socio-economic changes in the DPRK," May 2013, https://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr:444/board/download.php?fileno=1101&no=3&board_table=bbs_literature&page=1&word=&searchItem=&cate_id= (accessed March 21, 2016). For example, under North Korean law, the same crime may be punished differently depending on the "severity" or "circumstances" (jeongsang). For instance, a person caught harassing a woman could be punished with 1.) Social education based on art. 23 and 57 of the People's Safety Regulation Law; 2.) Up to three months of short-term hard labor; 3.) More than three months of hard labor in severe cases under art. 191 of the Administrative Penalty Law; 4.) Up to one year of short-term hard labor for shameless cases; 5.) Up to five years of long-term hard labor for repeated or plotted cases; 6.) Up to 10 years of hard labor for those who lead or are part of gangs that bring social instability based on art. 246 of the Criminal Code; 7.) Hard labor for life; or 8.) The death sentence for delinquent behavior with (undefined) especially severe "circumstances" under art. 17 of the Addendum to the Criminal Code. DPRK People's Safety Regulation Law (1992, 2005), arts. 23 &57; DPRK Administrative Penalty Code (2004, 2011), art. 191; DPRK Criminal Code (1990, 2015), art. 246; Addendum to the Criminal Code, art. 17.

[55] Additional rights of suspects include 1.) the prohibition of arbitrary arrest (arrest or detention must be made in accordance with the law), 2.) the right to file a complaint (if a suspect's rights are violated, he or she can file a complaint with the prosecutor within seven days of the alleged violation and the prosecutor is supposed to act on the complaint within three days), 3.) the right to contest a charge (during interrogation, a preliminary examiner is required to first inform the suspect of his or her rights, which include the right to contest a charge, offer counter-evidence, request further investigation, request a change of officers assigned to the case, including the preliminary examination officer, and to draft his/her own statement on the interrogation report), 4.) release pending trial (only suspects in crimes punishable by long-term hard labor or death who are likely to avoid preliminary examination or trial or interfere with an investigation and those suspected of offenses punishable by short-term labor in cases with "special circumstances" can be detained or arrested pending trial'), and 5.) notification to the family (when a person is arrested or detained, his/her family or work place should be notified of the detention or arrest within 48 hours along with the reason for the detention or arrest and the detention location). DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 6, 168, 169, 176, 178, 182 & 258.

[58] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 166.

[59] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 37.

[61] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 283.

[62] Ibid., art. 158. For more detail on North Korea's criminal procedural detail, see next section II. A Flawed Criminal Procedure Law & System, Criminal Investigation and Prosecution.

[63] Human Rights Watch interview with a former police officer and six former detainees between April 2015 and May 2020; DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 62; DPRK Lawyers' Law (1993), art. 8.

[64] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), arts. 133, 143 & 145.

[65] Ibid., art. 147.

[66] Ibid., art. 260.

[67] Ibid., art. 269.

[68] Ibid., arts. 10 & 46; for further details on law enforcement agencies, see section I. North Korea's Security and Law Enforcement Agencies.

[69] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 135.

[70] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 143; Human Rights Watch interviews with 22 former detainees and 6 former government officials, locations withheld, between January 2015 and October 2019.

[71] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees, locations withheld, between January 2015 and October 2019.

[72] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 143.

[73] An investigator may arrest a suspect without the approval of a prosecutor, search the suspect's body or residence, and confiscate evidence when 1.) a criminal just committed a crime or was caught while committing a crime, 2.) a victim or person who saw the crime pointed out the criminal, 3.) there is evidence of a crime in the body or residence of the suspect, 4.) a criminal or suspect tries to commit suicide or run away, and 5.) the location of the place of residence of the suspect is unclear. DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 142 & 143.

[74] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 143.

[75] Human Rights Watch interview with a former police officer, name and location withheld, on October 29, 2019.

[76] Human Rights Watch interviews with a former government official between August 2016 and May 2020.

[78] Human Rights Watch interview with four former government officials between January 2016 and May 2020.

[79] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), arts. 163, 175 & 177-180.

[80] "Based on objective evidence, the preliminary examination stage seeks to uncover all facts that count without reserve to get an understanding for the resolution of the criminal case, including the nature of the crime committed by the accused, the motives and purpose, the means and methods of the crime, the role of involvement and level of responsibility of the crime." DPRK Criminal Procedure Law (1950, 2012), arts. 133 & 148.

[82] DPRK Criminal Procedure Law (1950, 2012), art. 156.

[83] When the prosecutor, judge, or court returns a case with a possible sentence of hard labor for life or long-term, or execution, the follow up preliminary examination must be finished within 20 days. For cases with a possible short-term hard labor sentence must be finished within seven days. DPRK Criminal Procedure Law (1950, 2012), arts. 150, 151 & 157.

[84] Kim Young-Cheol, former police officer, public testimony, 10th International Conference on North Korean Human Rights & Refugees, Toronto, hosted by Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights & Han Voice, August 21, 2010, http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/eng/datacenter/related_write.php?mode=view&bbs_idx=4503&search_mode=&search_word=&pg=1 (accessed October 28, 2019).

[85] Human Rights Watch interview with a former police officer, October 29, 2019, and May 1, 2020.

[86] Ibid. DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 108.

[87] Human Rights Watch interview with two former police officers in October 2019.

[90] Human Rights Watch interview with two former government officials between August 2016 and May 2020; Kim, The North Korean Penal Code, p. 22-23.

[93] Human Rights Watch interview with three former government officials between January 2015 and October 2019.

[95] Human Rights Watch interview with two former government officials between October 2019 and May 2020; Kim, former police officer, public testimony, 10th International Conference on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees.

[96] Human Rights Watch interview with a former police officer, October 29, 2019.

[97] The North Korean system is built on a guiding ideology that gives primacy to the statements and personal directives of the country's leader, then to the "Ten Principles of the Establishment of the Unitary Ideological System" of the WPK, the rules of the party, the Socialist Constitution, and, finally, domestic laws. Human Rights Watch interview with three former government officials between January 2015 and October 2019; Kim, The North Korean Penal Code, p. 41;Kwak, A Study on the Change of relations between People's Safety Agents and Residents in North Korea, p.35; Human Rights Watch, "You Cry at Night but Don't Know Why": Sexual Violence in North Korea, p. 17 & 33 -37; Joanna Hosaniak, " Prisoners of Their Own Country," Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), 2004, http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/include/dn.php?mode=n_r_reports&ufile=20161208131257.pdf&rfile=Prisoners%20of%20their%20own%20country%20north%20korea.pdf (accessed January 18, 2018), p. 57; DPRK Socialist Constitution (1972, 2016), art. 11.

[98] Human Rights Watch interview with two former government officials between December 2017 and May 2020; Kim, The North Korean Penal Code, p. 40-41.

[99] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), arts.157 & 159.

[100] Ibid., art. 62, 158 & 159.

[101] Ibid., art. 161 & 162.

[102] Ibid., arts. 253 & 255.

[103] Ibid., art. 257.

[104] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 260.

[105] Ibid., art. 261.

[107] Ibid., art. 264.

[108] Human Rights Watch interview with three former government officials between October 2019 and May 2020.

[109] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 269.

[110] Ibid., art. 273.

[111] Ibid., art. 289.

[113] Ibid., art. 286.

[115] Ibid., art. 359.

[116] Ibid. art. 366.

[117] KINU, 2012 White Paper, p. 195 & 196. http://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/915/1/0000720104.pdf (accessed July 29, 2020); Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee who filed an appeal, location withheld, October 24, 2019.

[118] The Supreme People's Assembly also has the power to elect and summon the head of the Supreme Court. DPRK Socialist Constitution (adopted 1972, last amended 2019), art. 91, 166 & 168.

[119] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 50; DPRK Socialist Constitution (1972, 2019), art. 159.

[120] Ibid., art. 51.

[122] Ibid., arts. 52 & 91; DPRK Court Constitution Law (1976, 2011), art. 3.

[123] When a case has overlapping elements in a crime, the case will be tried in the court with the highest jurisdiction in the following order: 1.the Military Court; 2. the Military Supply Court; 3.the Railway Court; and 4. the People's Court. DPRK Criminal Procedure Code, arts.52 & 91.

[124] Ibid., art. 53.

[125] Ibid.; Baik, Nonjudicial Punishments of Political Offenses in North Korea, p. 906.

[126] Kim, The North Korean Penal Code, Criminal Procedures, and their Actual Applications, p. 20.

[127] For further details, see section I. North Korea's Security & Law Enforcement Agencies.

[129] DPRK Administrative Penalty Law (2004, 2011), art. 229 & 252; Park, The Human Rights Guaranteeing Characteristics and Problem of the North Korean Criminal Justice System, p. 65

[130] Human Rights Watch interview with Cho Chung Hui, former member of a provincial people's committee; Kim, North Korean Penal Code, pa. 21-22; Park, The Human Rights Guaranteeing Characteristics and Problem of the North Korean Criminal Justice System, p. 66-67

[132] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1992, 2012), art. 46; COI, para. 134.

[133] The decision-making is centralized and involves consultation with provincial and national headquarters. If the interrogating MSS office considers the case to be serious enough to warrant an enforced disappearance to a political prison camp or summary execution this appears to require a decision from at least the MSS national headquarters. It is not clear that courts are involved in this process. COI, para. 696, 698 & 720-723; for more details regarding political prison camps, see section III. Pretrial Detention Facilities in North Korea.

[134] COI, para. 841; "Mapping the Fate of the Dead: Killings and Burials in North Korea," Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), 2019, p 45 & 52, https://en.tjwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2019-Report-Mapping-the-Fate-of-the-Dead-Killings-and-Burials-in-North-Korea.pdf (accessed July 5, 2020).

[136] COI, para. 318.

[137] Corruption Perception Index 2019, Transparency International, January 23, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019 (accessed April 21, 2020).

[138] Human Rights Watch interviews with 46 North Koreans and eight former government officials between January 2015 to October 2019.

[139] Human Rights Watch interview with a former trader, location withheld, June 28, 2018.

[140] DPRK Criminal Procedure Code (1950, 2012), art. 143; Human Rights Watch interview with four former detainees between June 2018 and October 2019. The word daegisil (waiting room) is also used to refer to separate cells that hold detainees under questioning or investigation before starting the preliminary examination stage in some large detention and interrogation facilities ( kuryujang).

[141] Human Rights Watch with three former government officials and six former detainees between April 2015 and October 2019; Kwak, A Study on the Change of relations between People's Safety Agents and Residents in North Korea, p. 42. The word k uryujang is also used to refer to the cells where detainees are held while undergoing investigation and/or preliminary examination inside the detention and interrogation facility (kuryujang).

[142] These holding facilities ( jipkyulso) were originally traveler holding camps set up near trains stations for people traveling without permits, but they expanded, and many were set up near the Chinese border to hold the growing number of North Korean escapees who were caught and sent back to North Korea since the late 1990s. Yoon, Ku, Kim & Lee, Prisoners in North Korea Today, p. 30.

[143] The DPRK Criminal Code provides nine possible options for sentencing 1.)death, 2.)unpaid hard labor for life ( mugi rodong kyohwahyeong, in Korean literally "life-term of reform through labor criminal penalty"), 3.) fixed-term hard labor ( yugi rodong kyohwahyeong, in Korean literally "limited term of reform through labor criminal penalty," 4.) short-term hard labor ( rodong danryeonhyeong, literally "labor training criminal penalty"), 5.) deprivation of the right to vote, 6.) confiscation of property, 7.) fine, 8.) removal of qualifications, and 9.) suspension of qualifications. DPRK Criminal Code (1950, 2015), arts. 27 & 31.

[145] Ibid., paras. 816 & 819.

[147] DPRK Criminal Code (1950, 2015), art. 31.

[150] Human Rights Watch interview with Cho Chung Hui, Teodora Guypachanova and Alice Choi, researcher at Database Center for North Korean Human Rights between April and May 2020.

[151] There are no official statistics on the number of North Korean women, men or children who have tried to escape to China, but the vast majority of North Koreans who are able to leave the country are women. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, in 2019 80.7 percent of the North Koreans who arrived in South Korea were women (845 out of 1,047); between January and March 2020 71.1 percent were women (96 out of 135). South Korean Ministry of Unification, Policy on North Korean Defectors, Number of North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea. Surveillance of women is less stringent than of men, who are required to attend their government-mandated workplaces. A major factor is Illegal networks that traffic women into the commercial sex trade, including through brothels and online sex chatting services, or as "brides" to Chinese men.https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/ (accessed April 20, 2020); Human Rights Watch, "Give Us a Baby and We Will Let you Go": Trafficking of Kachin "Brides" from Myanmar to China, March 21, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/03/21/give-us-baby-and-well-let-you-go/trafficking-kachin-brides-myanmar-china; Human Rights Watch, "You Cry at Night but Don't Know Why," p. 20-24 & 32; COI, paras. 410-412, 456,700-717 & 1170; Human Rights Watch interview with nine smugglers, locations withheld, between January 2015 and August 2018.

[152] Ibid., para. 411.

[153] Ibid., para. 713.

[155] CEDAW Committee, 68th session, Summary record of the 1554th meeting, November 8, 2017, http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhskcAJS%2fU4wb%2bdIVicvG05RxP5%2bsP9Kr72JVaIpXVnDHbGgaNVpmnx6cNAlDjNXbvBIsv7xCXfotfuHerKpX%2f06EvYXGDPmTOF7jHHfOH4eOG (accessed February 18, 2019); COI, para. 786; DPRK Criminal Code (1950, 2015), arts. 27 & 31.

[156] DPRK Criminal Law (1950, 2015), arts. 27, 30 & 31.

[157] During the 1554th meeting of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women with the North Korean government, Jong Song Il, a researcher at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "the existence of political prison camps were groundless." Confidential witness testimony indicates that diplomats of the DPRK are under strict instructions never to admit to the existence of the camps; CEDAW Committee, 68th session, Summary record of the 1554th meeting, November 8, 2017, http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhskcAJS%2fU4wb%2bdIVicvG05RxP5%2bsP9Kr72JVaIpXVnDHbGgaNVpmnx6cNAlDjNXbvBIsv7xCXfotfuHerKpX%2f06EvYXGDPmTOF7jHHfOH4eOG (accessed February 18, 2019); COI, para. 731.

[158] COI, paras.1033-1067.

[159] Ibid., paras. 731 & 844.

[160] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees and eight former government officials, locations withheld, between January 2015 and January 2020.

[161] Human Rights Watch interview with eight former government officials between April 2015 and October 2019.

[163] Human Rights Watch interview with former police officer, October 27, 2019.

[164] He also said that sometimes after mobilizations and "loyalty demanding" projects are finished, government officials from Pyongyang sent orders to detain certain heads of state-owned enterprises for not having provided enough money or laborers, as demanded. Police would detain such managers in detention and interrogation facilities for three to seven days with educational objectives, so they would make efforts to give more next time. Ibid.

[166] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees and eight former government officials between January 2015 and October 2019.

[167] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees and four former government officials between January 2015 and October 2019.

[169] Human Rights Watch interview with ten former detainees and two former government officials between January 2015 and June 2018.

[171] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees and eight former government officials between January 2015 and October 2019.

[172] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees between January 2015 and October 2019.

[174] COI, para. 713.

[175] Ibid., paras. 713 & 717.

[177] The COI found forced abortion, infanticide, and sexual humiliation (including physical and verbal sexual molestation and rape) against women and children forcibly repatriated from China to North Korea in detention facilities that amounted to crimes against humanity. As a matter of standard practice, forcibly returned North Korean women entering detention facilities near the border must strip fully naked in front of other prisoners and guards. While naked they are forced to perform a series of squats to dislodge money hidden in their private parts (a practice known as "pumping"). They are also searched for money by female, and sometimes also male, guards who insert their hands into the victim's vagina using unsanitary techniques. COI, paras. 1105-1107.

[178] For further details see the case of Heo Yun Mi, described below in Section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities: Unhealthy and Inhumane Detention Conditions; unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Heo Yun Mi (pseudonym), location withheld, August 14, 2018.

[179] Unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Park Ji Cheol (pseudonym), location withheld, April 16, 2015.

[180] Given the volatility and complexity around the official and market North Korean currency rate, Human Rights Watch converted the value of the North Korean won to its value of amount of rice in the time of reference.

[181] Unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Kim Sun Young (pseudonym), location withheld, February 2, 2016.

[183] Unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Kim Keum Chul (pseudonym), location withheld, August 26, 2018; for further details see the case of Kim Keum Chul, described below in Section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities: Bribes and Connections.

[184] Unless other sources are specifically named this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Yoon Young Cheol, name and location withheld, October 24, 2019. For further details see Case of Yoon Young Cheol in Section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities: Unhealthy and Inhumane Detention Conditions.

[185] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees between January 2015 and October 2019.

[186] Human Rights Watch interview with 15 former detainees between January 2015 and October 2019.

[188] Human Rights Watch interview with two former detainees, locations withheld, February 2015 and August 2019.

[189] Human Rights Watch interview with a former police officer, October 27, 2019.

[190] Human Rights Watch interview with two former police officers between July 2018 and October 2019.

[191] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees between January 2015 and October 2019.

[194] The COI also found that detainees at detention and interrogation facilities run by the secret police endured "squalid hygienic conditions that facilitate the transmission of diseases. Medical care is provided only to those who are extremely sick or not at all. A considerable number of prisoners die from starvation or disease." COI, para. 715; Human Rights Watch interview with four former detainees and two former police officers, locations withheld, between April 2015 and October 2019.

[195] Human Rights Watch interview with a former police officer, December 12, 2017.

[196] Human Rights Watch interview with a former police officer, October 27, 2019.

[198] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees between January 2015 and October 2019.

[199] Human Rights Watch interview with a former police officer, July 2, 2018.

[200] Unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Baek Sol Hee, June 26, 2018.

[201] When infrastructure and circumstances allow, detainees under investigation or interrogation are held in waiting cells and moved to detention facility cells afterwards.

[202] Unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Heo Yun Mi, August 14, 2018; for further details see the case of Heo Yun Mi, described above in Section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities: Beaten and Abused.

[204] Unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Yoon Young Cheol, October 24, 2019; for further details see the above section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities.

[205] Human Rights Watch interview with 22 former detainees and eight former government officials, locations withheld, between January 2015 and October 2019.

[207] For further detail see the case of Kim Sun Young, described above in Section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities: Beaten and Abused; Human Rights Watch interview with Kim Sun Young February 2, 2016.

[209] Human Rights Watch interview with Heo Yun Mi, August 14, 2018; for further details see the case of Heo Yun Mi, described above in Section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities: Beaten and Abused & Unhealthy and Inhumane Detention Conditions.

[211] Human Rights Watch interview with Heo Yun Mi, August 14, 2018.

[212] For further details see the case of Kim Keum Chul, described above in Section IV. Abuses in Pretrial Detention and Interrogation Facilities: Beaten and Abused; unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Kim Keum Chul, August 26, 2018.

[213] Unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Lim Ok Kyung (pseudonym), location withheld, June 28, 2018.

[214] Unless other sources are specifically named, this account is based on Human Rights Watch interview with Jin Sol (pseudonym), location withheld, June 29, 2018.

[215] The United Nations has also adopted standards that outline specific measures for the protection of rights of persons in detention. While these standards are not legally binding, they provide authoritative guidance on the treatment of detainees. These standards include: United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), 2015; United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules), 2010; the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment , 1988; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules), 1985;the Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1982; and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 1978.

[219] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, para. 34.

[220] Juan Mendez, General Recommendation of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, para. g; UN Body of Principles, principles 17.1 & 17.2; Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 61, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRTorture/recommendations.pdf (accessed July 8, 2020).

[221] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, Article 9: Liberty and Security of Person, paras. 10 & 11, https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/GC/35 (accessed July 8, 2020).

[222] Ibid., para. 22.

[223] ICCPR, art. 9(2); United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) ( A/C.3/65/L.5), rule 2(1).

[224] ICCPR, art. 9(3); UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (A/RES/43/173), principle 39; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, para. 38.

[225] ICCPR, art. 14(2); UN Body of Principles, principle 36.1; Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 111(2).

[226] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, para. 30.

[227] Ibid., para. 6.

[229] Nelson Mandela Rules, rules 58 and 61.

[230] UN Body of Principles, principle 19; Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 58.

[231] UN Body of Principles, principles 16.1; Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 68.

[232] UN Body of Principles, principle 21.1.

[233] UN Body of Principles, principle 21.2.

[234] UN Human Rights Committee, Communications Nos. 1209, 1231/2003 and 1241/2004: Sharifova , Safarov, and Burkhonov v. Tajikstan (CCPR/C/92/D/1209,1231/2003&1241/2004).

[235] UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 20, para. 12.

[236] Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 43.

[237] UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 20, para. 10; Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 76(1)(b).

[238] UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 20, para. 14; Bangkok Rules, rule 25; Nelson Mandela Rules, rule 57(3).

[240] ICCPR, arts. 2.1, 3, & 26; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (accessed July 8, 2020), arts. 2 & 7; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx (accessed July 8, 2020), arts. 2.2 &. 3; Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Committee, General Recommendations No. 19 & 35, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx (accessed July 8, 2020).

[241] CEDAW, arts. 2 & 3, https://www.ohchr.org/documents/professionalinterest/cedaw.pdf (accessed July 8, 2020).

[242] CEDAW, art. 5.

[243] CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19, para. 6.

[244] Bangkok Rules, rule 56.

[245] CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No.30, paras. 38(a)(c)(e), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/C/GC/30&Lang=en (accessed July 10).

[246] UDHR, art. 8; ICCPR, art. 2.3; CEDAW, art. 2. See also CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/C/GC/28&Lang=en (accessed July 9, 2020), paras. 32, 34 & 36; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 33 on women's access to justice, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/C/GC/33&Lang=en (accessed July 9, 2020).

[247] CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 33, paras. 19(a)(b)(g). See also CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 30, para. 79.

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Summary In late 2014, police officers entered the home of Lim Ok Kyung, a smuggler in her forties from North Korea's South Hwanghae province. The police were looking for, and found, home appliances smuggled from China. Lim Ok Kyung was detained at a detention and interrogation facility (kuryujang) run by the police near the border.

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North Korea (officially called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) is isolated, impoverished, and a proclaimed enemy of its southern neighbor, South Korea (officially called the Republic of Korea)-an important U.S. ally. Kim Jong Un, who inherited the title of supreme leader from his father and grandfather, regularly threatens Japan, South Korea, and the United States with missile strikes. At home, Kim has silenced all opposition by detaining between 80,000 and 120,000 political prisoners, purging high-ranking officials, and likely ordering the assassination of his half-brother.

U.S. military involvement in the Korean peninsula has its roots in the Korean War of the early 1950s during the early stages of the Cold War, in which the United States supported forces in the southern part of the peninsula against communist forces in the north, who were aided militarily by China and the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is committed to defending South Korea under the terms of a mutual defense treaty [PDF]. The United States has nearly 29,000 troops deployed in the Korean peninsula for that purpose. In addition to U.S. troops, many of South Korea's 630,000 troops and North Korea's 1.2 million troops are stationed near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), making it one of the most heavily armed borders in the world.

In response to the increasing frequency of missile tests, the United States has deployed an anti-missile system in South Korea. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is located in the Seongju region of South Korea, one hundred and fifty-five miles from the northern border. Additionally, Japan, South Korea, and the United States maintain unilateral sanctions on North Korea, and the UN Security Council has passed harsh multilateral sanctions. In 2017, the United States placed North Korea back on a list of state sponsors of terrorism, a move that allowed additional sanctions.

In 2018, North and South Korea began a diplomatic rapprochement, and North Korean officials attended the Opening Ceremony of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea. Kim announced a freeze on weapons testing, attended three summits with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and met three times with Donald Trump, who became the first U.S. president to step foot in North Korea. At their summits, Kim and Moon signed statements pledging to work toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and an official end to war between the two countries. Ultimately, though, nuclear negotiations with the United States reached a deadlock, and North Korea restarted weapons testing in 2019. In 2020, North Korea blew up a North-South liaison office, and Kim announced a new phase in relations, labeling South Korea an enemy.

In 2020, at the start of the pandemic, North Korea implemented one of the world's strictest border closures, further depressing the country's economy and exacerbating hunger. However, North Korea did not report any COVID-19 cases for months and in 2021 rejected foreign vaccines. Entry restrictions extended to foreign dignitaries, isolating North Korea almost completely.

North Korea is a nuclear power with a complex relationship with China, and preventing both an interstate Korean war and a North Korean internal collapse are critical U.S. national security interests. Along with continued weapons and missile tests, small-scale military and cyber provocations by North Korea pose significant risks as each incident carries with it the potential for further and potentially uncontrollable escalation. Outright threats from North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un are also cause for concern, as he claims that North Korean weapons can now reach U.S. territories and even the U.S. mainland.

In an initial 2021 policy review, the Joe Biden administration outlined a middle-ground approach to North Korea, combining diplomacy and deterrence. In line with that policy, in July 2023, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said the administration was prepared for talks "without preconditions;" days later, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol boarded a U.S. nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarine visiting Busan, South Korea.

Overall, in the last year, both North and South Korea have taken a less compromising position, shored up alliances, and ramped up military provocations and readiness.

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North Korea Crisis | Global Conflict Tracker

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Learn about the status of U.S. involvement in the Korean peninsula as well as the origin of the crisis between North Korea and South Korea on the Center for Preventive Action's Global Conflict Tracker.

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North Korea is a country with a population of some 25 million people, located on the northern half of the Korean Peninsula between the East Sea (Sea of Japan) and the Yellow Sea. Formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK, it was founded in 1948 when the United States and the Soviet Union divided control of the peninsula after World War II. North Korea is a highly secretive communist state that remains isolated from much of the rest of the world. In recent years, leader Kim Jong Un and his aggressive nuclear program have posed a growing threat to international stability.

38TH PARALLEL

In 1910, Japan formally annexed the Korean Peninsula, which it had occupied five years earlier following the Russo-Japanese War. Over the next 35 years of colonial rule, the country modernized and industrialized significantly, but many Koreans suffered brutal repression at the hands of Japan's military regime.

During World War II, Japan sent many Korean men to the front as soldiers or forced them to work in wartime factories, while thousands of young Korean women became "comfort women," providing sexual services to Japanese soldiers.

Upon Japan's defeat in 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the peninsula into two zones of influence along the the 38th parallel, or 38 degrees north latitude. In 1948, the pro-U.S. Republic of Korea (or South Korea) was established in Seoul, led by the strongly anti-communist Syngman Rhee.

In the northern industrial center of Pyongyang, the Soviets installed the dynamic young communist guerrilla Kim Il Sung, who became the first premier of the DPRK.

KOREAN WAR

With both leaders claiming jurisdiction over the entire Korean Peninsula, tensions soon reached a breaking point. In 1950, with the backing of the Soviet Union and China, North Korean forces invaded South Korea, setting off the Korean War.

The United States came to the South's aid, leading an army of some 340,000 United Nations troops in opposing the invasion. After three years of bitter fighting and more than 2.5 million military and civilian casualties, both sides signed an armistice in the Korean War in July 1953.

The agreement left the borders of North and South Korea essentially unchanged, with a heavily guarded demilitarized zone about 2.5 miles wide running roughly along the 38th parallel. A formal peace treaty, however, was never signed.

KIM IL SUNG

After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung shaped his country according to the nationalist ideology of "Juche" (self-reliance). The state assumed tight control over the economy, collectivized agricultural land and effectively asserted ownership over all private property.

State-controlled media and restrictions on all travel into or out of the country helped preserve the veil of secrecy around North Korea's political and economic operations and maintain its isolation from most of the international community. The country's population would remain almost entirely Korean, except for a small number of Chinese transplants.

Thanks to investment in mining, steel production and other heavy industries, North Korea's civilian and military economy initially outpaced its southern rival. With Soviet backing, Kim built his military into one of the world's strongest, even as many ordinary civilians grew poorer. By the 1980s, however, South Korea's economy boomed, while growth in the north stagnated.

KIM JONG IL

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc hurt North Korea's economy and left the Kim regime with China as its only remaining ally. In 1994, Kim Il Sung died of a heart attack and was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il.

The new leader instituted a new policy of "Songun Chong'chi," or military first, establishing the Korean People's Army as the leading political and economic force in the nation. The new emphasis widened existing inequalities between the military and elite classes and the vast majority of ordinary North Korean citizens.

Over the course of the 1990s, widespread flooding, poor agricultural policies and economic mismanagement led to a period of extended famine, with hundreds of thousands of people dying of starvation and many more crippled by malnutrition. The emergence of a robust black market to meet such shortages would force the government to take measures to liberalize the state-run economy.

NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR TEST

North Korea's economic woes let up a bit due to improved relations with South Korea, which adopted a "sunshine policy" of unconditional aid towards its northern neighbor in the early 2000s.

Around the same time, North Korea came closer than ever before to forging peace with the United States, even hosting U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Pyongyang in 2000.

But relations between the two Koreas, and between North Korea and the West, soon deteriorated, due to North Korea's aggressive efforts to become a nuclear power. Though Kim Jong Il had pledged to abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1995, in the early 2000s reports began to surface of underground nuclear facilities and ongoing research into the production of highly enriched uranium.

By 2003, North Korea had withdrawn from the NPT, expelled international weapons inspectors and resumed nuclear research at a facility in Yongbyon. Three years later, Kim's government announced it had carried out its first underground nuclear test.

KIM JONG UN

After Kim Jong Il died after a heart attack in December 2011, the job of supreme leader went to the second youngest of his seven children, then-27-year-old Kim Jong Un.

Fashioning himself as a modern version of his legendary grandfather, Kim Jong Un took steps to consolidate power, ordering the execution of his own uncle and other political and military rivals.

Kim's government also continued to work on its nuclear arsenal, further damaging his nation's relations with the West. In 2013, a third nuclear test resulted in trade and travel sanctions from the UN Security Council, as well as a formal protest from North Korea's only major ally and main trading partner, China.

WAR WITH NORTH KOREA?

Over the course of 2017, tensions between North Korea and the United States reached an unprecedented level.

North Korea launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile with the strength to reach the mainland United States, threatened to launch missiles near the U.S. territory of Guam and tested a bomb seven times the size of those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Such actions prompted even harsher sanctions by the UN Security Council and an aggressive response from U.S. President Donald Trump, leaving the global community fearing the possibility of nuclear war.

Sources

North Korea.The World Factbook, CIA.
Korea, Asia for Educators. Columbia University.
North Korea country profile. BBC News.
Evan Osnos, "The Risk of Nuclear War With North Korea." The New Yorker, September 18, 2017.

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North Korea is a country with a population of some 25 million people, located on the northern half of the Korean Peninsula between the East Sea (Sea of Japan) and the Yellow Sea. Formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK, it was founded in 1948 when the United States and the Soviet Union divided control of the peninsula after World War II.